Mnemosyne 67 (2013) 613-630
brill.com/mnem
Ps.Plutarch/Aëtius Plac. 4.11
Some Comments on Sensation and Concept
Formation in Stoic Thought
Jaap Mansfeld
Utrecht University, Department of Philosophy,
P.O. Box 80125, 3518 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands
[email protected]
Received: March 2012; accepted: April 2012
Abstract
Ps.Plutarch Plac. ch. 4.11 is an abridged Aëtian chapter. Material that has been cut
can be identified. In its original shape the chapter not only provided information on
the perception of external objects but also, presumably, on inner perception, i.e. selfawareness. The mind of the newborn infant is not a mere tabula rasa, but a tabula
capable of constructing faithful and lasting images of what is perceived. The two final
lemmata of the chapter show how Placita literature could be updated, and so date the
account.
Keywords
abridgement – heading – awareness – oikeiôsis – school age
1
Chapter 11 of Book IV of Aëtius’ physical doxography deals with the Stoic view,
or a Stoic view, of concept formation through the assimilation of sense data.
According to this account a crucial part in the formation of conceptions is
played by prolêpseis, or ‘preconceptions’; that is, conceptions that are generated through sensation in early childhood in what is called a ‘natural’ way,
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without instruction.1 Chrysippus in Book I of his On Logos cited by Diogenes
Laertius is said to have listed preconception next to perception as criteria of
truth, though elsewhere, like others, he favoured the cataleptic presentation.2
An added note in Diogenes (omitted at SVF 2.105) tells us that ‘a preconception
is a natural conception of universals’, but it is not certain that this explanation
too derives from Chrysippus.3
In the standard textbook of Hellenistic philosophy the greater part of
Aët. 4.11 (without heading) is printed in translation and commented on in the
chapter dealing with impressions of the first volume, while the corresponding
text in Greek is to be found in the second volume.4 In the chapter on universals of the second volume the authors also print the Greek text of the final two
Dielsian lemmata of Aët. 4.11.5
The interpretation of this chapter has in the first place to deal with the issue
of its completeness. This takes two forms. On the one hand, it is clear and has
of course been noticed that as a Stoic account of concept formation in general
it is insufficient,6 because the only type of concepts exemplified is concerned
with sense data such as ‘white’, that is, with qualities of external objects. But
according to a standard Stoic account of concept formation found in Diogenes
Laertius other types of concept are of course generated as well, exemplified
inter alia by ‘death’, generated through ‘opposition’, or the incorporeals ‘lekta
and place’, generated through ‘transition’.7 Diogenes Laertius ad finem also
mentions notions of ‘something good and just’, which are ‘thought naturally’
(φυσικῶς . . . νοεῖται). But concepts such as ‘death’ and ‘place’ and ‘good’ are
not acquired in the same way as ‘white’. Yet ethical concepts are generated
in a manner comparable to that of the generation of concepts like ‘white’, for
according to Aët. 4.11.3 the latter, too, ‘arise naturally’ (φυσικῶς γίνονται).
On the other hand, a closer look at the text of Aët. 4.11 suggests that the
incompleteness of this account is not just a matter of a narrow empiricist focus
on the acquisition of concepts of physical qualities through the senses, to the
1 See Frede 1999, 315, 319-320, who translates πρόληψις as ‘anticipation’ and emphasizes that
these notions come to us naturally and unavoidably and “just capture the common content
of cognitive impressions.”
2 D.L. 7.54 ~ SVF 2.105, LS 40A.
3 Sandbach 1971, 29; Jackson-McCabe 2004, 327, n. 24.
4 Long & Sedley 1987, 1.238 (39E) + 2.240-1.
5 Long & Sedley 1987, 2.185 (30j).
6 See below, n. 10 and text thereto, and Scott 1988, esp. 137-138 with reference to Plu. CN 1070CD
(abest ab SVF et FDS) and D.L. 7.53 (~ SVF 2.87, LS 39D): “the account that Aetius gives is not
the whole story.”
7 D.L. 7.53.
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exclusion of other concepts. We are first informed about the registration, or
listing (apographê), of sense data like ‘white’, but then read about a ‘first [or:
primary] way of listing’ (4.11.2, πρῶτος . . . τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος) without being
informed about a second, let alone a third, and about ‘the aforesaid ways’
(4.11.3, τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους), although at a first glance only one such way
has been mentioned:
(11.2) The first way of listing is by means of the senses. Suppose it is of a
white something; when it has gone away they have a memory (mnêmê) of
it. When many memories of the same sort have occurred, then, we say
that they have an experience (empeiria). For an experience is nothing but
the set of impressions (phantasiai) of the same sort.
