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ATP 3-27.5
AN/TPY-2 FORWARD BASED MODE
(FBM) RADAR OPERATIONS
As of: 16 April 2012
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DoD and DoD contractors only to protect
information on technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentially significant military
applications or that related to specific military deficiencies of potential adversaries. This determination was made
on 21 August 2007. Other requests must be referred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FW-T, 1330 Inverness
Drive, Suite 440, Colorado Springs, CO 80910. (e-mail: [email protected])
WARNING NOTICE: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export
Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export laws are subject of
severe criminal penalties.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
Headquarters Department of the Army
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Publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (http://www.train.army.mil).
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Army Techniques Publication
No. 3-27.5
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC,
16 April 2012
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system Operations
Contents
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v
SECTION ONE – AN/TPY-2 (FBM) DOCTRINE ............................................... 1-1
Chapter 1
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ...................................................... 1-1
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Mission ...................................................................... 1-1
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Role ........................................................................... 1-1
GBMD Overview ................................................................................................. 1-2
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Capabilities ............................................................................. 1-4
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Description ................................................................ 1-5
Chapter 2
GBMD ORGANIZATIONS & MISSION COMMAND ......................................... 2-1
Organizations ..................................................................................................... 2-1
Mission Command .............................................................................................. 2-4
Relationships ...................................................................................................... 2-6
Chapter 3
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM OPERATIONS ....................................................... 3-1
Operations .......................................................................................................... 3-1
Radar Operations ............................................................................................... 3-3
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system Functions ................................................................... 3-4
Sensor Management Operations ....................................................................... 3-4
Safety Operations ............................................................................................. 3-12
Information Operations ..................................................................................... 3-14
Continuity of Operations/FailOver Operations .................................................. 3-15
Chapter 4
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SUSTAINMENT ..................................................................... 4-1
_____________________________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DoD and DoD contractors only to protect
information on technical data on current technology in areas of significant or potentially significant military
applications or that related to specific military deficiencies of potential adversaries. This determination was made
on 21 August 2007. Other requests must be referred to HQ USASMDC, ATTN: SMDC-FW-T, 1330 Inverness
Drive, Suite 440, Colorado Springs, CO 80910. (e-mail: [email protected])
WARNING NOTICE: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export
Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) or Executive Order 12470. Violations of these export laws are subject of
severe criminal penalties.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
16 April 2012
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Installation Support ............................................................................................. 4-1
Maintenance ........................................................................................................ 4-1
Contract Logistics Support .................................................................................. 4-3
Security Operations & Resource Protection ....................................................... 4-3
Chapter 5
COMMUNICATIONS .......................................................................................... 5-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 5-1
Communications Requirements .......................................................................... 5-1
Communications ................................................................................................. 5-2
GBMD Networks ................................................................................................. 5-2
SECTION TWO – C2BMC DOCTRINE .............................................................. 5-1
Chapter 6
C2BMC ............................................................................................................... 6-1
C2BMC Mission .................................................................................................. 6-1
C2BMC Roles ..................................................................................................... 6-1
C2BMC Capabilities ............................................................................................ 6-2
C2BMC System Description ............................................................................... 6-3
Deliberate and Dynamic Planner ........................................................................ 6-8
Battle Management ............................................................................................. 6-9
C2BMC Situational Awareness ......................................................................... 6-10
C2BMC Training Responsibilities ..................................................................... 6-12
C2BMC Acquisition, Sustainment, & Support ................................................... 6-13
Appendix A
STAFFING, TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION TECHNIQUES ....................... A-1
Staffing ............................................................................................................... A-1
Training and Certification ................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B
OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES ........................................................................... B-1
Operational Planning.......................................................................................... B-1
Operation Execution........................................................................................... B-1
Radar Search Plans ........................................................................................... B-2
Wideband Discrimination ................................................................................... B-3
Voice Reporting.................................................................................................. B-3
Security .............................................................................................................. B-3
Sustainment ....................................................................................................... B-4
GLOSSARY
.............................................................................................................. Glossary-1
Section I – Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................... Glossary-1
Section II – Terms ............................................................................... Glossary-4
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ Reference-1
INDEX
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Figures
Figure 1-1. AN/TPY-2 forward based and terminal based modes ......................................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. BMD System of Systems ..................................................................................... 1-3
Figure 1-3. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) with Essential Support Equipment ........................................... 1-6
Figure 1-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Antenna Equipment Unit components ..................................... 1-7
Figure 1-5. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Electronics Equipment Unit components ................................. 1-8
Figure 1-6. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Cooling Equipment Unit ........................................................... 1-9
Figure 2-1. 100th MD BDE (GMD) Organization Chart .......................................................... 2-4
Figure 2-2. AMD Coordination Relationships ....................................................................... 2-11
Figure 3-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD TOE ................................................................................ 3-2
Figure 3-2. Operational Mission Plan Structure ..................................................................... 3-8
Figure 3-3. Types of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Mission RSPs.......................................................... 3-10
Figure 3-4. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Facility .............................................................. 3-12
Figure 3-5. KOZ Top View .................................................................................................... 3-13
Figure 3-6. KOZ - Side View................................................................................................. 3-14
Figure 4-1. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Equipment .......................................................... 4-2
Figure 5-1. GCN Architecture ................................................................................................. 5-4
Figure 6-1. Plan, Monitor, Execute the Fight .......................................................................... 6-2
Figure 6-2. C2BMC Architecture ............................................................................................ 6-5
Figure 6-3. C2BMC Tri-Node Architecture ........................................................................... 6-12
Tables
Table 1-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Major Component Dimensions ............................................... 1-11
Table 3-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Readiness States. ..................................................................... 3-6
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Preface
ATP 3-27.5 provides an understanding of the AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) radar.
The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) provides BMD system track data to allow the Combatant Commands
to effectively defend the homeland from missile attack, and to support forward forces and
multinational nations with warning and missile engagement support. It also provides a
systematic, continuous, and common methodology for tracking and reporting on the adversary
missile activities.
The principal audience for ATP 3-27.5 is the joint, combined, and service level operators and
chain of command. It will aid the joint force commander in planning and executing cohesive
joint operations against missiles throughout the entire operational environment. In addition, it
will assist in sensor employment, collection management, target development, and force
application. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or
multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine
concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and
educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with
applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.
Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and
the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual [FM] 27-10.)
ATP 3-27.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions
appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-27.5 is the proponent
publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for
which ATP 3-27.5 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. These terms and
their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions shown in the
text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
ATP 3-27.5 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the
United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ATP 3-27.5 is the United States Army Space and Missile Defense
Command. The preparing agency is the United States Army Space and Missile Defense
Command Future Warfare Center - Directorate of Training and Doctrine (USASMDC FWCDOTD). Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes
to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, HQ
USASMDC/ARSTRAT ATTN: SMDC-FW-D (ATP 3-27.5), 1330 Inverness Drive, Suite
440, Colorado Springs, CO 80910, by e-mail to [email protected], or submit an
electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction
Effective missile defense operations, both global and theater, require high fidelity data from
forward based sensors in order to quickly respond to threats to the United States (US)
homeland, deployed troops, friends, allies and forward based assets. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system supports US and multinational missile defense operations through its ability to detect
missiles threats while in their boost and early midcourse phases. The data is transmitted over
various networks to command centers and increases the likelihood of successful intercepts.
The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system detects and tracks missile launches to support both strategic
missile warning activities and theater missile warning for the theater commanders. The
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) performs medium and long-range search, target acquisition, and target
discrimination in support of strategic, regional, and theater missile defense missions. The
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) provides cueing data to Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Fire
Control (GFC), Aegis BMD, Patriot, and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
systems. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system also has the capability to conduct collateral missions
as directed by US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), including space surveillance and
intelligence gathering.
An accurate missile defense common operational picture is essential to achieving the highest
level of situational awareness and understanding of the environment in which the command is
operating. This is accomplished with the use of Command and Control, Battle Management,
and Communications (C2BMC).
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems support missile defense operations in US European Command
(USEUCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and US Central Command
(USCENTCOM). Additional systems may be deployed over time.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with
applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.
Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and
the rules of engagement (see FM 27-10).
ATP 3-27.5 contains six chapters:
Chapter 1 identifies the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems mission and defines it roles. This chapter
gives a brief overview of global ballistic missile defense to explain the importance of the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems. This chapter then discusses the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems
capabilities and concludes by describing the major components of the system.
Chapter 2 identifies the global ballistic missile defense organizations, their roles,
relationships, and responsibilities in the mission execution of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
Chapter 3 discusses the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operations. This chapter identifies the
radar functions, Sensor Manager responsibilities, and operations for sensor management,
safety, information operations, and continuity of operations.
Chapter 4 identifies the sustainment issues required to keep the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system
operating. This chapter highlights the installation support, maintenance, contract logistics
support, security operations and resource protection.
Chapter 5 discusses the communications necessary to permit the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system
to transmit its track data to all echelons. The GCN architecture is described, as are the
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communications requirements, communication equipment, and theater communications data
links.
Chapter 6 identifies the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications
(C2BMC) mission and defines it roles as the controller for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
This chapter gives a brief overview of the system capabilities and describing the major
components of the system. This chapter also provides an understanding of how and to whom
battle management and situational awareness is provide by C2BMC. This chapter concludes
with training, acquisition, sustainment, and support of the C2BMC system.
Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which ATP 3-27.5 is proponent have
been added, rescinded, or modified for purposes of this manual. The glossary contains
acronyms and defined terms. See introductory table-1, introductory table-2, and introductory
table-3 for specific term changes.
Term
token
Introductory table-1 New Army term
Remarks
An electronic identification method
fundamental to C2BMC operations.
Introductory table-2 Rescinded Army terms
Term
Remarks
command and control
Replaced by mission command
full spectrum operation
Replaced by unified land operations
intelligence, surveillance, and Replaced by information collection
reconnaissance
Note: * This document has a five occurrences of command and control; all five
occurrences are used in reference to joint system names or joint operations.
Introductory table-3 Modified Army term
Term
Remarks
Composite risk management
Replaced by risk management
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SECTION ONE – AN/TPY-2 (FBM) DOCTRINE
Chapter 1
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) System Description
The AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) system is a U.S. Army transportable
radar system that complements other Department of Defense (DoD) sensor systems
to provide early detection and tracking of missile launches originating within an area
of interest. It provides continuous processing of near real-time warning, alerting and
cueing information on ballistic missile threats that pass through the radar’s field of
view. Data is sent to Combatant Commanders (CCDR) across multiple areas of
responsibility (AOR) and the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) for the
protection of military assets, civilian populations, and geopolitical centers.
Dissemination of data uses existing communications networks available within
theater and globally.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM MISSION
1-1. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system performs theater, medium, and long range search and target
acquisition in support of strategic, regional, and theater missile defense missions. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system provides cueing data to Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Aegis BMD, and
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) systems. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system also has the capability
to conduct collateral missions as directed by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
including space surveillance and intelligence gathering.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM ROLE
1-2. The U.S. Army was designated as the lead Service for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems in the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Memorandum, Lead
Services for BMDS, 15 September 2006. The BMDS operational architecture integrates the AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system into the worldwide system of sensors. Some AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems may be used in a
strictly regional focused environment and are not linked into the Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)
system. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system enhances BMDS sensor capabilities for strategic-, regional-, and
theater-level BMD. It performs preplanned and cued searches, object detection, tracking, discrimination,
and provides real-time, in-flight object track data during the boost and early midcourse phases of a ballistic
missile flight. All ballistic missile tracks are initially designated as ‘threat’ until determined otherwise. The
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is controlled by the Command and Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC) system. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has the ability to support more than one
AOR due to it range when effectively placed. Employment decisions are made at the area air defense
commander (AADC) level.
1-3. If linked to the GBMD, AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system track data is routed through the C2BMC system
to the GMD Fire Control (GFC) and passed within the AOR to THAAD, Aegis BMD, and Patriot systems
utilizing the Tactical Data Link-Joint (TDL-J) communications network. If the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is
not linked in to GBMD, the track data is used in a strictly regional environment only.
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Chapter 1
1-4. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system was originally envisioned as part of the Army National Missile
Defense system, as the Forward Based X-band-Transportable (FBX-T) system. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system was identified as an independent element of the BMDS when the National Missile Defense program
was transferred to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system may be used as a
forward based sensor to enhance BMDS, whereas AN/TPY-2 Terminal Mode (TM) system is used in the
THAAD system (figure 1-1). The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system uses the same hardware as AN/TPY-2 (TM)
but different control software, operating logic, and communications packages to accomplish its designated
missions. The focus of this doctrine is on the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, but it will always differentiate
between the FBM and TM systems.
Figure 1-1. AN/TPY-2 forward based and terminal based modes
GBMD OVERVIEW
1-5. BMD is an inherently joint mission and is a sub-set of Defensive Counterair (DCA) as part of the
active air and missile defense (AMD) operations. According to Joint Publications (JP) 3-01, Countering Air
and Missile Threats, DCA is all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and neutralize or
destroy enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. DCA includes both active
and passive AMD measures to protect friendly forces, critical assets, population centers, infrastructure, etc.,
and deny enemy freedom of action in friendly airspace. AMD is recognized as a unique sub-mission
because of the significance of the missile threat and the difficulty of defending against ballistic missiles. In
any joint or multinational operations, DCA falls under the authority of the AADC for a given AOR. The
AADC integrates all joint force components and supporting elements toward the common objective of
neutralizing, negating, or destroying the enemy’s ballistic missile capability. The objectives of GBMD are Defense of the US homeland from limited ballistic missile attack.
 Protection of US deployed forces.
 Protection of our friends and allies.
1-6. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5134.9 states that BMDS consists of a layered system of
systems comprised of sensors, weapon systems, planning, battle management (BM) software, and hardware
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System Description
capable of managing and executing the BMDS mission assigned to the USSTRATCOM. Refer to Field
Manual (FM) 3-27, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations for a more thorough look
at Army BMDS and GMD operations.
1-7. GBMD requires well defined command relationships because of the capability of a threat to cross
multiple AORs. The short reaction times and long ranges associated with ballistic missile attack demands
close coordination between supported and supporting geographic combatant commanders (GCC). The
C2BMC system ties all the BMDS elements into a distributed, worldwide, integrated, layered missile
defense system. The situational awareness (SA) and BM provided by C2BMC supports the complex
execution of GBMD.
1-8. As a threat ballistic missile travels its path, multiple sensor systems and weapon systems are
committed to detecting, tracking, intercepting, and negating the ballistic missile threat (see figure 1-2). The
BMDS utilizes space-, air-, land-, and sea-based sensors forward to enhance capability by adding
robustness against a wider range of threats and providing support for increased protection. The radars are
capable of detecting ballistic missiles early in their flight and provide precise tracking information for use
by BMDS. This approach provides overlapping, but not redundant sensor coverage, which increases the
potential to broaden the BMDS engagement environment, and complicates an enemy's ability to penetrate
the defense system. Communication between all sensors is required to increase the defensive opportunities
and the likelihood a threat will be destroyed.
Figure 1-2. BMD System of Systems
1-9. As identified in and consistent with JP 3-01, unity of command, unity of effort, centralized planning
and direction, and decentralized execution have proven to be vital tenets for countering air and missile
threats that may have an engagement window of only a matter of minutes. Synchronized operation is
achieved through Unity of command is all set forces are under the command of one responsible commander.
 Unity of effort relates to coordinating organizations not in the same command, as it is necessary to
defend against an attack that crosses AORs.
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

Centralized planning and direction gives the CCDR oversight of all activities in his AOR, to
include missile defense activities.
Decentralized execution of mission plans allows the CCDR to optimize engagement opportunities
and conduct prompt and decisive engagement of enemy ballistic missiles. Additionally, missile
defense fire control operations are delegated to the lowest echelon required to ensure responsive
decision making in the engagement of threat missiles.
1-10. Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for
global missile defense, and coordinating global missile defense operations support, and will do so in
coordination with other combatant commands, Services, and as directed, appropriate US Government
agencies.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE (GMD)
1-11. The three phases of ballistic missile flight, in which destruction or negation can occur are the Boost
phase, Midcourse phase, and Terminal phase. As its name implies, GMD is designed to launch groundbased interceptors (GBI) at ballistic missile threats with the intent of intercepting the threat in the
midcourse phase. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system facilitates early engagements in the GFC weapons’
engagement window.
1-12. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system tracks threat ballistic missiles during the boost phase and early
midcourse phase if positioned to see the threat. Because AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems are forward deployed,
they are positioned to provide excellent track data for an early midcourse intercept, as well as support boost
phase intercept, if available. This increases the probability of intercept prior to separation of the reentry
vehicle or deployment of countermeasures. While the reentry vehicle is in the midcourse phase of flight,
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems and other sensors continue to provide updated track data and cueing
information to the GFC and active defense systems.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) CAPABILITIES
1-13. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is a high value, low density missile defense resource. The AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system is a high-powered, high-resolution, self-contained, transportable radar and processing
equipment, designed to detect, track, classify, and discriminate ballistic missiles in the boost and early
midcourse phases of flight out to 1000+ kilometers. It utilizes X-band frequencies across the 8-12
Gigahertz range to calculate the trajectory parameters of threat ballistic missiles and missile components,
and pass the track information to other BMDS systems. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is capable of
tracking all classes of ballistic missiles and provides surveillance, tracking, object discrimination, and
cueing of threat ballistic missile objects. It is capable of tracking and identifying small objects at long
distance, and very high altitudes. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system maximizes the capability of the BMDS to
identify, assess, and engage threats to the US, deployed forces and allies. Object classification for reentry
vehicle, tank, decoy, or debris is performed automatically with no operator actions required under nominal
conditions.
1-14. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) can execute wide-band discrimination on theater class objects and transmits
object tracks to C2BMC and the GFC. The radar supports both GMD and theater/regional BMDS missions
by providing ballistic missile classification and discrimination quality track data. Discrimination is not
automatically performed on theater ballistic missile objects unless commanded by the Sensor Manager. The
track data is fed to the C2BMC to provide SA and early warning, as well as GFC.
1-15. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operation requires pre-developed mission profiles, which include a set of
radar search plans (RSP) individually developed to support each specific system location. Developing
mission profiles is part of the pre-deployment planning process and requires long planning timelines.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) mission profiles and RSP supporting the Area Air Defense Plan for a Joint Forces
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System Description
Commander (JFC) are developed in coordination with supported and supporting GCCs, USSTRATCOM,
and the executing JFC. When completed, the mission profiles and RSPs are loaded into both the AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system and C2BMC. Mission Profiles and RSPs are developed by the Raytheon mission planning
team in coordination with MDA.
1-16. The C2BMC forwards the track data to the GFC and has the capability to forward track messages to
Aegis BMD assets over TDL-J/Link-16 networks and the Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI). This
information may be used to cue other systems supporting missile defense operations and to improve the
overall SA of commanders at all levels. The TDL-J/Link-16 network also enables the precision cueing of
the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system with messages received from C2BMC relayed from theater assets such as
Aegis BMD. The precision cueing provides increased efficiency of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system target
acquisition.
1-17. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) has no organic communications equipment and requires connectivity to
secure networks for data and voice mission operations including, Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet), and Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN). Routine communications connectivity includes
plain old telephone system (POTS), Defense Switched Network (DSN), Non-secure Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNet), and high speed data links. A variety of satellite connectivity is required and
varies by deployed location.
1-18. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has the capability to conduct collateral missions as directed by
USSTRATCOM. Those collateral missions include support of space surveillance, intelligence gathering
operations, and targets of opportunity such as ballistic missile tests, space launches and space debris
reentering the atmosphere within the radar’s field of view. Although collateral mission will be deconflicted
with BMD missions, at no time will a collateral mission prevent the execution of the BMD mission. Host
nation (HN) and CCDR agreements for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system stationing may include a requirement
for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system support to HN defense.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
1-19. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system equipment is transportable by ground, sea or air, and includes key
mission equipment and essential support items (figure 1-3). The key mission equipment is comprised of the
Antenna Equipment Unit (AEU) which includes the phased-array radar, the Electronics Equipment Unit
(EEU) used to provide the initial data processing, and the Cooling Equipment Unit (CEU) which keeps the
heat created from damaging the circuits. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is powered by a commercial power
source or tactical power provided by GCC forces or MDA. Power for essential support equipment may be
provided via separate commercial feeds of other methods tactical generators to power the C2BMC
equipment, long haul satellite communications (SATCOM), and the maintenance vans and personnel
support shelters.
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Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) with Essential Support Equipment
1-20. The essential support equipment includes the communication interfaces, software used to process
data and provide direct interface with the BMDS mission command system. Additional supporting
equipment and facilities include security facilities, the necessary administrative and life support facilities to
support ongoing operations on a sustained basis, generator fueling equipment such as tanker trucks, fuel
storage, motorized support equipment, temporary storage containers, cooling equipment, power
conditioning, uninterruptible power supply, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.
ANTENNA EQUIPMENT UNIT
1-21. The AEU (figure 1-4) is a solid-state, single-faced, phased array, X-band radar and electronics
equipment. It has three major hardware groups: Front Mobilizer, Rear Mobilizer, and the array structure.
The array face is protected by a hinged radome, and transmits electromagnetic radio frequency (RF) energy
from the EEUs Receiver Exciter equipment into space to fulfill mission requirements. The AEU receives
the returned RF signal from the target and sends the signal back to the Receiver Exciter. The AEU requires
1,300-1,500 kilowatts of power for full operation and power is supplied by two Prime Power Units (PPU)
or four Mobile Electric Power (MEP)-810 power units. The antenna array has a 9.2 meter square aperture
that consists of 72 sub-arrays with each sub-array containing 44 Transmit/Receive Interface Microwave
Modules (TRIMM) for a total of 3,168 TRIMMs. Each TRIMM contains 8 transmit/receive elements
which provides 25,344 transmit/receive elements on the array face. The AEU has both front and rear
leveling jacks. The M1088 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles or a commercial semi-tractor is required to
move the AEU. Positioning of the antenna elevation is from zero to eighty degrees from the horizontal.
1-22. The AEU supports search, track, and discrimination functions through fence, volume, and cued
searches. Power to the AEU is supplied via the CEU and is capable of transmitting multiple RF beams
sequentially and receiving beams simultaneously. The AEU is emplaced so that the orientation (azimuth
and elevation) provides the best combination of detection, acquisition, and track coverage for the potential
threat trajectories of interest as determined through the deliberate planning process prior to deployment.
Although the AEU orientation is not typically changed after deployment, it is desirable to select a site with
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the maximal azimuth extent amenable to mission radar operations, and allowances for different orientations
may be made over an extended period of time. The AEU elevation tilt can be adjusted manually.
Figure 1-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Antenna Equipment Unit components
ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT UNIT
1-23. The EEU (figure1-5) is a self contained, environmentally controlled shelter housing the electronic
equipment necessary for generating the timing, transmit, and control signals required for radar operation
and signal processing. The EEU also receives return signals from the AEU for processing and data
distribution. The EEU consists primarily of the receiver, recorders, signal processors, and data processing
equipment of the system. All equipment is enclosed in a single trailer equipped with an air-ride suspension
on the main dolly set and the kingpin mechanism designed to protect the equipment.
1-24. The EEU functions as a communications center, and receives/disseminates information to and from
the C2BMC Deployable Interface Node (CDIN). The EEU contains the Signal Data Processor Equipment,
the Receiver Exciter, and the integrated Operator Control Unit. The Receiver Exciter is an advanced
receiver/exciter design with variable pulse width and bandwidth, and serves as both the radar RF signal
source and analog processor for the received signal. The Signal Data Processor Equipment provides the
data processing and the signal processing functions for this system. Power to the EEU is supplied via the
CEU from the Radar power distribution unit (PDU). The EEU is typically emplaced parallel to the AEU for
ease of cable connections and about 8’ to 12’ behind it for personnel accessibility.
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Figure 1-5. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Electronics Equipment Unit components
COOLING EQUIPMENT UNIT
1-25. CEU (figure 1-6) is a self-contained transportable cooling and power distribution system.
Approximately 4,160 volts of electricity enters the CEU and is distributed to the AEU and EEU. The CEU
steps down 4,160 volts of electricity to manageable levels, as well as provides electricity for other radar
equipment systems. The CEU provides liquid cooling required for the AEU, while the Power Distribution
System receives power from the PPU and/or a commercial power source and distributes it to the radar
assemblies. It is equipped with a PDU which distributes the primary input power from the source to the rest
of the radar components. The coolant lines have quick disconnect fittings for rapid march order and
emplacement. The cooling system contains a 50-gallon reservoir capacity and features an air separator for
rapid voiding of air prior to supplying coolant to the AEU. The trailer has an air-ride suspension installed
on the main dolly set and the kingpin mechanism.
