Political Parties within Democratic Transitions:
Setting the Ground for a New Research Agenda
Valeria Resta
Introduction
Thus far the relationship between political parties and democratizations has
been approached only as a matter of party system institutionalization during
democratic consolidation phases. Yet, recent cases of autocratic collapses
demonstrated the salience of parties also as far as transitions in its narrow sense
and democratic installations are concerned. In light of this, the present paper makes
the point about the necessity of studying political parties also during the earlier
phases of the democratic transition, when doing so may appear “less obvious”. As
a matter of fact, engaging in this new research agenda will contribute to
democratization studies in several ways. Fist, it will further unfold the dynamics,
i.e. strategic interactions, underneath democratic transitions and breakdowns.
Second, this study will help to disclose the intrinsic nature and functioning of
democratic parties, which are far from being mere representative vehicles of preconstituted social aggregates. Third, and most important, differently from the
mainstream studies on the topic, i.e. those on party system institutionalization, this
kind of works collocates itself in a temporally and functionally antecedent phase;
therefore, it will contribute to illuminate and solve some of the impasses that
affects this literature.
This is a starting point of huge work that goes beyond the scope and space
limitations of the present paper. Here, I will limit to first expose the empirical
reasons why this is needed. Secondly, a proposal in how this study might be done
will be sketched.
I. Political parties in transition and installation phases
The vast majority of studies concentrating their attention to the role of
parties in democratization processes temporally cover only the consolidation phase.
It is so for obvious reasons: first, parties’ formation and organization usually occur
within the transition in its narrow sense. Second, the contribution of parties to
democracy can be appreciated only if considered as a system interacting with its
external environment. Overall, what just described is referred to as the structuring
of the party system (Morlino 1995) and needs a span of time that cannot be covered
by the transition. Therefore, in countries where democracy is not consolidated, the
case for studying parties is less obvious (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
Nonetheless, parties remain salient in the earlier phases of the democratization
process, both for the intrinsic features of these processes and both for a set of
particular circumstances that might apply, as the cases of Tunisia and Egypt show.
The characteristic feature of transitions, as O’Donnell and Schmitter’s well-known
definition recalls (1986)1, is the absence of structures identifying a precise political
regime. Then, in dealing with these processes actors’ agency is a fruitful unit of
analysis, as large part of the literature has proved (Kitschell 1992; Przeworski
1991). However, what is missing in extant studies is a focus on political parties as
loci of agency at this stage of democratizations. This lack is not without
justification because political parties are understood as a result of political
liberalization: how can they form and organize lacking the freedoms of speech and
association, as it is the case in authoritarian regimes? (Dahl 1971; Gunther,
Diamandouros, and Puhle 1995; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In line of
principle this claim is certainly true. However, as a matter of fact, transitions do not
occur in-between perfectly typified and binary categories of authoritarianism and
democracy. Indeed, the empirical reality returns us a great variety of hybrid
regimes that are not yet democratic, but no longer authoritarian for they display
some features of inclusion and competition (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way
2002; Morlino 2008; Ottaway 2013). Among these, elections –fake elections, to be
sure- are not infrequent, for they serve a variety of scopes even in the context of
authoritarian regimes (Geddes 2006; Schedler 2006). As consequence, political
parties, even though extremely weak and poorly organized, are already present
when undemocratic regimes collapse, and this makes them a constant and salient
component of transitions affecting the dimensions of variations displayed by the
processes of transition and installation (Morlino 2011). Above all, what is of
foremost importance it’s parties’ capacity to steer the transition so as to prevent
other actors not bound to any kind of accountability, such as the military, to
infiltrate and drive this process with democratically uncertain results, as the case of
Egypt shows.
The second reason for focusing on political parties within transitions has to do with
the centrality of the constitution making within transitions. As a matter of fact,
“constitutions may not always lead to democracy, but it is nearly unthinkable – or
at least unprecedented in modern era- that a state would achieve democracy
without a constitution” (Elkins 2010, 972). It discloses the democratic structures
and procedures to which elite and people will possibly habituate to during the
consolidation phase. At the hardcore of these structures and procedures relies the
guarantee of freedom and equality provided the limited power of the ruling elite.