Some of these conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways [sic],
and without technical elaboration; others are in the end produced by our
instruction and attention. The latter are called conceptions only, the former also preconceptions.8
The absence of explicitly formulated other ways of listing suggests that there
is a lacuna in the text. But Diels argued long ago that a plurality of ways is
implicitly at issue in the terms ‘memory’ plus ‘experience’ at 4.11.2.9 Zeller however continued to believe that the account is incomplete, and so did Bonhöffer,
Pohlenz, and—at first—Sandbach.10 But Sedley, following Diels, convinced
Sandbach that ‘memory and experience’ adequately represent a plurality of
ways.11 Jackson-McCabe and van Sijl disagree with this solution.12
With one exception, viz. Zeller who referred to the working method of
ps.Plutarch the epitomist, the discussion has focused on the text of the chapter and omitted to include its context and background. It seems to have been
forgotten that what we have here is only ps.Plutarch’s version of Aëtius, since
the part of Stobaeus’ ch. 1.58 (‘On impression and the criterion’), which would
have contained the corresponding version, has been lost. Ps.Plutarch’s Placita
8
9
10
11
12
Aët. 4.11.2-3, πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος
οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν· τῶν δ᾿ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικῶς γίνονται κατὰ
τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως, αἱ δ᾿ ἤδη δι᾿ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας·
αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόνον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις.
Diels 1879, 400 apparatus; note that he writes μνήμην καὶ ἐμπειρίαν, but this formula is not
found in the text of the chapter and the words occur at some distance from each other.
Zeller and Bonhöffer, see below n. 14; Sandbach 1930 = 1971, 25-26; Pohlenz 1940, 82, and
1984, 2.33. Cf. Brittain 2005, 172.
Sandbach 1985, 80, n. 118. Cf. Long & Sedley 1987, 2.241.
Jackson-McCabe 2004, 329 with n. 29; van Sijl 2010, 10-12.
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is an epitomê, a digest or abridgement of Aëtius.13 It is, accordingly, a quite
ordinary phenomenon for bits and pieces of the original text to have been cut.
Zeller, aware of Diels’ argument in the Doxographi Graeci about our sources
for Aëtius, submitted that “the author of the Placita perhaps provides a bad
abstract.”14
The heading of the chapter, which also occurs in the Historia philosopha,
that is, in ps.Galen’s epitome of ps.Plutarch’s epitome (ch. 92), and in the Arabic
translation of ps.Plutarch by Qusta ibn Luqa made accessible by Daiber (1980),
intimates that this is indeed the case. This heading is Πῶς γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ
ἡ ἔννοια καὶ ὁ κατὰ <ἐν>διάθεσιν λόγος (‘How does the sensation come to be and
the conception and the interior reason’ [and/or: ‘inner speech’]).15 In its present condition the text of the chapter fails to deal with the origin of ἡ αἴσθησις,
or sensation in general, since it is only concerned with the sensation of external data. It also fails to deal with the origin of ἡ ἔννοια, or conception in general, since it is only concerned with conceptions of sense data such as white.
And it fails to advert further to the fact that the ‘reason/speech on account of
which we are called rational’ at age seven is inner reason/speech (logos kata
<en>diathesin, usually called logos endiathetos).16 The heading thus supports
the view of those scholars who believe that, apart from a ‘first’, (at least) a sec­
ond way of concept formation may originally have been formulated as well.
We should also take the larger Aëtian context into account. Book IV chs. 2-23
deals with the soul. The long series consisting of chs. 4.8-21 is about ­sensation
13
14
15
16
See Diels 1879, passim, Mansfeld & Runia 1997, 187-191.
Zeller 1880, 74, n. 2 = 1909, 76, n. 2: “vielleicht hat aber der Verfasser der Placita hier
schlecht exzerpiert, und die Worte beziehen sich ursprünglich auf die verschiedenen
Arten der Begriffsbildung.” Bonhöffer (1890, 194-195) believes that “zwischen den Worten
πλῆθος und τῶν δ᾿ ἐννοιῶν ein Satz ausgefallen ist (vielleicht auch mehrere Sätze, worin
die verschiedenen Arten der Begriffsbildung aufgezählt wurden)”, so does not think of
abridgement but of an accident of transmission.
For the authenticity and function of Aëtian chapter headings see Mansfeld & Runia 2009,
1.196-204. The false etymology of titulus in Remigius of Auxerre (and other medieval
authors) is illuminating; see Remig. in Donat. p. 1.8-10 Fox, Titulus dicitur a Titane, id est
a sole, quia, sicut sol illuminat mundum, ita et titulus librum, and Huygens 1970, p. 29.8-12,
with note (Accessus Sedulii), p. 60.68-69 (Bernardus Traiectensis). Most recent editions
and translations of Aët. 4.11 I have seen omit the heading, but SVF 2.83 and FDS 277 have it;
Inwood & Gerson, too, include it (2008, 48-49), meticulously referring to both ps.Plutarch
and the pagination of the DG.
Aët. 4.11.4a, ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ᾿ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί, ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι
λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (also printed SVF 1.149). Qusta ibn Luqa’s rendering ‘die
Logik des Denkens’ (see Daiber 1980) confirms Wyttenbach’s conjecture <ἐν>διάθεσιν.
