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Bi-weekly Press Review 16-31 March 2014

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Review no. 65
Press Review
16—31 March 2014
Table of Contents
African Union
Pages
- Le CPS de l'UA, en sa 425ème réunion tenue le 24 mars 2014, a adopté une décision sur la
Revue stratégique des opérations de l'Opération hybride UA-Nations unies au Darfour (MINUAD)
- The PSC of the AU, at its 425th meeting held on 24 March 2014, adopted a decision on the
Strategic Review of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) operations
- Le CPS de l'UA, en sa 425ème réunion, tenue le 24 mars 2014, a suivi des communications
sur l’évolution de la situation en Somalie
- The PSC of the AU, at its 425th meeting, held on 24 March 2014, was briefed on
the situation in Somalia
- La MISCA condamne vigoureusement les attaques injustifiées contre son personnel
- MISCA strongly condemns the murder of a peacekeeper in the northern CAR town of Boali
- AMISOM and Somali National Army capture Qoryooley
- Visite de travail du Chef de la MISAHEL S.E. Pierre Buyoya à la Mission de formation
de l'Union Européenne au Mali (EUTM-Mali)
- 4th Meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic - Brazzaville,
Republic of The Congo Friday, 21 March 2014
- 4ème Réunion du Groupe International de Contact sur la République Centrafricaine Brazzaville, République du Congo 21 Mars 2014
- MISCA welcomes the change in the curfew time in Bangui and the rest of the Central African territory
- La MISCA se Félicite de la modification des horaires du couvre-feu à Bangui et sur l’étendue
du Territoire centrafricain
- MISCA empowers CAR women to promote social cohesion, conflict resolution and a culture of peace
4
7
9
12
14
15
16
17
18
24
31
32
33
Terrorism in Africa
- From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed
35
CAR
- Will Central African Republic become a battleground for religious radicals?
53
Egypt
- 529 Sentenced to Death in My Country
57
Libya
- Op-Ed: Libya, facing possible civil war, asks for help against terrorism
- Libya seeks world help after bombings
- Tripoli vows to fight terrorist groups
- Libya mobilizes forces to fight 'terrorist groups'
60
62
63
64
Mali
- Mali/touareg: un ex-cadre du MNLA crée un mouvement dissident
- Justice « en marche », mais des progrès à faire sur les crimes du Nord (ONG)
2
67
68
Niger
- États-Unis : une coopération militaire soutenue
72
Nigeria
- Boko Haram: 10 lessons from Biafra
- Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria
78
82
Rwanda
- Murder Leads to Tension Between South Africa, Rwanda
93
Somalia
- Are we just going to sit around and wait to be blown to bits by terrorists?
95
Sudan
- KHARTOUM: REALLY OUT OF THE TERRORISM BUSINESS? – ANALYSIS
102
Tunisia
- Tunisia, Arab Spring's birthplace, takes on militants
110
International organizations
UN
- Combattre le «terrorisme nucléaire»
116
Terrorism in the World
France
- Côte d'Azur : un attentat islamiste « probablement » déjoué
119
India
- Arrests of Indian Mujahideen terrorists is the best answer to BJP's charges: Sushil Kumar Shinde
121
Syria
- Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Base, U.S. Officials Say
123
UK
- UK 'must do more' to tackle Sahel-Sahara terror threat
- MPs warn of Africa terrorism threat
127
130
USA
- Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security
- How local and state cops fit into counterterrorism
3
132
136
African Union
Le C S de l UA en sa
e r uni n tenue le
ars
a ad pt
une d cisi n sur la Re ue strat gi ue des p ra ns de l p ra n
ybride UA-Na ns unies au ar ur MINUA
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 425 ème réunion te
nue le 24 mars 2014, a adopté la décision qui suit sur la Revue stratégique des opé
ra ons de l'Opéra on hybride UA-Na ons unies au Darfour (MINUAD):
Le C nseil
de la mise à jour présentée par le Représentant spécial conjoint de
l'UA et des Na ons unies pour le Darfour et chef de l'Opéra on hybride UA-Na ons
unies au Darfour (MINUAD) sur la situa on au Darfour et la Revue de la MINUAD
conduite conformément à la résolu on 2113 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Na
ons unies, adoptée le 30 juillet 2013, et des observa ons formulées par le Com
missaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité, ainsi que de la déclara on faite par le Représen
tant de la République du Soudan.
le communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD) adopté lors de sa 400 ème réunion
tenue le 17 octobre 2013, sur la situa on au Darfour, dans laquelle le Conseil a de
mandé à la Commission de l'UA et au Secrétariat des Na ons unies de saisir l’occa
sion de la prochaine Revue de la MINUAD, tel que demandé par la résolu on 2113
1
fondie les dé s auxquels la Mission est confrontée et iden er les voies et moyens
de les surmonter, en vue de renforcer son e cacité, y compris les mesures à pren
dre par toutes les par es prenantes pour assurer la sécurité de son personnel et
appuyer la phase ini ale de redressement et le développement
de la Revue, et prend n te de ses conclusions, y compris celles rela
ves aux dé s majeurs entravant l'e cacité de la MINUAD dans l'exécu on des
4
principales composantes de son mandat. Le Conseil appelle le Gouvernement du
Soudan à renforcer le dialogue et la coopéra on avec la MINUAD, conformément
aux disposi ons de l'Accord qu’il a signé avec les Na ons unies et l'UA sur le statut
de la MINUAD (l’«Accord sur le statut des forces»)
en utre à des e orts renouvelés dans les trois priorités stratégiques
iden ées par l'équipe de la Revue, à savoir la média on entre le Gouvernement et
les mouvements armés non-signataires sur la base du Document de Doha pour la
paix au Darfour (DDPD), tout en tenant compte des évolu ons en cours au niveau
na onal, la protec on des civils, la facilita on de l'acheminement de l'aide humani
taire et la sécurité du personnel humanitaire et l'appui à la média on dans les con
its communautaires
F licite les pays contributeurs de troupes et de police, et les e
rte à améliorer
les capacités de leurs con ngents, y compris en remplissant les critères rela fs aux
équipements appartenant aux con ngents, a n d'améliorer l'e cacité de leur rôle
au sein de la MINUAD
C n ient d'examiner régulièrement la situa on sur la base de mises à jour par la
Commission et la MINUAD sur les mesures prises dans le cadre de la mise en uvre
des recommanda ons du rapport de la Revue et à la lumière des développements
ultérieurs. A cet égard, le Conseil e pri e sa disp nibilit de par ciper à l’évalua
on, prévue dans douze mois, de la mise en uvre des conclusions de la revue,
ayant à l'esprit la nécessité d’une implica on constante et d’une consulta on de
l’UA tout au long du processus, conformément à la nature hybride de l'opéra on
à la MINUAD, soulignant l'importance cruciale des
e orts de la Mission en appui à la recherche d'une solu on durable à la situa on
au Darfour et à la protec on de la popula on civile et, à cet égard, en appelle au
Gouvernement du Soudan pour qu’il apporte toute la coopéra on nécessaire à la
Mission
les e orts con nus du Représentant spécial conjoint de la MINUAD et Mé
diateur en chef conjoint, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, en vue de trouver un règle
ment poli que entre le Gouvernement et les mouvements non-signataires
son communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CD III), adoptée lors de sa
réunion, tenue le 10 mars 2014, par lequel le Conseil s’est félicité de l'ini a
ve prise par le Gouvernement du Soudan d’ini er un processus de dialogue na o
nal global et de révision cons tu onnelle et a encouragé les par s poli ques, la
société civile et l'opposi on armée à engager le dialogue pour relever les dé s de la
paix, de la sécurité et de la démocra sa on, ainsi que ceux liés à l’élabora on
d'une nouvelle cons tu on, aux réformes économiques et à la ges on de l'iden té
et de la diversité. Le Conseil salue les e orts du Groupe de mise en uvre de haut
niveau de l'UA et du Représentant spécial conjoint/Médiateur conjoint en chef,
conformément à leurs mandats respec fs, en vue de faciliter le succès de l’ini a
ème
5
ve prise par le Gouvernement du Soudan, et les enc urage à con nuer à travailler
en étroite collabora on, en appui à la promo on durable de la paix, de la sécurité,
de la stabilité et de la réconcilia on au Soudan
de rester ac vement saisi de la ques on.
6
T e SC
t e AU at its
t
ee ng eld n
Marc
ad pted a decisi n n t e Strategic Re iew t e AU-UN Hybrid pera n in ar ur UNAMI
pera ns
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 425 th mee ng held
on 24 March 2014, adopted the following decision on the Strategic Review of the
AU-UN Hybrid Opera on in Darfur (UNAMID) opera ons:
C uncil
Takes n te of the update provided by the Joint Special Representa ve of the AU
and the United Na ons for Darfur and Head of the AU-UN Hybrid Opera on in Dar
fur (UNAMID) on the situa on in Darfur and the Review of UNAMID undertaken in
pursuance of UN Security Council resolu on 2113 (2013), adopted on 30 July 2013,
and the remarks made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, as well as of
the statement by the representa ve of the Republic of Sudan
Recalls communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD) adopted at its 400th mee ng, held on
17 October 2013, on the situa on in Darfur, by which Council requested the AU
Commission and the UN Secretariat to take advantage of the upcoming UNAMID
review, as mandated by UN Security Council resolu on 2113 (2013), to consider indepth the challenges facing the Mission and the ways in which these could be over
come, with a view to enhancing the e ec veness of UNAMID, including the steps
to be taken by all stakeholders to ensure the safety of its personnel and support to
early recovery and development
3 Welc es the Review, and takes n te of its outcome, including the major chal
lenges impeding the e ec veness of UNAMID in implemen ng its core mandate.
Council calls up n the Government of Sudan to enhance dialogue and coopera on
with UNAMID, in line with the provisions of the Agreement that it signed with the
UN and the AU concerning the Status of UNAMID (the ‘Status of Forces Agree
ment’)
7
Furt er calls for renewed e orts in the three strategic priori es as iden ed by
the Review Team, namely the media on between the Government and nonsignatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Dar
fur (DDPD), while taking into account ongoing transforma on at the na onal level
the protec on of civilians, the facilita on of the delivery of humanitarian assistance
and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and support to the media
on rela ng to community con ict
C
ends the troop and police contribu ng countries (TCCs/PCCs) for the posi
ve role they con nue to play and urges them to improve the capabili es of their
con ngents, including mee ng the con ngent-owned equipment requirements, in
order to enhance the e ec veness of their role within UNAMID
Agrees to regularly review the situa on and receive from the Commission and
UNAMID an update on the implementa on and steps taken in light of the recom
menda ons of the Review report and subsequent developments. In this regard,
Council e presses its readiness t take part in the assessment of UNAMID’s imple
menta on of the review outcome after 12 months, bearing in mind the need for
con nued involvement of, and consulta on with the AU throughout the process, in
line with the hybrid nature of the opera on
7 Reiterates its str ng supp rt to UNAMID, bearing in mind the cri cal im
portance of the e orts of the Mission in support of the search for a las ng solu on
to the situa on in Darfur and the protec on of the civilian popula on and, in this
respect, calls on the Government of Sudan (GoS) to con nue to extend maximum
coopera on to the Mission
8 C
ends the con nuous e orts by the Joint Special Representa ve for UNA
MID and Joint Chief Mediator (JCM), Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, to nd a poli cal
settlement between the Government and non-signatory movements
9 Recalls its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD III), adopted at its 423rd mee ng,
held on 10 March 2014, welcoming the ini a ve by the GoS to open a process of
holis c na onal dialogue and cons tu onal review and encouraging the poli cal
par es, civil society and armed opposi on to engage in dialogue to address the
challenges of peace, security and democra za on, the elabora on of a new cons
tu on, economic reform and the management of iden ty and diversity. Coun
cil c
ends the e orts of the AU High-Level Implementa on Panel (AUHIP) and
those of the JSR/JCM, in accordance with their respec ve mandates, to facilitate
the success of this ini a ve by the GoS, and enc urages t e to con nue to work
closely together, in support of the promo on of las ng peace, security, stability
and reconcilia on in Sudan
ecides to remain ac vely seized of the matter.
8
Le C S de l UA en sa
des c
unica ns sur l’
e r uni n tenue le
ars
a sui i
lu n de la situa n en S alie
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 425 ème réunion,
tenue le 24 mars 2014, a suivi des communica ons sur l’évolu on de la situa on en
Somalie faites par le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité et le Représentant spé
cial de la Présidente de la Commission et chef de la Mission de l'UA en Somalie
AMISOM . L
g
v
f
R
tant spécial du Secrétaire général des Na ons unies, ainsi que par les représentants
du Gouvernement fédéral de la Somalie (FGS), de l’Ethiopie, en sa qualité de Prési
dent en exercice de l’Autorité intergouvernementale pour le Développement
IGAD . L
v
Rw
de la France, de la Fédéra on de Russie, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d’Amé
rique, ainsi que de l’Italie et de l’Union européenne (UE).
Le Conseil a rappelé son communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(CCC CI ) adopté lors de sa
99ème réunion tenue le 10 octobre 2013, ainsi que la résolu on 2124 (2013) du
Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies du 12 novembre 2013, qui, entre autres, a
autorisé un renforcement de l’e ec f de la Force de l’AMISOM à 22 126 personnel
en uniforme, élargi le module de sou en logis que des Na ons unies et demandé
au Bureau de sou en des Na ons unies à l’AMISOM (UNSOA) de soutenir les forces
de l’Armée na onale somalienne (SNA) impliqués dans des opéra ons conjointes
avec l’AMISOM, tel que formulé dans le Concept stratégique de l’AMISOM. Le
Council a, en outre, rappelé son communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV) du 21 janvier
9
1
v
O OPS
v
’AMISOM.
Le Conseil s'est félicité des mesures prises par la Commission, avec le sou en ac f
des partenaires, y compris les Na ons unies, l’UE et d’autres acteurs interna o
naux, dans la mise en uvre des disposi ons per nentes de la résolu on 2124
1
q PS /PR/ OMM.
DXIV .
En par culier, le Conseil a salué les opéra ons militaires conjointes conduites par la
SNA et l'AMISOM, qui ont abou à la reprise des mains d'Al-Shabaab de localités
stratégiques vitales. Le Conseil a rendu hommage aux composantes militaire et de
police de l’AMISOM pour leur courage, et a, une fois encore, félicité le GFS et les
pays contributeurs de troupes et de personnels de police (Burundi, de Djibou , de
l'Ethiopie, du Kenya, de Sierra Leone, du Nigeria et de l'Ouganda) pour leur engage
ment con nu en faveur de la promo on de la paix, de la sécurité, de la stabilité et
de la réconcilia on en Somalie.
Le Conseil a appelé à des e orts renouvelés a n que le sou en logis que apporté
par l’UNSOA à l’AMISOM, en par culier en ce qui concerne le sou en à l’homme,
les installa ons et le génie, réponde pleinement aux besoins opéra onnels de la
Mission sur le terrain, ainsi qu’à la nature et au rythme spéci ques des opéra ons
en cours contre Al-Shabaab. Le Conseil a également invité les États membres et les
partenaires interna onaux à contribuer au Fonds d'a ecta on spéciale créé en ap
plica on de la résolu on 2124 (2013), a n de soutenir la SNA dans la conduite
d’opéra ons conjointes avec l'AMISOM, et a appelé à l'opéra onnalisa on rapide
du Fonds. Le Conseil a appelé les Etats membres, en mesure de le faire, à mettre à
la disposi on de l’AMISOM les hélicoptères nécessaires en appui aux opéra ons de
la Mission en cours.
Le Conseil a condamné la poursuite des attaques terroristes perpétrées
par
Al-Shabaab contre des civils somaliens innocents, le FGS et l'AMISOM.
Le Conseil a présenté ses condoléances aux familles des vic mes de ces attaques,
ainsi qu’à leurs Gouvernements respec fs.
Le Conseil a encouragé le GFS à mettre en place des administra ons locales et à
assurer la sécurité, ainsi que d'autres services de base pour les popula ons des ré
gions reprises des mains d’Al Shabaab.
Le Conseil s'est félicité des progrès enregistrés dans le processus poli que en So
malie et a salué les e orts de I’IGAD à travers sa présidence en exercice, l'Éthiopie,
de la Mission d'assistance des Na ons unies en Somalie (ONUSOM) et du Représen
tant spécial de la Présidente de la Commission pour la Somalie, en appui aux e orts
du FGS en vue de la promo on de la paix et de la réconcilia on, et les a exhortés à
poursuivre les e orts.
Le Conseil a, en outre, encouragé le FGS à élaborer une Feuille de route poli que
qui facilitera la réconcilia on, le fédéralisme et le parachèvement du processus
10
d’élabora on de la cons tu on, de manière à ouvrir la voie à la tenue des élec ons
générales conformément à la Vision 2016. Le Conseil a exhorté les Etats membres
de l’UA, ainsi que la communauté interna onale, à apporter le sou en nancier
nécessaire au FGS.
11
T e SC t e AU at its
t
ee ng
brie ed n t e situa n in S alia
eld n
Marc
was
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 425 th mee ng, held
on 24 March 2014, was briefed on the situa on in Somalia by the Commissioner for
Peace and Security and the Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Com
mission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). Council was also briefed by the Special Representa ve of the United
Na ons Secretary-General, as well as by the Representa ves of the Federal Gov
ernment of Somalia (FGS) and Ethiopia, in its capacity as the Chair of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Council further received the
statements made by the Representa ves of Rwanda, France, Russian Federa on,
United Kingdom and United States of America, as well as by Italy and the European
Union.
Council recalled its communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(CCC CI ) adopted at its
399th mee ng held on 10 October 2013, as well as UN Security Council resolu on
2124 (2013), of 12 November 2013, which, inter alia, authorized an increase in the
AMISOM force strength to 22,126 uniformed personnel, expanded the UN logis cal
support package, and requested the UN Support O ce to AMISOM (UNSOA) to
support the elements of Somali Na onal Army (SNA) involved in joint opera ons
with AMISOM as ar culated in AMISOM’s CONOPOS. Council further recalled com
muniqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV) of 21 January 2014, endorsing the AMISOM re
vised CONOPS.
12
Council welcomed the steps taken by the Commission, with the ac ve support of
partners, including the United Na ons (UN), the European Union (EU) and others,
in the implementa on of the relevant provisions of resolu on 2124 (2013) and
communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CD IV).
In par cular, Council commended the joint Somali Na onal Army (SNA) and
AMISOM military opera ons, which have resulted in the further recovery of key
strategic loca ons from Al Shabaab. Council paid tribute to the AMISOM military
and police component for their courage, and, once again, commended the Federal
Government of Somalia, troop and police contribu ng countries (Burundi, Djibou ,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Uganda) for their con nued commit
ment to the promo on of las ng peace, security, stability and reconcilia on in So
malia.
Council called for renewed e orts to ensure that the logis cal support especially
with regard to vital life support, facili es and engineering, provided by UNSOA fully
meets the opera onal needs of the Mission on the ground and the speci c nature
and tempo of the current opera ons against Al-Shabaab. Council also called on
Member States and interna onal partners to contribute to the Trust Fund estab
lished in pursuance of resolu on 2124 (2013) to support the SNA in joint opera
ons with AMISOM, and called for speedy opera onaliza on of the Fund. Council
further called on those AU Members States, which can do so, to avail appropriate
helicopters to support the on-going opera ons of AMISOM.
Council condemned the con nuing terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab
against innocent Somali civilians, the FGS and AMISOM. Council o ered its condo
lences to the families of all the vic ms of these attacks and to their respec ve Gov
ernments.
Council encouraged the FGS to establish local administra ons and provide security
and other essen al services to the popula ons in the areas recovered from Al Sha
baab.
Council welcomed progress being recorded in the poli cal process in Somalia and
commended the e orts of the IGAD, through its Chair, Ethiopia, the UN Assistance
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of
the Commission for Somalia in suppor ng the FGS in its e orts towards peace and
reconcilia on and urged them to con nue with their e orts.
Council further encouraged the FGS to develop a poli cal roadmap which will facili
tate reconcilia on, federalism and the comple on of the cons tu on making pro
cess that will pave the way for general elec ons in line with Vision 2016. Council
urged AU Member States and the larger interna onal community to provide the
required nancial support to the FGS in this regard.
13
La MISCA c nda ne ig ureuse ent les atta ues injus fi es c ntre
s n pers nnel
Bangui, le 24 mars
2014: Le
Représentant
spécial de la Présidente de
la Commission de l'Union
africaine (UA) et chef de
la Mission interna onale
de sou en à la Centra
frique sous conduite afri
caine (MISCA), le Général
Jean-Marie Michel Moko
ko, a exprimé son outrage
et indigna on face à
l'attaque injus ée perpé
trée contre un véhicule
clairement iden é de la Mission, transportant trois membres de son personnel.
L'attaque, perpétrée par des assaillants armés non encore iden és, est survenue
hier soir, vers 19h30, près du Carrefour de la Réconcilia on (Monument Ali Bongo)
à Bangui, blessant grièvement un fonc onnaire chargé des nances et une in r
mière de la MISCA. La troisième personne à bord du véhicule, un chirurgien de la
MISCA, a été légèrement blessée. Le fonc onnaire chargé des nances et l’in r
mière sont dans un état stable et ont été évacués à Brazzaville, en République du
Congo. Dans un incident séparé, deux soldats de la paix de la MISCA chargés d'assu
rer la sécurité à l'Hôpital de l'Ami é, à Bangui, ont échappé, hier, à un attentat à la
grenade. Aucune blessure grave n'a été signalée.
Le Représentant spécial condamne dans les termes les plus énergiques cette
attaque totalement injus ée contre des soldats de la paix, et exhorte les autorités
de la transi on en RCA à ne ménager aucun e ort pour arrêter et poursuivre les
suspects. Il réitère l'aver ssement lancé le 21 mars 2014 par le Groupe interna o
nal de contact sur la RCA (GIC-RCA), lors de sa 4ème réunion tenue à Brazzaville, sou
lignant que tous les groupes et individus fauteurs de troubles en RCA seront tenus
responsables de leurs actes. Il demande instamment à tous les groupes armés à
remettre leurs armes et à se joindre au processus de dialogue et de réconcilia on
lancé récemment par le Gouvernement de transi on.
Le Représentant spécial souhaite un prompt rétablissement au personnel blessé, et
demande à tout le personnel en uniforme et civil de la MISCA de rester vigilants et
de con nuer à s’acquitter du mandat de la Mission avec le dévouement et l’enga
gement exemplaires dont ils ont fait preuve jusqu’ici.
14
MISCA str ngly c nde ns t e
ern CAR t wn B ali
urder
a peacekeeper in t e n rt -
Bangui, 25 March 2014 -- The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Af
rican Union Commission and
Head of the African-led Interna
onal Support Mission in the
Central African Republic (MISCA),
Gen. Jean Marie Michel Mokoko
has learned with shock and sad
ness of the death of a MISCA
peacekeeper in Boali, about 80
kilometers north of Bangui, in
the Central African Republic
(CAR). The peacekeeper from the
Republic of the Congo was killed
at about 6:30 p.m. yesterday
when the vehicle in which he was travelling with three other MISCA soldiers was
attacked by a group of armed men. The MISCA troops returned re killing 12 assail
ants who were later iden ed as an -Balaka mili a. The dead attackers included a
well-known notorious an -Balaka Commander. Two other MISCA peacekeepers in
the vehicle were slightly injured. In a separate incident yesterday in the district of
Bimbo, in Bangui, a MISCA peacekeeper from the Democra c Republic of Congo
(DRC) was wounded in an attack by yet uniden ed assailants. Both incidents oc
curred a day after an attack on a MISCA vehicle at the Reconcilia on Roundabout in
Bangui, in which three peacekeepers were injured, two seriously.
The Special Representa ve strongly condemns these incidents and reiterates that
there can be no jus ca on whatsoever for any individual or group to attack
peacekeepers from fellow African countries deployed in the CAR to help Central
Africans resolve their crises. He notes with regret that in the last few days, an Balaka elements have systema cally targeted MISCA vehicles and personnel in vio
la on of interna onal law, and by so doing iden ed themselves as spoilers and
enemies of peace in the CAR. He stresses MISCA’s con nued determina on to fully
implement its mandate, including by neutralizing all illegal armed groups.
On behalf of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma,
the Special Representa ve conveys his deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of
the fallen peacekeeper and to the Government and people of the Republic of the
Congo. He wishes a speedy and complete recovery to the injured peacekeepers.
The Special Representa ve notes with deep regret that as of today, 21 MISCA
peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty in the CAR.
15
AMIS M and S
ali Na
nal Ar y capture Q ry
ley
Mogadishu 22nd March 2014: In an opera on early this morning, Somali Na onal
Army backed by African Union forces overran Al Shabaab outposts to capture the
key town of Qoryooley in Lower Shabelle.
Located 120 kilometers Southwest of Mogadishu, Qoryooley has been under the
brutal rule of the terrorists for ve years. In the last one month, many of the al
Shabaab’s commanders have been eeing towards the town following a string of
defeats by the SNA and AMISOM forces. The capture of Qoryooley is also cri cal for
AMISOM future opera ons to liberate the port city of Baraawe, one of the remain
ing sources of illicit revenue for extremist group.
The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
(SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif congratulated Somali Na
onal Army and AMISOM troops on the achievement no ng that this opera on
demonstrates AMISOM’s con nuing determina on to support the people of Soma
lia as they embark on a new path of renewal and reconstruc on.
“AMISOM will con nue to bring security to more areas of Somalia so that local
people can live their lives and pursue their livelihoods in freedom”
The joint opera ons between the Somali Na onal Army and AMISOM which began
this month have so far liberated the eight towns in the various regions around the
country, the most recent being Qurunlow town in Middle Shabelle.
Since the UN Security Council boosted AMISOM troop numbers to over 22,000, the
forces who are working closely with Somali Na onal Army have been expanding to
new areas and have helped the Somali government by providing a secure environ
ment and recovering more territory, as well as ensuring law, order and jus ce.
16
Visite de tra ail du C e de la MISAHEL S E ierre Buy ya à la Missi n
de r a n de l Uni n Eur p enne au Mali EUTM-Mali
Ba ak le
ars
– M. Pierre Buyoya, chef de la Mission de l’Union afri
caine (UA) pour le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL) a e ectué ce samedi 22 mars courant
une visite de travail à la Mission de forma on de l'Union européenne au Mali
EUTM-M . tt v
q
g
les partenaires opéra onnels au Mali, avait pour objec f de s’informer sur le travail
accompli par l’EUTM auprès des Forces armées maliennes.
«Cette visite est instructive car elle permet à la MISAHEL de mieux appréhender les
domaines dans lesquels elle proposera son expérience et une expertise africaine aux
autorités maliennes » a indiqué le Chef de la MISAHEL. Il a réitéré l’importance de
la coordina on des e orts de la communauté interna onale pour accomplir l’ob
jec f commun de la stabilisa on du Mali tout en rappelant aussi le caractère crucial
de la coopéra on régionale a n de relever les dé s à la paix et à la sécurité dans le
Sahel.
M. Buyoya et le Général Bruno Guibert, commandant de l’EUTM, ont également
échangé sur les réalisa ons de l’EUTM dans la forma on des bataillons des Forces
armées maliennes mais ont aussi abordé les dé s qui restent à relever dans le
cadre de la réforme de l’armée malienne.
17
t Mee ng t e Interna nal C ntact r up n t e Central A rican
Republic - Bra a ille Republic T e C ng Friday
Marc
C NCLUSI NS
1.
The Interna onal Contact Group on the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR)
held its fourth mee ng in Brazzaville, on Friday, 21 March 2014, under the cochairmanship of Mr. Basile Ikouebe, Minister of Foreign A airs and Coopera on of
the Republic of the Congo, and Ambassador Sma l Chergui, Commissioner for Peace
and Security of the African Union (AU). The list of countries and organiza ons that
took part in the mee ng is indicated below .
2.
The opening ceremony was graced by the presence of H.E. Mr. Denis
Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, who delivered the opening
speech of the mee ng. His speech was preceded by statements made by the Prime
Minister of the CAR transi onal Government, André Nzapayeke the AU Commis
sioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui the ECCAS SecretaryGeneral, Ambassador Amad Allam-Mi the Deputy Minister for Foreign A airs of
the Republic of Chad, Madam Kassiré Isabelle Housnan as well as by the message
of the UN Secretary-General read out by his Special Representa ve in the CAR,
General Babacar Gaye.
3.
Par cipants reviewed the evolu on of the situa on in the CAR since the
3rd mee ng of the ICG-CAR held in Bangui, on 8 November 2013, on the basis of
the brie ng provided by the CAR Prime Minister, as well as interven ons by the in
18
terna onal actors involved in the management of the situa on in that country and
the ensuing exchanges of views.
nt ee
lu
n
t e situa
n in t e CAR
4.
Par cipants, having noted the obstacles that have severely hampered the
conduct of the transi on towards the end of 2013, welcomed the elec on of Mrs.
Catherine Samba-Panza as Head of State and the appointment of Mr. André Nza
payeke as Prime Minister, as well as the subsequent forma on of a new Govern
ment, in line with the conclusions of the ECCAS 6th Extraordinary Summit held in
N'Djamena on 9 and 10 January 2014. They noted that the changes at the top of
the execu ve of the transi on create an environment conducive to more sustained
and coherent na onal e orts for an early way out of the crisis, as well as to a great
er mobiliza on of the interna onal community in favor of the CAR.
5.
Recalling the serious incidents that took place in Bangui in early December
2013, with the attack launched by the an -Balaka group, the subsequent abuses
and sectarian tensions, Par cipants acknowledged that the security situa on has
signi cantly improved thanks to the ac on of the African-led Interna onal Support
Mission in the CAR (MISCA) and Opera on Sangaris. They noted, in this regard, the
con nued reduc on of the level of violence, the gradual return to normal life in
Bangui and elsewhere in the country and the beginning of the return of displaced
popula ons. Par cipants stressed the need for con nued e orts to strengthen the
trend towards an improved security situa on and the extension of State authority
throughout the na onal territory. They strongly condemned the armed groups and
elements that con nue to perpetrate criminal acts and attempt to undermine the
e orts of the transi onal authori es.
6.
Par cipants noted that, in spite of the improvement of the security envi
ronment, the humanitarian situa on remains a source of concern. In this regard,
they noted the massive displacement of civilian popula ons both within the CAR
and towards the neighboring countries, and stressed the urgency of greater inter
na onal mobiliza on to meet the needs of the a ected popula ons.
7.
Par cipants welcomed the appointment of the seven members of the Na
onal Elec ons Authority (NEA). They noted that the NEA members, with the sup
port of the UN, the EU, France and MISCA, had already made several visits to the
countryside, and that they had developed a metable for the electoral process
spread over 12 months. At the same me, they recognized the daun ng challenges
that lie ahead for the proper and mely conduct of the electoral process.
n t e i ple enta
n
t e R ad ap
r t e Transi
n
8.
Par cipants took note of the update provided by the CAR Prime Minister
on the implementa on status of the Roadmap for the Transi on. They noted the
announcement made by the Prime Minister on the presenta on of an implementa
19
on plan of the revised transi onal Roadmap to the Na onal Transi onal Council
(NTC), in early April 2014.
9.
Par cipants stressed the need for greater poli cal commitment on the
part of the CAR stakeholders to help consolidate the security gains recorded thanks
to the ac on of MISCA, with the support of the Sangaris opera on. They recalled
the primary responsibility of the CAR stakeholders in resolving the serious crisis fac
ing their country, stressing that the role of the interna onal community is to sup
port na onal e orts and not replace them. In this context, Par cipants urged the
CAR authori es to strengthen the measures aimed at isola ng and applying sanc
ons against spoilers, especially the an -Balaka elements, and promo ng na onal
reconcilia on in this respect, they encouraged countries that have undergone sim
ilar processes to share their experiences with the CAR. They strongly recommended
to the CAR Government to ini ate an inclusive dialogue among the various poli cal
and social stakeholders in the CAR. They urged the Government to keep the mem
bers of the ICG-CAR regularly informed of progress made in this regard, so as to
facilitate the mobiliza on of interna onal support.
10.
Par cipants also stressed the necessity and urgency of more sustained
e orts regarding the reform of the defense and security sector and the programme
for disarmament, demobiliza on and reintegra on (DDR). In this context, they
urged the Government to quickly implement, in accordance with the provisions of
UN Security Council resolu on 2134 (2014), the DDR strategy it has adopted, taking
into account all armed groups. They stressed the importance of developing a na
onal vision on the defense and security sector reform and DDR, which is in line
with the current capabili es of the State and takes into account the urgency of sta
bilizing the situa on. Par cipants agreed that the Government would keep interna
onal partners regularly informed of measures taken in this regard.
11.
Par cipants welcomed the apologies presented by the CAR Prime Minis
ter, on behalf of the CAR na on, to the neighboring countries whose na onals
were vic ms of atroci es and other viola ons of human rights on the CAR territory.
The Prime Minister noted that, in spite of these abuses, the countries concerned
have con nued to ful ll their duty of o ering hospitality to the CAR ci zens.
n regi nal and interna
nal e
rts
12.
Par cipants welcomed the ongoing e orts of the ECCAS leaders and
acknowledged the crucial role of the region in the resolu on of the CAR crisis. They
welcomed the decisions taken by the 6th ECCAS Extraordinary Summit and the
nancial assistance that the region extends to the CAR to enable it meet some of its
most pressing needs. They renewed their con dence and gra tude to Presidents
Denis Sassou Nguesso, Mediator of ECCAS, and Idriss Deby Itno, Chairman of EC
CAS, urging them to pursue and intensify their ac on in support of peace, security
and stability in the CAR. They urged the interna onal community, including the UN
20
Security Council, to e ec vely support the con nued role of the region and to en
sure that any interna onal ini a ve on CAR further this objec ve.
13.
Par cipants welcomed the transforma on of MICOPA into MISCA and
the measures taken by the AU to enable the Mission to quickly reach its authorized
strength of 6,000 uniformed personnel. They paid tribute to MICOPA for the work
it carried out in a challenging environment.
14.
With reference to the donors’ conference for MISCA organized by the AU
Commission in Addis Ababa, on 1 February 2014, Par cipants expressed their gra
tude to the AU Member States that have made pledges or are already extending
support to MISCA (ECCAS Member States, Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa). Similarly, they expressed deep apprecia on to
the interna onal partners who provide nancial, logis cal and technical support for
the deployment and opera ons of MISCA, including the U.S., the EU and its Mem
ber States (France, Luxembourg and United Kingdom), Canada, Japan and Norway.