This is achieved by the settlement of focal points, i.e. is a set of action that triggers
citizens’ reactions facing violations of the constitutional chart by the sovereign,
which will constitute the equilibrium underneath the exiting political regime
(Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). Here again, if the importance of constitution
making has captured the attention of scholars, the same cannot be said, with due
exceptions, for the actual process underling it (Elster 1995). How is the process of
A Political transition is defined as “the interval between one political regime and another”
(O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986: 6)
1
constitution making achieved? Which role do political parties play within it?
Which party politics configuration is more apt to arrive to an agreed constitution?
These kinds of questions deserve more attention from scholars, especially if the
founding free and fair elections are aimed at the establishment of a national
constituent assembly, as is the case of Tunisia and Egypt.
Moreover, political parties are as much intriguing as the transitional phase, and in
particular the constitution making process, is characterized by religious or ethnical
cleavages. Here, political parties face a twofold liability deriving from intra-party
and inter-parties bargain. On the hand, they are supposed to agree on a
constitutional text with their competitor, on the other, they have to decide whether
to reproduce or to overcome the existent cleavage in their relations with other
parties. The cases of Tunisia and Egypt might be illuminating in this regard for in
both countries religion represents a source of social and political division. This can
easily bring to polarization, defined as “a process through which individuals cluster
around mutually exclusive positions while the number of those who maintain
conciliatory positions between them decrease” (Tepe 2013, 833). Within this
context, it is difficult to see how sources of a constitutional agreement can be
pinpointed. Studies dealing with divided societies have produced lot of literature in
the attempt of theorizing the possibilities of democracy in these contexts. Driving
on Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985), lot of scholars deny divided
societies any successful cooperation among different (ethnic and/or religious)
groups. In contexts where there are two ethnic groups whose respective individuals
carry the same, intense and formalized preferences on alternatives at stake, then
cooperation, it is argued, is “strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and to the
politics of outbidding” (Rabushka and Shapsle 1972: 86). Therefore, the relation
between divided societies and the “viability of democracy remains obscure”
(Przeworski 2005). What makes a difference between the installation of democracy
and the return to a non-democratic regime seems to be the presence of
“countervailing mechanisms” (Tepe 2013). These are represented as parties’ elites
moderating the preferences of their constituencies. Aware that whether a religious
cleavage is intrinsically different form the other cleavages still remains an open
questions, I adopt here an agnostic attitude without any pretention of investigating
its inner nature. This account for the religious one is based on the fact that it
appears to divide the political space of the countries considered, suggesting that a
closer analysis on the role of parties at this stage of the democratization process is
worth needed.
II. A theorization for political parties and democratizations: party
institutionalization and democratic consolidation
Provided that political parties deserve special attention during the
transitional phase, which are the instruments at disposal to deal with them? This
section is aimed at exploring the extant theoretical framework for party politics and
democratization.
In the aftermath of the Third Wave of democratization, political parties have been
put front and centre in the context of democratic consolidations allowing the
development of a useful theoretical framework in dealing with fluid party systems.
The equation underneath the studies that spread at that time is that parties stand to
democracy as party institutionalization stands to democratic consolidation. The
first part of the equation represents one of the pillars of political science.
Democracy, as we know it, is representative democracy, therefore, it goes by
saying that parties fulfill a set of vital functions for its working (Lipset 2000). They
provide interests articulation and aggregation thus structuring the political debate;
they drop citizens’ costs of information, allowing them to take part in the public
discourse, moreover; they guarantee the popular control of the government trough
the recruitment and selection of candidates (Morlino 2011; Sartori 1976, 1987;
Schumpeter 1942). The second part of the equation is the straightforward
consequence of the previous one: if parties are vital to democracy, then democratic
consolidation needs party institutionalization, for only once institutionalized
political parties will be able to perform the aforementioned tasks. However, as will
be showed in what follows, there are cases of party institutionalization not
followed by democratic consolidation that require further research efforts.