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(αἴσθησις) and sense objects; the reliability of the senses; how sensation and
conception come to be etc. (our ch. 4.11); the difference between impression
and imagination etc. (ch. 4.12); the individual senses (except touch) with
special attention to visual phenomena; sound; and finally the general issue
how the soul comes to be percipient (αἰσθητική)17 and what is its regent part
(ch. 4.21, cf. 4.5). The focus is on αἴσθησις, its nature, instruments, reliability,
various forms, and so on. In ps.Plutarch/Aëtius concept formation is merely a
side issue, one linked with and dependent on sensation, αἴσθησις. It only needs
to be referred to in relation to sensation, not in itself. It does not have a chapter
of its own.
If, therefore, we should wish to identify a second ‘way of registration’,
abridged away by ps.Plutarch, we should look for a second way of sensation.
Zeller and Bonhöffer, followed by Sandbach and Pohlenz, so to speak took
the wrong turning by postulating that Aët. 4.11 should immediately be supplemented by an account such as that of concept formation at D.L. 7.53-54.18 But
in that passage most concepts are derived from other concepts; only those of
sense data (αἰσθητά) are acquired through direct contact (κατὰ περίπτωσιν) and
parallel to ‘white’, while only of those of ‘just and good’, as we have seen above,
it is said that they are ‘thought naturally’. The concept of ‘the centre of the
earth, derived by analogy from that of smaller balls’, is not natural, since the
concept of the earth’s sphericity is not natural to begin with. Diogenes’ list is
a mixed bag.
2
The nature of this second way of registration through αἴσθησις can be determined. In his Êthikê Stoicheiôsis the Stoic Hierocles (ca. 100 CE, so not far from
Aëtius) acerbically criticizes ‘slow-witted opponents who believe that sensation has only been given by nature to the living being for awareness in relation
to external objects, and not also in relation to that of itself’.19 So according
17
This ps.Plutarchean chapter, reporting Stoic doctrine as well (no parallel in Stobaeus, ~
SVF 2.836), also only deals with the five senses, though the movement is from the regent
part to the sense organs, not the other way round (the tentacles of the octopus). Its final
lemma states the Stoic minority position that the regent part is in the head.
18 Zeller 1880, cited above n. 14; Bonhöffer 1890, 195; Sandbach 1930, 46 = 1996, 26; Pohlenz
1940, 82.
19Hierocl. El. Eth. col. 1.42-46 Bastianini & Long (abest ab FDS), οὕ(τω) γ(ὰρ) αὖ βραδε[ῖς]
κ(αὶ) πόρρω συν[έ]σεω[ς] ἔνιοι τυγχάνουσιν ὥ[σ]τε κ(αὶ) τ(οῖς) ὅλοις ἀπ[ι]στεῖν εἰ τὸ ζῶιο(ν)
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to this Stoic doctrine there really are two ways of sensation: inward as well as
outward.
As is clear from the example provided at Aët. 4.11.2, the ‘first manner’ is actualized through each of the senses in relation to external objects, and pertains
to colours (and sounds, smells and so on, cf. Aët. 4.12.1).20 This indeed leaves
room for a manner of registration which does not occur via the individual
senses but through the ‘sensus communis the Stoics call ‘inner touch’, according
to which we are also aware of ourselves’:21 a mere awareness or sensation that
does not involve reflection or introspection. Accordingly the notion of selfawareness (sensus sui as Cicero has it, see below) or inner sensation is at home
in the world of the Placita. But the lemma of this earlier Aëtian chapter has not
been preserved in ps.Plutarch’s epitome, but only among Stobaeus’ far more
generous abstracts of ch. 4.8 at Anth. chs. 1.50 and 1.51. So the purported loss of
a reference to this primary sensation of the self in ps.Plutarch’s abridgement
of Aët. 4.11 is parallel to its actual loss in ps.Plutarch’s abridgement of Aët. 4.8.
But for Aët. 4.11 no compensation can be forthcoming from Stobaeus, whose
abstract of the latter chapter is lost together with most of Anth. 1.58.
This other, or second, mode of sensation, viz. the αἴσθησις of the self, is also
well attested elsewhere as a Stoic doctrine. Both Cicero and Seneca mention
small children (parvi, infans) in this context.22 Aisthêsis is a necessary condition of oikeiôsis, as is made clear by Hierocles:
(αἰ)σθάνετ(αι) ἑαυτοῦ. δοκοῦσι γ(ὰρ) τ(ὴν) αἴσ[θη]σιν ὑπὸ τ(ῆς) φύσεως αὐτῷ δ[(ε)]δόσθ(αι)
πρ(ὸς) τ(ὴν) τ(ῶν) ἐκτὸς [ἀ]ντίλη[ψιν], οὐκέ[τι δ(ὲ) κ(αὶ) πρ(ὸς) τ[ὴ]ν ἑαυτοῦ. See also ibid.
col. 1.37-39 (~ LS 57C(2)), ‘one should keep in mind that the living being is aware of itself
from the moment of birth’ (οὐκ ἀγνοητέον [ὅ]τι τὸ ζῶιον εὐθὺς ἅμα [τῷ] γεν[έσ]θαι (αἰ)
σθάνεται [ἑα]υτοῦ), and col. 4.38-44 (~ LS 53C(5)). For the date of Hierocles see Bastianini
& Long 1992, 283-284; Long 1996, 252.
