Walton Molly Walton Robert Kraut Philosophy 2450 10 March 2017

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Molly Walton
Robert Kraut
Philosophy 2450
10 March 2017
Opposing Views of Interpretation in the Art World
Terry Barrett’s “Interpreting Art” and Susan Sontag’s “Against Interpretation” hold
definitively opposing viewpoints in regards to the value of interpreting art. While an interesting
argument over the dangers of interpretation, Sontag’s criticisms do not hold up to Barrett’s as she
does not provide a clear basis to judge the value of a work of art. Barrett, on the other hand,
supports his claims throughout his writing, establishing a standard for the value in interpretation.
While the two critics may disagree on the value of interpretation, both Barrett and Sontag
agree that interpretation of art occurs. It is important to note that while Sontag criticizes the act
of interpretation, she never once questions its existence. Both writers operate under the
consensus that in the art world, works are subject to the viewers’ own interpretation. Neither
Barrett nor Sontag try to prove that interpretation does or does not exist, rather their arguments
are normative in that they question whether or not interpretation should be applied to the art
world.
Given that Barrett affirms the value of interpreting art, his view will be addressed first. In
Barrett’s “Interpreting Art”, he proposes that “any work of art can and often does receive many
and varied interpretations” (38). Barrett’s choice to only analyze the interpretations by art
historians reveals his belief that a work of art can only be fully appreciated when viewed within a
historical context. The underlying assumptions in Barrett’s discussion of Manet are that first, an
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interpretation of a work is incomplete without a knowledge of context, and second,
interpretations of art have value in that they allow the viewer to better understand the work itself.
Barrett goes on to state that the interpretations of art historians are not only interesting, but
that they “enlighten…with multiple points of view about a significant painting” (38). Describing
the interpretations of art historians as “enlightening” suggests that their work is of a holy nature
that cannot be discovered by any viewer, but rather it must be revealed to them. Barrett
incorporates the views of multiple art historians to establish a historical context for Manet’s
painting, stating that “Manet provoked critics and the public alike by challenging their notions of
sex and race” (42). Barrett includes these controversies as context to support his claim that
“interpretation build[s] meaning about a work and judgement apprais[es] how good a work is”
(42). Stating that interpretation and judgement “mutually affect one another” (42), Barrett makes
the claim that interpretation is an integral part of the art world. Saying the two are “intermeshed”
(42) makes it seem as if it is impossible to appreciate a piece of art without interpreting it. Barrett
expands on this claim, writing “how one understands a work of art, that is, how one interprets the
work of art, strongly affects how one will judge its value” (42). What is important to note is that
Barrett equates understanding a work of art to be interpreting it, again supporting the idea that
interpretation has value in the art world
While Barrett includes the perspectives of two formalists in his analysis of Manet, he clearly
favors the view of contextualism. Barrett introduces the concept of formalism in the framework
of finding a narrative from the form of the painting. Essentially, he establishes the formalist view
by first denying it entirely. Even Barrett’s definition of formalism is undermined by his
appreciation of contextualism. As soon as Barrett explains formalism, he suggests that it is not a
widely held view, as he introduces contextualism by writing, “Most critics and historians,
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however, favor a contextualist approach” (49). Framing formalism in this way asserts the idea
that it does not hold as much validity, given that most professionals conform to the theory of
contextualism.
Barrett concludes his analysis by reasserting the claim that interpretation is key to
understanding a work of art. Barrett supports this claim with the viewpoints of multiple scholars,
proving that all interpreters try to make sense of the painting. Barrett rejects the view of monism,
the belief that there is only one correct interpretation, by presenting a variety of insights from
interpretation. He asserts that “multiple interpretations are more desirable than single
interpretations” (55) as “each interpretation shows…different aspects of the painting” (55).
Citing the hermeneutic circle, Barrett proposes that interpretation and description have an
interdependency. The hermeneutic circle posits that to interpret art is to make sense of it, and
interpreters switch back and forth from describing and interpreting. Barrett claims these aspects
would not necessarily be noticed without reading the interpretations, again pointing to the innate
value interpretation has in the art world.