They thanked the UN and France for availing exper se to MISCA. They commended
MISCA for its outstanding work on the ground, in coordina on with Sangaris,
whose strength was recently increased, no ng that this work has signi cantly im
proved the security situa on in the CAR. They paid tribute to the soldiers and po
lice o cers who fell in the line of duty and wished a speedy recovery to those in
jured.
15.
Par cipants welcomed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council
(PSC) to authorize the deployment of addi onal police personnel and specialized
capabili es to enhance the e ec veness of MISCA. In this context, they launched
an urgent appeal to all interna onal partners to provide increased support to MIS
CA, especially in terms of mobility, equipment and nancial resources. They agreed
that the AU would submit, within a week, an updated list of MISCA’s needs to facili
tate the rapid mobiliza on of the required resources. Similarly, they expressed the
hope that, in order to ensure a smooth and e cient transi on between MISCA and
a UN opera on, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 5 March
2014, the UN Security Council would authorize the establishment of a speci c and
appropriate support package. Par cipants welcomed the EU decision to launch op
era on EUFOR RCA to contribute to the consolida on of the gains recorded by
MISCA with the support of the Sangaris opera on. They welcomed the ongoing
e orts to strengthen coordina on between MISCA and the Regional Coopera on
Ini a ve for the Elimina on of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA).
16.
Having recalled that the objec ve of MISCA is to create, with the support
of Sangaris, condi ons for a more sustained and sustainable interna onal engage
ment in the CAR and noted that MISCA plans to complete the ini al stabiliza on
phase of the situa on in the next six to nine months, Par cipants welcomed the
prospect of the deployment of a UN peacekeeping opera on. They stressed the
21
need for the AU and the UN to spare no e orts in ensuring a successful transi on,
drawing lessons from previous experiences. In this regard, they noted the relevant
provisions of the communiqué adopted by the AU PSC at its 422nd mee ng held in
Addis Ababa, on 7 March 2014, stressing that the success of MISCA is an essen al
condi on for the success of the envisaged UN opera on.
17.
Par cipants welcomed the holding in Brussels, on 20 January 2014, of the
Interna onal High-Level Conference on the Humanitarian Situa on in the CAR. Re
itera ng their deep concern at the scale of the humanitarian crisis in the CAR and
no ng that only 21 percent of the required amount has been mobilized to date,
they strongly urged all concerned donors to honor their commitments as soon as
possible. They expressed gra tude to the countries of the region hos ng CAR refu
gees. They commended MISCA for its support to humanitarian opera ons, includ
ing escort of convoys from the Cameroon border to Bangui, protec on of IDP sites
and of humanitarian actors.
18.
Par cipants acknowledged the seriousness of the socio-economic prob
lems faced by the CAR, stressing that the situa on calls for urgent ac on by the in
terna onal partners and for the adjustment of the procedures governing interna
onal assistance to t the peculiar situa on of the CAR. In this regard, they
stressed the importance of the regular payment of salaries for civil servants and
pensions of the re rees, as well as support for the reac va on of the state and ad
ministra ve machinery. They welcomed the ECCAS decision to devote 50 out of the
100 million U.S. dollars pledged during the donors' conference held in Addis Ababa
to economic and budgetary support to the CAR. They welcomed the reac va on by
the World Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD) of their o ces in Ban
gui. They encouraged the interna onal nancial ins tu ons, notably the World
Bank and the Interna onal Monetary Fund, as well as the African Development
Bank, to accelerate the resump on of their assistance to the CAR and to rapidly
and e ec vely disburse the resources pledged.
19.
As part of e orts to stabilize the situa on in the CAR, Par cipants stressed
the need for the imposi on of sanc ons against all CAR individuals and en es
attemp ng to hinder the transi on and the peace and reconcilia on process. They
urged the UN Security Council, in line with resolu on 2127 (2013), to quickly desig
nate individuals and en es to be sanc oned in order to send a clear message to
the spoilers about its determina on to hold them accountable for their ac ons. In
the same spirit, Par cipants welcomed the commencement of the work of the In
terna onal Commission of Inquiry on the situa on of human rights in the CAR since
1 January 2013. They look forward to the review by the AU of its list of individuals
under sanc on for acts that undermine peace e orts in the CAR.
n t e strengt ening
t e IC -CAR and
ll w-up
its c nclusi ns
20.
Par cipants agreed on the need to strengthen the e ec veness of the ICG
-CAR and its support to the transi on. Against this background, they requested the
22
co-Chairs of the ICG-CAR, namely the AU Commission and the Republic of the Con
go, to establish, under their leadership, a small informal structure comprising EC
CAS and key interna onal partners, as well as the CAR, to ensure the follow-up of
the conclusions of the regular mee ngs of the ICG-CAR, facilitate the involvement
of specialized experts and foster the mobiliza on of addi onal resources. The mo
dus operandi of this structure, which will meet at least one month before every
regular session of the ICG-CAR, will be determined by the co-Chairs in consulta on
with the concerned partners.
21.
Par cipants requested that the commitments made by the CAR Govern
ment and the members of the ICG-CAR, as well as the recommenda ons concern
ing them, be captured by the AU Commission in a matrix format and circulated to
all the members of the Group. The latter will, in turn, inform the co-Chairs of the
follow-up steps they have taken before every mee ng of the Group. Par cipants
welcomed the par cipa on of the OIC for the rst me, as a member of the ICGCAR, in the mee ng of the Group, and its desire to contribute to na onal reconcili
a on, humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced persons and refugees, as
well as to the reconstruc on of the CAR.
Ne t
ee ng
t e IC -CAR
22.
Par cipants agreed that the next mee ng of the ICG-CAR will be held in
Addis Ababa, in June 2014, at a date to be determined through consulta ons.
M
n
t anks
23.
Par cipants expressed their gra tude to the Congolese authori es for the
generous hospitality extended to all the delega ons that attended the mee ng,
and for the excellent arrangements made for the successful holding of the mee ng
23
Centra ricaine - Bra a ille R publi ue du C ng
Mars
C NCLUSI NS
1.
L G
R
q
f
GI
RCA) a tenu sa quatrième réunion, à Brazzaville, le vendredi 21 mars 2014, sous la
coprésidence de M. Basile Ikouebe, Ministre des A aires étrangères et de la Coopé
ra on de la République du Congo, et de l’Ambassadeur Sma l Chergui, Commis
saire à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA). La liste des pays et organisa
ons qui ont pris part à la réunion gure en bas de page .
.
L
’ v
S.E.M. D
Sassou Nguesso, Président de la République du Congo, qui a prononcé l’allocu on
d’ouverture de la réunion. Celle-ci a été précédée par les discours prononcés par le
Premier ministre du Gouvernement de Transi on de la RCA, M. André Nzapayéké
le Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité, l’Ambassadeur Sma l Chergui le Secrétaire
général de la CEEAC, l’Ambassadeur Amad Allam-Mi la Secrétaire d’État aux
A aires étrangères de la République du Tchad, Mme Kassiré Isabelle Housnan ainsi
que par le message du Secrétaire général des Na ons unies lu par son Représen
tant spécial en RCA, le Général Babacar Gaye.
.
L
v
24
’ v
R A
puis la 3ème réunion du GIC-RCA tenue à Bangui, le 8 novembre 2013, et ce sur la
base de la communica on faite par le Premier ministre de la RCA, ainsi que des in
terven ons des di érents acteurs interna onaux impliqués dans la ges on de la
situa on dans ce pays et des échanges qui s’en sont suivis.
Sur l’
lu
n de la situa
n en RCA
.
L
v
v
g q
g v
v
la conduite de la transi on vers la n de l’année 2013, se sont félicités de l’élec on
à la tête de l’État de Mme Catherine Samba-Panza et de la nomina on de M. André
Nzapayéké comme Premier ministre, ainsi que de la forma on subséquente d’un
nouveau Gouvernement, et ce dans le prolongement des conclusions du 6ème
Sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC, tenu à N’Djamena les 9 et 10 janvier 2014. Ils
ont noté que les changements intervenus à la tête de l’exécu f de la transi on
créent un environnement propice à des e orts na onaux plus soutenus et cohé
rents en vue d’une sor e de crise rapide, ainsi qu’à une plus grande mobilisa on de
la communauté interna onale en faveur de la RCA.
.
R
g v
v
g
cembre 2013, avec l’attaque lancée par le groupe an -balaka, les exac ons et ten
sions intercommunautaires qui s’en sont suivis, les par cipants ont reconnu que la
situa on sécuritaire s’est sensiblement améliorée, gr ce à l’ac on de la Mission
interna onale de sou en à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA) et de
l’Opéra on Sangaris. Ils ont relevé, à cet égard, la réduc on con nue des actes de
violence, le retour progressif à une vie normale à Bangui et ailleurs dans le pays et
l’amorce d’un mouvement de retour des popula ons déplacées. Les par cipants
ont souligné la nécessité d’e orts con nus pour renforcer la tendance à l’améliora
on de la situa on sécuritaire et étendre l’autorité de l’État sur l’ensemble du terri
toire na onal. Ils ont fermement condamné les groupes et éléments armés qui con
nuent de perpétrer des actes criminels et de chercher à saper les e orts des auto
rités de la transi on.
6.
L
q ’
’
’ v
sécuritaire, la situa on humanitaire con nue d’être préoccupante. Ils ont, à cet
égard, relevé les déplacements massifs de popula ons civiles tant à l’intérieur de la
RCA qu’en direc on des pays voisins, ainsi que la nécessité d’une mobilisa on in
terna onale beaucoup plus grande pour répondre aux besoins des popula ons
a ectées.
.
L
f
l’Autorité na onale des Élec ons (ANE). Ils ont noté que les membres de l’ANE,
avec le sou en des Na ons unies, de l’UE, de la France et la MISCA, avaient déjà
e ectué plusieurs visites en province, et qu’ils avaient élaboré le chronogramme du
25
processus électoral qui s’étale sur 12 mois. Ils ont, dans le même temps, reconnu
l’ampleur des dé s qui restent à relever pour la bonne conduite du processus élec
toral dans les délais impar s.
Sur la
ise en
u re de la Feuille de r ute de la transi
n
8.
L
f
f
P
nistre centrafricain sur l’état de mise en uvre de la Feuille de route de la transi
on. Ils ont pris note de l’annonce faite par le Premier ministre sur la présenta on,
au Conseil na onal de transi on (CNT), au début du mois d’avril 2014, d’un pro
gramme de mise en uvre de la Feuille de route révisée de la transi on.
9.
L
g
’
g g
q
core plus soutenu de la part des acteurs centrafricains pour aider à consolider les
acquis enregistrés sur le plan sécuritaire gr ce à l’ac on conduite par la MISCA,
avec le sou en de l’opéra on Sangaris. Ils ont rappelé la responsabilité première
qui incombe aux acteurs centrafricains dans le règlement de la grave crise que con
na t le pays, soulignant que le rôle de la communauté interna onale est d’accom
pagner les e orts na onaux et non de s’y subs tuer. Dans ce cadre, les par cipants
ont exhorté les autorités centrafricaines à renforcer les mesures prises pour isoler
et sanc onner les fauteurs de troubles, en par culier les an -balaka et promouvoir
la réconcilia on na onale, exhortant les pays ayant connu des processus similaires
à partager leurs expériences avec la RCA. Les par cipants ont fortement recom
mandé au Gouvernement centrafricain d’ini er un dialogue inclusif entre les di é
rents acteurs poli ques et sociaux centrafricains. Ils ont exhorté le Gouvernement
à tenir les membres du GIC-RCA régulièrement informés de l’évolu on de ses
e orts, de manière à faciliter l’accompagnement interna onal.
1 .
L
g
’ g
’
soutenus en ce qui concerne la réforme du secteur de la défense et de la sécurité,
le programme de désarmement, de démobilisa on et de réinser on (DDR). Dans ce
cadre, ils ont exhorté le Gouvernement à mettre en uvre rapidement, et en con
formité avec les disposi ons de la résolu on 2134 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité des
Na ons unies, la stratégie DDR qu’il a adoptée, en prenant en compte tous les
groupes armés. Ils ont souligné l’importance que revêt l’élabora on d’une vision
na onale de la réforme du secteur de la défense et de la sécurité et du DDR qui soit
en lien avec les capacités actuelles de l’État et qui enne compte de l’urgence de la
stabilisa on de la situa on. Les par cipants ont convenu que le Gouvernement
endrait les partenaires interna onaux régulièrement informés des disposi ons
prises à cet égard.
11.
L
v
f
de la na on centrafricaine, par le Premier ministre de la RCA à l’endroit des pays
26
voisins dont les ressor ssants ont sou ert des atrocités et d’autres viola ons des
droits de l’homme sur le territoire centrafricain. Le Premier ministre a noté qu’en
dépit de ces viola ons, ces pays ont con nué à remplir leur devoir d’hospitalité à
l’égard des citoyens centrafricains.
Sur les e
rts r gi nau et interna
nau
1 .
L
g
EEA
et reconnu le rôle crucial de la région dans le règlement de la crise centrafricaine.
Ils ont salué les décisions prises par le 6ème Sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC et
l’assistance nancière que la région apporte à la RCA pour permettre à ce pays de
faire face à certains de ses besoins les plus urgents. Ils ont renouvelé leur gra tude
et con ance aux Présidents Denis Sassou Nguesso, Médiateur de la CEEAC, et Idriss
Deby Itno, Président en exercice de la CEEAC, les exhortant à poursuivre et à inten
si er l’ac on qui est la leur, en appui à la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité en RCA. Ils
ont engagé la communauté interna onale, y compris le Conseil de sécurité des Na
ons unies, à soutenir e ec vement le rôle con nu de la région et à s’assurer que
toute ini a ve interna onale sur la RCA s’inscrive dans cette perspec ve.
1 .
L
v
f
f
MI O
PA en MISCA et les mesures prises par l’UA pour permettre à cette Mission
d’atteindre rapidement son e ec f autorisé de 6 000 personnels en uniforme. Ils
ont rendu hommage à la MICOPA pour le travail accompli dans des condi ons
par culièrement di ciles.
1 .
S
f
f
’
f
MISCA organisée par la Commission de l’UA, à Addis Abéba, le 1er février 2014, ils
ont exprimé leur gra tude aux États membres de l’UA qui ont annoncé ou déjà ap
porté des contribu ons en appui à la MISCA (États membres de la CEEAC, Algérie,
Afrique du Sud, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopie, Gambie, Namibie et Nigeria). De même ontils exprimé leur profonde apprécia on aux partenaires interna onaux qui appor
tent un sou en nancier, logis que et technique au déploiement et aux opéra ons
de la MISCA, notamment les États Unis, l’UE et ses États membres (France, Luxem
bourg et Royaume Uni), Canada, Japon et Norvège. Ils ont remercié les Na ons
unies et la France pour leur appui en exper se à la MISCA. Ils ont félicité la MISCA
pour le travail remarquable accompli sur le terrain, en coordina on avec Sangaris,
dont les e ec fs viennent d’être renforcés, travail qui a permis d’améliorer signi
ca vement la situa on sécuritaire en RCA. Ils ont rendu hommage aux soldats et
policiers qui sont tombés sur le champ d’honneur et souhaité un prompt rétablisse
ment aux personnels blessés.
1 .
L
f
curité (CPS) de l’UA d’autoriser le déploiement de personnels de police supplémen
27
taire et celui des capacités spécialisées, pour renforcer l’e cacité de la MISCA.
Dans ce cadre, ils ont lancé un appel pressant à tous les partenaires interna onaux
pour qu’ils apportent un sou en accru à la MISCA, notamment en termes de mobi
lité, d’équipements et de ressources nancières. Ils sont convenus que l’UA sou
mettra, dans un délai d’une semaine, une liste actualisée des besoins de la MISCA
pour faciliter la mobilisa on accélérée des ressources requises. De même, ils ont
exprimé l’espoir que le Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, dans la perspec ve
d’un passage de témoin harmonieux et e cace entre la MISCA et une opéra on
onusienne, tel que recommandé par le Secrétaire général dans son rapport du 5
mars 2014, autorisera la mise en place d’un disposi f spéci que et approprié à cet
e et. Les par cipants ont salué la décision de l’UE de lancer l’opéra on «EUFORRCA», en vue de contribuer à la consolida on des acquis enregistrés par la MISCA
avec le sou en de l’opéra on Sangaris. Ils se sont félicités des e orts en cours pour
renforcer la coordina on entre la MISCA et l’Ini a ve de coopéra on régionale
pour l’élimina on de l’Armée de résistance du seigneur (ICR-LRA).
16.
A
v
q ’
f
MIS A v ’
S g
de créer les condi ons d’un engagement interna onal plus soutenu et plus durable
en faveur de la RCA et pris note du fait que la MISCA envisage de parachever la
phase ini ale de stabilisa on de la situa on dans les prochains six à neuf mois, les
par cipants se sont félicités de la perspec ve de déploiement d’une opéra on de
main en de la paix des Na ons unies. Ils ont souligné la nécessité pour l’UA et les
Na ons unies de tout faire pour réussir cette transi on, en rant pleinement les
le ons d’expériences antérieures. cet égard, ils ont pris note des disposi ons per
nentes du communiqué adopté par le CPS de l’UA lors de sa 422ème réunion te
nue à Addis Abéba, le 7 mars 2014, soulignant que le succès de la MISCA est une
condi on essen elle à la réussite de l’opéra on envisagée des Na ons unies.
1 .
L
v
1
de la Conférence interna onale de haut niveau sur la situa on humanitaire. Réité
rant leur profonde préoccupa on face à l’ampleur de la crise humanitaire en RCA
et notant que seuls 21 pour cent des montants requis ont été mobilisés à ce jour,
ils ont fortement exhorté tous les donateurs concernés à honorer leurs engage
ments dans les meilleurs délais possibles. Ils ont exprimé leur reconnaissance aux
pays de la région qui accueillent des réfugiés centrafricains. Ils ont félicité la MISCA
pour le sou en apporté aux opéra ons humanitaires, y compris l’escorte de con
vois de la fron ère camerounaise à Bangui, la protec on de sites de déplacés et
celle d’acteurs humanitaires.
18.
L
g v
q
ciaux auxquels la RCA est confrontée, soulignant que la situa on appelle une ac on
urgente de la part des partenaires interna onaux et une adapta on des procé
dures d’aide interna onale à la situa on par culière de la RCA. cet égard, ils ont
28
insisté sur l’importance que revêt le paiement régulier des salaires des agents de la
fonc on publique et des pensions des retraités et du sou en au redémarrage du
fonc onnement de la machine éta que et administra ve. Ils ont salué la décision
de la CEEAC de consacrer 50 des 100 millions de dollars américains annoncés lors
de la Conférence de donateurs tenue à Addis Abéba à l’appui économique et bud
gétaire à la RCA. Ils se sont félicités de la réac va on, par la Banque mondiale et
l’Agence fran aise de développement (AFD), de leurs bureaux à Bangui. Ils ont en
couragé les ins tu ons nancières interna onales, notamment la Banque mon
diale et le Fonds monétaire interna onal, ainsi que la Banque africaine de dévelop
pement, à accélérer la reprise de leur assistance à la RCA et à décaisser e ec ve
ment et rapidement les fonds promis.
19.
D
R A
pants ont souligné la nécessité de la prise de sanc ons contre tous les individus et
en tés qui, en RCA, s’emploient à entraver la transi on et le processus de paix et
de réconcilia on. Ils ont exhorté le Conseil de sécurité des Na ons unies, dans le
cadre de sa résolu on 2127 (2013), à désigner rapidement les individus et en tés à
sanc onner, de manière à envoyer un message clair aux fauteurs de troubles quant
à sa détermina on à les tenir comptables de leurs actes. Dans le même esprit, les
par cipants se sont félicités du commencement de travail de la Commission inter
na onale d’enquête sur la situa on des droits de l’homme en RCA depuis le 1er
janvier 2013. Ils attendent avec intérêt la révision prévue par l’UA de sa liste des
individus sanc onnés pour actes de nature à saper les e orts de paix en RCA.
Sur le ren rce ent du IC-RCA et le sui i de ses c nclusi ns
20.
Les par cipants sont convenus de la nécessité de renforcer l’e cacité du
GIC-RCA et son accompagnement de la transi on. Dans cette perspec ve, ils ont
demandé aux co-Présidents du GIC-RCA, à savoir la Commission de l’UA et la Répu
blique du Congo, à mettre en place, sous leur direc on, une structure restreinte
informelle comprenant la CEEAC et les principaux partenaires interna onaux con
cernés et la RCA, pour assurer le suivi des conclusions des réunions régulières du
GIC-RCA, faciliter l’implica on d’experts couvrant des domaines théma ques et
favoriser la mobilisa on de ressources addi onnelles. Les modalités de fonc onne
ment de cette structure, qui se réunira au moins un mois avant chaque session ré
gulière du GIC-RCA, seront déterminées par les co-présidents en consulta on avec
les partenaires concernés.
1.
L
q
g g
G v
ment centrafricain et les membres du GIC-RCA, ainsi que les recommanda ons
faites à leur inten on, soient reprises par la Commission de l’UA sous la forme
d’une matrice et distribuée à tous les membres du Groupe. Ceux-ci doivent, à leur
tour, informer les co-présidents des mesures par eux prises en termes de suivi
avant chaque réunion du Groupe. Les par cipants se sont réjouis de la par cipa
29
on, pour la première fois, en qualité de membre, de l’OCI aux travaux du GIC-RCA,
ainsi que de sa volonté de contribuer à la réconcilia on na onale, à l’assistance
humanitaire aux déplacés et aux réfugiés, et à la reconstruc on de la RCA.
r c aine r uni n du IC-RCA
.
L
v
q
GI -R A
endra à Addis Abéba, en juin 2014, à une date qui sera déterminée par voie de
consulta ons.
M
n de re ercie ent
.
L
g
g
l’hospitalité généreuse dont les déléga ons ayant pris part à la réunion ont été en
tourées, ainsi que pour les excellentes disposi ons prises pour le succès de la réu
nion.
30
MISCA welcomes the change in the curfew time in Bangui and the
rest of the Central African territory
Bangui, 17 March 2014: The African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the Cen
tral African Republic (MISCA) welcomes the signing, on 13 March 2014, by the Head
of State of the Transi on, Mrs. Catherine Samba- Panza, of a decree rela ng to the
change in the curfew me across the en re Central African territory, which now
stands from 11 p. m to 5 a.m. The curfew was introduced after the tragic events of
5 December 2014 and the attendant security problems.
This change, the second of its kind, after the one on 13 February 2014 and which
had already shortened the curfew hours, from 8.00 p.m. to 5.00 a. m instead of
6.00 p.m. to 6.00 a. m, bears evidence to the undeniable improvement in the secu
rity situa on, thanks to the e orts made by MISCA and the French Sangaris opera
on.
The Special Representa ve of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African
Union (AU) and Head of MISCA, General Jean -Marie Michel Mokoko, seizes this
opportunity to urge the Central African people to redouble their vigilance to coun
ter the nega ve ac on of the illegal armed groups and complete the actual restora
on of the authority of the Central African State throughout the en re na onal ter
ritory. He warns these groups and rea rms, once again, the strong commitment of
the MISCA to implement its mandate, in a robust and impar al manner, and neu
tralise all armed elements which try to undermine the process of restoring peace
and the security and the promo on of na onal reconcilia on.
31
La MISCA se F licite de la
difica n des raires du c u re- eu à
Bangui et sur l’ tendue du Territ ire centra ricain
Bangui, le 17 Mars 2014 – La Mission Interna onale de Sou en à la Centrafrique
sous conduite africaine (MISCA) se félicite du Décret no. 14066 du 13 Février 2014
signé par la Présidente de la Transi on, Mme Catherine Samba Panza, portant mo
di ca on des horaires du couvre-feu à Bangui et sur l’étendue du territoire centra
fricain, de 20 heures à 05 heures et maintenant ramené de 23 heures à 05 heures.
Suite à l’o ensive des an -balakas du 5 décembre 2013, un couvre-feu avait été
décrété de 18 heures à 06 heures du ma n, allégé par la suite de 20 heures à 06
heures, gr ce aux e orts de stabilisa on de la MISCA. Cette nouvelle mesure d’allé
gement du couvre-feu témoigne de l’améliora on de la situa on sécuritaire dans la
ville de Bangui et dans le reste du pays, gr ce aux e orts de la MISCA, notamment
aux derniers ac ons coup de poing dont la traque et l’arresta on de plusieurs lea
ders du groupe des an -balakas, du désarmement et cantonnement des ex-salekas
et des opéra ons de saisies d’armes et de muni ons. Cette améliora on visible de
la situa on sécuritaire a conduit à la reprise des ac vités économiques, la réouver
ture e ec ve des ins tu ons académiques, etc., pour abou r aujourd’hui à une
certaine normalisa on de la vie dans la ville de Bangui et ses environs.
Tout en réitérant la neutralité de la MISCA et sa ferme détermina on à exécu
ter en toute impar alité son mandat, le Représentant Spécial de la Présidente de
la Commission de l’Union africaine et chef de la MISCA, le Gal. Jean-Marie Michel
Mokoko, met en garde tous les éléments des groupes illégaux qui con nuent de
commettre des exac ons auprès des popula ons civiles que les opéra ons d’éradi
ca ons de criminels vont se poursuivre en s’intensi ant. Il appelle la popula on à
plus de vigilance et de coopéra on a n de parachever la res tu on e ec ve de
l’Autorité de l’Etat et le retour de la Centrafrique à la légi mité démocra que.
32
MISCA e p wers CAR w en t pr
res lu n and a culture peace
te s cial c
esi n c nflict
Bangui, 17 March 2014: As the security situa on in the Central African Republic
(CAR) con nues to improve, the African-led Interna onal Support Mission in the
Central African Republic (MISCA) and the United Na ons Fund for Popula on Ac v
i es (UNFPA) have launched an ini a ve to empower CAR women to promote so
cial cohesion, con ict resolu on and a culture of peace. As part of the ini a ve,
MISCA’s Human Rights Protec on and Gender Unit, under the auspices of CAR’s
Minister of Health, Social A airs, Gender and Humanitarian Ac on, Dr. Marguerite
Samba, co-organized with UNFPA a workshop for 50 leaders from 26 CAR women’s
groups. The workshop, which took place at the Bangui Faculty of Evangelical Theol
ogy, from 12 to 14 March 2014, aimed to build the capacity of CAR women and em
power them to lead the post-con ict reconcilia on and reconstruc on e orts in
the country.
The MISCA Human Rights O cer for Gender explained to the women the funda
mental tenets and principles of UN Resolu on 1325 and related African Union in
struments, such as the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights, the economic and sociopoli cal dynamics of con icts in Africa, AU
e orts to prevent, manage and resolve con icts, and progress and challenges of
peacekeeping in Africa as informed by the experience of Liberian women. Par ci
pants expressed apprecia on for the AU’s ongoing e orts to resolve the CAR crises
and stressed the need for MISCA to con nue suppor ng CAR women in the di cult
33
post-con ict process of rebuilding their livelihoods and communi es. The women
leaders also emphasized the need to create and support opportuni es for more
women to par cipate in the governance of the country, adding that the history of
the CAR might have been di erent had women been in charge.
MISCA’s mandate includes a human rights component and the Mission currently
has two Human Rights O cers for Gender. The Special Representa ve of the Chair
person of the AU Commission to the CAR and Head of MISCA, Gen. Jean-Marie
Michel Mokoko, on the occasion of Interna onal Women’s Day, on 8 March 2014,
commended CAR women for their resilience, and paid tribute to their important
contribu on to interna onal e orts to resolve the country’s current crises.
34
Terrorism in Africa
Fr
Trans r a
n t Media
n: T e Arab Spring Re ra ed
MARCH 20, 2014
INTRODUCTION
Even if the Arab Spring has not de ni vely run aground, the dominant Western pol
icy narra ve surrounding it has fundamentally changed. What Western observers
ini ally saw as a process in which reformist civil society pitted itself against authori
tarian regimes today seems to be primarily about managing myriad levels of polari
za on within socie es. A simple narra ve only of poli cal reform looks increasingly
inadequate.
Pervasive polariza on now de nes much domes c poli cal debate in the Middle
East as well as the framework through which the European Union (EU) crafts its
strategy in the region.
Pervasive polariza on now de nes much domes c poli cal debate in the Middle
East as well as the framework through which the European Union (EU) crafts its
strategy in the region. As the focus has shifted toward building consensus in frag
mented socie es, the EU has developed a more prominent focus on high-level dip
loma c media on. While s ll running many tradi onal poli cal reform ini a ves,
the EU gives greater priority to e orts that build inclusive dialogue. The EU o ers
itself as a facilitator—a mediator between adversaries.
The focus on media on to bring about consensus re ects a welcome recogni on
that democra c transi ons are rarely sustainable when they are not underpinned
by broad agreement on the poli cal “rules of the game.” But Europeans should
avoid thinking that “inclusive forums” and na onal dialogue processes are a pana
cea for the Middle East’s ills. One of the de ning ques ons for the Middle East’s
future resides in the rela onship between the “media on lens” and the “reform
lens.” This rela onship is more complicated than often assumed. Patterns of polari
za on vary across di erent Middle Eastern states, and di erent types of reconcilia
on processes are afoot. A mutually reinforcing balance between media on and
reform that accounts for these complica ons must be sought.
The EU’s current strategy runs a risk of being o balance. There are many strong
points in the EU’s approach to dialogue and media on, and genera ng consensus is
undoubtedly important. But the EU should not neglect targeted reform e orts that
are needed to make media on work. Dangers lurk where a focus on consensus is
taken to jus fy an apoli cal approach to change in the Middle East. Media on
must not become a coda for passivity and hands-o neutrality. Successful media
on is often the outcome of reform, not merely its antechamber. It should be pur
sued as a complement not an alterna ve to support for poli cal liberaliza on.
POLARIZED SOCIETIES
35
In the three years since the Tunisian revolu on, the momentum of Arab reform has
stuttered. While the degree of social mobiliza on remains higher than it was be
fore 2011 and democracy is s ll on the agenda, tangible democra c advances are
becoming rare and the region’s social and poli cal context is increasingly brittle. In
some countries, hard-won gains in democra c rights are in danger of being re
versed. In others, regimes have comfortably contained pressures for reform. And in
several, violent con ict increasingly predominates. Among the many reasons for
such disappointment, the widening of internal divisions stands out as key.
Democracy’s bumpy ride across the Arab world holds little surprise. Nobody who
knew the region predicted that a rapid process of democra za on would seep
smoothly across the Middle East in the wake of the ini al Tunisian and Egyp an
popular uprisings. Indeed, all democra c transi ons take me. All are subject to
reversals of greater or lesser longevity. All engender forces keen to limit reform. All
open a Pandora’s box of rivalries between reform-minded fac ons.
However, the Middle East’s acute degree of division is especially striking. Managing
internal division is becoming the region’s de ning feature. The best transi ons
move within a reasonable me span into a phase where more technical issues of
reform predominate. But much of the Middle East has s ll to agree on some very
basic rules of the game. Mi ga ng polariza on has become of almost existen al
import.
The region’s primordial afflic on is a lack of consensus on basic poli cal rules.
As a result, debates are today not merely about speci c obstacles to par cular re
forms. Rather, the whole analy cal prism through which the Middle East is viewed
has gradually shifted to a broader framework. Zooming out from the intricate detail
that dominates atten on in each individual country, a common pattern can be dis
cerned: the emerging view is that the region’s primordial afflic on is a lack of con
sensus on basic poli cal rules.
Much analy cal coverage of the Middle East now has the feel and lexicon of
wri ngs on con ict mi ga on, at least as much as it conforms to standard work on
the tac cs of poli cal transi ons. The metric applied to the region is not merely or
primarily how far states are along a path of democra c reform. Increasingly, its sali
ent feature is the divisive nature of internal poli cs.
Many domes c and external e orts are now focused on tempering polariza on—
which in most states is reaching dangerous levels. Distrust between di erent poli
cal actors con nues to intensify. The per nent ques ons are not simply about
whether democracy is advancing or stalled, whether the Arab Spring is “alive” or
“dead.” It is, more subtly, about the way that change is taking place—the type
ofprocess through which it is facilitated and inhibited. The Middle East must be
seen through this lens of fractured poli cs and social iden es—not merely that of
how far democracy is progressing.
A number of types of polariza on have intensi ed over the course of the Arab
36
Spring. Sectarian, secular-Islamist, regime–civil society, and regional tensions have
all increased.
Sharper sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia communi es now dominate
domes c and regional poli cs. In par cular, the Syrian con ict, in which a ruling
Alawite class is pitted against a mostly Sunni opposi on, has impacted sectarian
tensions across the region. Sunni-Shia violence increasingly spread across Syria’s
borders during 2012 and 2013. Tensions have intensi ed as Lebanon’s Hezbollah
has extended its incursions into Syria, helping the regime of Syrian President Ba
shar al-Assad gain an upper hand in the con ict. This, in turn, has left Sunni com
muni es in many parts of the region more nervous. Sunni radicaliza on grows out
of a fear of Shia asser veness. Sunni regimes across the region use the specter of a
new Shia threat as jus ca on for delays to reform.
In addi on to these sectarian tensions, the cleavage between secular liberals and
Islamist movements breeds increasingly frac ous poli cs. In 2011, Islamists and
secularists joined forces to confront authoritarian regimes across the region. That
moment of apparent, if super cial, convergence has given way to divergent under
standings of what type of reforms is most desirable. The emergence of such di er
ences was not necessarily a surprise, but the vehemence with which these two
camps today confront each other is striking—as is the extent to which this division
now hinders stable coali on building in many Arab states. Many of the pre–Arab
Spring attempts at building common platforms between Islamists and secularists
now lie in tatters. A July 2013 coup that removed Egypt’s Islamist president has
sharpened divisions across the region as regimes, secularists, and Islamists have all
adopted more uncompromising posi ons in its tumultuous aftermath. 1
Another divide has widened between the civil society and government spheres,
including in rela vely reformist regimes. Prior to 2011, reformers within regimes at
mes sought to engage with civil society actors to forge agreements on modest re
form programs. This is a common dynamic that drives measured reform steps in
many transi on processes across the world. But in the Middle East, the channels of
trust and convergence between civil society and regime “soft-liners” appear to
have narrowed not improved since 2011. Some regime structures themselves have
become more malleable, but this has not helped with the construc on of broader
cons tuencies of reform that include both “insiders” and “outsiders.”