20 ‘An impression (phantasia) is an affection occurring in the soul, which within itself
reveals also its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through seeing; and it is this affection that enables
us to say that there is a white object that stimulates us. And similarly when we perceive
through touch and smell’ (~ SVF 2.54, LS 39B(2)).
21 Aët. 4.8.7 (~ SVF 2.852) ‹οἱ› Στωικοὶ τήνδε τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ἐντὸς ἁφὴν προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’
ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. Cited from SVF at Pohlenz 1940, 90.
22Cic. Fin. 3.16 (~ SVF 3.182), ‘but it would be impossible that they [sc. infants] should
want anything unless they possessed awareness of the self, and consequently felt affection for themselves’ ( fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid [sc. parvi], nisi sensum
haberent sui eoque se diligerent); Sen. Ep. 121.5 (~ SVF 3.184), ‘we wished to find out whether
all living beings have an awareness of their constitution’ (quaerebamus, an esset omnibus
animalibus constitutionis suae sensus), ibid. 121.11 ‘the child . . . feels that it is a living being’
(infans . . . animal esse se sentit). Self-awareness is attested for Chrysippus at D.L. 7.85
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It seems right to say a few words about sensation. For this induces knowledge of the first thing which is appropriate (to prôton oikeion), the subject
which we said would be the best starting-point for the Elements of Ethics.23
And where Hierocles says sensation he in the first place thinks of self-awareness, as we have seen above.24 Bastianini and Long cite sentences from Plutarch
and Porphyry as parallels for the idea that oikeiôsis begins with aisthêsis, or
even is (a kind of ) aisthêsis.25 Inner sensation results in self-awareness, and
self-awareness is a condition of oikeiôsis. Oikeiôsis begins with being aware of
what is ‘own’ or not ‘own’, that is, pleasant or painful in the sense of what needs
to be accepted or rejected in order to survive: proto-ethical notions.26
Another passage that has been adduced in this context27 is Plu. CN 1070C,
a passage which includes a kind of concepts absent in ps. Plutarch’s abridgement of Aët. 4.11. According to Plutarch, not always a sympathetic critic, the
Stoic view is not clear about the relative value of moral notions as compared
with that of sense data:
(~ SVF 3.178; the text needs to be corrected). See further Engberg-Pedersen 1990, 66-72;
Long 1996; Inwood 1999, 678-682 and esp. Bastianini & Long 1992, 379-396. Discussion
of the evidence at Doxographia ethica A ap. Stobaeum Ecl. 2.7.3c, p. 47.12-20 Wachsmuth
must be postponed till another occasion. For the Cyrenaics see Cic. Luc. 20, quid de tactu
et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis etc., and ibid. 76,
ea se sola percipere quae tactu intumo sentient; for Epicureanism cf. Lucr. 2.433-439, who
distinguishes between two kinds of touch, one reacting to things entering from outside,
the other registering what happens in our body.
23Hierocl. El. Eth. col. 1.34-37 Bastianini & Long, βραχέα δ(ὲ) δο[κ]εῖ γε π(ερὶ) [τ(ῆς)] αἰσ[θ]
ήσ[ε]ω[ς] εἰπεῖν· φέρει γ(ὰρ) εἰς γνῶσι[ν] τ(οῦ) [πρ]ώτο[υ ο]ἰκείου, [ὃ]ν δὴ λόγον ἀρχὴν
ἀρίστ[ην] ἔφαμ(εν) ἔσεσ[θαι τ(ῆς)] ἠθικ(ῆς) στοιχειώ[σε(ως)] (tr. Long & Sedley, slightly
modified).
24 See above, n. 19 and text thereto; see already Pohlenz 1940, 82-89, though he appeals to
sunaisthêsis of external sense data also discussed in the Êthikê Stoicheiôsis rather than to
inner aisthêsis. See further the texts and commentary at LS 57 (plus the comment on 1.375
and the note to 60B at 2.365), and esp. Long’s argument about the priority of sensation
qua cause over against impulse (hormê) in relation to oikeiôsis at Bastianini & Long 1992,
381-384. Good account by Babut at Casevitz & Babut 2002, 217-9.
25Plu. SR 1038C (~ SVF 1.197), rather imprecise, ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ
ἀντίληψις εἶναι, and Porph. Abst. 3.19 (~ SVF 1.197), καὶ γὰρ οἰκειώσεως πάσης καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεως
ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἀρχὴν τίθενται δικαιοσύνης οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος (from τὴν δὲ
not cited by Bastianini & Long).