Mainwaring and Scully’s outstanding contribution broke up with the dichotomy
between consolidated party systems and fluid party systems (Sartori 1976). These
latter, falling beyond the reach of existent theoretical framework, were not even
perceived as political objects. In contrast, the two authors worked out the concept
of party system institutionalization, which applies for both kinds of party systems,
and correlated it with the viability of democratic politics in both cases. In their
account, institutionalization refers to a “process by which a practice or organization
becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted”
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 4). Party system institutionalization then involves
on the one hand the physical establishment of political parties, and, on the other
hand, actors’ adaptation to and reification of political parties. This process consists
of four dimensions, namely: (i) stability in patterns of interparty competition; (ii)
party roots in society; (iii) legitimacy of parties and elections, and, (iv) party
organization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Subsequent studies on political parties
in new democracies revolved around this work and this conceptualization
recognizing in it a major analytical tool to deal with the study of party systems in
new democracies. However, such a usage has been sometimes confusing. On the
one hand, some scholars used the concept of party system institutionalization and
party institutionalization interchangeably without making any critical
differentiation between them (Morlino 1998). On the other hand party system
institutionalization was conceived as the direct result of individual party
institutionalization (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006;
Mainwaring 1998).
In light of recent developments in the literature, the two concepts are now treated
separately and individual party institutionalization has gained the momentum. In
Randall and Svåsand account, this is conceived a process characterized by four
dimensions taking in consideration the structural and attitudinal elements
underpinning consolidation both internally and externally to the party (2002).
These are: (i) systemness; (ii) values infusion; (iii) decisional autonomy; and, (iv)
reification. This work has the merit to get rid of the vagueness surrounding the
notion of party system thus allowing for more precision of analysis. Out of this,
contrary to what previously held, party institutionalization proved to be in some
cases antithetical to party system institutionalization, thus denying the correlation
between party institutionalization and democratization. The cases outlined by the
authors in which this can happen are when party institutionalization is uneven, that
is when during democratic transitions certain parties enjoy distinct institutional
advantages, or when the “major source of institutional strength for a party is its
identification with an exclusive ethnic or cultural grouping” (2002, 8–9). This is
for instance the case of Turkey wherein party institutionalization stems from a set
of institutional incentives leading to an uneven representation of political factions,
or where the institutionalization of parties is fostered by an underlying ideological
polarization (Yardimci-Geyikci 2015).
Even if the concepts of party institutionalization, party system institutionalization
and democratic consolidation remains interrelated, far from what theorized thus far
not all kinds of party institutionalization pave the way to democratic consolidation.
It might be the case then to ante pone this kind of analysis to the time when all
plausible ways of parties and party system development are potentially all possible:
that is to the transition phase. The next paragraph will be devoted to investigate
how this can be done.
III. Political parties and constitution making processes: proposing a
theoretical framework for analysis
What said insofar confirms the point made elsewhere that parties matter even if not
fully institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morlino 2011). In addition, it
makes the case for pushing further their analysis to the earlier stages of democratic
consolidation, namely the transition and installation phases. This kind of work has
already been done elsewhere, but only to provide a descriptive account of the
dimensions of variation of transition and installations (Morlino 2011). Instead, the
questions posed by this paper are aimed at disclosing the features of party politics
that favor the installation of democracy, which is a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for democratic consolidation.
Within democratic consolidation, party system institutionalization has been
conceptualized in several ways so as to measure and to correlate it with the
democratic enhancement. Within democratic transitions too, a pertinent
conceptualization correlating political parties with democratic installation has to
see the light in order to provide the required analytical tools enabling its
measurement and its correlation with democratic installation. In particular,
undertaking a theoretical effort to inquiry what are the features in transitional party
systems more likely to be conducive to democratic installation implies working out
a subset of parties’ functions that meet the exigencies of democratic installation.
The remaining part of the paragraph will be devoted to provide an understanding of
both the democratic installation within its broader environment of democratization
and of political parties. From the appreciation of these letters in the context of
installations, a set of party systems’ features favoring these processes will emerge.
This will finally allow the envisagement of a proper method to appraise them that
will be discussed in the next section.
In line with scholars belonging to historical institutionalism, I am prone to consider
democratizations, like any other political experience, as a path-dependent process
made up of a chain of episodes of institutional change (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010,
937; Pierson 2004). In literature this is subdivided in transition, installation and
consolidations processes. The first refers, as we saw, to the interval between one
political regime and another, the second refers to the settlement od democratic
institutions and procedures, and the third refers to the process by which democracy
becomes finally the only game in town, meaning that its institutions and procedures
are by now interiorized and not challenged. As often happens with categories, these
are not so clear-cut when coming to the empirical reality. Nonetheless, what
happens in an earlier stage of democratization will highly influence the rest of the
process.