Alliances and coali ons have shifted across borders, too, as regional rivalries have
sharpened. Sectarian- and iden ty-based cleavages play out alongside the rise of
tradi onal sta st power projec on in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran,
and even smaller players like Qatar have vied for regional in uence, and Turkey’s
ac vist foreign policy adds another complica ng factor, as many observers see An
kara’s approach as animated by a desire to shore up Sunni leadership in the region.
Meanwhile, ethnic cleavages involving Berbers, Kurds, and others have sharpened,
and these actors’ territorial divisions lie both across and within state boundaries.
Looking in ner granularity, these complex dynamics of polariza on color debate in
37
two opposing ways.
On the one hand, in many states internal division has worked against reform. Many
actors across the Middle East hold to damagingly “absolu st” posi ons that pre
clude compromise. This is true of di erent sectarian fac ons, of Islamists, and of
liberal secularists. Hos li es often appear almost viscerally rooted in clashing iden
es. Actors commonly hold to such absolu st posi ons in the name of progress,
not in opposi on to change yet the result of stubborn discord is the derailment of
reform e orts.
Today, the need seems to be for preliminary dialogue on basic poli cal values not
the ne-tuning of reforms that habitually characterizes the latter stages of poli cal
liberaliza on.
On the other hand, domes c poli cs in some states has been dominated by the
search for consensus. In an attempt to mi gate centripetal trends, the focus has
been on iden fying areas of agreement. Many actors genuinely concerned with
advancing democra c reform hold that all-inclusive dialogue is now the most ur
gent impera ve. The Arab Spring’s ini al illusions of democra c change and sys
temic overhauls have taken several steps backward: today, the need seems to be
for preliminary dialogue on basic poli cal values not the ne-tuning of reforms that
habitually characterizes the latter stages of poli cal liberaliza on.
These nega ve and posi ve dynamics are two sides of the same coin. The predomi
nance of internal divisions puts a premium on consensus-seeking dialogue. In some
states, fragmenta on is clearly ascendant dialogue and consensus are widely advo
cated but have not taken root rmly. In others, e orts to embed formal na onal
dialogue forums have advanced further and increasingly de ne domes c poli cs.
In short, consensus seeking either dominates domes c poli cs or is the most
strongly advocated route forward in those contexts where polariza on wreaks its
most untrammeled havoc. Fragmenta on and polariza on are now prominent po
li cal issues in nearly all Arab countries.
DIFFERING RECONCILIATION EFFORTS
Most countries a ected by the Arab Spring have ins gated some form of na onal
dialogue—of greater or lesser formality—aimed at narrowing internal divisions. A
small number of these dialogues have made some progress, and others have en
countered formidable obstacles.
Dialogue has varied with regard to type and grade. Di erences stem from both the
depth of polariza on with which a country has to contend and the formality or
strength of commitment to inclusive dialogue.
There have clearly been cases where dialogue has led to reform. In a small number
of states, dialogue-generated consensus has facilitated some degree of poli cal lib
eraliza on. Even in these rela vely successful cases, reform has been delayed and
diluted, internal divisions are wider today than at the start of the Arab Spring, and
38
consensus has been possible only on the most general principles of poli cal and
cons tu onal change. Yemen and Tunisia t into this category.
In Yemen, a high-level and formal process of na onal dialogue has generated some
limited reform. After an uprising that led President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down
in November 2011, a na onal unity government was sworn in. Elec ons in Febru
ary 2012 con rmed the consensus candidate Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi as presi
dent.
The agreement transferring power from Saleh to the unity government s pulated
that the new regime would hold a na onal dialogue. In March 2013, Hadi launched
the Na onal Dialogue Conference to deliberate on detailed reform op ons. In the
hopes of establishing a new, durable poli cal framework, these high-level talks
brought together Yemen’s main poli cal forces—including powerful tribes, some
southern separa sts, and Houthi rebels, members of a Shia minority from the
north—as well as previously marginalized groups such as women, youth, and mi
nori es.
The dialogue formally concluded on January 21, 2014, with an agreement regarding
the country’s future cons tu on. The agreement s pulates that un l elec ons take
place later in 2014, Hadi must increase southern and Houthi representa on in the
consulta ve upper house of parliament.2
Progress has been painfully slow, and unrest simmers. After the ini al unity agree
ment was signed, it took two and a half years for the Na onal Dialogue Conference
to begin in earnest. Saleh’s family s ll wields much power and retains control of
the security forces, and it has frustrated attempts at deeper reform. The long me
ruling party under Saleh, the General People’s Congress, remains dominant in the
parliament. Not all fac ons of the Southern Movement, an umbrella organiza on
for the country’s southern separa sts, par cipated in the conference, and the dia
logue was beset by ongoing controversies over ques ons of representa on, boy
cotts, and withdrawals.3 Yet it prevented the country from descending into out-and
-out civil war and provided Saleh with a face-saving exit from power.4
Tunisia is the clearest example of a consensus-led reform process. After a revolu
on in 2011 that ousted then president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisians elected a
widely inclusive coali on led by the Islamist Ennahda party. This coali on has
worked to draw up a new, democra c cons tu on, a goal that was tested in 2013
as instability rocked Tunisia. In the span of a year, the country saw two poli cal as
sassina ons, a suicide blast, and mul ple confronta ons between various poli cal
fac ons.
Through it all, the ruling coali on made a considerable e ort to maintain the inclu
sive ethos of the country’s transi on. After the assassina on of a prominent leftist
opposi on leader in February 2013, the government appointed a technocra c cabi
net in order to keep opposi on forces engaged. In September 2013, Prime Minister
Ali Laarayedh of Ennahda stepped down, bowing to pressure from the opposi on.
Ennahda also called for new elec ons and created a formalized na onal dialogue to
39
engage all actors in nalizing the new cons tu on, which was passed on January
27, 2014.
Consensus was aided in Tunisia by the fact that the ruling Islamists did not feel
their party had the local strength or the roots to confront other actors in a zerosum fashion. In par cular, Ennahda hesitated to disregard the country’s rela vely
in uen al trade union movement.
Rela ons between Islamists and secularists in Tunisia remain frac ous. And de
bates s ll rage about the balance between universal human rights and Islamist val
ues in the cons tu on—the document is ambivalent about how far the state’s role
may extend in “protec ng the sacred.” However, the consensual model has taken
Tunisia further down the road of democra c reform than other Arab states.
Some in the current Libyan administra on are trying to emulate the Tunisian exam
ple, albeit without tangible success so far. After the fall of long me Libyan leader
Muammar Qadda in October 2011, the new regime envisaged the elec on of a
broadly inclusive forum to draw up a new cons tu on. The aim to maintain such an
inclusive process cons tutes the guiding tenet of Libyan domes c poli cs.
But the country is facing rising tensions in the poli cal arena and a number of in
creasingly autonomous mili as that threaten Libya’s democra c transi on. Elec
ons in 2012 did not seem to provide the country’s legisla ve authority, the Gen
eral Na onal Congress, with su cient legi macy to make progress on reform is
sues. More radical Islamist forces have gradually gained power in the congress and
have forced puni ve measures against “liberals” associated with the previous re
gime.
To address this increasingly unstable situa on, in August 2013 the interim govern
ment launched plans for a formal na onal dialogue. This is currently in its prepara
tory stages, and it is due to begin in April and last for six months on the basis of an
agreed charter. Its prospects remain decidedly unclear as of this wri ng.
In other states, it is clearer that dialogue has taken place without leading to any
reform. Some countries have made a notable commitment to dialogue but have
priori zed stability and consensus in a way that is to the detriment of poli cal re
form. In these places, regimes sponsor dialogues but con nue to be very restric ve
and authoritarian.
Bahrain, for example, has priori zed holding a na onal dialogue but has not
achieved the sort of reform seen in Tunisia or Yemen. The Bahraini regime con
vened this dialogue after violent protests in 2011. Two of the main legal opposi on
groups, the Shia al-Wefaq and the secular Waad, ini ally agreed to par cipate but
later withdrew their support and accused the government of orchestra ng the dia
logue as a public rela ons exercise without any inten on of reform.
In February 2013, a renewed dialogue was ini ated, but debates have remained
stuck on procedural ques ons.5 The government suspended the talks in early Janu
40
ary 2014 only to begin a new dialogue under a revised format. All major poli cal
groups have agreed to resume the talks, hoping for discussion of further-reaching
ins tu onal reforms.6 However, both opposi on actors and outside observers re
main skep cal of the government’s willingness to reform and fear that hardliners
within the regime are simply playing for me.7
Like the rulers in Bahrain, the Jordanian regime has also come under re for its
e orts. The Islamist Ac on Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s poli cal party in Jor
dan, as well as groups of Pales nian origin and tribal leaders have all been cri cal
of Jordanian King Abdullah II’s attempts to forge a consensus on a reform program.
In March 2011, the king established a Na onal Dialogue Committee comprising
representa ves from various poli cal and civil society groups who were tasked
with arriving at a consensus on legisla on concerning various poli cal reforms.
These ac ons are now widely seen as disingenuous because reform promises re
main unful lled. Here, too, social harmony has splintered since the beginning of
the Arab Spring.
Attempts at dialogue have produced little tangible impact in Saudi Arabia. The Sau
di regime began an annual na onal dialogue in 2003, but these talks have not un
locked reforms or prevented the country from su ering instability since the begin
ning of the Arab Spring, par cularly in the form of rising sectarian tensions and calls
for democra c change among the country’s youth.
In Lebanon, the balance between polariza on and dialogue is precariously poised.
On the one hand, instability and sporadic violence plague the country. Due in part
to the destabilizing in uence of the ongoing civil war in neighboring Syria, Lebanon
hovers in a state of virtual con ict. Low-level violence and bomb attacks have be
come frequent.
On the other hand, the poli cal elite has gone to notable lengths to retain consen
sus—a commitment that has in some senses been striking given events in Leba
non’s immediate neighborhood. The country has a Na onal Dialogue Committee
that brings together representa ves from Lebanon’s main poli cal fac ons, uni ng
parliamentarians from the Hezbollah-led March 8 coali on and the pro-Western
March 14 coali on. The committee, however, has not met regularly since Septem
ber 2012 because of the increasing poli cal tensions between these fac ons, which
stand on opposite sides when it comes to major regional issues like the Syrian con
ict.8
Lebanon’s apparent saving grace is that Sunni, Shia, and Chris ans share a consen
sual aversion to taking the country back to civil war, having emerged from one in
1990. This aversion remains even as trust between the fac ons has frayed and
there is little posi ve e ort to develop a common project for Lebanon’s future.
In s ll other countries, dialogue has failed and authoritarianism has resurged.
There are now more vociferous calls for dialogue and consensus in these countries,
but di erences remain over the terms of any such dialogue and over what kind of
poli cal reform, if any, is most desirable to mend current instability. Egypt, Iraq,
41
and Syria are examples of this trend. Here, the failure of dialogue has clearly held
back democra za on and jus ed a return of authoritarian dynamics.
Egypt seemed to be making signi cant headway on the path to reform. But today,
the country’s main players—the army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the liberal
secularists—are further apart on many issues than they were in 2011.
A popular uprising led to the overthrow of strongman Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but
na onwide elec ons for a new government took place before broad agreement
was reached on a new cons tu on and democra c “rules of the game.” In May
2012, Egyp ans elected Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood–backed candi
date, as president. The country’s poli cal divisions widened appreciably under
Morsi’s rule, with secular groups and supporters of the military opposing the ruling
Islamists.
Ini ally, Morsi proposed an inclusive framework for preparing a new cons tu on,
but this framework became increasingly exclusionary, a process that culminated in
the president issuing a decree in November 2012 that a orded him greater power
over the drafting process. Secular opposi on groups banded together to form the
Na onal Salva on Front in response to this decree. The front orchestrated wide
spread protests against the government, eventually leading to a military-backed
coup that removed Morsi from power in July 2013.
The army then repeated the same divisive process of pushing through a cons tu
on that was drawn up by an exclusionary committee—in this case, the Muslim
Brotherhood was excluded. Consensus was not crafted on the document, and many
who spoke out against it were arrested. Its approval in a January 2014 referendum
will likely aggravate tensions. The new government has banned religious-based po
li cal ac vity, which is likely to perpetuate polariza on and result in the reappear
ance of jihadist violence.
Two par cularly drama c cases of violent polariza on are Syria and Iraq. In Syria,
attempts have been made to reach a nego ated settlement to the country’s ongo
ing civil war, as hopes have faded that Assad can be de ni vely pushed from pow
er. The abrupt curtailment of the second round of the Geneva process, a dialogue
between the government and the opposi on, raises doubts over whether this ap
proach now has any future. Intersectarian tolerance has weakened even at a micro,
communal level, while the regime has leaned even more heavily on its core sup
porters in an increasingly narrow Alawite and non-Muslim cons tuency.9Tensions
have grown between di erent opposi on groups, which now spend most of their
me gh ng each other. The con ict is no longer a dichotomous one between re
gime and an -regime forces, as the opposi on has splintered into a large and con
fusingly uid number of groupings. The interna onal community has staked much
on the leadership of the Free Syrian Army, once considered the main armed oppo
si on force, as the vehicle for reaching some kind of nego ated settlement, but
this group has lost standing within the constella on of Syrian forces. While, again,
42
the depth of authoritarian resilience has brought media on center stage, in Syria
this is yet to gain any purchase.
Iraq has remained largely outside the purview of the Arab Spring and subject to
unique dynamics. After the U.S. invasion of the country in 2003 toppled Saddam
Hussein, a process of dialogue to lay the groundwork for a democra c system
was attempted in the form of the Iraqi Na onal Conference, held in August 2004.
This conference gathered more than 1,100 representa ves of Iraq’s poli cal par
es, regions, tribes, and civil society organiza ons who were tasked with se
lec ng the members of a 100-seat na onal assembly to serve as the country’s
interim legislature. They were also tasked with agreeing on ways to curb the in
surgency that had begun after the U.S. invasion and to temper polariza on.10
Divisions were too wide for the conference to gain broad legi macy, and Sunni
insurgents did not recognize the conference as legi mate.11 Several Sunni, Shia,
and secularist par es opposing the U.S. occupa on of Iraq refused to take part.
The conference remained under the control of a core group of poli cal par es
without broader consulta ons or societal buy-in.12
Poli cal tensions con nued to plague the country through the U.S. withdrawal,
which was complete at the end of 2011. In March 2012, Iraq’s main fac ons ten
ta vely agreed to hold another na onal conference. This again failed, as Kurdish
and Sunni opposi on groups were reluctant to accept that the government of
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had any genuine intent of reversing its drift toward
repressive authoritarianism.13
In sum, there is much varia on in patterns of na onal dialogue and, crucially,
these do not relate in any straightforward fashion to countries’ di ering degrees
of poli cal reform. The focus on dialogue and consensus adds a very di use varia
ble to the analy cal framework of the Arab Spring. A clear typology of dialogue
processes and reform is hard to discern.
In poli cal science terminology, an eclec c mix now prevails: the Arab Spring’s
ini al avor of civic-led “ruptured” transi ons has morphed into an elitecontrolled “pacted” transi on dynamic. This is mixed with heavy doses of authori
tarian resilience and con ict-management power sharing interspersed in di er
ent combina ons across di erent parts of the region.
EUROPEAN CONCERNS
These trends in the internal poli cs of Arab states are re ected in the evolving
approaches of some external actors. In par cular, European policies toward the
Arab Spring have undergone a subtle change: a narra ve of narrowing polariza
on is now superimposed on the original narra ve of tempering authoritarianism.
The EU has increasingly, and in par cular, posi oned itself as a kind of impar al
mediator. Diplomats rou nely cite this as the EU’s compara ve advantage in the
region. The success that the current EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton,
43
had in brokering an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program in November
2013 is highlighted as the epitome and most convincing vindica on of this
“neutral broker” approach.
The EU has attached priority to suppor ng na onal dialogues in Yemen, Tunisia,
Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, and Lebanon. It has exerted diploma c pressure to
cajole reluctant governments to commit to such inclusive dialogue. It has used its
democracy and human rights funds to support numerous dialogue forums aimed
at bringing together di erent parts of the poli cal spectrum. The EU-orchestrated
task forces held in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia in 2011 and 2012 are another key
manifesta on of this “everyone inside the tent” approach: these roundtables
gathered as broad a range of par cipants as possible to discuss very prac cal de
velopment and investment goals for each country.
The EU formalized its focus on media on and created a Media on Support Team
within the European External Ac on Service, the EU’s foreign policy arm. This
commits the EU to strengthening ins tu ons and mechanisms speci cally de
signed to improve na onal capaci es for dialogue within con ict-prone
states.14According to guidelines of the External Ac on Service, na onal dialogues
are to be ac vely supported to the extent that they are locally legi mate, inclu
sive in their composi on, e ec ve, and underpinned by democra c values. They
are to be based on an analysis of the local context to ensure the dialogues are
legi mate and e ec ve in prac ce. External EU support will take care not to un
dermine local legi macy.15
As one of its rst ac vi es, the Media on Support Team conducted training ses
sions on media on for diplomats and o cials working in Syria and Yemen. The
unit has also been heavily involved in Lebanon and Libya. It has begun trying to
carve out access points in Egypt as well, in coopera on with the EU special repre
senta ve for the Southern Mediterranean region, who has developed a par cular
niche focus on bridge-building dialogue.
In Egypt since the July 2013 ouster of Mohamed Morsi, the EU has pushed strong
ly for the Muslim Brotherhood to be included in a na onal dialogue. Diplomats
argue that the e ort to make the Brotherhood part of an inclusive formal dia
logue is a more accepted form of interna onal involvement than pushing for
deeper democra za on to happen immediately.
The EU has exerted negligible pressure on the interim administra on led by the
Egyp an military to speed up democra c reforms. Most European government
and External Ac on Service reac ons to Egypt’s January 2014 cons tu onal refer
endum were posi ve and hopeful that the approval of the cons tu on would
open possibili es for new dialogue. For instance, Ashton stated that: “The cons
tu onal process—both before and following the referendum—could o er a
chance for a new poli cal dialogue and interac on leading to democra c elec
ons.”16 To that end, the EU has recently placed par cular priority on calling for
44
“the establishment of a higher commission for na onal reconcilia on,” and Ashton
has made numerous trips to Cairo to facilitate dialogue between Egypt’s di erent
fac ons.17 She is the only high-level interna onal gure to have engaged in this way
with the full spectrum of Egyp an actors.
Ashton has also fulsomely supported Bahrain’s na onal dialogue, sta ng that “the
dialogue between the par es is the best way to rebuild trust and to achieve genu
ine na onal reconcilia on by tackling outstanding issues and socioeconomic griev
ances, thereby preparing the ground for sustainable reforms.”18 In Libya, the EU
has—controversially—sought to ensure that former regime members are engaged
in the transi on process. As the formal na onal dialogue atrophies, the local repre
senta ves of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and
the United Na ons (UN) have coordinated to maintain contacts with di erent Liby
an fac ons in an e ort to en ce all players into some form of consulta on this fo
cus has essen ally taken over from long-term ins tu on building, for which poli
cal condi ons have not proven conducive. In Iraq, while the United States has fo
cused on counterterrorism assistance for the Maliki government, the EU has
pressed Baghdad to engage in more structured dialogue on consensual power shar
ing.
The EU has strongly supported the Na onal Dialogue Conference in Yemen. In
2012, the Council of Europe urged “all Yemeni stakeholders to support and par ci
pate in this process in a construc ve manner and without precondi ons to ensure
that it is fully inclusive, balanced, and transparent, adequately represen ng all
strands of the Yemeni society and re ec ng the important role of youth and wom
en.”19 Several EU member states are currently suppor ng the imposi on of UN
sanc ons against those actors who undermine the next phase of Yemen’s dialoguebased reforms.
In Syria, European governments have become more favorable toward some form of
dialogue and media on between the regime and the opposi on. A variety of Euro
pean funding has supported the respected organiza on Search for Common
Ground in its attempts to mediate between di erent communi es at a local level.
The Syrian regime reportedly asked the Dutch and Norwegian governments to sup
port ini a ves aimed at intercommunal dialogue. In 2012, the French government
backed a unity administra on to be headed by defectors from the regime. Europe
an governments pushed for an incremental broadening of the opposi on alliance
into the Na onal Coali on for Syrian Revolu onary and Opposi on Forces, formed
in late 2012. The United Kingdom and France have stepped back from o ering such
signi cant support to the rebels as those countries originally indicated they would
provide. London and Paris are now more reluctant to link themselves so rmly to
one fac on in the con ict.
European ministers talk of sponsoring a “mutually agreed settlement” in Syria they
s ll insist that this would entail Assad’s departure, but as prelude to an accord with
other parts of the regime. The European aim has decidedly shifted to resuscita ng
45
a media on process sponsored by the UN. After the August 2013 chemical weap
ons attacks near Damascus, Ashton responded by calling not for democracy but
for media on and for the Geneva dialogue process to be reconvened. While Eu
ropean rhetoric remains ercely cri cal of Assad, the pragma c policy focus is
now on the kind of dialogue process that can be set up between regime and op
posi on forces—and to what degree jihadist groups could and should be includ
ed.
BALANCING MEDIATION AND POLITICAL REFORM
The European focus on media on, consensus building, and allevia ng polariza on
would appear ins nc vely sensible in today’s Middle East. It is indeed necessary
and unsurprising—ignoring such impera ves is hardly an op on in current cir
cumstances.
Cul va ng some sense of na onal ci zenship that prevails over comba ve sec
tarian iden es is a prerequisite to sustainable poli cal reform.
The case for media on is that consensus is a necessary precondi on for demo
cra c reform. Indeed, e orts to support inclusive bargaining must take root be
fore there is any hope for successful poli cal reform or economic improve
ment.20 Many would concur that the painstaking and delicate crafting of a con
sensual democracy is a path uniquely desirable in such a sect-riven region. Cul
va ng some sense of na onal ci zenship that prevails over comba ve sectarian
iden es is a prerequisite to sustainable poli cal reform.
Yet there are important nuances to this argument. Dialogue and consensus are
hardly controversial in themselves, par cularly where polariza on currently tears
socie es apart. The nub of the matter is how the aim of tempering con ict and
tension through media on relates to that of fostering democra c reform. The
right balance between making pacts and popular mobiliza on is an issue that
con nues to engender debate between the most prominent experts on demo
cra c transi on.21 What advocacy of inclusive na onal dialogue some mes im
plies is that poli cal reform should be limited or delayed un l dialogue forums
reach more formal agreement on how to advance democra c transi ons. But
consensus is not necessarily best achieved through forms of dialogue that heavily
restrict poli cal reform.
An overly primary focus on media on harbors risks. Where accorded too much
centrality, media on can be an excuse for inac on. Interna onal actors that are
primarily concerned with consensus building can slip into a conveniently comfort
able passivity. They can develop a weak agnos cism about whether democra c
reform is even a good thing. They can come close to a de facto preference for
semi-democracy or managed reform—well-inten oned but out of tune with
changing social dynamics across the region that press for more par cipa ve gov
ernance not rebalanced elite deals. Media on is hardly ever as neutral or bal
anced as it purports to be, and it habitually empowers gures that further down
46
the road act as inveterate spoilers to peace and liberal reform.
Actors promo ng this approach can also fail to appreciate how some degree of
poli cal liberaliza on is itself needed to set the condi ons for successful consen
sus-building media on. Media on cannot be seen only as an apoli cal groundclearing strategy. In fact, quite the opposite is the case—its prospects are them
selves condi oned by poli cal structures. True democra c change needs some
degree of prior consensus, but meaningful consensus also needs space and chan
nels for the people to debate their poli cal op ons openly.
The focus on media ng divisions must be kept within proper propor on, as one
important but not overly dominant element of a rounded policy.
For all these reasons, the focus on media ng divisions must be kept within proper
propor on, as one important but not overly dominant element of a rounded poli
cy. Media on without structural change is likely to be untenable. Some degree of
liberaliza on of the poli cal system is necessary to ensure that all actors have a
voice in the consensus-building media on process.
In Egypt, for example, the EU has rightly striven to encourage dialogue, but most
opposi on groups complain that the increasingly repressive condi ons exclude
key forces and make it unlikely that talks can produce tangible results. Popular
hos lity has grown toward the army because its heavy-handed tac cs have under
cut the broad support it enjoyed after ous ng Morsi, but an pathy remains strong
toward the Muslim Brotherhood among other parts of the opposi on. One thing
the army and the Muslim Brotherhood appear to converge on is a penchant for
repressive leadership styles. Many talk about the need for dialogue and consen
sus, but all actors are not provided equal access to such dialogue. Some prior re
form is needed to pave the way for a more inclusive process.
In Syria, too, the tension between dialogue aims and the amount of poli cal space
for opposing voices is increasingly problema c. The European focus has shifted
from wholesale regime-exit to the sponsorship of a process that is at least par ally
open-ended. But mutual mistrust and the lack of a structure that allows for open
channels of communica on between all sides have hindered dialogue. Many Free
Syrian Army members are held back in laying down their arms by the fact that
they do not trust the regime to s ck to any promised amnesty accords. Nego
a ng an agreement will rst require the regime to loosen its grip and reform to a
degree.
In Jordan, the Islamic Ac on Front has sharply cri cized the EU for pressing it to
engage in a na onal dialogue that it dismisses as based on an en rely disingenu
ous reform commitment from the king. This is an example of how opposi on forc
es can often see in external actors’ support for impar al and generic dialogue a
covert form of support for a regime’s stalling tac cs. For example, the EU jus es
projects that support government-organized nongovernmental organiza ons in
Jordan as part of its bridge-building approach, but local reformers commonly des
47
pise these groups. Rather than reducing fric on, external support to these organi
za ons heightens local tension. To move forward, the EU will have to promote
more genuine and tangible poli cal reform to ank and help sustain the process of
na onal dialogue.
To move forward, the EU will have to promote more genuine and tangible poli cal
reform to ank and help sustain the process of na onal dialogue.
Even in the rela ve success story of Tunisia, the EU’s altered approach now some
mes attracts cri cism for dilu ng democra c reforms. For example, Tunisia’s con
s tu on remains ambivalent on many issues of personal freedom. But rather than
undertaking projects to promote these basic rights that would guarantee the kind
of open debate needed to generate consensus, the EU has focused on celebra ng
the inclusive process that produced the document.
The cri cal responses from the region warn that the EU’s support for media on is
becoming too much of an end in itself rather than one integral part of a holis c pol
icy of democracy support. Indeed, o cials in the EU’s Media on Support Team
acknowledge that they have eschewed any signi cant focus on democracy support
and that democracy promo on is not in any way linked to their ac vi es. There is
ongoing debate in the External Ac on Service over the compe ng merits of
“media on” rela ve to “poli cal dialogue,” and whether the balance of e ort
needs to shift toward the longer-term parameters implied by the latter concept.
And a commissioned review of the Media on Support Team concluded that the
EU’s approach is ad hoc rather than comprehensive and oriented to short-term en
gagements in moments of acute crisis in a way that is poorly linked to more under
lying and ongoing policy engagements.22
The EU tends to favor very formal media on at a track-one level over looser dia
logue e orts that embrace more reform-oriented “track-three” civil society ac
tors.23 This focus is in part a product of geopoli cs. To some extent, the EU now
sees the challenge of dealing with a polarized Middle East as about keeping its
Southern neighborhood at bay. It priori zes very tradi onal, old-style diploma c
media on to achieve that aim. This is quite di erent from the early op mism of the
Arab Spring, when the EU talked of democra za on opening the doors to deeper
coopera on and even ins tu onalized integra on between European and Arab
states. The risk is that the EU will come to expect too much of media on on its
own.
EU representa ves increasingly recognize the need for ne-tuning. They
acknowledge that di erences have widened too much in Egypt for their dialogue
e orts to gain trac on and that for now the aim needs to be to protect very basic
rights in the country. EU o cials insist they are aware of the risks of rehabilita ng
discredited elites through na onal dialogues. Dialogue is needed, they aver, but
built on the founda ons of pluralism rather than regime-engineered parameters.
So far, the Media on Support Team has focused on trying to bring together various
48
EU instruments so as to leverage poli cal in uence over dialogue processes—
rather than actually leading media on per se. And another recognized challenge is
to iron out inconsistencies, for example the widely held percep on that the EU has
pressed to include insurgents in dialogue processes far more in Syria than it did in
Iraq. This area of policy is in uid evolu on, as it seeks the right balances in each
Middle Eastern state.
GOING FORWARD: A BALANCED FRAMEWORK
Democra c reform in the Middle East requires a balanced combina on of consen
sual dialogue and pluralis c compe on. The focus on media ng division and gen
era ng consensus is well-conceived. But, there are signs that the EU—collec vely
and through member state governments’ na onal diplomacy—is pursuing it in an
imbalanced fashion and that this is eclipsing necessary concerns about core re
forms.
The concept of inclusive processes of dialogue aimed at genera ng consensus on
basic poli cal rules would appear to be uncontroversial. It is di cult to oppose
such a reasonable no on. And it seems rather obvious that democra za on is un
likely where major tensions persist over core ques ons of iden ty and statehood.
Care must be taken that na onal dialogues do not become so entrenched that they
turn into sources of policymaking that bypass representa ve bodies.
However, opera onalizing that sensible principle is far from easy—and e orts to
do so often engender new types of tension in their wake. What “inclusion” means
in prac ce can frequently be less than straightforward. And where e orts are not
rooted in ongoing processes of reform, na onal dialogues can inadvertent
ly deepen polariza on if mutually sa sfactory win-win outcomes are not possi
ble.24 Care must be taken that na onal dialogues do not become so entrenched
that they turn into sources of policymaking that bypass representa ve bodies.
Simply advoca ng “inclusive dialogue” does not in itself address the structural rea
sons why a country lacks a normal, peaceable process of consulta on. Some struc
tural issues make it impossible for actors to par cipate in dialogue on equal
foo ng. In countries like Egypt, a ghtening of poli cal space clearly gives some
actors more power than others. If those poli cal problems are not addressed, any
media on process is unlikely to produce results that the whole of society can ac
cept.
Under these condi ons, dialogue cannot be a benignly neutral approach to policy.
It has to be supplemented with e orts to balance underlying power rela ons.
Often, a more level playing eld is required to make dialogue and consensus seek
ing legi mate. More radical groups are again on the rise precisely because they feel
shut out from formal ins tu onal avenues.25 Once again, it is, in part, the paucity of
reform that is driving divergent and polarizing poli cal iden es.
This is not to argue that the focus on tempering polariza on is mistaken. But the
49
interna onal community must do more than simply herd clashing fac ons into setpiece dialogues. It must also seek to understand and fashion the kind of condi ons
that enable media on to result in sustainable convergence between adversarial
poli cal actors. After all, if opinions were such that a little dialogue su ced to pro
duce consensus, an e ort to engineer formal forums would almost by de ni on be
super uous.
The EU needs to be more than a provider of good o ces. European actors jus fy
the focus on media on in pursuit of locally generated consensus as a kind of liberal
neutrality, but if not combined with other elements of policy, it can cloak very illib
eral outcomes. Liberal neutrality can easily become its own travesty. The current
quasi-neutrality can, in at least some circumstances, look like adisplacement of
proper strategy. It can re ect a reluctance to strategize, more than represen ng
comprehensive strategy in itself.
Some aspects of European governments’ policy now replicate the dire historical
and colonial experiences of allying with local notables in places like Iraq, Algeria,
and Syria—a startling inability to learn from a recent history that so blighted the
European image across parts of the region. They risk conferring status on such g
ures in a way that widens their disconnec on from local society. Attempts to engi
neer fraught and precise power balances, rather than core poli cal principles, can
easily seduce outside actors into extremely harmful forms of engagement.
Pacted transi ons have many advantages, but the spirit of the Arab Spring was es
sen ally about a s rring, fear-bus ng, civic-led ac vism. Too much elite-driven ne
go a ng is likely to deviate too far from this ethos and reproduce the very factors
that sparked the rst revolts in 2010 and 2011.
A very ne and blurred line exists between admirable nego ated transi on and the
kind of consensus that enables vested interests to su ocate reforms. Arguably,
there are signs that the EU is insu ciently seized of the latter danger.
The challenge is to nd a mutually sustaining equilibrium. There must be consensu
al dialogue of a type that supports reform momentum but also enough reform mo
mentum for the seeds of consensus to germinate. It is in this rela onship between
media on and reform aims that a new framework for assessing external actors’
role in today’s divided Middle East is most required.
NOTES
1 Anouar Boukhars, Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, Raphaël Lefèvre, Marwan
Muasher, Frederic Wehrey, Katherine Wilkens, and Scott Williamson, “The Egypt
E ect: Sharpened Tensions, Reshuffled Alliances,” Carnegie Endowment for Inter
na onal Peace, February 2014,http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/13/egypte ect-sharpened-tensions-reshuffled-alliances/h0tb.
2 “Yemen’s Na onal Dialogue Conference Concludes With Agreement,” BBC News,
50
January 21, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25835721.
3 Stefan Wol , “Managing Expecta ons: Yemen’s Na onal Dialogue Confer
ence,”World Politics Review, July 23, 2013,www.worldpoli csreview.com/
ar cles/13104/managing-expecta ons-yemen-s-na onal-dialogue-conference.
4 Tim O. Petschulat, “Poli cal Change With Pitfall: An Interim Report on the Yemeni
Transi on Process,” Friedrich Ebert S ftung Yemen, September 2012,http://
library.fes.de/pdf- les/iez/09355.pdf.
5 Toby Matthiesen, “EU Foreign Policy Toward Bahrain in the Aftermath of the Up
rising,” in The Gulf States and the Arab Uprisings, ed. Ana Echague (Madrid: FRIDE,
2013).
6 “Bahrain Na onal Dialogue Resumes—In Revamped Format,” Monitor Global
Outlook, January 16, 2014, http://monitorfron ermarkets.com/news-story/bahrain
-na onal-dialogue-resumes-in-revamped-format.
7 Bill Law, “Time Running Out as Bahrain Tries to Revive Na onal Dialogue,” BBC
News, January 30, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25918628.
8 Peter Seeberg, “Lebanon, Dual Legi macy, and the Syrian Crisis,” Op-Med, Ger
man Marshall Fund of the United States, November 2013.
9 S. Heyderman, “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (October 2013): 61 and 65.
10 Roy McCarthy, “U.S. Opponents to Boycott Iraqi Na onal Conference,”Guardian,
July 10, 2004,www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/10/iraq.rorymccarthy.