26 Pohlenz 1940, 82-89.
27 Pohlenz 1940, 89; Scott 1988, 137-138; see the discussion by Babut cit., above n. 24.
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. . . matters concerning good things and evil and objects of choice and
avoidance and things appropriate and foreign, the clarity of which ought
to be more manifest than that of things hot and cold and white and black,
since the impressions of the latter follow upon the sensations from without, whereas the former are generated intrinsically from the principles
that are within us?28
Scott argues that the main point of contrast is between ἐπεισόδιοι and σύμφυτον,
between ‘incidental’ and ‘intrinsically’ as, following Cherniss, he translates.29
But the main contrast, surely, is between ‘from without’ and ‘within us’, which
immediately recalls the contrast in Hierocles.30 An interesting parallel is provided by Ptolemy, who explicitly states that ‘perception of self and of one’s
own movements31 according to inner sunaisthêsis precedes that of the primary
sense organs and outside objects’.32
3
The text of Aët. 4.11 contains other ingredients that have been insufficiently
exploited. Let us first look at the introductory lemma:
28
ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν οἰκείων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων, ἃ μᾶλλον
ἔδει θερμῶν [τε] καὶ ψυχρῶν λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων σαφεστέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν· ἐκείνων
μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθέν εἰσιν αἱ φαντασίαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεισόδιοι, ταῦτα δ’ ἐκ τῶν †ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν
ἡμῖν σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν; tr. Cherniss (Loeb), slightly modified. The word ἀγαθῶν has
been variously emended. Kronenberg’s ἀρχῶν is accepted by Cherniss (Loeb) and can be
paralleled at Arist. EN 3.7.1113b21, αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν; Pohlenz (Teubner) suggested ἀφορμῶν,
which is favoured by Scott (1998, 142-145) and Babut (Budé). A simple solution would be
to assume that ἀγαθῶν has been repeated from a few lines up, and to bracket τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
Cf. an example of the Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα (Porph. VP 14.15) in Plotinus at Enn.
3.4.[15]4.9-10 (de anima mundi) τί οὖν; συναίσθησιν [sc. ἔχει], ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐντὸς ἡμῶν;
29 Scott 1998, 137.
30 Above, n. 19 and text thereto.
31 For parallels in Seneca and Hierocles see next n.
32Ptol. Judic. 17.21-18.1 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπολελυμένα καὶ πρῶτα κριτήρια χωρὶς λόγου τινὸς αὐτόθεν
ἐστὶ καταληπτικὰ καὶ μὴ δεόμενα κατά γε τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτὴν ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς· ἀντιλαμβάνεται
γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν [leg. αὑτῶν] καὶ τῶν ἰδίων κινήσεων κατὰ τὴν ἐντὸς συναίσθησιν· ἔπειτα
ἤδη τῶν πρώτων αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ τῶν ὅσα τῶν ἔξωθεν στερέμνια καὶ μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδῶν κτλ.
Cf. Sen. Ep. 121.5, quaerebamus an esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus.
esse autem ex eo maxime apparet quod membra apte et expedite movent (‘move their limbs
with fitness and nimbleness’) non aliter quam in hoc erudita; nulli non partium suarum
agilitas est; Hierocl. El. Eth. col. 1.50-3.19 Bastianini & Long.
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The Stoics say: when a man is born he has the regent part of his soul like a
sheet of papyrus well prepared for making a copy (transcript). On this he
transcribes for himself each single one of his concepts.33
The regent part of the soul of the newborn human is compared to a sheet of
papyrus in a certain condition. The formula χαρτὴν εὐεργὸν34 εἰς ἀπογραφήν
should not be translated as ‘a sheet of paper ready for writing upon’.35 For on
such a tabula rasa one may write anything, which can hardly be the point of
a passage that illustrates the reliability of what is ‘written’, viz. the preconceptions. The word εὐεργόν entails that the χάρτης has been specially prepared to
serve this purpose. It really is quality papyrus. We may quote as a parallel an
instructive testimony concerned with Zeno’s cosmology, D.L. 7.135:
God, ‘the seminal principle of the world, stays behind as such in the moisture, making matter workable (euergon) for himself for the successive
stages of creation’.36
Matter has to be specially prepared for the Demiurge to be able to use it for
his exalted task. In the same way the soul of the newborn infant is specifically
conditioned for sensation of the self and of things outside.
The word ἀπογραφή does not just mean ‘writing’, but stands for ‘transcript’,
or ‘copy’; the quality and condition of the papyrus enable one to produce a
good and durable copy of an original. Stein, followed by Pearson, attributed
the contents of the first Dielsian lemma of ch. 4.11 to Cleanthes, because Zeno’s
successor interpreted the imprint, or mark (τύπωσις), in the soul in the literal
sense of ‘eminence and depression’, as that ‘in wax made by signet-rings’.37
33
Aët. 4.11.1, οἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς
ὥσπερ χαρτήν [or: χαρτίον] εὐεργὸν εἰς ἀπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν
ἐναπογράφεται.
34 Diels in the addenda of the DG corrected his apparatus, recognizing that εὐεργόν has been
preserved by ps.Galen. We now know that Qusta ibn Luqa has ‘das gut bearbeitete und
vorbereitete Blatt Papier’.