1-26. A status panel with alarm center provides status and warning of coolant overheating and fan failure.
The CEU has low coolant pressure and coolant reservoir level indicators. A low temperature, oil-fired
boiler provides for fast equipment start-up. The CEU is usually placed perpendicular to the AEU and EEU
as it controls and distributes primary power to both. The CEU connects to the Radar Power System through
the tactical cable interface cabinet. The CEU also provides and distributes conditioned liquid coolant to
remove waste heat generated by the AEU. Eight fans on each side of the trailer push the exhaust out of the
roof louvers to providing cooling
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Figure 1-6. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Cooling Equipment Unit
ESSENTIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
1-27. Power. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system equipment requires 1,300 kilowatts of electrical power at
4,160 volts. Six MEP-810 generators are required for initial deployment, four to operate the radar system
equipment, one for mission support and site requirements, and one as a spare. Two PPUs will eventually
replace the four initial MEP-810 as prime power for the radar system. Medium voltage (4,160 volts) power
is distributed to the radar components through the radar PDU that will provide over current protection,
ground fault monitoring, high resistance grounding, monitoring, and control. The PDU will also control
switching between generators. The PDU interfaces directly with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system through a
tactical cable interface cabinet connected to the CEU. The generators, tactical cable interface cabinet, and
PDU must be connected to the site grounding system. An alternative to using the generator sets is to use
two PPUs which are the primary power units for the THAAD system.
1-28. Radar PDU distributes 4160 volts of electricity to the radar components and provides over-current
protection, ground fault monitoring, high resistance grounding, monitoring, and control. The PDU also
controls switching between generators. The PDU interfaces directly with the radar through the tactical
cable interface cabinet on the CEU. The generators, tactical cable interface cabinet, and PDU must be
connected to the site grounding system.
1-29. The Radar Support Trailer (RST) is a mobile trailer that provides an environment for radar
operations and data reduction and analysis, and provides mission and test operations support. The RST is a
self-contained facility, but requires power, voice and data communications, security and fire alarms. The
RST is capable of storing classified material. Operational capabilities of the RST include:
 Workspace for permanent and temporary data analysis engineers, shift operators, and maintainers.
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Remote radar operation - the capability to control the radar from workstations located in the RST,
only during test or exercise when the radar is not available for immediate operational use.
Logical record identifier data reduction - the capability to extract performance data from local
record identifier data recorded during radar operations.
Software maintenance - the capability to generate limited changes to the radar component
software, or create Test Assist scripts.
1-30. Communications Equipment. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) passes target data to the C2BMC equipment on
the site, which then forwards it over using long haul communications to the BMDS Communications
Network (BCN) for distribution to the C2BMC network and GFC. Mission Support and Base
Communications are provided by the COCOM and include defense information switched network (DISN)
services, commercial services, encryption equipment and key management. The Communications Shelter
provides two-way connectivity between the RST and EEU. The shelter must be located within 100 meters
(328 feet) of the EEU. The equipment connects the host site communications interface via land-line fibers
and provides two-way connectivity between the Auxiliary Communications Shelter (ACS), EEU, and RST
with fiber cables. The ACS is power by the facility power system and has a mounting area for the systems
ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite communications antenna.
1-31. The CDIN is modular, scalable C2BMC node equipment which houses C2BMC interfaces and
services to meet the needs of a variety of capabilities and missions. The CDIN includes fourteen transit
cases integrated into a Communications Equipment Shelter, and an expandable shelter for a Tactical
Operations Center. A third shelter is the Mission Support Shelter, which provides environmentally
controlled storage for ready spares, electrical and mechanical maintenance work area, and serves as a
shipping container during CDIN transport. CDIN assets depend on the site to provide communications,
power, support utilities, distribution systems, and any other infrastructure required.
1-32. The ACS trailer provides connectivity for control to and from the EEU. The ACS is located within
100 feet of the RST and EEU. The shelter and equipment connect to the host site communications interface
via land-line fiber, and connect to the RST and EEU with fiber cables. The ACS draws power from the
facility power system, and hosts mounting points for the UHF SATCOM antenna. This shelter may be
staffed by up to two persons on each shift. The communications control facility provides an interface
between long-haul terrestrial communications and the on-base cable and delivery systems. Mission
communications require two separate conduits between the communications control facility, the CDIN, and
SATCOM inject facility. The communications control facility may be installed in a van or building and is a
COCOM responsibility. The single ACS deployed is currently serving in this role.
1-33. On site tanks are required to store diesel fuel to supply both the radar and facility power generators.
To facilitate the re-supply of diesel fuel to the site, a fuel fill station should be located outside of the
perimeter fence adjacent to the parking area pumps fuel from contractor delivery vehicles into the storage
tanks. This eliminates the need for contractor delivery vehicles and personnel to pass through the vehicle
entrapment area to make deliveries. The refueling station must be protected from vehicles by bollards.
Control equipment must be housed in a structure that prevents tampering or destruction. The fuel delivery
system is site dependent.
TRANSPORTABILITY
1-34. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is designed to be transportable by air, roll-on/roll-off ship, and rail.
Generators, a RST, and two supply containers also are part of the deployable radar. Although an entire
system is transportable by ship, and rail, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is air transportable by C-17 and C-5
fixed-wing military aircraft in accordance with MIL-STD-1366D, “Fixed-wing Air Transport.” Common
aircraft equipment may be used to load and unload AN/TPY-2 (FBM) equipment. AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
systems are fully deployed with mission command interface, a RST, six MEP-810 generators, and two
supply containers. Table 1-1 identifies the dimension of key equipment required to be transported.
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Table 1-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Major Component Dimensions
Equipment
Quantity
Length
Width
Height
Description
(Inches / feet)
(Inches / feet)
(Inches / feet)
Antenna Equip
1
510” / ~42’
96" / 8’
102* / ~8.5’
Unit (AEU)
Cooling Equip
1
460” / ~38’
96” / 8’
109* / ~9’
Unit (CEU)
Electronic Equip
1
484” / ~40’
96” / 8’
109* / ~9’
Unit (EEU)
Prime Power
2
505” / ~42’
96” / 8’
106* / ~9’
Unit (PPU)
MEP-PU-810
4
281” / ~24
96” / 8’
122.5”/ ~10’
generator
Weight
(pounds)
52,980
41,080
36,140
63,000
29,960
Note: * Indicates maximum height with suspension fully raised.
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GBMD ORGANIZATIONS & MISSION COMMAND
This chapter describes the mission command and relationships of the
organizations that share responsibility of ensuring AN/TPY-2 (FBM) support
personnel successfully accomplish the mission. Command relationships of the
GCCs support theater, regional, and strategic defense and provides the flexibility
and responsiveness needed to meet the critical requirements of USSTRATCOM
and provide beneficial ancillary support to theater CCDRs when possible.
2-1. This publication focuses on countering theater and strategic ballistic missile threats affecting an
overseas GCC AOR or subordinate JFC’s joint operations area (JOA). Those forces and capabilities
employed by overseas GCCs also may support a layered defense beginning in the forward areas against
strategic missile threats to the homeland. Commanders at all levels are responsible for planning and
executing appropriate passive AMD measures.
ORGANIZATIONS
2-2. Many organizations have a role in GBMD within a Combatant Command (COCOM), Joint Task
Force (JTF), or subordinate unit. Missile defense is inherently a Joint operation and conducted according to
Joint doctrine. GBMD operations may be multi-command, multi-regional, or occur within a single
operating area. The Unified Command Plan (UCP 2011), 6 April 2011 establishes missions,
responsibilities, and geographic AORs for GCCs.
2-3. Each Service component has unique responsibilities that are critical to the success of the layered
missile defense concept. These Service contributions are contained in DODD 5100.01, Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components. The Army’s contribution is derived from Department of
the Army functions, which includes:
 Organize, train, and equip forces to defeat enemy land forces, seize, occupy, and defend land
areas;
 Develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, in coordination with the other
military services, for employing forces operating on or from the land;
 Conduct AMD to support joint campaigns and assist in attaining air superiority;
 Provide support for space operations to enhance Joint campaigns;
 Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
2-4. CDRUSSTRATCOM has eight specific responsibilities identified in UCP 2011; of particular
importance to this document is missile defense. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing
planning for global missile defense. GBMD is the overarching characterization of the cumulative
(worldwide) planning and coordination for those defensive capabilities designed to neutralize, destroy, or
reduce the effectiveness of enemy BM attacks whether within or across the boundaries of any GCC’s AOR.
Specific responsibilities include:
 Coordinating global missile defense operations support.
 Develop and maintain global missile defense concept of operations.
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Advocate for global missile defense and warning capabilities.
Integrate theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support global
missile defense in coordination with GCCs.
Provide alternate global missile defense execution capability as directed, and as required to ensure
continuity or operations.
2-5. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for GBMD planning and coordinating GBMD
operations support. CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supporting commander to other COCOMs for GBMD
execution and is the COCOM authority for the 100 th Missile Defense (MD) Brigade (BDE) (GMD) and
forward deployed Missile Defense Detachments (MDD).
2-6. USSTRATCOM is organized to accomplish its mission with Joint Functional Component
Commands (JFCC) which are assigned specific functional responsibilities. JFCC-Integrated Missile
Defense (IMD) is responsible for the day-to-day planning and coordination of IMD and IMD-related issues.
JFCC - INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
2-7. JFCC-IMD coordinates with COCOMs and services for desired Joint effects and capabilities for
GBMD operations and support for missile defense. The command also synchronizes GBMD operations and
support (sea, land, air and space-based). JFCC-IMD monitors and coordinates activities with associated
combatant commands, other USSTRATCOM Joint functional components, and the efforts of the MDA.
The JFCC-IMD commander advises the USSTRATCOM commander on all aspects of GBMD.
2-8. The JFCC-IMD mission is to support USSTRATCOM's UCP mission by synchronizing operationallevel GBMD planning and GBMD operations support. JFCC-IMD supports development of global effects
for DoD and when directed provides alternate missile defense execution support to ensure continuity of
operations. JFCC-IMD will work with other JFCCs to continuously coordinate, plan, integrate, and
synchronize USSTRATCOM capabilities to provide tailored, responsive effects in support of national
objectives and COCOMs.
2-9. Additionally, the JFCC-IMD is responsible for maintaining oversight, SA and management of the
system resources/assets supporting readiness of the GBMD equipment. When one of the GMD or AN/TPY2 (FBM) systems has a readiness change, the JFCC-IMD conducts an asset management conference to
ensure all command elements concerned are aware of the change to the GBMD capability and status.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
2-10. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is assigned responsibility in UCP 2011 to, “detect, deter,
and prevent attacks against the US, its territories, possessions and bases, and employ appropriate force to
defend the Nation should deterrence fail.” One of the specific responsibilities identified in UCP 2011 is the
“responsibility for planning, organizing, and executing homeland defense (HD) operations within the
USNORTHCOM AOR in concert with missions performed by the North American Aerospace Defense
Commander.” Consistent with this document and implied is the responsibility to protect against ballistic
missile attacks and to employ available BMD forces to defeat ballistic missile attacks.
2-11. USNORTHCOM forces are responsible for executing GBMD operations in support of HD.
According to JP 3-01, “There is no higher priority than the security and defense of the US homeland.”
USNORTHCOM has OPCON for execution of the GMD mission. Active component and Army National
Guard missile defense forces are under command of USSTRATCOM to execute BMD operations for the
defense of North America. These forces are OPCON to USNORTHCOM during execution of mission.
2-12. The CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander for HD. If offensive operations are
necessary to protect the homeland, CDRUSSTRATCOM will support CDRUSNORTHCOM, Commander
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North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the appropriate overseas Combatant
CCDRs as directed by Secretary of Defense (SecDef).
USASMDC/ARSTRAT
2-13. The Commander, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command
(USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is the Army integrator for Global Missile Defense Systems, the senior mission
commander for GMD systems, and is responsible to organize, train, and equip the MDDs. The AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system is an Army operated system, an element of the GBMD system, and a contributing sensor to
the GMD system. As identified in Army Regulation (AR) 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service
Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, USASMDC/ARSTRAT  is an operational level Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army as the Army Service
Component Command (ASCC) to USSTRATCOM;
 exercises administrative control (ADCON) authority and responsibility over Army Forces
(ARFOR) on behalf of the Secretary of the Army and exercises OPCON over ARFOR, as
delegated by the Commander, USSTRATCOM;
 is the Army proponent for space, high altitude, and GMD; and develops and transitions
technology; and provides acquisition support to assigned fields
 is the Army's integrator for GBMD systems and the senior mission commander for GMD systems
to conduct mission-related operations in support of Army Title 10 responsibilities;
 serves as the Joint user representative, centralized manager, and integrator for the GMD System
and executes horizontal integration across all integrated AMD systems.
 advocates for AMD funding and requirements; provides input to Army AMD doctrine, policies,
and procedures; identifies AMD capabilities, capability gaps, and concepts; coordinates future
ground–based air defense requirements issues and programs with CCDR and Joint staff; reviews
AMD initial capabilities document and Joint capabilities documentation in support of future
requirements.
2-14. The MDDs appear on the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for the 100th MD BDE,
which allows for greater operational flexibility. Each MDD has three primary responsibilities when
deployed: site operations, sensor management, and security operations.
2-15. Coordinated Army support to both USSTRATCOM and GCC is critical to successful BMD and
achieved through the diligent efforts of both USASMDC/ARSTRAT and the JFCC-IMD. This coordination
is greatly assisted by the USASMDC/ARSTRAT Commanding General, who is also designated as the
Commander, JFCC-IMD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the integrator of Army GBMD and conducts missionrelated research and development in support of Army Title 10 responsibilities.
DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING AND DOCTRINE
2-16. The U.S. Army is the service component that serves as the centralized manager responsible for the
integration of all products associated with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. The Army is responsible to
provide mission training for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Managers. In support of that effort, the
USASMDC/ARSTRAT Future Warfare Center, Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in Colorado
Springs, Colorado is the Army organization responsible for the education of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor
Managers and Leaders. DOTD conducts the Sensor Manager Qualification Course (SMQC), which is an
accredited Army course scheduled in Army Training Requirements and Resource System.
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100TH MD BDE
2-17. The mission of the 100th MD BDE is to destroy, on orders, intercontinental ballistic missiles in the
midcourse phase of flight to defend the US and designated areas. Each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is
organized under the 100th MD BDE as an MDD. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is responsible to organize, train,
and equip the MDDs. The 100th MD BDE provides planning and coordination functions for GMD test
activities in support of MDA.
2-18. The 100th MD BDE Commander is dual-hatted and serves in both a Title 10 United States Code
(USC) and Title 32 USC capacity to effectively command multi-component Soldiers. Each MDD is
attached to or supported by an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) or ASCC supporting
the GCC. The MDDs are organized under TOE 40790A00 and are Regular Army units assigned to
USASMDC/ARSTRAT. Figure 2-1 illustrates the command structure of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDDs
within the 100th MD BDE.
Figure 2-1. 100th MD BDE (GMD) Organization Chart
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
2-19. The AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for Army Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD). In
wartime, the AAMDCs deploy into the theater of operations in support of the ARFOR commander or, if
designated, the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) ensuring that Army TAMD operations are properly coordinated and integrated with
those of joint and multinational forces. The AAMDC has the capability to serve as an operational force
protection integrator for the ARFOR or Joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army air defense
forces are properly trained and ready to support integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) operations. The
AAMDC may also support HD operations. Refer to FM 3-01.94 for more information on AAMDC
organization, functions, and capabilities.
MISSION COMMAND
2-20. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform mission
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command functions through a well defined system as identified in FM3-0, Unified Land Operations.
Mission command is fundamental to warfare and is comprised of the art of command and the science of
control. Each of the warfighting functions relies upon mission command for integration and
synchronization. National command authorities, USSTRATCOM, GCCs, and Service components
organizations all have a command and control role in GBMD.
2-21. The SecDef, as the President’s principal assistant on military matters, has overall authority for DoD
and executes the North America HD mission as defined in JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. The SecDef assigns
or attaches forces to respective GCCs as required for GBMD operations. GMD, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and
THAAD systems comprise the Army’s role in GBMD. During GBMD deployment and operations, the
SecDef has directed the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems fall the OPCON of the appropriate GCC. The
supported CCDR issues “commander’s guidance” for the missile defense mission. The Army component
provides forces to CCDRs to execute the missile defense mission.
2-22. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Execution Orders require GCCs to support ongoing operations
protecting the homeland against ballistic missile attack, when feasible. GCCs coordinate and synchronize
missile defense plans and actions under the direction of USSTRATCOM who has responsibility for
worldwide integration of BMDS.
2-23. USSTRATCOM is assigned as the COCOM over AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD. Since missile threats
may cross AOR boundaries, GCCs must establish cross-AOR mission command relationships to effectively
counter missile threats. The processes that enable cross-AOR collaboration and coordination is critical to
ensure effective planning and execution. Successful execution of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system requires an
integrated, cross-AOR strategy that supports the rapid, flexible application of defensive capabilities
synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat the adversary ballistic missile threat. This strategy
is based on the Joint BMDS doctrinal principles of unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning
and direction, and decentralized execution. Centralized planning is essential for integrating, synchronizing,
and controlling the efforts of all available friendly forces. Decentralized execution is essential to remain
flexible and react to the varying operations tempo and uncertainty of enemy actions.
2-24. Army organizations that have a mission command role in GBMD are USASMDC/ARSTRAT and
the AAMDCs in their respective AORs. USASMDC/ARSTRAT forces maintain a dedicated mission
command structure to plan, integrate, and coordinate Army support to GBMD. These capabilities are part
of a responsive, layered offensive and defensive system capable of deterring, preventing, or defeating
missile threats as part of the greater GBMD mission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the senior Army
headquarters responsible for providing Soldiers to support the GBMD mission. AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
operators remain under the control of the established Title 10 USC chain of command when conducting
sensor management operational duties.
2-25. Army AMD forces provide protection functions that span the breadth of all Army key operational
ideas for joint operations as defined by Army and joint protection doctrine. Normally, OPCON of
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems and MDDs are delegated to the GCC who may further delegate OPCON to the
JFLCC/AADC. Due to the unique operational role and limited timelines of a ballistic missile attack, the
mission command structure and support relationships must be clearly defined. Army AMD forces serve in a
direct support (DS) role.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
2-26. OPCON is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the
level of combatant command. OPCON may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations. OPCON does not include
authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
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training. As delegated from the GCC, the JFC/JFACC exercises OPCON over the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
systems through the AAMDC assigned to their region.
TACTICAL CONTROL
2-27. TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movement required for mission
accomplishment. The Sensor Managers, through the AAMDC, exercise TACON of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
MDD.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
2-28. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to
administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment,
personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization,
discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate organization or
other organizations (see JP 1-02). The MDDs are assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT and ADCON of
Soldiers is normally through the theater AAMDC to which the Soldiers are assigned. However, other
organizations within the ASCC may be designate to perform ADCON functions.
RELATIONSHIPS
2-29. The UCP establishes the following collaborative planning relationships for BMD:
 CDRUSSTRATCOM is the coordinating authority for planning and integrating global missile
defense operations.
 All CCDRs, and subordinate JFCs, if applicable, shall coordinate their global missile defense
planning and support with the CDRUSSTRATCOM through the JFCC-IMD.
2-30. USSTRATCOM provides recommendations to the SecDef /Joint Staff to balance HD requirements
with the missile defense needs of other GCCs. Supported by the Services, USSTRATCOM has the unique
position of integrating missile defense requirements and Service capabilities across multiple AORs and
linking GBMD planning with decentralized execution.
2-31. The proliferation of missile technology requires a global missile defense capable for HD, deployed
troops, and friends and allies within overseas theaters. The UCP tasks each CCDR with “deterring attacks
against the US, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force should deterrence
fail.” Each CCDR becomes the "supported" commander for all active defense operations aimed at defeating
ballistic missile threats in the respective AOR. In the case of attack operations, the supported commander is
the CCDR in whose AOR the attack operation occurs. Since ballistic missiles may cross AORs, the AOR
the attack operations occur in is defined as the AOR where the ballistic missile is predicted to impact.
2-32. To further complicate the defense problem, threats may launch from one AOR, fly over another, and
require targeting in a third. Missile defense requires an integrated strategy to support rapid, flexible
application of defense capabilities that are synchronized with offensive actions to deter and defeat
increased missile threat from these adversaries. This synchronization is achieved through the unity of
command, unity of effort, centralized planning and decentralized execution.
2-33. In regional defense situations, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is under the OPCON of the GCC who,
as the supported commander, is supported by other commanders in the defense of the threatened region. In
strategic defense situations, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is under the OPCON of the GCC who, as the
supporting commander, will support the CDRUSNORTHCOM, in his HD mission. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system may be used to concurrently support both strategic and regional missile defense operations. The
reporting chain will be established to deconflict lines of authority for the Sensor Managers during crisis
operations before deployment of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system into theater.
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2-34. Joint command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders and include
the command authority exercised by GCCs, OPCON, TACON, and support. Command relationships are
established through deployment orders, operations plans, concept plans, crisis planning, or Execution
Orders based on actual threats. Increasing range and other technological advances in ballistic missiles
necessitates missile defense forces in one AOR provide support to an adjacent GCC. The supported
commander's requirements establish the framework used by supporting commanders in their respective
supporting plans. The supported Commander’s concept plans establishes the framework used by AOR
CCDRs to develop supporting plans and to support regional missile defense plans.
2-35. At the strategic level, the collaborative missile defense planning process synchronizes each CCDR
missile defense plans with the BMD plans of adjacent CCDRs. At the operational level, the SecDef/Joint
Staff establishes CCDR relationships into supported and supporting roles, balancing AOR priorities for
defended assets with global missile allocation in accordance with priorities set forth for HD.
2-36. USNORTHCOM is the supported GCC for HD and directs active defense engagement operations
when the threat is to the US, its territories and its possessions. USNORTHCOM is a supporting GCC for
BMD threats to other GCCs.
JOINT FORCES COMMANDER
2-37. The JFC may be a CCDR, sub-combatant commander, or JTF commander authorized to exercise
combatant command (command authority) or OPCON to a joint force. The JFC intent for the mission of
AMD is to protect vital US interests from air and missile threats, as well as US and friendly forces. In order
to accomplish this, the JFC must integrate the capabilities of each component of the joint force to gain and
maintain air superiority. Historically, air superiority has proven to be a prerequisite to success for an
operation. It prevents enemy air and missile threats from interfering with operations of friendly air, land,
maritime, space, and special operations forces. It assures freedom of action and movement. Air superiority
also provides protection for friendly population centers, logistic sites, other critical assets, and politically
sensitive assets of HNs. Using counterair operations, the JFC employs complementary weapon systems and
sensors to accomplish the joint force mission (based on the situation); the JFC normally tailors forces to the
specific tasks to enable effective spans of control, responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection.
Because AMD and the counterair mission usually involve all components of the joint force, clear command
relationships and properly assigned responsibilities are essential for effective and efficient operations. The
JFC organizes forces, establishes command relationships, assigns responsibilities, and promulgates
necessary coordinating instructions. The JFC can also designate functional component commanders for the
air, land, maritime, and special operations forces roles.
JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER
2-1. The JFC normally designates a JFLCC when the land forces comprise two or more component forces
and a JFLCC can provide a better degree of centralized planning and direction for an expansive or complex
land operation. The JFLCC, as a single commander for joint land operations, not only enhances
synchronization of all land operations, but also provides forces/capabilities in DS of the counterair/AMD
mission. Normally, the JFLCC/ASCC has OPCON of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Managers, which is
exercised through the AAMDC.
JOINT FORCES AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER
2-2. If the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFACC is usually the supported commander for the
counterair/AMD mission. The JFACC is the service component commander having the preponderance of
air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations. Counterair/AMD is conducted by
all components with specific resources, and the JFC/JFACC ensures unity of effort, centralized planning,
and decentralized execution. Normally, the JFC designates the JFACC as the AADC and Airspace Control
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Authority, because the three functions are so integral to one another. The JFACC has OPCON over only
their own Service component forces and TACON or DS of the other Service/functional component forces
and those capabilities made available for tasking. Ground-based AMD forces such as AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
are provided in DS with mission-type orders. Consequently, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) remains under ARFOR
OPCON, but operate in a DS role to the JFACC/AADC/Regional Air Defense Commander (RADC)/Sector
Air Defense Commander (SADC). The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships
between the JFACC and other components to facilitate operations.
AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
2-3. The JFC defines the command relationships between the AADC and other joint force component
commanders. Components provide representatives, as appropriate, to the AADC’s headquarters to provide
both specific weapon systems expertise and broader mission expertise. The AADC has the authority to
plan, coordinate, and integrate overall joint force DCA operations. The AADC normally is the component
commander with the preponderance of AMD capability and the mission command and intelligence
capability to plan, coordinate, and execute integrated AMD operations, including real-time BM. Primary
responsibilities of the AADC include the following:
 Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint Area Air Defense Plan.
 Develop and execute a detailed plan to disseminate timely air and missile warning and cueing
information to components, forces, multinational partners, and civil authorities, as appropriate.
 Develop and implement, in coordination with the component commanders and with JFC approval,
identification (ID) and combat identification (CID) procedures and authorities, and engagement
procedures.
 Establish appropriate joint, fighter, and missile engagement zones.
2-4. The JFACC establishes an air defense system through the comprehensive integration of all available
component mission command systems and DCA capabilities and assets. The AADC also develops,
integrates, and distributes a JFC-approved joint Area Air Defense Plan. This plan should contain detailed
weapons control and engagement procedures for all DCA weapons systems and forces integral to DCA
operations. All counterair forces regardless of the command relationship, are subject to these rules of
engagement, airspace control, weapons control measures, and fire control orders established by the JFACC,
AADC, and/or Airspace Control Authority and approved by the JFC. When a significant portion of the
DCA capability is contributed by a component other than that of the AADC, a senior officer from that
component may be designated by the JFC or AADC as a deputy area air defense commander (DAADC
[AMD]). DAADC (AMD) responsibilities include assisting in Area Air Defense Plan development,
integrating respective component and multinational AMD into DCA operations, and advising on rules of
engagement, airspace control measures, weapons control measures, air defense warnings, and respective
component AMD operations and capabilities. As the senior Army air defender, the commander of the
AAMDC normally assumes the role of a DAADC (AMD) and advises the AADC on the best distribution
of the Army AMD capabilities.
AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY
2-5. The Airspace Control Authority has overall responsibility for establishing and operating the airspace
control system. The Airspace Control Authority develops policies and procedures for airspace control that
are incorporated into an airspace control plan and promulgated throughout the operational area. A key
responsibility of the Airspace Control Authority is to provide the flexibility needed within the airspace
control system to meet contingency situations that necessitate rapid employment of forces. The Airspace
Control Authority develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination
required among units within the AOR/JOA. Airspace control measures are employed to facilitate the
efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.
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AN/TPY-2 (FBM) must be integrated and compliant with established AOR/JOA policies and procedures
for airspace control.
REGIONAL/SECTOR AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
2-6. The JFC may choose to divide the JOA into separate air defense regions, each with a RADC, who
could be delegated responsibilities and decision-making authority for DCA operations within that region.
The AADC and RADC, as approved by the JFC, may choose to further divide regions into sectors, each
with a SADC assigned the appropriate authority to fulfill their respective responsibilities. Generally, the
regions/sectors are based on geographic size, overland features, and obstacles. The core of a RADC/SADC
is a Service component air control organization with radar and necessary mission command links upward to
the AADC/JFACC/JFC, down to the tactical units’ operation centers, and laterally to other RADC/SADCs.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) must coordinate closely with the RADC/SADC to ensure seamless operations with the
engagement authority.
CROSS-COCOM OPERATIONS
2-7. The SecDef establishes command relationships for GBMD and other cross-AOR operations.
CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for global missile defense. The crossCOCOM operational environment is characterized by activities that include defense against longer range
threats that cross one or more geographical combatant command boundaries, and require coordination or
integration among all affected combatant commands.
2-8. The cross-COCOM operational environment requires an approach to mission command that provides
the ability to coordinate selected aspects of IAMD at the global level while still allowing most of the
functions to be performed at the GCC level and below. Since the GCC is responsible for IAMD operations
within the theater, the IAMD approach must also encompasses global missile defense beyond the theater
level. Key force planning and employment decisions that have cross-JOA impacts will be developed and
implemented through a collaborative process led by the supported GCC for GMD planning as directed by
the President of the United States or SecDef according to JP 5-0.
2-9. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has cross-AOR capability, which can result in radar taskings in support
of multiple CCDRs. The desired outcome of cross-AOR capability includes Identifying and planning information exchange requirements and links between all users of the
radar data are included in the regional C3 architecture.
 Sensor management requirements identified for cross-AOR multiple mission sensors.
 Cross-AOR mission and taskings are codified into support plans, operations orders, Execution
Orders, or appropriate command agreements.
 Defense plans codified in the CCDR training plans, exercises, and Defense Readiness Reporting
Systems.
 Assigned missions that cross AOR boundaries and support defense against multiple AORs.
 DS relationships established between GCC to define the supported commander’s requirements.
2-10. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is OPCON to the assigned GCC who is the supported commander in
a regional defense situation. The GCC that has OPCON of an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is the supported
commander in a theater mission, and is in a supporting commander role to the Commander,
USNORTHCOM in the conduct of the HD mission. There are situations where a GCC may simultaneously
be the supported and supporting commander. The GCC may use the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system to
concurrently support both regional and strategic missile defense operations. Before deployment of the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system into a theater of operations, the reporting chain shall be established to deconflict
lines of authority for the Sensor Managers during concurrent strategic and regional crisis operations.
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2-11. Collaborative GBMD planning may identify missile defense forces and capabilities that can support
defense of multiple AORs. For a given crisis situation, these forces may be assigned missions that cross
AOR boundaries. DS relationships are established between combatant commands to define the supported
commander’s mission priorities and requirements that are codified in the appropriate documentation.
DIRECT SUPPORT ROLE
2-12. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system normally operates in a DS role to other than Army organizations,
specifically providing DS the JFACC/AADC/RADC/SADC by providing missile defense warning to
critical assets under the designated controlling authority and track data to fire control systems. JP 1-02
defined DS as “a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer
directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Joint doctrine considers DS to be a mission rather
than a support relationship. Units assigned a DS relationship retains the command relationship with their
parent unit, but positioning and priorities of support are established by the supported commander (refer to
ADP 3-0).
AAMDCS ROLE
2-13. The AAMDC commander is the ARFOR operational lead for counterair operations responsible to
ensure the ARFOR contribution is properly planned, coordinated, integrated, and synchronized in support
of a CCDR’s priorities. The AAMDC has the overall responsibility for mission command and planning for
AMD systems in support of the joint force commander. The AAMDC integrates the four operational
elements of Army AMD to protect contingency, forward-deployed, reinforcing forces as well as designated
assets from the CCDRs critical asset list. The four operational elements of Army AMD are  passive air defense.
 active air defense.
 attack operations.
 mission command information systems.
2-14. The AAMDC ensures that Army TAMD operations are internally coordinated and properly
integrated with the joint force In theater, AAMDCs normally have a command relationship of OPCON with
the ARFOR commander or JFLCC, and have DS to the JFACC. These command relationships allow the
AAMDC to assist in synchronizing Joint TAMD operations.
2-15. The commanding general of the AAMDC performs two critical roles as the senior Army commander
for IAMD operations. First, the AAMDC commanding general serves as the Theater Army Air and Missile
Defense Coordinator for the AOR/JOA. The second critical role is as DAADC to the JFACC/Combined
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) to provide mission command of multi-tiered AMD using air-,
land-, and sea-based missile defense assets. The DAADC provides CCDR direction and oversight directly
to the Sensor Manager in the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system as part of their OPCON responsibility.
2-16. The AAMDCs support CCDR missile defense priorities for each GCC. The 10th AAMDC supports
missile defense priorities for US European Command (USEUCOM), the 32nd AAMDC supports missile
defense priorities for US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the 94th AAMDC supports missile defense
priorities for US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the 263rd AAMDC supports missile defense
priorities for USNORTHCOM. The 32nd AAMDC also has a force provider responsibility and serves as the
Army Forces Command executive agent for USCENTCOM TAMD operations and Army AMD force
management.
2-17. AAMDCs are assigned to the JFC and have a coordination relationship, when approved by their
higher headquarters, with JFCC-IMD in its role as a GBMD integrator for USSTRATCOM.
USSTRATCOM, JFCC-IMD, or USASMDC/ARSTRAT are not in an AAMDC chain of command. The
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mission command relationship is that the JFLCC and AAMDC supports the JFACC/AADC for AMD.
Engagement authority flows from the JFC to the AADC through the respective RADC or SADC to the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Manager for execution.For example, the 32nd AAMDC, which has Army AMD
force management responsibility for USCENTCOM, may support JFCC-IMD in the global force
management process with Army Forces Command approval. Figure 2-2 illustrates the AMD relationships.
Figure 2-2. AMD Coordination Relationships
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AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM OPERATIONS
This chapter presents an overview of operations and considerations that Army
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) units must apply for the planning and execution of their mission.
This chapter describes the global context within which Army AN/TPY-2 (FBM) units
perform their mission to provide support to theater, regional, and strategic defense.
OPERATIONS
3-1. The USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the ASCC responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and
deploying the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDDs. The MDDs appear on the TOE for the 100th MD BDE, which
allows for great operational flexibility in their operational employment. The MDDs have four primary
operational focus areas: missile defense operations, sensor management operations, BM operations, and
information operations. MDD personnel are augmented as required through the request for forces process.
Primary TACON of the radar is performed via C2BMC suites located in a theater Air and Space Operations
Center (AOC) in which the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is assigned.
3-2. The establishment and maintenance of mission command and support relationships are the
responsibility of each MDD commander, or officer in charge, when deployed. Mission planning, profiles
and asset management are conducted at the direction of the CCDR with designated authority to execute
these functions based on METT-TC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and
actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.
Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war, the rules of
engagement, and the rules for the use of force. Refer to FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.
3-3. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)/C2BMC role is to support the active missile defense mission in such a way
that it integrates smoothly and effectively with the planning and execution of the DCA mission. The DCA
mission includes all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy
forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. C2BMC integrates BMDS into theater
operations in support of DCA mission.
3-4. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operations require Mission Profiles which are developed during the pre-mission
planning process and require long lead times for development. Each mission profile is comprised of a set of
RSPs developed to support the particular radar mission. When completed the mission profiles are loaded
into both the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and the controlling C2BMC suite.
3-5. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operations are divided into two disciplines: sensor management operations and
radar operations/sustainment. Sensor management operations include integration and management of the
sensor as part of the BMDS. Sensor Managers control the radar from a location geographically separated
from the radar, but usually from the theater in which the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is assigned. Radar
operations/sustainment include oversight of maintenance, sustainment, and operational support activities of
the radar and occur at the deployed site.
3-6. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD TOE is illustrated in figure 3-1. The TOE for each MDD (40790A000)
is a headquarters DA validated requirement and the Detachment Headquarters TOE (40598AA00) is
resourced in the Table of Allocation and Allowance. The Security Platoon TOE (40598AB00) is also a
headquarters DA validated requirement but it is not resourced in the Table of Allocation and Allowance;
instead security is resourced with request for forces, HN support, contractor support, or combinations
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thereof. The MDDs are organized to perform the four functions of an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD, which is
mission command, site support operations, sensor management, and security operations.
Figure 3-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD TOE
3-7. Like all mechanical components, downtime is required to support the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
Scheduled maintenance is approved in advance, based on recommended maintenance requirements in
accordance with USSTRATCOM Directive 538-1, BMDS Asset Management and GCC directives.
MISSION TRAINING
3-8. Training is managed, scheduled, and provided in accordance with Strategic Instruction (SI) 508.8,
and TRADOC Regulation (TR) 350-70. All mission training meets security requirements necessary to
facilitate effective instruction. Training is the key to ensuring that the personnel assigned to an AN/TPY-2
(FBM) MDD have sufficient expertise with the system prior to arrival on site. All training facilities and
maintenance of the facilities required by U.S. Government/Military training providers (for government
furnished equipment) are the sole responsibility of the U.S. Government.
3-9. The Army, as the service provider, is responsible to provide training for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor
Manager operations. In support of that effort, USASMDC FWC-DOTD conducts SMQC designed to
provide classroom and hands-on operational AN/TPY-2 (FBM) and C2BMC training for Sensor Managers.
Following successful completion of SMQC, the Sensor Managers arrive at the unit and receive appropriate
unit training. The local AAMDC (or designated representative) is responsible to certify the Sensor
Managers for real world operations. Sensor Manager Officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officer
(NCO) attend the advanced Sensor Manager Leader Development Course to further their understanding of
the radar in order to provide defense design recommendations to the local commander. Additional
executive level AN/TPY-2 (FBM) training is offered for senior leadership.
3-10. USASMDC FWC-DOTD develops and maintains courseware materials in accordance with
TRADOC established standards for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) task documentation
is provided via the Logistics Management Information database and is used as source data for developing
technical manuals, training and provisioning data.
3-11. New equipment training and installation are conducted by MDA and then handed off to USASMDC
FWC-DOTD to meet future institutional training requirements. The Army provides funding to support
training material updates, instruction, and crew qualifications (to include software/hardware upgrades to
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appropriate training devices). The Army provides cost data and projected costs for training and simulation
activities when requested to facilitate Army program objective memorandum development.
3-12. The distributive multi-echelon training system (DMETS) system is an externally operated training
system that interfaces with C2BMC to provide simulated BMDS sensor inputs to provide common training
scenarios to Sensor Managers. The DMETS supports training by providing medium fidelity C2BMC
emulation within the training environment.
RADAR OPERATIONS
3-13. The sensor management section normally operates from a location separate from the physical
location of the radar. Both locations require connectivity into the C2BMC network, as well as supporting
voice and data communications to the forward deployed AAMDC.
SITE LEADER
3-14. The site leader is assisted by one warrant officer and four non-commissioned officers who serve the
site leader for support matters and collateral mission support. This position is identified as key to
maintaining oversight of Army personnel assigned and to represent the interests of the US military in site
support. The leader performs the following functions:
 Supervises military team members on their shift, coordinates with contractors and assign duties as
needed to meet shift objectives.
 Responsible for shift safety, Operations Security, Communications Security, radar system
security, and report entries.
 Provides support to radar maintainer as required.
 Provides military oversight of site operations (24 hours continuous) including radar support,
communications operations and general mission support activities.
 Coordinates with site security for security operations.
 Assists in radar support as required.
 Keeps commander informed of site operations.
RADAR MAINTAINER
3-15. The materiel release agreement does not permit Soldiers to operate or maintain the radar. Pending a
materiel release agreement authorizing Soldiers to operate and maintain the radar, Soldier
operator/maintainers will perform the following mission operations:
 Perform and record all required preventive maintenance requirements.
 Perform radar system equipment inspections (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually,
and annually).
 Perform crew drills, crisis action planning, and conduct reporting (Asset Management).
 Assist in restoring system to mission capability by performing corrective actions.
3-16. This position is identified as key to ensure there are members of the US military who are
knowledgeable in system support and who will assist in safeguarding the interests of the US military
operations. The radar maintainer:
 Provides military support of the radar.
 Provides military personnel for asset management.
 Provides 24 hour continuous operations.
 Keeps military person fully trained and involved in day to day operations of radar.
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AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
3-17. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD provides early surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles from short
range thru ICBMs, necessary to achieve passive and active missile defense for HD, our friends and allies,
and deployed forces. The Army is responsible for life support to all assigned military and non-military
personnel on location. FBM radar capability serves as a visible, deployable deterrent which detects, tracks,
and identifies ballistic missiles. The following paragraphs summarize the sections of each MDD. Not all
MDDs are fully manned due to varying HN agreements on numbers of in-country personnel.
3-18. Sensor Management. The sensor management function is performed by the Sensor Management
section (17 personnel) and is organized as follows:
 Officer in charge: Overall in charge of section.
 NCOIC: Senior NCO for section.
 Sensor Manager (5 personnel): Controls Radar via C2BMC.
 Current Operations (5 personnel): Responsible for asset management of the radar, all reporting
requirements and situational related tasks; serves as back-up for radar control.
 Sensor Control Officer (5 personnel): Serves as the Officer in charge /NCOIC of the shift; overall
responsible for battle management actions performed by the Sensor Managers and Current
Operations; directs pre-planned responses and management by exception as required.
3-19. Mission Command. The mission command function is performed by the Headquarters Section (4
personnel), which provides command, planning, direction, coordination, and control for personnel and
operations to support the mission at the radar site.
 Commander (O3): Commands the Site.
 First Sergeant (E8): Senior NCO for the MDD.
 Supply Sergeant / Armorer (E5): Provides supply and armory support.
 Specialist (E4): Provides chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contaminant support.
3-20. Site Operations. All on-site radar, power generation, and C2BMC operation and sustainment
functions are conducted by civilian contractor personnel. The site operation military functions are
performed by the Site Operations Section. The site operations function is performed by the Site Operations
Section (4 personnel), which provides personnel for Site oversight in the Mission Support Facility and
radar operations in the EEU. The section provides oversight of all contracted support on site
3-21. Security Operations. The Security Operations function is performed by the Security Operations
Section (18 personnel), which provides oversight, training, and mission command of personnel to perform
security operations for the radar site.
 Five 3-person shifts to oversee Security operations.
 One NCO to supervise the Section.
 Two NCOs to provide training oversight and coordination for the security forces.
3-22. Each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD requires a Security Platoon, but it is not resourced. The actual
security forces to secure the radar site will be by Request for Forces from the COCOM, contractors, or HN.
Security force composition will be site specific, based upon threat, HN agreements, and other factors.
SENSOR MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
3-23. The C2BMC Deliberate and Dynamic Planner (DDP) capabilities lay the foundation for AN/TPY-2
(FBM) sensor management operations. As lead service for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, the Army
provides personnel and training to conduct the sensor management functions. The role of the Sensor
Managers is to provide control of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system using the C2BMC system to perform
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search and track commands. The AADC generates radar tasking based on task priorities and sensor
management objectives entered in the system.
SENSOR MANAGEMENT
3-24. The configuration of the radar optimizes the sensor to allow for execution of the specific GCCs
mission objectives. Object tasking actions by the Sensor Manager efficiently employs the radar resources,
enabling maximum usefulness. The Sensor Manager section is co-located with a BMDS node to integrate
sensor management in support of an integrated BMDS. The Sensor Managers are physically separated from
the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system site at the GCCs AOC or the AAMDC. Control of the radar can only be
exercised by a Sensor Manager who has logged into the C2BMC server where the system Token resides.
For example, if the Token resides on the USPACOM C2BMC server/suite, a Sensor Manager from the 94th
AAMDC logged into the USPACOM server/suite would be able to control the radar. Anyone logged into
another suite/server (USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM) can see the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system track data,
but only the Sensor Manager on the suite with the Token (USPACOM) has the ability to apply changes to
the radar.
3-25. Transitioning the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) control to another suite/server is known as a Token transfer. A
Token transfer to another GCC can be accomplished through a manual transition by the Data Sync
Administrator, or through an automatic unplanned Token transfer which is accomplished by the software
during failure. A Token transfer does not equate to a change in the TACON authority. A Token transfer
may occur but the original Sensor Managers with TACON can retain that control if they can log into the
new server that has the Token. If not, those Sensor Managers must also coordinate for TACON authorities
to also be transferred to another group of Sensor Managers. For example, if the C2BMC servers at location
“A” fail, Sensor Managers for location “A” will coordinate for a Token transfer to servers at location “B”.
Sensor Mangers at location “A” can then log into the server at location “B” and continue operations - no
TACON change has occurred. However, if Sensor Managers at location “A” cannot log into the server at
location “B”, Sensor Managers at location “A” must also coordinate for the transfer of TACON authorities
to Sensor Managers at location “B” as well.
SENSOR MANAGERS
3-26. The role of the Sensor Managers is to remotely operate the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system by using the
C2BMC system, in addition to providing SA of other BMDS assets to multiple combatant commands.
Through C2BMC, the Sensor Manager can adjust or change the operational status of the radar, mission
profiles, and/or RSPs.
3-27. In addition, the Sensor Manager allows for dynamic adjustment of radar resources. The Sensor
Manager also controls radar information using the track forwarding function and provides data for HN
support. Processing launch events and forwarding track data information with higher headquarters is
another important function of the Sensor Manager. The Sensor Manager assumes Asset Management
activities for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and updates the operational capability (OPSCAP) of the radar
and C2BMC as required. The radar supports both GMD and theater BMDS missions by providing ballistic
missile classification and warhead discrimination level track data. The track data is sent to C2BMC to
provide SA and early warning to the forces, as well as injected into the BCN.
3-28. The sensor management function is performed by the Sensor Management Section personnel, which
is comprised of five, 3-person teams on a 24 hour continuous basis though a two-console interface
providing the linkage between sensor and C2BMC. Each Sensor Manager Cell is comprised of three
positions, the Sensor Control Officer, the Sensor Manager, and the Current Operations. The Sensor
Manager optimizes the radars performance in support of the Area Air Defense Plan through real time
configuration and object tasking that is either pre-planned or managed by exception within the Sensor
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Managers cell. The Sensor Management Section initializes and configures the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system
for surveillance operations, selects and enable mission profiles, and monitors operational status.
 The Sensor Management Section will initialize and configure the sensor for surveillance
operations, load mission profiles, and monitor operational status. This section is located with
higher echelon air and BMDS mission command nodes to integrate sensor management and
tasking in support of an integrated BMDS protective net.
 This section is located with higher echelon Air and BMDS mission command nodes to integrate
sensor management in support of an integrated BMDS, most likely the GCCs AOC.
 The section is staffed to operate the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system C2BMC Sensor Management
equipment and is not resourced to operate other C2BMC equipment located at the Air and BMDS
mission command nodes.
3-29. Sensor Managers provide SA of other BMDS assets to multiple combatant commands. Through
C2BMC, the Sensor Manager is responsible to adjust or change the operational status of the radar, select
mission profile and RSP, initiate object tasking commands, enable ADSI track forwarding, and coordinate
with all levels of commands and the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operator/maintainers.
3-30. Processing launch events and reporting ballistic missile track data to higher headquarters is another
important function of the Sensor Manager. The Sensor Managers make dynamic adjustment of the radar
resources, control radar information using the down-select function, and provide data for HN support. The
Sensor Manager assumes Asset Management activities for their AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and provides
updates to GFC for the OPSCAP of their radar and C2BMC as appropriate.
3-31. A critical function for the Sensor Manager is the track forwarding function which enables the
C2BMC to transmit the data of selected ballistic missile tracks to other BMDS sensors for cueing and
weapon system engagement. The track forwarding function is a capability based on two key systems, ADSI
and extremely-high frequency (EHF) SATCOM. The C2BMC EHF/UHF Regional Gateway supports
forwarding AN/TPY-2 (FBM) tracks to Aegis BMD and forwarding Aegis BMD tracks to GMD. The
C2BMC EHF/UHF Regional Gateway receives Aegis BMD data over EHF and UHF satellite links for
higher quality and more survivable communications. The Gateway also transmits over both EHF and UHF
satellite links.
3-32. (FOUO) The Sensor Manager is responsible for ensuring the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is ready to
transmit and receive RF energy so it can perform its intended mission. There are discrete modes a deployed
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system resides in at any given moment. The system is designed to transitions between
modes sequentially and each transition requires specific safety precautions be observed prior to an
intentional action taken to manually transition between modes. Modes 1-4 may only be completed by the
Sensor Manager through C2BMC commands. Table 3-1 describes each mode.
Table 3-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Readiness States.
3-6
FOUO
Mode
Condition
1
2
3
Active RF
Live Operations Active
Live Operations Ready
4
Standby Ready
5
6
Standby Not Ready
Maintenance
Description
Radar is transmitting/receiving RF energy
Radar is ready to begin radiating on direction
Radar is ready to support mission - all functions are loaded
Sensor Manager controls system, full system communications
and interfaces are established.
Software and databases are loaded
Used to conduct preventative maintenance, checks, and services
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7
8
Radar Software Off
System Powered Off
Radar is not initialized
Primary power is not applied.
FOUO
OPERATIONAL MISSION PLANS
3-33. (FOUO) Operational Mission Plans (OMP) are used by the radar to generate the Mission Profile,
which provides radar initialization parameters and default track and discrimination taskings. Default
taskings are used by the radar at track initialization pending the receipt of specific tasking. The OMP
identifies the overall radar priorities, which are based on commander’s intent, to develop each operational
objective. Each OMP may be comprised from one to ten Mission Profiles, and is tailored to mission
specific launch areas and flight trajectories.