Sontag’s “Against Interpretation” is offered as a counterargument to Barrett’s view. While
Barrett holds that interpretation allows for art to have value, Sontag questions the merit of
interpretation. Sontag’s critique of the early Greek theory of mimesis, which focuses on
representation, that “all Western consciousness” (458) has remained within the confines of
mimetic theory points to her belief that art shouldn’t need to prove its value in terms of content.
Sontag hints at the oppressive nature of content, pointing out that while critics and artists alike
have “discarded” (458) the theory that art is representation, the main feature of it still persists.
Sontag furthers this statement when she claims, “None of us can retrieve that innocence before
all theory when art knew no need to justify itself” (459). This loss of innocence associated with
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viewing art based on its content asserts a negative viewpoint of interpretation, one that not only
denies people their innocence, but harms the art itself. By saying that those in the art world are
“stuck with the task of defending art” (459), Sontag suggests that this is an unwarranted burden
for viewers and critics alike, as it recalls themes of sacrifice by framing this “obligation” that has
been thrust upon them.
Sontag’s criticism of interpretation is straightforward, as she claims that “content today is
mainly a hindrance” (459) to appreciating the value of art. In her analysis, Sontag posits that the
method of approaching works of art to interpret them “sustains the fancy that there really is such
a thing as the content of art” (459). While Sontag criticizes interpretation today, she admits that
the “old style…was insistent, but respectful” (460), as its purpose was to erect another meaning
on top of the literal one. The “modern style” (460), as Sontag calls it, “excavates and…destroys”
(460) art. She even goes as far as to say that interpretation is the “revenge of the intellect upon
art” (460). The harms interpretation brings upon art is based upon Sontag’s view that “real art
has the capacity to make us nervous” (461). The fact that interpretation attempts to make art
“manageable, comfortable” (461) is a denial of the true purpose of art.
While interpretation destroys art, Sontag clarifies that this doesn’t mean art cannot be
criticized. Sontag claims that art isn’t “ineffable” (464), rather it can be described and
paraphrased, and it should be. In order to give an accurate commentary on the value of art,
Sontag asserts that more attention needs to be focused on “form” (464). Sontag calls for a
“loving description of the appearance of a work of art” (464), but the issue arises to what this
type of description looks like. With no basis for what this analysis consists of, Sontag’s argument
begins to grow weak as there is no clear systematic argument for what type of commentary
should take the place of interpretation.
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Where Sontag’s argument lacks in comparison to Barrett’s is that she provides no clear basis
as to what the value of art is. Sontag’s calls for “transparence” (464) and the luminosity that one
experiences from art on a formalist level, but she still does not provide a definitive standard for
what this analysis is. The absence of a system of evaluating art and what determines its value is
another weak point in her argument.
While Sontag offers a unique perspective on interpretation, her argument falls short by not
including a basis of analysis to determine a work of art’s value. Barrett, on the other hand,
clearly shows that through interpretation, viewers can come to understand a piece of art and can
extract its value. The hermeneutic circle that Barrett is in support of is called into question by
Sontag, as she states “in place of hermeneutics we need an erotics of art” (465). The issue again
with Sontag’s argumentation is that she gives no reason as to why we should prefer her view.
There is no definition as to what the “erotics of art” entails or how to achieve it. Her vague and
wide-sweeping claims for a formalist view of art go unsupported. Meanwhile, Barrett effectively
shows that interpretation is valuable in that it shows multiple aspects of the painting and allows
viewers to understand it on multiple levels.
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Works Cited
Sontag, Susan. Against Interpretation. 1966. The Philosophy of Art: Readings and Modern. By
Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley. N.p.: McGraw-Hill, 1995. 458-65. Print.
Barrett, Terry. Interpreting Art: Reflecting, Wondering, and Responding. Boston: McGraw-Hill,
2003. Print.