35 Sandbach (1978, 25) translates ‘serviceable’. Engberg-Pedersen (1990, 252, n. 1) rejects the
notion of a tabula rasa and translates ‘well adapted for writing upon’ (his italics). Bees
(2004, 298, n. 293) rightly points out that “ ‘gut beschreibbar’ ist nicht gleichbedeutend mit
‘leer’ ”, but his example, viz. lineated paper, is insufficient. For a bon mot of Apollodorus
the Garden Tyrant about a tabula rasa see D.L. 7.181 (not in SVF, cited Usener p. 87).
36~ SVF 1.102, 2.580, LS 46. For the term εὐεργός cf. also Arist. Phys. 2.2.194a33-34.
37 Texts at SVF 1.484; see Stein 1888, 112-114, 319; Pearson 1891, 38-39, 238-239 (Cleanthes
fr. 4 P.). In Arius Didymus fr. 39 Diels ap. Eus. PE 5.20.1-3 (~ SVF 1.519), the well-known
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There is no need to accept this attribution, but the intuition behind it, viz. that
the sheet of papyrus serves to make a reliable copy, is good. Pearson translated
εὐεργός rather well as ’ready to receive a copy’.38
It is ‘into’ this uniquely suitable material of the regent part that ‘each individual conception is transferred’ (εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται):
the verb ἀπογράφειν means ‘to copy’ (or ‘to enter in a list’—a procedure which
should mirror the facts).
In what comes next this process is explained. ‘The first way of registering
(anagraphê) is by means of the senses.’ Again, the vocabulary is quite precise,
ἀναγραφή meaning not just the process of ‘inscribing’, but also more specifically that of ‘putting on a list’. Such a list may contain a number of similar
entities or individuals one after the other, as for instance the Athenian archon
list (ἀναγραφὴ ἀρχόντων) does. In our present text it is a succession of remembered sense data of the same sort that is listed in every specific case. The sense
datum, e.g., ‘white’, leaves a trace in the regent part called ’memory’, and the
repetition of similar memories produces what is called an ’experience’, or
rather ‘acquaintance’, ‘familiarity’—the series of individual memories has
been compressed and unified. The memories (mnêmai) involved are supposed
to be ‘lasting and stable imprints’ (μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς τυπώσεις), as Plutarch,
criticizing Stoic epistemology, tells us.39
Next, two kinds of concepts are distinguished:
Some of these concepts arise naturally in the aforesaid ways [sic], and
without technical elaboration; others are in the end produced by our
instruction and attention. The latter are called concepts only, the former
also preconceptions.40
text where Cleanthes compares Zeno with Heraclitus on the soul as percipient exhalation (anathymiasis), this view is attributed to Zeno ad finem: ‘he says the soul is sentient
because its regent part is capable of being imprinted from the things that are and that
are the case through the sense organs, and so to receive the imprints’ (αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν
εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι τυποῦσθαί τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ
ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις). At ps.Plu./Aët. 4.20.2, a
general Stoic tenet is cited according to which the voice (or sound) makes an imprint, or
mark (ἐκτυπούσης), ‘in the hearing faculty [so not immediately in the regent part] like a
ring in wax’. On marking wax as a metaphor for cognition from Democritus, Plato, and
Aristotle to the Stoics see, e.g., Baldes 1975; Pohlenz 1938, 175-176 = 1965, 3-4; Mansfeld
2005, 401-403. The process is satirized by Plutarch, CN 1084F-85B.
38 Pearson 1891, 38.
39Plu. CN 1085AB ~ SVF 2.847, LS 39F.
40 Aët. 4.11.3.
Mnemosyne 67 (���4) 613-630
Ps.Plutarch / Aëtius Plac. 4.11
623
The preconceptions are concepts that are produced by means of an autonomous and involuntary copying process starting, so to speak, at birth: this is
nature as distinguished from culture. Other concepts (not: preconceptions)
are the products of our teaching and effort: this is culture as distinguished from
nature.
The final element covered by the heading of the chapter is about the genesis
of inner speech, or reason:
And [sc. inner] reason/speech (logos), which entitles us to the denomination rational (logikos), is said to be completed from the preconceptions at
the age of seven years.41
This is more or less our ‘school age’. Philo, presumably citing Stoic doctrine,
says that man becomes logikos in the first seven years, and reaches completion
with the second period of seven years, after which puberty begins.42 So we do
need ‘inner’, since the logos prophorikos, or outward-directed reason/speech, is
said to be formed only during the second set of seven years.
The discussion in the learned literature concerned with the question as to
whether, according to Stoic doctrine, preconceptions (or some preconceptions) are innate or acquired need not be entered into here.43 What is clear is
that our present text offers no support for the assumption that they are innate.
What is inborn is the specifically human cognitive ability to copy and register
things around us and inside us through sensations that are eventually unified
into concepts via memories. This is a fact of nature, or rather of human nature.
