Emergency Preparedness and Response
(GSR Part 7)
School on Drafting / Reviewing Regulations
16 – 27 January 2017, Vienna, Austria
Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
Preparedness and response for a…
• Nuclear or radiological emergency: An emergency
in which there is, or is perceived to be, a hazard
due to: 1) The energy resulting from a nuclear
chain reaction or from the decay of the products of
a chain reaction; or 2) Radiation exposure.
• Emergency exposure situation: A situation of
exposure that arises as a result of an accident, a
malicious act or other unexpected event, and
requires prompt action in order to avoid or reduce
adverse consequences.
IAEA
Basis
• IAEA Safety Standards Series:
 No. GSR Part 7: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency (2015)
 No. GSR Part 3: Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources:
International BSS (Section IV – Emergency Exposure Situation) (2014)
IAEA
Safety Requirements
No. GSR Part 7
 Establishes
requirements for an
adequate level of preparedness and
response for a nuclear or radiological
emergency, irrespective of its cause
• Requirements level: ‘Shall’ or ‘What’
to be done
• Approved in March 2015 by IAEA
Board of Governors
• Co-sponsored by FAO, IAEA, ICAO,
ILO, IMO, Interpol, OECD/NEA,
PAHO, UNEP, UNOCHA, WHO,
WMO, CTBTO
• Supersedes No. GS-R-2 issued in
2002
IAEA
Safety Requirements
No. GSR Part 3: Section 4
Relevant
requirements
in
Section 4 on Emergency
exposure situations
• Requirements level: ‘Shall’ or
‘What’ to be done
• Approved on September 2011
by IAEA Board of Governors
• Published 2014
• Co-sponsored by EC, FAO,
IAEA, ILO, OECD\NEA, PAHO,
UNEP, WHO
IAEA
Basis
• Further information can be found in:
 No. GS-G-2.1: Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency (2007)
 No. GSG-2: Criteria for use in preparedness and response for a
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2011)
IAEA
Safety Requirements in EPR
Graded approach
• EPR to be commensurate with hazards and
potential consequences of an emergency
associated with facility, activity or source
• Concept of hazard assessment
• Emergency preparedness categories I-V
• Safety requirements apply this graded approach
and they are addressed for facilities, activities and
sources in specific category(ies)
• If applicable for all categories, no category is
specified in requirements
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Requirements
• Overarching requirements
• Emphasis on topic
• Assigned to the Government
• Associated requirements
• Detailed arrangements associated with
overarching requirement topic
• Wherever possible, assigned to relevant
organization unless responsibilities are on
several organizations simultanously
• There is NO hierarchy among requirements!
IAEA
How do these safety requirements
differentiate from others?
• Responsibilities shared among:
• Government
• Regulatory body
• Operating organizations
• Other response organizations
• At the local, regional and national levels
IAEA
Responsibilities in EPR
General
Requirement 2, GSR Part 7:
• The government shall make adequate preparations to
anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a
nuclear or radiological emergency at the operating
organization, local, regional and national levels, and also,
as appropriate, at the international level.
• These preparations shall include adopting legislation and
establishing regulations for effectively governing the
preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
emergency at all levels.
IAEA
Responsibilities in EPR
General
Requirement 2, GSR Part 7:
• The government shall ensure that:
• All roles and responsibilities for preparedness and
response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are
clearly allocated in advance among operating
organizations, the regulatory body and response
organizations and
• They have the necessary human, financial and other
resources, […], to prepare for and to deal with both
radiological and non-radiological consequences of a
nuclear or radiological emergency, whether the
emergency occurs within or beyond national borders
IAEA
Responsibilities
Coordinating mechanism
Requirement 2, GSR Part 7:
• The government shall establish a national coordinating
mechanism to:
• Ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly specified and
are understood by all
• Coordinate and ensure consistency between the emergency
arrangements of the various response organizations,
operating organizations and the regulatory body at all levels
• Coordinate arrangements made for enforcing compliance with
the national requirements for emergency preparedness and
response as established by legislation and regulations
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Responsibilities
Regulatory body
• The government shall ensure that arrangements
for preparedness and response to a nuclear or
radiological emergency for facilities and activities
under the responsibility of the operating
organization are dealt with through the regulatory
process.
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Responsibilities
Regulatory body
• The regulatory body is required to establish or
adopt regulations and guides to specify the
principles, requirements and associated criteria for
safety upon which its regulatory judgements,
decisions and actions are based.
• These regulations and guides shall include principles,
requirements and associated criteria for emergency
preparedness and response for the operating
organization.