11 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Na onal Conference,” Council on Foreign Rela
ons, August 17, 2004, www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-na onal-conference/p7638.
12 Ka a Papagianni, “Na onal Conferences in Transi onal Periods: The Case of
Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 3 (2006).
13 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights, CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2013.
14 The EU Council in 2009 agreed on a “Concept on Strengthening EU Media on
and Dialogue Capaci es,” Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 10,
2009 EEAS, “Strengthening Na onal Capaci es for Media on and Dialogue: Na
onal Dialogue Platforms and Infrastructures for Peace,” European Union External
Ac on, Factsheet—EEAS Media on Support Project: Knowledge Product, Novem
ber 2012, 1.
15 EEAS, “Strengthening Na onal Capaci es for Media on and Dialogue,” 2.
16 “Statement by the EU High Representa ve Catherine Ashton on the Situa on in
Egypt Ahead of the Cons tu onal Referendum,” European Union External Ac on,
140111/01, Brussels, January 11, 2014,http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
51
docs/2014/140111_01_en.pdf.
17 EU General A airs council conclusions, February 10, 2014.
18 “Statement by EU High Representa ve Catherine Ashton on the Launch of Na
onal Dialogue in Bahrain,” European Union External Ac on, A 75/13, Brussels,
February 11, 2013,www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
EN/fora /135387.pdf.
19 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Yemen,” 3199th Foreign
A airs Council Mee ng, Brussels, November 19, 2012,www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/fora /133570.pdf.
20 Michele Dunne, “Storms of the Arab Spring,” Current History 112, no. 758
(December 2013).
21 Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Donald L. Horowitz, and Marc F. Plattner,
“Reconsidering the ‘Transi on Paradigm,’” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1 (January
2014): 86–100.
22 A. Sherri , V. Hauck, and C. Rocca, “Glass Half Full: Study on EU Lessons Learnt
in Media on and Dialogue,” study submitted to the European External Ac on Ser
vice by ECDPM through the AETS Consor um—Cardno (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2013).
23 V. Hauck and A. Sherri , “EEAS Media on Support Pilot Project Evaluatory Re
view,” study submitted to EEAS by ECDPM through the AETS Consor um—Cardno
(Maastricht: ECDPM, 2013).
24 “The Role of Poli cal Dialogue in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: An Interpreta
on of Current Experience,” Working Paper 1, in The Road to the New Deal, 2010–
2011 Internal Dialogue Working Groups, Interna onal Dialogue on Peacebuilding
and Statebuilding, 10–11.
25 Anouar Boukhars, “North Africa: Back to the Future?” in Challenges for European Foreign Policy 2014: The EU’s Extended Neighbourhood, eds. G. Grevi and D.
Keohane (Madrid: FRIDE, 2014), 29.
52
CAR
Will Central A rican Republic bec
icals?
e a battlegr und
T reat Central A rican Republic bec ing latest battlegr und
cals is increasing as c untry re ains di ided
Mar 27 2014
r religi us radr religi us radi-
MICHELLE SHEPHARD / TORONTO STAR Order this photo
Muslim civilians taking shelter near a mosque in Bangui's PK12 neighourhood
hold a noonday demonstra on earlier this month. Frustra on among some
groups is growing toward the French troops who arrived in the Central African
Republic in December.
BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC—The threat of the Central African Repub
lic becoming the latest battleground for religious radicals is increasing as the coun
try remains divided and the security situa on precarious.
In a wide-ranging interview with the Toronto Star, the country’s top United Na ons
representa ve warned that the con ict will spill beyond its borders if the country’s
Muslim and Chris an popula ons do not reconcile and civilians remain fearful of
returning home.
Al Qaeda-linked groups in nearby Mali and Nigeria are ci ng the plight of CAR’s
Muslim popula on with increasing frequency and are encouraging attacks against
53
France, which sent troops here in December after gh ng left 1,000 dead in just
two days.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) accuses the French of launching a
“crusade against Islam,” and a leader with the Nigerian-based Boko Haram has re
portedly vowed to avenge the deaths of the country’s Muslims.
The Central African Republic is even cited by ghters purportedly in Syria — includ
ing one bizarre, but slickly produced 18-minute video by German ex-rapper “Deso
Dogg,” who calls for jihad.
Such hos le statements are being followed “very, very carefully,” said Lt. Gen.
(re red) Babacar Gaye, the UN’s highest-ranking o cial in Bangui and special advis
er to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
“I hope that we will be in a posi on to expedite whatever should be done in terms
of reconcilia on in terms of the communi es. I think this is the best way to delay . .
. any ac ons of these terrorist groups,” he said. “Not only will they not have rea
sons to come, there will be no grievances that may serve the jus ca on.”
But CAR remains dangerously split — with Muslim residents occupying only two
neighbourhoods in the capital Bangui, and the rest seeking refuge in the north or
neighbouring countries.
The country was once mercilessly ruled by a mainly Muslim mili a known as the
Seleka, which included ghters from Chad and Sudan. Vigilante squads known as
an -balaka, which drew members from the majority Chris an popula on, clashed
with the Seleka, promp ng the French and African Union forces to intervene. Sele
ka-backed President Michel Djotodia was pushed from power in January and Cathe
rine Samba-Panza, Bangui’s former mayor, was appointed interim president.
The roots of this con ict, which has killed thousands and threatens to permanently
divide this small landlocked country, are complicated and not about religion. The
Seleka did not call for a state governed by Islamic law, nor did they espouse the
ideology favoured by groups such as AQIM. Just a year ago there was religious har
mony in CAR — mosques and churches are only blocks apart in the capital, commu
ni es mixed and intermarriage between faiths is common.
But in retribu on for months of Seleka killings, sexual violence and loo ng, the an
-balaka blindly targeted all Muslims. Women and children are among the dead.
At a recent demonstra on in PK12, a makeshift camp of Muslim women and chil
dren, cri cism was directed at the French for not ensuring the security of Muslim
residents. Ibrahim Alawad, the 52-year-old self-appointed leader of the camp and a
former member of the Sudan People’s Libera on Army who organized the small
march, will list a litany of alleged crimes of the French troops sta oned nearby to
visi ng reporters.
54
The ques on is whether the cycle of killings will con nue as the Seleka regroups in
the north and seeks outside help. Of par cular concern to intelligence and security
services is the largely remote northern Vakaga province, which shares a border
with Sudan’s Darfur region. The whereabouts of Seleka leader Noureddine Adam
and reports that he has travelled to Nigeria fuel specula on of future Boko Haram
involvement.
For now, the extremist calls for jihad are just rhetoric. And Islamic militant groups
opera ng in Africa would face signi cant logis cal hurdles, including CAR’s unfamil
iar terrain. “Their familiarity with often harsh and inhospitable desert condi ons
have given them the edge over regional and/or interna onal forces tasked with up
roo ng them from such areas,” wrote security analyst Ryan Cummings recently
in Think African Press. “However, these desert plains of North and West Africa
di er considerably with the jungle and savannah bushes which comprise much of
the CAR.”
But Gaye said the extremist threats are not being taken lightly and without addi
onal peacekeepers and increased interna onal funding, the interim government
under Samba-Panza is des ned to fail. “Today the reality is very simple,” he said.
“Without interna onal community support, it won’t be possible for this new gov
ernment — upon which we put a lot of expecta ons — it will not be possible for
them to deliver.”
Ban’s call for a UN peacekeeping mission of 12,000 troops and police to join the
2,000-strong French force and 6,000 African Union peacekeepers here is being de
bated by the Security Council. Gaye welcomed news that Canadian senator and re
red Gen. Romeo Dallaire is urging Canada to join the mission if approved.
Also a veteran peacekeeper, Gaye said he served alongside Canadian forces during
his rst mission in Sinai, in 1974. “We had excellent rela ons, probably because of
the French-speaking proximity but also because they are very professional and ex
perienced in peacekeeping,” he said. “We are expec ng the return of Canada to
peacekeeping.”
Beyond the gates of the UN compound where we sat during the recent interview,
there was a decep ve calm in Bangui. Life is slowly returning to the downtown
streets, where just a couple months ago res burned and discarded bodies lay un
claimed.
Stores owned by Chris an merchants have reopened and students have returned
to school, although the numbers are small as most parents are s ll too frightened
to leave their children alone. Later that evening, before the nightly curfew, the
setting sun casts a warm glow over roadside pa os where men and women unwind
over large bottles of the local Mocaf beer.
But that calm is easily shattered by evening gun re and attacks in the two remain
ing Muslim neighbourhoods of PK5 and PK12, and the French and AU tanks that
55
patrol the streets are a reminder of what is needed to ensure security in a city
that lacks a func oning police force, army or court system.
Since Saturday, the violence spiked again. The Red Cross has recorded 15 civilian
deaths and Médecins Sans Fron ères reports that it has treated 38 people for life
-threatening wounds.
http://www.thestar.com/
56
Egypt
9 Sentenced t
eat in My C untry
March 27, 2014
Egypt’s criminal court in El-Minya recommends death penalty sentences for Mus
lim Brotherhood opera ves. The writer ponders the interna onal response to this
decision.
Ashraf Ramelah, founder and president of Voice of the Copts, has recently given
tes mony to the Canadian Parliament on the revolu on taking place in Egypt.
Please visit www.voiceofthecopts.org to read more.
Egypt’s criminal court in El-Minya recommends death penalty sentences for Mus
lim Brotherhood opera ves
On Monday March 24, Egypt’s criminal court sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood
members to death. In less than 48 hours, Judge Saeed Yosef of the court of ElMinya, south of Cairo, weighed the evidence in accusa on documents presented
to the court and recommended the death penalty for 529 individuals of the 1229
defendants (all Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members involved in Muhammed
Morsi’s rise to power and administra on).
Only the 147 defendants in custody appeared in court. Many of the sentenced
(398 persons) are in hiding and therefore absent from court. Seventeen names
were found innocent.
According to Egyp an law, procedure calls for the court’s recommenda on to de
pend on nal approval by the Grand Mufti of Cairo, an iden tyseparate from
Egypt’s government and the highest religious Islamic posi on to issue legal edits
(fatwas) by interpre ng the Quran who must seal any death sentence by the civil
courts with a fatwa. Once the Grand Mufti approves or denies the court’s verdict,
a nal verdict will be issued by Judge Yosef in another court hearing set for April
28.
The remaining 683 defendants are scheduled for trial on April 28 as well. Among
those to appear for the next trial date are such notables as MB spiritual leader,
Mohammed Badee, and former president of the Egyp an parliament, Moham
med El Katatani.
Evidence documents presented to court showed defendants responsible for
crimes of upheaval and chaos against the state
The defendants were arrested for violence and riots in the streets of El Minya up
on Muhammed Morsi’s removal last July. These riots were related to the AlAdawia and Al-Nahda sit-ins that the world saw in falsi ed pictures by AlJazeera presen ng a vic mized MB and tou ng peaceful protesters. Some of the
charges include assault by rocks, Molotov cocktails and gun re on the Matay po
57
lice sta on, the death of a colonel deputy police sheri , the attempt to murder a
second police o cer, setting re to the police sta on and police vehicles after seiz
ing police weapons, and invading the public health center to kidnap and mu late
the Colonel’s body.
Courts around the country are busy with trials concerning similar incidents.
In addi on to the convic ons of the El Minya trial, Egyp an courts in many other
locales are busy holding MB members on trial for terror ac vi es:
In Cairo, Judge Mustafa Al Feeky who heads the court inside the Cairo Police Acade
my con nued a case against 104 members of the MB charged with Al Zaher (area in
Cairo) clashes resul ng in the killing and injury of ci zens, damaging public and pri
vate buildings and acts of in mida on against ci zens opposed to Islamist control
of their streets.
The Misdemeanor Court of Alexandria in Al Dekhela sentenced four MB members
to ve years in jail with forced labor for February 2014 crimes involving violence
during one or more unauthorized gatherings or demonstra ons in that neighbor
hood.
In the city called the Tenth of Ramadan in El Sharkia province, nine MB members
were arrested and held in prison for 15 days pending an inves ga on requested by
the public prosecutor. A 14 year-old student under arrest was placed in custody in a
juvenile home. Their charges include belonging to a terrorist group, par cipa ng in
unauthorized marches, chan ng slogans against the army and police and attacking
people. At the me of their arrests, they possessed a large stash of illegal rearms.
Reac
n t Egypt’s guilty erdicts
A statement issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan condemns the El Minya
court verdict. The statement considers the verdict a poli cal one and the MB vic
ms of military repression since the 529 persons sentenced are ghters for Allah
and “democracy.”
Meanwhile in various Egyp an universi es supporters of the banned Muslim Broth
erhood are protes ng the verdicts.
Catherine Ashton, Minister of Foreign A airs of the European Union, normally silent
on human rights viola ons in Egypt, voiced concern over the death sentences as
incommensurate with interna onal human rights standards. Apparently seeing it as
too harsh a sentence for terrorists working for decades to overturn the state and
undermining a wave of secularism with criminal ac vi es, she noted that Washing
ton viewed theevidence and the tes mony with skep cism as to fairness.
C nclusi n
The United States is shocked by the number of sentenced people, spokeswoman for
State department Marie Har “is sure to raise this issue with Egyp an government”,
adding “ and it is logical that the trial of the sheer number in two days , this is con
58
trary to logic and interna onal standards. Har , in her one-way pro-Muslim
Brotherhood ignored what Egyp ans su ered from brutal Islamists over the last
three years and how US never condemned killing of innocents or the destruc on of
churches, businesses and government buildings.
The Egyp an Foreign Ministry in a statement commen ng on the verdict, said it
was issued by an independent court, and after careful considera on of the issue
and that the defendants can appeal the ruling to the Court of Cassa on.
Is this a travesty or will it be known as the day of terror-control and a turning point
for jus ce and law and order?
http://www.israelna onalnews.com/Ar cles/Ar cle.aspx/14743#.UzQyyPldWSo
59
Libya
p-Ed: Libya acing p ssible ci il war asks
r elp against terr ris
MAR 20, 2014
Benghazi - The Libyan government has
asked both the UN and the interna onal
community to help it ght what it calls a
war on terrorism as the country appears
to be facing growing instability and chaos.
The government faces growing protests
as well as escala ng con ict with the
semi-autonomous eastern area of Cyre
naica. There a powerful mili a that sup
ports the autonomy movement has block
aded several oil ports including Es Sider and Tobruk and tried to sell and ship oil
independently of the central government.
On March 17 a blast killed 11 cadets in a Benghazi bombing targe ng a gradua on
at a military academy. O cials of the central government are frequent targets in
the area. The bodies of two armoured car guards kidnapped in the city of Derna
were found. There were also clashes between pro-government forces and rebel
mili as in Sirte in central Libya.
A statement on a government website said: Libya's interim government asks the
interna onal community and especially the United Na ons to provide assistance to
uproot terrorism, The government con rms that it wants this war on terror and its
crimes to start as soon as possible.
The government did not specify what help it wanted but western, Arab, and other
countries have been training thousands of LIbyan to form an army and police force.
The US has been clandes nely involved in Libya for some me through the CIA and
Special Forces and most recently by use of Navy Seals to seize a boat, the Morning
Glory, that had been loaded with oil by rebels at the port of El Sider. The boat had
escaped Libyan forces and was seized o the coast of Cyprus. It is being guided to a
Libyan port under control of the central government.
Ibrahim Jathran, the leader of the group, controlling several ports since last sum
mer responded with anger to the US seizure accusing the U.S. of piracy: We will
con nue our ght for our right to dream of a better tomorrow for our children and
families, said Jathran, calling for the United Na ons and Arab League to intervene
to help the people of eastern Libya. We urge the United States government to re
frain from siding with the extremists currently holding power in Tripoli,
After the oil tanker escaped from Libya parliament red prime minister Ari Zeidan
who ed to Europe fearing charges against him as well. The country seems to be
60
dividing up into compe ng groups of mili as often based upon tribal loyal es and
also into compe ng geographical areas based upon the tradi onal division into Cyr
enaica in the east Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan to the south. Some further
descrip ons of the mili a and their leaders can be found here and here.
US involvement in Libya is increasing as it commits more personnel
to training Libyan security forces:A small team of soldiers will go into Libya in the
coming weeks to begin prepara ons for a larger U.S. mission to train Libyan troops
in Bulgaria, a senior Army o cial said Wednesday
Security is so bad in Libya that training is taking place in Bulgaria. Libyan mili as
and others may not look upon foreign-trained troops as ac ng in the interests of
Libya but of the countries that trained them. The U,S. has already alienated Cyrena
ica and in e ect has taken sides against it in what could be a developing civil war.
Read more: http://www.digitaljournal.com/
61
Libya seeks w rld elp after b
bings
19 March 2014
Libya called on the United Na ons and interna onal community to help ght what
it called a war on terrorism, the government said on Wednesday, struggling to stop
the major oil producer sliding into widening chaos and instability.
The appeal came after a wave of bombings and assassina ons in the eastern city of
Benghazi and clashes between pro-government forces and a rebel mili a control
ling major oil ports in Sirte in central Libya.
The violence is part of turmoil in the North African country where the government
in unable to control mili as that helped overthrow Muammar Gadda in 2011 but
kept their weapons to grab oil wealth and power.
Terrorist groups had declared war on Benghazi, Sirte and other ci es, the govern
ment said. A powerful car bomb targe ng an army academy killed at least eight
people in Benghazi on Monday.
Libya's interim government asks the interna onal community and especially the
United Na ons to provide assistance to uproot terrorism, the government said in
a statement posted on its website.
The government con rms that it wants this war on terror and its crimes to start as
soon as possible, it said.
The weak central government did not say what kind of help it expected. Western,
Arab and African countries have been training thousands of Libyans to build up an
army and police but progress has been slow.
Major oil facili es are out of control of the Tripoli government since armed groups
and tribesmen seized them, knocking down oil exports, the country's lifeline, to a
trickle.
The government has said it will end, if necessary by force, a blockage of major ports
in the oil-rich east by a rebel group demanding regional autonomy and more oil
revenues. But analysts are scep cal the nascent army can confront the group.
The rebel mili a group managed earlier this month to load oil for export onto a
tanker but U.S. Navy Seals stormed the vessel o the Cyprus coast on Sunday. Reuters
Source: http://www.tradearabia.com/news/
62
Trip li
ws t fig t terr rist gr ups
21 March 2014
The Libyan government yesterday vowed to ght terrorism, in its rst acknowl
edgement that “terrorist groups” were behind dozens of attacks against security
services and Westerners.
Three years after a revolu on toppled former Libyan leader Muammar Qadda
and left the country awash with guns, near-daily attacks con nue unchecked
across the na on.
“The na on nds itself in a confronta on with terrorist groups, and it falls upon
the government to mobilize its military and security forces to ght this scourge,”
the government said in a statement on its Web site.
“There will be no place for terrorism in Libya ... and Libyans must be prepared for
such a battle in terms of cau on, awareness and sacri ce,” the statement said.
Eastern Libya has become a bas on of Islamist extremists, with authori es avoid
ing a full-blown confronta on with heavily armed former rebels pending the for
ma on of a regular army and police force.
The government indicated it would turn to “the na onal military force as it is of
now” in its ght against terrorism, alluding to pro-government mili as that battled
Qadda ’s regime in the 2011 uprising.
The statement was published after a Cabinet mee ng held in the southern town of
Ghat, two days after a car bomb at a military academy in the eastern city of Ben
ghazi left at least seven soldiers dead.
It also comes after parliament on Tuesday ousted former Libyan prime minister Ali
Zeidan over his failure to bring law and order to the country.
The government said “the ci es of Benghazi, Derna and Sirte and others are facing
a terrorist war carried out by Libyan and foreign elements with hos le inten ons.”
Libyan authori es did not men on any par cular group, but these ci es are
strongholds of extremists such as the jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia, placed on the
US’ terror list in January.
Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of waging attacks against judges and security forces,
but also of being behind attacks on Western interests such as an assault on the US
mission in 2012 that killed the ambassador and three other Americans.
There have also been a string of attacks and kidnappings targe ng foreigners in
the North African na on in recent months.
Source: http://www.taipei mes.com/
63
Libya
bili es
rces t fig t terr rist gr ups
20 March 2014
Boys, carrying ags, sit on a tank in Benghazi, March 19, 2014, during the third anniversary of
an attack by pro-Gadha forces on Benghazi. REUTERS/Esam Omran Al-Fetori
TRIPOLI: Libya's government announced Thursday it was mobilizing its security
forces after acknowledging for the rst me that terrorist groups were behind
dozens of attacks against security services and Westerners.
Three years after a revolu on toppled long- me dictator Moamer Kadha and left
the country awash with guns, near-daily attacks con nue unchecked across Libya.
An overnight government statement called on the interna onal community and in
par cular the United Na ons to provide the necessary support to eradicate terror
ism in Libyan ci es .
The na on nds itself in a confronta on with terrorist groups, and it falls upon the
government to mobilise its military and security forces to ght this scourge, said
the statement, published on the government's website.
There will be no place for terrorism in Libya... and Libyans must be prepared for
such a battle in terms of cau on, awareness and sacri ce, said the statement.
Eastern Libya has become a bas on of Islamist extremists, with authori es un l
now avoiding a full-blown confronta on with heavily armed former rebels pending
the forma on of a regular army and police force.
64
The government indicated it would turn to the na onal military force as it is of
now in its ght against terrorism, alluding to pro-government mili as that battled
Kadha 's regime in the 2011 uprising.
While welcoming the o cial change of stance by the central authori es, analysts
ques oned whether they had the means at their disposal to carry through with
their threats.
The language of the government statement is the strongest yet since the death of
Moamer Kadha in October 2011, said Libyan security expert Abdelmoneim alAkuri.
But the government did not specify who are the terrorists it intends to confront
nor how they intend to do so.
Poli cal analyst Salem al-Allagui cau oned that the call for interna onal help
should not be interpreted as foreign interven on, which could transform the coun
try into a land of jihadists to which extremists will ock to ght Western powers.
Allagui said the government faced an uphill battle as militants who have un l now
mainly targeted the security forces and Westerners could swing their sights on civil
ians and public places.
The government statement was published after a cabinet mee ng held in the
southern town of Ghat, two days after a car bomb at a military academy in the res
ve eastern city of Benghazi left at least seven soldiers dead.
It also comes after parliament last week ousted prime minister Ali Zeidan over his
failure to bring law and order to the country.
The government said the ci es of Benghazi, Derna and Sirte and others are facing
a terrorist war carried out by Libyan and foreign elements with hos le inten ons.
Libyan authori es did not men on any par cular group, but these ci es are strong
holds of extremists such as the jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia, which was placed on
the US terror list in January.
- Ansar al-Sharia suspected Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of waging attacks against judges and security forces,
but also of being behind attacks on Western interests such as a 2012 assault on the
US consulate in Benghazi that killed the ambassador and three other Americans.
There have also been a string of attacks and kidnappings targe ng foreigners in the
North African na on.
A French engineer was shot dead in Benghazi on March 2 and a Bri sh man and a
New Zealand woman were also found shot dead on a beach southwest of the capi
tal in January.
In December, an American teacher was killed in Benghazi, and two French guards
65
were wounded in a car bombing outside France's embassy in Tripoli last April 23.
Three years after the uprising, the government has come under increasing cri cism
from Libyans who accuse it of corrup on and failing to provide security.
Criminals roam the streets, and rival tribes shoot it out to settle long-standing dis
putes, while many ex-rebels have formed powerful mili as rather than integra ng
into the regular armed forces and police.
Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/.
66
Mali
Mali/t uareg: un e -cadre du MNLA cr e un
/
/
u e ent dissident
1
OUAGADOUGOU, 20 mars 2014 (AFP) - La Coali on du peuple pour l'Azawad (CPA),
une nouvelle organisa on regroupant toutes les communautés du nord du Mali ,
a été créée cette semaine par un ex-cadre du Mouvement na onal de libéra on de
l'Azawad (MNLA, touareg), a annoncé jeudi son fondateur.
La CPA, mise en place mardi, est consacrée à la défense des droits légi mes du
peuple de l'Azawad (nord du Mali) dans le processus de négocia ons prévues avec
Bamako, a indiqué son président Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, ancien haut cadre
du MNLA.
Elle mène le même combat poli que que le MNLA, mais dans un esprit moins va
-t-en guerre , a observé M. Assaleh.
Plusieurs membres du Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) et du Haut conseil
pour l'Unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), deux autres organisa ons arabe et touareg, ont
déjà rallié la CPA, ainsi que la grande majorité des militaires du MNLA, soit 8.000
hommes, a-t-il assuré.
"
ê
nous battrons sur la base des accords du 18 juin 2013 , a-t-il indiqué lors d'une con
férence de presse.
L'Azawad, un vaste territoire dans le nord du Mali, est considéré comme le berceau
des touareg, dont des représentants rebelles réclament l'autodétermina on.
"
v
v
'
O g
gou et nous voulons regrouper tous les mouvements de l'Azawad pour qu'en
semble nous parlions le même langage , a insisté M. Assaleh, qui est considéré
comme un modéré.
Le gouvernement malien a signé le 18 juin les accords de Ouagadougou avec les
groupes armés du nord du Mali, qui ont permis l'organisa on de l'élec on prési
den elle sur tout le territoire, mais qui tardent à être appliqués.
Les rebelles touareg ont été des alliés des islamistes armés qui ont occupé le nord
du Mali pendant plusieurs mois en 2012, avant qu'une interven on interna onale,
dirigée par la France et toujours en cours, ne chasse les jihadistes des grandes villes
de cette par e du pays.
http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/malitouareg-un-ex-cadre-du-mnla-cr-e-unmouvement-dissident
67
Mali: jus ce « en
du N rd N
arc e »
ais des pr gr s à aire sur les cri es
Mohamed A Bathily, ministre de la Jus ce, Garde des sceaux
AKAR La jus ce est « en arc e » au Mali en par culier c ntre les auteurs du putsc de
,
g
à
N ,
de deu N de d ense des dr its de l’H
e
Dans ce rapport publié jeudi in tulé « Mali: la jus ce en marche », la Fédéra on interna onale de
défense des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) et l’Associa on malienne de défense des droits de
l’Homme (AMDH) soulignent que »la volonté de faire avancer la jus ce pour juger les auteurs des
crimes commis lors de la crise malienne est manifeste ».
Elles se félicitent en par culier de « l’ouverture d’une instruc on judiciaire, le 14 mars, sur la mu
nerie du 30 septembre 2013″ à Ka , quar er général des putschistes près de Bamako, menée
par des hommes excédés par les avantages alors accordés à l’auteur du coup d’Etat du 22 mars
1 A
S
g q
ê
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v
1 .L
cette mu nerie avait fait au moins six morts.
Sanogo est également inculpé dans l’a aire dite des « bérets rouges », des militaires dèles au
président renversé Amadou Toumani Touré, dont une vingtaine de corps avaient été retrouvés
dans des charniers près de Bamako en décembre 2013.
Ces di érentes poursuites cons tuent « une avancée importante contre l’impunité au Mali », se
réjouissent la FIDH et l’AMDH, qui notent cependant que « beaucoup reste à faire, en par culier
dans le dossier des crimes du Nord qui regroupe des dizaines de procédures judiciaires dis
nctes ». Ces organisa ons « appellent à renforcer les enquêtes sur le terrain ainsi qu’à une plus
grande par cipa on des vic mes qui, ne sont à ce jour qu’une quinzaine à s’être cons tuées par
es civiles ».
Le rapport souligne en par culier que diverses exac ons attribuées aux forces armées maliennes
en 2013 « contre des civils ou de présumés jihadistes » dans le Nord semblent à ce jour n’avoir
fait l’objet d’aucune « condamna on judiciaire ».
Le putsch mené en mars 2012 par Sanogo , alors un obscur capitaine ensuite promu gé
néral avant de tomber en disgr ce n 2013 après l’entrée en fonc on du nouveau prési
dent élu Ibrahim Boubacar Ke ta, avait précipité la chute du nord du Mali aux mains de
groupes islamistes armés.
68
Ces groupes ont occupé cette région pendant plus de neuf mois avant d’en être en par e
chassés par une interven on militaire interna onale lancée à l’ini a ve de la France le
11 v
1
’
.
stb/aub
Communiqué commun FIDH / AMDH
La Fédéra on interna onale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH) et l’Associa
on malienne des droits de l’Homme (AMDH) publient aujourd’hui un rapport
in tulé « Mali : la jus ce en marche » qui analyse les avancées de la jus ce ma
lienne dans les procédures judiciaires à l’encontre des responsables présumés
des crimes perpétrés pendant la crise malienne de 2012-2013.
Nos organisa ons se félicitent que l’une de leurs principales recommanda ons
vient d’être mise en uvre, à savoir l’ouverture d’une instruc on judiciaire, le 14
mars 2014, sur la « mu nerie du 30 septembre 2013 » à la suite d’une plainte dé
posée par la FIDH et l’AMDH. L’inculpa on de 28 militaires dont 4 généraux dans
l’a aire dite des « bérets rouges disparus » cons tue également une avancée im
portante contre l’impunité au Mali.
Cependant, beaucoup reste à faire, en par culier dans le dossier des « crimes du
Nord » qui regroupe des dizaines de procédures judiciaires dis nctes. Nos organi
sa ons appellent à renforcer les enquêtes sur le terrain ainsi qu’à une plus
grande par cipa on des vic mes qui, ne sont à ce jour, qu’une quinzaine à s’être
cons tuées par es civiles dans ces procédures accompagnées dans leurs quête
de jus ce par l’AMDH et la FIDH.
« La volonté de faire avancer la justice pour juger les auteurs des crimes commis lors de la crise malienne est manifeste mais devrait inclure d’avantage de
victimes du Nord qui ont été les premiers témoins de ces crimes » a déclaré
Me Moctar Mariko, président de l’AMDH et avocat des vic mes.
Un an après le déclenchement des premières enquêtes, ce rapport est l’occasion
de faire un bilan d’étape de la lutte contre l’impunité menée par les autorités ma
liennes et par la Cour pénale interna onale, sur les crimes commis au cours de la
crise malienne en 2012 et 2013, tant par les groupes armés qui ont occupés le
Nord du Mali, que par certains militaires des Forces armées maliennes en 2013,
et les hommes d’Haya Sanogo, l’ex-chef de la junte du CNDRE.
Sur les crimes de la junte, nos organisa ons se félicitent de l’ouverture, le 14
mars 2014 d’une informa on judiciaire dans l’a aire dite de la « mu nerie du 30
septembre 2013 » pour « assassinat, enlèvement, séquestra ons et torture »
contre des proches du général Haya Sanogo et qui fait suite à la plainte déposée
par la FIDH et l’AMDH et au nom des 8 familles de vic mes, qu’elles représentent
dans cette a aire. L’ouverture de cette instruc on était l’une des principales re
69
commanda ons de ce rapport et une demande réitérée de la FIDH et de l’AMDH
en par culier depuis la découverte en février et mars 2014 de 6 corps dans 3
fosses communesde Ka qui s’avéreraient être selon nos informa ons des mili
taires exécutés par les proches du général Aya Sanogo à la suite de la mu nerie du
1 .
Dans l’a aire dite « des Bérets rouges disparus » au cours de la tenta ve de
contre-coup d’État d’avril 2012, le juge d’instruc on a procédé à l’inculpa on
pour « assassinat et complicité d’assassinat », de 28 personnes dont 4 généraux
parmi lesquels Aya Sanogo. Six d’entre eux ont été placés sous contrôle judiciaire
dont le dernier en date, le général Dahirou Dembélé, ex-chef d’État major des Ar
més, a été entendu et inculpé le 14 mars 2014. L’AMDH et la FIDH sont par es
civiles et accompagnent 23 familles de vic mes dans cette a aire.
« La justice malienne a accompli dans les six derniers mois des actes positifs et
hautement symboliques qui constituent les signaux d’une réelle volonté politique de ne pas laisser les auteurs de ces crime impunis » a déclaré Karim Lahidji,
président de la FIDH.
Concernant les dossiers des « crimes du Nord » au moins 201 personnes sont au
jourd’hui inculpées . Les récentes arresta ons d’importantes gures des groupes
armés djihadistes au Nord1 démontrent l’actualité et la per nence de ces dos
siers. Pourtant l’ac on de la jus ce malienne sur les crimes du Nord demeure ca
ractérisée par un très grand nombre de procédures judiciaires dis nctes, dont cer
taines sont déjà clôturées, et par la faible par cipa on des vic mes à ces procé
dures à l’excep on d’une quinzaine de vic mes cons tuées par es civiles et re
présentées par le pool d’avocats du Groupe d’ac on judiciaire de la FIDH et de
l’AMDH depuis novembre 2013.
Compte tenu du nombre d’informa ons judiciaires ouvertes sur ces faits, la FIDH
et l’AMDH recommandent à la jus ce malienne, d’une part d’approfondir les en
quêtes de terrain et d’autre part de renforcer la communica on autour de ces
dossiers a n de favoriser la percep on de l’ac on de la jus ce malienne ainsi que
la par cipa on des vic mes dans ces procédures. En n, nous déplorons que mal
gré les annonces de sanc ons, d’enquête et d’ouverture d’instruc ons judiciaires
par le parquet militaire en 2013, aucune instruc on judiciaire ne semble avoir été
e ec vement diligenter à ce jour contre les auteurs présumés d’exac ons au sein
des Forces armés maliennes (FAMA).
« La volonté de lutter contre l’impunité manifestée ces derniers mois devrait
guider les autorités maliennes à réaliser des progrès dans les dossiers des crimes
du Nord, notamment en créant les conditions d’une réelle participation des victimes aux procédures judiciaires, et en engageant des poursuites contre les militaires qui se seraient rendus responsables d’exactions pendant le conflit. Autant
70
d’actions nécessaires à la tenue d’un véritable processus de réconciliation nationale basé sur une justice impartiale », a déclaré a déclaré Me Patrick Baudouin,
coordinateur du Groupe d’ac on judiciaire (GAJ) de la FIDH et avocat des vic
mes.
Nos organisa ons appellent également le Bureau du Procureur de la CPI à renfor
cer sa coopéra on avec les autorités judiciaires maliennes et à lancer ses pour
suites à l’égard des plus hauts responsables des crimes les plus graves qui ne se
raient pas poursuivi au niveau na onal, dans les meilleurs délais.
http://www.maliweb.net/
71
Niger
Niger - tats-Unis : une c
6/
/
p ra
n
ilitaire s utenue
1
Un con ngent de soldats nigériens.a
AFP
Cette semaine Laurent Touchard revient sur plusieurs décennies de coopéra on
entre le Niger et les États-Unis.
toire militaire. Il a collaboré à plusieurs ouvrages et certains de ses travaux sont utilisés par l université Johns-Hopkins, aux tats-Unis.