3-34. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operations require pre-developed mission profiles and RSPs to support the
specific mission of each radar. Developing mission profiles are part of the pre-mission planning process
and require long lead times. Mission Profile is a list of object based activities (track, discrimination, data
collection, etc) for each threat named area of interest (NAI) in the planning database. Deliberate planning
takes place well in advance of a battle and allows the defender to study and, as appropriate, implement
effective deployment and coordination schemes and assess acquisition strategies. When completed, the
mission profiles developed normally through deliberate planning are loaded into both the radar and the
C2BMC that controls sensor operations.
3-35. (FOUO) Mission Profile is a top-level plans for deployed operations, used as the basis for radar
management plans that identifies radar track and discrimination activities. Mission profile allows the radar
to be controlled differently depending upon the environment in which the radar is deployed without having
to rebuild the entire controlling software as radar operation and performance are directly related to the
mission profile . The mission profile attributes define the areas of concern, launch area, threats, and RSP
surveillance volumes. Each mission profile may be comprised of from one to 20 RSPs as illustrated in
figure 3-2. Mission profiles and RSPs are selected upon initialization of the radar with C2BMC and may be
changed during radar operation. Mission profile supports various operational areas or threat region, but
only one Mission Profile may be active at a time.
3-36. (FOUO) The RSP attributes identify the priorities, waveform characteristics, and geometry of each
search sector, defined by the azimuth, elevation, and geometric volume. Each RSP may typically contain
three sectors, but may contain one or more search sector, with each sector specifying unique characteristics.
Therefore, each RSP may be designed to fulfill a variety of operational objectives.
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Figure 3-2. Operational Mission Plan Structure
RADAR SEARCH PLANS
3-37. (FOUO) The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system can execute a search for threat ballistic missiles by using
one of three different RSPs. An RSP identified the parameters used by the radar to activate a search and is a
defined volume in space used to detect and acquire threats. Each RSP is designed to maximize the
probability of acquiring a specific set of threats. The parameters used to define each RSP includes the
search priority, track priority, sub-priority, range, elevations, azimuth, planned beams, and beam
characteristics. The Radar Activity Priority defines the relative priority of each radar function such as
search, track, cue, and discrimination. Some radar functions are sub-prioritized with high, medium, and low
priorities within a specific function. Only one RSP may be activated at a time. RSP changes requested by
Sensor Manager may be executed at any time. RSP will not operate if it overlaps the keep out zone (KOZ).
3-38. (FOUO) The three distinct RSPs the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system may utilizes to acquire a ballistic
missile threat are (FOUO) Autonomous Search Plans (ASP). This is the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) standard operations
mode, but will only be executed when manually selected by the Sensor Manager to provide
autonomous search at mission execution. ASPs are RSPs designed to provide surveillance of an
area of interest (AOI) based on intelligence information and GCC guidance to support the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) planning order mission priorities. Search sectors are defined by deliberate
planning to provide desired probability of detection over the AOI. A single search plan normally
includes multiple search sectors. The active search plan can be the designated the default search
plan or another predefined plan may be selected by the C2BMC Sensor Manager. The AN/TPY-2
(FBM) autonomously acquires and reports tracks to GMD, Aegis BMD, and other BMDS
elements through C2BMC. ASPs are not automatically selected based on Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) data.
 (FOUO) Focused Search Plans (FSP). If enabled by the Sensor Manager, AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
FSPs are automatically selected by the C2BMC logic system based on early warning information
messages from SBIRS to maximize radar acquisition performance. FSPs, used to detect boosting
objects, are automatically selected by C2BMC based on thresholds triggered by SBIRS inputs.
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
FSPs are designed to provide enhanced acquisition performance for a defined surveillance AOI by
concentrating search beams at airspace volumes most likely to contain the threat. The ability of the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) to automatically switch between search volumes allows for a wide range of
FSPs to be used for strategic operations, allowing AN/TPY-2 (FBM) operators to focus on other
priorities to avoid task saturation. SBIRS detects a launch event and the report is sent from SBIRS
Mission Control Station to C2BMC. C2BMC assesses the threat and checks if the radar already
has the object in track. C2BMC provides the capability of tasking the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system to
acquire objects in the C2BMC track file but not being tracked by the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. If
not, C2BMC selects an FSP for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) to activate. FSPs are designed for boost phase
acquisition of ICBMs and typically remain active for a designated time period based on the time
the threat object is expected to be in that specific FSP airspace volume. AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
executes the search, acquires the track, and reports the track through C2BMC to GMD, Aegis
BMD, and other BMDS elements. Sensor Managers can delete and prioritize AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
taskings on a track-by-track basis using an interactive interface supporting real-time radar control.
(FOUO) Precision Cue Search Plan. Precision cueing provides increased efficiency of AN/TPY2 (FBM) acquisition performance in an environment with limited radar resources. Precision cueing
provides the capability to cue AN/TPY-2 (FBM) for acquisition of an external intercontinental
ballistic missiles or theater ballistic missile track. The benefit of precision cueing is earlier track
acquisition for engagement operations with minimum use of radar search resources. This mode is
primarily used for ballistic objects acquired by another forward sensor such as an Aegis BMD. A
BMDS sensor detects an object and initiates a track across TDL-J/Link-16 to the C2BMC
network. C2BMC assesses the threat and checks if AN/TPY-2 (FBM) already has the track. If not,
C2BMC assesses cue feasibility, schedules the cue, and activates the cue when the object enters
the radar’s field of view. To accomplish precision cueing, C2BMC sends AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
complete threat object state vectors such as velocity and three dimensional position, and
covariance information. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) implements cueing, acquires the track, and reports
the track data through C2BMC to Aegis BMD, and other BMDS elements. The track data is also
sent to the GMD System.
3-39. (FOUO) Operator Search Plans are a fourth type of RSP; they are not included in a mission profiles,
but are available at the radar for special tasks such as acquisition of targets of opportunity (TOO). If an
Operator Search Plans is available, it must be loaded onto the radar by the Radar Operator and activated at
the request of and in coordination with the Sensor Manager.
3-40. Radar coverage is a series of sectors comprised of layered, three-dimensional, pie-shaped search
wedges of different thicknesses arrayed horizontally and vertically to optimize detection of missile
launches emanating from the identified NAIs as illustrated in figure 3-3. The search pattern is enlarged or
reduced based on the geometric relationship of the defended area and the trajectories originating from the
NAIs. The larger the ballistic missile NAIs, the larger the search volume of the radar sector.
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Figure 3-3. Types of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Mission RSPs
3-41. Each search sector is defined by the geometry of the sector, which is specified as minimum and
maximum azimuth, elevation, and range. In addition, the search planning system must also define how the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system allocates RF energy to the sector. The following parameters quantify the
application of RF energy by the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system:
 Pulse width- the length of the search pulse measured in seconds
 Frame time- the time it takes to search all the beams of the sector
 Radar activity priority level is the priority of the sector relative to all other Radar functions, and
the priority within the same radar activity priority level
3-42. Whether an object is detected while transiting a search sector depends on the amount of time the
object is in the sector, the range to the object, the object’s radar cross-section, the radar activity priority,
and the sector’s pulse width, and frame time. As range increases and radar cross-section decreases more
radar resources such as energy and time must be applied to detect the object. Each candidate search sector
has a cost, which is a function of the sector’s geometry, pulse width, and frame time.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-43. Planning is critical for all aspects of BMD and that directly applies to the placement of a deployed
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. Deliberate planning is conducted in accordance with JP 5-0, Joint Operations
Planning and the Joint Operational Planning Process concept and the military decision making process
detailed in FM 5-0. To effectively utilize an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, BMD planning must involve Joint,
multinational, GCC, and Service and functional component commands. At each level of command,
planning begins with the receipt of a mission from higher headquarters and culminates in the issuance of
operations plans or operations orders, which provides planning direction to subordinate commands. The
plan is usually used instead of an order to prepare for operations far in advance. An operation plan may be
put into effect at a prescribed time or as directed where it becomes the operation order.
3-44. The placement of assets and the allocation of mission objectives and priorities are performed as part
of the deliberate planning process for BMDS. Using the assets available to support a mission, BMD
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planners perform analysis to determine the placement of each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in theater or region and
allocate specific objectives and priorities in support of specific missions. The process of determining the
stationing of assets and the assignment of mission objectives and priorities is an iterative process defining
COCOM intent and involves strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level BMD planners.
3-45. HD planning is primarily the responsibility of USNORTHCOM, who coordinates closely with
civilian authorities, other governmental agencies, and supporting COCOMs. Due to the consequences
associated from failed HD, the planning dictates a high degree of collaboration between supported and all
supporting COCOMs. Because of the capability for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system to simultaneously
support both theater-level and strategic-level threats, the CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSTRATCOM, and
supported GCC all have a vested interests in the planning and placement of each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
Defense designs must incorporate as many possible courses of action (COA) to maximize system
effectiveness, balance risk, and help limit vulnerabilities from a multi-layered BMDS perspective.
3-46. Planning considerations must be synchronized with Intelligence information and includes, but is not
limited to, launch points, launch systems, capabilities, intent, likely trajectories, and aim points. Planning
enables the development of friendly COAs and permits GCCs, JFCs, and JFACCs to create, analyze, and
optimize initial defense designs to develop BMD element tasking when confirmed as feasible by sensor and
weapon elements.
3-47. Selecting a position for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is part of the defense design process.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system position selection and defense design must be accomplished as part of the joint
force defense design to provide a mutually supporting and efficient AMD. The planning effort is a
continuous process. Planners must determine the location of the radar to optimize the development of the
mission profiles and RSPs to support the specific pre-planned radar mission. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems are
strategically positioned in support of BMDS to maximize their resources based on the radar’s field of view
and other characteristics. This involves determining the upper-tier search requirements, establishing the
primary target line, determining the optimum location, emplacing the radar support equipment, and
communications.
3-48. The threat, threat axis, terrain, weather, time-distance analysis, defended assets, desired engagement
zone, and surveillance requirements all impact placement of an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. When choosing
a location, planners must consider accessibility, connectivity, protection of sites, equipment, Soldiers,
potential interference, and HN support when planning to place the system in theater. An additional factor
that must be considered during selection of Radar sites and search planning is the need to protect friendly
forces and facilities from the hazards of RF emissions.
3-49. Deployment planning includes the full range of support functions, including medical support,
housing, supply support, transportation, subsistence, maintenance, moral, welfare and recreation, legal,
postal, field services, and support services to families. Site specific deployment planning conditions are
documented in a variety of documents, to include site operations plan, site activation plan, site safety plan,
and standard operating process. Figure 3-4 illustrates a notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system site complex.
3-50. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) position selection may be based on AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system coverage of
defended assets against selected NAI/ ballistic missile operations areas. NAI/ ballistic missile operating
areas are identified as ballistic missile operating areas where potential threat BM, mission command,
infrastructure, and forces may operate. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) planners should make every effort to place a
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) in a location that maximizes integration into the JFC defense design.
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Figure 3-4. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Facility
SAFETY OPERATIONS
RISK MANAGEMENT
3-51. All commanders, trainers, and leaders must plan, train, and stress Risk Management processes at all
times. Risk Management is a decision-making process used to mitigate risks associated with all hazards
that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact
mission effectiveness. See FM 5-19 for more detailed information on Risk Management.
RADAR OPERATING HAZARDS
3-52. (FOUO) The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and system components require approximately 2 acres of
graded, compacted surface and approximately 12 acres of “clear zone” to allow unobstructed, low-elevation
radiation and signal return. Contained within the clear zone is a “hazard clear zone” of approximately 6
acres. The site location should be as level as possible. The maximum allowable slope from front to back or
side to side is 2.86 degrees or 5 % slope.
3-53. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system’s power output makes emplacement considerations critical. The
planners must ensure that no other equipment is placed inside the KOZ. The KOZ extends out to 5,500
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meters from the radar and 65 degrees on each side of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system bore sight (see figure 35). Site personnel shall conduct routine functional tests of all warning devices and interlock systems and
maintain a record of all such tests. An audible signal shall be automatically activated by the radar
equipment to alert personnel the AEU is about to radiate. All site personnel must receive initial and routine
briefings on system hazards and the radiation protection program. Before radiating or going to remote
operation, site personnel must ensure all crew members have vacated the 100m personnel KOZ in front of
the AEU.
Note: Dangerous RF power levels exist on and near the antenna during operations. RF
electromagnetic radiation can cause serious burns and internal injury. All personnel must
observe RF danger zones as illustrated in figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5. KOZ Top View
AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES
3-54. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system planners and operators must be familiar with JP 3-52. This
publication identifies the airspace control measures that potentially will be in use throughout the JOA in
which the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system may operate. The airspace control measures that the AN/TPY-2
(FBM) operator may be asked to observe lies in the Restricted Operations Area (ROA). The ROA is an
airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the Airspace Control Authority in response to specific
operational situations/requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted
(JP 3-52). The ROA is used to identify the area in front of and above the radar that may potentially cause
damage to aircraft and/or munitions passing through the area (see figure 3-6). All ROAs must be identified
during the planning stages as the OMPs should be created with all applicable ROAs taken into
consideration.
Note: The terms ROA used by JP 3-52 and KOZ used by developer refer to the same airspace.
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Figure 3-6. KOZ - Side View
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
3-55. In accordance with JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, and FM 3-36, Electronic
Warfare in Operations, information is an element of combat power. Information operations is the
integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential
adversaries while protecting our own (JP 1-02). Information-related capabilities include cyber
electromagnetic activities (CEMA), inform and influence activities, public affairs operations, military
information support operations, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs operations,
human terrain system, Operations Security, and military deception. The Army supports information
operations through mission command and the staff tasks of CEMA and inform and influence activities.
Commanders conduct CEMA to conduct mission operations. Focused CEMA, synchronized with effective
information management and information collections, enable commanders to gain and maintain the
advantage.
Note: Refer to FM 3-36 for additional information on cyber electromagnetic activities.
3-56. Space-based and cyberspace capabilities and services provide assured, responsive, and timely
support down to the tactical level commander, and must be fully integrated with air and terrestrial-based
battlefield systems. The Army continues to expand cyberspace operations to build, operate, and defend its
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infrastructure in order to exploit communication, information collection, missile warning/defense, positionnavigation-timing, and environmental monitoring space systems that provide capabilities as part of unified
operations. Space based capabilities and resources are integrated components of transparent processes and
products provided to unified operating forces. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) must have unfettered communications
access to conduct its missile defense mission and must do so with assurances the information being
transferred has not been tampered with. Without our assured space capabilities, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
could not provide enhanced SA, support inform and influence activities, cyber electromagnetic activities, or
provide the high-tempo, noncontiguous, simultaneous distributed operations.
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS/FAILOVER OPERATIONS
3-57. (FOUO) Continuity of operations (COOP) is critical should the Sensor Manager loses control of one
or more AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems. Failover for control of each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is determined through
advanced planning with COOP protocols established and pre-coordinated to determine which units are
responsible and when COOP control should be implemented. C2BMC Global Engagement Manager
(GEM) has built in redundancies that do not exist within COCOM C2 suites to minimize failover to
alternate or backup sites.
3-58. (FOUO) The command authority has designated as a planning assumption that deployed AN/TPY-2
(FBM) systems are OPCON to the applicable GCC. Each GCC, with support from USSTRATCOM, will
develop COOP plans to maintain operations. In the event that the GCC with OPCON loses the capability to
control the radar, USSTRATCOM shall execute previously coordinated COOP functions in support of the
BMD mission. Regardless of where COOP is conducted from, the Sensor Managers who have control of
the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system fall under the OPCON and direction of the GCC to which the AN/TPY-2
(FBM) is assigned.
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AN/TPY-2 (FBM) SUSTAINMENT
The role of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is to provide general support to a
specific GCC or JTF. Since sensor operations in the BMDS have both theaterlevel and global implications, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) can support military
operations in various AORs and JOAs simultaneously. However, in order to
provide support to any military operations or BMD, the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
systems must be secured, maintained, and sustained to optimize operations.
4-1. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDDs are heavily dependent upon contractor support to maintain all systemrelated equipment and provide on-site security, as required. On-site technical operational and maintenance
support to the radar system is conducted by contractor personnel. Security operations are conducted with
military, contractors, or a blend of both. All security operations are conducted with direct military oversight
in accordance with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.
Security forces must comply with the law of war as well as the rules of engagement or the rules for the use
of force, whichever is then applicable.
INSTALLATION SUPPORT
4-2. Mission support and administrative facilities are sufficient to support 24 hour continuous operations.
Facilities, including life support requirements for assigned personnel such as housing, dining facilities,
health services, and administrative offices vary depending on the location of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site,
forward operating base/life support area or HN military installation, HN support, and available
infrastructure.
4-3. Site support for all operational and support personnel are provided by forward operating base/life
support area or US/HN support installation, depending upon deployed site location, Status of Forces
Agreements and METT-TC requirements. HN and US bi-lateral requirements vary with each site and shall
be included in the basing agreements. The protection warfighting function requirements vary by site and
are dependent upon what services are available and the environment. The objective is to ensure each site is
constructed and maintained in accordance with DoD and US Army anti-terrorism and protection
warfighting function requirements.
4-4. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system will normally be deployed overseas to a prepared site, but may also
deploy within the continental US (CONUS). Outside CONUS site preparation and support requires joint
US and HN effort coordinated through established US-HN diplomatic and military channels. Sites in
CONUS should be considered based on USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements and must follow all
applicable statutes and comply with environmental impact guidelines. When deployed to locations in
CONUS mission operations will be conducted in compliance with established processes for defense of the
homeland. Site preparation will include the typical provisions for site equipment identified in figure 4-1
and other sections of this document.
MAINTENANCE
4-5. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system was designed to provide consistent, reliable operations while
deployed, but to do so, field maintenance must be performed at regular scheduled intervals. Inspections and
maintenance on deployed radars are performed to maintain the useful life of the system and to incorporate
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emerging designs to increase system performance. Maintenance may consist of intrusive or non-intrusive
preventative maintenance, checks, and services (PMCS) which includes schedule maintenance events,
diagnostics, alignments, calibrations, and removal and replacement of damaged or non-functional
components. Non-intrusive PMCS activities which are those activities that do not require intrusion into the
physical system hardware may be performed during diagnostic windows to optimize radar availability.
Robust diagnostic techniques are used to determine the overall health and status of the deployed system.
Diagnostics are usually a suite of tests used to detect and isolate hardware faults and failures in the system,
and provide insight into the health of the system. Operators execute radar diagnostic tests as required.
4-6. MDA is responsible for configuration management of all AN/TPY-2 assets. There is a single
configuration control process and database for MDA and Army changes to the AN/TPY-2 radar. MDA
manages the process, maintain records, and schedule configuration control boards. The Army is a voting
member of the AN/TPY-2 configuration control board. The configuration control process must support a
holistic view and consider impacts to both AN/TPY-2 (FBM) and AN/TPY-2 (TM) configurations on
matters such as technical, DOTMLPF domains, programmatic, operations, and implementation.
For Official Use Only
Typical AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Equipment
 Radar Equipment
• Antenna Equipment Unit
• Electronic Equipment Unit
• Cooling Equipment Unit
• Radar Support Trailer
• Enhanced Calibration Unit
 Power Plant
• 6 Generators
• 4 - radar equipment
• 2 - site support
• Diesel fuel storage tanks
• Commercial power converters to 60Hz
• Power transformers & switch center
• Power load banks
• Generator control facility
 Site Security
• Restricted Area fences
• Security system (cameras, motion
detectors, sensors)
• Security Control Center
• Weapons and ammunition storage
• Perimeter and area Lighting
• Blast walls, bunker, defensive fighting
position
• Entry Control Facility
 Site Infrastructure
• Gravel hardstand, roads, parking
• Underground utilities
• Facility lighting
• Drainage
 Facilities and Trailers
• Administrative
• Break area
• Latrine/Showers
• Hazmat shelter
• Logistics trailers and tent
• Maintenance tent
For Official Use Only
Figure 4-1. Notional AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Equipment
 Communications & SATCOM Equipment
• Terrestrial communication lines (fiber)
• Satellite communications terminals
(portable antennas – USC-60)
• C2BMC Deployable Interface Node
Communications Van
• Communications control facility
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4-7. Alignments and calibrations are a set of procedures that minimize RF, angular errors, and waveform
irregularities to ensure system level performance is maintained. Periodic Alignments and calibrations are
required to maintain optimum performance and restore system performance following maintenance actions.
Alignments and calibrations are conducted on the radar system following return from certain maintenance
activities or as a result of analysis conducted following routing PMCS to verify system performance,
accuracy and confidence.
4-8. Weekly diagnostics are performed at the system, sub-system, and component level to evaluate the
AEU, EEU and CEU health. Site personnel review the diagnostic data to determine if the system needs
immediate attention, and take prescriptive removal and replacement actions, as required. All diagnostic
data is sent to the material developer where it is analyzed for radar performance and failure trending.
4-9. Maintenance is performed on the radar to maintain current system capabilities sand incorporate
emerging designs that enhance performance, reliability, availability, and safety. Maintenance is performed
at different intervals. PMCS are diagnostic tests and inspections conducted in accordance with technical
manuals on a variety of radar system equipment. PMCS may be conducted daily, weekly, monthly,
quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. Periodic software updates are loaded on the radar as they become
available.
CONTRACT LOGISTICS SUPPORT
4-10. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and mission power generation equipment is operated and sustained
by MDA through a consolidated contractor logistics support (CLS). The onsite operations and support
staffing is contractor led. Key sustainment features include CLS, two-level, field- and sustainment-level,
and fault isolation with on-site repair or replace service of line replaceable units. Sustainment product
teams are structured to allow deployment, operations, and sustainment of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) equipment
worldwide. The consolidated CLS is responsible for all aspects of supply management, to include
acquisition, receiving, shipping, storage, issue, replenishing, and disposal, as well as all packaging,
handling, storage, and transportation of all equipment and supplies.
4-11. Storage facilities and containers are utilized for storage of various site material and equipment to
include adequate space for CLS spares and generator maintenance. Storage facilities and containers may be
arranged to shield mission essential generators and provide ballistic protection from small arms fire.
4-12. The CLS trailers are temperature controlled, with sufficient lighting and electrical outlets to allow
for the use of power hand tools. One trailer is exclusively loaded with critical equipment spares and repair
parts. A second trailer houses a small maintenance area with an electrostatic device-approved workbench
area with electricity, local telephone, and NIPRNET connections where simple electrical and mechanical
repairs can be performed. The CLS trailers are lockable and have provisions to store classified material.
SECURITY OPERATIONS & RESOURCE PROTECTION
4-13. The primary mission of assigned security forces to ensure the protection of the resource. Sufficient
forces must be assigned and identified to provide necessary security to meet Security System Level (SSL)
requirements. It is the commanders’ responsibility to apply security standards required by SI 538-2,
Ballistic Missile Defense System Physical Security Program, to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources,
particularly during increased threat level or high risk determinations, or as the commander/director deems
necessary. As a tenant unit on a host installation, AN/TPY-2 (FBM) units will comply with the host service
component requirements for establishing controlled areas for the protection of GBMD system resources
and personnel. The objective of security for the Army AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sites is to:
 Implement general policy for the security of personnel, installations, military operations, and
designated assets in accordance with SI 538-2, DODD 5200-8, and Army applicable security
regulations.
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Provide security guidance and general processes that are realistic, harmonized with other security
disciplines, and provide the necessary flexibility for commanders to protect personnel,
installations, projects, operations, and related resources against capable threats from terrorists,
criminal activity, and other subversive or illegal activity.
Reduce the loss, theft, diversion of, or damage to DoD assets with advanced technologies; thereby
enhancing overall security, while ensuring that warfighting capability is maintained.
Standardize personal identification and authentication to DoD installations and facilities, including
interoperability with other Federal entities.
Utilize the DoD personal identity verification credentials on the Common Access Card (CAC) as
the universal authority of individual authenticity.
THREAT AND RISK/VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
4-14. Continuous intelligence gathering and analysis is critical to effective security of GBMD system
resources. Commanders working with their DoD and Service component intelligence agencies, and
USSTRATCOM Special Security and Counter Intelligence (J21), must analyze potential threats.
