AAN Election Blog No. 12: Impressions from P2K (1): Flying with Both Hands
posted: 17-08-2009 by: Thomas Ruttig
Gardez makes true of its name – ‘dusty’. The capital of the South-eastern province
of Paktia’s skyline, with the two characteristic cony hills and the Bala Hissar, the
fort, on a third hill under which Buddhist remains are suspected are barely visible
in the dust that is driven by the afternoon wind over the plateau 2300 meters above
sea level. Particularly so the large compound close to the airfield that is still
lined with the heavy weapons of militias and army units that were ‘cantoned’ at the
start of the DDR program in 2003 – kilometres of artillery pieces, rocket launchers
and armoured vehicles of Warsaw pact origin slowly rotting in the dry air.
The regional office of the Independent Election Commission shares it with the small
team of the three remaining EU election observers (one just had to leave for medical
reasons) and its support staff, as well as with the electoral component of UNDP.
While the latter ones are accommodated in shacks, the observers live in bare
containers almost made invisible behind large piles of sandbags – office and bedroom
in one. Additionally, they have a big open tent through which the wind is blowing and
providing the idea of a cool breeze. At least, they have the fastest internet
connection in town.
Colourful Afghan trucks are coming in and unload election material. Tomorrow, says
the local head of the IEC, the first loads will be brought to the districts. From
there they are distributed to the 1097 (or so – figures oscillate a lot here) polling
stations in the South-Eastern region with the four provinces of Paktia, Paktika,
Khost – P2K in US Army English – and Ghazni.
But the region is dangerous. In many districts, the government just controls the
central small town (or even the local police station only) and a connecting road to
the Gardez. More than 20 (ten in Paktika, seven in Khost and at least five in Ghazni)
are fully out of control. The same goes for – unofficially - 336 (a third) of the
polling stations (PS). Officially, only 33 in Paktia (28 alone in Zurmat district),
21 in Paktika, 12 in Khost and 33 in Ghazni will remain closed on E-Day – for
security and recruitment problems which are obviously linked to each other. But that
figure will be significantly higher in reality. In Khost alone, 71 of 176 PS are
probably affected. Mid-week, enough electoral staff was recruited for 33 of the 306
Paktika PS only; a day later, it had miraculously increased to 70. Only 35 per cent
of the PS in that province could be verified by security forces (including the
international ones). This adds a question mark behind the official Afghan government
figure of only 11 to 14 ‘black’ districts country-wide that are fully insurgentcontrolled.
There was a beheading carried out by insurgents in Janikhel district (Khost) a few
days ago. In Terezai district (also Khost), insurgents were announcing over
loudspeakers that they would cut off the fingers of voters – to be identified by the
indelible ink (see AAN Election Blog No. 6). On Taleban nightletters, polling sites
are called ‘siasi posts’ (political check-posts) and therefore declared legitimate
targets. IEDs are abundant, even going off in Paktika’s centre Sharana. And there is
a lot of criminal activity going on in not long ago peaceful districts like
Ahmadabad, barely 40 minutes by car outside Gardez.
The only two provincial council candidates in Zurmat district have given up after
threats. One was abducted by insurgents, later freed but forced to leave the country.
The only Surikhel Dzadran provincial council candidate – the subtribe to which
insurgency leader Jalaluddin Haqqani belongs – supports Dr Abdullah – but cannot go
to his area. Woman candidates can campaign only very low key, i.e. through small
meetings in private houses. Only one in Paktia dared to use the offer of the local TV
station to be on air.
The running candidates, in particular the ones in rural areas, have to ‘fly with
both hands’ as one Afghan put it - keeping up relations with both the government and
the insurgents.
Many of the Afghan election personnel are too afraid even to tell their families
where they work. Voter education and so-called outreach must remain virtually
underground under these circumstances. The international personnel have no way to
check whether posters meant to educate the voters about election procedures are
really displayed in the villages and have to rely on hear-say. (Even in Kabul, many
of them are torn and in the Gardez not many are visible.)
For that reason, some of the election material will be transferred airborne –
‘jingle trucks’ dangling from ISAF transport helicopters.
Election posters are only visible in the centre. They make the few signboards and
traffic signs at junctions unreadable. A portrait of Ramazan Bashardost – who a while
ago to the amazement of the Gardezis walked the town’s bazaar – is prominently
displayed at the column at the central roundabout, beneath rows of Ashraf Ghani and
Dr Abdullah posters (I even saw a man with a bucket-full of glue putting them on
walls), the ones of the incumbent and here and there of Amin Arsala. Also, local
leftist (former PDPA) candidate Habib Mangal, back from years in Moscow, is
prominently present – very chic with a silver-black turban of his tribe. Together
with whole array of those of Provincial Council candidates this reflects a picture of
pluralism that might be larger than in reality. Apparently, the party agents of the
two major challengers of President Karzai have a difficult time to get a foot on the
ground. Karzai, Abdullah, Ghani and Mangal seem to be the only ones who run local
campaign offices.
In the setting sun, a caravan of
towards Kabul: a Karzai campaign
Minister Amanullah Dzadran. Late
year – the wind carries a bit of
cars carrying Afghan flags paces out of Gardez
dash team reportedly led by former Tribal Affairs
in the evening – strange enough for this time of
rain. But the few drops will hardly rob Gardez of
its name.
The road to perdition
Paul McGeough
September 26, 2009
After eight difficult years, Afghanistan has gone off the rails. America's top
general says he needs thousands more troops to avoid defeat, and Barack Obama has
added "cut and run" to America's list of options. The Herald's chief correspondent,
Paul McGeough, and the SBS Dateline cameraman David Brill travelled to Afghanistan's
south-east, where a Taliban warlord has declared war against a $US100 million road
being built by the Americans. Their report, Highway to Hell, is on Dateline and
repeated on SBS One today and Thursday at 2.30pm.
As ominous as the spot thunder storms electrifying the mountain air this time of
year, Jalallulidin Haqqani's and Pacha Khan Zadran's shared history of victories and
defeats rumbles menacingly across the craggy south-east. And just as theirs is no
ordinary falling out, the $US100 million ($115 million) bid to link the remote,
eastern border city of Khost to the hub-city of Gardez, south of Kabul, is no
ordinary road project.
Standing between them, astride a ribbon of bitumen snaking its way towards one of
Afghanistan's most treacherous mountain passes, is the unlikely figure of Robert
Campbell - a lean, leathery US Army colonel who finds himself slipping between the
sliding doors of time. On one side, ancient tribal enmity, big-man chest-thumping and
insurgency diktats issued amid feuds, internecine ethnic loyalties and strange codes
of honour and conduct; on the other side, a faltering, US-led bid to root democracy
in the parched, rocky valleys of the Hindu Kush.
Inevitably, the tale of Haqqani and Pacha Khan entwines with that of a huge effort to
build this new road, as a parable on the crisis gripping their homeland. Told in
several parts, it is the story of Washington getting one up over Moscow. It's a tale
of Afghan power-brokers milking the international donor community, hedging their bets
while playing footsies with the Taliban and other insurgencies, because they're
unconvinced Washington and its allies will not cut and run.
More than that, it reveals the dual dialogue that
effort to haul Afghanistan into the 21st century.
down, tell the world what it wants to hear, while
kowtow to those above them in the power chain, as
people on their own brutal, near-biblical terms.
is a flaw in the glass of a chaotic
Local leaders, from the President
tribal elders and local warlords
they carve up the country and its
Connecting Khost and Gardez, the K-G Road is part of a grand design to break five
strategic centres from economic and social dependency on neighbouring Pakistan. By
linking them together and to the national ring-road, they might be hooked back into
Kabul's orbit.
In Paktia province, people worry about who will control the road. Will Jalallulidin
Haqqani slap a tourniquet on it and hold the city of Khost to ransom - as he did so
relentlessly in the past? Will Pacha Khan Zadran throw up checkpoints to extract
tolls from all who pass - as he did so voraciously in the past?
For Americans stuck between them, the contest is as much about a showdown between two
old tribal enemies as it is about the longevity and viability of the Kabul
government.
Campbell, the American colonel, knows the stakes are high and that he dare not
underestimate either opponent. "They have very different objectives," he tells the
Herald while patrolling the K-G Road late last month. "Pacha Khan wants to control
commerce on the road; Haqqani wants to control Khost."
Haqqani's whereabouts are a mystery. "The last I heard, he was in Pakistan - in Miram
Shah," says a senior US officer, referring to a small town in the wilds of
Waziristan, just over the border. When the Herald previously searched for Pacha Khan,
the Pancho Villa lookalike was at home in the woodcutters' village of Wazi Zadran,
lolling on a pile of floor cushions, his girt ample and the whiteness of his teeth
visible below the black-dyed moustache. A belt of bullets stretched diagonally across
his chest as he worked a great length of cotton into a classic Pashtun turban.
This time, he is in a private hospital in suburban Kabul. Lifting his hospitalgreens, he reveals a flabby stomach and the bandaged wound of his hernia operation.
Bare-headed, Pacha Khan is in an armchair. The warlord has not shaved in several
days. A briefcase is on the floor and an AK-47 against the wall. Armed men guard the
corridor and the street outside. Huddled in a corner beside a small primus stove and
its bent teapot is an old woman. Almost cowering, she pulls a veil across her eyes
because two male strangers have been ushered into the room.
Pacha Khan has a great sense of entitlement. "One-third of this country belongs to
me," he says before revealing he views power more through the prism of past factional
wars than the permanence of the nascent Afghan state. "I share equal rights with
[President] Hamid Karzai and Abdul Haq [another former Mujahideen commander executed
by the Taliban as he organised a 2001 uprising]. By rights, I should be Karzai's
deputy or defence minister. He refuses me, but I could bring peace to this country in
less than a year."
Pacha Khan has a problem, however. Within the local dynamic, Haqqani's bloody and
brutal opposition to the Kabul government and its US-led backers, leaves him little
room to manoeuvre on the anti-Kabul, anti-US side. Despite him being the first oldguard warlord to violently challenge the Karzai presidency, Pacha Khan is obliged,
however reluctantly, to line up with Kabul and the Americans. Haqqani sucks all the
oxygen of opposition.
"I don't oppose Karzai," Pacha Khan says. "The President is a good national figure.
There is no alternative and I ordered my people to vote for him. We don't clash … I
just demand my rights every now and again." He finished there, but might have added:
"And Karzai ignores me."
He is at pains to deny that he and 59-year-old Haqqani were ever close. "I reject
that we were friends," he insists. "He always had his own ideas - even in the time of
Jihad [the 1990s]. Now he works for al-Qaeda and the [Pakistani intelligence service]
ISI. He serves their agenda; I support the Afghan Government.
Pacha Khan and Haqqani come from opposing sub-tribes of the Zadran tribe, which
sprawls across a dozen high-mountain districts in three eastern provinces. Pacha Khan
is Supeer; Haqqani is Mizai. Haqqani has tried three times to kill Pacha Khan. That
pales against US efforts to assassinate Haqqani - usually by dropping bombs on
suspected hideouts on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Last year,
Haqqani's bearded face emerged from a Taliban propaganda video to taunt the
Americans: "Now as you see, I'm still alive."
In his Kabul hospital room, Pacha Khan's gold fillings flash the indignation.
"Haqqani keeps launching these suicide-bomb attacks on me," he says. "Each time God
saved me. Some of my men were injured in the attacks, but Haqqani will try again and
again and again as long as I am alive. We are enemies."
Both men were Washington darlings when they fought side-by-side with huge supplies of
American arms against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Pacha Khan was paid
American millions to have his militia join the failed chase for Osama bin Laden after
the Taliban fell in 2001.
The Americans see Pacha Khan almost as a cartoonish representation of the Afghan
warlord trying to assert authority in the face of a significant Haqqani challenge.
"Cuddly evil," says one. Others opted for the descriptive scumbag. "To describe this
guy as pragmatic is a massive understatement," said another of the warlord's wild
record of switching sides and lashing out in fury when he does not get his way.
In the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Pacha Khan was made to cough
up 42 truckloads of heavy arms. He refuses to disarm entirely and is presumed capable
of fielding 2000 to 3000 soldiers.
After the fall of the Taliban, the warlord was so impressed with American firepower
he arranged for it to be turned on his enemies. He lied to the Americans that a
convoy of elders bound for Kabul to attend Karzai's 2002 inauguration were Talibs.
The Americans bombed, killing more than 60. "He knows how to eliminate his political
rivals by whatever means," says a US military analyst.
The CIA assessed PKZ - its name for Pacha Khan - as "brutish, mercurial and
unstable''. His eldest son was killed in
year, Haqqani's youngest son, Omar, died
highest point on the K-G Road. Campbell,
Haqqani: "His business is killing people
Government."
an early 2003 clash with US forces. Last
in a clash at the Satukandav Pass, the
the American colonel, is clear about
and trying to delegitimise the Afghan
For Afghans, the Haqqani myth is rooted in his fierce fighting against Soviet
occupation forces in the 1980s - and his 1991 capture of Khost from the Moscow-backed
Kabul government. He allegedly introduced suicide bombs to the Afghan war.
Haqqani was Paktia governor under the Taliban; Pacha Khan under Karzai.
When Pacha Khan was sacked from the post, his men took to the streets, guns blazing,
as he tried to bomb his way back into office. Angry US Special Forces were caught in
the crossfire, but their plans to arrest the warlord were stymied by a decision in
Washington that Pacha Khan was untouchable. When Pacha Khan was arrested in Pakistan
in 2002, his militia attacked Afghan Government installations in the south-east for
two years. Both men see Khost as a prize worth fighting for. A year after the Taliban
fell, Pacha Khan forces were driven out by rivals who exploited confusion generated
by a rumour that Americans had arrested Pacha Khan. On another occasion, Pacha Khan
laid siege to Khost because the Americans spurned him.
These days, Campbell reckons he has Pacha Khan's measure. "He has a shady past, but
now he is on the side of the Government. He wants this road to happen." Why? Because
violently extorting tolls from truck drivers is profitable. As much as the Americans
distrusted Pacha Khan, they worried he would bolster the respectability of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda if he defected to them with his mujahideen warlord credentials.
"Haqqani wants to dominate the road so that he can hold Khost to ransome," says
Campbell. "He wants to own the road to stop traffic getting through by closing it
when he likes - and his use of foreign fighters makes him a force to reckon with.''
Of Pacha Khan, Campbell says locals ''will think about trying to shut down the road
if they don't get what they want [from Kabul]. They are not fools - they feel left
out and they know what's going on. Pacha Khan is a powerful force. He lives in Kabul
and comes back here like an evangelist, making speeches and riling up the people.
Then he leaves and the elders have to deal with the aftermath."
An analyst on Campbell's staff says Haqqani opposition to the road is rooted in
denying ''people access to the outside world". ''He wants to keep the people as they
are - prisoners of their ignorance and religion. Haqqani figures that if he makes the
road as costly as he can, we'll be forced to pull out."
Poverty is deep in the Zadran Arc. Villagers eke out existence, farming crevices or
narrow ledges in the mountains. Illiteracy is high and some American officers worry
that children's growth is stunted. The only non-farm employment is driving jingletrucks with their decorative chains dangling from the bodywork. So the Zadran
staunchly defend the K-G Road, right?
Well, no. In the mountains, something doesn't add up. Zadran are swathed in warrior
heritage. Haqqani and Pacha Khan are legends because, as mujahideen commanders in the
1980s, they sensationally defied all but one short-lived Soviet effort to break the
mujahideen grip on the K-G Road.
Today, some locals risk their lives by working on US bases and last year there were
loud demands for funding and authority for them to stand an arbaki force - a local
militia to defend the road. But they shun service in the new Afghan security forces
and their warrior instincts don't kick in unless a bag of money is on the table. "At
times we tell the elders that they are an embarrassment to themselves," says US
Sergeant Brent Koegler. "They got the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but they can't
fight 20 Talibs who threaten their village? They're supposed to be awesome fighters."
This indifference by locals is staggering in the face of excoriating speeches by
Pacha Khan and other senior figures at a community meeting last year at Combat Out
Post Wilderness, as work began on the road.
Warning people their fence-sitting embarrassed him, Pacha Khan demanded they take
sides. "Don't shame yourself into being stuck in the middle, by not picking a side
and not fighting," he hectored. "It is shameful to be whining to the Government one
minute that you can't fight the Taliban; and at the next moment, telling the Taliban
when they come to your door that you are on their side."
General
let you
change.
respect
Said Gul, chief of staff of the Afghan National Army, told the people: "We
keep your weapons in the name of your Pashtun culture, [but] things have to
If my enemy continues to shoot at me from your doorsteps, I'm not going to
your elders or your tradition.
"I keep hearing that Paktia is the land of respect; the land of the brave, the land
of the proud. What pride? What bravery? What respect? I don't see any of it. I was
sent here to protect your sisters, your wives and your kids. And if you are the
enemy, how am I going to fight you and protect them?"
At the Kabul hospital, Pacha Khan sets out his solution. It was wrong, he says, to
let a major contract to an Indian firm. "I warned them to give the contract to the
Turks, not the Indians. The road will not be finished unless the Turks get the
construction contract and I get the security contract - the budget should be split
between us." He insists he does not have a particular Turkish contractor in mind,
with an eye to a big fat kickback.
Seemingly oblivious to the loathing prompted by his extortionate toll collections on
the road just a few years ago, he goes on: "I would have to set up checkpoints and
patrol the road."
But would Pacha Khan do a better job than the South African firm managing the
security cocoon around the road work? He feigns ignorance. "South Africans? I've not
seen them on the road. All I hear about is IEDs [improvised explosive devices],
kidnappings and terrorists running around. There'd be none of that if it was a proper
Afghan security operation.
"I have an army of 3000 fighters. I would defeat Haqqani - he is a thief who comes in
the dark. You should ask the Americans why they can't beat him. They have more than
60,000 troops and forces from 40 other countries and they still can't deal with him?
And if he operates from Pakistan, why are the Americans not putting more pressure on
Islamabad to shut him down?"
Kabul will not allow Pacha Khan a look-in. It fears the Zadran's fierce independence
and seeks to weaken and undermine the tribe, lest there be an uprising in a region
traditionally left to manage its own affairs. The Zadran claim as their right the
Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs but have been denied this influential post for
nearly 20 years. No Zadran has been made a foreign ambassador. Efforts last year by
elders to iron out differences between Zadran sub-tribes ignited American speculation
that the Zadran were bent on resisting Kabul.
Says Pacha Khan, with a wagging finger: "We should not be forgotten, but we don't get
what we deserve in terms of schools, clinics and economic development; we don't get
the jobs we need. It concerns me that Paktia is seen as the forgotten province."
The Haqqani Network is the only significant element of the insurgency not based
inside Afghanistan. His local support and training bases are supplemented by lethal
long-range hit-and-run missions by mostly foreign fighters based in Pakistan.
Influential as he is in Paktia, however, Haqqani must work with the reality that
tribes do sit on the fence, play his game but also play America's. "They want to keep
in touch with the Americans and Kabul," says Thomas Ruttig, a 25-year veteran of the
region and a member of the Afghanistan Analysts' Network. "The Zadran are split, but
the tribes are strong."
The Haqqani Network is judged by analysts to be the most unreconcilable of the Afghan
insurgency units. Haqqani is believed by the US to be the Taliban figure most closely
linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, to be in receipt of Arab funds and to get help
of sympathetic elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services in crossborder movement and in hiding his operatives in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.
American eavesdropping last year reportedly heard the Pakistani military chief of
staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, describe Haqqani as ''a strategic asset''.
Colleagues of the general were overheard warning Haqqani of attacks against his
forces. In the 1980s war against the Soviets, Haqqani was one of Washington's
strategic assets, receiving significant funds and huge arms shipments.
"Today, Haqqani seems to enjoy a 'most-favoured' status among some Pakistani and
Saudi authorities who repeatedly have suggested including him as a 'moderate' in
attempts to start negotiations with insurgents," Ruttig writes in a paper published
in July.
After the 1990s civil war, Haqqani threw in his lot with the Taliban and their Saudi
Arabian guest - bin Laden. He went from being Washington's well-funded mujahideen
darling to sworn enemy.
Haqqani, one of the most powerful American-backed mujahideen warlords against the
Soviets, was undefeated in the subsequent mujahideen civil war. With the mid-1990s
emergence of the Taliban, he signed up with the fundamentalists, reportedly making
available his plentiful stocks of US-supplied Stinger missiles. His reward was to be
the first non-Talib in the Kabul ministry and later commander of Taliban forces and
governor of Paktia. There, he formed a personal and organisational bond with bin
Laden, who had his al-Qaeda training camps near Khost.