• The regulatory body shall verify compliance with
the requirements […].
IAEA
Responsibilities
Operating organization
• The operating organization shall:
• Establish and maintain arrangements for on-site
preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological
emergency for facilities or activities under its
responsibility, in accordance with the applicable
requirements.
• Demonstrate that, and shall provide the regulatory body
with an assurance that, emergency arrangements are in
place for an effective response on the site to a nuclear
or radiological emergency in relation to a facility or an
activity under its responsibility.
IAEA
Safety Requirements in EPR
Structure
Functional
General
Infrastructural
IAEA
Goals of emergency preparedness
and response
Goals of EPR
Goal of emergency preparedness
• An adequate capability in place at the operating
organization and local, regional, national and international*
levels, for the effective response to a nuclear or radiological
emergency.
• Integrated set of infrastructural elements that include, but
are not limited to:
IAEA
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
authority and responsibilities
organization and staffing
coordination
plans and procedures
tools, equipment and facilities
training, drills and exercises
management system
* where appropriate
Goals of EPR
Goals of emergency response
• To regain control of the situation and to mitigate consequences
• To save lives
• To avoid or minimize severe deterministic effects
• To render first aid, to provide critical medical treatment and to manage
the treatment of radiation injuries
• To reduce the risk of stochastic effects
• To keep the public informed and to maintain public trust
• To mitigate, to the extent practicable, the non-radiological
consequences
• To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment
• To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal
social and economic activity
IAEA
Safety Requirements in EPR
Structure
Functional
General
Infrastructural
IAEA
Goals of emergency preparedness
and response
Safety Requirements in EPR
General requirements
To be fulfilled before any emergency planning
can start
 Emergency management system
 Roles and responsibilities
 Assessment of hazards
 Protection strategy
IAEA
Emergency management system
 To enable an effective response at all level
 To be integrated under an all-hazards approach
IAEA
Roles and responsibilities
• Clear allocation of roles and responsibilities
in EPR:
•
•
•
•
Government
Regulatory body
Operating organizations
Response organizations
• Coordination mechanism to ensure:
• Roles and responsibilities are well understood
• Coordination and consistency among emergency
arrangements at all levels
• Enforcement and compliance
IAEA
Hazard Assessment
 Definition:
“Assessment of hazards associated with facilities, activities or sources
within or beyond the borders of a State in order to identify:
• Those events and the associated areas for which protective actions and
other response actions may be required within the State;
• The actions that would be effective in mitigating the consequences of
such events.”
 Provides basis for:
• Graded approach in implementing requirements in EPR
• Developing generically optimized arrangements in EPR
IAEA
Emergency Preparedness Categories
Cat.
Description
I
Associated with facilities in which severe deterministic effects
off-site are possible (e.g. reactors > 100 MW(th))
II
Associated with facilities that can warrant urgent protective
actions off-site but severe deterministic effects are only
possible on-site (e.g. reactors 2 – 100 MW(th)
III
Associated with facilities that can only warrant urgent protective
actions on-site, severe deterministic health effects are possible
only on-site (e.g. radiotherapy facility)
IV
Associated with activities and sources leading to an emergency
at any location (e.g. mobile industrial radiography, transport)
V
Associated with areas affected by a transboundary
contamination necessitating prompt response (areas within
IAEA
emergency
planning zones and distances of neighboring NPP)
PAZ
National border
UPZ
EPD
ICPD
Protection strategy (1)
• Justified and optimized set of protective actions and other
response actions to be taken in a nuclear or radiological
emergency to meet the goals of emergency response
• To be developed:
• At the preparedness stage
• Based on the results of hazard assessment and the potential
consequences of an emergency if it is to occur
• Involving all interested parties, as appropriate
• To be implemented:
• Safely and effectively in response to an emergency
• Through the execution of pre-planned emergency arrangements
IAEA
Protection strategy (2)
• GS-R-2 (2002)
• Justified and optimized intervention (any action):
• Goals of emergency response
• Intervention levels for dose actually avertable by taking specific action
• EALs, OILs and other indicators/observables on-site
• GSR Part 7, GSR Part 3, GSG-2 (2011)
• Justified and optimized protection strategy:
• Goals of emergency response
Basis to take actions!
• Generic criteria in terms of dose projected or dose received
• Operational criteria (EALs, OILs and other indicators/observables on-site)
• Reference level in terms of residual dose
IAEA
Basis to assess effectiveness
of actions and to optimize!