Intelligence analysis shall consider current local, regional, and international factors bearing on the security
threat to installations and GBMD system resources. It stresses the known capabilities of hostile elements to
damage, destroy, or impede the planned use of SSL resources. Commanders will use USSTRATCOM
Postulated Threats to GBMD Systems and any theater specific threat assessments to develop local threat
assessments. Commanders shall conduct formal risk/vulnerability assessments of the GBMD system
resources in their custody. Up-to-date threat assessments shall be developed and maintained as a vital part
of evaluating the overall security of GBMD system resources.
4-15. As a part of the baseline operations GBMD system, each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is protected as a
SSL-A resource. SSL-A is assigned to operational GBMD system resources for which the loss, theft,
destruction, or misuse would result in great harm to the strategic capability of the US. SSL-A security must
result in the greatest practical deterrence against and response to hostile acts. In-place security measures
should provide an effective means to achieve detection, interception, and defeat of a hostile force before it
is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Entry control for SSL-A and -B restricted areas is conducted
by posted entry controllers through a single entry point whenever practical.
4-16. All installations possessing or supporting SSL resources must publish a security plan. Plans should
identify required posts based on the importance of each post to the overall security of the installation's
resource prioritized by functions in the following order: (1) detection, (2) response, (3) entry control, and
(4) mission command.
PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM
4-17. The physical security program (see AR 190-13, Physical Security) is that part of security concerned
with active and passive measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to personnel, equipment,
installations, information, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, terrorism, damage, and
criminal activity. Physical security is a primary command responsibility. This security is for worldwide
GBMD operations. Security/defensive forces shall be prepared to respond rapidly to incursions
continuously.
4-18. Physical security programs are for prevention and provide the means to counter threats when
bypassing or ignoring preventive measures. Physical security threats include, but are not limited to:
 Foreign intelligence services.
 Foreign military and paramilitary forces.
 Terrorists and saboteurs.
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Criminals.
Protest groups.
Disaffected persons.
4-19. Physical security planning includes using biometric, electronic, and/or mechanical technological
security systems to mitigate both vulnerability to the threat and reduce reliance on fixed security forces.
Requirement For Extraordinary Security Measures
4-20. Security. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and associated equipment are classified as SSL-A assets.
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Site Security provisions are consistent with SSL-A protection standards. The MDD
Commanders have oversight responsibility for all radar security operations. MDD security personnel are
subject to HN Status of Forces Agreements coordination and requirements.
4-21. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is designated as a SSL-A resource to be protected at the medium
threat security level. All equipment and resources required to be operational to perform this mission are
considered SSL-A resources. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system physical security system consists of redundant
integrated, layered, multi-technology subsystems for intrusion/detection coverage during all site specific
weather conditions. The components of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system physical security system are: Entry
Control Facility (ECF), vehicle crash barrier, vehicle entrapment area, Security Control Center, perimeter
security fence line, perimeter security lighting, video and infrared cameras with full view of perimeter
security fence line, and defensive fighting positions which provide 360 degrees of protection for security
personnel as indicated in figure 3-4.
4-22. The ECF is located at the boundary fence and allows personnel and vehicle inspection prior to
entering the site. All personnel pass through the personnel entrapment area where they are required to
present valid credentials to gain access to the restricted area. The Security Control Center houses the arms
and ammunitions center, and the Integrated Electronic Security System control room. The perimeter
security fence line is a physical access barrier to the restricted area which consists of two concentric fences
separated by at least 30 feet. Planning dictates security forces must thoroughly understand the strengths and
weaknesses of the Integrated Electronic Security System.
4-23. The baseline for an operational or operationally capable AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is SSL-A, as
defined by SI 538-2. SSL identifies specific resources that must be secured, and the level of security that
will be dedicated to those resources. SSL-A resources assigned to operational units are resources for which
the loss, theft, destruction, or misuse would result in great harm to the strategic capability of the US. The
SSL-A security level must result in the greatest practical deterrence against and response to hostile acts. Inplace security measures should provide an effective means to achieve detection, interception, and defeat of
a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources.
4-24. All vehicles not required within the SSL-A area shall be parked in a designated parking area outside
the perimeter fence.
4-25. GBMD assets are possible targets for sabotage. It is essential that frequent and periodic security
assessments are made of the potential threat and the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the GBMD
security program. Other considerations are:
 The postulated threat to GBMD assets, DA, and USASMDC/ARSTRAT annual threat statements,
local threat, and all other relevant factors will be considered.
 Security programs will be revised accordingly to ensure adequate protection at all times.
 Physical security processes must constitute a balanced, in-depth system responsive to all credible
and potential threats and vulnerabilities.
 Construction projects require continuous security coordination between engineers and security
personnel from planning through completion of the project.
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VISITOR PERSONNEL
4-26. Occasionally, it is necessary to escort personnel who do not have the minimum security clearance
required to be granted access to a GMD facility. Approved personnel shall escort cleared visitors within all
controlled areas. All GBMD units shall have established policies for escorting visitors.
Day-to-Day Operations
4-27. When the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) is normal at the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site, posts at the
site are staffed. However, the unit security force must be prepared to react and negate a threat according to
pre-established plans and rules for the use of force. The importance of training to react in a crisis cannot be
overemphasized. Not all scenarios will allow for a smooth progression.
Example: A no-notice attack or penetration attempt could cause immediate transition to crisis
operations, thus highlighting the significance of intelligence, extensive preplanning, and
personnel and asset management.
Security Forces And Use Of Force
4-28. There are sufficient security forces assigned and designated to provide necessary security
requirements. Security forces are organized, trained, armed, and equipped to provide normal day-to-day
protection for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system assets and to react to security incidents. Security force personnel
shall not be tasked to perform functions unrelated to the security mission while on duty.
4-29. Exterior fences and barriers must cause a long enough delay to unauthorized personnel to allow
security forces to respond to and neutralize the threat before they gain access to the protected facilities
containing AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources. Security forces shall use the degree of force necessary to prevent
unauthorized access, damage, loss, theft, or sabotage of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, in accordance with
DODD 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law
Enforcement and Security Duties. Assessing the adequacy of the security of AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources is
an essential task for the responsible commander. The postulated threat to AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources,
including intelligence on local threats and other relevant factors will be considered. Security programs will
be revised accordingly to ensure adequate protection. Threat analyses or other security considerations may
lead to a doubt that adequate protection can be provided from available resources. If so, commanders will
request appropriate assistance through command channels. Other security force considerations are:
 Security forces appropriately armed and all possible actions taken, including the use of deadly
force within the limitations of AR 190–14, to prevent the sabotage of GBMD assets.
 Ensure immediate re-occupation and security of a AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources exclusion area
wrongfully penetrated.
Resources, Training, And Equipment
4-30. MDA and the US Army shall apply sufficient human resources and funds to the security program to
ensure a secure environment for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) resources. Commanders will identify resource needs in
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and allocate necessary resources to support their
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) security programs. Commanders will use funds identified for physical security as
intended. For physical security equipment, follow guidance in AR 190–13 for the planning, evaluation,
approval, and procurement, which includes any item, device, or system used to protect AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
resources.
4-31. Due to the SSL of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, security forces shall be provided adequate personal
protection. At a minimum, protective masks with operational filters installed, ballistic vests, and helmets
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shall be immediately available to all personnel assigned to security functions. Equipment should be worn
during increased threats or when responding to real-world incidents and alarms.
4-32. The objective of security training programs is to ensure personnel are prepared and trained to deny
unauthorized access to GBMD system resources. Security forces must maintain training capabilities
necessary to achieve the objectives of the GBMD security program. Security force personnel assigned the
duties of protecting the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and site resources should be trained in a wide variety of
subjects. Refer to SI 538-2, chapter 7 for a complete list of training items.
Protection Warfighting Function
4-33. As the FPCON increases, the commander may increase the number of personnel on duty. The
number of personnel on-duty for each FPCON level is the commander’s decision. The commander may
deem it necessary to use all available personnel for the highest level of preparedness. Each increase in the
number of personnel on duty includes associated risks and resource expenditure. The commander weighs
all aspects of the mission to determine the staffing level and how long to sustain each level. The unit site
security standard operating process reflects the details. Specific security measures must be directly linked
with FPCON levels. Protection Warfighting Function requirements vary by site, but must be in compliance
with DoD and US Army anti-terrorism and Protection Warfighting Function requirements.
DESIGNATED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FORCE
4-34. A dedicated security force for each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site is required for a show of force to
repel/control civilian protestors and defeat or delay any attacking force. At least one immediate response
force team will be organized and trained as a tactical element, or as a combined force for situations
threatening the security of the radar site. The immediate response force shall include a minimum of two,
but may contain more appropriately armed and equipped security force personnel capable of responding to
a situation within the prescribed time limits. Reaction and response times must be determined through
exercises and drills while taking into consideration the layout of the radar site. Static posted sentries shall
not be part of the immediate response force, which should be deployed in elements to patrol the exterior of
restricted area perimeter boundaries. There must be at least one security response team and one designated
immediate response force for each restricted area with an SSL resource.
RESERVE FORCE
4-35. Army doctrine requires the designation of a reserve force. A reserve force is an uncommitted force
available for action at the decisive moment. Its primary purpose is to retain freedom of action throughout a
contingency operation. The designated reserve force consists of the members of the platoon (-) on mission
cycle inside the wire, who are not staffing a post or otherwise engaging the threat. Once the immediate
response force and the remainder of the platoon (-) is committed, the commander must immediately
reconstitute a reserve force from the company (-) to retain freedom of action.
COMMUNICATIONS
4-36. The security force is equipped with two-way radios, which are essential for the efficient operation of
the security force and the accomplishment of its assigned mission. The Integrated Electronic Security
System (alarms and sensors) operator maintains the security force net. All on-duty security force personnel
have an individual radio, and the security force vehicles have vehicle-mounted radios. The
installation/garrison security force must have compatible communications equipment to allow continuous
coordination between the two organizations when the mission dictates. Use secure voice capability when
possible.
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WEAPONS
4-37. Squad-level weapons provide the maximum practical firepower for security forces and are carried or
immediately available. Where employing side arms, security personnel responsible for FPCON of SSL
resources shall have immediate access to weapons providing greater firepower. Military and contract
security forces shall be equipped and armed for site protection and terrorist incidents as determined
appropriate by the local commander; military security forces shall also be armed for combat operations.
The local environment must be considered in authorizing the types of weapons employed.
4-38. Issuing of weapons to security personnel is in accordance with AR 190-11 and local unit standard
operating process. The use of privately owned weapons while on duty is not authorized. The commander
may prescribe other weapons to the security force based on needs and requirements. Normally, weapons are
loaded with live ammunition, except when prohibited for safety reasons. Criteria must be established when
to authorize lock and load in prohibited areas. Weapons and ammunition issued to security-force personnel
shall not be removed from the installation, except, when authorized by the senior military representative for
official duty.
4-39. Because of the high number of civilian personnel onsite, the personnel are briefed by the senior
military representative on the rules for the use of force. Civilian personnel on site shall not be issued
weapons.
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COMMUNICATIONS
This chapter describes the global communications systems needed to support the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and provides a general overview of the existing
architectures in support of global communications. The global communications
network (COMNET) connects the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and other BMD sensors
with fire control systems that enable the integration of individual components into a
BMD system. Additionally, key organizations that support GBMD have duties and
responsibilities to ensure specific communications systems and equipment are always
available to support GBMD SA and BM.
OVERVIEW
5-1. GBMD uses many secure voice and data communication systems to execute the mission. The
GBMD communications capability provides connectivity to the entire BMD community and is required to
be secure, interoperable, collaborative, redundant, and survivable. The communications infrastructure
consists of interoperable systems spread across regions and theaters with considerations for HN interface
and multi-national forces. To support inter- and intra-theater communications, a comprehensive network
has been developed. Information assurance is built into every aspect of the system to ensure validity of the
data and mission success.
COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
5-2. Reliable communications are imperative for BMD systems conducting their mission. Effective BM
requires reliable communications to enable the commanders to conduct operations during stressing
situations for extended durations around the world. Commanders must retain the flexibility to operate
missile defense units on the battlefield, to maintain communication links with the mission command
elements, and to maintain access to time-sensitive data to influence the battle.
5-3. Seamless, integrated secure communications provide for the horizontal and vertical integration of
mission required voice, data, imagery, and video information. Integrated networks support combat
operations with the purpose of keeping the commander informed, which means connectivity to Joint
communications links, global connectivity of extended-range assets, and integrated communications. These
networks must connect to existing military and civilian, Joint and multinational partners, operations, forces,
Intelligence sources, sustainment centers, and support administrative functions.
5-4. SATCOM must support all battlefield systems to significantly enhance the speed and accuracy of
useful information that commander’s exchange with subordinates. COMNETs provide entry at key points
within the force structure to facilitate SA through data exchange and automated routing capabilities.
5-5. GBMD communications systems require the capability to transmit large amounts of information
with no latency, while denying the enemy access to the information. Communications systems supporting
GBMD are capable of providing secure, real-time exchange of essential information between commanders
and subordinate commanders. The systems must be responsive but sufficiently flexible to allow timely
redirection of BMD resources. GBMD communications systems must have sufficient capacity, electronic
protection, security, and flexibility to accommodate information exchange among strategic, operational,
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and the tactical levels of command, even when an intermediate level of operations have been disabled or
degraded.
COMMUNICATIONS
5-6. USSTRATCOM is responsible for communication networks for GBMD as defined within SI 538-4.
USSTRATCOM leverages DoD communications architectures to support worldwide BMD forces.
5-7. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has no organic communication. However, there are various nonorganic communications networks available to support the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) to permit it to rapidly
disseminate the sensor data. The data collected is sent to both GCCs and the BMD systems.
5-8. The mission of the BMD COMNET is to ensure commanders have access to the information and
data required to execute the GBMD mission and provides the infrastructure that connects all sensors,
weapon systems, C2BMC, and decision makers into an integrated missile defense architecture.
5-9. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) interfaces with the C2BMC network through the C2BMC Network Interface
Processor (CNIP) and may use the C2BMC architecture to communicate with the GFC. Execution of the
Sensor Management function is from the C2BMC terminals. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) sends messages to US
and multinational expeditionary forces over TDL-J/Link-16 networks. Communications requirements for
collateral mission support are determined based on deploying location.
5-10. Communications access includes DSN, DRSN, NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and high speed data link access.
Depending on the communications availability at the radar site, dual military satellite communications, plus
UHF and EHF, and in some cases commercial SATCOM and associated connectivity may be required. The
number of channels and channel capacities vary for each site and depend on the HN or GCC.
5-11. The BMDS leverages networks to provide connectivity for BMDS elements assuring commanders
have access to information and data required to execute the BMDS mission. These existing NetOps
interoperate to form a virtual community of interest, referred to as BMD COMNET. The BMD COMNET
includes data, voice, video, and transport systems that are independently installed and operated across
multiple theaters supporting GBMD. The BMD COMNET is not a dedicated network for GBMD as it
shares the same transport and communications systems used to support multiple missions.
5-12. Its current infrastructure consists of both commercial and DoD NetOps and satellites. The BMD
COMNET includes operational, development, test, and training components of DISN, hardened and nonhardened commercial and military SATCOM assets, and the dedicated GMD communications network
(GCN).
5-13. JFCC-IMD is the primary asset manager for the BMD COMNET. JFCC-IMD manages the BMD
COMNET through the Global IMD NetOps Integration Center (GINIC), which is the communications
portion of an operations center responsible for monitoring and reporting the availability, reliability and
security of the BMD COMNET and the components that directly support the BMD missions. The GINIC
assists global and theater NetOps service providers with troubleshooting and fault isolation activities, and
ensuring network outages affecting the BMDS are resolved in a timely manner. The GINIC coordinates
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities affecting BMD COMNET system integrity to ensure
minimal operational impact. To ensure NetOps capability gaps are closed, the GINIC relies on support
from JTF – Global Network Operations NetOps centers, service/agency communication providers, and
BMDS Network Operations Support Centers (BNOSC).
GBMD NETWORKS
5-14. To support GBMD operations, communications are established and maintained using all available
means, including strategic and tactical service component, sustaining base, commercial leased,
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multinational, and HN communications. The required communications must support high-speed data
systems with massive data storage, retrieval, and dissemination capabilities. The following types of
information are exchanged:
 SA - consisting of common operating picture (COP) and alerting and early warning.
 Mission command - consisting of command authority, mission orders, OPCON, and TACON.
 Operations and intelligence - consisting of planning, coordination, orders, reports, static
intelligence, dynamic intelligence, and targeting information.
 Administrative/sustainment - consisting of sustaining information, personnel and unit information,
and status reports.
5-15. The BMD COMNET is the main communication network used to support BMDS. The BCN and the
GCN are the two primary communications sub-networks that support the BMD COMNET NetOps
structure. The BCN crosses all COCOMs and AORs, and consists of terrestrial and submarine cables,
military and commercial SATCOM. The two primary mission sets of the BCN is fire control for the GCN
and SA from the C2BMC communication architecture.
5-16. The BCN is a collection of telecommunications switching, routing, and ancillary equipment and
interconnecting virtual circuits that distribute BMDS information among BMDS subsystems, using the
DoD telecommunications infrastructure such as the DISN and global information grid. The BCN includes
all the data, voice, video, and transport systems independently installed and operated across multiple AORs
supporting GBMD. The BCN shares the same transport and NetOps systems used to support multiple
missions. Infrastructure is available through commercial and DoD terrestrial networks and satellites.
5-17. The mission of the GCN is to ensure commanders have access to the information and data required
to execute the GBMD mission. The GCN is a dedicated network providing direct, secure communications
connectivity between the GFC operating elements and the GBI fields. The GCN integrates multiple
separate sub-components, collectively capable of secure data, secure voice, and encrypted long-haul
communications links. The GCN uses both government and leased civilian networks, Defense Satellite
Communications System, Milstar, UHF and UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites, TDL-J, and all physical and
logical links providing data and voice communication equipment. It is capable of configuring data and
voice networks rapidly and accurately. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) track data is provided to C2BMC via the
BCN, and then C2BMC injects the track data into the GCN at dedicated inject points for the GFC. The
GFC operating elements receive the track data and use it to obtain a firing solution if the track data
indicates the trajectory is a threat and it is within the kinematic access of any GBI. The same process works
in reverse when the GFC passes track data to C2BMC, via BCN to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM). Figure 5-1
illustrates the GCN architecture.
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Figure 5-1. GCN Architecture
C2BMC
5-18. The C2BMC is part of the BCN, which is integrated with multiple sensor and weapon system
communications systems. It interoperates with a variety of associated message formats, protocols, and
computer security information assurance measures. C2BMC uses its communication architecture to link
sea-, land-, and space-based sensors to display track and ballistic missile threat data which is distributed to
each connected C2BMC suite.
5-19. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system interfaces with C2BMC to receive and provide information. This
information is used to cue other systems supporting the missile defense operations, receive command and
cueing information, and to improve the overall SA of commanders at all levels. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
track data is provided through the CNIP to C2BMC via the BCN. Then, C2BMC-
5-4

Forwards track messages through ADSI so they can be transmitted over the TDL-J/Link-16
network to the Aegis BMD assets. The TDL-J/Link-16 networks enables the precision cueing of
the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system by directing messages from the Aegis BMD to the C2BMC and on
to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.

Injects the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) track data into the GCN at dedicated inject points for the GFC. The
GFC operating elements receive the track data and use it to obtain a firing solution if the track data
indicates the trajectory is a threat and it is within the kinematic access of any GBI. The same
process works in reverse when the GFC passes track data to C2BMC, via BCN to the AN/TPY-2
(FBM).
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5-20. C2BMC network system employs Parallel Staging Network (PSN), which is a separate but parallel
network consisting of a full complement of network suites used to develop the next delivery of C2BMC
software using spiral acquisition. The PSN is not designed or intended to be a back-up or fail-over to the
operational C2BMC network. The operational network has its own built-in, automated fail-over
mechanisms, accomplished through established COCOM crossovers with diverse data routing and
redundant high-availability communications node equipment with two identical strings of network
components arranged in an active/passive configuration. Refer to chapter 6 for more information on PSN.
TDL-J/LINK-16
5-21. Tactical-level data links involve transmissions and exchange of bit-oriented digital information. The
TDL-J program applies to all bit-oriented message formats used in support of joint and multinational
operations. The TDL program facilitates information exchange between the US armed forces, other US
agencies, and multinational commands. TDL-J is a Joint Chiefs of Staff approved standardized
communication link suitable for transmission of machine-readable, digital information. All US military
Services, Joint services, some nations of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Japan employ TDL-J
communications. The US Navy uses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization designation, “Link-16” when
referring to TDL-J communications, but the two are synonymous.
5-22. TDL-J/Link-16 uses the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System as its communications
component. It provides increased jam resistance; improved security; increased data rate (throughput);
enhanced granularity of information exchange; reduced data terminal size; digitized, jam-resistant, secure
voice capability; relative navigation; precise participant location and identification, and increased numbers
of participants over other networks. . The TDL-J/Link-16 network also enables the precision cueing of the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system by directing messages from the Aegis BMD to the C2BMC and on to the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
5-23. (FOUO) Agencies use voice communications to deconflict track reporting errors and track
discrepancies. Voice communications are important in resolving miscorrelation and dual tracking to
minimize ambiguity that may affect a commander’s SA. Dual tracking results when there are multiple
tracks for the same target which results in a common operational picture with more tracks than there are
actual objects. Voice communications required for support and coordination of BMDS operations is
through both DSN and DRSN. The most common voice communications equipment used by Sensor
Managers is an Integrated Services Telephone and Secure Telephone Equipment. Additionally, Sensor
Managers use voice over internet protocol and Defense Connect Online via SIPRNET for chat.
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SECTION TWO – C2BMC DOCTRINE
Chapter 6
COMMAND, CONTROL, BATTLE MANAGEMENT, &
COMMUNICATIONS
This chapter describes the system, operations and support of C2BMC. BMD requires
well-defined command relationships because of the threat capability to project across
multiple theaters. The short reaction time associated with BMD demands close
coordination between GCCs. C2BMC ties all the BMDS elements into a distributed,
worldwide, integrated missile defense system, including upgraded early warning
radars, GMD, Aegis BMD, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), THAAD, and Patriot. Ballistic missile
SA, sensor management, and BM provided by C2BMC supports the complex
execution of global BMD.
C2BMC MISSION
6-1. C2BMC is the integrating element for BMDS to negate enemy ballistic missile threats, by providing
critical mission coordination between BMDS sensors to weapon systems. C2BMC provides the foundation
for conducting deliberate and crisis action planning for BMD in accordance with JP 5-0, Joint Operations
Planning. It provides BMD related SA, sensor management, and BM tools that allow operators to execute
portions of the BMD battle, and the global communications connectivity required to link all elements of the
BMDS.
C2BMC ROLES
6-2. C2BMC is principally a battle staff tool and not a command execution tool. With the exception of
the sensor management function where a Sensor Manager controls the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, C2BMC
is a tool used to conduct planning and provide GBMD SA. While the COCOM C2 suite was originally
fielded to address a strategic BMD fight and was later modified to provide theater-level information, the
GEM suite is designed to focus on theater- and regional-level BMD. As such, full integration into theater
counterair mission systems was not a design consideration.
6-3. C2BMC is deployed at the strategic- and operational-levels and provide a constant, global COP of
world-wide BMD status. Over one hundred C2BMC workstations are fielded globally at GCCs, AOCs,
AAMDCs, and a variety of other organizations responsible for implementing IAMD. C2BMC suites are
distributed across GCC sites to provide planning and SA support for the Enterprise Work Stations (EWS)
and web browsers. Suites and EWS are deployed in host centers with infrastructure and communications
interfaces to other BMDS elements and external systems.
6-4. C2BMC interfaces with sensor and weapon systems to establish a common view of BMD, detect
threat missile launches, and enable the successful negation of those threats. C2BMC interacts with external
BMD elements to share information for more effective planning and to leverage non-BMDS resources to
respond to threat situations. The C2BMC planning capability allows the system operator to develop rules of
engagement and defense plans that span multiple GCCs and BMDS resources. C2BMC was designed as a
standalone BMD system to provide rapid capability to control the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system and provide
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BMD SA to decision makers. Figure 6-1 illustrates the ‘plan, monitor, execute the fight’ concept of
C2BMC.
Figure 6-1. Plan, Monitor, Execute the Fight
C2BMC CAPABILITIES
6-5. C2BMC provides the capabilities necessary to conduct end-to-end BMD missions at all levels of
operation. Capabilities provided by C2BMC include scalable, configurable C2BMC suites, control of the
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system equipment, BMD SA, BMD planning, sensors & weapon system interfaces,
communications connectivity, and data management.