Shortly after the Taliban fell, Haqqani was courted by the US and Kabul. He was
reportedly offered the post of Karzai's prime minister. Later his brother Ibrahim and
son Ishaq were arrested and used unsuccessfully as bargaining chips to turn Haqqani.
Haqqani told reporters in Islamabad late in 2001: "We will retreat to the mountains
and begin a long guerrilla war to reclaim our pure land from infidels and free our
country like we did against the Soviets … We'll deal with [the Americans] in our own
way."
Haqqani is believed to be a member of the Taliban leadership council and to have
embraced the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar as his spiritual leader. But Haqqani
operates his own command, a semi-independent warlord with autonomy from the Taliban.
"Haqqani's strength is intimidation," says the analyst Ruttig. "He is ruthless, so he
intimidates people."
Haqqani has extended his operations into the provinces of Wardak and Logar, on
Kabul's doorstep. He's been blamed for last year's assassination attempt on Karzai;
last year's bombing of the Serena, Kabul's only five-star hotel; last year's suicide
attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul; and a car-bomb attack on NATO military
headquarters in Kabul in the lead up to the August 20 presidential election.
He refused to agree to Mullah Omar's 2006 order to cease attacks on ordinary Afghans.
"Haqqani would be responsible for two-thirds of all the strife there [in the Zadran
Arc],'' ventured an American analyst. ''Some of the communities are very Taliban, and
much of the rest is neutral. No one in the whole area is pro the Kabul government or
the NATO forces."
Haqqani, who has an Arab wife and funding from Dubai and other Arab regions, was
excluded from the Bonn process, where the international blueprint for Afghanistan was
stamped. His nemesis Pacha Khan was at the top table for festivities, hob-nobbing
with diplomats. "His fury at being left out is the reason for his resistance," says
US Captain Gary McDonald at COP Dyesai in the depths of the mountain pass. "How much
of that is in play? The son has to continue the father's war because the father was
so disrespected."
In the way of the tribes, Pacha Khan's son has been installed as the sub-governor of
Wazi Zadran, the seat of Pacha Khan power. When the Taliban fell, the son was a
twentysomething car dealer in Dubai. "None of the father's presence," says a senior
American officer. "He watched out for the family interests, but he is not very
dynamic." This arrangement leaves much of the running in Paktia to Haqqani.
The fathers may be handing power to the sons and, in Paktia, the Americans are
banking on leadership shortcomings in the younger generation.
But already the Americans rank
insurgency leader in the east.
of the terrorist network. "The
analyst. ''But I can't say the
Haqqani's son Serajuddin, 35, as an influential
He is understood to have taken over day-to-day running
Haqqanis have had a successful succession," says a US
same for Pacha Khan and his boy"
Pacha Khan bridles at the suggestion his warlord days are over. As the Herald's
question is translated, his entire brow quivers. Stabbing a finger in the air, he
says: "I have not delegated my power or authority to anyone - my son is just the
district chief to help secure the area. I'm 58 - and still a strong man."
Colonel Campbell is disarmingly frank about his circumstances. With 19 years of
conventional military service behind him, he is also a model spokesman for Washington
as American forces in Afghanistan attempt to switch to the counterinsurgency
objective of protecting people and growing communities, instead of relentlessly
pursuing the enemy in the gaps between communities. "What I have changed in the lives
of the people will be the indicator of my success,'' says Campbell. "Beating my chest
on rounds fired and enemy kills is one thing … I can kill 150 fighters, but next
year another 150 will come over the mountains. What I have to do is create an
environment in which they can't come back."
While remaining ''on the offensive'' and looking for the enemy, ''we look for sources
of discontent that can be exploited by the Taliban and we try to fix them. We have to
be the anchor that pulls the people towards the Kabul government. If they are afraid,
we have to separate them physically and psychologically. The people are the centre of
gravity."
As the Afghanistan crisis enters its ninth year, there is a growing sense that the
number of Americans in central Asia is insufficient, and that the ''more'' that
Barack Obama might provide won't be sufficient enough to make a real difference.
"The first eight years have been wasted," says Thomas Ruttig. "And it is very
difficult to answer what do we do now. We've been talking up a rosy picture for the
last five years - and now we have awakened to a nightmare."
Insurgency leaders are wont to claim time is on their side; that the Americans will
be ground down and will leave. But at COP Dyesai, Sergeant Brent Koegler has seized
the sentiment as his own. "We can wait out the Taliban … we just have to keep doing
what we are doing."
Koegler seems to embrace the local inshallah principle of deferring to a higher
authority - God willing, things will happen. His boss, Neal Erickson, doesn't buy it.
"I hope it's not inshallah," he says. ''Inshallah is nice - but it doesn't get shit
done."
2010 Elections 4: Gardez déjà vu
posted: 17-09-2010 by: Thomas Ruttig
In 2009, author Thomas Ruttig witnessed the presidential elections – and some of its
irregularities - in Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktia in South-Eastern
Afghanistan and tried to get a remote-view idea about what happened around it. So, it
made sense to go here for the parliamentary elections, too, to check see what has
changed and what not. Some first impressions from the dusty town a not-possible-anymore three hours’ drive south-southeast of Kabul and Paktia province.
On the first glimpse, Gardez today differs not much from last year. When you fly in
to the airstrip north of town, the same steel-concrete skeletons of multi-storey
buildings started in the hopeful boom years after the Taleban collapse catch the eye.
They lie abandoned on the dusty plain west of the main road that winds down from Tera
Pass to town. (‘Gardez’ is pashto for ‘dusty’.) The budgets of most hopeful
private entrepreneurs obviously have run dry. Large elections posters hung up on
their sides bring in some colour, at least.
In contrast, the road itself got a second two-lane tarmac strip that would make
overtaking less hazardous – if it did not end a kilometre or so from the central
chowk. There, the usual traffic jam has built up because South-Eastern Pashtuns are
proud people and do not like to be overtaken even if that means to crawl along the
street with 25 km/h. Melons, grapes and radish are piled up at the roadsides
‘downtown’ where the main bazaar is. (The elections take place in the same season
as last year.) Men with ankle-free trouser legs and pizza plate-sized pakols – some
of Gardez’ villages are Tajik, some of them Shia – or balloon-like turbans are
frozen in minutes-long greeting embraces during which one party often lifts the
opposite of his rubber slippers made from car tires.
Unchanged is that there are almost no women visible in the streets. Only a few deeply
veiled ones hurriedly carry their babies as if eager to reach the shelter of their
walled homes. An exception is a proudly erect, uncovered, henna-haired kuchi woman
following a whitebeard with glasses as big as bathroom mirrors and thick as airplane
windows. Still – what a contrast to the large-sized posters of the women running for
the one Paktia Wolesi Jirga seats reserved for them: sitting MP Sharifa Zormati who
is said to even command the respect of the local Taleban in her district, one of the
most volatile ones in Paktia; Razia Sadat Mangal who seems to be the favourite this
time, dark horse Halima Paktianai (picture) or the untiring but hitherto unsuccessful
Dr Nazdana who works in the local hospital and is one of the rare icons of women
rights in this conservative area. Under these circumstances, one is prone to agree
with one candidate who proudly calls the posters: ‘What a progress!’
Election posters are virtually up everywhere. As they reportedly are in Chamkani and
Jaji Aryoub, two more relatively stable areas. In Zurmat, in contrast, one Afghan
interlocutor says, there are only posters of Rahmatullah Wahedyar, a former Taleban
deputy minister who had been back in the country for a number of years and who is
close to the group around Senator Arsala Rahmani. He takes it as a sign that the
Taleban have endorsed him. Indeed, last year the Taleban prevented all (real) voting
in Zurmat, putting up posts checking people’s fingers for election ink.
All in all, everything in Gardez looks relaxed – if it weren’t for the first bulletproof vested soldiers and policemen that took up vigilance in the bazaar on
Wednesday. But that was practically (although not officially) the first day after Eid
and everyone came out of the holidays extremely slowly, probably a bit late to
prevent insurgents with suicide vests from infiltrating the town - about which the
whole world here is concerned but practically easy-going. Although the insurgency has
steadily increased since summer of 2009, reflecting the ineffectiveness of military
countermeasures, over Eid the number of incidents went down. It looks as if Paktia’s
local insurgents – Mansur’s Taleban in the West, Haqqani’s Taleban in the central
parts and Hezb-e Islami in the northeast - also have been busy visiting families.
Few incidents were reported: nightletters, Taleban showing up in mosques just outside
Gardez, in Seyyed Karam and Ahmadabad districts, warning everyone against
participating, or setting up ‘check posts’. Even the areas just outside town that
were still accessible last year, are not recommended for visits: the stretch of road
between Gardez’ northern limits and the Tera pass, barely a 20-minutes’ drive away,
which had a Elysian polling centre last year with no voters all day except the young
staff; Chawni where the Taleban staged a ‘search operation’ a few days ago or Bala
Deh on the road to Khost. The biggest incident today was reported from neighbouring
Ghazni, a bazooka shot taken at the helicopter of the incoming IEC District Field
Coordinator in Rashidan district which did not hit him fortunately.
The question is: Is this the lull before the storm on E-Day or will there be more
rumours than actual violence, like in 2009? No one is really in the mood to find out
personally, so everybody - Afghans and foreign security people - recommend to take it
easy on E-Day morning and wait for incoming reports. That’s also what most
Paktiawals did last year; the turnout started very sleepily in the morning. Some
Afghan interlocutors also express their belief that the rumours might be spread by
non-Taleban to prevent even a superficial observation.
In any case, the convoys with elections material went out heavily escorted by ANP,
border police and other Afghan forces in Humvees, armed with machine guns and bundles
of PRGs, this morning. On E-Day, private car traffic will be prohibited like last
year (we still have to get a permit.)
When it comes to
participating in
won’t bother to
lower than 2009.
election. As one
the election, the dominant reaction by Afghans not directly
its organisation is a lack of interest. So, many here in Gardez
vote and Afghan observers believe that the turn-out will be even
But there is also concern about the democratic quality of the
Afghan interlocutor states:
‘There are not the candidates running that should be running. There are warlords,
commanders, some who have killed a lot of people. There is even one who fired rockets
into town who now puts up his photos all over town and is a candidate.’
(I am not sure whom he is talking about because there are two who are accused of
this; one was brought to Guantanamo, the other was elected in 2005.)
Another Afghan interlocutor says:
‘The people even don’t trust their candidates of their own area.’
And a third one adds, pointing at a poster of a candidate that had run in another
province in 2005:
‘He did not do anything for his people in the past five years. That’s why he tries
it here now.’
Also one candidate sounds sceptical about the quality of elections:
‘These are not the kind of elections we wanted. They are just a formality.’
And another one, linked to an Islamist party, makes the tribal system responsible for
‘the blockade of democracy’ because there is ‘no independence of the vote’ and
that people ‘doubt that their vote remains secret’. He demands that education is
made the priority in the coming years so that ‘after two, three more elections, the
spirit of democracy starts to influence the young ones of today’. Finally, somewhat
surprisingly, he states that:
‘There should be no weapons.’
Candidates are concerned about the security situation but even more about fraud. The
Pakistani-made false voter cards which are said to be sold in packages of hundreds in
the bazaars of Gardez and Chamkani are said to cost between 200 and 500 kaldar
(Pakistani Rupees, the currency of choice here), are the talk of the town. There are
a few sitting MPs who are said to have lost the support of their local communities –
amongst them the famous Pacha Khan Dzadran –, so people believe that they will help
themselves by adding fake votes, in particular in volatile areas where there will be
no or very few local observers(*). The Dzadran districts Waza and Shwak, Lajja
Mangal, Ahmadkhel and even the more stable Jaji-inhabited border districts are
regularly mentioned. (False ballot papers are also said to be available.)
Although naturally none of the candidates admits it one gets the feeling that counter
measures are prepared by some. Why should they lose while being honest while the
cheaters get the prize? That is likely to lead to more although smaller scale fraud
instead then less than last year – just to be on the safe side. I have been shown a
few examples of the false documents in the local FEFA office and the officials there
say that they cannot easily be distinguished from the real ones, in particular when
laminated.
The election institutions, meanwhile, give an ambivalent picture. The IEC and
Provincial ECC staff present themselves as alert and able. The ECC, however, resides
in a compound in the side street of a side street not known to many people – where it
had moved to just three weeks ago from the AIHRC office which provided it with
shelter. (According to the ECC executive director, the candidates have rented all
available space.) Maybe therefore they only received 24 complaints yet – 12 of which
they said they have processed. Most came from candidates, they say, some from voters
and two from the provincial administration – about posters posted at wrong places.
Apparently, also former provincial police chief Hai Gul Suleimankhel’s
disqualification as a candidate for still holding a police officer’s post was caused
by a leak in the welayat. He is a former Khalqi and many pro-mujahedin people dislike
him.
The IEC seems to be technically and organisationally stronger than last year –
confirming a trend in the whole country. But that is relative, as even regional chief
Najibullah Ahmadzai admits. ‘There is no law and order in the region’, he says,
‘so there will be fraud – this is 100 per cent sure.’ And he points to the
drastically reduced number of polling stations himself (Paktia down from 207 to 127;
Khost 175/104; Paktika 265/190; Ghazni 379/272; this is not fully compensated by an
increase of polling stations). On a whiteboard outside his office it is written that
‘1,288,800 people can use their right to vote in this region’(**). This also means,
on the basis of IEC-estimated 2.4 million voters (or voter cards distributed, who
knows), that half of the people remain deprived of this right, mainly in areas
outside the immediate population centres.
Ahmadzai insists that the ANSF are solely responsible for ‘the closure and opening’
of polling centres and that the IEC ‘has nothing to do with it’. This already seems
to be part of the prophylactic blame-game, passing on responsibility for eventual
glitches on E-Day and after from one to another. (In this vicious cycle, many of the
expected complaints might get stuck.)
Another Afghan interlocutor summarises the dilemma facing the organisers: ‘From the
point of security, the decrease in polling centres was justified in most cases. But
we are concerned that it will influence the legitimacy of the elections.’ And he
adds another big problem these elections will face:
‘We will not be able really find out what will happen in the districts.’
See the first of the author's 2009 Paktia blogs here and follow the serial numbers.
(*) Observer figures: FEFA has 100 observers for Paktia, including 3 women, which
will travel to the centres of four districts close by or considered to be more
stable. The AIHRC has 17 for the four Southeastern provinces, including 4 women. 30
(with some women) come from IRI for the three provinces of Loya Paktia, each with a
car available – they must have excellent funding. The 7 ECC people also observe on EDay. (These figures might still change.) NDI has an office in Khost and might cover
Paktia etc from there. And there is one observer from AAN.
(**) This figure is the result of the following mathematical operation scribbled by
the IEC regional head into my notebook: 2,184 polling stations to be opened x 600
ballot papers.
Splitting the Haqqanis with NATO Reconciliation Air?
posted: 01-11-2010 by: Thomas Ruttig
The initial big wave of reports about talks with the Taleban gathering speed and of a
possible short-term ‘reconciliation’ have given way for a slower but steady trickle
of spicy detail. A detail dropped here, some names there, mixed with half-denials
like Richard Holbrooke’s ‘There is less than meets the eye' line keep the shurwa(*)
boiling. The focus seems to be on the Haqqani network for the moment. AAN’s Senior
Analyst Thomas Ruttig looks back at how the ‘talk about talks’ developed, what the
prospects are and who is flying which ‘airline’ to the talks.
In late September, General David H. Petraeus’ remark that ‘[t]here are very highlevel Taliban leaders who have sought to reach out to the highest levels of the
Afghan government and, indeed, have done that’ struck like a bomb (Alissa J. Rubin,
‘Petraeus Says Taliban Have Reached Out to Karzai’, New York Times 28. September
2010, read this article here).
On 6 October, AP’s Kathy Gannon reported that ‘several Pakistanis and Afghans
insist that CIA officials have held clandestine meetings with top Taliban leaders,
some at the level of the Taliban's shadow Cabinet ministers. At least two rounds of
meetings were held in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan,
according to a former Taliban member who spoke on condition of anonymity because of
fears for his own safety. He said the talks were held in the area between the towns
of Peshawar and Mardan and included Qudratullah Jamal, the former Taliban information
minister.’ The report did not say when these talks had happened. (‘Taliban set
preconditions for formal peace talks’, AP 6 October 2010, see it here).
A day later, the British Independent revealed referring to ‘diplomatic sources’
that ‘[s]ecret high-level negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban
leadership aimed at ending the war have begun [...]. Meetings which included
delegates of the Quetta Shura, the Taliban's Pakistan-based governing body which is
overseen by Mullah Mohammed Omar, are believed to have taken place in Dubai. [...].
Talks have also taken place in Kabul with "indirect representatives" of the
insurgency.’ (Kim Sengupta and Julius Cavendish, ‘Taliban’s high command in secret
talks to end war in Afghanistan’,full article here).
On 10 October, the New York Times quoted an Afghan official ‘with knowledge of the
talks’ that ‘[i]n at least one case, Taliban leaders crossed the border and boarded
a NATO aircraft bound for Kabul […]. In other cases, NATO troops have secured roads
to allow Taliban officials to reach Afghan- and NATO-controlled areas so they can
take part in discussions. Most of the discussions have taken place outside of Kabul’
(Dexter Filkins, ‘Taliban Elite, Aided by NATO, Join Talks for Afghan Peace’, 19
October 2010, read article here). On 13 October, a NATO official confirmed that
‘personnel from NATO nations in Afghanistan “have indeed facilitated to various
degrees the contacts” by allowing Taliban leaders to travel to the Afghan capital’
(Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. Aids Taliban to Attend Talks
on Making Peace’, New York Times, see this one here).
One day earlier, the Independent reported it had ‘learned that there are six sets of
negotiations, some more viable then others, taking place with the aim of arriving at
a cease-fire and paving the way for Western forces to pull out of the conflict’
(‘Nato launches major offensive to clear Taliban heartland’, read full piece here).
The latest scoop came from Kathy Gannon again. Yesterday, she reported that ‘[t]hree
Taliban figures met secretly with Afghanistan's president two weeks ago’. According
to a ‘former Afghan official’ who was cited as the source for the report, the group
included ‘Maulvi Abdul Kabir […] from the same Zadran tribe as the leaders of the
Haqqani network, an autonomous wing of the Taliban [who had] served as governor of
Nangarhar province and deputy prime minister during the Taliban rule’. The two other
were ‘Mullah Sadre Azam and Anwar-ul-Haq Mujahed’ the latter ‘credited with
helping Osama bin Laden escape the U.S. assault on Tora Bora in 2001. […] The men
were brought by helicopter from Peshawar and spent two nights in a luxury Kabul hotel
before returning to Pakistan.’
According to her report, these talks are ‘an effort by the Afghan government to
weaken the U.S.-led coalition's most vicious enemy, a powerful al-Qaida linked
network that straddles the border region with Pakistan’ – the Haqqani network.
‘U.S. and Afghan officials hope that if Kabir agrees to quit the insurgency, it
could split the Zadran tribe and undercut the pool of recruits from which the Haqqani
[network] currently draw[s] fighters [and] help shift the power balance in eastern
provinces(**) where the network poses a major threat.’
Kabir and Sedrazam are indeed Dzadran (I prefer the exact transliteration from
Pashto). Kabir is from Nika district (Paktika), and he was more than just the
‘deputy prime minister’. After ‘real prime minister’ Mulla Muhammad Rabbani’s
death in a Rawalpindi hospital in April 2001, he took over his position in an
‘interim’ status – at the head of what the Taleban called their Interim Council
(Muwaqati Shura) and later Council of Ministers (De Wuzara Shura). This was the
Taleban ‘cabinet’ based in Kabul, while the real leadership remained in Kandahar,
far from the ‘Babel’ of Kabul as Mulla Omar saw the capital after two short visits
there. At the same time, Kabir remained responsible for economic affairs in the
Taleban government.
During all of Kabir’s career, Sedrazam – which literally means ‘prime minister’
(he never made it, though) – apparently remained his deputy. But he was not prominent
enough to make it to the UN sanctions list based on resolution 1267.
Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed, however, is definitely not a Dzadran. He is the son of the
deceased Maulawi Yunes Khales, leader of Hezb-e islami (Khales), one of the seven
major Sunni and Pakistan-based mujahedin ‘parties’ in the 1980s. This party has
split, meanwhile, into two wings: One, the Jabbarkhel-Ahmadzai faction, is now allied
with Karzai; originally led by Haji Abdul Qadir, killed as a minister in Kabul in
July 2002, it is now headed by Haji Din Muhammad, its senior family member and by
Haji Qadir’s son Haji Zaher Qadir who is apparently successfully running for the
Wolesi jirga. The other one, Khales’ Khugiani wing, is opposing the Karzai
government but some analysts have insisted it is more because of its exclusion from
the administration – similar to what happened in Southern Afghanistan - than for
ideological reasons.
Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed a.k.a. as ‘khalifa’, the son, established the so-called Tora
Bora Military Front in early 2007 as an insurgent outfit operating in the Southern
Nangrahar home area of the Khugiani tribe which includes the notorious ‘Black
Sawdust’ (or ‘Powdered Sugar’) Mountains. But it possibly drifted closer to the
insurgency as early as 2004.
Interesting enough, Anwar was rumoured to have been taken out of circulation recently
by the Pakistani – for exactly what he is doing now: opening a separate channel with
Kabul. To bring Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed in connection with the Haqqani network makes no
sense, of course.
Also Maulawi Kabir’s influence on it might be limited. After all, he has never
really operated in the Southeast and therefore in the Dzadran areas. While he was
reported for a while as trying to establish parallel ‘Quetta Shura’ Taleban
structures in Loya Paktia around the middle of this decade (and Sedrazam was with
him), this either failed or was stopped by Quetta in October 2007 in order to not
upset the Haqqanis who are valuable, although not completely trusted allies. (After
all, Haqqani Senior’s jihad history is much longer and more impressive than Mulla
Omar’s and he was kept at arm’s length from Kandahar as minister for border affairs
in the Kabul-based Interim Shura during the Taleban regime.) Reportedly, Kabir was
tasked to lead its regional ‘Peshawar shura’ for eastern Afghanistan then.
As importantly, we had reported earlier this year that Kabir was not exactly
difficult to find. He has not been the most active at the Afghan front but led a life
of relative luxury – with ‘a beautiful house close to the Pakistani town of Nowshera
in the North West Frontier Province [now renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and placidly
driving around in a posh SUV with a diplomatic number plate’ (see: Willi Germund’s
2 March 2010 AAN guest blog ‘Finding Kabir’, the link here). He had been arrested
earlier by the Pakistani authorities – and probably would still be easy to deliver to
Kabul. The same might be true for Mr. Sedrazam who most probably was still with him.
By the way, the report wave about ‘talks’ had also started with a reference to the
Haqqani network. On 27 June this year, al-Jazeera reported that Afghan President
Karzai ‘has met Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of a major anti-government faction, in
face-to-face talks’ and ‘that Haqqani junior ‘is reported to have been accompanied
to the meeting earlier in the week by Pakistan's army chief and the head of its
intelligence services’ (Zeina Khodr, ‘Karzai “holds talks” with Haqqani’, alJazeera, 27 June 2010).
Michael Semple, contacted by the Qatar-based station for comment on the same day,
hung the story a bit lower – but might have been closer to the truth: ‘Afghans that
I talk to... passed along stories of shuttle diplomacy between Ibrahim Haqqani [the
brother of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani network] and Karzai's
government. They claimed Haqqani would travel between Islamabad, Kabul, and
Miranshah.’ By the way, Ibrahim Haqqani’s correct name is Ibrahim Omari. And maybe,
he did not travel himself.
If he or someone on his behalf was indeed travelling, it would be an irony of
history. Omari had surrendered to the Afghan authorities after Operation Anaconda in
the mountains of Shahikot, the southern part of Zurmat district in Paktia province,
in early 2002. Then, US special forces had flushed out fighters of the Haqqani and
the Mansur networks from this traditional Haqqani stronghold. After that, Omari was
kept first in Logar in the Afghan army’s headquarters for the Southeast by General
Gul Haidar, a confidant of then Defense Minister (and not yet Marshal) Muhammad Qasem
Fahim, and later in a government-run guesthouse in Kabul.
As it was the rule in those days, nothing much was made of this chance. There was
Washington’s line about ‘no talks with terrorists’, no ‘reconciliation’, just
cleaning up ‘the remnants of the Taleban and al-Qaida’. Some years later, Omari was
somehow gone, back to Pakistan.
The al-Jazeera report came in an interesting time, though. Since quite a while, the
Haqqani network has been in a transition period, from the senior mujahed Jalaluddin
Haqqani to hiss on Serajuddin who was too young fight the anti-Soviet jihad and
received a Wahhabi religious education in Saudi Arabia during this time. That has
weakened his grounding in the Dzadran tribe – at least compared with his father. As
one result, he has started to kill rival leaders in his tribe, a development
unthinkable of under his father.
By the way, this is only one example for a younger, more radical generation of
Taleban commanders taking over the movement. Should this radicalisation continue and
those Young Turks take over key positions in the movement, we probably can soon talk
'Neo-Taleban‘ with more reason than even before.
In the meantime, a few questions remain: Is Ibrahim Omari ‘talking’ on behalf of
Haqqani the Elder or Haqqani Junior? If he did (or does) on Haqqani Junior’s behalf,
did or does he also talk on behalf of the Taleban leadership? After all, Sreajuddin
Haqqani had stated in an interview this June that:
‘[t]he Haqqani Group or the Haqqani Network Group is not an official name or a name
we chose. This name is used by the enemies in order to divide the Mujahideen. We are
under the highly capable Emirate of the Amir of the Faithful Mullah Umar, may Allah
protect him, and we wage Jihad in the path of Allah. The name of Islamic Emirate is
the official name for us and all the Mujahideen in Afghanistan’ (read the full
interview here). He reportedly also told interlocutors sent from Kabul to inquire
about his willingness to talk that they should ‘turn to Quetta’ instead.
About what would they talk? And finally, not directly related but as important, why
does Haqqani Senior not stop his son killing Dzadran elders? Does he want him to take
over his place at any cost to ‘keep it in the family’? Or is he unable to stop him.
Then, Tom Gregg’s 22 September appeal on the AfPak Channel (‘Talk to the Haqqanis,
before it’s too late’, find it here) might have been almost too late.
A set of very last questions: What kind of planes or helicopters do the ‘Taleban
leaders’ board? Kathy Gannon’s report doesn’t answer this. Are these US planes, as
the NATO official quoted above might have indicated? If that’s the case, how do the
Taleban trust the Americans? Wouldn’t they be afraid that they might end up in
Guantanamo instead of Kabul? If I were a Taleb and even if Petraeus and/or Kayani
gave me their personal word for a safe return, I would not have wanted to be the
first one to take such a ticket.
Or are these Pakistan Army flights? After all, Kayani had promised to ‘deliver’ the
Taleban. Although here the same applies - hand-overs and renditions have happened
from Pakistan, too – it is possible that people who are under the influence of
Pakistan are flown in, without being asked for their consent. Was Mulla Baradar
‘released’ this way? And what kind of result would emerge from talks between the
Karzai government and Pakistani-owned Taleban leaders?
Did Kathy Gannon’s source, the Afghan official, leak the report intentionally to
make us happy about progress on the ‘talks front’ or is he one of those who doubt
that the current approach to ‘reconciliation’ (if it is one) leads into the right
direction?
Are we being set up for something?
(*) Pashto and Dari for ‘soup’.
(**) Paktia, Paktika and Khost are part of southeastern region of Afghanistan, but
under NATO it belongs to the Regional Command East which also includes the eastern
region, with Nangrahar.
Facts and Fiction on the Frontier: The Haqqanis and the Kurram peace deal
posted: 14-04-2011 by: Fabrizio Foschini
For a few weeks, it looked like the sectarian conflict in Kurram Tribal Agency had
been brought to a solution. The years-long siege on Shia residents had been lifted
thanks to a much talked about peace agreement, allegedly brokered with the help of
Jalaluddin Haqqani. This, however, now looks increasingly doubtful and seems to be
more the part of a narrative that wants to paint a favourable picture of the old
mujahedin commander’s network. Meanwhile, a series of brutal attacks have plunged
one of the most strategic areas of FATA once more into instability, while the links
between this conflict and the one in Afghanistan grow even stronger. AAN’s analyst
Fabrizio Foschini pieces the story together.
The 3 February Kurram Tribal Agency peace agreement that took at least two years to
broker, has broken down in a matter of weeks. After the initial agreement, traffic on
the Parachinar-Thal road which had been blocked for the last three years because of
attacks of Sunni militants, resumed with a semblance of normality after it had been
inaugurated in a solemn way by the elders returning from a jirga in Islamabad barely
two months ago. For the first time since, the Shia inhabitants of Upper Kurram – from
the Pashtun tribe of the Turi - were able to use the most direct road to Peshawar and
elsewhere in Pakistan. The Sunni militants were supposed to halt their attacks.
But their attacks on Shia travellers started again from mid-March onwards, first near
Thal in Hangu district, right outside the agency’s border, then, on 25 March, near
Bagan in Lower Kurram. In this last instance, they stopped some minivans at a
checkpoint, killed 13 people and kidnapped another 45 (sources differ about the
number of victims, though; local people insist on higher figures, reporting that some
women and children were released after a few days).
Kurram, along with Khyber, is often considered the most strategic of the tribal
agencies because of its proximity to Afghanistan. The Durand Line here plunges deep
towards Kabul; the Afghan capital lies less than 100 kilometers from Parachinar, the
main town in Kurram. Almost half of the around 500,000 inhabitants of Kurram are
Shia, mostly Turi, and they constitute the majority in the northern portion of the
agency. Occasional clashes between the Turi and their Sunni neighbours – mainly
Bangash (there are also some Shia Bangash) – over land and water disputes have been
recorded since the nineteenth century. Also, the sectarian nature of these clashes
and the involvement of fellow Sunni tribesmen from adjoining areas predates the
recent conflict. The English colonial recordings for the NWFP and Tribal Areas around
the turn of the twentieth century extensively report the presence of Afridi lashkar
joining the fight under the guidance of Sunni religious leaders.
At the same time, the agency has been one of the least ‘tribal’ ones, in relation
to the way many observers have typically portrayed the FATA: it is being partially
inhabited by a religious minority who are forced to rely on good relations with the
state in order to face down the threats of their neighbours. This has made Kurram one
of the most accessible spots for the British colonial power and then the Pakistani
institutions in the region. From the perspective of the Pakistani government, it was
less remote and wild than, for example, the Waziristans or Bajaur. Parachinar town
also has a literacy rate comparable to national levels, a unique feature in the FATA.
However, the sectarian clashes triggered in the rest of the country by Sunni
extremist militant groups in due course reached Kurram, exacerbating the pre-existing
tribal rivalries(*).
It was the 1980s, with the influx of Afghan refugees and the arming by the Pakistani
government of Sunni tribesmen willing to take part in the Afghan jihad led to the
first major clashes in decades. According to some sources, Hezb-e Islami fighters had
a part in attacking the Shia inhabitants in the town of Sadda in 1986-87, but the
conflict was sparked by confrontations between the two sects during religious
ceremonies (for example during Ashura and on the Birthday of the Prophet). Communal
riots continued to affect Parachinar at intervals of ten years, but the situation did
not escalate into full warfare until April 2007. Since then, a low-intensity conflict
has predominated, marked by outbursts of hard fighting which each cost hundreds of
lives, and by a blockade of Upper Kurram by the Sunni combatants. This has cut off
the Shia from urban centres in Pakistan and reduced their lives to dire
extremities(**).
The establishment of the Tehrik-e Taleban-e Pakistan (TTP) maximized opportunities
for the local Sunnis to receive support from other areas and, as early as autumn
2007, TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud reportedly sent the first Waziri/Mahsud lashkar to
Kurram. In the spring of the following year, this was followed by a more permanent
group of TTP militants who came from Orakzai agency and whose presence in Kurram was
made more formal in the summer of 2009 by the appointment of Mulla Tufan as TTP
commander in charge of the agency. Tensions have at times been reported between local
Sunnis and their external allies. Even fighters from Khyber agency – belonging to
Lashkar-e Islam and Ansar al-Islam, Pakistani Taleban groups that had remained
outside TTP - have joined the anti-Shia fight on various occasions, although rivals
among themselves.
The strategic position of Kurram, which had already entailed a problematic flux of
Taleban and foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001, quite naturally makes
it an interesting spot for those groups who, like the Haqqani network, enjoy crossborder insurgent activities. The presence of Afghan Taleban and al-Qaida fighters and
even some top leaders has been widely reported, and sometimes exaggerated, by foreign
analysts’ websites as well as by local Shias who hope to get external support to
fight the siege imposed on them. Reports about the shift of the Haqqanis’ activities
to Kurram and about Serajuddin Haqqani himself hiding in Kurram, after North
Waziristan became heavily affected by drone strikes, reached their peak late last
summer. According to some sources, these reports played a role in triggering US
helicopter attacks on Teri Mangal and Mata Sangar on 27 September 2010, attacks which
were directed at militants involved in cross-border firing, but in which some
Pakistani security personnel were killed. The most visible, although short-term,
reaction to this attack was the closure of the Khyber Pass supply route for NATO
troops for over a week. Less evident, although with more far-reaching consequences
for the people of Kurram, was the closure by the Pakistani army of the border
crossings leading from Kurram to Afghanistan. This closure is enforced to this day.
Border crossings leading to Afghanistan had, until then, provided the safest and most
reliable way out of the agency. Through these routes, the Shias could reach Kabul and
then Peshawar or Islamabad, while access to the provincial capitals of Khost and
Gardez in itself remained an important channel for the supply of foodstuffs and other
basic goods which could not be got through the blockade in Lower Kurram. Since
October, however, Kurram has been almost completely isolated. According to locals AAN
spoke too, it is still possible to bribe the Pakistani border guards with 25,000 to
30,000 rupees (US$300-350) and be allowed to cross the border, but given these high
costs, this is an opportunity for big businessmen only, not for normal people.
Reasons that the Pakistani authorities give for the draconian measure are the need to
prevent ‘miscreants from outside from exploiting the situation’ (ie the sectarian
struggle), and the slightly worn-out issue of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan
built close to Pakistan’s border who are ‘engaged in terrorist activities’. ‘We
always get this answer from the local commander of the Frontier Corps’, one local
journalist told AAN. ‘But why then are the frontier crossings in Waziristan and
Khyber agencies open?’
A more local element of Pakistani paranoia could also have played a role: the fear
that Kurram’s Shias are growing closer to Kabul than to Islamabad. Kurram, as
stated, has been a comparatively ‘civilized’ tribal area, so much so that there was
a certain degree of state control by Kabul when the area was part of the Afghan
kingdom (until the second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878/80) - certainly to a much higher
degree than in neighbouring Khyber or Waziristan, and slightly more so even than in
Khost or Paktia. Much later, the minority position of Shia Turi tribesmen made them
turn to the PDPA government in Kabul at a time when they were hard-pressed by
mujahedin and by Zia ul-Haq’s support for Sunni sectarians (religion was not the
only cause; PDPA outreach efforts to the tribes across the border were significant
and, at times, quite effective.) More recently, the Afghan government seems to have
considered resuming contacts with the beleaguered Turi in order to prevent Taleban
infiltrations. This, however, has been done with the usual degree of confusion and
inconsistency which plagues Afghan institutions.
In a joint jirga in 2007, the governor of Paktia managed to dissuade the tiny Mangal
community of Upper Kurram from accepting financial offers from the Taleban in
exchange for access to its strategic position on the border: it was the Turi, worried
by the Taleban, which had requested him to intervene. A few months later, however,
after clashes had erupted between Afghan and Pakistani troops on the Paktia-Kurram
section of the Durand Line, and a meeting had been called in Parachinar to settle
things, the same governor and Afghan and US officers were fired at by what were
reported by some as ‘rogue elements’ of the Frontier Corps. ‘They fired at us
twice, even when the plane was taking off’, related one of those present.
‘Karzai’s only reaction was to express astonishment, and the Americans were
convinced by the Pakistani that it had been the Taleban arriving on the scene - or
they pretended to be convinced.’
Even before the Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga in August 2007, a series of trans-border
jirgas between Jaji and Turi elders had agreed to ‘fight terrorism together and live
like brothers’, in the words of one of the Afghan participants, the former MP Bedar
Jaji. Even in this case, the involvement of the Afghan government was minimal, with
just a small contribution to expenses from the Ministry of Border and Tribal
Affairs(***).
However, a 2010 article by the former Nawaz Sharif advisor and prominent Pashtun
politician Ghayur Ayub, which was widely republished by the Pakistani press, while
advocating state support for the Shia, raised the alarm by its title: ‘Is Islamabad
losing Parachinar to Kabul?’
It seems likely that the bogeyman of a long-dead Afghan irredentism on the Pakistani
side of the Durand Line was considered useful to justify the sealing of the borders
of Kurram, a policy which actually delivers its population into the hands of the
militants. Locals are unhappy with the Pakistani army, as one complained: ‘The
military does not take serious action against the Taleban. Only in the eastern part
of Kurram, near the border with Khyber and Orakzai, do they sometimes claim they’ve
killed some Taleban…but if they really wanted to act, they could clear them out in a
couple of months.’
Militants, on the other hand, have been hectically active. Rumours of a concerted
attack on the Shias by different Taleban groups started to circulate in October 2010.
In particular, the Pakistani press highlighted the role to be played by Mulla Tufan
and Tariq Afridi, the latter a TTP commander originally from Dara Adamkhel, and both
notorious for their anti-Shia stance. It also described how they were supported by
‘thousands’ of Orakzai Taleban (and Panjabi elements of Lashkar-e Jhangvi or
similar groups, although this was not so highlighted by the media). Several articles
started introducing the idea that Serajuddin Haqqani had been asked by the Shia Turi
to mediate with the TTP on their behalf. In an alternative narrative, reported by the
Pakistani Express Nation on 28 October 2010, the Turi tribesmen ‘…sought the
Haqqanis’ help… They want the Taliban to stand by them in case of intrusions into
their area by NATO troops,’ as explained a former MP from Kohat who, according to
himself, had a part in the talks.
The ideal intention, if such a request was true, of avoiding bloodshed among Muslims
– including even Shias - and concentrating instead on the ‘real jihad’ against NATO
and the Afghan government, fits well with the evolution of the Afghan Taleban's
discourse after 2001. Very sensibly, for example, the Taleban never claimed the
killing of eleven Shia travellers from Kurram in Chamkani district of Paktia last
summer, even if it was probably Haqqani Taleban enacting the blockade also on the
Afghan side. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father, and Serajuddin, the son, have been
endowed with unlimited influence and powers of mediation among the militant galaxy in
the FATA, at least by the Pakistani press(****).
Later it was ‘revealed’ that the accord had already been brokered in September
2010, that actually Haqqani’s involvement dated back to 2009, that Khalil and
Ibrahim, two other relatives of Haqqani senior, had taken part in several meetings in
Peshawar and Islamabad, and finally, that the Haqqanis had obtained access to the
Shia territory in exchange for their mediation and permission to infiltrate the
border from Kurram and to re-deploy safely to their areas if US pressures finally
induced the Pakistani army to move its operations into North Waziristan.
An elder from Parachinar interviewed by AAN dismissed the whole engagement of the
Haqqanis in the jirgas as a tale only, saying that it did not happen in such an overt
or relevant way, if it happened at all.
Whatever Haqqani’s role was, on 3 February 2011 a 220-strong peace jirga in
Islamabad headed by the former federal minister, Waris Khan Afridi, concluded a
process initiated over two years previously and sanctioned the peace agreement. It
also received verbal support from the TTP in Kurram. Its current commander, Fazl
Sayed, was quoted as declaring: ‘Violating the new accord would be punished
according to shari’a (Islamic law)…We will first ask the political administration
and jirga members to take action against the side violating the agreement. But we
will be justified to punish the violators after 15 days, as per the accord.’
However, it was the same commander who bears the strongest suspicion of being behind
the recent attacks on travellers. According to the local journalist who interviewed
seven women who were released by their captors, the women were sent with a message
for the Turi elders, to the effect that the attacks were in retaliation for the
Pakistani government not having fulfilled its promises to the militant group.
Reportedly, one of Fazl Sayed’s brothers is being held in a Pakistani prison along
with another 20 of his affiliates. Again, whatever the truth of the matter, a breach
in the cease-fire was only to be expected. If not the local TTP, the Orakzai-based
anti-Shia fanatics, Afridi militants fleeing from the current infighting in Tirah, or
Hakimullah Mehsud himself could have broken the truce at any moment, given their
strong armed presence and the lack of control of the area by the Pakistani security
forces.
