Eliminative Materialism
The Case Against Folk
Psychology
Intertheoretic Reduction
Certain (usually older) theories can be seen as special cases of
other (usually newer) theories
We say the older theory reduces to, or is reduced by, the newer
theory
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Kepler’s planetary astronomy reduces to Newton’s Laws of Motion
Newton’s Laws of Motion reduce to Einstein’s General Relativity
Common sense theory of sound reduces to physical theory of
compression waves in a plastic medium
Common sense theory of heat reduces to kinetic theory
A genuine reduction occurs when, in the newer theory, we can
derive a set of claims about certain objects and their relations which
are relevantly isomorphic to (sufficiently mirror) the claims of the old
theory
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Note that this is a matter of degree
Within Newton’s system, one can basically deduce Kepler’s system
Within General Relativity, Newton’s Laws turn out only to be very close
approximations requiring the assumption of low masses, low velocities, and
short distances
Not every aspect of common sense theory of sound/heat reduces to physical
theory
Intertheoretic Reduction
When a Reduction occurs, the language of the old theory
may be dispensed with, but (a significant amount of) the
structure of the old theory lives on within the new theory
Thus reduced theories are NOT eliminated
They are, in a sense, given legitimacy
They are incorporated into a new and more
encompassing theory
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Identity Theorists think that FP will reduce to Neurology
Functionalists and Classical AI theorists think that FP will reduce
to a more abstract theory of formally specified symbols and
operations
Dennett Rejects the question of reduction as inappropriate,
misunderstanding the function and success of FP
Theory Elimination
When the resources of a new theory outstrip that of an
old theory, and there is no portion of the new theory
which sufficiently mirrors the old, the old theory is said to
be eliminated
The New replaces the Old
The Old loses its legitimacy
Little to no structure of the old is preserved
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Copernican/Newtonian (heliocentric) view of the Solar system
eliminates the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian (geocentric) view
Kinetic theory of heat eliminates the caloric theory
Oxidation theory of combustion eliminates the phlogiston theory
Neuro-psychological theories of mental illness eliminate theories
of humors and daemonic possession
We find is that we were seriously wrong about what
objects existed and how they interrelated to produce the
phenomena we were theorizing about
Eliminative Materialism
Folk Psychology is a “radically false” and
“radically misleading” conception of human
cognition and the causes of human behavior
FP will be replaced by a “completed
neuroscience”
“Our mutual understanding and even our
introspection may then be reconstituted within
the [more powerful] conceptual framework of
completed neuroscience”
The Case Against FP
1. Serious Explanatory, Predictive, and
Manipulative poverty
2. History of Stagnation and Retreat
3. Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical
Theory
4. 1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation,
retreat, lack of promise
5. A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater
than that of reduction
1. Explanatory, Predictive, and
Manipulative Poverty
a. Normal mental processes poorly explained or
not explained
Sleep, learning, memory, creativity, motor
coordination, differences in intelligence
b. Abnormal mental processes poorly explained
or not explained
Mental illness, effects of brain damage, intoxication,
psychopharmacological effects
c. Special importance on explanation of learning
1.c. Special importance on
explanation of learning
i.
No account of pre- and non-linguistic
learning
ii. No good account of learning a first
language
iii. No good account of the underlying
dynamics and kinematics of learning in
general
iv. No good account of conceptual change
in the individual
2. History of Stagnation and
Retreat
a. Virtually every other folk theory has been
eliminated—motion, heaven, fire, life, etc.—
unlikely we got this one right on the first try
b. Many domains of phenomena once explained
via the intentional categories of FP, now
explained in physical terms—behavior of
seasons, weather, animals, geology—
intentional categories of FP are in retreat
c. FP has not significantly advance in 3–4
millennia
3. Little Hope of Integration into
Overall Physical Theory
Biology, physiology, evolutionary theory,
neurology—all show a high degree of
integration into our basic physics
FP shows little or no hope of such
integration
FP shows little or no hope of progressing
Further to address its failings (stagnation
again)
4. Profile of of failure, stagnation,
retreat, lack of promise
1.–3. combine for a story of failure,
stagnation, retreat, lack of promise
A Priori Argument
A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater
than that of reduction
More ways for Neuroscience to be successful
while eliminating FP, than way for Neuroscience
to be successful while reducing FP
See pp. 46-47 of Matter and Consciousness
See Also p.45 for “The Vision”
Some Standard Objections to EM
FP is not an empirical falsifiable theory
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Rather it is the abstract descriptive core
required to understand any system as
intelligent and rational (no matter the
instantiation)
Traditional functionalism, classical AI, Dennett’s
intentional stance
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Rather, its central core concerning
Propositional Attitudes is normative,
characterizing the ideal reasoner
Being normative it cannot be falsified (?)
Dennett? Fodor?
Some Standard Objections to EM
I can Introspect Beliefs, Desires Qualia,
How could I be wrong about what I most
directly know?
Self-Effacing/Incoherent—see p. 48
Mountains out of Molehills
Clark’s Objections
Tension between the propositional modularity
apparently required by our notion of mental
causation and extreme holistic nature of neural
nets
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Could there be a deeper unity?
Deny that FP committed to inner propositions
(Dennett, scattered causes)
Accept incompatibility and go eliminativist
(Not Noticed By Clark) Find a deeper unity, but of a
structure which does not vindicate FP (Churchland, cf.
p. 76 of Mindware)
Clark’s Objections
Thought is systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn)
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So internal representations must be structured
Connectionist models lack structured internal representations
So connectionist models are not good models of human thought
Clark’s two suggested responses
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Classical symbol systems not the only way of supporting
structured representations (Churchland)
Human thought might gain what systematicity it displays from the
structure of human language (Clark? Dennett)
Bag-of-tricks—no central code or processor, but a bunch of
different (possibly multi-tasked and/or redundant) modules
(somehow) working in concert (Dennett, Churchland)
Clark’s Objections
Biological Reality
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Artificiality of tasks
Choice of problem structure
Abstraction and over-simplification
Dimensionality of input
Lack of exploitation of real-world structure for
problem solving
One-network-one-task attitude
Over-simplification of the structure and function of
neurons