6-6. The C2BMC product lines offer several fielding options to units depending on their BMD
operational and staff requirements. C2BMC has multiple hardware fielding configurations based on
increasing levels of BM, mission command, connectivity, and processing. Some users may require robust
C2BMC processing and connectivity, and therefore have full C2BMC suites, while other users may only
require a C2BMC web browser with SIPRNet connection.
6-7. All C2BMC suites have the ability to operate and control one or more AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems.
All suites can be configured to operate in standalone mode or in with multi-node connectivity between all
connected suites. However, a dedicated crew is required to operate and control each AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system.
6-8. C2BMC has the capability to conduct collaborative, deliberate, and crisis action planning to develop
Defense Designs, build COAs, conduct analysis, provide summary displays of the current IMD system
status, and provide remote sensor resource management of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. C2BMC has the
option to use the C2BMC DDP on the EWS or a stand-alone Laptop Planner.
6-9. The Integrated Ballistic Missile Picture (IBMP) generates detailed, real-time IMD reports with
critical IMD data supporting operational analysis, decision making, and graphic display of information in a
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variety of tables and reports for SA. The IBMP provides two- and three-dimensional maps overlaid with
friendly and enemy ballistic missile track data and trajectories.
6-10. C2BMC has the capability to communicate with sensors and weapons systems to enhance missile
defense battles. C2BMC suites receive target track data from sensors such as AN/TPY-2 (FBM), Aegis
BMD, and COBRA Dane. C2BMC uses this data to provide the information to weapon systems such as
GFC and THAAD for engagement and to display BMD SA. C2BMC cannot communicate directly with
some sensors, such as the upgraded early warning radars. In these cases, the data is sent from the upgraded
early warning radars sensor to the GFC, which then forwards the data to C2BMC for SA.
6-11. C2BMC Data Services provides consistent services and applications simultaneously to both the
COCOM C2 and GEM suites. Services include  Messaging services provide tactical message interface to and from GEM.
 Planning services provide DDP data to GEM.
 NetServer provides persistent OPSCAP and protection capability (PROCAP) data.
 CNIP provides message processing interface and translation capabilities between C2BMC and
external BMD sensors.
 ADSI communicates on Link-16 networks in the TDL-J format.
C2BMC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
6-12. C2BMC provides a tailored set of tools and capabilities to plan, monitor, and assist in executing a
BMD fight; it provides BMDS SA, and provides BMD SA for friends, allies, deployed forces, and HD.
This is accomplished through the use of operator stations, multiple server suites, COCOM C2 EWS, GEM
work stationss, web browser access, and hardware/software applications. Supporting network connectivity
includes network management equipment, security protocols, external system interface (ESI), dedicated
circuits, NIPRNet/SIPRNet connection, and the software required to support system administration and
manage the various communications interfaces. The hardware/software is client-server based system that
uses a combination of government and commercial off the shelf (GOTS/COTS) and BMD specific
applications. A data synchronization Token concept is employed to ensure all linked suites receive and
display the same track information, as is the case with Tri-Node suite. Interfaces include those with GMD,
SBIRS, Aegis BMD (via Gateway), Global Command and Control System, and other C2BMC nodes.
6-13. The baseline architecture for a C2BMC suite consists of eight operator workstations with up to four
monitors each, a network management workstation, and four racks of servers and communications
equipment, located within existing facilities to provide communications connectivity, power, shelter,
security, and other services. Each operator workstation carries the same software suite. C2BMC supports
workstations and browsers at multiple locations including USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM,
USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and the National Capital Region. C2BMC controls the sensor management
and track processing for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, via the C2BMC IBMP software segment.
6-14. C2BMC suites are deployed in two distinct configurations; the COCOM C2 suite and the GEM
suite. Although very different systems, the significantly quantifiable difference in function between the two
is that a COCOM C2 suite can only control one AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system whereas a single GEM suite can
control multiple AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems, but each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system requires a dedicated crew.
The GEM suite also provides advanced tracking and discrimination algorithms, and advanced BM
functions. C2BMC suites can operate collaboratively with connectivity between multiple suites via the
BCN as is the case with the C2BMC Tri-node suite which links USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and
USPACOM. Multi-node C2BMC suites can operate together sharing information, referred to as ‘data
synch’ or work independently with one suite used for test/exercise and others supporting real world
operations.
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6-15. C2BMC core infrastructure was designed with the requirement to interface with the GMD system
and provides all system, database, message transmission, information security, and communications
services. The C2BMC system interfaces, communicates, coordinates, and manages a wide range of sensors
and weapons systems not initially designed to work together such as the Aegis BMD and the Patriot Missile
Launcher. These sensors and weapon systems form the basis for a multi-layer defensive shield against
ballistic missile threats to the U.S., its friends and allies, and all common interests of the US and its allies.
6-16. C2BMC planning capability allows the system operator to develop rules of engagement and missile
defense plans across BMDS resources. C2BMC interacts with external sensors and weapon systems to
share information for more effective cross-AOR planning.
6-17. C2BMC interfaces with sensors and weapon systems in order to establish a common view of BMD,
display hostile missile launches, and the interceptors employed to successfully negate those threats.
Through these interfaces, C2BMC is able to provide SA of active defense elements, attack operations, and
passive defense operations. C2BMC is deployed at strategic, regional, and theater levels of operation.
6-18. Interfaces to BMDS elements are supported through CNIP and ADSI for elements using TDLJ/Link-16 interfaces. C2BMC has a common message architecture based on eXtensible Markup Language
(XML) standards, the BMDS XML file that integrates multiple legacy message formats into data structures
forming the basis for a BMD COP.
6-19. The Sensor Managers execute TACON of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system through a C2BMC suite
located in an AOC or other operating location geographically separated from the AN/TPY-2 (FBM). Both
sensor management and radar site locations require connectivity into the BMDS COMNET, as well as
supporting voice and data communications to the forward deployed AAMDC. C2BMC suites offer a means
to conduct concurrent training, test, and operations without degrading real world operations.
6-20. C2BMC supports six fundamental missile defense functions as identified in figure 6-2. Each of the
independent functions has sub-functions; the functions and sub-functions interact at all levels of the system
to provide system synergy through integrated use of common data and applications. This doctrine will
focus on BM, SA, DDP and communications.
6-21. SA is a subset of BM and provides Summary Screens and IBMP display of information to support
senior military leadership make decisions during critical BMDS decision making processes. The operators
can maintain SA by receiving current, real-time SA information when configured for the test or exercise
mode.
6-22. The C2BMC IBMP provides the foundation for detailed IMD data and graphical information
available in a variety of tables and reports for operational forces SA. The C2BMC IBMP allows Sensor
Managers to select radar states, define search parameters, override tracking priorities, control track
forwarding, define discrimination confidence, and enable wide-band discrimination and coordination with
mission command levels and operators and maintainers. The IBMP is a customized version of the same
software common to numerous other military software mission command systems such as CCIC2S and
Global Command and Control System. Web-based IBMP feeds provide BMD SA to the President of the
US, senior DoD-level users, GCCs, Brigades, and forward-deployed users.
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Figure 6-2. C2BMC Architecture
COCOM C2 SUITE
6-23. Each C2BMC COCOM C2 suite provides the operator with the capability to operate one AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system and transmit the data to all BMD elements to maintain SA. COCOM C2 suite discussion
focuses on those elements that are unique to the COCOM C2 suite, which include the DDP, and COCOM
C2 suite as the battle manager.
6-24. The COCOM C2 suites support BMD planning and mission command operations, providing missile
defense SA data to support BM for decision makers. The COCOM C2 suite of hardware consists of two
EWSs which display the Alert Client, Summary Screen, Executive Summary Screen, IBMP, and host the
DDP. COCOM C2 suites also include mission servers, network management equipment, and
communications node equipment.
6-25. The DDP used with the COCOM C2 suite is the DDP and is also available as a stand-alone Laptop
Planner. The DDP provides a set of tools to develop and assess BMD designs. The DDP integrates with
Army’s Air & Missile Defense Workstation, Navy’s Maritime IAMD Planning System, and can load the
defense designs into GEM.
6-26. The BM function uses the COCOM C2 suite to provide system developed tools and decision aids
that permit the OPCON of one AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. Designed for strategic focused operations, it is
also used for theater BMD, is web-accessible, and provides SA and executive level situation summary.
Primary products include the IBMP and Summary Screen.
GEM SUITE
6-27. C2BMC GEM suites provide the operator with the capability to automatically or manually manage
one or multiple AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems; however, each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system requires a dedicated
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crew. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems transmit the data to all linked BMD elements in support of SA, BM,
and sensor management mission areas. GEM suite discussion focuses on the four independently operated
but integrated functions; DDP, GEM as the battle manager, Track Server, and C2BMC Data Services. Each
of the independent functions has sub-functions; the functions and sub-functions interact at all levels of the
system to provide system synergy through integrated use of common data and applications.
6-28. GEM suite provides GCCs an integrated, semi-automated BM capability for BMD. The GEM battle
manager provides improved sensor resource management and engagement coordination over a COCOM C2
suite. GEM provides primary sensor management of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system while retaining the
capability to control the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system via a COCOM C2 suite. GEM improves sensor resource
management by automating sensor tasking through user-selectable mission objectives and has the
capability to concurrently manage multiple AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems. GEM has improved algorithms for
down-select tracks for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system to forward a track to TDL-J/Link-16 network and Japan
and HN.
6-29. A GEM suite does not contain a resident DDP, and therefore relies upon, and is initialized from a
BMD defense designs built with the DDP from the COCOM C2 suite or stand-alone Laptop Planner. GEM
has a DDP that is a set of tools and interfaces to obtain planning input products and assess BMD designs.
6-30. GEM suite is the primary BM function used by AADC to support regional BMDS forces. The GEM
products provide enhanced automated tools and decision aids that permit the OPCON of one or multiple
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems. Although a different system from the COCOM C2 suite, GEM does similar
function as COCOM C2 suite, but provides the additional automation, functionality of BMDS track
management and dissemination, and coordination of BM engagements. GEM may support strategic
operations, but is designed to provide theater and regional focused BMD detail and enhanced AN/TPY-2
(FBM) sensor management control and operation.
TRACK SERVER
6-31. Both the COCOM C2 and GEM suites share a common Track Server to provide track processing
enhancements, improve track correlation, and launch event association between multiple reporting sensors.
Within multi-node suite operations, the C2BMC suite that controls the Token is the ‘master’ suite for
establishing system-wide track numbers so a consistent, BMD COP is maintained. The Token suite sends
all other suites identical track data to be processed in each individual suite to maintain a consistent common
track picture. The Token is an electronic identification method used within a C2BMC suite to identify the
lead server for transmission of track data. Only one Token may exists within a C2BMC suite regardless of
whether the suite is in single-node or multi-node operations.
6-32. (FOUO) Track Server is a separate part of the network and communications function and it receives,
processes, stores, and provides a single IBMP to all C2BMC nodes (COCOM C2, GEM, AAMDCs, and
AOCs). The Track Server receives track data from all early warning, SBIRS Mission Control Station,
Integrated Broadcast Service, TDL-J/Link-16, AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and GMD sources. The Track Server
correlates tracks from all BMDS sensors and creates C2BMC Representative System track, referred to as a
Rep track, for all launch events. The Rep track is the system track most likely to represent the reentry
vehicle.
SYSTEMS INTERFACES (CNIP & ADSI)
6-33. Each ESI provides the ability for C2BMC to interface with external systems. ESIs use commercial
industry, standards-based XML web-based applications for standard, consistent interface to GMD
components, sensors and external systems. ESI equipment consists of workstations, servers, and network
connectivity and includes a dedicated DISN Asynchronous Transfer Mode Service (DATMS) circuit,
NIPRNet, and SIPRNet connection. ESIs include those with GMD, SBIRS, Aegis BMD (via Gateway),
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Global Command and Control System, and other C2BMC nodes. The ESI architecture is designed to
accommodate future functionality and growth.
6-34. (FOUO) The ESI to C2BMC provides GFC Summary Screen data such as weapons, targets, and
tracks to the C2BMC command node. It provides data reports for Registration and Heartbeat, Operational
Capability, and Health and Status. The ESI also provides missile-launch warning through SBIRS messages
and reports which include Quick Alert, Boost State, and Coverage Reports. The ESI provides AN/TPY-2
(FBM) Track Reporting connectivity to GMD and other external sensors.
6-35. (FOUO) CNIP. The CNIP permits C2BMC to interface with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system as well
as with the C2BMC network. The CNIP works by converting one message type to another message type,
such as from a B-series to a C-series or from a B-series to BMDS XML file, so different BMDS elements
communicating over different pathways may communicate with each other.
6-36. (FOUO) CNIP provides significant missile defense interfaces including the direct interface. The
direct interface between C2BMC and SBIRS allows C2BMC to receive SBIRS data directly from the
SBIRS Mission Control Station.
6-37. (FOUO) ADSI. The air defense system interface is a family of products designed to meet many of
today’s communications Information Systems requirements and provides two-way TDL-J/Link-16
interfaces, which is the primary mechanism for exchanging missile track data between theater-level BMDS
elements such as Aegis BMD, Patriot, and THAAD. The system is capable of receiving, forwarding, and
displaying tactical information via TDL-J/Linl-16, radar, intelligence links, and other means. ADSI and
remote ADSI terminals are considered part of C2BMC.
6-38. (FOUO) The C2BMC forwards down-select track messages through an ADSI to Aegis BMD assets,
over TDL-J/Link-16 networks. This information is used to cue other systems supporting the missile defense
operations and to improve the overall SA of commanders at all levels. The TDL-J/Link-16 network also
enables the precision cueing of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system by directing messages from the Aegis BMD
to C2BMC and on to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. The ADSI forwards the tracks to the Aegis BMD
platforms using UHF SATCOM or higher-quality communications with EHF SATCOM.
PARALLEL STAGING NETWORK
6-39. The PSN enables concurrent training, test, and operations which permits real world operations with
no interference to the C2BMC operational network during software development and testing and allows the
BCN to meet operational availability requirements. The PSN mitigates C2BMC operational and fielding
risks by allowing uninterrupted installation and check-out of next C2BMC software delivery staged on a
separate (but parallel) network. Fielding new C2BMC software simultaneously on all suites eliminates the
requirement for compatibility between current and next spiral delivery.
6-40. The PSN minimizes C2BMC operational downtime while maintaining the development schedule
and reducing technical risks, because the PSN is separate from on-line C2BMC operations. PSN
enhancements are delivered as part of the C2BMC spiral delivery. Both logical and physical (or equivalent
to physical, such as crypto) separations are designed in the operational BCN and PSN to preclude data
mixing between the networks, and verified through rigorous testing to confirm PSN data is separate from
the operational network and does not spill over from the PSN to BCN.
6-41. The PSN is not designed or intended to be a back-up or fail-over to the operational C2BMC network.
The operational network has its own built-in, automated fail-over mechanisms, accomplished through
established COCOM crossovers with diverse data routing and redundant high-availability communications
node equipment with two identical strings of network components arranged in an active/passive
configuration. PSN is not intended for exercises or routine training activities. The PSN is often unavailable
for training, exercises, and sustainment testing because it is in a development and test configuration.
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DELIBERATE AND DYNAMIC PLANNER
6-42. Unity of effort and planning are essential to accomplish the BMD mission and play a critical role for
effective BMD given the limited sensors and weapon systems available with which to engage threat
ballistic missiles. BMDS exercises and war games illustrate the necessity for pre-engagement planning to
optimize sensor and weapon systems positioning, and crisis action planning during BMD operations for
flexible and adaptive BMD engagements. The C2BMC DDP is the integrated, common missile defense
planning tool for all C2BMC applications, providing optimized missile defense planning and analysis for
high demand/low density strategic and theater assets. The DDP publishes all plans to C2BMC Services,
allowing GEM and other users to access and download defense designs as necessary.
6-43. C2BMC provides DDP capability to enable strategic- and theater-level planners to develop and
evaluate the effectiveness of BMD plans against potential enemy COAs, resulting in the protection of
assets. Supported BMD planning includes developing and coordinating Joint Operational Planning and
Execution System (JOPES) planning products such as operations plans and operations orders, and
developing initialization parameters for C2BMC software to implement the plans.
6-44. The DDP supports deliberate planning, crisis action planning, and dynamic planning phases. During
deliberate or contingency planning, GCCs use C2BMC to understand the force-level requirements for
various operations plans, assess enemy ballistic missile COAs, and draft deployment and coordination
strategies. During crisis action planning, the DDP can develop and assess possible threat scenarios,
determine optimal element placement for critical asset protection, and support element coordination
strategies to de-conflict elements across threats and missions.
6-45. DDP has a BMD Plan Generation routine that creates its own plans. The DDP is used to develop and
communicate BMD plans and defense designs in an evolving IMD planning architecture consistent with
existing joint doctrine planning and execution. At the strategic level for planning, the DDP allows GCCs to
synchronize Intelligence information such as launch points, intent and aim points, and to develop friendly
COA guidance to GCCs. At the operational level, the DDP allows GCCs, JFCs, and JFACCs to create,
analyze, and optimize initial defense designs to develop BMD element tasking when confirmed as feasible
by sensor and weapon elements. The stand-alone Laptop Planner allows operators to build BMD plans
while connected from remote locations or in stand-alone configuration which can be uploaded to C2BMC
Services.
6-46. The DDP provides increased tactical-level capability when used in conjunction with the AMD work
stations and Aegis BMD Mission Planner. Tactical-level information is relative to intelligence preparation
of the operating environment, evaluating friendly COAs, validating mission tasks such as search sector
probability of success, and integrating service-specific battle command requirements.
6-47. The DDP graphic users interface is built on the commercial Joint Mapping Tool Kit which enables
handling of detailed Digital Terrain Elevation Data products. The DDP is a medium fidelity planner that
contains data and element models for GMD, Sea-Based X-band radar, AN/TPY-2, THAAD, Patriot, and
Aegis BMD based on extensive blue force validation efforts that may be used for defense analysis. The
DDP also interfaces with the Navy’s Maritime IAMD Planning System to provide information exchange
with Aegis BMD Planner.
6-48. The DDP provides the initial capability for the dynamic planning of near-real-time plan adaptation
due to sensor and weapon system changes in health and status that impact OPSCAP and PROCAP
functions. The OPSCAP tool improves SA of the sensors and weapon systems by containing options to
filters sensors, weapon systems, and communications within the defense design to perform rapid planning
and analysis based on real-world element outages, predictive analysis, or scheduled outages. The DDP
provides the basis and initializing parameters for the BMD PROCAP displayed on the IBMP.
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PLANNER - DEFENSE DESIGN
6-49. The DDP allows the combat planner to create and edit defense designs for use in operations plans,
access and database management, build plan layers, import and export objects, and develop Critical and
Defended Asset Lists. The DDP enables plan merging from multiple GCCs into a single GBMD Plan for
use in evaluating IMD Defense Designs. Coordination of BMD plans within and between GCC staffs is
supported by exchanging plan data via SIPRNet. C2BMC has two levels in which planning data can be
created and merged; the plan level and the defense design level. The plan level contains data available to all
Defense Designs in the plan. Objects defined exclusively at the plan level can be moved by an analyst to
the Defense Design level to be displayed on the map and analyzed. Objects created in the Defense Design
level are automatically added to the plan level. The DDP enables coordination of multiple regional plans
into global Defense Designs and loads them to the C2BMC mission server.
6-50. The Defense Design creates branches to represent different COAs based on operational events such
as sensor down time or emerging threats. The DDP enables the creation of plan branches and sequels or
alternative plans in the plan for analysis and contingency planning, or to represent changes to Defense
Designs over time. Multiple plans may be open simultaneously and may be used for branch and sequel plan
creation to facilitate plan comparison and analysis. The DDP can incorporate sequels into contingency
planning by representing discrete battle phases or phases as sequels such as pre-hostilities, hostilities, and
post-hostilities. The DDP also permits trade-offs on contingencies with changes in resources such
scheduled and unscheduled resource outages.
6-51. The DDP provides functionality to analyze Defense Designs so planning personnel can visualize
gaps, weaknesses, overlaps, and seams in blue force designs versus specific, actual, and future threat
scenarios. It also assists planning personnel in optimizing BMDS sensor and weapons systems during
positioning. The DDP analysis provides the capability to modify a Defense Design by modifying, deleting
or adding new platforms, NAIs, defended assets, and tasks.
6-52. Defense analysis is based on models of BMDS sensors and weapon systems resulting from an
extensive friendly force validation effort with the BMDS Program Offices, National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC), U.S. Air Force, Missile Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), and U.S. Army
databases.
SENSOR MANAGEMENT
6-53. Sensor management refers to the operations and control of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. Refer to
Chapter 3 for the discussion of sensor management and the functions of a Sensor Manager.
BATTLE MANAGEMENT
6-54. BM facilitates the integration of missile defense capabilities. BM addressed planning in support of
BMD operations and recognizes the importance of integration and collaboration of all BMDS elements.
Using humans in control, BMDS BM provides enhanced SA, conservation of interceptor inventories, more
efficient use of sensors, and minimized cross-sensor interference.
6-55. BM consists of the deliberate planning, planning during execution, and employment of BMDS assets
and rules of engagement to enable effective and efficient execution of sensor tasks, engagement
monitoring, peer-to-peer engagements, and directed engagements to defeat threats while conserving system
resources. BM functions include all the activities that support control of the BMD forces during operations.
Those functions include the creation of a BMD COP using the source track data provided by BMD sensors,
the distribution of BMD track data throughout the BMDS, the management of BMD sensors, the conduct of
engagement planning, and oversight of engagement operations conducted by the BMD weapons system.
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6-56. Automated BM aids support BM by providing BMDS element battle managers the means to
prioritize threats, evaluate weapons employment criteria, and identify the preferred assets and weapons to
engage those threats. GEM was developed as a global automated battle manager. BM between elements
range from fully autonomous to fully coordinated.
6-57. Three general levels of BM coordination are used for integrating BMDS elements for efficient and
effective operations. Automated BM aids support these three levels of coordination


Passive coordination is defined by pre-planned shot doctrine and rules of engagement with
minimal exchange of information between weapons systems that share defended assets and are
capable of engaging a common threat. Applies primarily to theater level engagements.
Peer-to-peer coordination is active, real-time coordination between weapons systems that share
defended assets and are capable of engaging a common threat.
Directed coordination is between an overarching battle manager for BMDS with a global, multiAOR perspective and weapon systems that share responsibility for negating common threats.
C2BMC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
6-58. SA is critical for understanding enemy actions and defending against ballistic missile threats that
may be comprised of cross-AOR, theater-level, and strategic-level attacks. SA capabilities are designed to
provide an integrated view of both theater- and strategic-level operations. The DDP developed Defense
Designs and integrated sensor information form the basis for C2BMC SA. C2BMC SA provides BMDS SA
to operators and decision-makers via real-time processing and display of BMDS sensors and weapon
systems missile track data. The SA screens display data and 2D or 3D maps in Summary and IBMP
screens. The Essential Elements of Information (EEI) screen allows system users to focus on a single
screen instead of switching between multiple data screens and maps.
6-59. SA is maintained through two unique set of messages, the engagement status messages and
engagement coordination messages. Engagement status messages report unit plans on specific threat
engagements, launched interceptors and hit assessment, if available. The engagement coordination
messages provide information for peer-to-peer coordination between designated BMD sensors. Using the
SA screens, forces provide engagement status and engagement coordination messages that enable the
AADC/DAADC to maintain SA of BMD engagement activities. C2BMC computes and displays the GMD
sensors and weapons kinematic access and displays the battle time remaining for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) and
Aegis BMD.
6-60. The C2BMC IBMP is the operational heart of sensor management for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
The IBMP allows AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Managers to change radar states, define search parameters,
override tracking priorities, control track forwarding, define discrimination confidence, enable wide-band
discrimination, and coordinate with decision makers and radar operators/maintainers. The IBMP display
provides the foundation for detailed integrated BMD data and graphical information available through a
variety of tables, reports, and graphs. The IBMP can display the current status of forces for friendly forces,
and both friendly force and enemy ballistic missile track data. The IBMP generates multiple real-time
reports with time sensitive information to support operational analysis and decision making.
6-61. The Summary Screen provides decision makers with integrated summary information on the state of
all strategic and theater threats, current defensive capabilities, and engagement activities where applicable.