The idea of Haqqani taking a lion-share in successfully bringing the warring parties
to the negotiating table fitted both the ISI’s current whim of presenting Jalaluddin
Haqqani as an elderly philanthropist, and his sons as moderate elements acting as
potential peace-makers for the FATA on behalf of Pakistan, and the American antiterrorism experts’ wailing and crying over Pakistani ‘duplicity’ and the renewed
ability of the diabolic ‘Haqqani Network’ to steal across the border and strike
into Afghanistan(*****).
Nobody challenged the crazy idea that a man, or even a family, could single-handedly
solve a conflict which had lasted for years and which featured at least seven major
militant groups. Nobody questioned the idea that, outside of Islamist rhetoric, a
clan of refugee guerrillas from another tribe could exert influence in such a degree
on the Mehsud, Waziri, Afridi, Orakzai and Panjabi militant outfits, or even the
original fighting parties, the Bangash and Turi. As for the degree of support the
Haqqanis would have received from the Pakistan military and intelligence in their
peacemaking intervention - whatever its extent - the institutions involved should
have learnt by now that it is much easier to destabilize a region than to put the
pieces together once the first objective is achieved.
The real objective of last month’s attacks may have been to further isolate the Shia
of Upper Kurram, disrupt the cohesiveness of their social networks, and bring them to
their knees, which, it should not be forgotten, could be the desire of a state
confronting semi-autonomous, tribal communities. Of course, the jirga provided the
perfect excuse for the state to keep away from Kurram’s problems and gave a façade
of law and order. There is no need to admit state failure as long as ‘obsolete
tribal customs’ or foreign plots can be blamed.
One can only hope that the details concerning a guarantee supposedly placed with the
Haqqanis by the Turi and Bangash - a sum of between 40 and 60 million rupees
(US$500,000-700,000) as well as sheep - was a joke. It would be exceedingly untoward
if the Haqqanis have managed to add this money to the funding sources of the Taleban.
(*) Conversely, years of sectarian tensions also stimulated the creation of a couple
of Shia militant groups in Kurram, called Hizbullah and Mehdi Militia, which have
played an prominent role in the recent fights.
(**) In Kurram, basic goods like fuel cost three times more than in other areas of
the FATA and Pakistan. A blockade on a smaller scale has in turn sometimes been
enforced by the Turi on some of the small enclaves of Sunni tribes dwelling in the
uppermost portion of Kurram, for example in Teri Mangal.
(***) Afghanistan’s Ministry for Tribal and Border Affairs was initially established
to take care of the relations with the so-called Free Tribes (Qabayel-e Azad), an
expression of Kabul’s never fully relinquished claim to the areas cut off from it by
the Durand Line.
(****) We reproduce the conclusion of a visionary article by Dawn (click here for the
full text), as it provides an insight on the type of disinformation that reaches
Pakistani mass media, most probably through some security institutions (propaganda on
peace talks is not a feature unique to Afghanistan, nor is it desperation for peace
among the public), and on the rather explicit territorial and political claims that
the latter seem to entertain regarding Afghanistan:
‘An elder who is familiar with recent arrangements said that the Haqqani network
undertook initiatives for restoration of peace in Kurram Agency against the backdrop
of growing understanding between President Hamid Karzai and those who had influence
over Pakistan's Afghan policy. Now, an option for securing stakes for the Haqqani
network in Afghanistan's future political settlement is being reviewed at the highest
level. The option is to give the group some share in power in Afghanistan's southern
provinces, which will end violence in the volatile Kurram Agency. About the Haqqani
network's offers, the elder said that even its affiliates would help the government
in maintaining peace in Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, which are facing the
worst type of sectarian violence. To that end, the Haqqani network will use its
influence over rouge sectarian elements, which are part of their operations, to end
attacking innocent civilians. "If the formula works in Kurram then it can be
replicated in other troubled areas," he remarked.’
(*****) Even the authoritative article by Daud Khattak published on the AfPakChannel
in mid-February, although sceptical on the goodwill of the parties involved, seemed
inclined to believe that the deal would have worked (click for it here).
Guest Blog: Reconciliation Reloaded in Khost
posted: 02-07-2011 / by: Emilie Jelinek
Once there was the Strengthening Peace programme, with it provincial branches, like
here in Khost, to ‘reintegrate’ willing insurgent fighters. It failed because of
corruption and a lack of political support. Now, there is its successor programme
APRP, and it is unclear whether that’s just a new name on the same project. Our
guest blogger Emilie Jelinek* has been to Khost and already sees reconciliation 2.0
not working properly before it really took off.
In a small, sparsely furnished room on the 4th floor of a shoddily constructed
building in Khost's bustling town centre, my Taleban host minimizes his Facebook page
on an open laptop as we settle on the cushions that line his fluorescent tube-lit
quarters.
The heat is almost suffocating and I remove my burqa, which is awkward and difficult
to walk in, yet strangely liberating in the anonymity it provides me.
A few moments earlier on the drive here, I felt invincible in the back of the car
under this cheap blue polyester veil, triumphant as I secretly spied on the city
through the coarse mesh of my invisibility cloak. I watched groups of men chatting
idly by the roadside and a shopkeeper handing over a thin plastic bag of snow-white
eggs to a customer. I watched a man flicking a damp rag over a pyramid of blood-red
tomatoes to make them seem fresher, more enticing.
Life was almost normal, hardly as though this were one of the most volatile corners
of Afghanistan, where only last week another lost soul corseted with explosives blew
up a police checkpoint. On this hot June afternoon, all is quiet along the town's
eucalyptus-lined streets. Nearby, the perfect blue dome of the Jalaluddin Haqqani
mosque shimmers quietly in the heat.
***
My host is wearing a white shalwar kamiz and matching skullcap. He has light brown
hair, smiling eyes the color of jade stone and keeps one hand wrapped in a soft white
cotton scarf during our meeting. His nom de guerre is Patsun Ghurzang, ‘Revolution
Movement.’
Patsun Ghurzang doesn't normally give interviews, but my translator knows him
somehow, and he has agreed to meet me here in what is presumably his home away from
his more permanent home, which lies somewhere beyond Khost's porous mountain
frontier, across the border in Waziristan. His belongings are few -- a spittoon, a
thermos flask, a small camping stove and a duvet bundled up in a corner.
It's risky talking to anyone these days, he tells me. He worries that his phone is
tapped and laments he can never talk freely to anyone. ‘I am scared every day. Every
day I worry I might be arrested. Every day some of us are attacked.’
‘I am mostly afraid of US forces,’ he adds, ‘and secondly of the Afghan
intelligence department - they are working for the Americans. But fear doesn't mean
we can't fight.’
And there is a lot to fight for in a place where for so many already, waving a white
flag and surrendering peacefully has effectively meant losing everything.
Three months ago I met Haji Ismael, the head of Khost's Program-e Tahkim-e Solh
(commonly referred to as the PTS, the government's former national program for
reconciliation, officially Program for the Strengthening of Peace), set up in 2005 to
reconcile and reintegrate insurgents with the objective of ‘healing national
wounds.’
The program failed, due to poor funding (or the disappropriation of the funding) and
a lack of political support, which meant that opportunities to bring in Taleban were
squandered. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) now proposes to
integrate the existing capacities of the PTS into its framework, although it is
unclear how, with the added risk that this will simply revive former failed efforts
under a new name.
Haji Ismail is a white-bearded man wearing a pale green and grey turban. His eyes
gleam as he talks and he uses his hands a lot when speaking, pulling invisible
streams of words from his mouth with long, brown, delicate fingers. He sits in a rundown office a few streets from here with the ubiquitous portrait of Afghan president
Hamed Karzai towering above him, as it does in most government offices across the
country.
When I met him in February, he introduced me to two recently reconciled insurgents,
who told me they'd decided to stop fighting for two reasons. Firstly, because they
said they trusted the head of the provincial commission; and secondly, because the
government had promised them jobs, housing and benefits if they surrendered. This was
almost a year ago, and they haven't seen a single Pakistani Rupee (the Afghani is not
really used in this border province).
‘I regret joining this process; all of my brothers regret it as well,’ one of them
told me. "We have received no assistance from the government, nothing that they
promised. We gave up everything in Miram Shah [the capital of Pakistan's North
Waziristan agency, and a center of Taleban-affiliated groups] and now we have
nothing, we can't get jobs. Our six families share a single room. Not even animals
live the way we do now. We receive threatening calls from Miram Shah that we will be
found and killed and our home attacked.’
***
The Taleb sitting in front of me now says he has not been contacted by anyone in the
government about reconciliation, and neither does he want to be contacted; like many,
Patsun despises the present administration for its endemic corruption and empty
promises. Friends who have reconciled have been, in his words, ‘insulted and
degraded.’
The [new] peace commission is just another of the government's projects, it's a lie,
another money-making scheme and nothing else,’ he spits.
For all the hype surrounding the APRP, funded to the tune of $132 million, work has
yet to begin in Khost province, an insurgent-filled sub-tropical parcel of land
saddling the Durand Line that divides Afghanistan's and Pakistan's Pashtun tribal
heartlands.
‘We started work about three months ago, but so far we have been focusing on setting
up our office’ says APRP spokesman Nasir Ahmad Rokhan. ‘We haven't had a formal
inauguration, and no one has been reconciled yet.’
This casts doubt on the veracity of the figures announced by Maj. Gen. Phil Jones,
the British director of NATO's reintegration cell in Kabul, who said last month that
although the reintegration program had been running for only 10 months, demand from
the Taleban to rejoin society had outpaced resources. According to Jones, the number
of Taleban fighters who had joined the program stood at 1,740, though an additional
2,000 had applied. The combined figure represents about 15 per cent of the total
20,000 to 25,000 Taleban fighters estimated by NATO to be operating in Afghanistan.
Gen. Jones said the number of Taleban fighters coming forward had accelerated since
the death of Osama bin Laden.
The fact that the APRP is headed by the one-time leader of the anti-Taleban Northern
Alliance will certainly be a deterrent to many. ‘There is deep mistrust of the peace
commission's leadership,’ my Taleb host tells me. ‘Someone like [former Taleban
Ambassador to Pakistan Mulla] Zaeef should lead the commission, not [former Afghan
President Burhanuddin] Rabbani.’
The APRP spokesman tells me there is no specific policy in place yet for how they
will compensate young Taleban willing to give up their struggle. ‘Maybe we will help
them finding jobs or support some private businesses,’ he says vaguely.
Given the amount of attention the peace program is receiving, as well as the millions
of dollars that are being committed, this ambiguity and evasiveness almost a year
after its inception is alarming.
‘They've promised to release people from Guantánamo and Bagram, but it won't
happen,’ growls Patsun. ‘As far as I'm concerned, all these peace talks are
nonsense. My friends and I, we are not interested. If the U.S. forces really want to
negotiate, they need to be realistic. They need to close Guantánamo. There could be
important people there who could advise their friends to join the peace process.
Unless there are real changes in the top ranks of leadership, nothing will happen, we
will never join this government.’
As reports start to flood the wires about the withdrawal of U.S. troops in the coming
year, Patsoon says he praises the news but that no one on his side believes it,
assuming that it will only be a symbolic gesture.
I ask what he makes of Taleban methods of targeting their enemies, often with
roadside bombs or suicide attacks, which are a far greater cause of civilian deaths
in the region than botched U.S. military operations.
‘We have a code of conduct, layha, issued by [Taleban leader] Mulla Omar, in which
he is very clear about this issue. Our layha is like the Afghan constitution, and we
have a complaints commission: If someone doesn't meet the rules of our constitution,
they lose their job or they are sentenced. Actually we have exactly the same
structure and framework as a normal government - the only difference is that we are
working in the mountains, not in government offices.’
He tells me he has no problem with others operating under the name of Taleban - the
only people he hates are the criminals and thieves exploiting the security vacuum in
the region who give the Taleban a bad name.
I ask about coordination with the Haqqani network, considered one of the most deadly
insurgent groups in Afghanistan. ‘Of course we have strong coordination with Haqqani
sahib. The Western media likes to say that there is conflict between our groups;
there isn't.’
‘I'm very optimistic’ he smiles, ‘I know we will be victorious.’
There are no shadows beneath the glaring neon to indicate time passing or that the
sun will soon set and prayers must be offered. But my host is fine-tuned to his faith
and knows it is time for me to go. As we stand to say goodbye, discordant offerings
to Allah are already sounding in the distance through the airless sky.
(*) Emilie Jelinek has been in Afghanistan since 2004 and is currently working on a
briefing paper for the Afghanistan Analysts Network. She writes the Captain Cat's
Diaries blog.
This blog is republished with her permission and that of the AfPakChannel blog were
it appeared first on 30 June under this link.
Conflict going East, conflict going on
posted: 10-08-2011 by: Fabrizio Foschini
The US-led Coalition has declared that its troops’ new strategic focus will be on
eastern Afghanistan, after its claims of gains made in southern Afghanistan last
year. Although the bad security situation in the East is not new, the recent emphasis
on it may be mainly linked to the increased interest (and concern) of the Coalition
with regard to the insurgent groups active there, as it is the case with the Haqqani
network in Loya Paktia and the neighbouring provinces, argues AAN’s Fabrizio
Foschini.
While packing up at the end of his ultimately brief sojourn in Afghanistan, General
David Petraeus on 4 July 2011 discussed where he thought the conflict was going.
Although it was couched in cautious military language, by the time it was relayed
through the media, it sounded like a prophecy: the conflict is moving east(*).
The way some outlets reported on the issue, gave the impression that not only the
conflict had moved, but that also the Taleban themselves had been cleared out of
southern Afghanistan by the 2010 offensives in Helmand and Kandahar, and were
relocating hundreds of kilometres north-eastward. This impression was helped on its
way by some in the military: ‘The kinetic battle is pushing insurgents out of
Afghanistan,’ a US army captain told AFP(**), ‘and they are moving east to key exit
points. Khost has been a traditional embarkation point for insurgents from Pakistan,
so the fight here will pick up.’ (read the whole article here). But the idea of the
same Taleban climbing in through the window (Khost) after having been kicked out of
the door (Helmand & Kandahar) is misleading.
It is difficult to argue seriously that the Taleban have been physically removed from
the south. Mainly, the coalition refer to a handful – of many more – critical
districts: Arghandab, Maiwand, Zherai in Kandahar as well as Marja and Sangin in
Helmand. Moreover, the conflict in the south-east and east has been entrenched for
several years (in some areas it started at a very early stage, shortly after the
fall of the Taleban regime in 2001). Its main protagonists have been sub-networks of
the Taleban that are only – or mainly active – in those particular regions. It is
probably only because the situation is now getting so bad that it has become
impossible to ignore, that the area has been recognized as the priority by the ISAF
command.
The porous border with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan
still constitutes one of the insurgents’ major assets, even after the Pakistani army
has been reluctantly making inroads into some of the areas (for instance in South
Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand in the past years, and in Kurram at present – however
without significantly reducing cross-border movement of insurgents in any of these
areas).
The aggressive attitude by insurgents has led the situation in the east and southeast to slowly but steadily grow worse. This development is coupled with the
inability of the Afghan government to extend its presence among rural communities,
some of which were antagonized at an early stage due to targeting by foreign troops
and abuses by local officers. Currently, the whole arc following the border with
Pakistani FATA shows similar signs of an increased volatility, with its farthest ends
– Paktika and Nuristan – representing the worst-case scenarios: those of insurgents
potentially threatening to take over the entire province.
So what measures are being considered by the ISAF command to counter this threat, in
the light of the planned reduction of the foreign troops’ presence and the hoped-for
de-escalation of the conflict in view of a peace deal? Let’s turn again to former
commander in chief Petraeus: ‘There could be some small [Coalition] forces that will
move, but this is about shifting helicopters – lift and attack. It’s about shifting
close-air support. It’s about shifting, above all, intelligence, surveillance and
recognizance [sic] assets’ (for how helicopter strikes affect civilian casualties
read our previous blog here).
Petraeus’s emphasis on greater close-air support, rather than ground troops, may be
a tactical response to increased instances of insurgent massing in the east. Local
Taleban have employed larger and larger groups of fighters, including in areas that
were previously mainly affected by armed groups of small or medium size. This has
also brought a change in their possible range of objectives.
In Loya Paktia, for example, the standard Haqqani modus operandi, until a few years
ago, was to avoid establishing permanent big fronts of fighters. They rather
preferred to stage periodic, cross-border raids, infiltrating from their sanctuaries
in Waziristan, while keeping small cells of facilitators and affiliates on the
ground. Recently, hundreds of fighters have been fielded in single operations, even
in areas far removed from the border. Evidence also suggests that they have
(re)established hidden facilities and bunker complexes capable of hosting large
numbers of operatives. In May 2011, for example, a group of more than one hundred
insurgents attacked a construction company site in Waza Zadran, Paktia province, far
outgunning the company’s security detail, which numbered only several dozen of men.
Such amassing leaves fighters more vulnerable to air attack. Already in October 2010,
during an attack on security outposts in Barmal district of Paktika, airstrikes had
caused up to 30 losses to a larger attack forces of the insurgents (see here). More
recently, on 21-22 July 2011, an unspecified number of casualties, between 80 and
100, were inflicted on insurgents in Sar Hawza district of Paktika province, during a
two-day air and ground operation. The overall number of insurgents present in the
area must have been even higher than that.
The question is why Haqqani commanders in Paktika choose such tactics, given that
they already virtually control most of the territory outside the district centres in
the province. Locals believe that the concentration of such large numbers of
insurgents at less than 25 kilometres from the provincial capital Sharana indicates
that they are seeking to make a show of force. Insurgents tried to attack Sharana as
early as August 2007; it seems now their chances of success have only increased.
Although the Taleban will not be able to occupy and hold any place inside
Afghanistan that the US will want to retake, be it a medium-sized city or a
shepherd’s hut, but briefly occupying a provincial capital, and perhaps razing to
the ground its government buildings as a warning, would send a powerful message.
Haqqani fighters have done this in the past with several district centres throughout
Loya Paktia and may be aiming at bigger objectives now.
A parallel increase in size can also be noticed in a different kind of insurgent
attacks considered the domain of the Haqqani network: suicide commando operations
against high profile targets inside cities. Starting with the attack at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on 29 June 2011 and reaching the raid in Tirinkot on
25 July 2011, once skimpy suicide groups have been beefed up to impressive sizes
(nine bombers in the first case, seven in the second). The Haqqanis, to apply the US
military-diplomatic jargon to the other side, have apparently decided to go for a
‘short and heavy’ approach where, according to guerrilla rules, they could have
gone for ‘light and long’.
A reason to do this, given the human and financial costs, could be more diplomatic
rather than purely military. The Haqqanis may be trying to assert their political
weight, among others, in view of future political settlements.
During the last months there has been an increasing emphasis in the Western media on
the Haqqani network as possibly the coalition’s ‘worst enemy’. This is also seen
in the recent appearance of several reports on the group by strategic studies centres
(links here and here).
As its long lasting links with al-Qaeda and other international jihadist groups, as
well as with the ISI, are investigated and exposed, the Haqqani network increasingly
becomes a ‘diabolic entity’ in the eyes of the US. On the other hand it appears
more and more openly sponsored by Pakistan, through media narratives and probably
diplomatic efforts, as an interlocutor that cannot be set aside if Afghanistan is to
have a peaceful future. Any announcement that the Haqqani network, with its history
of brutal attacks inside cities and its obvious links to the ISI, had been engaged in
talks would obviously turn into a sensitive political issue. Afghans from different
walks of life already criticize the government’s position as too prone to Pakistani
diktats and too soft on the Taleban, not just with regard to peace talks. The US
themselves, although supportive of any peace talks that would bring some results in
the short-term, have until now excluded the Haqqanis from the list of the ‘guys they
may want to talk to’ (read here). But what of the Haqqanis themselves?(***)
An informed Afghan source pointed to the fact that Serajuddin (the real political
head of the family, now that Jalaluddin has turned into yet another record of
longevity among mujahed leaders) may be interested in peace talks if a complete
withdrawal of foreign troops (‘even a gradual one’) was agreed upon and the current
‘corrupt’ order was replaced by another to be chosen by the Afghan people
‘freely’ (it is not clear if this means through some form of elections), but that
he has not been asked until now. If true, the increased Haqqani military activity
could be an effort to step into the limelight and receive recognition as a major
actor. It could be even considered a parallel strategy to the Coalition's will to
strike the insurgents first to force them to the peace table. However, the Haqqanis
have never declared openly any interest for talks.