Within this more general context, I will concentrate my attention from transition to
installation. The most salient moment of democratic installation is more evidently,
but not only, the constitution making process. Within this, as far as the cases
considered are concerned, political parties are required to agree on a set of
hardcore principles grounding the new regime. In most cases, they are required to
agree on their basic disagreement, e.g. identity questions, form of government, and
so on. Hence, what inferred by large part of the literature about the importance of
elite pacts applies also to this case, especially the claim that democratic
consolidation is not possible in the absence of elite’s agreement (Higley and
Burton 1989; North and Weingast 1989; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Weingast
1997).
To take place, this agreement requires either the proneness of parties to fair
negotiations stemming either from their strategic interactions or, more frequently,
from a shared understanding about the aims of the transition and the basic
principles of the resulting constitutions. However, this process does not occur in a
vacuum. Indeed, the anchoring process is already at stake (Morlino 2005; Morlino
2011). This means that political parties, in their hook and binding people within
society, are in turn fettered by civic society. In Morlino’s words:
“The metaphor may be better understood when the governmental
institutions to which people make reference are seen as the ‘boat’
from which the anchor emerges; civil society as the terrain where the
anchors are hooked; and the boat has the actual possibility of
changing and adapting its position within the limits allowed by the
length of the anchors, that is by the various intermediate institutions”
(2011, 114)
As far as political parties are concerned, they are considered by the literature only
as anchors of democracy. However, as governmental institutions, or parties in
public office (see: Katz 2014), each party can itself be conceived as a single boat in
need of anchoring itself, as represented in Figure 1 (see Annex).
In here, the points of the sea floor in which the anchor is hooked represent parties’
constituencies. These points might be clustered around an almost delimited space if
societies are quite homogeneous or be located at the extreme of an ideal axe in
cases of polarized societies. The length of the anchor represents the age of the
party, while the dashed lines denote party’s complexity, measured as the number of
local subunits. This latter is envisaged to be positively correlated to the former. The
area under these refers to party’s systemness, i.e. “the increasing scope, density and
regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure”, indicating the
breadth of party’s internal structuring (Randall and Svasand 2002, 13). Finally, the
movements on water surface represent possible party’s policy positions the party as
public office can adopt inside representative and governmental institutions.
What emerges from this conceptualization of parties within transitions is that
party’s actions and policy positions, are circumscribed accordingly to: (i) the
location within a policy space of its constituency; and (ii) the reach of its
organizational development entailing systemness. In particular, the range of
possible policy placements available to the party in public office tends to broaden
in accordance with party’s longevity, and consequently, complexity. This exactly
what described by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, which is useful for the
understanding of the evolution of religious parties.
Moreover, as far as constitution making is concerned, from this abstraction it
follows that: (iii) for an agreement to see the light, an overlapping consensus in
policy preferences among parties must be in place; (iv) the agency of party elite is
unlikely to go beyond what allowed by its systemness, otherwise, it will lose
support (see Figure 2 in the Annex).
According to the model, when systemness is high, the agency of party
representatives inside the newborn institutions increases as well thus enabling
negotiations and the design of an overlapping consensus necessary to arrive to a
constitutional text. By contrast, lacking systemness, party representatives remains
encroached to the instances of their constituencies decreasing the probabilities that
this compromise, necessary for democratic installation, will come into being.
Coming to the empirical experience, in transitional societies, parties are unlikely to
be sufficiently developed, with few exceptions. Therefore, in line with what said
insofar, it is also unlikely that parties’ representatives, or overall parties as public
office, inside the constituent assemblies will distance themselves from the positions
of their constituencies, for they are still too weak to take the risk of dissatisfying
their voters. Hence, according to the model, installation is to be reasonably
expected only in the absence of social cleavages. However, historical records tell a
different story. A number of deeply divided societies along left/right lines or along
ethnical and religious cleavages finally managed to democratize; Italy, India and
Indonesia are some examples of this phenomenon. How can the model account also
for these experiences?
The aphasia of the model can be overcome by considering parties’ function of
structuring politics. Under this perspective, parties cease to be mere vehicles of the
instances of their respective constituencies and more agency is conferred to them.