Safety Requirements in EPR
Structure
Functional
General
Infrastructural
IAEA
Goals of emergency preparedness
and response
Safety Requirements in EPR
Functional requirements (1)
Functions to be performed for response to be
effective and goals of emergency response to be
met
 Managing emergency response operations
 Identifying, notifying and activating
 Taking mitigatory actions
 Taking urgent protective and other response
actions
 Providing instructions, warning and relevant
information to the public
IAEA
Safety Requirements in EPR
Functional requirements (2)
 Protecting emergency workers and helpers
 Managing the medical response
 Communicating with the public
 Taking early protective and other actions
 Managing radioactive waste
 Mitigating the non-radiological consequences
 Requesting, providing and receiving int.
assistance
 Terminating an emergency
 Analysis of emergency and the response
IAEA
Functional requirements (1)
1. Managing emergency response operations
• Smooth transition from normal to emergency operations
•Clearly specified and unified command and control system
•including decision-making
• Coordination at any level
•including across border where appropriate
2. Identifying, notifying and activating
• Identification (Emergency Action Levels)
• Emergency classification
•General emergency, Site emergency, Facility emergency, Alert, Other
• Notification and activation of pre-planned response
•On-site and off-site (including across border) as appropriate
IAEA
Functional requirements (2)
3. Performing mitigatory actions
• Actions to be taken to reduce the potential for conditions to develop
that would result in exposure or a release of radioactive material
requiring response actions on-site or off-site
• Authority to be given at preparedness stage
• Provision of off-site emergency services to support on-site response
4. Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions
• To avoid severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk for
stochastic effects (e.g. sheltering, evacuation, ITB, restrictions on
food and comodities, preventing inadvertent ingestion etc.)
• Within hours to be effective; effectiveness is significantly reduced by
delay
• NPP – Severe fuel damage: ACT BEFORE A RELEASE IF POSSIBLE
• Failure to do so could result in deaths and other severe
IAEA deterministic effects off-site that could have been prevented
Functional requirements (3)
4. Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions
• Take these actions safely:
• Off-site emergency planning zones and distances
for facilities in Category I&II:




Precautionary action zone (PAZ)
Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ)
Extended planning distance (EPD)
Ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD)
 Arrangements to be ensured at the
preparedness stage
IAEA
Emergency Planning Zones and Distances
IAEA EPR – NPP Public Protective Actions (2013) publication
Emergency
planning
zones and
distances
Suggested radius (km)
≥ 1000 MW(th)
≥ 100 to 1000 MW(th)
PAZ
3 to 5
UPZ
15 to 30
EPD
100
50
ICPD
300
100
IAEA
Functional requirements (7)
4. Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions
 Appraise hazardous conditions throughout the emergency
(site conditions, monitoring, sampling and assessment)
• to identify, characterize or anticipate new hazards or the extent of
hazards
• to refine protection strategy
 Share the information among response organizations
throughout the emergency including the IAEA
?
Sprays
 Recognize the limitations of prediction tools
REACTOR VESSEL
?
SPENT FUEL POOL
IAEA
REACTOR CORE
CONTAINMENT
Functional requirements (4)
5. Providing instructions, warnings and associated information
 To potentially or actually affected public
Cat. I, II & V
• In normal operations & at preparedness stage:
• Identify target population groups
• Communicate to them in understandable language:
• Potential for an emergency and hazards associated
• Arrangements in place to protect them (warning, actions to take)
• In emergency
Cat. III&IV
• Warn them and instruct them what to do
 To help identify those affected by an emergency
IAEA
Functional requirements (5)
6. Protecting emergency workers and helpers
•Emergency worker
• Worker with a duty in emergency response
operating personnel, directly or indirectly employed
 first responders, drivers&crews of evacuation vehicles etc.
• Designation prior to the emergency & fitness for duty
Integration of those not designated in advance
•Helper in an emergency
• Volunteers on the part of public
Integration and protection as for emergency workers
not designated in advance
IAEA
Functional requirements (6)
6. Protecting emergency workers and helpers
Identification of hazardous conditions in which they may need to take
actions
Provision of appropriate protection:
• Training (including ‘just-in-time’ training)
• Dose management, control and recording
• Protective equipment, ITB, monitoring equipment
• Informed consent and medical attention, as needed
 Apply dose restrictions
IAEA
Guidance Values for Restricting Exposure of
Emergency Workers [GSR Part 7]
TASKS
GUIDANCE VALUES
Hp(10)
E
< 500 mSv
Life saving actions
< 500 mSv
ADT
1
< 2ADT, SDE a
This value may be exceeded — with due consideration of the generic criteria
used for taking actions to prevent severe deterministic effects to occur — under
circumstances in which the expected benefits to others clearly outweigh the
emergency worker’s own health risks, and the emergency worker volunteers to
take the action and understands and accepts these health risks
Actions to prevent severe deterministic effects
and actions to prevent the development of
catastrophic conditions that could significantly
affect people and the environment
< 500 mSv
< 500 mSv
< 2ADT, SDE
Actions to avert a large collective dose
< 100 mSv
< 100 mSv
< 10ADT, SDE
(a)
1
1
Values of RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ at which
protective actions and other response actions are to be taken in a
nuclear or radiological emergency to avoid or to minimize severe
deterministic effects.