The Haqqani family, and the network around it, has a long history of survival. They
have benefited politically from the conflict situation in Loya Paktia and the
neighbouring FATA more than anybody else in the last thirty years. They have not only
consolidated their hegemonic role among the insurgency of Loya Paktia, but have
managed to expand their presence into Logar, Wardak, Kabul and parts of Nangrahar and
even Kapisa. Although consisting mainly of a relatively narrow and localized core
leadership, they enjoy wide respect and economic support among regional and
international islamist groups as local facilitators for non-Afghan jihadis from
Waziristan and beyond. They are actually becoming the main providers of access to
jihad, an increasingly sought after commodity in this region(****). They also seem to
have become Pakistan’s ‘best horse’ in Afghanistan, and increasingly in the FATA
itself. The Haqqanis have not only survived the collapse of the Taleban Emirate, they
have actually made their political fortunes over it.
Furthermore, they retain a high degree of ambiguity as to their political autonomy
and ambitions(*****). Would they shy away from any separate participation in peace
talks because, as the claim, they are just normal Taleban following the political
course set by Mullah Omar? Would they be ready to accept a ceasefire if the alleged
Pakistani conditions of a degree of control for its proxies on the border areas, the
so-called ‘Pashtun corridor’, are ensured? They could be fanatically committed to
an international jihadi terrorist agenda or pragmatically concerned with a mere
regional perspective. Or they could just be interested in exploiting the conflict
situation and the support they derive from it to enhance their importance in a broad
lawless region spanning across Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the end, paralleling a
point often made with less self-righteous warlords operating in border areas: what
would they have to gain by national reconciliation in either of the two countries?
But there could be something else keeping both the Haqqanis (and the Taleban at
large) and the Americans (and the foreigners at large) from reaching the peace table,
as both sides seem to believe that they can determine the conditions for talks. The
two sides have been feeding too long on their respective propagandas of effectiveness
and progress, and of resistance and martyrdom. In reality, neither side has a
realistic hope to have things their way, but both spend a lot of energies in
creating narratives that are saying they can.
Many questions remain. Will we reach the point where another ‘Marja’ success-story
is announced triumphantly, this time in the east? Will, let’s say, Jalalabad become
a deadly city like Kandahar, due to the omnipresent Taleban violence? Or, if
Petraeus’s words about an increase in close-air support and intelligence assets are
the key to the new scenario, are we going to witness an early version of Blackwill’s
own prophecy of an enduring US air-threat over Taleban controlled areas (see our
earlier blog here)?
(*) When NATO talks about the Afghan ‘east’, they talk about the area that is
covered by their Regional Command East, i.e. the traditional Eastern region
(Nangrahar, Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan) and the South-eastern region (Loya Paktia’s
three provinces and Ghazni).
(**) Veteran Gen. Rodriguez put it in a plainer way stating that ‘the coming troop
movements reflect the gains made in southern Afghanistan, where U.S. and Afghan
forces have pushed the Taliban out of several former strongholds in Helmand and
Kandahar’, while according to an unnamed US official ‘[a]ny new troops sent to
eastern Afghanistan will take part in interdiction efforts along the border or
escalate the U.S.-led offensive against the Haqqani network.’ (read the whole
article here)
(***) See an earlier discussion of this by former UN South-eastern region chief Tom
Gregg here. Almost a year ago, Gregg emphasised the point to talk to the Haqqanis as
long as Jalaluddin still has some influence and Serajuddin has not fully taken over
(but is this still the case?), arguing that Haqqani the elder, as a former mujahedin
commander, still is better linked to communities inside Afghanistan while his son
might have been more influenced by outside (Wahhabi) ideology; he was educated in
Saudi Arabia. (Another source told AAN members years ago that Jalaluddin does not
have a political programme beyond vague concepts of an Islamic order)
(****) Among the hundred-or-so high death toll of the Paktika operation in late July
2011, only 35 were recognized as Afghans. Mass movement of Pakistani citizens into
Afghanistan to wage jihad, especially on the Waziristan border, is not a new or a
disputed phenomenon. The Haqqani network can count on the cooperation of several
militant outfits there, focusing more and more on the Afghan side of the border after
a significant weakening of the rebellious Tehrik-e Taleban-e Pakistan (TTP). The
reported decision of the so-called pro-government Taleban groups (like Hafiz Gul
Bahadur’s and Mullah Nazir’s) not to oppose an eventual army operation in North
Waziristan, together with their declaration that suicide attacks inside Pakistan are
haram, point towards a renewed focus on the jihad in Afghanistan. Increased drone
strikes and radicalized political relations between the US and Pakistan contribute to
the trends of participation in the Afghan conflict among sections of the Pakistani
youth, who may wish to bring the fight to the US military.
(*****) This ambiguity is best illustrated by the rumour in May 2011 that Mulla Omar
had been killed by the Haqqanis – at the ISI’s request – when re-locating from
Quetta to Waziristan. The fact that many reasonable people believed this feuilletonstyled development to be possible shows the depth of that ambiguity.
Conflicts in the East, part II
posted: 17-08-2011 by: Fabrizio Foschini
Coalition's concerns arising from the increasingly aggressive and assertive behaviour
of insurgent groups, or from their very identity and international connections, are
not limited to Loya Paktia and the locally dominant Haqqani network. Following
Petraeus’s guidelines and moving further East, one arrives in what has sometimes
been termed Loy Nangrahar (Nangrahar, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan - we can better call
this part of the country the eastern region, according to the old administrative
divisions). Here, insurgents are not under the sway of a major and highly distinctive
network, but rather belong to several different groups, which, although cooperating
in the fight against foreign troops, show a high degree of autonomy and
unpredictability. AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini reports about the ‘East’ proper.
Fazlullah Wahidi, the governor of Kunar, has commented the news that the US is
shifting its strategic focus to the east in a recent interview, linking it directly
to an increased US interest in the Haqqanis’ activities and resolutely denying that
the network holds any sway in Kunar (read Pajhwok article here). This to cool things
down on the US side, but Wahidi has of late been accused by some Pakistani media
outlets (Dawn News channel on 4 July) of harbouring and actively supporting antiPakistani terrorist groups in his province.
Let us start with order. The Haqqanis seem in fact to be conspicuously absent from
the eastern border region of Kunar and Nuristan, and although they have taken the
road to the East, this has meant mainly sending people across the Spinghar mountain
range from Kurram Tribal Agency into Nangrahar. Notwithstanding its considerable
altitude, cross-border movement through the Spinghar remained a major factor of
strength for insurgents in the southern districts of Nangrahar for the last years,
nor does it seem to have stopped now that the Pakistani army is carrying out a longcalled for operation in Kurram. Both Afghan and Pakistani Taleban aim mostly at the
three Khugiani-inhabited districts of Khugiani, Sherzad and Pachir o Agam (but
insurgents have been often infiltrating also Deh Bala, Achin and Nazian in Shinwari
territory) in the south and east of the province where the insurgents count on a
solid presence. From there, the insurgents are actually projecting themselves on the
districts closer to Jalalabad. In these areas, cross-border raids constitute an
important tool for insurgents to intimidate or punish not-supportive local
communities, as exemplified by the most famous of these instances when, two months
ago, gunmen stormed a wedding party in Dur Baba, killing the groom and eight other
guests, apparently in retaliation for the defiant attitude of the district governor.
A major operation involving the Afghan Border Police and Army and the Coalition
troops was launched in the area in the second half of June with the purpose of
stopping massive infiltration from Kurram – probably the militants were trying to
relocate to avoid confrontation with the Pakistani army. During the first week of
July the flux of insurgents from Pakistan was eventually stopped, after airstrikes
killed as much as 30 of them in Khugiani. On the other hand, infiltration from Khyber
Agency, which had been gaining prominence during 2010, seems to have decreased since
Lashkar-e Islami, the foremost Khyber-based militant outfit, has been weakened by
internecine fighting starting from April.
Insurgent groups in and around Nangrahar have reportedly being trying to extend
taxation of local populations outside of their traditional strongholds(*). To mollify
the locals into paying ‘ushr and zakat (tax on land produce and alms) to them, the
Taleban usually secure first the help of local mullas. These are made to preach to
their communities the need to support jihad financially if not by direct armed
participation, and the combination of social and religious pressure together with
individual threats or action against those unwilling to comply is usually effective.
The taxation campaign may thus have reached unprecedented levels in the eastern
region, both in terms of population and areas affected, but it is not the only
direction where insurgents have been looking to for funds. The smuggling of gems,
timber and opiates - the last item in particular is experiencing a revival - are of
course ‘normal’ sources of income for the insurgents, among others, countrywide.
Inside Jalalabad, the region’s centre, it seems that the already existing links
between political insurgents and organized crime have further strengthened as of
late. In the last weeks for example, a series of kidnappings of wealthy businessmen
shook the city, causing even a lockout of protest among the moneylenders of the
bazaar. In one of the last instances, one such sarraf was abducted from the main
bazaar in full daylight by men presenting themselves as NDS officers. The Taleban
eventually distributed night letters in Jalalabad denying their role in the
kidnappings and ordering locals to report abductions to the Taleban security
commission; many locals however believe that insurgents are abetting the criminals
and benefiting economically from the latter’s activities.
Nor seems this criminality to be hitting randomly. A specific group of businessmen
are reportedly safe from risks thanks to their high connections and economic deals
with government officials. Even more worrying is that this does not dispel the idea
among locals that the targeting of the other victims has an insurgent matrix. It
would suggest a close understanding, if not actual cooperation, between the ‘enemies
of the state’ and government officials with their business lobby, especially when
outstanding traders outside of the latter’s circle are targeted.
One could also argue that this kind of insecurity affects areas experiencing
administrative changes, and Jalalabad is definitely fitting in the category. Let us
leave aside the transition of the city’s security to the Afghan forces, which is
widely believed will happen among the next batch of areas to be announced in October
– or in December. Not only the police chief has been replaced last month, and it will
take time for the newcomer to settle down; Nangrahar’s governor Gul Agha Sherzai is,
since last spring, rumoured to be on the move (see our previous blog here). After the
death of Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar, some argue, he has multiplied his lobbying
efforts to become governor there again. Almost every second day in Jalalabad there
are rumours about his appointment having been made effective. It is still to be seen
if Sherzai obtains the seat in spite of strong Karzai’s reserves. But, then, who
will take his place in Jalalabad in case he succeeds?
None of the members of the locally prominent Arsala family (of the late Haji Qadir
and Abdul Haq as well as its current elder Din Muhammad) seem in a good position to
attain their longed-for object of desires: Nasratullah, among them probably the most
broadly acceptable, is still considered by many too young to deal with such a
delicate position, while his cousin Haji Zaher is too controversial in the eyes of
the foreigners (and of many a local). Furthermore, Haji Zaher, now an MP, has just
declared war on Karzai on a series of issues, and if the dispute over the parliament
figures as the main theme, it could well be that his frustrated attempts at getting a
governor seat in the eastern region in the recent past helped him to radicalize his
position towards the President. So, the government would seem more inclined to bring
in another ‘neutral’ outsider, and the name most commonly heard of in this respect
is that of Juma Khan Hamdard, currently governing Paktia.
Hamdard, however, is seen as all but neutral. In a former stronghold of Hezb-e Islami
like Nangrahar, the presence of a Hezbi ‘firebrand’ like Hamdard will surely affect
the political landscape heavily. Many local observers agree that such an appointment
would undoubtedly appease a lot of former commanders and party members, and possibly
even improve the security of some districts in the short term. But, they warn, it can
have serious consequences for the entire region’s future stability, as the governor
would most probably lean on old Hezb-e Islami networks to improve his position and
thus favour a score of party members, be them siding with the government or taking
part in the armed insurgency(**).
The presence of Hezbi insurgents brings us to the already mentioned complexity of the
eastern insurgents’ map. Local Hezbis and Taleban are joined by a significant
proportion of Pakistani militants, themselves pertaining to different outfits, while
in some areas specific local groups further complicate the situation(***). It is the
case of Kunar, where local Salafi militants are active in the insurgency too, both as
part of Taleban units or in more autonomous fronts. There is no single command or
coordination among all the different groups, and sometimes tensions have been
reported, but insurgents in Kunar, even Taleban and Hezbis, do not seem to experience
rivalries or infighting to the degree witnessed in some other provinces, and they are
reportedly cooperating when one group becomes hard pressed(****).
The result, however, is a confused situation, where the behaviour of the insurgents
is not easily predictable. For example many locals from Kunar reported to AAN that
local insurgents have accepted to allow schools, even for girls, to function. On the
contrary, one month ago, insurgents burnt down a girl school in Chaparhar district of
Nangrahar. Not even inside single provinces, where the Taleban shadow administration
supposedly should try to implement same standards and united leadership at least
among the followers of Mulla Omar, things do appear clear. In Kunar, for example,
there has been a deal of confusion as to the identity of the Taleban shadow governor:
Mawlawi Abdur-Rahim, already in charge since 2008, or Qari Zia-ur-Rahman, more
closely linked to the foreign fighters and the Pakistani Taleban? Apparently, a
compromise was reached by appointing the first as ra’is-e tanzimat (here with the
meaning of ‘head of the military operations’) for the whole eastern region,
possibly as a way to make room for the other.
It happens thus that from a somewhat relaxed modus operandi towards NGOs or even
Afghan security forces caused by the insurgents’ deep roots in local communities
there could be a sudden shift to situations of extreme brutality and victimisation of
civilians. The insurgents of Kunar for example banned beheadings years ago, and at
least some commanders in the southern half of the valley have reduced their attacks
on ANP and ANA, apparently trying to concentrate on foreign troops (interestingly,
some reported this as an explicit order issued by a ‘mawlawi claiming to come from
Pakistan on Mulla Omar’s behalf’ around three months ago, although this does not
seem a plausible explanation). At the same time, the killing or abduction of
civilians – even clerics - for intimidating purposes is a frequent occurrence in
parts of the province. Or, for example, Kunar holds the sad record of female suicide
bombers, apparently more a by-product of emphatic Taleban propaganda among
communities than a case of child exploitation.
The more brutal acts of violence – like the murder of two local Community Development
Council workers in Rodat district of Nangrahar last Wednesday, which subsequently saw
the attacker done to death by locals - are usually ascribed to foreign, or anyway not
local, insurgents. The need to keep Afghan and Pakistani Taleban focusing on their
respective areas or, when not, coordinating closely with local insurgents, is
apparently well understood on principle by the Taleban leadership, but not always put
in practice effectively. In most of Afghanistan, foreign fighters are allowed to
operate only in coordination with local insurgents and under local commanders, even
when they provide the main economic assets. But in a province like Kunar this is
simply impossible. According to some local sources, a tentative division of the areas
of responsibility has been done, with the ‘Emirate Taleban’ (those directly linked
to the Quetta leadership) in charge of the districts on the left bank of the river,
and those integrated in the TTP ranks conducting operations on the right bank
bordering the FATA. But things do not seem to work that way consistently, and double
appointments for the same shadow district governor position, with consequent
quarrels, have been reported.
A major reason for this state of things is the porousness of the border in Kunar, in
both geographical and political sense. As Qari Zia-ur-Rahman had been in charge of
administering swaths of Bajaur in the past, so TNSM/TTP commanders like Mawlawi Faqir
Muhammad and Abdul Wali have been able to carry out attacks in Kunar from Bajaur and
Mohmand respectively. If these trespassings had been until now denounced by
Afghanistan as ISI’s disruptive activities inside Afghanistan, they have been
increasingly taken up by the Pakistani government as Afghan support for antiPakistani groups after an unclaimed attack in Upper Dir, the first of a series
apparently originating from Afghanistan, left dozens of Pakistani security forces
dead on the first of June 2011. Since then, the reversal of the situation, with the
Pakistani press accusing the Afghan governor of Kunar of sheltering the terrorists in
sanctuaries on Afghan soil or the Afghan and Coalition troops of not doing enough
and, part of it at least, expressing security concerns at the planned withdrawal of
the Nato, could not have been more complete (read Dawn article here).
Unfortunately, the development, instead of bringing about a closer cooperation
between the two countries to improve control over their border, gave the Pakistani
army an additional incentive to continue and intensify the artillery shelling of
areas inside Afghanistan all along the Kunar border down to Goshta in Nangrahar. This
has been an inexplicable(*****), months-long bombardment which, provided it is now
over, for more shelling were reportedly killing livestock in Naray district on 4
August, it has caused at least 14 civilian deaths (this is what UNAMA could confirm,
figures given by locals are much higher) and displaced hundred of families. The lack
of a strong diplomatic reaction from the international community and the Afghan
government has been a strikingly negative signal given to local inhabitants already
experiencing degrees of disaffection from their government and its international
backers.
On top of it, insurgents allowed themselves to play with the issue: Qari Zia-urRahman stated in an interview with a Kunar local newspaper that his men carried out
raids inside Pakistan in retaliation for the shelling of Afghan territory, and it was
now the Afghan state’s turn to react. The truth is that insurgents simply do not
recognize nor care for borders, and this not in the name of gone-by ideals of
internationalism, but in acknowledgement of the inability or unwillingness of nation
states to repress their criminal activities, on whatever side of the Durand Line.
(*) According to an Afghan source, local insurgents found themselves in straightened
circumstances after the killing of Osama Bin Laden and the disruption of some of the
funding networks originating from the Gulf countries. They would have sought to
replace diminished international funding by leaning more on taxation and other local
sources of income.
(**) Nangrahar, and more generally the whole eastern region, has been arguably the
most important stronghold of Hezb-e Islami during the ‘80s and early ‘90s. In
particular, some central districts like Batikowt or Rodat provided a high percentage
of the party cadres countrywide, while currently several MPs from the four provinces
have a Hezbi background. The pivotal role of Nangrahar’s governor in the whole
eastern region would make Hamdard’s a heavy appointment. Furthermore, the loyalty
commanded by Hezbi affiliates within the state apparatus reportedly allows even those
who sided with the insurgents’ considerable freedom of movement, and this, in turn,
offers margins of exploitation by other insurgents. In the words of a Kunari: ‘some
corrupted MPs facilitate the movement of Taleban and even al-Qaeda leaders in the
area (from Kunar to Torkham and vice-versa) in black-windowed four-wheels by calling
the security forces in Jalalabad and telling them it’s Hezb-e Islami members moving
around, not to mess with them.’
(***) This diversity of course applies also to the agendas allegedly pursued by the
various insurgent groups: according to some locals it would be difficult to find a
foreign country which is not sponsoring this or that armed group on the border areas
of Kunar or Nuristan. Afghan officials themselves are said to have close contacts
with some insurgents, as shown by a narrative of the recent operation in a high
school in Shewa district of Nangrahar, which on 17 July led to the death of 14
insurgents including their commander Khan Wali. Three insurgent groups numbering a
total of around 60 had gathered there, but one of the commanders had actually set up
a trap in cooperation with the NDS to eliminate Khan Wali, considered the more
committed and dangerous among them (and an outsider, originating from Nurgal). Khan
Wali himself, by the way, had some high-ranking connection on the other side, as he
had been among former Nangrahar police chief and now MP Hazrat Ali’s clients before
turning to jihad, and apparently had kept close contact with some of the latter’s
lieutenants.
(****) This could be because Hezb-e Islami’s presence there is clearly limited
compared to more mixed environments. The famous Hezbi commander and Hekmatyar’s
deputy Kashmir Khan completely controls Shigal district in the north of the valley,
and such is the sway his men hold over the area that Shigal is sometimes mockingly
described as the district ‘having the best security in Kunar’, even allowing for
some development projects to take place. In the rest of the province, except for
Chawki district, Hezbi presence is negligible.
(*****) A rather indulgent remark would be that Pakistani troops are at a loss as how
to repress entrenched hostile militants after they have allowed them to move
undisturbed across the border in the past. Unless the shelling preludes to a will of
the Pakistani army and intelligence commands to step in as providers of security in
the parts of Kunar border region abandoned by the NATO troops and where the Afghan
government’s presence is merely nominal. Only, judging by the amount of problems
Pakistan already faces inside its tribal areas, such a move would definitely disproof
the fabled strategic acumen of the ISI.
PEACE JIRGA BLOG 4: Who’s come to town… and who’s staying away
posted: 02-06-2010 by: Kate Clark
The peace jirga has begun today without President Karzai’s main rival in last
year’s presidential elections, Dr Abdullah, who has announced that he and his
supporters are not attending. Abdullah’s party comrade, head of Jamiat-e Islami and
former president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, however, looks set to chair the jirga – a move
which is seen as an attempt by the President to split potential opposition inside the
tent and beyond. There is now an agenda of sorts and a better idea of how discussions
will be structured. And it appears ever more clear that it will be largely Karzai
loyalists hearing and discussing what plans the government has for the insurgency. A
blog by AAN senior analyst, Kate Clark, with input from AAN co-director Martine van
Bijlert.