The Summary Screen is accessible from the EWS and through a SIPRNet web browser. C2BMC also
displays BMDS interceptor inventory status for GMD, Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot. The Summary
Screen includes a feature to filter all tracks track data and nuclear detonation by region or GCC.
6-62. The EEI screen display provides improved SA of strategic engagements, enabling more effective
mission command of GMD assets. The Summary Screen was originally designed to provide an integrated
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view of both strategic and theater data. The combination of strategic and theater missile defense data
provides an overwhelming amount of data, resulting in an unclear picture of ongoing engagements. The
EEI display provides configurable, graphic information based on the GFC displays without fused data from
theater sensors. The EEI provide SA and status of the GFC’s ongoing engagements. The EEI display
enables individuals to focus on a single screen rather than multiple displays such as IBMP Track Table,
Summary Screen, All Track and various maps to obtain the information necessary to brief senior decision
makers. The EEI display is GMD cluster-centric and provides data on GMD rules of engagement, weapons
hold/free status, GBI inventories, essential GMD cluster, C2BMC track identification data, and engagement
timelines for sensors and weapons.
6-63. The Executive Summary Screen is intended for senior-level decision makers who require essential
missile defense data for SA but do not require the detailed C2BMC data offered by the Summary Screen
and IBMP on an EWS. Information includes a 3-D map display, graphic representation of system tracks
and track number, threatened asset, and estimated time to impact. Access to the Executive Summary Screen
is via the C2BMC SIPRNet web page and requires a log-in, password, and authentication.
OPSCAP AND PROCAP
6-64. The IBMP hosts key operational functionality with Sensor Manager access to the BMDS OPSCAP
and PROCAP reports. BMD units transmit health and status reports to C2BMC that indicate the status of
key components of the system. The OPSCAP is calculated by C2BMC using automated tools that use the
health and status reports to determent the impact of the change on the ability of the sensor or weapon
system to complete the mission. Each unit Commander is responsible for determining the OPSCAP of their
systems and has the prerogative to override the systems calculated status with an on-site determination of
the systems’ actual capability.
6-65. The PROCAP is created with the C2BMC DDP using available sensors and weapon system
OPSCAP data to engage the range of possible ballistic missile trajectories that could threaten the
USNORTHCOM AOR or defended assets therein. The PROCAP report displays the current PROCAP
assessment, while allowing users to conduct PROCAP analysis to visualize and understand BMDS
operational force strengths and weaknesses based on planning assumptions and limited resource situations.
The report may be published to all suites with an assessment, which adds the analysis to the PROCAP
history record.
C2BMC TRI-NODE ARCHITECTURE
6-66. (FOUO) C2BMC’s Tri-Node communication architecture provides three primary mission sets for
the GCCs, SA, mission command of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, and data synchronization between the
C2BMC suites at USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM. C2BMC provides mission
command of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system at Shariki, Japan, a COP to senior leadership, and connectivity
for the GFCs. Figure 6-3 shows a graphical C2BMC Tri-Node architecture.
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Chapter 6
Figure 6-3. C2BMC Tri-Node Architecture
C2BMC TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES
6-67. The U.S. Army is the service component that serves as the centralized manager responsible for the
integration of all products associated with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. The Army is responsible to
provide mission training for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Managers. In support of that effort,
USASMDC/FWC-DOTD conducts the SMQC, which is an accredited Army course listed and scheduled in
Army Training Requirements and Resource System.
6-68. Training is a fundamental missile defense functions. The DMETS is an externally operated training
system that interfaces with C2BMC in a similar manner as a sensor to provide common training scenarios
to worldwide distributed multi-echelon BMD participants or individual sites. The DMETS servers are
located at Schriever Air Force Base and support training and exercises by providing medium fidelity
C2BMC emulation without interfering with real world operations. DMETS use is scheduled in advance in
order to deconflict competing requirements.
6-69. Training is managed, scheduled, and provided in accordance with SI 508.8, and TR 350-70. All
mission training meets security requirements necessary to facilitate effective instruction. All training
facilities and maintenance of the facilities required by U.S. Government/Military training providers (for
government furnished equipment) are the sole responsibility of the U.S. Government.
6-70. Individual qualification training is delivered using stand-alone computer-based training, which may
be completed independently of other students or instructors (asynchronous training). This computer-based
training provides interactive, performance-based, self-paced training using duty position-defined missile
event scenario threads. Asynchronous computer-based training material is available to each site. The
classification and distribution statement should be noted before sharing or discussing the information. The
SA material currently is releasable to Canadians working in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center,
NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center, and the Great Britain Liaison Officer working at
USSTRATCOM Headquarters.
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C2BMC
C2BMC ACQUISITION, SUSTAINMENT, & SUPPORT
6-71. C2BMC’s spiral evolution approach delivers increased IMD capability to units globally with each
delivery. C2BMC spiral development, testing, and fielding remain the backbone of the C2BMC operational
system. Periodically, sub-spiral releases occur as additional improvements and system modification
requests are completed.
6-72. The MDA Battle Control directorate (MDA/BC) is responsible for C2BMC acquisition through
spiral development, test, and fielding of the operational system. The C2BMC is principally responsible for
planning BMDS operations, providing SA, monitoring and conducting operations, and providing
connectivity for BMD for HD. MDA is responsible for design, development, integration, fielding, and
sustainment of C2BMC.
6-73. C2BMC is maintained and sustained by on-site CLS funded by MDA. C2BMC maintenance and
sustainment is accomplished via CLS with a four tiered maintenance concept performed by  Site-customized CLS Teams (Tier I).
 C2BMC Centralized Help Desk (Tier II).
 One of five distinct teams based on problem (Tier III).
 Ad hoc, task-organized team assembled to correct a critical or catastrophic failure that could not
be solved otherwise (Tier IV).
6-74. MDA is responsible for all aspects of software maintenance, upgrades, licenses, testing and
configuration management. Necessary spares and repairable parts are stored in the general vicinity where
each C2BMC suite or system is installed. MDA also provides all C2BMC technical data, including the
Integrated Logistic Support Plan, Site installation Plan, Site Installation Document, systems engineering
and production drawings, operations and support processes, and COTS vender manuals.
6-75. C2BMC maintenance and sustainment is accomplished by on-site CLS. Resources exist at each
C2BMC suite location to ensure support is provided, at each deployed AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and US Army
C2BMC training facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado supported by USASMDC/FWC-DOTD. The
C2BMC program office has warranties for all COTS hardware and software and government furnished
equipment hardware procured by MDA.
6-76. All existing facility modifications necessary to support C2BMC are identified in the site-specific
installation plan. Facility modifications are the responsibility of the facility owner. All program facility
security requirements can be found in the System Security Authorization Agreement.
BMDS NETWORK OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CENTER-C2BMC
6-77. The BNOSC-C for C2BMC was established to streamline the operational structure and network
services supporting C2BMC and BMDS elements. The BNOSC-C is located at the Missile Defense
Integration and Operations Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and serves as the
communications nucleus of the C2BMC network centric capability, fulfilling the requirements for
integrated mission command and network security vital to the success of C2BMC net-centric operations.
6-78. The BNOSC-C ensures availability of the BCN and ensures it is secured by performing: information
assurance through the use of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and the web proxy; management of
network transport hardware and software to including gateways, routers, and switches; management of the
enterprise systems, to including the virtual private network, active directory, servers, storage devices, and
database services; vulnerability mitigation; and management of information assurance in coordination with
the CUBE.
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C2BMC CONTROL CENTER
6-79. The C2BMC Control Center, known as the CUBE, is located in the Missile Defense Integration and
Operations Center and provides continuous support to all C2BMC operations. The CUBE is the focal point
for operations and maintenance of all C2BMC operational locations. The CUBE provides around the clock
control center to support to all fixed and deployed C2BMC assets. They schedule, manage, and coordinate
all C2BMC-related operational, test, and develop assets that are or will connect to the BCN; schedule,
manage, and coordinate all C2BMC-related installation, upgrade, modification, and inspection activities;
manage all operational hardware and software components integrated into C2BMC Suites and/or connected
to the BCN; and coordinates and liaises with multiple organization to ensure seamless uninterrupted
operations.
C2BMC CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
6-80. (FOUO) COOP is critical in the event of loss of control of one or more AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems.
Failover for control of each AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is determined through advanced planning with protocols
established and pre-coordinated that determine which units are responsible for ensuring COOP and when
COOP control must be implemented. GEM has built in redundancies that do not exist within COCOM C2
suites to minimize failover to alternate or backup sites, but still have COOP delegation. In the event the
GCC with OPCON loses the capability to control the radar, USSTRATCOM shall execute COOP functions
in support of the BMD mission. Regardless of where COOP is conducted from, the Sensor Managers who
have TACON the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system resource fall under the OPCON and direction of the GCC to
which the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) is assigned.
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Appendix A
STAFFING, TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION TECHNIQUES
This appendix describes the military staffing, training and certification techniques
required to operate the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. Presently, the prime contractor
provides the majority of the personnel operate the system with military personnel
serving as Sensor Managers and oversight. This chapter describes the military
staffing required to operate and support the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. Presently, the
prime contractor personnel support the system.
STAFFING
A-1. MDA provides contractor personnel to operate and sustain the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, power
generation, and C2BMC mission-essential equipment. The MDD Commander provides oversight of all
military, civilian and contractor personnel and equipment, including administrative control and security
planning and execution. Tactical mission control of the radar is the responsibility of the AADC/RADC,
which is exercised through the MDD Sensor Managers via C2BMC hardware and software systems.
A-2. An approved table of organization and equipment is in place to support current and future military
staffing. Staffing of the radar sites continues to rely on contractor support. The radar requires continuous
staffing 24 hours a day. The proper balance between military and contractor personnel will evolve by using
lessons learned during initial operations.
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
A-3. The Army is the service component that serves as the centralized manager responsible for the
integration of all service products associated with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. The Army provides
training and qualification for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Sensor Manager operations. In support of that effort,
USASMDC FWC-DOTD conducts the SMQC, which is currently listed in the Army Training
Requirements and Resource System. The unit commander (or designated representative) will certify these
individuals once they arrive at the unit and receive appropriate unit training.
A-4. USASMDC/FWC-DOTD also conducts the Sensor Manager Leader Development Course designed
to train the Sensor Manager Section Officer in charge /NCOIC on providing recommendations to the
COCOM commander regarding the use of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system in a COCOM Defense Design.
A-5. USASMDC/FWC-DOTD will develop and maintain concurrent testing, training, courseware
materials, and operational capability for the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. It also applies training concepts
using simulators and other training devices such as DMETS to integrate and enhance performance training
and testing.
A-6. New equipment training and installation will continue to be conducted by MDA and then handed off
to USASMDC/FWC-DOTD to meet future institutional training requirements. The Army will provide
funding to support training material updates, instruction, and crew qualifications (to include
software/hardware upgrades to appropriate training devices).
A-7. Training is the key to ensuring that the personnel assigned have sufficient expertise with the system
prior to arrival on site. The contractor currently provides the bulk of the required support and validates the
personnel are capable of performing their portion of the mission. Certification is not currently done by any
military entity.
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Appendix B
OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES
This appendix describes the operational techniques of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system.
The system must first search for indications of missile launch, acquire the track of the
missile and forward this data to other BMDS elements. The system is designed to
rapidly respond to launch indications and to provide high fidelity data to
USSTRATCOM and CCDRs so that they may effectively respond to the missile
event.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
B-1. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operations require two distinct functions: radar support and sensor
management operations. Radar support includes oversight of maintenance, sustainment, security, and
operational support activities of the radar itself, and occurs at the radar site. Sensor Management operations
include integration and management of the sensor as part of the BMDS, and are executed from a remote
location. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) MDD includes military security forces to execute the security mission;
however, there is no HQDA plan to resource the security platoon. Security for deployed MDDs is provided
by contracted security forces.
B-2. Overall AN/TPY-2 (FBM) site security is the responsibility of the MDD Commander. Detailed
security planning, security training and awareness, security oversight, HN security coordination, and
execution is conducted by the MDD Security Operations Section. The site security guard force may be
provided via the COCOM Request For Forces process, U.S. civilian contractor security personnel, HN
security personnel, or a combination thereof. SF personnel are responsible for complying with all securityrelated plans, policies, and procedures developed by the MDD Commander and Security Operations
Section personnel. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with
applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all
levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war, the rules of engagement, and the
rules for the use of force.
B-3. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system operations require pre-developed mission profiles and RSPs to support
each specific mission. Developing mission profiles are part of the pre-mission planning process and require
long lead times. Mission Profile is a list of object based activities (track, discrimination, data collection,
etc) for each threat NAI in the Planning base. Deliberate planning takes place well in advance of a battle
and allows the defender to study and, as appropriate, implement effective deployment and coordination
schemes and assess acquisition strategies.
B-4. Crisis action planning occurs hours or days before an attack based on updated information to assess
likely threat scenarios and develop radar control logic to maximize protection of critical assets. A plan
produced by deliberate or crisis action may also be used to provide the basic input to generate near-real
time execution logic formulated during BM. When completed, the mission profiles developed normally
through deliberate planning are loaded into both the radar and the C2BMC that controls sensor operations.
OPERATION EXECUTION
B-5. (FOUO) Radar coverage is a series of layered 3-dimensional geometric search volumes of different
thicknesses, arrayed horizontally, and vertically to optimize the probability of detection of missile launches
emanating from the identified NAIs. The search pattern is enlarged or reduced based in the geometric
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Appendix B
relationship of the defended area and the trajectories originating from the NAIs. However, the maximum
search volume of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is based on the area of the threat NAI. It can be focused to
look at a smaller NAI but cannot be made to exceed the maximum search volume. The Sensor Managers,
through C2BMC, guided by deliberate planning and real-time cueing, will focus the search volume where
the probability is highest that the radar will detect the launch of ballistic missiles originating from within
theater.
B-6. As a missile launch occurs, early warning sensors begin to transmit messages with information about
the launch to C2BMC. The C2BMC track processing function will correlate track information and identify
tracks from different sources that are generated by the same object. These are referred to as family tracks.
Sensor managers at the AOC use C2BMC as a tool to allocate the radar resources to improve the likelihood
of detecting and tracking threat ballistic missile objects.
B-7. While the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system is detecting threat ballistic missiles and sending the track data
via C2BMC, other forward-based sensors, such as the Aegis BMD and long range surveillance and tracking
(LRS&T) ships, are also detectings and generating tracks data using their organic baseline search plans.
Some of the track data may be of the same objects observed by the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. These multisource tracks are also forwarded to C2BMC where C2BMC track processing correlates them to produce
system Rep tracks for the observed objects.
RADAR SEARCH PLANS
B-8. AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system sensor operations include search, tracking, and discrimination. Object
classification, such as reentry vehicle, tankage, decoy, and debris is performed with operator intervention
required under normal conditions. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system utilizes three different RSPs to acquire a
ballistic missile track; the ASP, FSP, and the precision cue search.
B-9. The RSP is selected by the Sensor Manager on the appropriate C2BMC application and is based on
warning and indications of potential launches. Depending on the mission of the day, a default RSP is
normally utilized for operations. The Sensor Manager will be directed by leadership when changing these
types of RSPs. The search pattern is enlarged or reduced based on the relationship of the defended area and
possible trajectories originating from the NAIs. Coordination with HN may be required when changing
RSP.
AUTONOMOUS SEARCH OPERATIONS
B-10. (FOUO) The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) search sectors are defined by deliberate planning to provide the
desired probability of detection over the AOI. A single search plan normally includes multiple search
sectors. The active search plan can be the designated default search plan or another predefined plan selected
by the C2BMC Sensor Manager. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system autonomously acquires and reports tracks
through the C2BMC to GMD, Aegis BMD, and other BMDS elements.
B-11. The RSP is selected by the Sensor Manager using a C2BMC application and is based on indications
and warnings of potential launches. Depending on the mission, a specified search plan is utilized for
operations. The Sensor Manager may request from the leadership (GCC, USNORTHCOM, JTF, AAMDC
etc) or may be directed to change the RSP based on changing situations. Coordination with HNs may be
required when changing RSP.
FOCUSED SEARCH ACQUISITION
B-12. (FOUO) The FSP mode is designed for boosting objects and relies on SBIRS inputs. SBIRS detects
a launch event and reports the event to the C2BMC through the SBIRS Mission Control Station. C2BMC
identifies a potential threat launch and checks the radar track data to determine if the radar has already
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Operation Techniques
acquired the track. If the radar has not already acquired the track, the C2BMC evaluates the AN/TPY-2
(FBM) system coverage, and selects the best FSP to activate.
B-13. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system executes the search and, if it is able to acquire the track, reports the
track through the C2BMC to GMD, Aegis BMD, and other BMDS elements. FSPs are selected by the
C2BMC from the RSPs and mission profiles in the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system based on early warning
information and boost report messages from the SBIRS to maximize radar acquisition performance.
B-14. (FOUO) The FSPs are designed for boost phase acquisition of ICBMs. This provides the capability
of tasking AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system to acquire objects in the C2BMC track file but not currently being
tracked by the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system. The C2BMC can reprioritize various AN/TPY-2 (FBM) tasks on
a track-by-track basis using an interactive interface supporting real-time radar control. This dynamic
relationship allows for improved resource allocation by focusing the search vice having the asset doing a
wide sweeping search.
PRECISION CUE ACQUISITION
B-15. (FOUO) Precision cue acquisition mode is for non-boosting objects acquired by another forward
sensor such as an Aegis BMD. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has the ability to receive precision cues from
other sensors via the C2BMC. Precision cueing increases the efficiency of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system
acquisition performance in an environment with limited radar resources. The sensor detects the object and
transmits the track across TDL-J/Link-16 to the C2BMC network. The C2BMC assesses the threat and
checks if the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system has acquired the track. If not, the C2BMC assesses cue feasibility,
schedules the cue, and activates the cue when the object enters the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system’s field of
view. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system implements cueing, acquires the track, and reports the track through
C2BMC to GMD, and other BMDS elements. The benefits of precision cueing of the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system includes more efficient use of radar resources and earlier track acquisition that facilitates
engagement operations.
WIDEBAND DISCRIMINATION
B-16. (FOUO) The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system can execute wide-band discrimination on selected targets.
This wide-band discrimination function is used with ballistic missiles launched from within the theaters.
When the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system transmits theater object tracks to the C2BMC, the C2BMC forwards
the associated cueing data to the Aegis BMD, GFC, approved HN interfaces, and the rest of the C2BMC
network. This allows for inter-theater event, as well as intra-theater and strategic notification.
VOICE REPORTING
B-17. (FOUO) The voice report is a brief synopsis of the data warning initiated by BMDS event producers
and is used to confirm receipt of data, correlate the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) data warning, and determine if
warning information produced by the sensor element is valid. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) uses the DRSN voice
conference as the primary means of voice reporting and the BCN as the primary means of data reporting.
SECURITY
B-18. The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) has been designated as having SSL-A status. As such, military police and
security forces are required to protect the system elements from unauthorized access and against any
physical attacks that may interfere with operations. Contract security forces may also be employed.
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Appendix B
SUSTAINMENT
B-19. Sustainment is accomplished by a combination of:
 Human resourcing, conducted by the MDA, Contract support, and USASMDC.
 Contractor Logistic Support, coordinated by MDA.
HUMAN RESOURCING
B-20. The MDA, in coordination with Raytheon, manages all non-military personnel resourcing. The
majority of personnel providing support and sustainment for AN/TPY-2 (FBM) systems are Raytheon
employees.
B-21. All military resourcing will be coordinated with the USASMDC/ARSTRAT G1 to ensure personnel
selected to work on-site possess the required basic skill identifiers and are scheduled for mandatory training
prior to arrival on site. This ensures unit readiness is maintained by anticipating losses and scheduling
replacements far enough in advance so all personnel have sufficient time to be trained and to allow for a
short overlap period for mission hand-off from the departing military member to the in-coming person.
CONTRACTOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT
B-22. MDA has a requirement for CLS for operation and maintenance of all forward deployable radars in
support of the BMDS. Under this effort, the contractor shall provide all operations and sustainment support
that includes: radar operation, site survey and engineering services, preventative and corrective
maintenance, administrative and physical security, spare parts, and personnel. The CLS contract covers all
operations and sustainment of the forward based radars, including site surveys and site preparation;
operational readiness certification; site operation and maintenance; mission preparation and support; radar
performance reporting and analysis; depot and administrative support.
B-23. The government or ASCC is responsible for operating and sustaining government common support
equipment. There are no unit or DS maintenance performed by the military on the AN/TPY-2 (FBM)
system, but they maintain site government equipment. There is limited military supply function to be
performed since the contractor is responsible for site sustainment. However, the responsibility may shift
over time from contractor site support and system maintenance to the military personnel on the TOE.
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Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AADC
AAMDC
ACS
area air defense commander
army air and missile defense command
auxiliary communications shelter
ADSI
air defense system integrator
AEU
antenna equipment unit
AMD
air and missile defense
AOC
air and space operations center
AOI
AOR
ARFOR
ARSTRAT
ASCC
area of interest
area of responsibility
army forces
army forces strategic command
army service component command
BCN
BMDS communications network
BDE
brigade
BM
BMD
BMDS
BNOSC
BNOSC-C
C2BMC
battle management
ballistic missile defense
ballistic missile defense system
BMDS network operations support center
BMDS network operations support center for C2BMC
command and control, battle management, and communications
CCDR
combatant commander
CDIN
C2BMC deployable interface node
CDR
commander
CDRUSNORTHCOM
commander, US Northern Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM
commander, US Strategic Command
CEMA
cyber electromagnetic activities
CEU
cooling equipment unit
CLS
contractor logistics support
CNIP
C2BMC network interface processor
COA
course of action
COCOM
COCOM C2
16 April 2012
combatant command
COCOM command and control (nomenclature for a specific, joint C2BMC
suite of equipment)
ATP 3-27.5
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Glossary-1
FEF
Glossary
COMNET
communications network
CONUS
continental United States
COOP
COP
common operating picture
COTS
commercial off the shelf
DA
department of the Army
DAADC
deputy area air defense commander
DATMS
DISN asynchronous transfer mode service
DCA
defensive counter air
DDP
deliberate and dynamic planner
DISN
DoD
DMETS
DRSN
DS
defense information system network
department of defense
distributive multi-echelon training system
defense red switch network
direct support
DSN
defense switched network
ECF
entry control facility
EEI
essential elements of information
EEU
electronics equipment unit
EHF
extremely-high frequency
ESI
external system interface
EWS
enterprise work station
FBM
forward based mode
FPCON
FSP
FWC-DOTD
GBI
GBMD
force protection condition
focused search plan
future warfare center - Directorate of Training and Doctrine
Ground-based interceptor
global ballistic missile defense
GCC
geographic combatant commander
GCN
GMD communications network
GEM
global engagement manager
GFC
GMD fire control
GINIC
Glossary-2
continuity of operations
global IMD netops integration center
GMD
ground-based midcourse defense
GOTS
government off the shelf
HD
homeland defense
HN
host nation
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16 April 2012
FEF
Glossary
IAMD
integrated air and missile defense
IBMP
integrated ballistic missile picture
IMD
JFACC
JFC
JFCC-IMD
JFLCC
JOA
JP
joint forces air component commander
Joint Forces Commander
Joint Functional Component Command - Integrated Missile Defense
joint forces land component commander
joint operations area
joint publication
JTF
joint task force
KOZ
keep out zone
MD
missile defense
MDA
Missile Defense Agency
MDD
Missile Defense Detachment
MEP
mobile electric power
METT-TC
NAI
NCOIC
NIPRNET
NORAD
OMP
OPCON
OPSCAP
PDU
PMCS
PPU
PROCAP
PSN
RADC
RF
ROA
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations
named area of interest
non-commissioned officer in charge
non-secure internet protocol router network
North Atlantic Aerospace Defense Command
operational mission plans
operational control
operational capability
power distribution unit
preventative maintenance, checks, and services
prime power unit
protection capability
parallel staging network
regional air defense commander
radio frequency
restricted operations area
RSP
radar search plan
RST
radar support trailer
SA
situational awareness
SADC
SATCOM
SBIRS
16 April 2012
integrated missile defense
sector air defense commander
satellite communications
space-based infrared system
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Glossary-3
FEF
Glossary
SecDef
secretary of defense
SI
strategic instruction
SIPRNET
SMQC
SSL
TACON
secure internet protocol router network
sensor management qualification course
security system level
tactical control
TAMD
theater air and missile defense
TDL-J
tactical data link-joint
THAAD
TOE
TRIMM
terminal high altitude air defense
table of organization and equipment
transmit/receive interface microwave modules
UCP
unified command plan
UHF
ultra-high frequency
US
USASMDC
USCENTCOM
United States
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command
United States Central Command
USEUCOM
United States European Command
USNORTHCOM
United States Northern Command
USPACOM
USSTRATCOM
XML
United States Pacific Command
United States Strategic Command
eXtensible markup language
SECTION II – TERMS
Note: Terms with an asterisk are terms for which this publication is the proponent (the authority).
active air defense
Aegis BMD
air and missile
defense
area air defense
commander
Glossary-4
Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of
hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 1-02.)