Les débuts de l'aide militaire américaine au Niger en ma ère de sécurité datent
d'un accord du 14 juin 1962. En vertu de celui-ci, Washington fournit des équipe
ments et des services à Niamey a n d'aider à assurer sa sécurité et son indépen
dance . Dix-huit ans plus tard, le 9 juin 1980, un autre accord est signé. Il donne le
droit au Niger d'accéder au programme Interna onal Military Educa on an Training
I
. L'I
f
gers, y compris dans les centres et académies aux États-Unis. l'instar d'autres
pays du con nent africain, les membres des Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS)
nigériennes en béné cient tout au long des années 1990. Aide à laquelle viennent
s'ajouter d'autres projets d'assistance militaire qui se mettent en place dans le cou
rant des années 2000. L'intérêt de Washington pour l'Afrique se réveille alors.
Discuté avec le Mali, la Mauritanie, le Tchad et le Niger, en octobre 2002, la Pan
Sahel Ini a ve (PSI) est mise sur pied en novembre 2002. Un an après les attentats
de New York, la PSI s'inscrit dans la logique de guerre totale contre le terrorisme
voulue par l'administra on Bush. Elle implique un vaste spectre d'organismes gou
72
vernementaux américains. Néanmoins, les objec fs sont modestes. Avec un bud
get d'environ 8 millions de dollars, est prévu d'organiser une compagnie an terro
riste dans chacun des pays concernés tandis que des unités régulières et paramili
taires sont entra nées à l'u lisa on des armes légères, à la tac que des pe tes uni
tés, aux transmissions, à la naviga on dans le désert... La PSI comprend également
un volet opéra onnel, via l'Opera on Enduring Freddom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS),
contre Al-Qa da en Afrique. Volet qui concerne de fait le Groupe sala ste pour la
prédica on et le combat (GSPC) qui, depuis 2003, se fait de plus en plus remarquer
dans le Sahara.
Si l'implica on américaine est discrète, elle n'en est pas moins réelle. Un violent
a rontement, le 9 mars 2004, l'illustre. Des jihadistes du GSPC se heurtent à des
militaires nigériens et tchadiens, dans la zone frontalière entre les deux pays. Au
cours de la bataille, les terrobandits perdent au moins 43 hommes. Nigériens et
Tchadiens béné cient de l'appui américain, en par culier d'éléments du 10e
Special Force Group (Airborne) et d'un avion P3 Orion qui e ectue des missions ISR
g
v
A
q
fran ais dont nous avons parlé précédemment. L'Orion opère alors depuis... l'Algé
rie Plus précisément, à par r de la base de Tamanrasset.
g
En 2005, la Trans-Saharan Couter Terrorism Ini a ve (TSCTI) succède à la PSI. La
liste des pays soutenus s'allonge. Évidemment, le Niger y gure toujours l'aide
nancière et l'assistance militaire de Washington ne s'interrompt donc pas, bien
au contraire. En 2006, les préroga ves de la TSCTI sont transférées au TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Le TSCTP ne succède pas à la TSCTI.
Il s'agit d'une extension de cette dernière, concernant davantage de pays : l'Al
gérie, le Mali, le Maroc, la Mauritanie, le Nigeria, le Sénégal, la Tunisie et toujours
le Niger. Le Burkina Faso est intégré en 2009. L'OEF-TS con nue d'exister, mais est
renommée par la suite Opera on Juniper Shield dont la ges on et l'exécu on re
viennent à l'Africom. Schéma quement, le TSCTI/TSCTP représente donc le pro
gramme dans sa globalité tandis que l'OEF-TS en cons tue le volet opéra onnel
spéci quement an terroriste.
L'Africom, c'est cette autre expression de l'évolu on de la poli que sécuritaire
américaine en Afrique. Commandement régional créé le 7 février 2007, totalement
opéra onnel en octobre 2008, il englobe l'essen el du con nent (à l'excep on de
l'Égypte). Con nent qui auparavant était morcelé en trois zones de responsabilité,
chacune a ectée à un commandement (Eucom, Centcom et Pacom). Washington
se dote ainsi d'une structure militaire panafricaine, dans la logique du concept de
soft power . Moins agressive, cette poli que a pour ambi on de contraster avec
celle menée en Afghanistan et en Irak. Cette structure se dis ngue donc, a priori,
des autres commandements de par une caractéris que très par culière : son fonc
onnement et ses missions se veulent teintés de l'esprit approche globale (que
73
nous avons explicitée dans un billet précédent). Malgré tout, les États africains ne
sont pas franchement enthousiastes de cette créa on.
En 2007, l'ennemi principal visé par toutes ces mesures s'émancipe. En e et, le
GSPC devient Al-Qa da au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi). Il s'e orce alors de mul plier
les ac ons visibles , pour exister dans la région et pour prouver que le mouve
ment est digne du label Al-Qa da. Le Niger n'est pas épargné tandis qu'une nou
velle rébellion nomade (la précédente date de 1990) éclate. Dans ce contexte, les
ac vités criminelles se développent. La di culté à contrôler les vastes étendues du
désert et d'interminables fron ères favorisent malheureusement les in ltra ons
de terrobandits. L'augmenta on du budget du TSCTP, cette même année 2007,
traduit bien que Washington a conscience des menaces et des risques qu'ils font
peser sur la stabilité. Ainsi, plus de 168 millions de dollars (dollars constants 2014)
sont octroyés à l'ensemble des services et agences impliqués dans le programme.
Mener une poli que interna onale dite des 3D pour e acer l'image héritée des
années Bush.
En novembre 2008, Barack Obama est élu président des États-Unis. Il choisit Hillary
Clinton comme Secrétaire d'État. Celle-ci plaide en faveur du principe de la smart
power que l'on pourrait traduire par puissance sub le . L'idée est simple : s'ap
puyer sur l'ensemble des moyens dont disposent les États-Unis a n de mener une
poli que interna onale dite des 3D : diploma e, développement et défense.
Idée simple, mais enjeu de taille : il s'agit d'e acer l'image qui colle désormais à
l'Amérique, héritée des années Bush . Une Amérique brutale, hégémonique, im
périaliste... Et de remplacer cette image par la convic on que le pays de la Liberté
est un partenaire respectueux des droits, des cultures. Quant à l'ensemble des
moyens dont disposent les Etats-Unis, ils relèvent de la puissance douce ou de
la puissance dure . Le principe n'est pas nouveau : le président Theodore Roose
velt en est à l'origine avec sa poli que étrangère du gros b ton (et, implicite
ment, de la carotte ). Il est ensuite cul vé tout au long de la Guerre froide, avec
des fortunes diverses en Asie du Sud-est (au Laos, en Tha lande) et surtout, en
Amérique Centrale et en Amérique du Sud tout au long des années 1970 et 1980.
En dépit de ce changement de mentalité , des observateurs soulignent qu'au
moins jusqu'en 2010-2011, le TSCTI/TSCTP reste par trop focalisé sur la dimension
militaire. Les ques ons de développement économique, d'éduca on, de santé
sont mal considérées. Il faut attendre 2012 pour que les choses s'équilibrent véri
tablement et que l'on puisse davantage parler d'approche globale dans le cadre
d'une diploma e de smart power . Les objec fs du TSCTP sont résumés dans un
document o ciel américain :
Renforcer les capacités an terroristes régionales
Améliorer la coopéra on entre les forces de sécurité du Sahel
Promouvoir les régimes démocra ques
74
Discréditer l'idéologie terroriste
Renforcer les liens militaires avec les États-Unis.
Mais là encore, tout comme pour les programmes européens, le manque de coopé
ra on entre les organismes gouvernementaux impliqués dans les projets conjugués
à un défaut de concerta on nuisent à l'e cacité générale.
Autre programme qui béné cie au Niger comme à d'autres pays d'Afrique, l'African
Con ngency Opera ons Training and Assistance Program (Acota). L'origine de celui
-ci remonte à l'ère Clinton. Son administra on souhaite alors créer une force d'ac
on rapide africaine qu'organiseraient et entra neraient les États-Unis. Le con nent
ne l'accueille pas favorablement. A n de préserver les suscep bilités souverainistes
"
"
f
tenu mais sous une forme moins ambi euse et surtout, plus anodine, désigné Afri
can Crisis Response Ini a ve (Acri). En 2002, l'Acri devient l'Acota. Il encadre l'en
tra nement des militaires africains aux opéra ons de main en de la paix. En 2004,
l'Acota dépend de la Global Peace Opera ons Ini a ve (GPOI). La GPOI reste cen
trée sur la prépara on aux missions de main en de la paix. Depuis leur créa on,
l'Acri puis l'Acota ont permis d'instruire 154 500 hommes de 20 na ons africaines.
Au Niger, ce sont ainsi deux bataillons qui en béné cient.
Le Niger à d aut du Mali
Le 19 ao t 2009, les dérives autocra ques du président Tandja conduisent les États
-Unis à stopper temporairement tous les programmes d'assistance militaire au pro
t du Niger. Toutefois, cette parenthèse est de courte durée. par r du 25 février
1 q q
'
q v
Tandja (le 18 février ), des discussions sont discrètement entamées à propos d'une
éventuelle implanta on américaine dans le pays. l'instar de Paris, la Maison
Blanche et le département d'État cherchent à installer une base au c ur du Sahel.
Le refus du Mali conduit naturellement Washington – là aussi, tout comme Paris – à
jouer la carte du Niger.
Les soldats occidentaux déployés à l'étranger suscitent un rejet croissant des socié
tés locales à mesure qu'augmente la durée de leur présence.
Néanmoins, il faut encore attendre plusieurs mois avant que ce projet n'abou sse.
Certes, en 2012, les États-Unis sont autorisés à u liser Agadez pour le ravitaille
ment de leurs Pilatus PC-12. Désignés U-28A dans l'Armée de l'Air américaine, ils
mènent des missions ISR au-dessus du Sahel depuis 2007. Au milieu de l'immensité
de la région, disposer d'un point d'escale à Agadez est appréciable. Reste que
l'Afrique est globalement hos le à une ostensible présence américaine. Les di cul
tés de Washington pour trouver o installer sur le con nent le quar er-général de
l'Africom en témoignent. En dehors du Liberia et de rumeurs infondées quant à la
Tunisie
' v .I
v q '
-U
ê
v
' v
contre cette installa on. commencer par l'ex-ambassadeur Bob Houdek, pour
qui, un complexe comme le QG de l'Africom, avec toutes les contraintes en ma ère
75
de logement et de sécurité des personnels, ne provoqueraient l'impression d'un
"
"
.A
q
v
D v
spécialiste de la probléma que de la contre-insurrec on. Selon ses travaux, les sol
dats occidentaux déployés à l'étranger suscitent un rejet croissant des sociétés tra
di onnelles locales à mesure qu'augmente la durée de la dite-présence.
g
Avec le déclenchement de l'opéra on Serval
f
sol ont un besoin crucial en renseignements tac ques. Pour éradiquer progressive
ment les terrobandits qui occupaient le nord du Mali, elles doivent d'abord les loca
liser précisément. Dans un premier temps, Washington semble déployer au moins
un drone MQ-1 Predator. Lui succèdent deux MQ-9 Reaper. L'US Air Force compte
alors environ 200 hommes au Niger (auxquels s'ajoutent évidemment les person
nels de la CIA en poste à Niamey et suscep bles de rayonner dans l'ensemble du
pays). Parmi eux, des éléments de sécurité, armés, assurent la protec on des
hommes et du matériel.
La Maison Blanche con rme leur présence le 22 février 2013, même si elle ne re
conna t qu'une centaine d'hommes. Ils opèrent à la fois en appui des Fran ais, mais
aussi pour les besoins propres des autorités américaines. Par rapport aux avions U8A
R
v
g .T
'
q ' ' g
d'aéronefs pilotés à distance (RPV), si l'un d'eux vient à s'écraser, aucun équipage
ne risque d'être tué ou pire , capturé par des jihadistes. Ensuite, les Reaper dispo
sent d'une endurance beaucoup plus grande que le Pilatus, tout en emportant des
capteurs plus performants. Revers de la médaille, les unités de drones nécessitent
des e ec fs plus importants pour leur mise en oeuvre. Ainsi, alors qu'une pe te
trentaine d'hommes - pilotes compris – su t à faire voler quelques U-28A, il en
faut jusqu'à dix fois plus pour une unité de Predator... En outre, contrairement à ce
qui prévaut avec les Pilatus, le personnel des unités de drones ne se compose pas
de la même propor on de contractors , ces personnels civils sous contrats, d'em
ploi plus souple à l'étranger...
Le 9 avril, un Reaper s'écrase dans le nord du Mali, suite à une panne. Les missions
ne s'interrompent pas pour autant. ce moment-là, Washington prévoit d'envoyer
environ 300 hommes au Niger. Fin 2013, certaines sources évoquent le chi re d'en
viron 1 000 Américains en majeure par e sur la Base Aérienne 101 (BA 101). Si les
Reaper ne sont des nés aux opéra ons directement o ensives, en septembre
1 M
A
g
q q
apprécierait des drones armés... Déclara on qui ouvre des portes à l'administra on
et aux militaires de Washington. D'autant que les drones armés sont des acces
soires majeurs de la stratégie de l'empreinte légère . Manière de mener la guerre
avec une e cacité op male sans s'impliquer massivement est dans la logique de la
"
w ".
Si les matériels ont évolué, que la technologie a pris le pas sur l'humain, les Reaper
du Sahel ne sont nalement pas si éloignés des avions américains de la Civil Air
76
Transport (CAT) qui soutenaient les Fran ais au Laos dans le cadre de l'opéra on
Squaw à par r de mai 1953, puis avec Air America toujours au Laos de 1954 à 1974.
L'on songera également aux missions au-dessus du Tibet, de la Chine communiste,
au-dessus du Nicaragua pour livrer des armes aux Contras... La stratégie de
"'
g "
v
-U
'
q
'
menter à maintes reprises aux quatre coins du monde...
propos de cette
"
v
"
l'excellent travail de Maya
Kandel.
Outre les RPV sur la BA 101, les Américains contribuent de concert avec la France
au renforcement du poten el des FDS. En juillet 2013 sont fournis 2 Cessna 208
Grand Caravan, d'une valeur de 11 millions de dollars (incluant la forma on des
pilotes, l'entre en des appareils). Dix Toyota sont livrés dans le même temps, pré
cédant un lot de camions citernes (carburant et eau), valant au total 4,2 millions de
dollars. Ces camions améliorent sensiblement les capacités logis ques des FDS. Ils
permettent d'assurer le ravitaillement des patrouilles motorisées loin des casernes,
autorisant ainsi des raids beaucoup plus longs. Un prochain billet présentera en dé
tails les matériels et l'organisa on des FDS.
l'été 2013, l'ambassadrice des États-Unis au Niger, Bisa Williams, annonce la li
vraison d'autres équipements a n d'aider les FDS à accomplir leurs missions, en
par culier au sein de la Minusma (Mission mul dimensionnelle intégrée des Na
ons unies pour la stabilisa on au Mali). En e et, un bataillon nigérien de 850
hommes est alors sur le point d'intégrer le disposi f interna onal. En n, l'exercice
Flintlock 2014 commence le 19 février. Prévu jusqu'au 9 mars, il se déroule pour
l'essen el au Niger dans les zones d'Agadez, de Di a et de Tahoua. Y par cipent
plus de 1 000 hommes de 18 pays d'Afrique et d'Europe (dont la France et les PaysBas), aux côtés des États-Unis.
l'évidence, l'entente est excellente entre Niamey et Washington. Bonne entente
que facilite paradoxalement la crispa on discrète des rela ons avec Paris : dossier
Areva
v
'
v
f
L
... D f
cristallise un certain mécontentement qu'augmente sa présence militaire non négli
geable, détournant ainsi l'atten on des Américains.
Source: http://www.jeuneafrique.com
77
Nigeria
B k Hara :
less ns r
Bia ra
on March 21, 2014
NIGERIANS have con nued to be inundated with the ever chilly tales of the deaths
of scores of innocent ci zens on daily basis in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents
in the North-East.
The way out of this trouble has obviously become the pre-occupa on of many hav
ing realized that it is better to think and pro er solu ons than fold arms and blame
the government in newspaper publica ons, demonstra ons and public statements.
The Buni Yadi massacre of FGC students left so much bad taste in the mouth and
evoked in me memories of the Nigeria civil war which started when I was barely 10
years old. In those 30 months of my boyhood marred by war which I luckily sur
vived, there are experiences to be shared for the bene t of the children and par
ents living in the northeastern part of Nigeria now trauma zed by Boko Haram.
There are also memories that can bene t the military leaders gh ng Boko Haram
insurgency even when it has come from an ordinary civilian who experienced war
as a boy. Yes, Nigeria fought a civil war for 30 months at the end of which the se
cession of the former Eastern Region (Biafra) was brutally stopped. The objec ve
was to keep the country one and the end jus ed all the means employed.
In rela on to the current insurgency which now has all the trappirigs of real war,
the rst lesson to be drawn from the civil war was the Federal Government’s galva
niza on of the en re ci zenry against the people of Biafra with a slogan devoid of
ethnic or religious coloura on…To keep Nigeria one.’ To defeat Biafra, therefore,
became a movement keyed in to by all Nigerians other than those on the side of
secessionist Biafra. This na onal consciousness was the most lethal weapon in the
hands of Gen. Yakubu Gowon and his military. In the current war against terror,
na onal consciousness against Boko Haram is yet to emerge despite the unending
bloodshed. It is probably because some Nigerians seem to see the problem as
Goodluck Jonathan’s challenge and which they pray becomes the albatross that will
make him abandon power. Others who are saddened by the deaths of fellow Nige
rian ci zens in the Northeast look forward to seeing a non par san and humanitari
an movement against the insurgency that will draw them in and add strength and
grassroots appeal to what the residency is doing.
Crus ing
entu
With the two posi ons, it means the level of na onal consciousness needed to con
front and defeat Boko Haram is not yet crystallized. Even as I commend the current
achievements of the Chief of Army Sta (COAS) Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minimah who has
since relocated to Bornu State, we need from all Nigerians a heart that will gener
78
ate a consciousness with crushing momentum against Boko Haram.
The second lesson from the civil war is the seeming poor awareness of the civilian
popula on in the Boko Haram a ected zone of the monumental dangers they face.
This was unlike the situa on in Biafra where internal propaganda sensi zed every
one of the imminence of death in the hands of “vandals”. The popular radio jingle
s ll engraved in my brain was: a me of genocide is a me for vigilance Biafra be
vigilant Consequent upon this, people were engaged in dog sleep (i.e. with one eye
open). Even as a primary ve pupil in 1967, we were taught how to dive for cover,
how to shield from bullet and how to craw to safety in the face of attack from land
or air. We were clearly tutored to understand that to run was to DIE. Our mothers
were taught not to look for their children but save their lives rst. Family bunkers
where members hid during air raids were constructed. With these, we survived
many bomb attacks.
It is doubtful if our ci zens facing the wrath of Boko Haram in the northeast villages
have been exposed to some current trainings considering how they react to attacks
and the consequen al death tolls. They should be trained to expect sudden attack
and advised on how to respond whenever it happens.
Apparent injury
The third lesson is the evacua on of people in danger of apparent injury to safety.
As a boy in 1968, I lived with people who were evacuated from war endangered
communi es of Biafra including people from Udi and Nsukka in the present day
Enugu state and Ogoni from the present day Rivers State.
One therefore wonders why people in border communi es of Adamawa, Borno and
Yobe states being massacred by Boko Haram daily cannot be evacuated to safe ref
ugee camps. If Biafra could do it in 1967, obviously Nigeria can in 2014. Besides se
curing the endangered people, it a ords the military and intelligence organs the
opportunity of appropriately execu ng their o ensive without fear of unnecessary
casual es.
The fourth lesson is the protec on of school children as much as prac cable from
disasters consequent upon war strife or civil commo on. This is necessary because
the children are the future who will grow to rebuild the city destroyed by wars
fought by parents. When air raids on Biafra territory became too severe in 1968,
schools were closed to protect the children of Biafra and when they were reopened
in 1969 children and their teachers studied under tree shades instead of the highly
exposed school premises. The emphasis was the protec on of the children. With
the vicious Boko Haram opera ng in the north east of the country and focusing on
soft targets, schools should be closed and children relocated to areas where safety ,
may be guaranteed un l normalcy returns.
79
The fth lesson bothers on military strategy. In our boy soldiering, we were thought
to blow the bridge of disaster and I want to believe this is a long tested opera onal
pattern in warfare. With Boko Haram opera ng from along our borders with Chad
and Cameroun Republics, the borders should be closed. This cuts o the enemy’s
supply line and weakens the opera onal capacity of members within the na onal
boundaries.
The sixth lesson is the need for the military to leverage on na ve intelligence. Intel
ligence by the na ves of various communi es was the cornerstone of Biafran mili
tary intelligence. In every community, the good and the bad are well known by the
people. Indigenes and strangers can be di eren ated and movements interpreted.
With careful inves ga on, it may be that communi es severely attacked by Boko
Haram in the North-East have bad leadership which led their youth into deviant
behavior of joining the insurgent group. The attack may well represent a puni ve
payback on such community leaders.
THE seventh lesson is the special role the sacri ce made by indigenes of communi
es in military service played in the survival of such communi es during the civil
war. Biafran soldiers were allowed the priviledge of elec ng to lead the defence of
their towns and villages in the face of enemy invasion. The local communi es usu
ally collaborated e ec vely with their sons who would do everything to save their
kith and kin from calamity. I con nue to wonder how a soldier who hails from one
of the Borno State
villages a ected by the Boko Haram attacks and serving in Lagos would feel hearing
that not less than a hundred of his kinsmen perhaps including his parents, brothers
and sisters have been massacred. He certainly would have loved to play a role in
saving them given the opportunity.
The eighth lesson is the necessity of seeking the collabora on and support of for
eign powers. To defeat Biafra, Nigeria got the support of such countries as Britain,
USSR (Russian) and USA. The propaganda oozing out of this global support helped
to bring Biafra to its knees. In the face of Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria may seek
the support and collabora on of countries that have economic es with it.
The nineth lesson is the possibility of hiring foreign experts (war mercenaries) to
assist our military in certain areas of special need. Most of the military pilots that
ew ghter jets during the civil war were expatriates and since we are now faced
with a special kind of enemy, people with special skills may be recruited from out
side the shores of Nigeria.
The tenth lesson is the necessity of keeping discussion and nego a on with the
enemy ongoing. Nigeria never abandoned any opportunity of dialoging with Biafra
much as her military was on an assault mission. As faceless as Boko Haram is, the
80
government of Nigeria should con nue to seek its face. Hopefully, it would be
found someday.
The above lessons from Biafra are for the authori es to consider in line with cur
rent and peculiar trends in the Boko Haram insurgency. Beyond this expecta on,
ordinary Nigerians together with non-governmental, faith-based and corporate or
ganiza ons should address the humanitarian fallouts of the terrorism challenge.
Counter terrorism in this regard means na onal solidarity with vic ms of Boko Ha
ram insurgency devoid of unnecessary poli ciza on and driven by freewill gifts of
cash, food, clothing and shelter. To show such concern will no doubt strengthen
our na onhood which Boko Haram seeks to destroy. Meanwhile, the world is
watching our behavior.
- See more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/boko-haram-10-lessonsbiafra/#sthash.qjTHEtmZ.dpuf
81
B k Hara : H w a Militant Isla ist r up E erged in Nigeria
March 27, 2014
The Western in uence of Bri sh colonialists caused a division among the people of
Northern Nigeria, who were once united by Islam. This division saw, on one side,
the so-called civilized -- by Western standards -- elite who were used by the
Bri sh as agents of coloniza on and on the other side, the commoners, who vehe
mently resisted Western in uence in the region.
Dissa sfac on with Western in uence also led to an emergence of Islamist funda
mentalists among people of the Northeastern region of Nigeria.
The reason Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram appears to be that he saw an
opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corrup on by linking it to
Western in uence in governance.
What developments might have triggered the emergence of violent Islamist group
Boko Haram during the last decade in Nigeria? According to Umar Mamodu 1 -- a
scholar and key Boko Haram historian -- its incep on in 2002 resulted from a clash
between the moderate Islamic teachings of the prominent Sheikh Jafaar Adam at
the Mahammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri-Borno State in the Northeastern part
of Nigeria, and the more militant interpreta on of the Qur'an by his disciple, Mo
hammed Yusuf. 2
According to Mamodu 3 , Yusuf believed in the crea on of a new order in which
the wretched should inherit the earth, and for his extremist views, was expelled in
2002 from the Ndimi Mosque Committee. 4 Later that year Yusuf built a mosque
in the northeast Nigeria to serve as a magnet for primary and secondary school pu
pils who, in response to his teachings, would abandon Westernized schools in the
belief that Western educa on Boko is a sin Haram hence the name Boko Ha
ram. 5
The group's o cial name, according to its manifesto, is Jamaiatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda awata Wal-Jihad, 6 which translates as Associa on of Sunnis for the Propaga
on of Islam and Jihad. 7 Abul Qaqa, the o cial spokesman of the group, stated
categorically, in an interview reported by Reporters Without Borders, that Boko
Haram's objec ve is the applica on of Sharia law throughout Nigeria … t hrough
kidnappings, bombings and suicide attacks aimed at the United Na ons, churches
and symbols of the federal government such as police sta ons. 8
Ideologically, Boko Haram opposes not only Western educa on but also Western
culture and science -- a posi on Mohammed Yusuf revealed in an interview con
ducted by the BBC, when he stated that the belief that the earth is spherical in
shape is a sharp contradic on to Islamic thought and therefore should be rejected
along with Darwinism and the theory that rain comes from water evaporated by
82
the sun. 9 Ironically, Nigerian academic Hussain Zakaria told BBC News that Yusuf
is graduate educated and very pro cient in English . 10
Violence linked to Boko Haram's ac vi es is reported to have resulted in an es
mated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2013. 11 Since 2012 alone, according to
an Amnesty Interna onal report that details Boko Haram's ac vi es in Nigeria, at
least 70 teachers and over 100 schoolchildren and students have been killed or
wounded. At least 50 schools have either been burned or seriously damaged and
more than 60 others have been forced to close. Thousands of children have been
forced out of schools across communi es in Yobe, Kaduna, Adamawa and Borno
states. 12
Abubakar Shekau, leader of the Nigerian Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, appears in a video
communiqué claiming responsibility for an October 24, 2013 attack that killed 35 people.
Boko Haram is considered a threat to not only Nigeria but also the en re world. In
2012, then-Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter
Ham, voiced concerns about the intent of terrorist groups such as Somalia's AlShabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM and Boko Haram to collaborate
and synchronize their e orts. After the 2011 Christmas Day bombings of churches
in Nigeria, General Ham said that he remained greatly concerned about Boko Ha
ram's stated intent to connect with Al-Qaeda's senior leadership. 13
Socio-poli cal state of Northern Nigeria: Maitatsine
Nigeria was created in 1914 from an amalgama on of the north and south region
by Bri sh colonial authori es. Northern Nigeria consists mainly of the Hausa and
Fulani ethnic groups, who are predominantly Muslim, while Southern Nigeria con
sists of the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups, who are Chris ans and animist worship
pers.
83
The history of Northern Nigeria has been profoundly in uenced by religion and pol
i cs. Since the Borno Sultanate and the Sokoto Caliphate -- which ruled parts of
what is now Northern Nigeria, the Republic of Niger and southern Cameroon -- fell
under Bri sh control in 1903, there has been strong resistance to Western educa
on among the Muslims of the area. 14
In the Northern part of Nigeria, religion has long been used as a uni ng tool. The
Fulani Jihads of 1804-1808, through conquest and conversion, superimposed Islam
on the Hausa iden ty, crea ng a central poli cal and religious authority on the
fragmented Hausa states of present day Northwestern Nigeria, and fusing them
into one poli cal and linguis c unit. 15 As historian John Phillips stated, to be Hau
sa gradually came to mean that one was a Muslim, even though not all Muslims in
the region were Hausa and not all Hausa were Muslims. 16
The unity seen among Northerners strongly contrasts to the Southern region of Ni
geria, which is made up of various scattered ethnic groups, languages, poli cal or
ganiza ons and religions.
Bri sh control and the subsequent coloniza on of the region, however, evidently
did not sit well with the indigenous people of Northern Nigeria. 17 Opposi on to
Western in uence followed, largely due to the circumstance that the Hausa elite -the traders, scribes and clerks used by the Bri sh as agents to colonize the region -led lives that were physically, attitudinally and materially removed from their
hosts'. 18 An account of the indirect rule adopted by Bri sh colonial authori es
states: Like the white colonialist, these black imperialists would not live amongst
and mix with the people. They stayed on their own. They had their own quarters
just as the Whiteman had his own Government Reserva on Area... 19 Although
this account refers to the Igede area of central Nigeria, in his examina on of the
account, Moses Ochonu, Associate Professor of African History at Vanderbilt Uni
versity, observed that, in many ways, the Hausa auxiliaries too were vic ms of a
colonial administra ve policy shaped by the racist no on of the more civilized na
ves helping to civilize the less civilized ones. 20
Added to the Western in uence in government and administra on, was the suspi
cion of the spread of Chris anity in a Northern Nigeria dominated by Islam. As Fa
rouk Chothia commented in a BBC report, O wing to ac vi es of early Chris an
missionaries who used Western educa on as a tool for evangelism, it is viewed
with suspicion by the local Northern popula on. 21
The Western in uence of Bri sh colonialists caused a division among the people of
Northern Nigeria, who were once united by Islam. This division saw, on one side,
the so-called civilized -- by Western standards -- elite who were used by the
Bri sh as agents of coloniza on and on the other side, the commoners, who vehe
mently resisted Western in uence in the region. Written accounts show that not
only did the system of governance cause animosity among the people living in
84
Northern Nigeria the system was also seen as a cheap and an ine ec ve coloniza
on project. 22
In the years leading to Nigeria's independence in 1960, there was a popular move
ment among Northern Nigerians known as the Talakawas 23 -- headed by Aminu
Kano, a socialist poli cian who led an Islamic uprising against Bri sh colonialists in
the 1940s. Talakawas had as its driving force a distaste for Western in uence, and
planned to use poli cs and religion to create a Northern Nigerian Society of Social
Jus ce, Economic Prosperity and Fairness . A study on the government of Northern
Nigeria from 1350-1950 shows that many Talakawas(commoners) in Kano State
supported that message to demonstrate disapproval with what they perceived as
an unrepresenta ve government composed of a selected few. 24
Dissa sfac on with Western in uence also led to an emergence of Islamist funda
mentalists among people of the Northeastern region of Nigeria. Prominent among
them was Mohammed Marwa, a radical preacher also known as Maitatsine the
one who curses , notorious for his violent ac vi es during the 1970s and 1980s.
25 Marwa denounced Western in uence and technology, and also mainstream
Muslim teachers. The riots and armed clashes he ins gated, which pitted his fol
lowers against police and the army, resulted in the deaths of thousands of people
in the country. 26 A BBC report quotes a witness who saw hundreds of people
summarily executed, as the Nigerian authori es tried to crush a week-long uprising
in December 1980, speaking of the horri c nature Maitatsine's attacks:
They were extrajudicial killings everywhere. …. There were hundreds of them, in
nocent people. 27 The report went on to say, Here cal seems to be the only
word to describe him Maitatsine … he had millennial ideas of the end of me. …
There was a certain fana cism by Maitatsine s rebels which overwhelmed the
attempt to deal with them… I saw a lot of dead bodies everywhere. Everywhere
was lled with dead bodies. Road blocks were mounted… everybody was living in
absolutely fear. People were living with their hearts in their mouth . 28 In the
aftermath of the uprising, it was reported that, It took the police three days to get
the bodies o the street. An es mated 4,000 people were killed in the week-long
uprising. 29
Analyst Tony Johnson views Boko Haram as a spawn of the Maitatsine riots. 30
This disenfranchisement of commoners in the Northern part of Nigeria seems to
have been used as an opportunity by the commoners to carry out uprisings for so
cial jus ce, an Islamic mode of governing and economic prosperity against the
establishment.
The reason Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram, according to accounts of
Umar Mamodu - an Arabic scholar and Boko Haram historian, appears to be that he
saw an opportunity to exploit public outrage at government corrup on by linking it
85
to Western in uence in governance. 31 Yusuf, according to Mamodu's account,
wanted to gather young impressionable minds that had never gotten a fair deal
from government he was fascinated with the idea of destroying the social, poli cal
and religious order to create a new order in which the wretched would inherit the
earth. 32 This no on has prompted Chris Kwaja, a Nigerian researcher on religion,
to assert that religious dimensions of the con ict have been misconstrued as the
primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality are the
root causes. 33 Another Nigerian researcher wrote, A psycho-analysis of the ad
herents of the sect shows that their major belief is in the full implementa on of
Sharia law in their respec ve states. With Sharia fully implemented, there will be
social jus ce, economic prosperity, equality and fairness… Western educa on is
not really there problem…Maladministra on is the remote cause. 34
A look at the membership of Boko Haram will also reveal the role that bad govern
ance and disenfranchisement of commoners in Northern Nigerian states have
played in the group's emergence. According to gures extrapolated from a 2001
ar cle by Tony Johnson for the Council of Foreign Rela ons, the sect's hundreds of
followers, mostly Northerners, known also as usu ya, consisted largely of impov
erished Islamic students and clerics, as well as university students and profession
als, many of whom were unemployed. 35 Human Rights Watch researcher Eric
Guttschuss told IRIN News that Yusuf successfully attracted followers by speaking
out against police and poli cal corrup on on behalf of the country's vast num
bers of unemployed youth who he was able to tap into for recruits . 36 He also
went on to suggest that the emergence of Boko Haram is largely due to corrup on
and poor governance. 37
Nigeria: North-South Divide
Since the amalgama on of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, it has been ar
gued that Nigeria has favored the elites of the North at the expense of inhabitants
of the Southern region. At Nigeria's 100-year anniversary, cons tu onal lawyer
Fred Agbaje suggested that the amalgama on by the Bri sh was a self-serving alli
ance. The amalgama on, he wrote, put the poli cal administra on of Nigeria in
the hands of some people instead of an equitable distribu on of power. 38
After Nigeria's Independence in 1960, the North-South division led to discrimina
on against Southerners. Between 1963 and 1998, Nigeria saw a near-unbroken
chain of rulers from the North. 39 During this period, there were 16 Police Com
missioners in charge of Lagos State (a Southern State). Out of this number, eight
were Northerners. In the Northern state of Kaduna, with the same number of Com
missioners, only one, Joseph Adeola was a Southerner the remaining 15 were all
Northerners. 40 This dispropor onate distribu on of posi ons of power not only
existed in the police, but also in most Northern-led military juntas -- in which gover
nors of Southern States were mostly Northerners. 41
86
In the banking sector, Southerners were not spared the discrimina on of a Nigeria
dominated by Northerners. The display of uneven treatment reached its peak dur
ing General Sani Abacha's regime, which was dominated by Northerners. The cen
tral government passed the Failed Banks decree, ostensibly to clean up corrup on
in the banking sector of Nigeria and sani ze it, however, this was actually used to
persecute Southerners 42 by deliberately targe ng and arres ng former bankers
who were General Sani Abacha's poli cal and personal enemies 43 and who were
members of Southern states, all the while shielding the Northerners. An example of
the preferen al treatment of Northerners is the case of a high-pro le Northerner
who had a company that was in debt for 300 million naira to one of the distressed
banks. 44 He was not charged before any tribunal -- in contrast to many Southern
bank directors and company owners who were kept in deten on inde nitely. 45
The disbursement of proceeds from Nigeria's Petroleum Trust Fund PTF also
seems to discriminate against Southerners. Although the oil-producing states are
situated in the Southern region of the country, these states have bene ted the
least from the oil wealth. 46 Before Olusegun Obasanjo became the rst President
of Nigeria's third republic in 1999, the PTF generated more than 70 of its revenue
in the South, while disbursing less than 40 of the money in the South.