Dr Abdullah is now definitely out of the tent, taking with him as many as 60 to 70
MPs from his bloc. Other MPs who share his concern that the jirga is unrepresentative
of the nation, unconstitutional and has no hope of moving any sort of peace process
forward, have been debating whether to go or stay and have opted to stay as critical
voices. “Actually, I don’t believe in this jirga,” said MP Mir Ahmad Joyenda, “It
won’t have any outcome, but if we’re not there, they may decide something in our
absence. I’m afraid, they will cross red lines.” Senior Junbesh leaders, including
General Dostum, will not be attending, while other Junbesh activists, like MP
Fazlullah Zaki will be. “We don’t know much about it, we weren’t part of designing
this, but some of our people will participate and take part in the discussions. They
will try to protect the constitution.”
MPs and other delegates predicted that Ustad Rabbani would be asked to chair the
jirga, which they suspect is a move to weaken the opposition. A new opposition
alliance, Omid wa Taghir (Hope and Change), was established by Dr Abdullah after the
2009 presidential election. Rabbani’s Jamiat is a member of the alliance and is
considered one of its leaders. Rabbani’s possible chairmanship has also caused
unhappiness among some of the MPs, particularly from among his old rivals from Hizb-e
Islami, who have been discussing a walk out if he is elected or selected (the jirga
agenda says either method could be used).
So far, though, the disapproval for the jirga has been expressed in fairly moderate
ways. "We have not boycotted the jirga, but we will not participate in it,” was the
stated strategy of Dr Abdullah. And Junbesh, unhappy over promises made and not kept
(again) by Karzai in exchange for electoral support last year, is neither planning to
complain loudly inside or outside the tent, but has shown its disapproval by keeping
its big leaders away. These passive tactics seem hardly designed to generate much
press coverage, let alone make political waves.
The cynicism about the jirga expressed by many MPs and on the streets is set against
the high vaulting narrative that is being constructed by the government and by
diplomats, who are presenting it as an event that it will boost the president and
give him a mandate to move the ‘peace process’ with the Taleban forward. To Afghans
however this is looking ever more like the president talking to his friends and
trying to sell that off as a process of debate and national consensus.
However, if the aim of the jirga was to hammer out a real national consensus on how
to deal with the insurgency, you would want delegates to have clout, influence
locally and the ability to sell any deal to their people. You would want the critics
there. You would also want proper representatives from groups who have links or
sympathies with the insurgents. Yet, in most provinces, it seems governors or
equivalent power-holders, have chosen Karzai loyalists. As Jowzgan MP, Zaki described
it, the mechanism for selecting delegates, “was extraordinarily limited and
manipulated, [leading to] “delegates who were hand-picked.”
There has been confusion as to the final list of is attending the jirga. Some people
who turned up in Kabul, fully expecting to participate, found their names missing
from the central database of participants. Last minute additions to the list have led
to accusations that the make-up of the jirga was still being manipulated. There is
still no final list that is publicly available, but AAN has managed to see a ‘late
stage’ list of delegates from many, but not all of the provinces and it makes
interesting reading.
Locals looking at the selection of delegates from Paktia, Ghazni, Herat, Ghor,
Kandahar and Farah have commented that members of Hamed Karzai’s 2009 election teams
feature strongly. Concerns have also been expressed in Nuristan, Kunar and Kapisa
(but they hold true for many of the other provinces as well) that many of the
delegates, who are close associates of the governors, live in the provincial centres
or even Kabul and cannot actually travel to their districts or function as proper
representatives. Several of the delegates are seen to be involved in drugs smuggling
or other criminal activities, which obviously undermines their reputation.
In Kandahar, the list of delegates, on paper, appears to represent a good mix of
tribes, including at least one delegate from each of the main ‘disgruntled tribes’,
but this masks the fact that according to the Kandahar-based analyst, Alex Strick van
Linschoten, “the real movers and shakers are not there, the people who are sought
out when there’s a problem.” AAN was told that although there had been a
consultative process in Kandahar to select the delgates – Kandahar’s tribes were
asked to suggest names and, where there were shuras, to vote for representatives –
but that in the end Ahmad Wali Karzai, checked over the list and crossed off the
names he did not like, especially of those who were independently-minded. “The
really significant people,” said one man, “who might have something to say, won’t
be at the jirga, but people are not that bothered because they don’t see the jirga
as important.”
In Uruzgan and Zabul the list represents the existing tribal inbalance of power with
no real Ghilzai representation in the former and a Tokhi/Hotak dominance in the
latter, which means that the main insurgency-affected areas and tribes are not or
only minimally represented. The Uruzgan delegates that were selected were handpicked
by local strongman Jan Mohammad. In Paktia, where the Hezb-e Islami, Karzai loyalist
governor Juma Khan Humdard reportedly kept a close eye on selection, there is only
one delegate from Zurmat, the most important centre for Taleban leadership outside
the south and no delegates at all from the other district politically important for
the insurgency, Gerda Tserai, birthplace of Taleban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. There
is in general underrepresentation of the alienated tribes and groups among the
delegates, both in numbers and in terms of the strength of the leaders.
The northern provinces have, as might be expected, more delegates who supported Dr
Abdullah in 2009, but this is not the whole picture and local politics feature
strongly. From Badakhshan, for example, there are a few independently-minded
delegates, but the bulk are Shura-e Nazar and Jamiat associates. Of them, a few are
pro-Abdullah, but most are close to the Karzai ally and Badakhshi strongman and MP,
Zalmay Mujadiddi or to Fahim’s local ally, governor Baz Mohammad Ahmadi. Almost the
whole Badakhshi ulema shura has been invited – mawlawis from Rabbani’s home
district, Yaftal.
Sarepul, Balkh and Samangan do not seem to have sent any delegate who does not belong
to one of the military-political factions; almost all delegates are Jamiat, Wahdat or
Junbesh, with a few Hezb-e Islami thrown in for good measure.
Reportedly none of the western provinces (Herat, Badghis, Farah and Ghor) put forward
women delegates in their initial suggestions, so bravo to Daikundi which most closely
matches the national gender balance, with five out of nine of its suggested delegates
being women.
The last word on who appears at the jirga or not, as insiders in Kabul say, was with
the chief organiser, education minister Faruq Wardak, and the president himself. And
what will they do once they all get together? Organisationally, we now know,
delegates will be split into 28 groups, which will each be further broken up into 3
sub-groups to facilitate discussion of reconciliation and how to strengthen national
unity.
As to those who are firmly outside the tent, the Taleban has said the conference does
not represent the Afghan people and was aimed at "securing the interest of
foreigners." It called the event an ‘order of Richard Holbrooke” and said the
delegates were all affiliated with the “invaders” and, “their powerless stooge
administration, in one way or the other.” The other main insurgent group, Hezb-e
Islami, called the jirga a “useless exercise" because "only handpicked people" were
invited. Their legal largely pro-government wing in Kabul, however, went public to
support the jirga and many of those hand-picked people representing the nation in
Kabul today are Hezbi: a quarter of the delegates from Kapisa, for example, (surely
an over-representation there), half in Nangarhar and all but one of the Laghmanis.
Wiley Tribesman Thwart U.s. Hunt For Al-qaeda
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 8
May 11, 2004 08:00 PM Age: 7 yrs
By: Afzal Khan
The vaunted "Mountain Storm" U.S. spring offensive on the Afghan border with Pakistan
and the supporting Pakistani action against tribes believed to be harboring Al-Qaeda
on its side of the border in Waziristan has petered out. From "a hammer and anvil"
strategy that would have trapped the terrorists between the "hammer" of the Pakistani
military action and the "anvil" of the U.S. forces waiting on the other side of the
border, the reality on the ground in Afghanistan has become just another routine
search for elusive guerrillas, come this summer.
On the Afghan side, the U.S. army has failed to net fleeing terrorists from
Waziristan because the Pakistani army, after botched operations in March in South
Waziristan, has concluded truce after truce with clans of the powerful Wazir tribe
for the peaceful surrender of suspected "foreign terrorists" believed to be harbored
by them.
The latest news from a local Reuters correspondent in Wana, the headquarters of the
semi-autonomous South Waziristan tribal agency, said that on May 10 the Wazir
tribesmen had once again vowed to raise a tribal lashkar, or militia, to hunt AlQaeda militants along the Afghan border. This comes after allies of one of the Wazir
sub-clans failed to hand over "foreign" fighters to meet a Pakistani government
deadline that expired that day. Instead, it was decided by the jirga, or traditional
assembly of tribal elders, to meet again on May 11 to decide when to launch their
hunt for Al-Qaeda. The same tribal assembly had raised a similar militia in April. It
forced local allies of Al-Qaeda to pledge not to launch attacks against the Pakistani
army in return for an amnesty.
This "wait-and-see" strategy by Pakistan has frustrated Lieutenant General David
Barno, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. "We have concerns that the Pakistani
operation could go in the wrong direction," he said (AP from Kabul, May 3). He was
referring to the frequency of attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan by militants
based across the border in both the North and South Waziristan tribal agencies. These
areas are peopled largely by the powerful Wazir and Mahsud tribes, who have
historically been involved in the making and un-making of Afghan kings on the Kabul
throne, and who now number over a million.
As a matter of fact, "frustrated" U.S. forces have crossed over into Pakistan while
in hot pursuit of these guerrillas. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported on April 30
that U.S. forces, accompanied by soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA), on April
28 entered the border village of Mir Sperkay in North Waziristan, across from
Afghanistan's restive Khost province. There they distributed leaflets offering
rewards for information about Taliban commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
aides. The leaflets were written in Pashtu, the local language, and reportedly
offered rewards amounting to US$2,500 and more for information on the whereabouts of
Maulvi Haqqani and other Taliban leaders.
There were also accompanying reports that the U.S. troops abused local tribesmen
belonging to the Madakhel clan of the Wazir tribe by forcibly searching vehicles and
beating up those who resisted.
Such incursions into Pakistani tribal territory in hot pursuit of militants - however
practical from the point of view of U.S. troops in Afghanistan - may not bode well
for continued cooperation between U.S. forces in Afghanistan and their Pakistani
counterparts across the border in the joint campaign against Al-Qaeda and its Taliban
supporters. It may well end up inflaming the volatile Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen in
the region, who have been, hitherto, sympathetic to the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.
Further, the active pursuit of former Mujahideen leaders such as Maulvi Haqqani --who
valiantly fought for the United States against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
in the 1980s -- may anger the tribesmen even more. That the United States should now
turn against those who fought for them against the common enemy - the Russians, or
Shoravi, as they call them - is deeply disturbing to Pashtun tribesmen who value the
loyalty of old friendships, even to the extent of sacrificing one's life for
preserving it, if necessary.
Survival for these border tribesman in the no-man's-land between Afghanistan and
Pakistan - through centuries of passage by conquerors from Alexander to the Mughals
and the British colonials - has made them wise historically. Coupled with that, they
have their social code of Pashtunwali. It includes endless revenge for perceived
wrongs and eternal hospitality for fugitives, including mortal enemies. Therefore,
demands from the United States or Pakistan to summarily surrender "foreign"
terrorists among them is a pretty tall order. Only a compromise - one based on equal
and face-saving terms - can win their cooperation in the voluntary surrender of AlQaeda and Taliban leaders who may have sought refuge with them. That compromise could
entail hefty sums of dollars being exchanged and further assurances of supporting
their historical independence.
South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 9
May 14, 2007 09:37 AM Age: 4 yrs
By: Hassan Abbas
Pakistan is experimenting with the Taliban yet again. The primary focus of the effort
is to de-link the Taliban from al-Qaeda and bring them back into the Pakistani sphere
of influence. Uzbek militants have been the first “casualty” of this re-alignment.
Potentially, remaining Arab militants will be next. Tribal forces in South Waziristan
under the leadership of Maulvi Nazir are at the forefront of this “movement.”
Extremist notions of religion remain their bread and butter, but new political
objectives also guide their activities on the ground. This, in short, defines the
neo-Taliban phenomenon. It is critical to understand the background, motivations and
alliances of Maulvi Nazir to fully comprehend what is transpiring in the region.
Maulvi Nazir (also known as Mullah Nazir), is 32 years old, a dual citizen of
Pakistan and Afghanistan and is married with a son and daughter (The News, May 4;
Boston Globe, April 21). Although he presently resides in South Waziristan, he is a
frequent traveler to Afghanistan’s Paktika province and Kandahar where he owns some
property (Boston Globe, April 21). Common to the area, his extended family lives on
both sides of the Durand Line. He belongs to the Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan
of the Ahmedzai Waziris (who dominate parts of South Waziristan) [1]. Intriguingly,
his first association was with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami, a favorite of
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the days of the anti-Soviet
jihad (The Friday Times, March 30). His battle experience and guerrilla training are
not that of an amateur. He later joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and
remained politically aligned with Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s JUI party (Daily Times,
January 9).
He moved back to South Waziristan when the Taliban lost their ground to U.S.-led
coalition forces in November 2001. During this political vacuum, al-Qaeda funds
started pouring into the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal belt and Nazir vied for this
treasure with other competitors including Nek Mohammad, brothers Mohammad Sharif and
Noor Islam, Maulvi Nur Abbas and commander Javed (Dawn, June 19, 2004). It took the
Pakistani military and intelligence leadership some time to realize what was
happening in the region because, at the same time, the Indian military was amassing
on Pakistan’s eastern border in 2002-2003, creating a time-consuming distraction.
When they finally started confronting Taliban and al-Qaeda elements militarily in
2003, Nazir was already prominent on the most wanted list. When he surrendered to the
authorities in 2004 as part of a deal with militants, he got cleared and was soon
released by the military (The Friday Times, March 30). Apparently, he kept a low
profile for the past couple of years—possibly at the behest of his handlers in the
ISI.
When he was reincarnated in late 2006, he was supported by the Pakistani segment of
the Taliban led by Mullah Dadullah. He also received approval from the Taliban Shura
that includes Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran mujahideen and an
important leader of the Taliban. Nazir first established his credentials as a new
amir of the Taliban by enforcing rigid Sharia law in South Waziristan—apparently
unhindered by government forces. He also directed his supporters not to confront the
Pakistani military. He was supported in this endeavor by: 1) about a dozen
independent pro-Taliban groups of the area; 2) Punjabi Taliban (mostly members of
banned sectarian and Kashmiri militant groups); and 3) his tribe members.
After establishing some degree of control in a matter of months, he challenged
“immigrant” Uzbek militants operating under Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), an action which led to an ensuing bloody battle. The Uzbeks lost
around 200 people in the conflict—about a fifth of their total strength in the area
(The Guardian, April 5). The Pakistani army provided medical cover to Nazir’s forces
and also helped him secure the bases vacated by the Uzbeks. Major General Gul
Muhammad, the commanding officer of Pakistani troops in the region, was quick to
appreciate this development by saying that “Wana will become a model for the entire
Waziristan region as far as the campaign against foreign militants is concerned,”
while also emphasizing that Maulvi Nazir had not joined the fight against Uzbek
militants as a Taliban amir, but as a member of the Kakakhel tribe (Daily Times,
April 12). It is interesting to see a very similar theme postulated by Nazir when he
addressed a press conference in early May: “I invited you to see for yourself, the
changed environment here after the expulsion of foreign militants, who had made the
area volatile for its own people. Let the world know that Wana is now free from
foreign militants” (The News, May 4). The above two statements explain the
relationship between Nazir and Pakistani army. It is not an ideal scenario for
Pakistan, but it has arguably opted for the lesser evil.
It is necessary to explore Nazir’s motivation behind his campaign against the Uzbeks
and foreign militants. Besides Arab militants in the area, there are some Chinese
Uighurs (from Xinjiang) and Chechens as well (UPI, April 11; The Pakistan Times, June
16, 2004). In the words of Nazir, the charges against Uzbek militants relate to their
involvement in “killing and robbing tribesmen besides imposing their self-styled
Sharia upon them” (The News, May 4). Uzbeks reportedly became enmeshed in local
rivalries and were blamed for increasing not only crime, but also brutal
assassinations of pro-government elders (who were often dubbed by Arab and Uzbeks as
U.S. spies). In addition, economic interests are also playing a part in this power
matrix. Uzbeks started coming to the area during the late 1980s and early 1990s;
however, the major influx began after key developments in 2001. Uzbek families
managed to acquire large properties, some of which were bought, and some of which
were offered as gifts by the local people who entered into relations with them. The
Uzbeks worked hard and gradually developed some lands into model farms. This became
the bone of contention between the settlers and the locals. Some locals partnered
with the Uzbeks in business and also acted as their protectors. Others naturally
developed a grudge. On the other hand, Nazir has always looked for economic
opportunities, and soon after his first victory over Uzbek militants he publicly
urged the Pakistani government to initiate development work in the area and
specifically asked mobile phone companies to start their services in the area.
It will by no means be smooth sailing for Maulvi Nazir, who leads a group of no more
than 3,000 fighters—mostly Waziris. Family and friends of the assassinated leader Nek
Mohammad, a legendary figure, are still supportive of Uzbek fighters and al-Qaeda
elements. Mehsud tribesmen (the largest tribe in terms of numbers in the area) under
Baitullah Mehsud are also resisting Nazir. Haji Omar, a senior pro-al-Qaeda Taliban
commander in South Waziristan and an arch opponent of Nazir, while being interviewed
by a BBC correspondent about Nazir’s anti-Uzbek drive, gave a stern warning to the
Pakistani military: “Do not become a party to the conflict, otherwise we will sign
out from the peace agreement we reached with the government [in November 2004]”
(Daily Times, March 24). It is in this context that Nazir’s recent pro-Osama bin
Laden statement should be interpreted [2]. Contrary to Western media assessments, it
is likely that this assertion is a mere public relations effort to win support of
many in the region who are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden. The statement should not
be construed as blind support for all things al-Qaeda. For similar reasons, Nazir had
to declare Uzbek leader Tahir Yuldashev an agent of the CIA, KGB and Mossad before
attacking his forces. Such slogans work wonders in the region.
To succeed, Nazir still faces serious challenges. Uzbeks, as indicated above, have
supporters among the Mehsud tribesmen in South Waziristan, and some Uzbeks have now
shifted to North Waziristan, which is largely out of range for Nazir. Secondly, the
Punjabi Taliban component of Nazir’s forces may restart their sectarian killing
business as a night job as soon as they succeed in their current task. Moreover,
there are no guarantees about how Nazir will start behaving once in complete control
of the area. If recent history is any indicator, Maulvi Nazir may be a passing
phenomenon, but this overall strategy may open up an avenue for Pakistan to reclaim
some of its lost territory.
Notes
1. For details about the dynamics of the Wazir tribe and its sub-clans, see Ilyas
Khan, “Pakistan’s Tribes: Who is Killing Who?”, BBC, April 5, 2007.
2. Nazir said that although he has never met bin Laden, “if he comes here and wants
to live according to tribal traditions, then we can provide protection to him because
we support oppressed people.”
The Father of the Taliban: An Interview with Maulana Sami ul-Haq
Publication: Spotlight on Terror Volume: 4 Issue: 2
May 23, 2007 01:23 PM Age: 4 yrs
By: Imtiaz Ali
Maulana Sami ul-Haq
Maulana Sami ul-Haq is the director and chancellor of Pakistan's famous madrassa,
Darul uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak. He has served in this post since the death of
his father, Maulana Abdul ul-Haq, the founder of the madrassa, in 1988. Darul uloom
Haqqania is where many of the top Taliban leaders, including its fugitive chief,
Mullah Omar, attended. It is widely believed that the madrassa was the launching pad
for the Taliban movement in the early 1990s, which is why Sami ul-Haq is also called
the "Father of the Taliban." Besides running his madrassa, Maulana Sami has a long
political history as a religious politician. He was among the founders of Pakistan's
Muttahida Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition of six Islamic religious parties.
He recently spoke with Jamestown analyst Imtiaz Ali.
Imtiaz Ali: During the Russian invasion, the students from your madrassa were
traveling to Afghanistan to fight, after which most of them were eventually inducted
as governors and administrators in the Taliban government. Is the same thing
continuing today? Are you still sending people to Afghanistan for jihad?
Maulana Sami ul-Haq: No, there were not only Taliban who took part in jihad. This is
an incorrect assumption, which needs correction. After the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan, people from all walks of life went to Afghanistan for jihad. Students
from colleges and universities went more than madrassa students.
IA: But it is an undeniable fact that students who graduated from your madrassa
played a significant role in the establishment of the Taliban regime.