IAEA
Functional requirements (8)
7. Managing the medical response
 Medical screening and triage, medical treatment and longer term
medical actions for those affected in the emergency
• Provision of first aid, triage, transportation
• Specialized treatment of overexposed resulting in severe deterministic effects
• Dose estimation
• Early detection and treatment of stochastic effects among the exposed
population
 Medical practitioners make appropriate notifications and implement
the response actions
• Presentation of medical symptoms of radiation exposure
• Other effects indicating possible radiological emergency
IAEA
Functional requirements (9)
8. Communicate with the public throughout the emergency
 Provide useful, timely, truthful, coordinated, consistent and appropriate
information
 Account for loss of usual communication
 Account for any sensitive information
• Develop a system to place health hazards in perspective:
 To support informed decisions concerning emergency response actions to be taken
 To help assure that actions taken do more good than harm
 To address public concerns regarding health consequences (e.g. Am I safe?)
 Monitor and address misleading information and actions taken beyond
actions that are warranted
 Respond to enquiries from the public and news media
IAEA
Functional requirements (10)
9. Taking early protective actions and other response actions
• To reduce the risk of stochastic effects (e.g. restrictions on food and
commodities, relocation, prevention of inadvertent ingestion etc.)
• Within days to weeks and still be effective on the basis of monitoring
and assessment
• Develop monitoring strategy and use OILs
• Specific to emergency planning distances (EPD, ICPD)
• Provisions to extend areas within EPD&ICPD if needed
• Access control and restriction control for areas in which evacuations
and relocations are carried out
IAEA
Functional requirements (11)
10. Managing radioactive waste during an emergency
 Ensure safe and effective management of radioactive waste
• Do not compromise protection strategy
• Consider, at preparedness stage, its impact on waste to be produced
 Minimize the amount of material declared as radioactive waste
 Ensure method of identifying appropriate storage options and sites
 Respect national policy and strategy for rad. waste management
 Consider management of contaminated human and animal remains
IAEA
e.g. Goiania radiological accident
• Source: Cs-137
• Activity: 50.9 TBq
• Volume of waste produced: about 3500 m3
IAEA
Functional requirements (12)
11. Mitigating the non-radiological consequences
• Adverse psychological, social and economic consequences
• May arise from emergency itself or from actions taken
 Considered them in development of protection strategy
 Provide the public with:
• Information and place the health hazard in perspective
• Medical and psychological support
• Social support
 Protect international trade
 Identify and address inappropriate actions
IAEA
Functional requirements (13)
12. Requesting, providing and receiving international
assistance
• On the basis of multilateral instruments (e.g. Assistance Convention)
or bilateral arrangements
Be able to:
• request international assistance when needed
• receive assistance rendered
• timely respond to request for assistance
IAEA
Functional requirements (14)
13. Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency
Prepare to terminate the emergency
• Recovery
• Transition to existing or planned exposure situation
 Ensure consultation with interested parties
 Adjust protective actions and other actions
Inform the public
Ensure:
Clear roles and responsibilities
Organization, criteria, guidelines
IAEA
Functional requirements (15)
14. Analysis of emergency and emergency response
• identifying root causes to prevent similar emergencies to occur
• identifying improvements needed in emergency arrangements
 Preserve data and information during response to the extent practicable
 Identify general implications to safety
 Be able acquire the expertise needed
IAEA
Safety Requirements in EPR
Structure
Functional
General
Infrastructural
IAEA
Goals of emergency preparedness
and response
Safety Requirements in EPR
Requirements for infrastructure
Infrastructural elements essential for performing
response functions
Authority
Organization
and staffing
IAEA
Coordination
Plans and
procedures
Logistical
support
and
facilities
Training,
drills and
exercises
QM
programme
Thank you for your attention!
Mr Phillip VILAR WELTER
Associate Incident and Emergency Assessment Officer
Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
[email protected]
IAEA