However, this is not the kind of agency that can be observed in parties’
representatives behavior inside the process of constitution making. It’s rather an
intermediate one that locates itself within the supply side of the process of
representation (Downs 1957). This offer is embodied in party manifestos that are
subjected to the process of text formation (see Figure 3 in the Annex)
demonstrating the potential role the agency of parties’ elites can have. The actual
extent of it can be traced by looking at the political distance between party
members’ self-positioning and the location of party manifesto on a policy space.
The wider, the more prominent is the intermediate agency of party’s elite in the
process of transition. For sure, this prominence can either promote a process of
“adjustment to at least some attributes of the centre in a particular country at a
certain time” (Somer 2014) where the notion of centre refers to “the main attributes
of the mainstream social-economic, political and external environment” (ibid., p.
245) or may outbid the more extreme positions of their constituencies polarizing
and dividing the political system. Of course, only the former, falls under the
acceptation of countervailing mechanisms (Tepe 2013) is conducive to an agreed
constitutional text.
If, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, not all kinds of party
institutionalization led to democratic consolidation, from this paragraph a set of
different configurations of party systems, even though fluid, might encourage the
installation of democracy. These are first of all is a constitutional occurring at the
presence of parties with a relatively long live presence in the country. By contrast,
in cases of newborn parties in the constituent assembly, is more likely that a
constitution will be finally adopted if the underneath society is relatively
homogenous. However, transitions are not so ordered, and it is highly probable that
neither this latter hypothesis applies. In such cases, that is of divided societies and
newborn parties in the constituent assembly, a constitution is more likely to see the
light if parties’ intermediate agency act as a countervailing mechanism to
polarization. This is actually the more frequent case and the most interesting one
from a point of democratization studies.
IV. From concepts to indicators
The empirical investigation for the test of the aforementioned
hypothesis revolves around four parameters, which are: the age of parties,
the number of subunits (which are supposed to be positively correlated
with the former), the extent of social cleavages and what I named
intermediate agency.
Calculating the age of parties is easygoing for it normally suffices to look
at the year of their foundation. However, this measurement might not be
as reliable in cases of newborn parties with a longer tradition of civic
engagement by means of associations. In such cases it might be advisable
to take into account at the moment in which social engagement went
political by using as a proxy the electoral candidature, to parliamentary or
presidential elections, of exponents of these association, even as
independents. Correlated with the formal or informal longevity of parties,
there’s the number of local subunits that is considered by looking at the
number of smallest unit parties allowed by the electoral law (YardimciGeyikci 2015). Such a indicator shall in turn be considered as both one of
the dimensions of organizational development and political polarization
within the society, whose development of indicators to measure it, is still
under construction.
Finally, the extent of the intermediate agency is represented by the
distance between voters’ positions and parties’ location in the policy
space. This can be done by recurring to what citizens express in merit of
salient policies, i.e. looking at the role of religion within the state, and
comparing their position with those of their parties so as expressed in
party manifestos. On the one hand voters’ self positioning on certain
issues will be grasped recurring to suveys, in particular, as far as this
work is concerned through ArabBarometer (Tessler 2011), which asks
respondents about both their opinion on specific issues and their intention
of vote. On the other hand, parties positioning on the same issue might be
grasped through a supervised method of content analysis of their
manifestos.
Conclusions
Speaking about conclusion in reference to the very first draft of a
working paper makes little sense, for there are not conclusions but just a
starting point.
In here I only tried to stimulate a debate around a role played by parties
that so far did not received attention. In occasion of this conference, I do
hope to test the logical grip of the proposed theoretical framework and
the validity of the method envisaged, even though barely sketched, to
study political parties within transition.
This new research agenda is worth needed for the development of both
democratization studies and party politics. On the one hand, a precise
function will be finally covered by the literature on party politics. On the
other, the dynamic underneath the installation of democracy will be
pointed from another, and hopefully more systematic, point of view.
Annex: List of Figures
Figure 1: Political Parties conceptualized.
Figure 2: Overlapping consensus: dimensions of variation
Figure 3: Process of party manifesto formation
Source: Quantitative Text Analysis course material by John Slapin, University of Essex 2015.
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