SH: Well, the Taliban were busy in their studies when the factional wars in
Afghanistan reached their climax. Naturally, when the leaders could not make it, the
students had to come to the rescue of the war-torn country. Thus, the Taliban rushed
back to rescue their country from the factional fighting. Similarly, when America
attacked Afghanistan in late 2001, the same event happened—it is understandable that
when infidels attack a Muslim country, then it is the duty of every Muslim to defend
it. Maulana Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) also took
thousands of people for jihad, which was a commendable action. The U.S. attack on
Afghanistan was a clear act of aggression and terrorism. But when someone rises up
against U.S. aggression, then he is called a terrorist. It is a strange and illogical
philosophy.
IA: There were reports that the Taliban leadership had called for fresh
reinforcements in connection with its spring offensive in Afghanistan. Is this true?
SH: These are just baseless reports. Had they called upon the madrassa students, they
would have called us for the reinforcements or at least we would know. The Taliban
are not that organized. They are living in caves. They lack proper communication and
logistics systems, and that is why they do not want new recruits. The Afghans
themselves have risen up and they are fighting against American and NATO forces.
IA: If they would ask you for help, what would be your reaction?
SH: They would never ask us. We ourselves have not sent students before nor will we
send them now. It is not our madrassa policy to do so.
IA: What would you call the situation in Afghanistan? Is that jihad?
SH: When the red forces of the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, it was a war of
independence and we all agreed that it was jihad. Even the United States had said
that the Russians must be ousted from Afghanistan. When Russia left, the United
States committed the same aggression. So, the situation is the same. One infidel
force replaced another. No difference at all. Whether it is Russia or America, it is
a jihad.
IA: Some analysts call it a Pashtun uprising. What do you think?
SH: It is neither a Pashtun uprising or a Persian one, or a Sunni uprising or a
Shiite. In fact, the Afghan nation has risen up against the invaders—the United
States and its allies. It is a war of independence. After the fall of the Taliban
regime, the Afghan people remained quiescent for two years to see if any positive
change would come into their lives. But they did not see anything that was promised
to them at the time of the collapsing Taliban regime and that is why they started
this revolt against the occupied forces. It is now a war of independence for all
Afghans. They want to get rid of the U.S.-led occupation forces. Terming it only a
Pashtun uprising is a completely incorrect assumption.
IA: Do you not consider the Karzai-led government in Afghanistan a Muslim government?
SH: We have nothing to do with the Islam of Karzai. It is not our business to issue a
decree about him being Muslim or non-Muslim. We just want an end to the suffering of
the Afghan people. We ask the current Afghan rulers to start negotiations with the
Taliban and other jihadi forces to pave the way for a durable peace in the war-torn
country.
IA: It does not matter to you, then, if there is a Karzai-led government or the
Taliban, just as long as it is an Afghan government?
SH: We say that there should be no foreign interference in Afghanistan, and the
Afghans themselves should come up with a solution. All the factions—the leaders, the
Taliban, the jihadi forces—should come forward and work together for peace. They
should decide their fate in the absence of foreign interference. But I firmly believe
that there is no chance for peace and stability in Afghanistan until the presence of
foreign troops is removed.
IA: What are your thoughts on the flow of fighters between Afghanistan and Pakistan
over the Durand Line?
SH: Like I said earlier, it is an Afghan uprising against foreign invaders and it has
nothing to do with cross-border terrorism and the flow of fighters from Pakistan.
IA: Why, then, has the government decided to fence and plant mines on the Pakistani
side of the border? Do you approve of that?
SH: I oppose this plan because the Pashtun nation on both sides of the border shares
cultural, racial and religious values. Their lives are intertwined. They are all
Muslims. They are one nation. Fencing the border will not solve the problem. The main
reason behind the tension on the Pakistan-Afghan border is the presence of U.S.-led
foreign troops in Afghanistan. The day they leave Afghanistan, there will be no
tension at all.
IA: With the ban on foreign students' admission in the religious seminaries in 2003
by the government, has enrollment of the students changed in your madrassa?
SH: That ban is a total violation of our fundamental rights. People from here go to
the United States and the United Kingdom for studies. Similarly, students from other
countries come to Pakistan for education. That was a kind of service we were
providing to the Muslim students from other countries. But this ban is an
unconstitutional, inhumane and unlawful act. The government has taken this step only
to appease the United States and its other Western masters. It is a shame for us
because India is a secular country, but has been issuing visas to students from all
Muslim countries who want to come to India for education.
IA: But there have been accusations that terrorists are being trained here in the
madrassas.
SH: This is nothing more than an example of the perpetual propaganda against the
madrassa system. This is what we have been hearing, but so far no one has produced
any solid evidence.
IA: The mystery has always been shrouded by the lack of an audit of the money being
received by madrassas, correct?
SH: We are not bound by the government to audit our funding system because they do
not give us any money. First, let them give us funds for running our madrassas and
then we will let them have their audit. Why are they taking pains when they are not
giving us a penny? Only those who give us financial support have the right to audit
our funds. We have our system of donations and we do not accept any donations from
the government. I also want to make it clear that we keep a record of all our
donations and funding. The funding is being registered and we prepare annual reports
and then those reports are printed along with the names of the donors.
IA: Who gives you the donations for running this big madrassa?
SH: Common Muslims. And the majority of the funding comes from the poorer classes of
society. They know that madrassas are the forts of Islam and the students in
madrassas are the real guardians of Islam. God's religion is flourishing in the
madrassas. These people cut their meager domestic budget and give us donations. This
is how they express their love of Allah almighty and save the integrity of these
madrassas.
IA: Is Musharraf validated in meddling with religious issues considering he is
supposed to be the leader of a secular government?
SH: He has been doing all this just to appease the United States and his other
Western masters.
IA: To what extent could a nuclear Iran pose a potential threat to the strength of
Pakistan?
SH: Iran is not a threat to Pakistan at all. Iran is giving the United States a tough
time in the region and seems quite determined to acquire nuclear power status.
Muslims all over the world are happy about this move because there should be someone
who has the courage to demonstrate the religious strength to look into the eyes of
the United States. We support Iran. Besides, we would not allow the Pakistani
leadership to toe the U.S. line in dealing with Iran, as they have done in the case
of Afghanistan.
IA: There has been speculation that Iran has ambitions for a "Shiite Crescent" in the
Middle East. What is your opinion of this?
SH: This is U.S. propaganda aimed at dividing the strength of Muslims. The ShiiteSunni issue has been created by the United States just to hide its failure in Iraq
and to achieve its goals in the Middle East. Besides, the United States is also
creating poisonous propaganda against Iran for intervening in Iraq's affairs just to
malign its position in the world community. It is baseless. I was in Iran two months
ago where I held meetings with the top Iranian leadership. I urged them to counter
U.S. propaganda and try to satisfy Kurds, Arabs and Sunnis. I clearly told them that
if you [Iran] need the support of the whole Muslim ummah, then you have to garner
support against the United States, not only from Shiites but also from Sunnis.
IA: What do you think of Lashkar-e-Jangvi, TNSM and other jihadi outfits in Pakistan?
SH: Lashkar-e-Jangvi and similar organizations are the continuity of the Kashmir
problem. These jihadi forces were patronized by the Pakistani intelligence agency,
the ISI, with full state support for their activities in Kashmir. But when Pakistan
came under immense pressure, then this whole drama was wrapped up and that is why a
ban was put on these jihadi organizations. It is all a dictated policy from the West.
IA: What do you think about the latest spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan?
SH: This is not a surprise. This new suicide phenomenon in Pakistan is the direct
outcome of the government's policies, particularly the unjust military operations in
the tribal belt along the Afghan border. Today, Pakistani forces are at the highest
level of danger and risk due to the flawed policies of General Musharraf in the name
of fighting the so-called war on terror. This is what I had forewarned about in the
past, that if the government did not stop these unjust military operations, then
attacks on military posts and violence would not be confined to the tribal areas, but
will spread to the rest of the country. Today, you see that this is happening.
IA: Do you think that suicide attacks are fair?
SH: The bombers would not ask us to confirm whether it is fair or unfair.
better you ask this question to the suicide bombers, whose family members
killed and houses have been bombed. They themselves decided what they had
would not ask any mullah. But they do think that they will go straight to
It is
have been
to do. They
paradise.
IA: Who do you think these bombers are?
SH: They are young and emotional Muslims. When they see that their leaders have
surrendered to the United States and its allies, then they do not see any other way
out except for the option of suicide bombing. Among them are students of modern
universities who see how the Western powers are destroying Muslims around the world.
Suicide bombing is an international phenomenon now. These young people do not receive
any suicide training or motivation in a madrassa or a mosque. They watch it on their
TVs—the dead bodies of Muslim brothers. They see that Muslims are being killed in
various part of the world. When they see these atrocities, they go their own way. If
the international community wants to put an end to this kind of activity, it is high
time for them to ponder solutions to issues like Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir.
IA: Besides your madrassa role, how do you see your role as a politician in the
political field?
SH: My role is very clear as a madrassa teacher as it is as a politician. I want a
true Islamic system in Pakistan. That is my simple goal. The current Pakistani system
of governance was introduced by the British Raj, which means we are still enslaved by
that colonial legacy. Our economy, education and judicial system stem from the same
exploitative British rule. I want to introduce real Sharia, which was implemented by
the four caliphs of Islam.
IA: Will you support Musharraf in the upcoming presidential elections?
SH: We have not yet decided about the upcoming elections. But I think they will be a
fraud and a futile exercise in the name of democracy. Elections are part of
democracy, but here they have become a fraud. In my 37-year career as a politician, I
have seen a particular group of politicians from a particular group of families
ruling this country. They have made their own dynasties. Since the creation of
Pakistan, they have just been replacing one another, with no big change in policies.
I am in favor of a bloodless revolution, which would completely overhaul the existing
system. I just wonder, how can a democracy flourish in the shadow of a military
uniform? The present one is a shame of a democracy.
IA: Do you think that with his support for the war on terror, Musharraf's popularity
has increased or decreased at home?
SH: Absolutely decreased. First, look at the declining popularity of President Bush
in his own country. So, how can Musharraf be popular for his role in the so-called
war on terror? The reports about his increasing popularity are just rubbish.
IA: Will Musharraf be able to maintain control over Pakistan?
SH: Well, people are not happy with what he is doing here in Pakistan. The
overwhelming majority of the masses are opposing his policies, particularly the much
talked about "enlightened moderation." After bringing changes to the Hudood laws, now
his government might soon amend the blasphemy laws. But he does not understand that
the Pakistani people will sacrifice their lives on the issue of blasphemy. All these
actions demonstrate his unpopularity among the masses.
IA: Is an Islamic revolution a possibility in Pakistan's future?
SH: Anything is possible. But the most important thing to keep in mind is that the
motive behind the creation of Pakistan was the establishment of an Islamic state for
the Muslims of India. Establishment of Sharia is the logical conclusion of Pakistan's
creation.
IA: How do see yourself and your role in the next 10 years, and how can you
contribute to the peaceful revolution you mentioned earlier?
SH: I'll see how events unfold in the future. However, I'm optimistic that after 10
years, the whole Muslim ummah will have awakened from its deep slumber; Pakistan is
no exception. I think that the vast majority of Pakistanis will not tolerate what is
going on here as silent spectators. Here is also a lesson for the United States: to
learn from what happened to the former superpower the USSR. It should address the
problems of the world in a positive way and address the sense of deprivation being
created in the people of this region and especially in the Muslim ummah. Things have
drastically changed. With the way they [the United States and its Western allies]
inflict cruelties and damages on the Muslim ummah, there will be a strong response.
Now, the Muslims have awakened. It is time for the United States to act responsibly.
Otherwise, there will be tit-for-tat attacks.
IA: Do you think that the suicide bombing phenomenon is a kind of awakening?
SH: Look, if you kick a sleeping man, he will not only wake but will also resist. So,
yes, suicide bombing is an awakening. Tell me, where did the concept of suicide
bombing in Pakistan come? We had not heard about any suicide bombings in the more
than two decades of the Afghan conflict. But this is a new and unbeatable discovery
which some Muslim youth have found as an answer to the cruelties and damages being
inflicted on the Muslim ummah.
IA: Can Western governments have a healthy relationship with Pakistan through foreign
aid or development work?
SH: The first step is sovereignty and respect, and only then can foreign aid work.
Until the United States and the West respect the sovereignty of Muslim countries and
stop their aggression and atrocities, nothing will work.
The Taliban Fedayeen: The World's Worst Suicide Bombers?
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 14
July 19, 2007 03:44 PM Age: 4 yrs
By: Brian Glyn Williams
Suicide bombing statistics from Afghanistan alarmingly demonstrate that, if the
current trend continues, 2007 will surpass last year in the number of overall
attacks. While there were 47 bombings by mid-June 2006, there have been approximately
57 during the same period this year. Compounding fears of worse carnage to come,
Afghanistan's most lethal single suicide bombing attack to date recently took the
lives of 35 Afghan police trainers near Kabul. When considering the expanding use of
IEDs and the discovery of the first Iraqi-style Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP)
in Afghanistan in May (i.e. a more deadly form of IED that has killed high numbers of
soldiers in Iraq), it is understandable that critics of the war in Afghanistan
discuss it in alarmist tones. Approximately 80% of U.S. casualties in Iraq come from
IEDs, and members of the U.S. and Afghan military who were interviewed for this study
believed that the absence of mass casualty suicide bombings and EFPs were the two
factors that made Afghanistan less dangerous than Iraq. A deeper investigation of the
wave of suicide bombings that have swept the country in 2006 and 2007 paints a less
bleak picture.
Missing the Target
An analysis of the attacks carried out in the last two years reveals a curious fact.
In 43% of the bombings conducted last year and in 26 of the 57 bombings traced in
this study up to June 15, the only death caused by the bombing was that of the bomber
himself. Astoundingly, approximately 90 suicide bombers in this two year period
succeeded in killing only themselves. This number exceeds 100 when you factor in
those who succeeded in killing only one person in addition to themselves. There was
one period in the spring of 2006 (February 20 to June 21) when a stunning 26 of the
36 suicide bombers in Afghanistan (72%) only killed themselves. This puts the kill
average for Afghan suicide bombers far below that of suicide bombers in other
theaters of action in the area (Israel, Chechnya, Iraq and the Kurdish areas of
Turkey). Such unusual bomber-to-victim death statistics are, of course, heartening
for both coalition troops—who have described the Afghan suicide bombers as
"amateurs"—and the Afghan people—who are usually the victims of the clumsy bombings.
These statistics also represent a uniquely Afghan phenomenon that warrants
investigation. In the first portion of this study, it was demonstrated that a part of
the reason for this low kill ratio lies in the Taliban's unique targeting sets
(Terrorism Monitor, March 1). As Pashtuns with a strong code (Pashtunwali) that
glorifies acts of martial valor and badal (revenge), the Afghan suicide bombers are
more prone to hit "hard" military targets than callously obliterate innocent
civilians in the Iraqi fashion. On the rare occasions where there have been high
casualty bombings of Afghan civilians, they tend to have been carried out by Arab alQaeda bombers [1].
The Taliban's selective targeting is a calculated decision on the part of the Taliban
shuras (councils) to avoid inciting the sort of anti-Taliban protests that led
thousands in the Pashtun town of Spin Boldak to chant "Death to Pakistan, Death to
al-Qaeda, Death to the Taliban" following a particularly bloody suicide bombing in
that frontier city (BBC News, January 18, 2006). Taliban spokesman Zabiyullah Mujahed
recently claimed, "We do our best in our suicide attacks to avoid civilian
casualties. These are our Muslim countrymen, and we are sacrificing our blood to gain
their freedom. Their lives are important to us, of course. But fighting with
explosives is out of the control of human beings." Then he made an interesting
admission that speaks to other factors that might explain the Afghan suicide bombers'
failure rate. He stated, "We have a problem with making sure they attack the right
targets, avoiding killing civilians" (BBC News, June 21).
Clearly, there is more to the Taliban bombers' stunning failure rate than simply
"hard" targeting difficulties and an obvious reluctance to slaughter the Afghan
constituency that the Taliban is trying to win over. Members of the Afghan police,
government and National Directorate of Security (NDS) who were interviewed about this
trend during the months of April and May 2007 offered a surprisingly unanimous
explanation for the Taliban bombers' poor showing [2]. The cause for the Afghan
suicide bombers' underwhelming performance, they claimed, lay in the ineptitude of
the people the Taliban were recruiting as fedayeen (suicide) bombers. Afghan
officials continually told stories of lower class people who had been seduced,
bribed, tricked, manipulated or coerced into blowing themselves up as "weapons of
God" or "Mullah Omar's missiles." Afghan NDS officials also spoke of apprehended
bombers who were deranged, retarded, mentally unstable or on drugs.
Such claims should, of course, be accepted with caution for two reasons. First, the
targets of suicide bombings are prone to speak in disparaging tones regarding the
mental state and motives of those who carry out bombing attacks against them. They
tend to describe them as mindless, insane, fanatical, drugged or brain-washed.
Second, in his ground-breaking work Understanding Terror Networks, Marc Sageman has
refuted the long-held notion that suicide bombers are impoverished, voiceless dupes
tricked into killing themselves. Rather, he has shown them to be politically and
religiously motivated. They are conscious actors who, like the multilingual and
educated September 11 attack team, do not need to be brainwashed. Certainly, in the
Afghan context there are bombers who fit the Sageman profile. Several Taliban leaders
have carried out bombings, and the al-Qaeda team that scrambled on short notice to
launch the symbolically important mass-casualty bombing at Bagram Air Base during
Vice President Dick Cheney's February 2007 visit was clearly comprised of
professionals [3].
Nevertheless, interviews and field work conducted in Afghanistan for this study
revealed considerable evidence that the "duped, bribed, brainwashed" paradigm applies
to a growing percentage of the bombers being deployed in the Afghan theater [4].
Afghan police told of numerous incidents where citizens in Kabul reported finding
abandoned suicide vests in the city. They seemed to signify a last minute change of
heart in several would-be-bombers. In one case, they told of a mentally deranged man
who threw his vest at an Afghan patrol, assuming it would explode on its own [5].
Several of the bombers apprehended by the NDS were carrying mind altering
hallucinogens or sedatives, which they had been told to take in order to calm their
fears during their last moments of life. Others, including a Taliban bomber who was
arrested while pushing his explosives-laden car toward its target after it ran out of
gas, appear to be inept beyond belief [6]. Recent media and think-tank reports have
also mentioned the utilization as suicide bombers of an Afghan war invalid who was
blind, another who was an amputee and one who was a disabled man whose only motive
was to make money for his family (Terrorism Monitor, November 18, 2004; New York
Times, October 21, 2005). Coalition troops who have spoken of seeing bombers blow
themselves up far from their convoys have characterized it as the act of drugged or
mentally unstable bombers.
While this might explain some of the Afghan suicide bombers' failures, there also
appears to be a financial motive behind several of the bombings that offers further
explanation. UN representatives spoke of a bomber who entered a Kabul internet cafe
in 2005. Instead of setting off his bomb in the middle of the cafe where it would do
the most damage, he went into a bathroom to set it off, killing only two people [7].
There are many such examples of Afghan suicide bombers seemingly with a conscience or
reluctance to inflict mass casualties. The fact that a number of them are doing it
simply for payments for their families might explain this [8].
Research in the Pashtun areas to the southeast of Kabul reveals an even more
disturbing trend than the employment of suicide bombers who are mentally unsound,
using drugs or working solely for money payments: the use of child bombers.
Afghanistan's Child Bombers
Local villagers interviewed for this study—living in front-line provinces such as
Khost, Paktika and Paktia—have reported that Taliban recruiters were active in their
areas. Many parents have lost their young impressionable sons to those who prey upon
them [9]. Parents often learn of their tragic fates only when the Taliban arrive at
their homes to hand out their sons' "martyrdom payments." Villagers are, of course,
outraged by such tactics, but there is often little recourse in light of the
Taliban's dominance in the countryside. In one case, a powerful tribal chieftain in
Khost province who discovered that his son had been recruited by Taliban commander
Jalaluddin Haqqani for a "martyrdom operation" managed to get him back (after
threatening to attack the Taliban with his tribe); unfortunately, this is an
exception, as is the recent case of a captured 14 year-old suicide bomber who was
personally pardoned by President Hamid Karzai, who announced, "Today we are facing a
hard fact, that is a Muslim child was sent to madrassa to learn Islamic subjects, but
the enemies of Afghanistan misled him toward suicide and prepared him to die and
kill" [10].