To compound the unfair treatment of Southerners, there was a worrisome transfer
of federal public ins tu ons to Abuja, a state dominated by Northern Hausaspeaking people, after the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria was moved there
from Lagos, a state in the Southern region: In par cular, there was the economical
ly and logis cally imprac cal decision to have the Nigerian Ports Authority NPA
and Nigerian Mari me Authority NMA relocate to Abuja, when the major ports
are in Lagos and other coastal states in the South. 47
Terrorism against the Nigerian State
After the elec on of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Chris an Southerner, as the Presi
dent of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2010, there was an increase in violent
ac vi es by the Boko Haram sect, who began to wage war on the new government
led by President Jonathan, who has often been cri cized for indulging in ethnic fac
onalism and favoring the Ijaw ethnic group situated in Southern Nigeria. 48
Before the bombing of the United Na ons building in Nigeria's capital of Abuja on
August 16th 2011, the most daring ac vity of Boko Haram had been the group's
June 7, 2011 bombing of Abuja's police headquarters. That attack appeared to be
speci cally targeted the Inspector General of Police, Ha z Ringim. 49
On July 10, 2011, a Chris an Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State, in the
Middle Belt part of Nigeria, was bombed. The next day the University of Maidu
guri, in the Northern part of Nigeria, closed on the order of the University Authori
ty, ci ng security concerns. 50
87
Boko Haram has made it known by way of public announcements, 51 backed by
terrorist ac ons, that its strategy is to undermine Nigerian governmental authority.
Boko Haram's video clips -- which can be viewed on YouTube -- featuring the
group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, stress disdain for the Southern-dominated gov
ernment. 52 Apart from video footage, the Shekau, has underlined his an government posi on in o cial statements. 53
Apart from countless attacks on civilians, other attacks have been carried out that
show direct opposi on to the Nigerian government. In September 7, 2010 attack,
members of Boko Haram set free over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State.
54 In Borno State, Boko Haram's violence has killed approximately 800 people,
including rela ves of high-ranking state o cials. 55
In 2013, Boko Haram took control of the local governments of Marte, Mobbar,
Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala, in Borno
State, chasing out government o cials, taken over government buildings and im
posing Sharia law. 56
Though the insurgency carried out by Boko Haram has not been limited to any geo
graphical area to denote a North-South dispute, an examina on of the aforemen
oned attacks shows a systema c assault on symbolic en es of the Nigerian
State.
Boko Haram – A Genuinely Islamic Group?
Since the beginning of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria, there is no doubt that
religious tension has been on the rise. It may however be overstated to conclude
that the Islam-Chris anity dispute solely led to the group's emergence.
Looking back at Boko Haram's history, which is marred by Muslim vs. Muslim con
ict, it can be seen that the intra-religious dispute adherents of Islam played a key
role in Boko Haram's crea on. Not only are most of the group's ac vi es speci cal
ly located in the Muslim-populated Northern region of Nigeria, evidence also shows
that the majority of Nigeria's Muslim popula on do not support the ac vi es of
Boko Haram, and it has been reported that the members of Boko Haram do not
interact with the local Muslim popula ons. 57 Also, several prominent Muslim g
ures such as the governor of Niger State, 58 the Sultan of Sokoto 59 and the Coa
li on of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria CMCN 60 have publicly denounced the group.
Nigerians have been caught up in an imbroglio in dis nguishing the poli callydriven Islamist movement from a faith-driven Islam. This has caused a religious ten
sion between Chris ans and Muslims since the onset of the insurgency led by Boko
Haram.
Boko Haram falls primarily under the category of a poli cal group consis ng funda
mentally of Islamists who, by using religious obscuran sm, hide under the cloak of
the faith-based Islam.
Conclusion
88
Evidence shows that the origin of Boko Haram is linked to the poverty and lack of
development in Northern states of Nigeria in the era of colonialism. Boko Haram,
which perceives the West as a corrup ng in uence on the governance of Northern
States, emerged as an armed revolt against a widening regional economic disparity.
Although the elec on of Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan -- a Southern Chris
an -- provoked many Northerners and coincided with an increase in Boko Haram's
violent ac vi es, there is no evidence indica ng conclusively that Boko Haram
emerged solely in response to North-South tensions in Nigeria. Also, a lack of vio
lence ac vi es by the group in the South further disproves the no on that Boko
Haram's emerged primarily due to the North-South divide.
Lastly, in the di eren a on of Islam and Islamism, faith-based Islam does not play
the paramount role in inspiring Boko Haram's ac vi es. Instead, poli cally driven
Islamism was adopted as a doctrine to wage war on all, including Muslims who
adopt Westerniza on. The religious face used by Boko Haram is a decep ve cloak
to deceive Nigerians that share Islamic sen ments. But there is no evidence that
Muslims generally endorse or condone ac vi es of Boko Haram. The speci c
attacks on Islamic States in the North, such as the mosque bombing in Borno State,
indicate further that this violent group is primarily an ideologically driven poli cal
organiza on trying to weaken the in uence of moderate Islam in Northern Nigeria,
which they deem as Westernized.
Femi wolade is a Law LLB graduate of ingston University London. He currently
lives in Nigeria and serve as a Legal Assistant to the DLD Director of Legal Dra ing
of wara State s Ministry of Justice.
Notes
1 Umar Mamodu, Boko Haram - The Beginning Lagos 2011 . Umar Mamodu is
an Arabic Scholar in the Northern part of Nigeria, Kano (Northern State of Nigeria).
He has debated on matters rela ng to Islam in Nigeria and is well versed in the His
tory of Boko Haram. He has also been a source for Nigerian newspapers. In 2009,
he had a conversa on on Boko Haram with Niyi Owolade, a former Attorney Gen
eral and Commissioner for Jus ce of Osun State (southwest Nigeria) and A rene
Wilson, a lawyer from South Nigeria.
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Reporters without Borders, Innermost thoughts of the Islamist Group Boko Ha
ram, Reporters without Borders Paris 2012
7 Samuel A. Ekanem, Jacob A. Dada and Bassey J. Ejue, BOKO HARAM AND AM
NESTY: A PHILO-LEGAL APPRAISAL , Interna onal Journal of Humani es and Social
Science Vol. 2 No. 4 New York Feb 2012
8 Reporters without Borders, Innermost thoughts of the Islamist Group Boko Ha
89
ram, Reporters without Borders Paris 2012
9 Joe Boyle, Nigeria's Taliban Enigma , BBC News, London 31 July 2009
10 Ibid
11 John Allen, The Catholic Church: What Everyone Needs To Know , Oxford Uni
versity Press London 2013 P 166-167
12 Amnesty Interna onal, Keep away from Schools or we ll kill you: Educa on
under attack in Nigeria ,
13 Mark Doyle, Africa's Islamist Militants Co-ordinate E orts BBC News, London
June 26 2012
14 Ibid
15 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi
nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African
Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008
16 J. Philips, Spurious Arabic: Hausa and Colonial northern Nigeria , African Stud
ies Center, Madison 2000
17 Ira Marvin Lapidus, Islam in West Africa , Cambridge University
Press Cambridge 2002 P 405
18 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi
nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African
Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008
19 A.P. Anyebe, Man of Courage and Character: The Ogbuluko War in Colonial
Idomaland Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu 2002
20 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi
nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African
Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008
21 Farouk Chothia, Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? , BBC News, Lon
don 11 January 2012
22 Moses Ochonu, Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imagi
nary and the Bri sh Colonial Administra on of the Nigerian Middle Belt , African
Studies uarterly Gainsville 2008
23 M.G Smith Government in Kano, 1350-1950 , Westview Press Boulder 1997 .
The term Talakawa is used to denote a commoner from the Northern part of Nige
ria.
24 Ibid
25 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Relations,
New York 31, August 2011
26 Ibid
27 BBC Witness Maitatsine .
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
30 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Relations,
New York 31, August 2011
31 Umar Mamodu, Boko Haram-The Beginning Lagos 2011 .
32 Ibid
90
33 Chris Kwaja, Nigeria's Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Con ict , Africa
Security Brief (Africa Center for Strategic Studies) Washington, DC 2011
34 Temidayo, A. Boko Haram: The Way Out , the Nation Lagos 2011 p. 13.
35 Tony Johnson, Backgrounder: Boko Haram , Council on Foreign Rela ons,
New York 31, August 2011
36 IRIN News, Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals , IRIN
News, Nairobi, 18 July 2011
37 Ibid
38 Prominent Nigerians react over Amalgama on of 1914 , The Daily Sun Lagos,
1st January, 2014.
39 Abraham Adesanya Afeniferi: Yoruba Na on Endangered, Abeokuta 1998 .
Text of the maiden conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the
Afenifere Socio-Cultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya.
40 Ibid
41 Ibid
42 Ibid
43 Banji Ayiloge, Abacha defends non-exis ng integrity Soc.culture.nigeria La
gos 1997
44 Afenifere, oruba Nation Endangered Abeokuta 1998 . Text of the maiden
conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the Afenifere SocioCultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya.
45 Ibid
46 O. Douglas and others, il and Militancy in the Niger Delta: Terrorist Threat or
Another Columbia -- a paper presented during a peace rally, Ins tute of Interna
onal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, USA. 2004
47 Abraham Adesanya Afeniferi: Struggle for democracy, Abeokuta 1998 . Text
of the maiden conference delivered in Lagos by the Na onal Leader of the Afe
nifere Socio-Cultural Organiza on, Senator Abraham Adesanya.
48 Eric Osagie, Obasanjo's letter bomb , Daily Sun, Lagos, December 16 2013, p
61
49 The Nation, Lagos, June 18 2011, pp 1-2
50 Daily Sun Newspaper Editorials, Lagos, June 28 2011, p 4
51 YouTube, 30 December 2013
52 Ibid
53 Aislinn Laing, Boko Haram Leader taunts US over Bounty ,
54 Samuel A. Ekanem, Jacob A. Dada and Bassey J. Ejue, BOKO HARAM AND AM
NESTY: A PHILO-LEGAL APPRAISAL International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science Vol. 2 No. 4, New York Feb 2012
55 The Nation Newspaper Editorial, Lagos, July 3, 2011, p 13
56 Integrated Regional Informa on Networks, Nigerians on the run as military
combat Boko Haram , Irin NewsNairobi May 2013
57 Dozens killed in Nigeria clashes BBC News, London, July 26 2009
58 Jimmoh Abbas, Boko Haram not represen ng Islam- Governor Aliyu , Sunday
Trust, Abuja, June 13 2011.
91
59 Bayo Oladeji and George Agba, Smoke out Boko Haram Sponsors, Jonathan
Orders Security Chiefs , All Africa, December 30 2011
60 Gallup Poll, Nigerian Muslims Overwhelming Oppose Boko Haram , Islam Today, February 20 2012
92
Rwanda
Murder Leads t Tensi n Between S ut A rica Rwanda
FILE - Rwandan president Paul Kagame during a conference in Nairobi, Kenya.
March 20, 2014
JOHANNESBURG — It has not been a good few months for diploma c rela ons be
tween South Africa and Rwanda.
Two high-pro le Rwandans who'd sought asylum in South Africa were attacked. A
former Rwandan intelligence chief, Patrick Kareyega, was found strangled to death
in his Johannesburg hotel room on New Year's Day.
Then, in early March, armed men broke into the safe house of former Rwandan
military chief Faus n Nyamwasa. The South African government said it was an
attempt on his life.
Kareyega and Nyamwasa had a lot in common. Both had a falling out with Rwan
dan President Paul Kagame both sought refuge in South Africa and both were
among former top army o cers who started an exiled opposi on party.
South Africa accused four Rwandan diplomats of playing a part in the attack on
Nyamwasa's home, and expelled them. In return, Rwanda - which has denied any
link to either case - kicked out six South African diplomats.
Ko Kouakou, an Africa analyst at the University of Witswatersand School of Gov
ernance in Johannesburg, said the recent developments show that South Africa
cannot protect asylum seekers.
In fact, South Africa is quite kind and very meek to a large degree. South Africa is
very weak in its response to what’s been happening on its own territorial integrity - where you have people viola ng it, assassina ng other people. So there's a grave
93
issue of security. But also, most important, insecurity in South Africa. So any
body can walk into the territory of South Africa and do whatever they want to do
and then just leave. And that is sending a wrong signal, said Kouakou.
Rwandan o cials have long maintained that some of the an -Kagame dissidents
living abroad -- including those in South Africa - have planned or carried out gre
nade attacks against Rwandans.
Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo posted a series of tweets in March, accus
ing South Africa of protec ng terrorists while expelling law-abiding diplomats.
Meanwhile, Rwanda has denied all allega ons that it targets poli cal opponents
at home or abroad. But at the same me, President Kagame also seems intent on
sending a message to his former allies.
In the weeks after Kareyega's murder, he said: You cannot betray Rwanda and
get away with it. There are consequences for betraying your country.
With tensions so public, what is the next step for South Africa and Rwanda
Westen Shilaho, a research fellow of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the
University of Johannesburg, said while tensions have escalated, it seems that
both countries have left room for nego a on, with neither government expelling
the heads of their respec ve diploma c missions.
He noted Rwanda is an important player and ally in Africa's Great Lakes region,
and South Africa is very important for Rwanda, as it helped the country rebuild
after the genocide and has given Rwandans cheap educa on in South Africa.
I don't think they will fall out en rely… My take is that they will nd a way of
mee ng each other and resolve this matter and try and bring the diploma c situ
a on back to where it was before now, Shilaho said.
In the mean me, South Africa's Department of Interna onal Rela ons has issued
a stern warning that ac on will be taken against any individual or group that
abuses the human rights laws of the country.
http://www.voanews.com/
94
Somalia
Are we just g ing t sit ar und and wait t be bl wn t bits by terr rists?
Print
A pipe bomb tted in the dashboard of this vehicle is among the explosives recov
ered by the police in Mombasa, March 19, 2014. The cache of weapons that were
recovered is the kind Al-Shabaab has been employing to devasta ng e ect in Mog
adishu. PHOTO | LABAN WALLOGA
In Summary
It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up,
knock down our buildings and slaughter our children.
I have learnt to recognise the frozen, blazing eyes of the killer the unblinking, rep
lian stare of those who had crossed the line from human to monster.
I fear that soon I will begin to sound like a broken, right wing record. But I am a
man with fears which I believe to be real and I am frustrated that no one seems to
share them.
It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up,
knock down our buildings and slaughter our children.
They declared war on us and we thought it was a small matter that some guy in
95
government was going to take care of. We were wrong.
This week, police have tracked down two bomb wagons and recovered a cache of
weapons. My colleague who is more conversant with arms than myself has regaled
me with the horrors that this kind of arsenal can cause.
He says these are weapons Al-Shabaab has been employing to devasta ng e ect in
Mogadishu.
First, the bombs are very powerful. They are made from C4, which is military grade
explosive material. Apparently, they are harves ng the explosive from landmines
and ar llery shells, which are plenty in Somalia.
Secondly, the bombs are many. So far police have recovered eight which had been
sewn into vehicles the way beads are sewn into a kiondo.
Third, the type of attack, described as a “complex” attack against buildings, is just
evil. It is like Westgate and the US Embassy attack rolled into one.
The plan is to blow up a building, then open re and slaughter survivors and other
shocked people around.
What kind of person dreams of killing people they have never met, who have done
them no harm, just to make some point?
Archbishop Desmond Tutu recently said that he would not worship a homophobic
God. Would God command us to indiscriminately slaughter men, women and chil
dren? Would the taking of innocent life really please God?
For years, it has been my job to sit here at my desk and look at the pictures of
many events, some of them atroci es, others not so. I look at the eyes of people
and I can tell what kind of human beings they are.
I have learnt to recognise the frozen, blazing eyes of the killer the unblinking, rep
lian stare of those who had crossed the line from human to monster. And I see it
often in those who have been arrested on suspicion of terrorism.
Apart from the combatants, the killers have a rich catchment of support among us.
I remember once seeing a picture of women whose faces were wreathed in smiles
gawping at the brains of a young AP who had been shot at close quarters with a
high-calibre ri e by suspected Al Shabaab.
MANA E IMMI RATI N
Do we or don’t we have the right to protect the innocent and all of us from an un
96
fair death? Do we or don’t we have the right to stop guys from driving across the
border to knock down our towns?
If we do, let’s get down to work then. First, we stop that stupid corrup on at bor
der points, registra on centres and Immigra on. Those who allow terrorists into
the country, or give them papers, for 30 pieces of silver should share in the terror
ists’ guilt.
Secondly, we should up our security game. I am horri ed at the mess in the Police
Service. As technical-borne terrorists are pouring across the border, they are
gh ng over who should transfer o cers.
I know it would be totally wrong and out of order for anyone to suggest that these
police bosses should be locked in the same room with the explosive tubes –and for
someone to call the attached cell phone. But the Commander-in-Chief should get
back the job of hiring and ring police bosses and Parliament to approve or disap
prove.
All countries must manage immigra on. Many Western countries, which sit in judg
ment of the world, are very rough with immigrants. Australia holds them in horrible
camps in Papua New Guinea.
We, on the other hand, have welcomed them into our ci es and sold them our
property. But generosity has public safety limits. A thorough audit of Somali immi
grants must be done and op ons for repatria on vigorously debated.
The presence of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia is not su ciently degrading the
capacity of Al Shabaab to attack us. Actually, the terror group appears to have re
grouped and retaken the ini a ve.
There needs to be a strong military response to these atroci es.
We are at war. Let’s start shoo ng.
Source: http://www.na on.co.ke/-
97
Al-S abab and t e party ball
n e ect
As a result decades e pl ita
ways being t e e pendable pawn
n t eS
ali pe ple are sick and red
al-
19 Mar 2014
From the outset, let me make one thing clear: Al-Shabab and its extremist world
view is neither construc ve nor sustainable. This extremist neo-Islamist group rep
resents one of two nihilis c worldviews that dominated the 21st century poli cal
discourse - global (dysfunc onal) jihadism and global war on terrorism.
Both, due to their applied mantra - with hammer, all problems are solvable - are
des ned to self-destruct. What has been happening in Somalia is not en rely de
void of that mindset that jus ed senseless violence across the globe in recent
years.
In recent weeks, Ethiopian-led AMISOM , together with the Somali government
forces have captured several strategic towns previously ruled by al-Shabab. There
was not much resistance there and that is hardly surprising since, in the past few
years, that has been al-Shabab's favourite tac c - melt or move, depending on geo
graphic and clan dynamic.
T e c ase is n
Though it is too early to forecast how the current military odyssey might turn out, I
would venture to say, contrary to the declared objec ve of eradica ng al-Shabab, it
would cause more poli cal, security and humanitarian problems, simply because
98
the necessary environment for such success has not been cul vated.
Granted, al-Shabab could not have been more vulnerable as a host of mainly inter
nal issues have divided the group.
Defea ng them would require a grand strategy made of thoroughly coordinated
poli cal, humanitarian, military and economic plans in order to e ec vely prevent
any vacuum or post libera on zero-sum poli cking that seldom bene ts Somalia.
This, while crea ng space for dialogue.
In theory, there is such coordina on in reality there is no such thing for these fac
tors. On the internal side, mainly due to a fundamental misjudgment of priori es
that puts genuine reconcilia on on the back burner, the federal government, and
by extension AMISOM, are viewed by some key poli cal en es and actors as an
intrusive partnership.
On the external side, the interests of the de facto twin engine that propel AMISOM
- Ethiopia and Kenya - and the other twin engine that propel the interna onal com
munity which pays the bills - US and UK - are at odds. While there is a facade of ci
vility between these four key actors, there exists among them a poli cal passive
aggression that underscores the impending collision.
On the peripheral side, there are shadowy elements who apparently view
manageable insecurity as a good business. Not even the Somali government
knows to whom most are accountable.
Hearts and
inds
As ever, compe on for the hearts and minds of the masses is in full swing. In a
recent statement aired by the Voice of America - Somali language program, alShabab's leader, Ahmed Godane, describes the current military campaign as a
proxy war in which US, after it was defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq, uses Ethiopia
for the second me (to advance its interests) .
The rst objec ve, according to him, is to Divide what's left of Somalia between
Ethiopia and Kenya in ways masqueraded as regional administra ons .
He urged Somalis to wage Jihad against Ethiopia, AMISOM, the Somali government
and US.
On their part, the AMISOM spokesperson has beenon many key media outlets try
ing to shake o their recently earned image of parasi cal laziness intended to pro
long their lucra ve engagement. Concurrently, AMISOM has launched a relentless
campaign on social media.
Anyone who deviates from the o cial line gets PAS-ed (called Pro al-Shabab). S ll
none could be more e ec ve than Ethiopia's percep on management.
Though nothing has changed as far as its policy toward Somalia is concerned, it ap
parently has rebranded its image. So e ec ve has its rebranding been that it dra
ma cally increased the number of its Somali poli cal clientele.
99
Much of the credit goes to the diploma c nesse of its foreign minister, Tedros Ad
hanom, whose style I call njera Diplomacy. In era is a spongy Ethiopian atbread
served with a variety of meat and vegetable stews. With it one can easily scoop
much of the stew one bite after another without dirtying one's hand.
Make no mistake Ethiopia is the hegemon of The Horn. As such, it is on a constant
quest to expand its sphere of in uence, and, in the case of Somalia, its subdivision
of subjuga on.
T e ubbaland ini a
e
k
The highlight of Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom's In era Diplomacy was the bro
kering of what's known as the Addis or Jubbaland Peace Agreement or between the
federal government and the advocates of establishing yet another region that
could further Balkanise the na on in its inevitable demand for autonomy.
The so-called peace agreement, delivered on an IGAD silver plate, was full of holes
that would not only make it unsustainable but, one may argue, was engineered to
lure the central government into a deep poli cal ditch.
Though neither the government nor the Jubbaland leadership have sought a twoyear interim agreement, in hindsight, that conspicuously short span was convenient
for the architects (Ethiopia and Kenya) as it expires during the busiest and indeed
most poli cally charged period - one year before the end of the current govern
ment's term.
By the same token, it would embolden other clan-based en es to mimic the Jub
baland blueprint for breakaway. This, needless to say, would compel the govern
ment to beg for yet another reconcilia on x as it has before the New Deal confer
ence.
The whole thing was a PR sham and an entrapment. From its incep on, the Jubba
land ini a ve has been nothing more than a shotgun wedding that would not
solve any problem.
Hardly a few days have passed before the Jubbaland breakaway model was being
implemented. In the city of Baidao alone, two parallel conferences have produced
two di erent presidents with overlapping authori es, cons tuencies and territorial
claims.
Both inter and intra-clan bloodshed is looming. Guess who is going to come to the
rescue? Ethiopia, of course.
Strategy
sel -anni ila
n
Over the years, al-Shabab has made a number of strategic errors that caused death
and destruc on. They are on course to repeat history once again.
Godane is fundamentally wrong in his assessment. Going back to the aforemen
oned two couples (Ethiopia and Kenya) and (US and UK), while they all are on the
same page in defea ng al-Shabab, they do not have the same geopoli cal and geoeconomic interest or strategy.
100
Ironically, the African couple see it's in their strategic best interest to permanently
bury the Somali state and nurture the mushrooming clan-based paper ger parastates that pose dangers only to themselves.
On the other hand, though they have made their respec ve contribu ons to fur
ther complicate issues, by and large, the Western couple have been trying to resus
citate the Somali state for their own strategic purposes.
While counter-terrorism, piracy, and geopoli cs make headlines, it was the relent
less lobbying e ort of a few major oil companies, eager to reclaim their old con
tracts (now in highly contested areas), and interna onal ins tu ons such as Inter
na onal Monetary Fund and World Bank, eager to reclaim their old loans and fat
interests, that made it happen.
It is important to note that this par cular coali on which has considerable in u
ence on the interna onal community is growing very impa ent.
Meanwhile, the federal government and all regional or autonomous para-states
have been on a dizzying signature frenzy that produced nothing more than colour
ful and indeed highly contested contracts, agreements, and trea es that further
complicate the issue.
W at t en?
Though the majority of Somali adults s ll lament their collec ve failure to mi gate
the raw (clan-s rred) emo ons that ul mately destroyed the state, and along with
it law and order, we are bound to repeat those mistakes.
Failing to ask what then? has opened the gates of chaos and famine and the rest
is a seemingly endless dark history.
So, what is the strategy when the party balloon e ect changes the reality on the
ground? Common sense dictates by squeezing an in ated party balloon from one
side, you would force the inside air to swiftly migrate to the other side. So sooner
or later, al-Shabab would be forced to migrate and take their show elsewhere
(Puntland, Somaliland, etc.), then what?
Meanwhile, under the current poli cal calculus and on-going military cam
paign, the Somali government is shackled into submission, and thus has zero lever
age to impact any change that could be considered good for Somalia.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed
must embrace the reality that the only viable leverage they have is to cul vate
trust within the Somali people, who, as a result of decades of exploita on, are sick
and red of always being the expendable pawn.
Analysis by Ambassador Abu ar Arman is the former omalia special envoy to the
nited tates and a foreign policy analyst.
http://www.aljazeera.com/
101
Sudan
KHART UM: REALL
UT F THE TERR RISM BUSINESS? – ANAL SIS
MARCH 21, 2014 PAMBAZUKA NEWS LEAVE A COMMENT
Given the U.S. intelligence community’s eager rela onship with Khartoum, it would
be convenient if the Na onal Islamic Front/Na onal Congress Party regime were no
longer in the business of suppor ng interna onal terrorism and no longer on the
State Department list of state sponsors of interna onal terrorism. Of course, the
domes c terrorism wrought in Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Abyei, and
among those who would resist the regime’s brutal tyranny seems of little concern
to the Central Intelligence Agency and other of the myriad intelligence-gathering
agencies dealing with the very real and ongoing threat of interna onal terrorism.
Indeed, there seems to have been a general loss of moral balance in how the intel
ligence community thinks and operates, even as its in uence in domes c and for
eign policy con nues to grow rapidly.
For example, so eager was the CIA to improve rela ons with the Khartoum regime
that in 2005 the agency decided to y to Langley, Virginia (CIA headquarters)—on
execu ve jet—Major-General Saleh Gosh, then head of Khartoum’s intelligence
services and, cri cally, minder of Osama bin Laden during his me in Khartoum:
1992 – 1996, forma ve years for al-Qaeda. It mattered little that Gosh’s hands
were covered with the blood of poli cal detainees and any perceived opponents of
the regime. And it mattered little that Gosh was instrumental in carrying out the
genocidal counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur, then at its height. He had infor
ma on the CIA wanted, and the price to be paid was a trip to Washington.
102
An extraordinary piece of inves ga ve journalism by the Los Angeles Times re
vealed the attitude of the U.S. intelligence community during the Bush administra
on. For despite President Bush’s 2005 reitera on of the genocide nding against
Khartoum for its ac ons in Darfur, rst announced in September 2004 by former
Secretary of State Colin Powell, the CIA ‘proudly’ ew Gosh to Washington. In an
unusually detailed depic on of the controversy over this visit within the Bush ad
ministra on, the Los Angeles Times reported on June 17, 2005:
‘The CIA and Mukhabarat Khartoum's intelligence and security services o cials
have met regularly over the last few years, but Gosh had been seeking an invita on
to Washington in recogni on of his government’s e orts, sources told The Times.
The CIA, hoping to seal the partnership, extended the invita on. ‘The agency’s view
was that the Sudanese are helping us on terrorism and it was proud to bring him
over,’ said a government source with knowledge of Gosh’s visit. ‘They didn’t care
about the poli cal implica ons.’
The cynicism re ected in this attitude—the ‘pride’ in bringing a known génocidaire
to the United States—almost beggars belief.
The ‘poli cal implica ons,’ of course, included Khartoum’s canny understanding of
the signi cance of Washington’s willingness to invite a man not only complicit in
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Darfuris but a regime o cial directly re
sponsible for many tens of thousands of ‘disappearances,’ extrajudicial execu ons,
instances of brutal torture, poli cal arrests, and other viola ons of human rights.
These have been regularly chronicled for many years by Human Rights Watch, Am
nesty Interna onal, and the African Center for Jus ce and Peace Studies (UK),
among others.
As the Los Angeles Times dispatch con nued:
‘An internal debate erupted after word of the invita on to Gosh spread to other
government agencies. Their concern stemmed in part from a 2004 letter that 11
members of Congress sent to Bush, which accused Gosh of being a chief architect
of the violence in Darfur. The letter said Sudan had engaged in a ‘scorched-earth
policy against innocent civilians in Darfur.’ It iden ed 21 Sudanese government,
military and mili a leaders as responsible and called on the administra on to
freeze their assets and ban them from coming to the U.S. Gosh was No. 2 on the
list.’
Several sources, including a State Department o cial, said the ques on of the pro
priety of the visit provoked sharp divisions at that agency. Similar opposi on
emerged at the Jus ce Department, where o cials discussed arres ng Gosh, ac
cording to two sources.
Ted Dagne, a Sudan specialist with the Congressional Research Service, said State
Department o cials believed Gosh’s trip would ‘send a poli cal signal to the
Sudanese government that Darfur would not prevent Sudan from winning sup
103
port in Washington.’
This painfully cynical attitude toward Khartoum as a valued partner in the ‘war on
terrorism’ is just as prevalent in the Obama administra on as in the Bush admin
istra on. Indeed, in terms of decep on and disingenuousness, the Obama admin
istra on may have an edge. The most glaring example was provided by former spe
cial envoy to Sudan Scott Gra on, a man singularly without diploma c skills, region
al knowledge, relevant languages—or common sense. Tes fying before the Senate
Foreign Rela ons Committee shortly after being appointed to this most challenging
diploma c undertaking, he was asked speci cally about Sudan and support for in
terna onal terrorism. His reply was an example of shocking mendacity, or igno
rance:
‘There’s no evidence in our intelligence community that supports Sudan being on
the state sponsors of terrorism. It’s a poli cal decision,’ Gra on said.’ (Tes mony to
the Senate Foreign Rela ons Committee, Washington, DC, July 31, 2009) Let’s ex
amine this claim more deeply than the Senate did, and see just what the historical
record suggests about Khartoum’s support for interna onal terrorism.
Most recently, with considerable interna onal atten on, the Israeli Defence Forces
reported that on March 5, 2014 they seized a Panamanian- agged freighter, with a
Turkish captain, as it was approaching Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The ship was Ira
nian, the Klos-C. In the cargo-hold, under bags of cement, were dozens of Syrian M302 rockets—not, evidently, the most advanced version of this rocket system, but
with a very large warhead and a range of approximately 100 kilometers (a number
of photographs have been publicly released).
The rockets—originally from Syria and delivered to Iran—were to be transported
overland from Port Sudan through Egypt and on to Gaza and presumably Hamas
(with which Iran is trying to repair rela ons) or Islamic Jihad (Iran’s proxy in Gaza).
Both are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. The rockets would bring a tre
mendous number of Israeli ci zens within range of these powerful rockets. Nota
bly, Hamas con nues to have an o ce in Khartoum—as it did when Gra on made
his claim that the designa on of Khartoum as a sponsor of terrorism was merely
“poli cal.”
Beyond this most recent episode, there is a good deal of evidence that Khartoum
has been complicit in attempts to smuggle weapons to Gaza through Egypt for a
number of years. But if we look back further, to the years after bin Laden left Sudan
for Afghanistan, there is also a good deal of revealing detail about Khartoum’s on
going support for terrorism. A good deal of this informa on has come from
‘Wikileaked’ U.S. diploma c cable tra c, which is candid because it has been as
sumed to be completely secure.
We should note rst that the August 2010 State Department assessment of inter
na onal terrorism found that ‘al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements as well as ele
ments of the Pales nian Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, remained in Sudan in 2009’—
104
the very year in which Gra on tes ed. Khartoum was of course aware of and ac
quiesced in this presence. Moreover, U.S. intelligence knew that as recently as
March 2009 Sudan had a role in supplying Iranian arms for Hamas in Gaza. The
Guardian (UK) reported in December 2010 on ‘Wikileaked’ State Department cables
from both January and March 2009:
‘State department cables released by WikiLeaks show that Sudan was warned by
the U.S. in January 2009 not to allow the delivery of unspeci ed Iranian arms that
were expected to be passed to Hamas in the Gaza Strip around the me of Israel’s
Cast Lead o ensive, in which 1,400 Pales nians were killed.’ (December 6, 2010)
U.S. diplomats were instructed to express ‘excep onal concern’ to Khartoum o
cials, but those warnings evidently went unheeded. The Guardian goes on to re
port:
In March 2009, Jordan and Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to
ship a cargo of ‘lethal military equipment’ to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan
and then to Hamas.