A ship-based combat system that can detect, track, target, and engage air,
surface, and subsurface threats, including ballistic missiles on some modified
ships. (JP 1-02.)
Direct [active and passive] defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce
the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly
forces and assets. Also called AMD. (JP 1-02.)
The component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability
and the required command, control, and communications capabilities who is
assigned by the joint force commander to plan and execute integrated air
defense operations. Also called AADC.
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FEF
Glossary
autonomous search
plan
ASPs are radar search plans desgined to provide surveillance of a launch area
based upon intelligence information and COCOM guidance in suppor tof
AN/TPY-2 (FBM) PLANORD mission priorities. ASPs are manually selected
by the Sensor Manager to provide autonomous search at mission execution.
ballistic missile
Any missile which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and
consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. (JP 3-01)
battle management
The management of activities within the operational environment based on the
commands, direction, and guidance given by appropriate authority. Also called
BM. (JP 3-01)
boost phase
That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile or space vehicle during which the
booster and sustainer engines operate. (JP 1-02, JP 3-01)
combatant command
(command authority)
(Joint) combatant command (command authority) — Nontransferable
command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States
Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified
combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the
Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be
delegated and is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of
command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands
and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics
necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant
command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders
of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through
subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component
commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full
authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON is inherent in combatant
command (command authority). (JP 1-02)
crisis action planning
Provides the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs a process for getting
vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President
and SecDef. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the
operation. CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time sensitive
development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of
assigned, attached, and allocated forces and capabilities in response to a
situation that may result in actual military operations. CAP provide for the rapid
and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of
military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt
transmission of their decisions to the Joint Planning and Execution Community.
defense design
defense plan
16 April 2012
An overlay of multiple defensive tasks onto a system such as C2BMC, where
each task includes Resources (blue force laydown), NAI’s (enemy forces), and
Features (terrain limitations). Defense Designs may be combined together to
create a Defensive Plan. Defense plan parameters such as Resources, NAI’s,
and Features are used to initialized the C2BMC COCOM C2, GEM, and Track
Servers.
A plan comprised of multiple Defense Designs, including multiple Defensive
Tasks that are made up of Resources, NAI’s, and Features.
ATP 3-27.5
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Glossary-5
FEF
Glossary
deliberate and
dynamic planner
A set of tools and interfaces within C2BMC that enable system operators to
obtain planning input products for other designated systems to develop and
assess a BMD defense design, and to include BMD Defense Design in a BMD
plan.
deliberate planning
Encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations. It is
used to develop battle and contingency plans for a broad range of activities
based on requirements identified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or
other planning directives. With regards to AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system, it is the
act of creating, manipulating, and processing MPs and RSPs prior to threat-time
radar operations.
focused search plan
RSP that is automatically selectable with the C2BMC logic. FSPs are designed
to provide enhanced acquisition performance for a defined surveillance region
or launch area by concentrating search beams into volumes that are most likely
to contain the threat.
global ballistic missile
defense
Defense against ballistic missile threats that cross one or more geographical
combatant command boundaries and requires synchronization among the
affected combatant commands. Also called GBMD. (JP 1-02.)
*global engagement
manager
Provides automated tools and decision aids that enable commanders to exercise
mission command of BMD forces deployed within the COCOM AOR.
ground-based
midcourse defense
A surface-to-air ballistic missile defense system for exo-atmospheric midcourse
phase interception of long-range ballistic missiles using the ground-based
interceptors. Also called GMD. (JP 1-02.)
integrated air and
missile defense
The integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the
homeland and United States national interests, protect the joint force, and
enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to achieve adverse
effects from their air and missile capabilities. Also called IAMD. (JP 1-02.)
midcourse phase
That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile between the boost phase and the
terminal phase. (JP 3-01)
mission profile
MP is a top-level plans for deployed operations, used as the basis for radar
management plans that identifies radar track and discrimination activities. The
MP allows the radar to be controlled differently depending upon the
environment in which the radar is deployed withou having to rebuild the entire
controlling ssoftware. Defines the areas of concern, launch area, threats, search
plan surveillance volumes, track waveforms, and discrimination waveforms.
Only one MP may be active at a time.
operational mission
plan
A set of input data provided to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Deliberate Planner from
CCDRs. OMPs contain the defense design, a threat database, and commander’s
guidance. A Deliberate Plan is created to allow the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) to
support the priorities oulined in the received Misison Plan guidance. An OPM
is composed of Mission Profile (enable support for pre-defined radar missions)
and C2BMC Index Mapping files (enables coordinated C2BMC-AN/TPY-2
(FBM) operations) ensuring the radar functions in a manner consisten with the
radar’s mission objectives as defined by the planners, and within the physicaland software-defined capailities of the radar. Often referred to only as a radar’s
‘mission plan’.
passive air defense
All measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness
of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 1-02.)
Glossary-6
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
16 April 2012
FEF
Glossary
planning during
execution concept
Planning continues during execution, with na initlal emphasis on refing the
existing plan and producing the operations orders. As operations procede,
planning generally occurs in three distinct realms: future plans, future
operations, and current operations.
radar search plan
RSP consists of a list of parameters required by the radar to create a search.
Parameters used to define each search plan includes the search priority, track
priority, sub-priority, range, elevations, azimuth, planned beams, and beam
characteristics. Multiple RSPs may be available for each MP. Only one RSP
may be active at a time.
regional air defense
commander
search plans
Commander, subordinate to the area air defense commander, who is responsible
for air and missile defenses in the assigned region and exercises authorities as
delegated by the area air defense commander. Also called RADC. (JP 1-02.)
Plans designed to cover specific threat launch areas and contain one or more
sectors with individual priorities.
sector air defense
commander
Commander, subordinate to an area/regional air defense commander, who is
responsible for air and missile defenses in the assigned sector, and exercises
authorities delegated by the area/regional air defense commander. Also called
SADC. (JP 1-02.)
space-based infrared
system
A consolidated system for infrared space, air, and terrestrial surveillance and
reconnaissance along with associated communications links, designed to meet
missile defense, missile warning and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance mission requirements. Also called SBIRS. (JP 1-02.)
terminal phase
That portion of the flight of a ballistic missile that begins when the warhead or
payload reenters the atmosphere and ends when the warhead or payload
detonates, releases its sub-munitions, or impacts. (JP 1-02.)
16 April 2012
*token
An electronic identification method used within a multi-node configured
C2BMC suite to identify the lead server for transmission of track data. The
Token may be tranferred between suites to maintain positive integrity of track
data. The suite where the Token resides is the only suite that may make changes
to the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) system configuration. The Token methodolgy also
applies within a single node C2BMC suite, but the Token remains within the
single node.
track
1. A series of related contacts displayed on a data display console or other
display device. 2. To display or record the successive positions of a moving
object. 3. To lock onto a point of radiation and obtain guidance there from. 4.
To keep a gun properly aimed, or to point continuously a target-locating
instrument at a moving target. 5. The actual path of an aircraft above or a ship
on the surface of the Earth. 6. One of the two endless belts on which a full-track
or half-track vehicle runs. 7. A metal part forming a path for a moving object
such as the track around the inside of a vehicle for moving a mounted machine
gun. (JP 1-02, JP 3-01.)
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Glossary-7
FEF
Glossary
This Page Intentionally Blank
Glossary-8
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16 April 2012
REFERENCES
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.
Joint and Multi-Service Publications
All Joint publications are located at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/Jointpub.htm .
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2 May 2007, change 1, 20 May 2009.
JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 16 October 2006.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001.
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009.
JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 22 March 2007.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 05 February 2007.
JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 13 February 2006.
JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 29 June 2006.
JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 12 July 2007.
JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 20 May 2010.
JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 18 July 2008.
JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 11 August 2011.
SI 538-01, Vol. I, Ballistic Missile Defense System Description and Asset Management, 18 August 2011.
SI 538-01, Vol II, BMDS Logistics Reporting and Assessment Procedures, 18 August 2011.
SI 538-2, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Physical Security Program, 22 February 2012.
SI 538-04, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Communications Network (COMNET) Planning, Integration and
Network Operations (NETOPS) Reporting Procedures, 13 March 2012.
USSTRATCOM, Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations (S), 28 February 2010.
USSTRATCOM, USSTRATCOM Postulated Threats to GBMDS, (U) 28 December2004.
FM 3-01.16, Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (TMD IPB) Multiservice
Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation Of The
Battlespace, March 2002.
US Strategic Command, Integrated Air and Missile Defense Operational Concept, Version 1.0, 4 June
2008.
US Strategic Command, Operational Concept for Global Ballistic Missile Defense Battle Management,
Command and Control, and Communications (C2BMC), USSTRATCOM, JFCC-IMD, Version
0.3, November 2008.
Department of Defense Policy and Publications
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Designation of Lead Military Department for Two Elements
for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), February 11, 2006.
DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 21 Dec 2010
DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, January 1987.
DOD 5200.8-R, Physical Security Program, May 1991
DoDD 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law
Enforcement and Security Duties
16 April 2012
FM 3-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
References-1
References
National Security Presidential Directive-23, "National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense," December 16,
2002.
Unified Command Plan (FOUO), 6 April 2011.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011
AR 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units, 4 September
2007.
AR 190-13, Physical Security, 30 September 1993.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-5, The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP) for Global Missile
Defense 2015-2024, Version 1, 4 Aug 2008.
FM 1, The Army, 14 June 2005.
FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, September 2004, Change 1, 4 February 2010
FM 3-01, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 25 November 2009.
FM 3-01.15, Multi-Service Tactics Techniques and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, 1 May
2009.
FM 3-01.94, Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations, 8 April 2005
FM 3-14.5, Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) Operations, 28 Nov 2008.
FM 3-27, Army Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD) Operations, 21 January 2011.
FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare in Operations, 25 February 2009
FM 3-39, Military Police Operations, 16 February 2010.
FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 15 July 1974.
USASMDC Operational Concept for the AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode (FBM) Radar, 25 June 2010.
NONMILITARY PUBLICATIONS
C2BMC, Command & Control, Battle Management, Communications Spiral 6.4 Warfighter Capability
Summary (v1.8), 1 March 2011.
C2BMC, Spiral 6.4 Global Engagement Manager (GEM) Software Users Manual (SUM) (v1.9), 1
December 2010.
“Mapping the Global Future” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Dec 2004,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf.
Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense Battle Management Operational Concept, Version1.0,
31 December 2008.
Missile Defense Agency, Fact Sheets:



09-FS-0018, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, 01/2009.
09-FS-0019, Army Navy / Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), 01/2009.
09-FS-0020, Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications, 01/2009.
Missile Defense Agency, BMDS Handbook.
Missile Defense National Team Command and Control/Battle Management/Communications, Joint Air
operations Center (JAOC), Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) Operations Cell Working Group
Report, 4 June 2007.
References-2
FM 3-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
16 April 2012
FEF
References
MDA Directive 3110.01, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Readiness Reporting System, 01 June
2007.
MDA Manual 3110.01-M, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Readiness Reporting System, 04
January 2010.
Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency,
Before the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee, Thursday, April 2, 2009.
Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency
Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Regarding the
“The Future of Missile Defense Testing” Wednesday, February 25, 2009.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, 15 November 2006 .
AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993.
AR 420-1, Army Facilities Management, 12 February 2008.
AR 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC), 19 April 2007.
FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004.
FM 1-02.1, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, 17 April 2010.
FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 15 October 2009, change 1, 27 October 2010.
FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003.
16 April 2012
ATP 3-27.5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
References-3
References
This Page Intentionally Blank
References-4
FM 3-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
16 April 2012
Index
100
th
100 MD BDE (GMD), 2-2, 2-3,
2-3, 3-1
A
Aegis BMC, v, 1-1, 1-5, 3-6, 38, 3-9, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 6-3, 6-4,
6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-10, B-2, B-3
air and missile defense, 1-2, 21, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9,
2-10, 2-11, 3-11, 6-8
air and space operations
center, 3-1, 3-5, 3-6, 6-4, B2
air defense system integrator,
1-5, 3-6, 5-4, 6-3, 6-4, 6-6,
6-7
airspace control authority, 2-7,
2-8, 3-13
airspace control measure, 2-8,
3-13
antenna equipment unit, 1-5, 16, 1-7, 1-8, 1-11, 3-13, 4-3
area air defense command
(AADC), 1-1, 1-2, 2-5, 2-7,
2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 3-5, 6-6, 6-10,
A-1
area air defense plan, 1-4, 2-8,
3-5
area of interest, 3-8, 3-9, B-2
area of responsibility, 1-1, 1-2,
1-4, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7,
2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 6-4, 6-10, 611,
Army Air and Missile Defense
Command, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 28, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 3-2, 3-3,
3-5, 6-1, 6-4, 6-6, B-2
th
10 AAMDC, 2-10
nd
32 AAMDC, 2-10
th
94 AAMDC, 2-10
rd
263 AAMDC, 2-10
Army Forces, 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, 210
Army Forces Strategic
Command, see USASMDC
16 April 2012
Army Service Component
Command, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 29, 3-1, B-4
Army training requirements and
resource system, 2-3, 6-12,
A-1
auxiliary communications
shelter, 1-10
B
battle management, 1-2, 1-3,
2-1, 2-8, 3-1, 3-11, 5-1, 6-1,
6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-9,
6-10, B-1
ballistic missile defense, 1-1, 12, 1-5, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 2-7, 3-6,
3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 3-15, 41, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1,
6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7,
6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 613, 6-14, B-2, B-3
ballistic missile defense
system, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 16, 1-10, 2-5, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 35, 3-6, 3-8, 3-10, 3-11, 4-1,
5-2, 5-3, 5-5, 6-1, 6-3, B-3,
B-4
ballistic missile operating area,
3-11
BMDS communication network,
1-9, 3-5, 5-3, 5-4, 6-3, 6-7,
6-13, 6-14, B-3
BMDS network operations
support center, 5-2, 6-13
C
C2BMC, v, vi, 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 15, 1-7, 1-10, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 34, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 315, 4-2, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 61, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7,
6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 613, 6-14, A-1, B-1, B-2, B-3
COCOM C2 suite, 3-15, 61, 6-3, 6-5, 6-6, 6-14
GEM suite, 3-15, 6-1, 6-3,
6-5, 6-6, 6-8, 6-10, 6-14
training requierment, 6-12
tri-node architecture, 6-11,
6-2
C2BMC deployable interface
node, 1-7, 1-10, 4-2
C2BMC network interface
processor, 5-2, 5-4, 6-3, 6-4,
6-6
cooling equipment unit, 1-5, 16, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 4-3
combatant command, 1-10, 21, 2-2, 2-5, 2-9, 3-4, 3-11, 53, 5-5, 6-7, A-1, B-1
common operating picture, 5-3,
6-1, 6-4, 6-6, 6-9, 6-11
communications network, 5-1,
5-2, 5-3, 6-4
communications node
equipment, 1-10, 5-5, 6-5, 67
communications requirements,
5-1, 5-2
communications security, 3-3
computer based training, 6-12
contractor logistics support, 43, 6-13, B-4
concept plan, 6-8, 6-9
concurrent training, test and
operation, 6-3, 6-7
continuity of operations, 3-15,
6-14
cross COCOM, 2-9
course of action, 3-11, 6-2, 6-8,
6-9
D
defense information system
network, 1-10, 5-2, 5-3, 6-6
defense red switch network, 15, 5-2, 5-5, B-3
defense switch network, 1-5, 52, 5-5
defensive counterair, 1-5, 2-8,
3-1
deliberate and dynaic planner,
3-4, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6,
6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11
direct support, 2-5, 2-7, 2-9, 210, B-4
DISN asynchronous transfer
mode service, 6-6, 6-12
ATP 3-27.5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Index-1
Index
distributive multi-echelon
training system, 3-3, 6-12,
E
electronics equipment unit,1-5,
1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 3-4,
4-3
enterprise work station, 6-1, 62, 6-3, 6-10, 6-11
entry control facility, 3-12, 4-5
essential elements of
information, 6-10, 6-11
execution order, 2-5, 2-7, 2-9
external system interface, 6-3,
6-6, 6-7
extremely high frequency, 3-6,
5-2, 6-7
F
field of view, 1-1, 1-5, 3-9, 311, B-3
force protection conditions, 4-6,
4-7, 4-8
G
geographic combatant
command, 1-3, 1-5, 2-1, 2-2,
2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9,
2-10, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-10,
3-11, 3-15, 4-1, 5-2, 6-1, 6-4,
6-6. 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 614, B-2
global ballistic missile defense,
1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3,
2-5, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 4-3, 4-4,
4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3,
6-1, 6-9
global command and control
system, 6-3, 6-4, 6-7
global IMD netops integration
center, 5-2
GMD communications network,
5-2, 5-3, 5-4
GMD fire control, v, 1-1, 1-4, 15, 1-10, 3-6, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 63, 6-7, 6-11. B-3
ground-based interceptor, 1-4,
5-3, 5-4, 6-11
ground-based midcourse
defense, v, 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 22, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-9, 3-5, 3-6,
3-8, 3-9, 4-6, 5-2, 6-1, 6-3,
6-4, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-10, 6-11,
B-2, B-3
Index-2
H
homeland defense, 2-2, 2-3, 24, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9, 3-4, 3-11, 63, 6-13
host nation, 1-5, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5,
3-6, 3-11, 4-1, 4-5, 5-1, 5-2,
5-3, 6-6, B-1, B-2, B-3
I
immediate response force, 4-7
information operations, 3-14
installation support, 4-1
integrated air and missile
defense, 2-4, 2-9, 2-10, 6-1
integrated ballistic missile
picture, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 66, 6-8, 610, 6-11
integrated missile defense, 2-2,
6-2, 6-4, 6-8, 6-9, 6-13
intercontinental ballistic
missiled, 2-4, 3-9
METT-TC, 3-1, 4-1
missile defense agency, 1-2, 15, 2-2, 2-4, 3-2, 4-2, 4-3, 4-6,
6-13, A-1, B-4
missile defense detachment, 22, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2,
3-4, 4-5, A-1, B-1
missile defense integration and
operations center, 6-13, 6-14
mission control stations, 3-9, 66, 6-7, B-2
mission command, 2-4
mobile electric power, 1-6, 1-9,
1-10, 1-11
N
named area of interest, 3-7, 311, B-1, B-2
NIPRNet use, 1-5, 4-3, 5-2, 63, 6-6
NORAD, 2-3, 4-1, 6-12
O
J
JFCC-IMD, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 2-10,
5-2
joint forces air component
commander, 2-4, 2-6, 2-7, 28, 2-9, 2-10, 3-11, 6-8
joint forces commander, 1-5, 21, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 3-11
joint forces land component
commander, 2-4, 2-5, 2-9, 210
joint operations area, 2-1, 2-8,
2-9, 2-10, 3-13, 4-1
joint task force, 2-1, 2-7, 4-1, 52, B-2
J
joint operational planning and
execution system, 6-8
K
keep out zone, 3-8, 3-13, 3-14
L
link-16, see tactical data linkjoint
laptop planner, 6-2, 6-5, 6-6, 68
M
maintenance, 4-1, 4-2
maritime IAMD planning
system, 6-5, 6-8
operational capability, 3-5, 3-6,
6-3, 6-8, 6-11
operational control, 2-2, 2-3, 25, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9, 2-10, 3-15,
5-3, 6-5, 6-6, 6-14
operational mission plan, 3-7,
3-8
operations order, 2-9, 3-10, 6-8
operations plan, 2-7, 3-10, 311, 6-8, 6-9
operations security, 3-3, 3-14
P
parallel staging, network, 5-5,
6-7
Patriot, v, 1-1, 6-1, 6-4, 6-7, 68, 6-10
planning considerations, 3-10,
3-11
power distribution unit, 1-7, 18, 1-9
preventative maintenance,
checks, services, 4-2, 4-3
prime power unit, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9,
1-11
protection capability, 6-3, 6-8,
6-11
R
radar activity priority, 3-8, 3-10
ATP 3-27.5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
16 April 2012
FEF
Index
radar operating hazards, 3-12,
3-13, 3-14
radar operations, 3-3
radar readiness states, 3-6
radar search plan, 1-4, 3-6, 37, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, B-2
autonomous search, 3-8
focused search plan, 3-8, 39, B-2, B-3
precision cue search, 3-9
radar support trailor, 1-9, 1-10
radio frequency, 1-6, 1-7, 3-6,
3-10, 3-11, 3-13, 4-3
receiver exciter, 1-6, 1-7
reentry vehicle, 1-4, 6-6, B-2
regional air defense
commander, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 210, A-1
restricted operations area, 3-13
rules for the use of force, 3-1,
4-1, 4-6, 4-8, B-1
rules of engagement, iv, v, 2-8,
3-1, 4-1, 6-1, 6-4, 6-9. 6-10,
6-11, B-1
S
satellite communications, 1-5,
1-10, 3-6, 4-2, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3,
6-7
sector air defense commander,
2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10
secretary of defense, 2-3, 2-5,
2-6, 2-7, 2-9
security control center, 4-2, 4-5
security operations, 4-3, 4-4, 45, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8
security system level, 4-3, 4-4,
4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, B-3
16 April 2012
security systems, 4-2, 4-5, 4-7
sensor management, 3-4, 3-5
sensor management
qualification course, 2-3, 3-2,
6-12, A-1
sensor manager, 3-5, 3-6
mission training, 3-2
SIPRNet, 1-5, 5-2, 5-5, 6-2, 63, 6-6, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11
situational awareness, 1-3, 1-4,
1-5, 2-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-15, 5-1,
5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3,
6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9,
6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13
site equipment (notional), 4-2
space-based infrared systems,
3-8, 3-9, 6-3, 6-6, 6-7, B-2
standard operating process, 311, 4-7, 4-8
status of forces agreement, 41, 4-5
T
table of allocation and
allowance, 3-1
table of organization and
equipment, 2-3, 2-4, 3-1, 32, B-4
tactical cable interface cabinet,
1-8, 1-9
tactical control, 2-6, 2-7, 3-1, 35, 5-3, 6-4, 6-14
tactical data link-joint, 1-1, 1-5,
3-9, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 6-3,
6-4, 6-6, 6-7, B-3
target of opportunity, 3-9
terminal high altitude air
defense, v, 1-1, 1-2, 1-9, 2-
5, 4-2, 6-1, 6-3, 6-7, 6-8, 610
theater air and missile defense,
2-4, 2-10
Title 10/32, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5
token, 3-5, 6-3, 6-6
transmit/receiver interface
microwave modules, 1-6
transportability, 1-10
U
ultra-high frequency, 1-10, 3-6,
5-2, 5-3, 6-7
unified command plan, 2-1, 22, 2-6
United States Army Space and
Missile Defense Command,
iv, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-10, 31, 3-2, 4-5, 6-12, 6-13, A-1,
B-4
United States Central
Command, 2-10, 6-3
United States European
Command, 2-10, 6-3
United States Northern
Command, 2-2, 2-3, 2-6, 27, 2-9, 2-10, 3-5, 3-11, 4-1,
6-3, 6-11, 6-12, B-2
United States Pacific
Command, v, 2-10, 3-5, 6-3,
6-11
United States Strategic
Command, v, 1-1, 1-3, 1-4,
1-5, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6,
2-9, 2-10, 3-2, 3-5, 3-11, 315, 4-4, 5-2, 6-3, 6-11, 6-12,
6-14, B-1
V
voice communications, 5-5
ATP 3-27.5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Index-3
Index
This Page Intentionally Blank
Index-4
FM 3-14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
6 January 2010
FEF
ATP 3-27.5
(MIL WIKI Posted 28 Jan 2010)
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
NAME OF CHIEF OF STAFF
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
NAME OF AASA
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
DISTRIBUTION:
Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number (IDN) _______, requirements for ATP 3-27.5.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY