Quota-hopping: strategic choices under legal and economic constraints: the French and British cases1.
Nicolas Roncin2, Nathalie Caill-Milly3, and Denis Bailly4.
This paper has been written in the context of the project FAIR n° CT98 4409
funded by the EU General Directorate for Fisheries.
Introduction
The development of «quota hopping»5 results from the reduction of a nation’s fishing capacities,
which consequently may lead to a decrease in the national market supply. The preservation of this
level of supply thus supposes the seeking of new opportunities of access to the resource within the
waters of third countries. Two categories of nations emerge in this process: those which tried to
register vessels under third state flags, and those which “welcomed” these ”quota hopper” fleets. This
access to a third state flag goes with the access to its fishing rights, and particularly those ruled by the
resource conservation system. Indeed, quotas enable the sharing of rare community resources between
the different nations on the basis of historical rights. They aim at guaranteeing to the Member States
the possibilities of capture from which their fishing-dependent populations, as well as the related
industries, could take advantage of in the past, before the quota system was set up (principle of relative
stability of fishing activities). The gap between the TAC share initially allocated to certain states,
linked to the global decrease in the resource, the extension of exclusive economic zones up to 200
miles, and the dynamic nature of their markets, are the major factors that explain the significant
development of «quota hopping» that has been observed since the early 1980s6, notably thanks to the
quite liberal regulations applied in the UK and in Ireland. In France, registrations appeared later since
«quota hopping» only started to develop between 1993 and 1994. In late 2000, Spanish-owned vessels
constituted by far the largest proportion of “quota hoppers”: 53 in France, 83 in the UK, and 20 in
Ireland.
1
The authors would like to thank Julian Frere (CEMARE) for his contribution to the British case study.
Oïkos, Brest, France. mailto:[email protected]
3
IFREMER, Fish Laboratory of Aquitaine, Saint-Pée s/ Nivelle, France. mailto:[email protected]
4
CEDEM/UBO, Brest, France
5
For a definition of « quota-hopping », see T. Douard: “Le Quota-Hopping” et la politique commune de la
pêche », D.E.A. dissertation, Rennes I 1998, page 8.
2
1
The Netherlands had 33 vessels operating in the UK7. The fleet of “quota hoppers” also developed in
other European nations, notably in Belgium, Germany, and Portugal8.
The description of the activity of the fleets in two study cases, UK and France, allows us to highlight
the major determining factors of the modes of exploitation of the “Anglo-Dutch”, “Anglo-Spanish”
and “Franco-Spanish” fleets - (fishing areas and targeted species, landing and marketing places,
supply and maintenance, and ship repair areas). The analysis focuses upon the reasons for which ships
are going to chose to operate from such and such harbour, and the type of operation with which they
will be associated. The factors cost/income resulting from this choice will be a fundamental element of
the description of the strategies. The data are derived from the processing of French official statistics,
and from the MAFF for the UK. They have been completed with a series of interviews. A
questionnaire was used, though with variable quantitative results, more conclusive for the UK than for
France9. A certain proportion of the answers is thus of a qualitative nature. The context in which these
strategies are studied is important since the data that could be obtained concern the first year of
application of regulatory frameworks, aiming at “managing” quota hopping, notably starting from the
condition of the Real Economic Link. The objective thus consists in understanding the stakes relative
to the willingness of the states concerned to supervise the phenomenon, and the difficulties of
implementation in relation to the liberal principles of the community law. Consequently, what can be
the effect on the strategies of “quota hoppers”?
1- “Quota hopping”: conflicts of use, or conflicts of interests?
The more detailed study of the behaviour of the three major fleets of quota hoppers in Europe, the
“Anglo-Dutch”, “Anglo-Spanish” and the “Franco-Spanish”, allows to confront the determinants of
“quota hoppers” to register vessels under third state flags, as well as the motivations of the authorities
of these nations to limit these “entrances into the fleet”.
1.1- Description of the activity of the main quota hopper fleets.
6
Ch. Lequesne (2000), page 20.
These data do not integrate the industrial ship-owning companies the equity of which is basically made of
foreign funds, and therefore which fall into the scope of “quota-hopping”. (e.g. in France, Jégo-Quéré is owned
at 97% by the Spanish Pescanova. In the same way, Dhellemmes, which is owned at 90% by the Dutch Jaczon).
This paper does not take into account these fleets as their ships’ modes of exploitation have not yet been
significantly changed. See also Ch. Lequesne, 1999, page 28.
8
For further information about the extent of the quota-hopping fleet in France, see E. Hoefnagel (1998), for
instance.
9
The concentration in two maritime districts, and especially in two management companies, wishing to
guarantee the confidentiality of the responses did not allow for sufficient response rate.
7
2
The three fleets used in this detailed analysis adopt quite variable behaviours, notably in terms of
fishing areas and targeted species. The “Anglo-Dutch” mainly operate in the ICES area IV b and a,
where they target flat fish (plaice and sole for commercially significant species (in value), and also
dab, turbot, cod, hake and whiting), essentially in the southern areas of the North Sea.
Of the 29 “Anglo-Dutch” vessels, 25 use the beam trawl (table 1). These data do not integrate the 6
Icelandic and Belgian vessels flying the British flag.
Table 1 – Composition of the “foreign-owned” population in the UK in relation to the basis population
(per fishing gear).
Vessels
Spanish
Gear Type
Population
Interviewed
% / stratum
Trawler
47
15
31.91
Liner
11
4
36.36
Netter
19
4
21.05
Other
6
2
33.33
83
25
30.12
Beam Trawler
29
17
58.62
Other
4
0
0.00
33
17
51.52
Total
Dutch
Total
Length (mean)
34.77
40.3
Sources: results from the survey, supplemented with MAFF information.
The result of the survey conducted with a sample of the “Anglo-Dutch10” fleet show that 44% of the
catches obtained with these vessels are comprised of plaice, 15% of cod, and 9% of dab. As a whole,
the quasi-totality of the catches made with “Anglo-Dutch” vessels is comprised of quota species
(Table 2).
10
These data, which come from the sample, integrate the results of the three “Anglo-Icelandic”.
3
Table 2 – Declared landings of “foreign-owned” fleets in British ports (quota and non-quota species).
Landings (tons)
Anglo-Spanish
Anglo-Dutch
1998
1999
1998
1999
Totals
31911
27055
49453
48264
Among which quota species
9433
7723
49244
47771
% of quota species
29.56
28.55
99.57
98.98
Among which non-quota species
22478
19332
1009
493
In the UK
2127
7047
1296
491
% of the landings in the UK
6.67
26.05
2.62
1.02
Among which quota species
1125
4017
1009
212
% of quota species
11.93
52.01
2.04
0.44
92
3030
287
279
Among which non-quota species
Source: adapted from MAFF (10 June 2000)
Conversely, the “Anglo-Spanish” fleet operates traditionally in the ICES area VII, using mainly
bottom trawls and nets. Yet, it may also operate in the areas VI (Scotland), IV (Shetland), in the North
Sea, and along the western coasts of Ireland. The most targeted quota species are hake, monkfish, and
megrim. In parallel, secondary catches may concern saithe, cod, pollack and haddock, as well as a
certain number of non-quota species. On the sample, the catches landed by these vessels are clearly
less significant than those made by “Anglo-Dutch” ones, 2,044 tons for 25 vessels, versus 15,487 tons
for 17 vessels. Referring to both official statistics, as well as to the sample, the “Anglo-Dutch” fleet is
comprised of more recent and larger units. A detailed analysis of the respective yields of these fleets
may allow us to clarify and explain the origin of these differences.
Compared to the fleets previously mentioned, the “Franco-Spanish” fleet presents intermediary
characteristics, notably because of the diversity of its size segments and fishing areas, divided between
the Bay of Biscay and the ICES area VII (Annex 1). The vessels we took into consideration for this
analysis come from the Bayonne and La Rochelle maritime districts, where most11 “Franco-Spanish”
ships are concentrated. Their target species are the same: hake, anglerfish, megrim, and also secondary
species in lesser proportions. Here, the share of quota species is more significant than with the “AngloSpanish fleet”: 72-82% for the boats in Bayonne, and 87% for those in La Rochelle (Table 3).
Apart from industrial ship-owning firms, in 2000, the other “Franco-Spanish” units were registered in the
districts of Lorient (1) and Cherbourg (1).
11
4
Table 3 – Main characteristics of the “Franco-Spanish” boats in 1998.
Total
Length
Fishing
Landed
crew
(m)
areas
tonnage
Bottom trawlers
 20 m
Bottom trawlers
> 20 m
Mixed trawlers
8
11
5
Netters
 20 m
Netters*
> 20 m
SUB TOTAL
BAYONNE
Netters
La Rochelle
TOTAL*
14
8
46
8
54
19
(16 to 20)
Composition of Share of quota
the catches**
Anglerfish
VIII
4,424
36%
31
VIII
Megrim 18%
(25 to 35)
VII
Hake 7%
29
VIII
(24 to 34)
VII
17
(13 to 20)
VIII
26
VIII
(22 to 33)
VII
/
/
27
VII
(20 to 37)
VIII
/
/
species**
1,056
745
Hake 63%
Anglerfish 8%
82%
Hake 52%
Pouting 9%
Anglerfish
2,017
72%
69%
45%
Hake 25%
/
/
/
Hake 45%
1,852
Anglerfish
87%
37%
/
/
/
Source. Nathalie Caill-Milly, November 2000.
* These data do not integrate the four ships for which the activity is classified in “others”
** These data concern the share of the sole quota species present among the species that constitute the
most significant proportion of these ships’ activity.
The activity of these fleets must be put in perspective with the evolution of the local fleets.
1.2- Importance of “quota hoppers” in relation to national fleets.
The 122 foreign-owned British vessels represent only 6% of the total number of boats12. Yet, they
represent 16% of the national “power”, corresponding to the significant size of mixed ships relatively
to the mean size of strictly national vessels.
12
The data about the British case are considered at the national level, and could not be quantified at the regional
level. Source: Fishing vessels of Britain and Ireland, ships with a length in excess of 10 metres.
5
In Bayonne, in late 1998, the “Franco-Spanish” fleet consisted of about 50% of the kW of the district
(21,657 kW of 46,401 kW). The DIDAM13 also calculated the total power granted to “foreign-owned”
vessels throughout the 1993-98 period. During the POP3, 12,305 kW were bought by “foreign-owned”
company of the Bayonne district: 4,614 kW in 1997 and 12,305 kW in the first quarter of 1998.
Of this total power, and throughout the 1993-98 period, 19,270 kW, i.e. 84% came from other
maritime districts14. In La Rochelle, in late 1998, ¼ of the whole power of the district could be
attributed to “foreign-owned” ships (5,007 of 21,419 kW), but about a half of this total power
concerned the segment of vessels with a length in excess of 16 metres.
Yet, this fleet did not develop to the detriment of national fleets, but took a place left empty due to the
numerous sales and exits from the fleet observed since the late 1980s, notably in France15. The
financial dynamism of Spanish and Dutch investors was a factor more favourable to «quota hopping»
than to the purchase of these units by French investors. Today, the improvement of the financial
situation of the French ship-owning firms inverses the trend. This is basically due to the fact that
concentrations in the field of semi-industrial fishing have recovered since the late 1990s, while the
“Franco-Spanish” fleet now tends to stabilise16. The importance of the “Franco-Spanish” ships’ power
compared to the total power of the Bayonne district has become a source of conflict in the context of
the possibilities of renewal of the fleet, planned in the POP417.
1.3.- Operational strategies of quota hoppers.
The search for the determinants of these strategies only finds an answer by paying attention to the
global strategy of the “foreign-owned” fleets. Indeed, the choices of fishing strategies can only be
explained by taking into account the destination of catches both for landings and for sales. The
evolutions of the operating strategies of semi-industrial or industrial ships, which confirm a more and
more evident dissociation between fishing areas (which remain linked to landing places) and selling
places (which generally remain link to the port of registration), are quite well illustrated by the case of
the “foreign-owned” fleets18.
13
Regional Direction of the Maritime Affairs
DIDAM data, Bayonne. These changes do not take into account the power of the ships already registered in
the Bayonne district, on 1st January 1993.
15
See notably” Le Marin”, issue 2672, and “La politique maritime littorale de la France »: “La Pêche », 2000.
16
Caill-Milly N. (2000)
17
Communication of the “county council of the Pyrenees Atlantiques”.
18
See: M. Morin (2000), “The fisheries resources in the European Union. The distribution of TACs: principles
of relative stability and quota hopping”, in Marine Policy 24 (2000), pages 265-273.
14
6
The destination of catches is an important element that allows for the explanation of the operational
strategies of “quota hoppers”. The Table 2 provides us with information about the distribution of
landings and sales between the UK and the countries of origin of “quota hoppers”. The “AngloSpanish” fleet lands two thirds of its production directly in Spanish ports, and the answer to the
questionnaire allows us to indicate clearly that 80% of the landings made in the UK are transported to
be sold at auctions abroad. The question cannot be posed in the same terms in the case of the “AngloDutch” since their production is almost integrally landed and sold in the Netherlands.
For the “Franco-Spanish” vessels, the quantitative data available concern the repartition of the sales in
France and in Spain, as well as the landing data.
They do not allow for a clear assessment of the use of “advanced bases”. Information about “advanced
bases” comes from the interviews. In case of the use of this system, even if the landing is not operated
physically from the vessels, the fish is landed by lorry, a process which has a limited impact on the
recourse to port services, except for certain supplies and especially for refuelling. The detail of sales in
France and in Spain allows for a quite precise idea of this distribution and its determinants. The
distribution of the sales for the Bayonne fleets is presented in the table 4. The annex 2 presents the
detail of the sales by species for the fleets of the Bayonne and La Rochelle districts.
7
Table 4 – Distribution of sales of the Bayonne Franco-Spanish ships, between France and Spain
(1998).
1998
Total
Sales in Spain
Share of known sales Mean price
Weight
Value
Weight
Value
(t)
(€)
(t)
(€)
Mixed trawlers
833
2,945.2
752
2,726.4
90.28
92.57
3.63
Bottom trawlers
3,300
8,859.4
2,770
7,845.0
83.94
88.55
2.83
Netters
1,423
5,925.2
1,155
5,073.4
81.17
85.62
4.39
Others
162
344.1
116
316.5
71.60
91.98
2.73
Total
5,718
18,073.9
4,793
15,961.3
83.82
88.31
3.33
1998
% weight % value
Total
(€)
Sales in France
Share of known sales Mean price
Weight
Value
Weight
Value
(t)
(€)
(t)
(€)
Mixed trawlers
833
2,945.2
81
218.8
9.72
7.43
2.70
Bottom trawlers
3,300
8,859.4
530
1,014.4
16.06
11.45
1.91
Netters
1,423
5,925.2
268
851.9
18.83
14.38
3.18
Others
162
344.1
46
27.6
28.40
8.02
0.60
Total
5,718
18,073.9
925
2,112.6
16.18
11.69
2.28
% weight % value
(€)
Source: Nathalie Caill-Milly, November 2000.
Concerning the sales declared by “Franco-Spanish” ships, the mean prices obtained are around 1 euro
(€) per kg below those obtained in Spain. This significant difference in price does not totally explain
the strategic choice of selling in Spain rather than in France, and thus working more with Spanish
ports. It is partly the result of the distribution of sales between France and Spain. Among the three
most targeted species by the “Franco-Spanish”, megrim is totally sold in Spain since the market for
this species is quasi non-existent in France.
Conversely, concerning hake and anglerfish, also sold at French auctions, the difference in price is
quite low (Table 5): 0.368 €/kg for hake and 0.179 €/kg for anglerfish in favour of Spain, in spite of
quite significant differences by segments.
For instance, in the case of hake, better prices are obtained in Spain (segments between 0.20 and 1.20
kg), or in France (segments below 0.2 kg and beyond 1.2 kg19).
19
These prices are based on the sole sale reports known for the fleet of the 51 “Franco-Spanish” fleet, in 1998.
8
Table 5 – Mean prices of European anglerfish and hake in Spain and in France, for the 44 ships
registered in Bayonne20 in 1998.
European anglerfish
Share of the production
Hake
Share of the production
(in €/kg)
taken into account
(in €/kg)
taken into account
Spain
3.904
64 %
4.439
78 %
France
3.724
100 %
4.076
92 %
Sources: Nathalie Caill-Milly, November 2000.
The other species sold in France are basically netted species (haddock, saithe, whiting, ray…) with a
quite well developed market in France, but with a low commercial value (less than 1.5 €/kg21). The
respective markets of these two countries are thus used in order to maximise the selling prices. Most of
the catches are sold at Spanish auctions, even if the difference in the final price of the two main
species is relatively low. The global difference in price is thus due to the composition of sales in
France, where more than 50% of the sales concern low value species which makes prices decrease. On
the contrary, in Spain, significant volumes of higher value species are sold. The market’s absorption
capacities, as well as commercialisation networks, play a fundamental role, and this explains why the
Spanish market receives the greatest proportion of anglerfish, hake and megrim catches. In order to
supply the market of “processed fish”, French wholesalers bank more on species that can be processed
in fillet.
The activity report of the port of La Rochelle indicates the first ten species sold in 1998, among which
hake is not listed22, and anglerfish ranks in third position behind ray and conger. In 1999, anglerfish
was only in ninth position. This acknowledgement also explains the growing interest of FrancoSpanish ships for ports such as Lorient and Concarneau, which take advantage of more developed
markets due to the historical presence of industrial ship-owning companies. The seeking of these
markets may occur to the detriment of La Rochelle, which is the main selling area of “foreign-owned”
fleets.
20
These data mainly concern the supplies in La Rochelle auction room, because the ships registered in Bayonne
basically land in La Rochelle.
21
Annual report, auction room marketing data, OFIMER, 1998.
22
Besides, generally speaking, the French “autochthonous” fleet caught less than the half of the hake quota
attributed to France in 1998 (FAO source). Hake is only considered as a “secondary” species (though not
negligible) for most autochthonous fleets, which does not call into question the worrying overexploitation of this
species. Concerning the dynamics of hake market, and the more global problem of management of this resource,
see: “Analyse du merlu et implications pour la gestion des pêches dans le Golfe de Golfe du Lion, et le Golfe de
Gascogne”, Survey DG XIV n° 97/SE/011, Oikos, October 2000. See also “le Marin”, 27 October 2000, page
10.
9
The specificity of the different types of fishing, the variety of the species targeted by “foreign-owned”
fleets in France as well as in the UK, thus shows that these vessels have reproduced under French and
British flags the fishing strategies of their countries of origin. Consequently, the catches are effectively
destined to the market of the State of origin. Much more than a conflict of use for the resource, the
conflict that opposes the supporters of “quota hopping” to its detractors is a conflict of interest.
The problem was brought up at the national level of the counting of “foreign-owned” ships within the
total power of a district such as Bayonne. Yet, the central question remains that of the States’
sovereignty on the stocks of fish that depend on their jurisdiction. The relative stability of fishing
activities is thus called into question de facto by the strategies developed by “quota hoppers”, and due
to the absence of a real conflict of use23 on the resource. Yet, in order to try to counter “quota
hopping”, the supporters of which rely on the EU funding principles to legitimate the practice, the
States leaned on this principle of relative stability.
2.- Evolution of the strategies of quota hoppers: influence of the statutory framework.
The central question about “quota hopping” is obviously linked to the resource conservation system.
The different programmes initiated by the States to manage “quota hopping” officially aim at
preserving the access of their national fleets to their share of the community TAC, as defined from the
principle of relative stability. The challenge thus consists in maintaining the relative stability of the
fishing activities from which fishing-dependent populations and associated industries take advantage.
Yet, this relation between the fishing possibilities (i.e. the rights of a State to appropriate a share of the
community TAC), and the population that depends on fishing tends to disappear. “Quota hopping” is
only an example of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for restriction of access to fishing rights
appears to be limited. The progressive setting up of a statutory framework in the late 1990s now seems
to have a limited impact on the strategies of quota hoppers.
2.1- A juridical conflict: the seeking of arguments to “supervise” quota hopping.
The arbitration made by the community judge between the great community principles of liberal
nature (the principle of non-discrimination according to the nationality, and marginally those of
legitimate confidence and proportionality) and the derogatory principles of the PCP (institution of
reserved coastal strips, and quota system based on the principle of relative stability) allowed the
definition of the broad lines of the possibilities for supervision of the practice of “quota hopping” by
23
Even if some conflicts for space have been mentioned in the interviews.
10
Member States. In order to supervise “quota hopping”, the States can decide on two types of measures:
those independent from the resource conservation systems, and those which are linked to it24.
The European Justice Court adopted a liberal position about the statutory constraints related to the
ships’ specificities, the composition of the crews, and the presence of a stable establishment on the
territory, reminding that these conditions were subject to the rules of the community law, and
particularly the principle of non-discrimination and the freedom of establishment25. Being independent
from the conservation system, these conditions were not integrated in all the national regulations.
Concerning the study cases, France was the sole nation to really impose regulations that the ship had
to be controlled and managed from a stable establishment based on the territory of the ship’s flag.
Besides, it imposes rules requiring the official skipper of the vessel, and its second-in-command on
vessels in excess of 100 tons, must have the nationality of the ship’s flag26.
This condition is based on the civil state prerogatives that France considered indispensable aboard a
fishing vessel. This provision seems to be the most debated in terms of community law. Besides it is
now called into question by the “Franco-Spanish”27.
The broad lines of this condition of real economic link have been defined based on conclusions
pronounced by the European Court of Justice, after several recourses to the Commission 28. This
condition relies on the resource conservation system in order to make the principle of relative stability
of fishing activities prevail.
The demonstration of a real economic link determines access to the fishing rights of a nation, and thus
to its quotas, based on the evidence that the ship is of benefit to the fishing-dependent populations, as
well as to related industries. This two-level reasoning, referring to quotas, and to fishing-dependent
populations, partly explains the vague formulation of these recommendations, and in the end poses a
number of coherence problems regarding its interpretation.
2.2.- Transcriptions different from the real economic link in the internal rights of the States.
In the UK, for a ship willing to have access to British quotas, most of the regulations about “quota
hopping” have been oriented around the demonstration of the real economic link. This demonstration
can be done based on from four criteria at the choice of the ship owner. The first is directly linked to
the conservation system since it requires the landing of least 50% of the vessel’s catches of quota
stocks in the UK. The second concerns crews since the ship must employ a crew comprised of a least
24
Forthcoming report to the European Commission, project FAIR N°CT98-4409
“Pesca Valencia” and “Factortame II” cases.
26
JORF (French Republic Bulletin) 27 February 1996, pages 3094s “portant du code du travail maritime”.
27
See for instance “le Marin”, 27 October 2000.
28
“Agegate” and “Jaderow” cases, and letter of application.
25
11
50% of seamen living in a UK coastal location. These first two conditions are roughly the same in
France29. The sole difference is that the catches concerned are not explicitly catches of quota species in
the first criterion. The link is implicit as it refers to decisions of the Court. The French circular
specifies this first criterion by the fact that a “substantial part” of the catches landed in France must be
sold locally, - without any additional clarification concerning the notion of “substantial part”. The
third criterion differs between the UK and France since the UK defines a given level of operating
expenditure in the UK for goods and services provided in UK coastal areas, - with no additional
clarification on the “given level”. In a different way, the French legislation prefers a condition based
on the fact that at least 50% of the fishing operations must start from a French port. The fourth
criterion is common to the two nations. The economic link can be demonstrated by any other mean,
including the combination of the three criteria mentioned above. The British law specifies that the
means implemented must provide a sufficient profit to the fishing-dependent populations and to the
related industries.
2.3.- Management of “quota hopping”: limited effects.
These statutory frameworks add an additional constraint in the exploitation of “foreign-owned”vessels.
The first constraint, historically and in the absence of regulations of the real economic link, was to
guarantee the cost efficiency of ship-owning companies, in spite of the dissociation between fishing
areas and selling locations. This constraint has been overcome thanks to the development of a system
of “advanced bases”, as with the case of the industrial ship-owning companies of the Atlantic coasts of
France. The principle of “advanced bases” allows for the preservation of a mode of exploitation based
on the relationship between Selling Location (market demand) and Targeted Species (type of fishing,
fishing area). The fuel cost differential, the other supply expenses and auction room taxes, as well as
the cost of repatriation by road to the country of origin30, are balanced by the saving in money
resulting from the absence of fuel expenses to sail back to the port of origin, and especially by shorter
distances to the fishing area, which allows for the optimisation of the time spent fishing and the
duration of the campaigns. The repartition of the different calls is closely linked to the existence of
differentiated markets between France and the UK, and Spain and the Netherlands. In France and in
the UK, the most part of the expenses related to the ship are made in the state of origin. This is
illustrated by the case of the “Anglo-Dutch” because almost the totality of the landings are carried out
in the ports of origin, and in the case of the “foreign-owned”, in order to take advantage from the
significant cost differentials, whatever the rate of trips back to the ports of origin31. The other
29
Circular dated 31 August 1998, relative to the application of the clauses of the outline act n° 97-1051, 18
November 1997 on maritime fisheries and marine cultivations (art. 6-8-10) relative to “quota-hopping”.
30
Means the port from where the owners are coming, vs the registration port or “welcoming” port.
31
In all cases, the expenses linked to the ship and to supply in “welcoming” ports only intervene as complement
or in case of necessity.
12
expenses result from the repartition of calls between the state of origin and the state that “welcomes”
the ship. In the case of the “Franco-Spanish” working in “advanced bases” in the Bay of Biscay, or in
the zone ICES VII, according to the interviews, 80% of the fuel expenses are made in the
“welcoming” state, versus only 20% for supply expenses. Without “advanced bases”, the proportion
reverses, and about 80% of the expenses are made in the state of origin. In terms of cost differential,
the “Anglo-Spanish” ships, for instance, made about 50% of their fuel expenses in the UK in 1999
(results of the survey), though this budget heading only represents 12.5% of these ships’ turnover,
versus 20% for British vessels having the same fishing activity.
This repartition thus depends on the type of exploitation the vessel adopts, as well as on the
requirements of the regulation. This demands, or requirements, do not necessarily impact the strategies
of exploitation of “mixed” ships.
This depends on the choice of the possibilities of justification of the real economic link, and therefore
on the adaptation of the ship to apply this choice. Yet, the different possibilities offered allowed the
boats to choose criteria enabling them to change their strategies of exploitation in a relatively
reasonable proportion32. It is the case for the two major fleets of the UK, as well as for the “FrancoSpanish”.
The British case is interesting as it displays two distinct fleets of “quota hoppers” submitted to the
same conditions of justification of the real economic link. Yet, these two fleets present opposite
behaviours. The purchases of fishing units and related fishing rights by Spanish investors were part of
a much wider movement of access to British fishing areas, since the declared catches of quota species
are below 30% of the total. Conversely, the catches made by “Anglo-Dutch” vessels are almost totally
comprised of quota species, mainly destined to the Dutch market. A review of the strategies of the
ship-owning companies does not reveal any remarkable change in the way “Anglo-Spanish” or
“Anglo-Dutch” vessels have operated since the application of the regulation on the LER, of 1st January
1998. Even if the MAFF highlighted a clear increase in the landings (in percentage) of “AngloSpanish” boats in British auction rooms (Table 6), concerning the volumes of landed catches
compared to the total activity of these ships, this increase is relative.
32
This assumption is just based on the data available and on the sole interviews in the case of France.
13
Table 6 – Volumes of fish landed in the UK by the Anglo-Spanish fleet, in 1998 and 1999.
1998 (tons)
1999 (tons)
% change
Total landings
2,127
7,047
+ 230%
Quota stocks
1,125
4,017
+ 260%
Non-quota stocks
1,002
3,030
+ 200%
Source. MAFF 2000
Related to the volumes landed, these figures highlight the ambiguity of the objectives sought by the
national regulation concerning the real economic link. Though “Anglo-Spanish” vessels have
significantly increased (in percentages) their landings in British ports to reach 52% of their total quota
catches (Table 2), landings in British ports taken as a whole only represent ¼ of the catches declared.
The effect of the need for a real economic link is reduced since it only integrates quota species. Yet,
the quota species of these ships represent only a third of their total activity. Reaching a percentage of
50% of quota catches in British ports is therefore less constraining. Seventy five percent of the catches
are directly landed in Spain, and the rest, which are landed in the UK, is almost exclusively destined
for the Spanish market. Conformity with the conditions of a real economic link is established, yet with
no fundamental change in the modes of exploitation.
These ship-owning firms had to increase the proportion of landings in British ports, with a number of
additional calls. Now, the analysis of cost data related to the fishing areas and to the calls in British
ports reveals the continuity of privileged relations with Spanish harbours, notably concerning the
ship’s maintenance and repair, and more generally all expenses of exploitation except refuelling and
icing.
Conversely, the “Anglo-Dutch” vessels justified their real economic link starting from a condition
with no direct relation with the landings of quota species made in British ports. Now, the choice to
conform to such a condition would have been much more constraining, since this fleet only harvest
quota species for the Dutch market.
The share of landings in British ports has not changed, and now remains stable at a maximum of about
1% (in value). The expenses that allow for the justification of the real economic link are due to the
employment of British seamen, for whom the geographical situation allows, with very few constraints,
to keep relations with their home port in the “welcoming” state. Besides, these expenses also refer to
refuelling operations, which in spite of quite a few calls, represent a significant value. The low cost
differentials explain for the most part this strategic choice. Unfortunately, unlike the case of the
“Anglo-Spanish”, the MAFF report does not quantify as precisely the criteria that are used by the
“Anglo-Dutch” to justify their real economic link. This is probably due to the vagueness of the
14
criterion used, as already mentioned, and to the related freedom of interpretation. Yet, another reason
has been proposed by Ch. Lequesne33. The reason why both professional organisations and the
administration focus their attention on “quota hoppers” from Spain, in France as well as in the UK,
might be due to their reticence to accept a calling into question of the hierarchy in terms of
North/South relations, from competitive and dynamic economic operators coming from the South. On
the contrary, the development of investments in Spain by French hypermarket groups has never posed
any problem.
The French statutory framework is more constraining as it imposes that the ship’s official skipper must
be of French nationality. In the same way, it imposes that the ship must be controlled and managed
from a stable company based on the territory. This constraint of having a French skipper onboard is
quite important in terms of costs, since the activity of “foreign-owned” fleets reproduces that of
Spanish fleets. In almost all cases, the ship’s command is assured by the “pesca”, the real and effective
ship’s skipper, even if he is not the official one. The skipper mentioned on the crew list is French, and
his role just consists in taking its watch and fulfil the requirements. The cost related to the French
skipper is thus a net extra cost for the vessels’ exploitation34. The constraint of the stable company on
the territory also represents a significant extra cost for the “foreign-owned” fishing firms. The
functions assured by this company are variable. It is generally a management company or cooperative,
for which the cost level depends on the services given35. An additional cost results from the
progressive support of almost all “mixed” ships to institutions of French producers, to which they pay
back 1%36 of the turnover, whatever the landing or catch sale places37. It is thus not surprising that the
related expenses integrate into the justification of the real economic link, and that the sole complement
is assured from the landings and sales made on the French territory. There again, the changes in the
exploitation have been relatively limited, just because the condition of landing only intervenes in
complement, and also because the strategies of a certain proportion of the “Franco-Spanish” fleet have
already developed on the fringe of the link with a given territory. Adaptation was then easier for
vessels using the system of advanced bases, by sorting potentially sold catches, or better, by selling
them at French auctions, according to the determinants already used by these companies before the
application of the law on the real economic link.
33
Ch. Lequesne, 1998, page 13.
This extra cost is also due to the difficulty of finding a skilled French shipper who accepts to board on a
“Franco-Spanish” ship and share, in the best case, the ship’s command with the “pesca”. The effect of this rare
and specific workforce is an increase in the wages for a French skipper. This cost was assessed from the
interviews at about 15,000 francs of net wage per person and per month.
35
These services range from a simple accountancy to a certain part of the ship’s exploitation (recruitment of the
crews, relations with PO’s and authorities…).
36
Generally speaking, but this percentage cannot be negotiated.
37
Given the repartition of the sales between Spain and France, and therefore considering the potentially low
withdrawals, the “foreign-owned” ships are considered as good clients by the PO’s (according to the interviews).
34
15
Conclusion
By comparing these three fleets, notably taking into account their strategies, it appears that they are all
focused on the supply of their markets of origin. The justification of the real economic link with the
territory does not seem to be so constraining, given the different possibilities offered. The definition of
the criteria remains too vague, even if related conditions such as the skipper’s nationality in France,
brings and additional level of constraint. Yet, the vagueness of the definition is also related to the lack
of rigor in the objectives sought.
The “Anglo-Spanish”, for which the activity on quota species is low (30% of the catches declared),
justified their real economic link from the condition referring to the landings of these quota species in
British ports. This evidence correlates with the hypotheses of the community jurisprudence, which
first bases its conclusions on the resource conservation system, which is itself related to fishingdependent populations and to the related industries. This being said, the proportion of quota species
catches is relatively low compared to the two other fleets mentioned in this study. On the contrary,
“Anglo-Dutch” and “Franco-Spanish” ships mainly target quota species up to 70 or 80% depending on
those considered in France, and almost integrally in the case of the “Anglo-Dutch”. Yet, the
justification of the real economic link by these fleets was made from criteria that are not directly based
on the resource conservation system because they do not take into consideration the sole proportion of
quota catches. In this case, it is more an economic link between the ship and the “welcoming” state
based upon the fishing activity taken as a whole. The evolutions in the seeking of access to fishing
rights, and more generally to community fishing areas, imposes to clarify the rules and modes of
attribution of these rights.
The concentrations in the fishing sector in general, as well as the development of systems such as
“advanced bases”, call into question the economic link between the ship’s port of registration and the
ground installations that it uses. The difficulty to find crews, especially for long campaigns, tends to
favour even more rapidly the disappearance of this link with the port of registration, due to the
necessity to recruit seamen out of the “welcoming” territory, and even out of the country of origin (e.g.
Portugal). From then on, the ship-owning companies, which can concentrate some part of their activity
according to market determinants, to the quality of the services given, and to the correlation between
supply and their expectations, will try to use them as efficiently as possible in order to meet
imperatives of profitability. The regulations on the real economic link have been an additional
incentive to exploit the respective assets of the different countries. Yet, the French case clearly shows
despite the fact that the greatest part of the “mixed” fleet is registered in Bayonne, there is a trend to
frequent the north ports of France, and notably those of Brittany (Lorient, Concarneau) in order to take
16
advantage of services more adapted to a stronger exploitation38 of the activity in French ports. The
notion of “fishing-dependent populations”, and more particularly concerning their local nature, also
needs to be clarified.
38
i.e. in ports where historically, a strong activity developed around industrial fishing.
17
References.
Anonyme, 2000. Monographie des Pêches Maritimes des Pyrénées Atlantiques et des Landes, année
1999. DIDAM, 38 p.
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Atlantique - cas des navires rattachés aux quartiers maritimes de Bayonne et de La Rochelle » Rapport
interne Ifremer - DRV/RH/LHA, 56 p. + annexes.
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Rapport Ifremer DRV/RH/LHA, 176 p.
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81.
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18
Morin M. (2000), “The fisheries resources in the European Union, the distribution of TACs : principle
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19
Annex 1. Distribution of the
fishing areas – « french
spanish » fleet of the maritime
areas of Bayonne and La
Rochelle – 1998. Source :
La Rochelle – netters - 1998
Nathalie Caill-Milly (2000)
Bayonne – Netters over 20 meters in length - 1998.
Bayonne – Netters under 20 meters in length - 1998.
Bayonne –mix trawlers - 1998
Bayonne – bottom trawlers - 1998
20
Annex 2. Distribution of the sales of the « franco-spanish » fleet.
Administrative maritime area of Bayonne.
Distribution per species of the sales in Spain « french spanish » vessels registered in the
maritime area of Bayonne - 1998
Others
23%
Distribution per species of the sales in France « french spanish » vessels registered in the
maritime area of Bayonne - 1998
Monkfish
15%
Monkfish
31%
Others
35%
Pout
3%
Various
4%
Siki
4%
Megrim
12%
Hake
13%
Saithe
9%
Hake
23%
Various skates
9%
Haddock
10%
Whiting
9%
Source : Nathalie CAILL-MILLY (2000)
Administrative maritime area of La Rochelle.
Distribution per species of the sales in Spain « french spanish » vessels registered in the
maritime area of La Rochelle - 1998
Edible crab
4%
Various
4%
Monkfish
34%
Distribution per species of the sales in France « french spanish » vessels registered in the
maritime area of La Rochelle - 1998
Others
11%
Others
15%
Pout
6%
Hake
47%
Hake
48%
Whiting
7%
Monkfish
12%
Meagre
12%
Source : Nathalie CAILL-MILLY (2000)
21