The cables don’t specify what the disposi on of this ‘lethal military equipment’
was. But Hamas is considered a terrorist organiza on not only by the U.S. but Cana
da, the European Union, and Japan. So what to make of Gra on’s claim of July 2009
that there is ‘no evidence in our intelligence community’ that Khartoum supports
terrorism’? Perhaps he came to regret the misrepresenta on. For shortly after his
Senate tes mony, Gra on would shamelessly lie to Darfuris in a Radio Dabanga in
terview, claiming he’d never suggested that Sudan be removed from the State De
partment list of interna onal sponsors of terrorism, as if there were no obvious syl
logism in his claim that Khartoum’s presence on the list was not because of support
for terrorism, but merely for (domes c) ‘poli cal’ reasons.
Obama’s intelligence community seems to have made a convert of the President
himself. In April 2008 candidate Obama expressed ‘deep concern’ that the Bush
administra on was making an unseemly deal with the Khartoum regime as a means
to bolster the edgling but already failing UN/African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID):
‘This reckless and cynical ini a ve would reward a regime in Khartoum that has a
record of failing to live up to its commitments. First, no country should be removed
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism for any reason other than the existence
of veri able proof that the government in ques on does not support terrorist or
ganiza ons.’
The disparity between this strenuous rhetoric and the reality of the past ve years
has been striking, something I have explored at length previously.
But what happens if we look further back? Do these more recent ac ons follow a
previous pattern? In the days following September 11, 2001, a number of revealing
reports quickly emerged, demonstra ng that bin Laden’s departure for Afghanistan
105
did not end his rela onship with the Khartoum regime. For example, the Boston
Globe, CNN, and Reuters all reported on the con nuing role of al-Shamal Bank in
nancing Osama bin Laden’s campaign of terror against the United States. Unsur
prisingly, al-Shamal Bank is in Khartoum. Moreover, the Na onal Islamic Front (as it
was known during bin Laden’s sojourn) also gave bin Laden many lucra ve oppor
tuni es not only in banking, but in agriculture and construc on. And as the alShamal Bank example suggested, bin Laden con nued to derive extensive support
from Khartoum well after his departure for Afghanistan. The Boston Globe o ered
a par cularly telling example:
‘Bin Laden could be using the al- Shamal bank to gain access to US banks,’ Senator
Carl Levin said, calling for new laws that would prevent such access. Levin cited an
instance in which 250,000 was wired from al- Shamal Bank to a bin Laden associ
ate in Texas, who used the money to buy a plane for bin Laden.’
According to CNN (September 26, 2001), bin Laden had provided 50 million in
start-up capital for the al-Shamal Bank. It’s simply not credible that the Khartoum
regime wasn’t fully aware of such a large nancial presence in its banking system.
And as the Boston Globe also notes in repor ng on the years in which bin Laden
was actually in Sudan: ‘U.S. o cials said bin Laden controlled some of the largest
commercial enterprises in Sudan, genera ng both pro ts and a cover for terrorist
ac vi es.’ In yet another revealing moment in the Boston Globe report, we learn
that:
‘ Bin Laden's businesses were not just focused on the bottom line, U.S. prosecu
tors in the Tanzania and Kenya embassies bombing trial say. In one transac on, a
bin Laden company sent sugar from Sudan to Afghanistan. But on its return ight,
the rented Sudan Airways cargo plane was loaded with Milan rockets and S nger
missiles.’
Moreover, al-Qaeda never fully left Khartoum and Sudan, even after bin Laden’s
departure. The April 2001 State Department report on state sponsors of terrorism
declared empha cally: ‘ In 2000 Sudan con nued to be used as a safe haven by
members of various groups, including associates of Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida or
ganiza on.’
The broadest and most authorita ve picture was provided by Africa Con den al,
and much of what was said over a decade ago remains true today:
‘The N a onal I slamic F ront poli cal and security apparatus is intact, as are the
NIF’s and the interna onal Islamists’ control of the economy. Many of those run
ning terrorist training are s ll in security and ministerial jobs. So, well informed Su
danese doubt that the NIF will hand much of value to U.S. inves gators. The NIF is
as Islamist as its friends Usama and the Taliban. This regime believes in what it
does. Any concession is intended only to protect the greater cause. Secondly, any
major betrayal would be suicidal, just as dangerous as holding free elec
ons.’ (Africa Con den al, Volume 42, No. 19, September 28, 2001)
106
Bri sh Prime Minister at the me, Tony Blair, disclosed in the wake of 9/11 that:
‘…these bin Laden companies were key assets in the al-Qaeda terrorist campaign.
Since 1989, Osama bin Laden has established a series of (Sudanese) businesses to
provide income for al-Qaeda, and to provide cover for the procurement of explo
sives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of al-Qaeda opera ves,’ said a re
port tabled in the Bri sh parliament. (The Ci zen Ottawa , October 12, 2001)
In the same account The Ci zen reported (along with many others):
‘The FBI has con rmed that Mohamed Atta, who piloted one of the commercial jet
liners into the World Trade Center, “wired money to Mr. bin Laden’s former pay
master in Sudan, Shaykh Sai’id el Masry, also known as Mustafa Muhammad Ah
mad, on the eve of the terrorist attacks…. Shaykh Sai’id Mustafa Muhammad Ah
mad controlled the bin Laden nancial network in Sudan through a company
called Taba Investments, and used pro ts from related Sudanese banks and busi
nesses to nance and cloak terrorist training.’
The Associated Press reported that Ali Mohamed, who pled guilty to conspiracy in
the 1998 east African embassy bombings, said
‘he Mohamed arranged security for a mee ng in the Sudan between Hezbollah’s
chief and bin Laden. Hezbollah provided explosives training for al-Qaida and Islamic
Jihad, Mohamed said, while Iran supplied Egyp an Jihad with weapons and used
Hezbollah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks,’ (Associated
Press, October 12, 2001)
The Washington Post, on October 11, 2001 reported that ‘Tens of millions of the
100 million provided by bin Laden to the Taliban since he arrived in Afghanistan
from Sudan in 1996 has been directly traced to bin Laden en es through banking
and other transfers.’ These transfers would certainly have involved the Taba Invest
ments Company and al-Shamal Bank in Khartoum, which received 50 million in
start-up capital from bin Laden when he was in Sudan.
The Post had earlier reported: ‘Aldy el-Attar, a 53-year-old surgeon who had a prac
ce in the city of Neu-Ulm in the state of Bavaria, met separately both with alleged
hijacker Mohamed Atta and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an alleged nancier for Osa
ma bin Laden’s al Qaeda network, the sources said. El-Attar traveled frequently in
Europe and between Germany and Sudan’ (October 9, 2001).
The Los Angeles Times reported on October 7, 2001 that a unit of Islamic moujahe
deen in Bosnia had been nanced by bin Laden ‘by means of small convoys of re
cruits from the Arab world through his businesses in Sudan, according to Mideast
sources.’
And The Guardian of October 1, 2001 reported in detail on the nancial back
ground of bin Laden and al-Qaeda:
‘United States inves gators believe they have found the ‘smoking gun’ linking Osa
107
ma bin Laden to the September 11 terrorist attacks, with the discovery of nancial
evidence showing money transfers between the hijackers and a bin Laden aide in
the United Arab Emirates.’
The man at the centre of the nancial web is believed to be Sheikh Saeed, also
known as Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, who worked as a nancial manager for bin
Laden when the Saudi exile was based in Sudan, and is s ll a trusted paymaster in
bin Laden’s al-Qaida organisa on.
Perhaps the most chilling and explicit report was that of September 28, 2001, from
the Na onal Post (Canada). Ci ng documents from the Canadian Security Intelli
gence Service, the Na onal Post reported on two disturbing developments:
1 Sudanese leaders agreed in 1998 to use their embassy sta in New York, Lon
don and Rome to raise funds for Osama bin Laden, according to documents from
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
2 The documents, led in Federal Court, also claim the Sudanese agreed to ar
range for diploma c creden als for bin Laden followers, allowing them unfettered
travel around the world. The alleged agreement was struck between bin Laden’s
top aide, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri, and ‘Sudanese Islamic leaders,’ the CSIS brief said.
This report found its counterpart in the Hindustan Times (New Delhi) of September
20, 2001:
‘According to a senior police o cial, fresh evidence gathered by them has revealed
that Ismail, the rst secretary in the Sudanese embassy, was not only opera ng as a
conduit of Osama bin Laden in the Capital New Delhi but was also trying to recruit
more opera ves for subversive ac vi es.’
See also my overview account of the banking, investment, and commercial inter
twining of the Khartoum regime and bin Laden and al-Qaeda at: ‘Osama bin Lad
en’s Ongoing Commercial and Financial Connec ons to Khartoum’, September 19,
2001 and ‘Khartoum and a ' nancial war on terrorism': connec ng the dots,’ No
vember 2, 2001, http://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/22/khartoum-and-a- nancialwar-on-terrorism-connec ng-the-dots-november-2-2001/
See also transcripts of the 1998 embassy bombings trial, which had recently con
cluded. The trial for these acts of terrorism clearly indicated the responsibility of
bin Laden and his terrorist network al-Qaeda. Companies such as Talisman Energy
and the Government of Canada must certainly have had considerable knowledge of
bin Laden's, and thus Sudan's, role in the embassy bombings when Talisman o
cially entered Sudan in October 1998. For transcripts of the trial, revealing much
about bin Laden’s nancial and commercial connec ons to Sudan, see the analysis
of those transcripts by the Center for Nonprolifera on Studies of the Monterey In
s tute of Interna onal Studies: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm.
108
Has K art u
really c anged?
And just who is the man and the organiza on that Khartoum chose to have as such
a close ally and business partner?
Bin Laden makes little dis nc on between American civilians and soldiers. ‘You say
I am gh ng against the American civilians,’ he told one interviewer. ‘My enemy is
every American man who is gh ng against me, even by paying taxes.’ (Los Angeles
Times, September 15, 2001)
The same attitude prevails in many powerful quarters in Khartoum, as suggested by
the willingness to assist in the transfer of powerful rockets to Gaza, where their on
ly targets can be Israeli civilians, taxpaying and otherwise. General Gra on’s claim
that only domes c ‘poli cs’ keeps Sudan on the State Department list of state
sponsors of interna onal terrorism re ects either disabling ignorance or cynical
mendacity in his case it’s a tough call to make. But the U.S. intelligence community
knows full well all that I report here—and s ll chooses to attempt to de ne U.S.
Sudan policy through the lens of counter-terrorism ‘coopera on’ with Khartoum.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21032014-khartoum-really-out-of-the-terrorismbusiness-analysis/
109
Tunisia
Tunisia Arab Spring s birt place takes n
ilitants
Mar. 23, 2014
A w an lds a flag wit t e ace
pp si n leader C kri Belaid at a February rally c
e ra ng is assassina n T e Tunisian g ern ent bla es Ansar al-S aria w ic Tunisian aut ri es and t e US g ern ent c nsider a terr rist gr up
being be ind Belaid s urder / Sara Lync
r USA T A
ADVERTISEMENT
Sara Lync Special r USA T A 10:40 a.m. EDT March 2 , 2014
TUNIS, Tunisia — Islamist militants across North Africa have been gh ng govern
ments in Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Mali for not imposing harsh sharia law, launching
terror attacks and even full blown military o ensives against them.
Tunisia is pushing back.
The rst to cast o a dictator and herald the Arab Spring uprisings elsewhere, Tuni
sia has been dealing with poli cal unrest and terrorism from those who hoped to
take advantage of the uncertain mes to establish a Muslim theocracy.
But Tunisia seems intent on not letting go of the edgling democracy that came out
of its Jasmine Revolu on, to date perhaps the most successful of the Arab Spring.
The protest movement that began with a simple act — a desperate fruit vendor set
himself on re in December 2010 — and gave rise to uprisings across the country
that led to the ouster of long me dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.
110
The country has developed signi cant counterterrorism forces that have been giv
en the means to ght back, say analysts. And the government is in ltra ng the
once-sacrosanct haven of the mosque to root out imams accused of inci ng vio
lence.
I would describe the overall sweep as a stunning success for the rst phase of the
crackdown, said Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Founda on for
Defense of Democracies.
There are many caveats coming. But if you're just looking at their e ec veness in
terms of what you might expect, they've been far more e ec ve than what I would
have thought.
Places like Benghazi and the Egyp an North Sinai are under widespread militant
sway, and Mali needed a French invasion force to turn back a 2013 Islamist insur
gency.
Mili as roam Libya ush with weapons liberated from the stores of the deceased
dictator Moammar Gadha , and in some ci es control major governing func ons.
The northern Sinai is a nearly lawless zone where weapons tra cking is rampant. Al
-Qaeda has in ltrated Western Iraq and has resisted Baghdad military e orts to
force it out.
Tunisian authori es have faced billowing security threats as well.
In August, security forces launched heavy air and ar llery strikes on militant
hideouts in the Mount Chaambi area near the Algerian border and have attacked
repeatedly there for months. More than 20 members of Tunisia's security forces
were killed last year during opera ons against Islamist militants in the western por
on of the country.
In 2013, two well-known secular poli cal gures who opposed overt religious in u
ence in the government were assassinated.
Just last month Islamist militants ambushed Tunisia security forces in the west of
the country, killing three policemen. Earlier in February police killed seven militants
armed with suicide bomb vests and explosives in a raid just north of the capital.
Gen. Carter Ham, who headed the U.S. Army's Africa Command, warned last year
that al-Qaeda was trying to get a foothold in Tunisia.
THE FFENSIVE
Tunisia's response has been forceful. The Interior ministry created crisis cells to
gather intelligence on terrorist ac vity and act on it.
Last year 1,343 defendants were prosecuted in connec on to terrorism, according
to Tunisia Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou. Weapons caches were also seized, in
cluding 250 rockets, more than 200 homemade bombs and over 350 guns.
In a recent visit, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry heralded Tunisia's security oper
a ons as well carried out, well planned and well executed. He also announced
111
that the U.S. would give the na on a mobile crime lab for police forensics inves ga
ons and a high-tech mobile command post vehicle for conduc ng terrorism inves
ga ons.
Militancy in the Arab world is often fueled by repressive poli cal policies many ex
perts say Tunisia is wisely steering away from despo c edicts that have rocked Arab
Spring movements in Egypt and Libya.
More than three years after its 2010 revolu on, the country is moving toward elec
ons based on a new cons tu on passed with broad support among compe ng
par es.
Tunisian poli cians and the poli cal system in general have just graduated from
elementary school to middle school — where you always squabble and you're not
too mature … to now having a bit of a structure, more knowledge and a bit more
experience, said Firas BenAchour, president and founding member of Tunisian
American Young Professionals, a Washington-based associa on.
We're moving from the self-serving poli cians, or their poli cal par es, to actually
mee ng the needs of the people or the country.
Things looked bleak in July when massive protests were going on against the gov
ernment because of the assassina on of a popular poli cal rival to the ruling Islam
ist Ennahda Party. The party, which won elec ons in 2010, blamed the murder on
radical adherents of harsh Islamic law known as Sala sts.
In response, Ennahda entered into nego a ons with rival par es to make longdelayed reforms to the poli cal system. The Na onal Cons tuent Assembly ap
proved a new cons tu on endorsed by 200 of 217 members of the body that
wrote the draft.
And in January, Ennahda stepped down from power to allow an appointed govern
ment to preside over new elec ons in a peaceful relinquishing of power not seen
elsewhere in the region from elected Islamist par es. Ennahda's party leader, Ra
chid Ghannouhchi, said at the me that, Tunisia will not follow the Egyp an sce
nario. We will hold on.
THE RI HT CLIMATE
It was a matter of everyone needing to get through this process and get to the
next step, said Mahmoud Baroudi, a member of the na onal assembly.
Noureddine Arbaoui, a member of Ennahda's execu ve bureau, said the party
chose to compromise to serve the country's collec ve interests.
Among the ve countries of the Arab Spring — Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and
Egypt — Tunisia has reached the right poli cal climate and a certain stability, he
said. The passing of the cons tu on proves Tunisians left their clashes and di er
ences behind and they now coexist and live together peacefully.
Tunisia may have had an easier me transi oning to democracy because it has as
112
sets other countries don't, analysts said.
The popula on is wealthier and more educated than other countries in the region
and women are more emancipated, said Michele Dunne, a senior associate in the
Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for Interna onal Peace.
And while the military backed the revolu on, it made space for civilian rule and did
not involve itself in poli cs — vastly di erent from Egypt where the military gov
erned after Hosni Mubarak's fall and then forced then-President Mohamed Morsi
out of power last summer.
Tunisia now has set the stage for greater poli cal stability, Dunne said.
Poor economies have also fed instability in the Middle East, and Tunisia is not im
mune to that danger.
Unemployment, a driving force behind the country's 2010 revolu on, remains high.
Last year's economic recovery slowed and in a on steadily increased, according to
the World Bank. Analysts said the government is expanding public spending to an
unsustainable level.
Prices of food have increased and things got expensive, said Lamia Bouthour, a
housewife in Tunis. But s ll, the overall situa on is better than it was right after
the revolu on.
Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamdi is seeking to strengthen economic es with
European countries. We must ensure that Tunisia is a success story because if it
doesn't then no other Arab country will succeed, Hamdi told Reuters last month
while in Paris.
By far most here believe the greatest challenge now to a peaceful future is the de
feat of militant ideology.
About 400 Tunisians have returned from gh ng in Syria's civil war while 8,000
were prevented from traveling to ght in the con ict, Interior Minister Lotfi Ben
Jeddou says. The broader region, sweeping horizontally across the Mediterranean
coast, is plagued by jihadist violence that can easily transit borders.
At the end of the day, democracy thrives in a stable, economically vibrant society
and region as well, BenAchour said. What happens in Algeria will a ect Tunisia.
What happens in Egypt will somehow a ect Tunisia.
Tunisia's security crackdown has focused on Ansar al-Sharia, a U.S.-designated ter
rorist group with es to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The Tunisian government
blames the group for assassina ons and its leader, Abou Iyadh, was accused of or
chestra ng a September 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis.
Security analyst Gartenstein-Ross said the Tunisian government has a decent
chance at eviscera ng and marginalizing the power of Ansar al-Sharia because it is
not a deep organiza on that is able to regenerate.
113
A lot of the members are young people who see it as a protest movement and
don't have the same sort of overarching passion for the jihadist cause that you get
within some other organiza ons, he said.
A EE ER BATTLE
Tunisia's e orts against militancy face challenges, analysts said.
Ansar al-Sharia can easily recruit disa ected young men who view Islam as the so
lu on to problems that have plagued Tunisia for decades, allowing the group to
grow faster than security forces can ght it, said Scott Stewart, vice president of
analysis at Stratfor, an intelligence rm.
You have a physical problem that the government is facing as far as some militant
attacks and assassina ons, but you also have a deeper ideological battle right now,
which is really what's giving rise to the physical, Stewart said.
That battle is being fought also in mosques, where government sanc oned houses
of prayer exist alongside unsanc oned ones where militancy is some mes
preached.
Two weeks ago, imam Khamis El Mejri was arrested in a city north of the capital
Tunis for preaching without a permit, Mongi Belaress, spokesperson for the rst
court of Bizerte, told Arab news outlet Al Jazeera.
El Mejri, who referred to a suspect in the assassina on of secular leader Chokri
Belaid as a martyr, is the latest imam to be detained by the government for ap
parently for views seen as extremist.
Despite their successes, Tunisian security forces are not always equipped or trained
to their best abili es, analysts said. And some ci zens lack respect for the police
and are skep cal of the security network's inten ons.
Cyber ac vist So ane Belhaj accuses the Ministry of Interior — which oversees the
police — of conduc ng security opera ons only for poli cal gain and of lying to the
public.
No one trusts the police ... or the informa on they give, Belhaj said. (Police) only
react when they want to react, he added. They only react when they want media
buzz, not because an issue is a na onal security matter.
Cri cs say a February police raid on suspects in the assassina on of Belaid was
med to happen a few days before the rst anniversary of Belaid's death to con
vince the public of the government's success in gh ng terrorism.
Others, however, praise police e orts and point to palpable security gains.
Security has improved compared to a few months ago, said Lamia Bouthour, a
housewife. Now we can go out in the streets and hang out, and go around the
country safely. We feel secure. We don't feel threats like we used to.
114
Cyber ac ist S fiane Bel aj accuses t e Interi r Ministry w ic
ersees
t e p lice
carrying ut security pera ns r p li cal gain and lying t
t e public Photo: Sarah Lynch for USA T DA
There's a whole image in society that Sala sts are violent, radical, said Yahya bin
Abdallah, who belongs to a student union comprised of numerous Islamists. I have
friends from Ansar al-Sharia who are in jail now and who say that the jails are full of
Sala sts.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/
115
International Organizations
UN
C
battre le «terr ris e nucl aire»
L initiative a été lancée par les tats-Unis, les Pays-Bas et la Corée du Sud,
puis signée par 2 autres pays. Photo Robin Van Lonkhui sen / AFP
-
-
1
LA HAYE - Une cinquantaine de chefs d'État et de gouvernement ont renforcé mar
di à La Haye les mesures des nées à empêcher des groupes terroristes de s'empa
rer de matériaux nucléaires qui leur permettraient de construire des armes ato
miques ou des bombes «sales».
Intervenant lors de la conférence de presse nale concluant la troisième édi on du
Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire (NSS), Barack Obama a salué les e orts accomplis
et réinvité les dirigeants du monde à coopérer étroitement pour contrer la menace
du terrorisme nucléaire, qu'il quali e de «menace la plus immédiate et la plus ex
trême pour la sécurité mondiale.»
«Il est essen el que nous ne nous rel chions pas mais plutôt que nous accélérions
nos e orts sur les deux prochaines années, que nous maintenions l'élan a n de
nir en beauté en 2016», lors de la prochaine édi on du sommet à Washington, a
déclaré le président des États-unis.
«Au vu des conséquences catastrophiques qu'auraient une seule et unique attaque,
nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre de nous complaire dans l'auto-sa sfac on», a
-t-il ajouté.
116
Selon le Premier ministre néerlandais Mark Rutte, des «mesures importantes» ont
été adoptées en regard des trois objec fs du sommet : réduire le nombre de maté
riaux nucléaires dangereux, améliorer la sécurité de ces matériaux et améliorer la
coopéra on interna onale.
Certains États ont néanmoins voulu aller plus vite que les autres, à l'image des 35
qui se sont engagés à appliquer des standards interna onaux plus stricts que ceux
adoptés dans le communiqué nal, et à renforcer leur coopéra on.
Cette ini a ve a été lancée par les États-Unis, les Pays-Bas et la Corée du Sud, puis
signée par 32 autres pays, dont la France, la Turquie, l'Ukraine et Israël.
Elle représente «l'avancée la plus importante du sommet», a commenté Miles
Pomper, un expert au centre James Mar n pour les Études sur la non-proliféra on.
Mais «il serait nécessaire que la totalité des pays qui par cipent au sommet signent
également ce texte, surtout la Russie.»
Selon le Groupe sur les matériaux ssiles, un groupe d'experts sur le nucléaire,
«l'absence de la Russie, de la Chine, du Pakistan et de l'Inde, tous des pays dispo
sant de l'arme nucléaire et d'un stock fourni de matériaux nucléaires, a aibli l'im
pact de ce texte.»
L'autre annonce importante du sommet a été l'engagement du Japon à renvoyer
aux États-Unis plus de 300 kilos de plutonium et près de 200 kilos d'uranium haute
ment enrichi qui lui avaient été fournis à des ns de recherche pendant la Guerre
froide.
Ces matériaux sont actuellement stockés dans des b ments à 140 kilomètres au
nord-est de Tokyo, une cible facile pour des terroristes, selon les experts.
«En cédant ces matériaux nucléaires, nous pouvons réduire le risque de terrorisme
nucléaire», a déclaré le conseiller spécial du Japon sur le nucléaire, Yosuke Isozaki.
NOUVEAU SOMMET EN 2016
La lutte contre la menace terroriste nucléaire est au coeur de l'héritage poli que
que souhaite laisser le président américain Barack Obama, qui avait lancé le pre
mier Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire en 2010 et devrait accueillir la 4e édi on en
16 W
g .
L'enjeu est de taille car «il y a presque 2 000 tonnes de matériel, prêt à être u lisé
dans une arme, en circula on dans le monde», avait rappelé le Premier ministre
néerlandais Mark Rutte lors de la cérémonie d'ouverture lundi.
Dans le communiqué nal, les dirigeants recommandent de con nuer à réduire les
stocks d'uranium hautement enrichi et de plutonium, en les transformant en ura
nium faiblement enrichi, notamment.
Barack Obama a assuré que les dirigeants envisageraient de transformer le format
actuel de sommets en une organisa on plus permanente dirigée au niveau ministé
117
riel a n de «synchroniser le NSS avec des ins tu ons existantes comme l'AIEA et
Interpol.»
Alors que la première journée avait été dominée par l'Ukraine, les débats ont éga
lement porté sur la di culté à faire respecter les accords existants dans le nu
cléaire, comme l'illustre la crise ukrainienne.
Après son indépendance en 1991, l'Ukraine avait accepté en 1994 de se débarras
ser de son arsenal nucléaire en échange de la garan e que son intégrité territoriale
ne serait pas violée.
«Dans le cas de l'Ukraine, l'assurance de la sécurité (territoriale, ndlr) était une con
di on essen elle à son accession au traité sur la non-proliféra on nucléaire», a dé
claré lundi le secrétaire général des Na ons unies Ban Ki-moon. Mais ces assu
rances ont été «sérieusement minées par les événements récents», a-t-il ajouté, en
faisant allusion au rattachement de la Crimée à la Russie.
http://fr.canoe.ca/infos/interna onal/archives/2014/03/20140325-152621.html
118
Terrorism in the World
France
Analyse Côte d A ur : un attentat isla iste « pr bable ent » d j u
1
Les 900 g d'explosifs ont été découverts dans l'un des appartements de cet im
meuble situé près de Cannes. (Photo AFP)
Il est encore trop tôt pour savoir si la DCRI a réellement empêché un attentat d'ori
gine islamiste sur la Côte d'Azur, mais c'est le sens des informa ons di usées, hier,
après l'arresta on en février d'un homme de 23 ans - Ibrahim B. - revenant du jihad
119
en Syrie, o il était par en septembre 2012. Selon l'AFP citant uniquement une «
source proche du dossier », les enquêteurs de la DCRI auraient acquis la cer tude
que les 900 grammes d'explosif TATP découverts le 17 février dans un immeuble de
Mandelieu-la-Napoule (Alpes-Mari mes), près de Cannes, lors d'une perquisi on
dans un logement occupé par le suspect arrêté au même endroit, auraient pu servir
à commettre un attentat. L'homme avait été repéré le 3 janvier en Grèce, rentrant
de Syrie. Il appar endrait au réseau appelé « cellule de Cannes-Torcy », dont le dé
mantèlement a entra né à ce jour vingt-et-une mises en examen.
L'existence de ce réseau fran ais autonome, sans a lia on proclamée avec une
organisa on criminelle interna onale, avait été découverte en septembre 2012,
après l'attaque à la grenade d'un magasin de Sarcelles (Val d'Oise), tenu par un
commer ant de religion juive. L'explosion de la grenade avait blessé une cliente. Un
des leaders de cette cellule, Jérémie Louis-Sidney avait été abattu par la police lors
de son interpella on à Strasbourg, après qu'il avait ré sur elle. Lors du démantèle
ment de la cellule, plusieurs de ses membres, dont Ibrahim B. et Abdelkader T., au
raient rejoint en Syrie le front al-Nosra, une des composantes islamistes radicales
de la résistance à Bachar el-Assad. Abdelkader T. avait été arrêté en Italie en jan
vier, mais son acolyte courait toujours.
es e pl i s tr s instables
Le TATP ou peroxyde d'azote - condi onné dans ce cas dans ces canettes de bois
son couvertes de clous - est un explosif puissant, que n'importe qui peut bricoler
dans sa cuisine avec des composants disponibles dans le commerce. Il est extrême
ment instable, donc très dangereux pour ses manipulateurs et n'est pas u lisé par
des terroristes professionnels, pour cette raison. Il n'empêche qu'il est par culière
ment destructeur et qu'il a déjà servi à commettre des attentats meurtriers, notam
ment à Marrakech (Maroc), en 2011. Le code pénal permet l'arresta on et la mise
en examen de personnes soup onnées de par ciper à une « associa on de malfai
teurs en rela on avec une entreprise terroriste », sans qu'il soit nécessaire que
l'acte ait été commis. La DCRI suivrait environ 700 jihadistes fran ais, dont une cen
taine de femmes, par s en Syrie ou soup onnés de vouloir s'y rendre.
http://www.letelegramme.fr/
120
India
Arrests
Indian Muja ideen terr rists is t e best answer t B
c arges: Sus il Ku ar S inde
s
28 Mar, 2014
40 comments |Post a Comment
NEW DELHI: The success in
netting all top four Indian Muja
hedeen (IM) terrorists in the last
six months is the 'best answer'
that the UPA government has
given to the BJP's charge that
the government was weakkneed
against terror, Union Home
Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde
has said. Speaking to ET, Shinde
said the arrest of IM's current
chief Tehseen Akhtar on Tues
day was a 'major success' for The success in netting all top four Indian Mujahedeen
(IM) terrorists in the last six months is the ‘best answer’
the country's intelligence and that the UPA government has given to the BJP’s charge
security agencies.
that the government was weakkneed against terror, Un
ion Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde has said.
We rst got Yasin Bhatkal and Asadullah Akhtar last August. But we chose not to
rest ll we got the other two major terrorists too - Waqas and Tehseen Akhtar. The
BJP in the past has hurled all sorts of accusa ons at us for not tackling terror. This is
the best answer to those charges, Shinde said.
Based on Tehseen's disclosures, two more Pakistani terrorists planning to attack
poli cal rallies were apprehended near Gorakhpur on Thursday. This comes even as
BJP President Rajnath Singh on Thursday said the UPA had no comprehensive
plan to tackle terror. At a lecture in Chennai last October, BJP's Prime Ministerial
candidate Narendra Modi had said India's approach against terrorism had been
weak of late .
After the Hyderabad blasts last February in which the involvement of IM was found,
BJP leader Sushma Swaraj termed the government's response to the blasts as
'rou ne' and ques oned the alertness levels of the government to such strikes.
But the recent spate of top IM arrests, with close co-opera on from Nepal, has em
boldened the government. When asked if the IM had been e ec vely decimated
121
with these arrests, Shinde said he cannot conclusively say so.
Whether the back of the IM has been broken—this I cannot say. But yes, their ma
jor men are now behind bars. The credit goes to the Intelligence Bureau and securi
ty agencies, the Home Minister said. To buttress his case of UPA's resolve to act
against terrorists, Shinde also pointed out that the execu ons of the Mumbai 26/11
accused Ajmal Kasab and the Parliament attack accused Mohammad Afzal were
carried out in his tenure.
The home minister had, however, earlier admitted to ET that it was a mistake on
his ministry's part that Afzal's family wasn't informed well in advance before the
execu on. O cials in IB as well as the Home Ministry meanwhile give credit to the
'systems' put in place by former Home Minister P Chidambaram for the present re
sults.
Source: http://economic mes.india mes.com/
122
Syria
Qaeda Militants Seek Syria Base U S
fficials Say
MARCH 25, 2014
Fighters from Al Qaeda’s main a liate in Syria, the Nusra Front, last April near
Aleppo.CreditGuillaume Briquet/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
WASHINGTON — Dozens of seasoned militant ghters, including some midlevel
planners, have traveled to Syria from Pakistan in recent months in what American
intelligence and counterterrorism o cials fear is an e ort to lay the founda on for
future strikes against Europe and the United States.
“We are concerned about the use of Syrian territory by the Al Qaeda organiza on
to recruit individuals and develop the capability to be able not just to carry out
attacks inside of Syria, but also to use Syria as a launching pad,” John O. Brennan,
the C.I.A. director, told a House panel recently.
The extremists who concern Mr. Brennan are part of a group of Qaeda opera ves
in Pakistan that has been severely depleted in recent years by a decade of Ameri
can drone strikes. But the ghters s ll bring a wide range of skills to the battle eld,
such as bomb-building, small-arms tac cs, logis cs, religious indoctrina on and
planning, though they are not believed to have experience in launching attacks in
the West.
123
Syria is an appealing base for these opera ves
because it o ers them the rela ve sanctuary of
extremist-held havens — away from drone strikes
in Afghanistan and Pakistan — as well as ready
access to about 1,200 American and European
Muslims who have gone there to ght and could
be poten al recruits to carry out attacks when
they return home. Senior counterterrorism o
cials have voiced fears in recent months that
these Western ghters could be radicalized by the
country’s civil war.
New classi ed intelligence assessments based on
informa on from electronic intercepts, informers
and social media posts conclude that Al Qaeda’s
senior leadership in Pakistan, including Ayman alZawahri, is developing a much more systema c,
long-term plan than was previously known to cre
ate speci c cells in Syria that would iden fy, re
cruit and train these Westerners.
Abu Khalid alSuriCreditAgence FrancePresse — Getty Images
Al Qaeda has in the past blessed the crea on of local branches in places like Yem
en, where an a liate has tried to strike the United States. But the e ort in Syria
would signify the rst me that senior Qaeda leaders had set up a wing of their
own outside Pakistan dedicated to conduc ng attacks against the West, counter
terrorism o cials said. It also has the poten al to rejuvenate Al Qaeda’s central
command, which President Obama has described as being greatly diminished.
The assessment by the United States, however, has some detractors among even
its staunchest counterterrorism partners, which also see an increase in Pakistanbased veterans of Al Qaeda among Syrian rebel groups but which disagree over
whether they are involved in a coordinated plan to attack the West.
“At this stage, it’s a lot less organized than a directed plan,” said one Western secu
rity o cial. “Some ghters are going to Syria, but they’re going on an ad hoc basis,
not at an organized level.”
Most of the opera ves iden ed by intelligence o cials are now focused on
attacking Syrian government troops and occasionally rival rebel fac ons. But the
fact that these kinds of opera ves are showing up in Syria indicates to American
o cials that Mr. Zawahri is also playing a long game — coun ng on easy access to
Iraq and Qaeda support networks there, as well as on the United States’ reluctance
to carry out drone strikes or other military opera ons against targets in Syria.
“A key ques on, however, is how using Syria as a launching pad to strike the West
ts into Zawahri’s overall strategy, and if he’s soft-pedaling now, hoping to consoli
date Al Qaeda’s posi on for the future,” said one American counterterrorism o
124
cial. “Clearly, there is going to be push and pull between local opera ves and Al
Qaeda central on attack planning. How fast the pendulum will swing toward trying
something isn’t clear right now.”
The new assessment is not likely to change American policy toward Syria any me
soon, but it puts pressure on the Obama administra on and its allies because it
raises the possibility that Syria could become the next Afghanistan.
Top o cials at the F.B.I., the Na onal Counterterrorism Center and the Depart
ment of Homeland Security say they are working closely with European allies to
track Westerners returning from Syria.
There are perhaps “a few dozen” Qaeda veterans of gh ng in Afghanistan and Pa
kistan in Syria, two top counterterrorism o cials said. “What we’ve seen is a coa
lescence in Syria of Al Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as
extremists from other hot spots such as Libya and Iraq,” Matthew G. Olsen, the di
rector of the Na onal Counterterrorism Center, told a Senate panel in March.
“From a terrorism perspec ve, the most concerning development is that Al Qaeda
has declared Syria its most cri cal front.”
In his rst speech as secretary of Homeland Security in February, Jeh C. Johnson put
it even more bluntly. “Syria has become a matter of homeland security,” he said.
The Qaeda veterans have mul ple missions and mo va ons, counterterrorism o
cials say. Like thousands of other foreign ghters, many have been drawn on their
own to Syria to ght the government of President Bashar al-Assad.
Many others, like Abu Khalid al-Suri, a Syrian-born veteran of Al Qaeda, were sent
by the terrorist group’s central command in Pakistan rst to ght Mr. Assad, but
also to begin laying the groundwork to use enclaves in Syria to launch attacks
against the West, American o cials said.
Mr. Suri, who is believed to have been close to Osama bin Laden and to have
fought against American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, was sent to mediate con
icts between Al Qaeda’s main a liate in Syria, the Nusra Front, and another ex
tremist fac on, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which Al Qaeda has disavowed.
He was killed in a suicide attack in February by the rival group.
There are believed to be hundreds, if not thousands, of groups gh ng in Syria.
These opposi on groups are gh ng the Assad regime, but recently turned on each
other with increased ferocity.
Many of the Qaeda planners and opera ves from Afghanistan and Pakistan have
clustered in the east and northwest sec ons of Syria, in territory controlled or
heavily in uenced by the Nusra Front, intelligence o cials said.
Sana al-Nasr, a Saudi-born extremist who is on his country’s list of most wanted
terrorists, traveled to Syria from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region late last
year and emerged as one of the Nusra Front’s top strategists. Jihadi forums report
125
ed that he was killed in gh ng last week, but American counterterrorism o cials
said those reports could not be con rmed.
“Al Qaeda veterans could have a cri cal impact on recruitment and training,” said
Laith Alkhouri, a senior analyst at Flashpoint Global Partners, a security consul ng
rm that tracks militant websites. “They would be lionized, at least within the
ranks, as experienced mujahedeen.”
While these senior Qaeda envoys have been involved in the immediate ght
against Syrian forces, American counterterrorism o cials said they also had broad
er, longer-term ambi ons.
Without naming Mr. Nasr, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of na onal intelligence,
told a Senate panel in February that a “small nucleus” of Qaeda veterans from Af
ghanistan and Pakistan in Syria who are “separate from al-Nusra harbor designs on
attacks in Europe and the homeland.”
Charles Lister, a visi ng fellow at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, agreed, say
ing, “The large majority of Al Qaeda-linked commanders now in Syria are there due
to the poten al for Syria to be the next jihadist safe haven.”
Hassan Abu Hanieh, a Jordanian expert on Islamist movements, said that launching
attacks on Western targets did not appear to be a priority for the Nusra Front now.
However, the group’s ideology, or a belief that it was under direct threat, could
lead it to attack the West eventually, he said.
“As soon as they get targeted, they will move the battle outside,” Mr. Hanieh said.
Source: http://www.ny mes.com/
LA VI E
126
United Kingdom
UK
ust d
re t tackle Sa el-Sa ara terr r t reat
21 March 2014
MPs said little had been achieved since last year's Algerian gas plant siege, in which
six Britons were killed
T e UK needs a "bigger
tprint" in Mali and t er Sa el-Sa aran c untries t
fig t e tre is a c
ittee M s as said
The Foreign A airs Committee pointed to a mismatch between the UK's vision of
a secure western Sahel-Sahara region and its very light diploma c work.
It said jihadists had put down roots in the region, which was a new frontline of
violent extremism .
The government welcomed the report and said it was working in the region.
The Sahel runs along the south of the Sahara Desert, and the western Sahel-Sahara
region includes Mali and Mauritania.
wer ul t reat
T e Sa ara ay be a depart ental barrier wit in t e F reign ffice but it is n t
ne r terr rists”
Sir Richard OttawayForeign A airs Committee chairman
T ec
ittee said concerted interna onal ac on was needed to tackle the caus
es of instability and stop the contagion of extremism from spreading further .
Extremists had capitalised on poor economies, weak state security and anger at
corrupt governing elites , it said.
127
Committee chairman Sir Richard Ottaway said the UK should help build indigenous
security capacity .
The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan provides an opportunity to increase
the number of Bri sh military training missions in the region, he said.
A powerful threat from extremism remains throughout the region with no sign yet
that African countries would be able to deal with future crises on their own.
Sir Richard told the BBC little had been achieved following the prime minister's
promise to tackle insecurity in the Sahara in the wake of last year's Algerian gas
plant siege, in which six Britons were killed.
The MPs cri cised the lack of UK diploma c ac vity in Sahel states
Economic ac vity is often des
perately low, organised crime is
rife, and armed gangs of mili
tants seem able to move almost
unchecked across porous na on
al borders, he said.
The committee also found:
the UK was right to o er prac
cal support for the French-led
military interven on in Mali, which helped put the country on a path back to sta
bility
the young, angry and jobless in western Sahel-Sahara are dispropor onately at
risk of being lured into criminality or religious extremism
the region's popula on is growing more rapidly than anywhere else in the world
there is growing evidence of young people in the region going to desperate
lengths to leave, with Europe the most popular des na on. The committee said
the EU lacked a clear policy on how to deal with this
The ndings come after a year-long inquiry, during which members visited the re
gion.
ept
kn wledge
Sir Richard said the committee had uncovered a worrying pattern of unsightedness
on the part of the UK and others about events there.
The Sahara may be a departmental barrier within the Foreign O ce but it is not
one for terrorists, he said.
The UK's diploma c presence in the whole area is extremely small rela ve to oth
er parts of the world.
128
We would urge the UK government to look at expanding its presence and depth of
knowledge in rela on to the whole region, in view of the foreign policy challenges
that lie ahead.
Malian soldiers were supported by France as they fought to regain control of areas
held by rebels last year
The committee said the UK and its allies had been caught out by recent crises in
Mali, Libya, the Central African Republic and elsewhere.
The Foreign O ce said the committee's report agreed with its analysis that
disengagement from this region would carry long-term risks for the UK .
That is why we have been
working in the region both bi
laterally and with key partners
including the French, the US,
EU, UN and African Union, a
spokesman said.
He said other UK work in the
region included 27 UK troops
and a civilian trainer who were
helping the EU training mission
to help Mali's armed forces, and the appointment of Stephen O'Brien MP as Special
Envoy for the Sahel in 2012.
Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26668665
129
M s warn
A rica terr ris
t reat
21 March 2014
T e UK and t er Western p wers ailed t sp t t e warning signs instability in
Mali and t e Central A rican Republic un l it was t late M s a e said as t ey
urged t e
ern ent t step up e rts t engage wit pr ble s in t e regi n
The Foreign A airs Committee
cri cised the scant resources
allocated to the Western SahelSahara and said there had been
a costly error in failing to an
cipate the e ects of the col
lapse of Muammar Gadda 's
regime in Libya on its neigh
bouring countries.
The report warned there were
signi cant gaps in infor
ma on about terrorist groups
opera ng in the region and said
improving the quality of intelli
gence should be a priority for
the UK and its allies.
The MPs said: A new front line of violent extremism has opened up in the West
ern Sahel-Sahara region of Africa.
Jihadists have put down roots in remote or marginalised areas, taking advantage
of weak or non-existent state and security ins tu ons, lucra ve local criminal net
works, and public disillusionment and anger with the corrup on and misgovernance of poli cal elites.
In Libya, Mali and Nigeria the threat is currently greatest, but all countries in the
region are at risk. Concerted interna onal co-opera on is required to address this
threat: there need to be robust security responses, but also large-scale poli cal and
economic interven ons to address the underlying causes of instability.
The UK Government has set out a bold vision to increase its poli cal, security and
economic engagement with the region.
But the MPs said the mismatch between the Government's ambi ons and its scant
diploma c resources in the region is vast and irreconcilable.
The Government should consider enhancing its diploma c presence in the West
ern Sahel and the Maghreb, within the ght nancial constraints that the FCO
(Foreign and Commonwealth o ce) is currently forced to operate in.
130
It should also avoid in ated rhetoric and be realis c in its aims, focussing on what
the UK does best.
The MPs said the West seemed to turn a blind eye to events in Mail failing to spot
the warning signs un l it was too late and the pattern was repeated in the Central
African Republic.
The UK and its allies need to examine their early warning systems for the region,
the committee said.
There was also a failure by the UK Government to an cipate the full e ects of the
Gadda regime's collapse on its Saharan neighbours, and therefore to try to mi
gate them. This has been a costly error.
The report said it was s omewhat troubling to acknowledge that there are some
signi cant gaps in informa on about the region, par cularly in rela on to the ter
rorist groups opera ng there.
We s ll know little about the insurgency's leaders: in some cases we do not know
for certain if they are living or dead.
We know rela vely little about how groups are organised, how strong or wellarmed they are what their income is, and who their external supporters are.
We do know that they t end to thrive on the remote peripheries of the region,
which makes them hard to monitor and track, and we have learned that gathering
evidence about the groups by in ltra ng them is very di cult.
The Government has itself acknowledged that it is s ll learning about the region's
complex dynamics and that there are gaps in its knowledge.
Committee chairman Sir Richard Ottaway said: Overall, our committee has uncov
ered a worrying pattern of unsightedness on the part of the UK and others in rela
on to events in and around the Western Sahel region.
A common thread appears to be a weakness of analysis in rela on to crises that
straddle both North and West Africa. The Sahara may be a departmental barrier
within the Foreign O ce but it is not one for terrorists.
The UK's diploma c presence in the whole area is extremely small rela ve to oth
er parts of the world.
We would urge the UK Government to look at expanding its presence and depth
of knowledge in rela on to the whole region, in view of the foreign policy challeng
es that lie ahead.
Copyright (c) Press Associa on Ltd. 2014, All Rights Reserved.
http://www.hartlepoolmail.co.uk/
131
USA
int State ent n t e C ntribu ns t e l bal Ini a e t C
bat Nuclear Terr ris
ICNT t En ancing Nuclear Security
-
22 March 2014
The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the Unit
ed States of America, Russia, Spain, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Australia,
and the Kingdom of Morocco on the occasion of the contribu ons of the Global Ini
a ve to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to enhancing nuclear security.
Begin Text:
The Global Ini a ve to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) has made valuable con
tribu ons in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nu
clear terrorism. To date, the 85 partner na ons have completed more than 60 ac
vi es under the auspices of the GICNT aimed at building partners’ capabili es in
this area. We, the Co-Chairs of the GICNT (Russia and the United States), the past
and present Implementa on and Assessment Group (IAG) Coordinators (Spain and
Republic of Korea), and leaders of the three IAG Working Groups (the Kingdom of
Morocco, the Netherlands and Australia) wish to inform the states in attendance at
the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear Security Summit of the ac vi es of the GICNT since
the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the Republic of Korea in Seoul in March
2012.
Over 250 representa ves of GICNT partner na ons and representa ves from all
four GICNT o cial observers (the Interna onal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the
European Union (EU), the United Na ons O ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and
the Interna onal Criminal Police Organiza on (INTERPOL)) par cipated in the
eighth GICNT Plenary Mee ng, hosted by Mexico in Mexico City on May 24, 2013.
This robust par cipa on demonstrates the vital importance that GICNT partner na
ons place on enhancing nuclear security and underscores their desire to work co
opera vely to further this goal. At the Plenary mee ng, GICNT partners recognized
the valuable contribu on of the IAG mechanism created at the June 2010 GICNT
Plenary mee ng in Abu Dhabi. The U.S. and Russian Co-Chairs further recognized
the contribu ons of Spain in serving as the IAG Coordinator for three years, includ
ing organizing and chairing the Implementa on and Assessment Group mee ngs in
Arona and Ispra, Italy, in October 2012 and in Madrid, Spain, in February 2013.
Through its leadership, Spain brought strong focus and coordina on to GICNT ac v
i es. At the 2013 Plenary, the Republic of Korea was endorsed as the new IAG Co
ordinator.
The collabora ve e orts fostered by the GICNT are especially signi cant in light of
the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security
Summit, and the 2014 The Hague Nuclear Security Summit. Already, GICNT collabo
ra on has produced important results that complement the Nuclear Security Sum
132
mit process and help advance cri cal elements addressed in the Summit:
The Nuclear Detec on Working Group (NDWG), chaired by the Netherlands, is
nalizing the Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture series of documents fol
lowing the publica on of Volume I, Model Guidelines Document for Nuclear Detection Architectures, in 2009. Volume II in the series, Guidelines for Awareness, Training, and Exercises, and Volume III, Guidelines for Planning and rganization, focused on issues inherent to successful implementa on and enhancement of
nuclear detec on architectures. Ukraine hosted a mee ng of the NDWG in Lviv in
November 2012 to further the development of the third document in the series.
Volumes II and III in the founda onal series were approved at the May 2013 GICNT
Plenary mee ng. At a workshop hosted by Greece in Athens in October 2013, the
NDWG con nued work on Volume IV, Guidelines for Detection Within a State’s Interior, the nal best prac ces guide in the series. Also during the Athens workshop,
the NDWG began e orts to develop a tabletop exercise “playbook,” a compendium
of detec on-related exercise scenarios available to all GICNT partner na ons.
The United Kingdom hosted the GICNT’s 2nd Symposium on Enhanced Detec on of
Special Nuclear Material in November 2012, to take stock of current advancements
in detec on technologies, drawing widely on the experiences of other GICNT part
ner na ons.
In September 2012, Russia conducted an exercise on nuclear detec on, “Guardian
2012.” During the exercise, Russia used a realis c scenario and real me ac vity to
demonstrate the di erent aspects of Russia’s na onal system for detec ng nuclear
threats, thereby further raising awareness of best prac ces for the prac cal imple
menta on of basic principles of nuclear detec on architectures in the framework
of the GICNT.
In February 2014, Mexico hosted a eld training exercise under the auspices of the
NDWG, during which the par cipants had the opportunity to observe implementa
on of a radia on detec on alarm adjudica on process and interagency communi
ca ons protocol in response to realis c nuclear detec on scenarios at the Port of
Manzanillo. This exercise highlighted na onal best prac ces in detec on systems
and in coordina on of a domes c interagency response to a nuclear terrorism
event.
The Nuclear Forensics Working Group (NFWG), chaired by Australia, completed a
document en tled, Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision
Makers, which was endorsed at the GICNT Plenary Mee ng in May 2013. This docu
ment is intended to raise policy maker and decision maker awareness of nuclear
forensics as a tool to enhance nuclear material security and to prevent illicit uses of
nuclear and other radioac ve material. In May 2012, Australia hosted “Iron Koala,”
a nuclear forensics seminar and tabletop exercise, which examined the importance
of informa on sharing partnerships, both na onally and interna onally, to e ec
vely respond to cases related to nuclear smuggling. This exercise iden ed an in
terest amongst GICNT partners in further study of the topic of informa on sharing
133
in the nuclear forensics eld. Thus the working group has commenced develop
ment of a document seeking to frame the issues related to sharing nuclear foren
sics informa on in the response to and inves ga on of a nuclear terrorism-related
event, currently tled Sharing Nuclear Forensics Information: Benefits, Resources,
and Challenges.
Also under the auspices of the NFWG, the United Kingdom hosted in January 2014
the “Nuclear Forensics Workshop and Exercise – Exploring the Nuclear Forensics
Chain of Custody: Guidance on the Development of Legally Compliant Nuclear Fo
rensics Capabili es and Systems.” The workshop incorporated a tabletop exercise
“Blue Beagle” that demonstrated the Bri sh system for control and use of forensics
evidence from a crime scene through its development and presenta on as evi
dence in a courtroom and to its disposal. The workshop and exercise presented
best prac ces for inves ga ng a crime scene contaminated with radioac ve mate
rial and showcased the cri cal steps needed to successfully introduce the evidence
into legal proceedings.
Addi onally, awareness-building informa on modules based on the GICNT Global
Ini a ve Informa on Portal (GIIP) are in development. Currently, the NFWG is
tes ng a Na onal Nuclear Forensics Library module that provides policy-makers an
outline of the na onal nuclear forensics library concept and iden es key re
sources for partner na ons interested in further informa on on this subject.
The Response and Mi ga on Working Group (RMWG), chaired by the Kingdom of
Morocco, is working collabora vely to develop the Response and Mitigation Framework Document, a collec on of key considera ons that a country with limited capa
bili es should consider when ini alizing its na onal nuclear/radiological emergency
response system. This document includes substan al input from the Moroccan ex
perience in setting up its response capabili es. TheFramework Document is intend
ed as a living document, meant to be rou nely updated and improved through fol
low-on prac cal ac vi es and further input from partner na ons. In its capacity as
RMWG Chair, Morocco con nues to work on an ac on plan for future ac vi es
aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabili es in responding to a nuclear ter
rorism event. Morocco con nues to work on an ac on plan for future RMWG ac v
i es aimed at strengthening GICNT partner capabili es in responding to a nuclear
terrorism incident.
Under the auspices of the RMWG, Canada hosted the RADE exercise in May 2012
in Toronto, to provide an overview of Canada’s emergency management and na
onal security authori es and demonstrate its response to a terrorist attack. Spain
and Morocco jointly hosted the REME -2013 exercise, in Madrid, Spain, in April
2013. This exercise helped to test the na onal capabili es of both countries and
their coopera on on responding to and mi ga ng simultaneous terrorist attacks
involving radioac ve substances.
In October 2012, the RMWG and NWFG met jointly in Ispra, Italy, to address the
intersec ons of the two working groups in responding to nuclear and radiological
134
events. Based on the success of this joint ac vity, in February 2014, the NFWG and
RMWG jointly held a workshop incorpora ng the tabletop exercise “Tiger Reef”
focused on interagency coordina on and training that highlighted best prac ces
and key resources for integra ng cross-disciplinary training into na onal response
frameworks. “Tiger Reef” was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur and was sup
ported by Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia.
Looking to the future, the GICNT Co-Chairs, the IAG Coordinator and the Working
Group Leaders remain committed to working with GICNT partner na ons to pursue
focused e orts and ac vi es that foster nuclear security collabora on and advance
nuclear security goals. Moving forward, the GICNT leadership will seek to engage
partner na ons in prac cal exercises and workshops that enable them to prepare
for and prac ce responding to nuclear security events. Such ac vi es will focus on
encouraging interagency, regional, and interna onal coopera on and communica
on, in accordance with the proposals for GICNT work endorsed by the partners at
the 2013 Plenary mee ng in Mexico City. By enhancing partner na ons’ capacity to
prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, GICNT will con nue to strength
en nuclear security capabili es globally through e orts that complement and sup
port the objec ves of the Nuclear Security Summit.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223761.htm
135
H w l cal and state c ps fit int c unterterr ris
While we will always need to train to respond to an attack, we will be much more
e ec ve by conduc ng proac ve inves ga ons — inves ga ons which begin with
learning the pre-attack indicators of terrorists
Edit r’s N te: This week’s PoliceOne First Person essay is from PoliceOne Member
Matt Ernst, who encourages all o cers to begin their counterterrorism e orts by
learning the non-criminal indicators of terrorism. In PoliceOne First Person es
says, our Members and Columnists candidly share their own unique view of the
world. This is a platform from which individual o cers can share their own person
al insights on issues confron ng cops today, as well as opinions, observa ons, and
advice on living life behind the thin blue line. If you want to share your own per
spec ve with other P1 Members, simply send us an email with your story.
By Matt Ernst, PoliceOne Member
If you’re like most cops, comba ng terrorism is not one of your daily concerns —
and understandably so. Unless you’re assigned to a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF), you spend the great majority of your shifts dealing with drunks, domes cs,
car accidents, assaults, mental illness, drugs, etc. Given the law of averages, you are
simply much more likely to deal with those types of incidents than a terrorism in
ves ga on.
I have found that many cops think only ci es like New York City and Los Angeles
have to worry about terrorists. While our high-pro le ci es will always be the pop
ular targets, we need to recognize that terrorists are living all over the U.S. and
they can be plotting an attack against a target even while living several states away.
Terrorists are mobile and travel the na on’s highways in order to recruit, raise
funds, purchase resources, conduct surveillance, and ul mately carry-out an attack.
Thus, as law enforcement o cers, we need to focus our training not only on re
sponding to an attack, but on learning the non-criminal indicators of terrorism. It is
these indicators that we are much more likely to encounter on tra c stops or while
handling those everyday calls.
In 2010, the FBI con rmedhttp://cis.org/kephart/update-most-terrorist-incidentspast- ve-years-committed-foreign-bornthat 4,876 alleged terrorists had contacts
with U.S. law enforcement, usually for reasons not related to terrorism. i It has also
been es matedhttps://www.cis.org/administra ve-amnesty-and-terrorists that
20,000 - 30,000 known terrorists who are on the Terrorist Watchlist are in the U.S.
at any given me. ii Based on my research, 36 U.S. states have either been the in
tended target of a terrorist plot, or have been the loca on where terrorists have
been arrested, lived, attended college, etc. iii The quickest way to visualize this is
through this interac ve maphttp://www.inves ga veproject.org/maps/terrorismmap.php.
There are two key points that street cops should understand:
136
Ad erents t a radical Isla ic ide l gy are all er t e U S t ey’re n t li ing
in just N C
r LA
The recent arrest of Terry Loewenhttp://
www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/jus ce/wichita-terrorism-arrest/index.html?
iref=allsearch, who plotted to bomb the airport in Wichita, KS is a perfect example
of this. iv Perhaps the best example of having an entrenched network all across the
U.S. is the Somali terror group Al-Shabaab, which has had supporters arrested in
California, Alabama, Minnesota, Seattle (Wash.), Columbus (Ohio), Maryland, Vir
ginina, Chicago, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Wyo
ming. v
T e radicali a n pr cess terr rist financing and training ac i es ay n t
take place in t e sa e l ca n as t e intended target an attack Perhaps the
best example of this is Najibullah Zazi, who plotted to attack the NYC subway sys
tem while living in Aurora (Colo.). Zazi purchased bomb-making chemicals in Den
ver and then drove a rental car from Denver to NYC. Thankfully, Zazi was ul mately
arrested and the plot foiled. vi
But forgotten in the analysis of this case is how many poten al terrorist targets ex
ist between Denver and NYC. Zazi would have passed through eight states during
his travels and could’ve very easily changed his intended target to somewhere oth
er than NYC.
Let’s consider other cases http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf with simi
lar circumstances:
Seven people from the Miami, FL area developed a plot in which one of their tar
gets was the Willis Tower in Chicago. vii
Rezwan Ferdaus, from Ashland, Massachusetts, planned to attack the Pentagon in
Washington D.C. viii
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed, residents of Atlanta, plotted to
attack buildings in Washington, DC. ix
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, living in Lubbock, Texas was plotting attacks against various
targets, some of which were thought to be in Colorado and California. x
Iyman Faris, living in Columbus, OH, plotted to attack the Brooklyn Bridge in NYC. xi
Eight residents of North Carolina were arrested after plotting attacks in Virginia. xii
Naser Abdo, a U.S. military member sta oned in Kentucky, plotted to attack the Ft.
Hood military base in Texas. xiii
Aside from these examples, there have been countless other examples of people
who have left the U.S., including from low-pro le ci es such as Cary, NC http://
www.inves ga veproject.org/4211/north-carolina-man-charged-with-support-toal xiv and Flint, MI http://freebeacon.com/american-european-jihadists-in-syriaraise-new-domes c-terror-fears/?print=1 xv , to join terrorist groups overseas.
137
There is also the example of two New Orleanshttp://www.inves ga veproject.org/
documents/case_docs/1232.pdf residents who sold State of Mississippi drivers li
censes, birth cer cates, and social security cards to members of the Phillipinesbased terrorist group, Abu Saayaf. xvi
Not only are Islamic-inspired terrorists living all over the U.S. but they are going
through the radicaliza on process right here in our ci es and towns. Radical Islamic
mosques exist all over the U.S. Using this interac ve map once again, you can see
that these mosques are in loca ons we normally wouldn’t think of as being incuba
tors for terrorism — loca ons such as Spring eld (Mo.) and Rome (Ga.).
The Columbus, OH mosque Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattabhttp://
www.inves ga veproject.org/maps/terrorism-map.php has contributed to the rad
icaliza on of at least four separate terrorists.
Terrorism nancing is occurring all over the U.S. as well. Terrorist groups are
pro ng from a wide variety of street crimes — crimes that local o cers inves
gate -- and then sending that money overseas to radical Islamic terrorist groups.
For a perfect example of this, we can once again look to Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab
has been using pro ts from Khat http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf (an illegal narco c common in eastern Africa) sales, to
send back to fund jihadists in Somalia. xvii So if you are street cop, and you contact
someone in possession of khat, there is a very good possibility that there is a lot of
intel that you can acquire from that person. If that same person is in possession of
a large amount of cash, a real possibility exists for that money to end up back in
Somalia.
The San Diego Police Department has gured this out and developed an impressive
intelligence collec on system to in ltrate Al-Shabaab. http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf
There have also been numerous exampleshttp://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2014/02/treasury_adds_afghan.php of drug tra ckers in Afghanistan that
are using hawalas in the U.S. to help move and hide the pro ts -- pro ts which are
ul mately being used to fund the Taliban. xviii
T e F cus
Terr ris
Training Needs t C ange
Since 9/11 there has been constant discussion of the need for local law enforce
ment o cers to be involved in the domes c counterterrorism e orts. A lot of em
phasis has been placed on responding to an attack. But not enough emphasis has
been placed on recognizing the indicators of terrorism.
Now we need to start equipping o cers with the knowledge of how to iden fy ter
rorists and conduct inves ga ons. Street cops should begin attemp ng to answer
these types of ques ons:
Do we know what a hawala is? Do we know what khat is? Do we know where the
138
closest radical mosques are to our jurisdic on? Do we know which U.S ci es have
large popula ons of Somali-Americans with known es to Al-Shabaab? How much
do we know about the refugee popula ons in our jurisdic on? Have we ever taken
the me to check someone’s interna onal travel history through the El Paso Intelli
gence Center (EPIC)? Do we even have an EPIC account so that we can further in
ves gate such matters?
One thing we have learned is that terrorism and fake iden ca on documents go
hand in hand. xix Could we iden fy a fake passport? How often do we ngerprint
people who we are suspicious about? Is your agency moving towards using biomet
rics as a way to verify someone’s iden ty?
In 2007, the NYPD released Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threathttp://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/N PD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf, which is an excellent guide for learning the charac
teris cs of someone going through the radicaliza on process. Some of the common
characteris cs include:

Males between the ages of 15 - 35

Begins growing a beard

Recent convert to Islam, which could include a name change

Withdrawal from his normal mosque or begins attending a Salafi mosque

Travel abroad to attend a training camp in a war-torn na on

Chemical odors coming from the house or apartment
Trains in rearms, mar al arts, and par cipates in paintball games or other rearm
exercises xx
Rolling up the pants legs xxi
Adop ng customs of the Prophet Muhammad, such as chewing miswak, a s ck
used for cleaning one‘s teeth.[xxii]
While we will always need to train to respond to an attack, we will be much more
e ec ve by conduc ng proac ve inves ga ons — inves ga ons which begin with
learning the pre-attack indicators of terrorists.
i
Update: Most Terrorist Incidents in the Past Five ears Committed by ForeignBorn Individuals. Janice Kephart. Center for Immigra on Studies. April 19,
2013. http://cis.org/kephart/update-most-terrorist-incidents-past- ve-yearscommitted-foreign-born (Accessed January 30, 2014).
ii
Connecting the Dots. Janice Kephart. Center for Immigra on Studies. December
2011.https://www.cis.org/administra ve-amnesty-and-terrorists (Accessed January
31, 2014).
iii
The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Colorado, Con
139
nec cut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Hawaii, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Washington DC, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Sources include: the IPT Map, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a
Complex Threat.Jerome P. Bjelopera. Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd,
2013, Appendix A, The untold story of Hasanville s shadowy past: Part 2 . Lee
Berthiaume. ttawa Citizen. May 4, 2002 and my personal knowledge of terrorism
inves ga ons.
iv
Local man planned suicide attack at Wichita, ansas, airport, feds say. Elliot
McLaughlin. CNN.com. December 13, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/
jus ce/wichita-terrorism-arrest/index.html?iref=allsearch (Accessed January 31,
2014).
v
Al Shabaab’s American Recruits. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE. October,
2013.http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-americanrecruits.pdf Accessed February 4, 2014). Two Indicted in Missouri on Charges of
Providing Material Support to a Terrorist rganization A Third Defendant is
Charged with Structuring Violations. Department of Jus ce. Press Release. Novem
ber 3, 2010. http://www.fbi.gov/stlouis/press-releases/2010/
sl110310.htm (Accessed February 4, 2014)
vi
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Jerome P. Bjelopera.
Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd, 2013.Pg. 95. http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/R41416.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2014)
vii
Ibid, Pg. 112,
viii
Ibid, Pg. 68.
ix
Ibid, Pg. 113.
x
Texas Resident Arrested on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction. Department of Jus ce Press Release. February 24, 2011. http://
www.jus ce.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-nsd-235.html (Accessed February 3,
2014).
xi
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Jerome P. Bjelopera.
Congressional Research Service., Jan. 23rd, 2013.Pg. 120. http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/R41416.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2014)
xii
Ibid. Pg. 100.
xiii
Naser Abdo, an AW L soldier, accused of plotting Fort Hood attack. Peter Finn
and Jason Ukman. THE WASHINGTON POST. July 28, 2011. http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/na onal-security/awol-soldier-accused-ofplotting-fort-hood-attack/2011/07/28/gIQAvml1fI_story.html (Accessed February
3, 2014)
140
xiv
North Carolina Man Charged with Support to Al- aida in Iraq. Abha Shankar.
INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM BLOG. November 13, 2013. http://
www.inves ga veproject.org/4211/north-carolina-man-charged-with-support-toal (Accessed February 3, 2014).
xv
American, European Jihadists in Syria Raise New Domestic Terror Fears. Bill
Gertz. WASHINGTON FREE BEACON. August. 20, 2013. http://freebeacon.com/
american-european-jihadists-in-syria-raise-new-domes c-terror-fears/?
print=1 (Accessed February 3, 2014).
xvi
U.S. vs. Ranson & Carpenter. Criminal Complaint. Dunn Lampton, U.S. Attorney.
Feb. 18, 2005.
http://www.inves ga veproject.org/documents/case_docs/1232.pdf (Accessed
February 3, 2014).
xvii
Running a Three-Legged Race: The San Diego Police Department, The Intelligence Community, and Counterterrorism. Andrew G. Mills and Joseph R.Clark. THE
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE. August 1, 2011. http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/issuebrief_SDPDIntel.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2014).
xviii
Treasury adds Afghan heroin tra cker to narcotics kingpin list. Bill Roggio. THE
LONG WAR JOURNAL. Feb. 12, 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2014/02/treasury_adds_afghan.php(Accessed Feb. 13, 2014).
xix
This has been learned from extensive analysis of terrorism inves ga ons. A few
examples include:
1. U.S. vs. Ranson & Carpenter. Criminal Complaint. Dunn Lampton, U.S. Attorney.
Feb. 18, 2005.
http://www.inves ga veproject.org/documents/case_docs/1232.pdf (Accessed
February 13, 2014).
2. Al Qaeda had an o ce of passports in the Khandar airport that altered passports,
visas, and iden ca on cards. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. Norton
and Company. July 22, 2004. Pg. 169.http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
report/911Report_Ch5.pdf (Accessed Nov. 18, 2013)
3. AQ-a liated groups in Syria are collec ng European passports and redistribu ng them to similar-looking Jihadists. Return of Jihadists Threatens Europe. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Siobhan Gorman, Cassell Bryan-Low, Maria AbiHabib. Dec. 4, 2013. (Accessed Dec. 7, 2013). http://online.wsj.com/news/ar cles/
SB20001424052702303722104579238542737904868
4. And Israeli intelligence recently uncovered a plot by Al Qaeda to attack Israel
through the use of foreign ghters who were going to be brought into Israel by us
ing fake Russian passports. Zawahiri s Servant in Gaza rchestrated Plots for Mega
Terror Attacks. Special to IPT News. Yaakov Lappin. January 28, 2014. http://
141
www.inves ga veproject.org/4277/zawahiri-servant-in-gaza-orchestrated-plotsfor (Accessed January 30, 2014).
5. A DEA inves ga on revealed that the Dino Bouterse, counterterrorism com
mander in Suriname, had plotted with Hezbollah to bring Hezbollah opera ves to
Suriname. Once in Suriname, these opera ves would conduct attacks against U.S.
targets, and provide protec on for Bouterse. In exchange, Bouterse would supply
false passports to the opera ves for the purpose of entering the U.S.
6. Enemies at the gate. Richard Greenberg, Adam Ciralsky, Stone Phillips. DATELINE
NBC. Dec. 28, 2007. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22419963/ (Accessed Feb. 13,
2014).
xx
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Mitchell Silber and Arvin
Bhatt. New York Police Department, Intelligence Division, 2007. Pgs. 23, 31,
43http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicaliza on_in_the_West.pdf(Accessed Feb. 13, 2014).
xxi
Abdulhakim Mu ahid Muhammad Carlos Bledsoe : A Case Study in Lone Wolf
Terrorism. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. JIHADOLOGY.NET. Dec. 23, 2013. http://
jihadology.net/2013/12/23/guest-post-abdulhakim-mujahid-muhammad-carlosbledsoe-a-case-study-in-lone-wolf-terrorism/ (Accessed Feb. 13, 2014).
xxii
Ibid.
http://www.policeone.com/
142
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