The Placita deal with the part of philosophy called physics.44 One may wonder why ch. 4.11 in its present abridged condition fails to speak of the genesis
41
Aët. 4.11.4a, ὁ δὲ λόγος, καθ᾿ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοί, ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι
λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα, also printed SVF 1.149. The distinction between inner
speech/thought and uttered speech, already made by Plato, can safely be attributed to
Chrysippus; see the verbatim quotations from his On the Soul in Gal., PHP 3.7.42 (~ SVF
2.903), ‘speaking must be from the mind, and also speaking within oneself and thinking,
and going through voice in oneself, and sending it out’, ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς διανοίας δεῖ λέγειν καὶ
ἐν ἑαυτῷ λέγειν [ἢ φωνὴν διεξιέναι] καὶ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς φωνὴν διεξιέναι καὶ ἐκτὸς
ἐκπέμπειν. See further, e.g., Hoffmann 1921; Inwood 1985, 72-73; Chiesa 1991 and 1992;
Mansfeld 2005, 378-384 and the literature there cited.
42Philo, Leg. all. 1.10, cf. Stein 1888, 116-117; Waszink 1947, 268 with quotation of Sen. Ep. 124.8;
Bees 2004, 31-32 with n. 34. Also see the beginning of Aët. 5.23.1 ~ SVF 2.764 (more on this
text below, n. 45).
43 See Scott 1988.
44 Mansfeld & Runia 2009, 18, 36.
Mnemosyne 67 (���4) 613-630
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of ethical, or proto-ethical, conceptions. The answer cannot be that ethical
themes do not really belong with the physikos logos announced in the first sentence of the treatise. For at the end of the mono-lemmatic ch. 5.23 ps.Plutarch
says—again, Stobaeus is absent—that the ‘conception (ennoia) of the good
and the bad and of the teaching of them occurs in the second period of seven
years’.45 The two chapters are consistent and complementary. Ps.Plutarch/
Aëtius seems to be striving to be consistent: preconceptions of, e.g., physical
qualities occur without teaching during the first seven years, and ch. 4.11 is
concerned with precisely this earliest period. Ethical concepts (not: preconceptions!) are formed and taught during the second hebdomad, treated in the
later chapter 5.23. However, the fact that teaching plays its part in the genesis
of these ethical concepts leaves room for a previous genesis of ethical preconceptions without teaching. These must be meant in the passage of Diogenes
Laërtius dealing with concept formation quoted above, section 1: ‘the notion
of what is good and just is acquired naturally’—naturally, so not by teaching.
Diogenes’ overview (as so often) is incomplete, since ethical concepts are not
acquired in the natural way only.
4
The two final Dielsian lemmata of ch. 4.11 do not deal with the genesis of preconceptions or the constitution of inner speech. But they tell us a bit more
about the rationality that is achieved according to the previous lemma by combining preconceptions, that is, something more about what it is to be a rational
animal (λογικὸν ζῷον):
45
Aët. 5.23.1 ~ SVF 2.764, according to Heraclitus and the Stoics περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα
ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ καὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας αὐτῶν. The abstract at ps.Gal., Phil.
hist. c. 127, turns this part of the tenet into a new doxa with another name-label, viz.,
Aristotle, and mentions the first (!) hebdomad (it also reads διδασκαλίας ἀρχή, more intelligible than ps.Plutarch’s perhaps corrupt (ἔννοια) τῆς διδασκαλίας). This attribution to
Aristotle is in itself mistaken (cf. HA 8.1.588a31-b2, cited by Waszink (1947, 434), followed
by Podolak (2010, 151)). One may assume that in the somewhat different version of ps.Plutarch worked over by ps.Galen the name-label Aristotle was still present in this chapter. That in (a predecessor of) Aëtius Stoic doxai dealing with infancy and the onset of
puberty were linked with an Aristotelian view of the cognitive capacities of plant souls is
paralleled at Tert. An. 19.2, where the view on infancy held by philosophers in general (so
of course including Stoics, above n. 22 and text thereto, and see Waszink 1947, 434) is followed by the view on the intelligence of plants connected with the name-label Aristotle.
Waszink has failed to notice the relevance of Aët. 4.11.
Mnemosyne 67 (���4) 613-630
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625
A concept is a phantasm in the thinking faculty of a rational animal; for
a phantasm is only then called a concept (ennoêma) when it occurs in a
rational soul, deriving its name from mind (noûs). Accordingly, all phantasms that occur to non-rational animals are mere phantasms. But those
that occur to the gods and to us are phantasms as to genus and concepts
as to species. Just as denarii <and> staters, if you consider them in themselves, are simply denarii and staters. But if you use them to pay for a
naval voyage these are not only denarii, but are called ‘ship fare’ as well.46
Long and Sedley argue that this contradicts the evidence to be found elsewhere, because a phantasm according to Stoic doctrine is a figment of the
imagination.47 Kerferd suggested that phantasma is “here clearly used as the
equivalent of [Stoic] phantasia.”48
The concept qua phantasm of the thinking faculty in Aët. 4.11 is an image
in the soul, that is, a psychical and mental image in the case of humans, and a
psychical image for other living beings.49 In Aristotle, ‘phantasm’ can mean an
image of the imagination as well as a mental image in general.50 At Aët. 4.11.5-6,
‘phantasm’ comes close to the second of Aristotle’s meanings. Scholars have
noted that already the first part of the chapter contains a view that is very close
to one of Aristotle’s in the first chapter of Metaphysics and the last of Posterior
Analytics, viz. the idea that an empeiria comes about by unifying the memories
of a succession of similar impressions.51 Here Aristotle distinguishes between
humans and animals as well.
