Bullshitting and lying are not the same thing, as
Professor Harry Frankfurt contends in his book,
On Bullshit. But they are different from one
another not for the reason he gives, that
bullshitters do not care about the truth and liars
do. They differ from one another because hearers
(receivers) determine that the liar is purposely
not telling the truth, purposely deceiving, but the
bullshitter is one we perceive to be inaccurate
according to our beliefs about the truth. They
differ from one another in terms of our beliefs
about their beliefs of the validity of what they are
saying. The liar doesn’t believe in the truth of
what he/she is saying and the bullshitter may
believe in the truth of what he/she is saying but
they are wrong, as we see it. In short, if I do not
agree with you, I may choose to label you a
bullshitter, or, at the very least, I may choose to
label what you express as bullshit. In which case, I
deny the evidence you present. I see it as not
accurate—I do not agree with it. To call what you
have told me by the label “bullshit,” is to
emphatically deny the truth of what you said. I
think it would sound familiar to then say, “I just
don’t believe it.” Hence, the content alone does not
tell us what is and what is not bullshit. One
person’s truth is another’s bullshit. To deny what
you say as untrue is enough to stimulate me to
label what you say as bullshit. To call you a
bullshitter is to go beyond labeling what you say
as bullshit. It is to attribute to you a disposition, a
tendency to utter bullshit in more than just this
one instance. For me to call you a bullshitter says
as much about me and my beliefs as it does about
you and what you say.
To bullshit is to embellish an untrue statement, to
support it with reasons, claims, supposed truths.
We hypothesize that to bullshit is a more
complicated cognitive process than to lie.
Bullshitting requires greater cognitive effort to
produce and to detect than does lying.