It is, in fact, not particularly odd that in the doxographical tradition as
represented by ps.Plutarch/Aëtius this Stoic doctrine is represented in more
or less Aristotelian terminology; that is to say, in a terminology that is more
Aristotelian than a Stoic, presumably, would have used himself. We should
again take the doxographical macro-context of this chapter into account. In
the Stoic system epistemology is a part of logic, while in Aristotle’s œuvre, apart
from the final chapter of Posterior Analytics, it is a part of psychology, that is, of
physics. In the Placita epistemology, more peripatetico, is dealt with in Book IV,
46
47
48
49
50
51
Aët. 4.11.4-5.
Sandbach 1985, 52; Long & Sedley 1987, 2.185; cf. D.L. 7.50 ~ SVF 2.55, LS 39A.
Kerferd 2006, 111.
Compare the distinction between logikai and alogoi phantasiai, SVF 2.61, 187.
E.g. Arist. An. 3.7.431a16-7, ‘the soul never thinks without a mental image.’ See further
Bonitz 1870, v. φάντασμα; Thomas 2010, § 2.2 and the literature there cited.
Sandbach 1985, 52; Long & Sedley 1987, 2.241; cf. Arist. Met. Α 980b29-981a1, APo. 2.99b36100a6, on which see the fine discussion of Cambiano 2012.
Mnemosyne 67 (���4) 613-630
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mansfeld
which (with the exception of its first chapter) is about psychology.52 So it is
entirely possible that this Peripatetic framework, or rather this Peripatetic
manner of thinking, influenced the formulation of the doctrine. This certainly
justifies the rejection of this use of phantasma as evidence for Stoic doctrine
by Long and Sedley.53
5
A final point. An interesting simile is found at the end of ch. 4.11: denarii and
staters, when used to pay for a voyage on a ship, are not only called denarii and
staters but also ‘ship fare’ (ναῦλα).54
Such a name change is also found in a passage of Clement of Alexandria
about the different names of the one virtue depending on the circumstances,
the gist of which has plausibly been attributed to Zeno’s pupil Aristo:55
one and the same drachme is called ship fare when given to the shipowner, tax when to the tax collector, rent when to the landlord, pay when
to the teacher, and deposit when to the seller.56
It has not been seen that what is in Aëtius is an update of what is in Clement:57
Ariston’s drachme has been replaced by staters and denarii. The stater is a
Greek coin, already cited in early texts and here present, apparently, to represent the Greek side of the purse. The denarius, Greek δηνάριον, is a Roman
coin,58 which does not seem to have become a common currency in the Greek
East before the first century CE. The word turns up for the first time in literary
(or semi-literary) texts in the first century CE, for the earliest such ­attestations
52 See Mansfeld & Runia 2009, 147-148 on the positioning of Aët. 4.11-12.
53 Above, text to n. 47.
54 See n. 46 above, and text thereto.
55 See Rolke 1975, 199; Ioppolo 1980, 226-228.
56Clem. Strom. 1.20.98 ~ SVF 1.376, μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς δραχμῆς τῷ μὲν ναυκλήρῳ δοθείσης
λέγεσθαι ναῦλον, τῷ δὲ τελώνῃ τέλος καὶ ἐνοίκιον μὲν τῷ σταθμούχῳ, μισθὸν δὲ τῷ διδασκάλῳ
καὶ τῷ πιπράσκοντι ἀρραβῶνα.
57 Not even by Rolke (1975, 199-200), who compares the two passages.
58 First issued 211 BCE, see Jones 1990, 85; that is, when in faraway Athens Chrisippus was an
old man.
Mnemosyne 67 (���4) 613-630
Ps.Plutarch / Aëtius Plac. 4.11
627
are several passages in the New Testament, and, surprisingly, the present lemma
in Aëtius.59
Diels noticed the presence of the two coin types, but said he failed to see why
both were needed; the unknown Stoic author of the original simile in his view
should have been content with the stater alone. So Aëtius had a Roman public
in mind, unless (Diels says) it was ps.Plutarch who interpolated the denarius.60
But one may phrase this insight in a more positive way, and argue that apart
from illustrating an interesting detail of Stoic epistemology the simile not only
confirms the probable date for the Aëtian Placita,61 but also testifies to the process of updating such functional texts were subjected to.62 The presence of the
denarii shows that we do have to assume a relatively late date for the account
of sensation and concept formation in Aët. 4.11.*
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