Such recruitment for madrassa training of young bombers is even more widespread on
the Pakistani side of the border. There have been several widely reported instances
of the Taliban recruiting school children to be suicide bombers in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In one
notorious instance, Taliban soldiers arrived at the Oxford High English medium school
in Tank and began to recruit young boys by asking them to fulfill their "jihad duty"
and engage in an "adventure." According to eyewitnesses, "The militants came to town
with a mission, and wanted to convert us to their cause. 'They said that jihad was
obligatory and those who heed the call are rewarded,' the principal said. 'As many as
30 students from each of the four government schools in Tank enlisted.' A similar
number have also joined from private schools. The ages of those taken are between 11
to 15 years." According to one of the teachers involved, the students who were
recruited without their parents' permission were subsequently trained as suicide
bombers (BBC News, June 12). The age of these bombers would explain why one of the
courses in Taliban suicide camps teaches students how to drive a car.
In a similar case, two Pakistani teenagers who left school to train as suicide
bombers without their parents' permission claimed, "We were told to fight against
Israel, America and non-Muslims," said Muhammed Bakhtiar, 17, explaining why he
wanted to become a suicide bomber. "We are so unhappy with our lives here. We have
nothing. We read about jihad in books and wanted to join…We wanted to go to the
Muridke madrassa so we would have a better life in the hereafter" (MSNBC, March 28).
While Mullah Nazir, a powerful Taliban leader in Pakistan's Waziristan provinces
recently made an unprecedented request for the Taliban to stop recruiting children, a
recent video of a suicide bomber ceremony in the region would seem to indicate that
his appeal has been honored in the breach (Daily Times, June 19). In the video that
was obtained by ABC, boys as young as 12 are shown "graduating" from a suicide
bombing camp run by Mullah Dadullah Mansour, the successor to his brother, the
recently slain Mullah Dadullah (ABC News, June 22).
As disturbing as this video is, it pales in comparison to the discovery Afghan
security officials recently made in eastern Afghanistan. In an incident that caused
tears of fury among local villagers, a six year-old street urchin approached an
Afghan security checkpoint and claimed that he had been cornered by the Taliban and
fitted with a suicide bomber vest. They had told him to walk up to a U.S. patrol and
press a button on the vest that would "spray flowers" (Daily Mail, June 26).
Fortunately, the quick thinking boy instead asked for help, and the suicide bomb vest
was subsequently removed.
While this case is obviously an extreme example, it fits the trend and certainly goes
a long way in helping to explain why almost half of Taliban suicide bombers succeed
in killing only themselves. Many Taliban bombers come from small backwater villages
and have to be taught how to drive on strange roads, travel beyond their locale or
country and then hit fast moving, armored coalition convoys with improvised
explosives. Even at the best of times, suicide bombing is a task that involves
considerable resolve, determination, focus and a degree of intelligence. Clearly,
such vital ingredients are often missing in the Afghan context, where many of the
bombers appear to be as much victims as perpetrators.
Commenting on the bombers' failure rate, U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Paul
Fitzpatrick explained the lack of ambiguity that U.S. military personnel have about
the bombers who commit suicide instead of suicide bombings. "Certainly there are a
fair number of failed attempts, and that's OK. I hope they don't get better" (St.
Petersburg Times, November 23, 2006). While some have engaged in relativism in
efforts to compare the coalition's "collateral damage" losses from close air support
to the Taliban's "collateral damage" from suicide bombing, the coalition clearly has
the moral high ground when the enemy has resorted to deploying children as "living
weapons."
Notes
1. The bomber who killed 20 people in a mosque in Kandahar in 2005 was an Arab. The
bomber in the Spin Boldak bombing of 2006 which killed 26 civilians was also said to
be an Arab and the Taliban later denied responsibility for the unusually bloody
bombing. Similarly, al-Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libi has been accused of being the
mastermind behind the February 2007 large suicide bombing at Bagram Air Field during
Vice President Dick Cheney's visit that killed 22 civilians. Most recently, NDS
officials in July arrested an Arab member of al-Qaeda who was planning to use suicide
bombers to assassinate Afghan officials.
2. Author Interviews, Kabul, April 2007.
3. In one case a mullah drove a vehicle-borne improvised device into a bus. Most
recently, the Kunduz bombing of May 2007 was carried out by a mullah named Jawad from
Baghlan province.
4. Marc Sageman's excellent work has more applications for elite, transnational alQaeda-style bombers than the impoverished, illiterate Afghans who seem to make up the
majority of the bombers in recent years.
5. Author Interview in National Directorate of Security Headquarters, Kabul, April
2007.
6. Story relayed to author by Craig Harrison, Director of UN Security in Afghanistan,
UNAMA Compound, Kabul, April 2007.
7. The media erroneously reported that the bomber had set the bomb off in the middle
of the cafe.
8. As in other "zones of jihad," including Chechnya and Iraq, it appears that Arab
financiers are offering payments ranging from $11,000 to $23,000 for those who carry
out bombings.
9. Author's findings while carrying out research in the region in April 2007.
10. This story was conveyed to the author in Gardez, Paktia province by Tom Gregg of
the UNAMA, on the morning after a suicide bomber hit the town. Local Pashtuns
interviewed after the bombing called the attack "obscene" and "un-Islamic."
Baitullah Mehsud – The Taliban’s New Leader in Pakistan
Publication: Terrorism Focus Volume: 5 Issue: 1
January 9, 2008 11:41 AM Age: 4 yrs
By: Imtiaz Ali
Baitullah Mehsud, the most feared and dangerous militant commander in Pakistan’s
tribal region, has not only become the public face of militancy in the country, but
is now also openly posing a serious threat to U.S. efforts to bring stability to
neighboring war-torn Afghanistan. Mehsud leads the recently formed Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan), a joint group of various local Taliban
outfits sharing the common objectives of implementing sharia (Islamic law) and waging
jihad against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan.
Mehsud—who is suspected of having close ties with al-Qaeda—has been in the headlines
of local newspapers for more than three years now because of his prominent role in
spearheading the insurgency against Pakistan’s armed forces, who are currently
hunting al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas. Lately Mehsud has become
a menacing presence in Pakistan due to the widespread belief of his involvement in
the deadly wave of suicide bombings—mostly targeted against security forces—that has
shaken the whole nation. A UN report released in September last year blamed Mehsud
for almost 80 percent of suicide bombings in Afghanistan (Daily Times [Lahore],
September 30, 2007). According to some reports, Mehsud has compiled his own hit list
of political leaders and high-profile government officials, and has formed special
squads for carrying out such terrorist acts (Daily Times, May 31, 2007).
Already a household name in Pakistan, Mehsud rose to global notoriety two weeks ago
when officials named him as the prime suspect and alleged mastermind behind the
killing of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, which was the most high-profile
political assassination in the recent history of the country. Pakistani authorities
have released the text of a Pashto-language telephone conversation allegedly
intercepted by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry, in which Mehsud congratulates “brave
boys” for accomplishing a “mission,” which—according to officials—refers to the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto (English-language version by Agence France Press,
December 29, 2007).
At thirty four years old, Mehsud is a warlord based in the restive South Waziristan
tribal agency and is said to be much revered by militants on both sides of the
Pakistani-Afghan border. Locals say that he has more than 20,000 fighters, mostly
from his Mehsud clan. Officials as well as his aides claim that he also has hundreds
of trained fidayeen (men of sacrifice) ready to lay down their lives as suicide
bombers upon his instructions.
According to his aides, Mehsud has taken an oath of allegiance to the Taliban supreme
leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Apart from sharing the same ideologies on sharia and
jihad, Mehsud also shares with his spiritual leader an aversion to publicity and
photographs. As a guerrilla fighter, Mehsud sharpened his skills under the guidance
of legendary Pashtun commander Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, who is widely believed to
have helped Osama bin Laden escape targeted bombing by the United States in the Tora
Bora mountains of Afghanistan in early 2002.
Known as Amir (commander) among his followers, Mehsud was an unknown figure on the
tribal scene until late 2004, when he filled the vacuum left by the famous tribal
militant leader, Nek Muhammad Wazir, who was killed in a missile attack in June 2004.
In February 2005, the Pakistani government brokered a deal with Mehsud in a bid to
bring normalcy and peace to violence-stricken South Waziristan. In return for
amnesty, Mehsud promised not to attack security posts or cross into Afghanistan for
jihad, but backed out of the deal in late August 2007 following the Red Mosque
military operation in Islamabad. Local journalists from Waziristan say that the socalled peace deal raised his stature and allowed him to further strengthen his
support base (author’s interviews). As a result, the government’s writ is confined
to the compounds of its security forces while gun-brandishing fighters control the
countryside in the South Waziristan agency. Mehsud had his moment of glory when the
government conceded to his demand to free militant prisoners in return for releasing
more than 250 Pakistani soldiers, seized by his fighters and held hostage for two and
half months. Among the released militants were presumably a number of would-be
suicide bombers (Dawn [Karachi], December 31, 2007).
The rising popularity of this young and committed jihadi on both sides of the border
has made him a bridge linking the Pakistani Taliban with the Afghan Taliban on the
other side of the frontier. Many believe that Mehsud has already been involved in the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan by dispatching his men to fight against the U.S.led Coalition forces. A close aide of Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, was captured by NATO
forces in the border region while trying to cross into Afghanistan with five foreign
fighters (Dawn, March 8, 2007).
Once described as a “soldier of peace” by a top Pakistani military general, Mehsud
is now not only defying Islamabad, but has emerged as a major irritant in the global
war on terror. Some of the latest reports from the frontier may be right in citing
him as the new triggerman for al-Qaeda in the border region between Pakistan and
Afghanistan—an area which carries immense strategic importance for the terrorist
network.
The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 6
March 24, 2008 01:46 PM Age: 4 yrs
By: Imtiaz Ali
There has been an increase recently in alleged missile strikes inside Pakistani
territory by U.S. forces operating across the border in Afghanistan. The attacks come
at a time when there is a growing call in the United States for strikes on Pakistani
territory to take out al-Qaeda safe havens believed to exist in the tribal agencies
along the Afghan border. NATO military commanders in Kabul have time and again
expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of Pakistani security agencies
in stopping the infiltration of armed Taliban groups like the “Haqqani Network”
from Pakistan’s tribal areas into Afghanistan. Despite the fact that U.S.
authorities have consistently expressed their respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty,
they are simultaneously growing impatient with the growing strength of the militants
on the Pakistani side of the border. According to U.S. officials, the cross-border
activities of these militants have a direct impact on U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
Attack on Lwara Mundi
A March 12 missile attack targeted a home in the town of Lwara Mundi in North
Waziristan, killing two women and two children. Pakistan quickly registered a protest
with the Coalition forces in Afghanistan, deploring what an official called “the
killing of innocent people.” However, U.S.-led Coalition officials in Kabul said
that the target of the precision-guided missile was a safe house of the Haqqani
Network based in the border region of the North Waziristan agency (Daily Nation
[Lahore], March 14). Just a day after Pakistan lodged its protest over the attack in
Lwara Mundi, another missile attack on March 16 left as many as 20 killed, including
a number of foreign fighters, when a house was targeted in Shahnawaz Kheil Doog
village near Wana, the regional headquarters of South Waziristan. It is believed that
the missiles were fired from two U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the belief
that the house was being used as a training camp for terrorists (Daily Post [Lahore],
March 14). Though a U.S. Central Command spokesman would only say the missiles were
not fired by any military aircraft—Predator UAVs are operated by the CIA—U.S. forces
took responsibility for the earlier “precision-guided ammunition strike” on Lwara
Mundi but made it clear that the target was the Haqqani Network (Daily Mail
[Islamabad], March 14; AFP, March 13; Reuters, March 17). A spokesman for Coalition
forces in Afghanistan said that Pakistan was informed after the attack, not before.
The spokesman made it clear that U.S. forces will respond in the future as well if
they identify a threat from across the border in Pakistan’s tribal belt (Daily Times
[Lahore], March 14). Though the Pakistani tribal region has been a center of concern
since late 2001 when hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters took refuge there, the lawless
belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan is now receiving attention for the growing
activities of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group which has been spearheading the
insurgency against U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
A Profile of the Haqqani Network
The “Haqqani Network” is a group of militants led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jalaluddin, who is said to be in his late 70s, is a noted
Taliban commander with a bounty on his head and a place on the U.S. most-wanted list.
Jalaluddin Haqqani is considered to be the closest aide of Taliban supreme leader
Mullah Omar and was a noted mujahideen commander in the 1980s resistance against the
Russian occupation of Afghanistan. He rose to prominence after playing a leading role
in the defeat of Muhammad Najibullah’s communist forces in Khost in March 1991.
After the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 1995, the senior Haqqani joined the Taliban
movement and rose to the top echelon of power in the regime. He remained a minister
during the Taliban government and a top consultant to Mullah Omar. The senior Haqqani
has rarely been seen in public since the collapse of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan in late 2001, when he is believed to have crossed into Pakistan’s
Waziristan Tribal Agency to evade the advance of Coalition forces. There are
continuous rumors that he is seriously ill or has even died. However, his son,
Sirajuddin Haqqani, alias Khalifa, has not only filled the void created by the
absence of his veteran jihadi father, but his well-organized group, known as the
Haqqani Network, has emerged as the most dangerous and challenging foe for the
Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network is based in the Dande Darpa Khel village near Miramshah,
headquarters of the North Waziristan Tribal Agency. The town is about 10 miles from
the Afghan border. Sirajuddin, believed to be in his early thirties, has a $200,000
bounty on his head. He belongs to the Zadran tribe of Afghanistan, which also has
roots on the Pakistani side of the border. Residents in Dande Darpa Khel say that the
junior Haqqani grew up in this small and remote town of North Waziristan, once the
operational headquarters of his father’s jihadist activities. It is said that he
attended the now defunct religious seminary which his father founded in the early
1980s in the town of Bande Darpa Khel. Though he could not be considered a religious
scholar, Sirajuddin certainly sharpened his jihad skills under the guidance of his
father. Considered to be the leader of a new generation of Taliban militants on both
sides of the border and a bridge between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, NATO
officials have recently declared him as one of the most dangerous Taliban commanders
in the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan (Los Angeles Times, March 14). He is
suspected as the mastermind behind the deadly attack on Kabul's only five-star hotel
last January, which left eight people killed, including three foreigners (Daily
Times, March 4). A U.S. military spokesman at Bagram Air Base described Sirajuddin’s
role in a series of devastating suicide bombings: “We believe him to be much more
brutal and much more interested in attacking and killing civilians. He has no regard
for human life, even those of his Afghan compatriots” (AP, February 21). The United
States has offered a $200,000 bounty for Sirajuddin, who is expanding his operations
from east Afghanistan into the central and southern regions.
Sirajuddin has evaded capture several times despite attempts by Pakistani security
forces to arrest him at his house and seminary in Miramshah in North Waziristan. In
2005 Pakistani officials raided his headquarters in Dande Darpa Khel, the religious
seminary and residential compound used by his network. The raiding party seized huge
caches of weapons and ammunitions but Sirajuddin again escaped arrest (Dawn
[Karachi], September 15, 2005).
Sirajuddin is also reported to have taken credit for a suicide-truck bombing in Khost
on March 3 that killed two NATO soldiers and two Afghan civilians (Xinhua, March 13).
The attack on a government building involved a truck loaded with explosives, drums of
petrol, mines and gas cylinders. A Taliban videotape of the bombing was released on
March 20, including a statement from the German-born suicide bomber, Cuneyt Ciftci—
also known as Saad Abu Furkan—“The time has arrived to give sacrifices to Islam.
Since we lack resources to fight the enemy, we will have to turn our bodies into
bombs” (Newkerala.com, March 20).
On the Pakistani side of the border, Sirajuddin’s influence has been growing as a
“revered jihadist commander.” He strongly opposed Maulvi Nazir’s campaign against
Uzbek and other foreign militants waged earlier this year by the militant tribal
leader in South Waziristan (see Terrorism Monitor, January 11). He is reported to
have played an important role in stopping the fighting between Maulvi Nazir’s tribal
militia and Uzbek militants in Wana and the surrounding area in March last year.
Sirajuddin took part in a tribal jirga, attempting to sort out differences between
combatant foreigners and local militants, but the talks collapsed when Maulvi Nazir
asked for the surrender of all foreign militants residing in the region bordering
Afghanistan (Dawn, March 24, 2007). In late January, two arrested members of the
Haqqani Network revealed that up to 200 suicide bombers had infiltrated into
Pakistan’s cities in preparation for the current wave of bombings (Khabrain
[Lahore], January 28).
Two months ago, one of Sirajuddin’s most important commanders, Darim Sedgai, was
reported killed after being ambushed by unknown gunmen in Pakistan, though spokesmen
for the Haqqani Network claim that Sedgai is recovering from his wounds (The News
[Karachi], January 28). Coalition forces in Kabul confirmed the killing of Sedgai,
who was known as a powerful commander of the Haqqani Network, overseeing the
manufacture and smuggling of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into Afghanistan.
These activities led U.S. forces to post a $50,000 reward for information leading to
his death or arrest. A native of the North Waziristan agency, Sedgai was a follower
of Jalaluddin Haqqani and fought under his command with the mujahideen in
Afghanistan. Until his reported death in January, Sedgai was an important leader of
the Haqqani Network and was considered to be a close friend of Sirajuddin Haqqani
(Pajhwok Afghan News, January 28).
Conclusion
Afghan officials as well as Coalition forces in Kabul have cited Sirajuddin’s use of
North Waziristan as operational headquarter for his alleged cross-border terrorist
activities as one example of Pakistan’s inability to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries
in its tribal areas. Though the Pakistan government regards these claims as baseless,
it is known that two years ago Sirajuddin issued a circular urging militants to
continue their “jihad” against the United States and the Karzai government “till
the last drop of blood.” But in the same statement he pointed out that “fighting
Pakistan does not conform to Taliban policy… those who [continue to wage] an
undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in
our ranks” (Dawn, June 23, 2006). There are signs that this is no longer the policy
of the Haqqani faction of the Taliban.
As the Haqqani Network has risen to the first rank of the Taliban insurgency it can
be expected that U.S.-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan will continue to target
Sirajuddin Haqqani and the rest of the network leadership. With such strikes now
occurring on Pakistani soil the Haqqanis are emerging as a serious domestic problem
for Islamabad. How it chooses to deal with the Haqqani Network threat will provide a
test case for Pakistan’s role in the ongoing war on terror.
Jalaluddin Haqqani Challenges Mullah Omar’s Leadership of the Taliban
Publication: Terrorism Focus Volume: 5 Issue: 25
July 1, 2008 03:18 PM Age: 3 yrs
By: Waliullah Rahmani
Since the reemergence of the insurgency in 2002, Afghanistan has witnessed a largely
united insurgent front under the banner of the Taliban. To date there have been few
records of disputes and differences within the Taliban. The unity of different groups
of insurgents under the Taliban banner and the obedience of the rank and file of the
group to the orders of Mullah Omar as their only Amir has been a key to the success
and revival of the Islamist resistance. But seven years after the fall of the
Taliban, disputes about the direction of the movement have begun to emerge within
Mullah Omar’s mujahideen.
Small clashes inside the insurgency have been followed by deep divides within the
Taliban. A recent letter from Jalaluddin Haqqani has asked for a change in the
leadership of the Taliban. Haqqani is a respected veteran commander of the antiSoviet insurgency of the 1980s and is now a powerful authority within the current
insurgency, well known for his dedication to jihad and the suicide attacks carried
out under his orders in many parts of Afghanistan. Unlike many elements of the
Taliban leadership, Haqqani was little influenced by the religious and political
thought of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The open letter to Taliban fighters and other Afghan insurgents is written in the
Pashto language under the logo and title of the “Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.”
Haqqani’s message describes Mullah Omar as an illiterate person and claims that his
erroneous decisions might cause the collapse of the Taliban (Payman Daily [Kabul],
June 14). As stated in Haqqani’s letter, it is time for the neo-Taliban to change
the head of the Taliban leadership council. Haqqani claims to have consulted many
Taliban commanders who were in agreement that this is the right time to bring about
changes in the leadership (a full facsimile of the letter is published at
www.kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article1816).
Haqqani suggests that the passage of time has led to the understanding that errors by
the Taliban leadership have caused the loss of many prominent commanders, including
Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Osmani, Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Abdul Manan and Mullah
Saifullah Mansoor. The veteran jihadi commander believes that the Taliban’s shura
(consultative council) in Quetta has made a deal with intelligence agencies to kill
those insurgent commanders who are opposed to working with Mullah Omar’s
representatives. Singled out for criticism is Mullah Omar’s cooperation and
coordination with his relatives, such as Mullah Azizullah Eshaq Zai, Mullah Abdul
Shakoor and Mullah Jan Muhammad Baloch, whom Haqqani accuses of issuing orders that
have caused losses to Taliban forces. Haqqani claims that those loyal leading
commanders of the Taliban who learn of the shura’s deals with intelligence agencies
and no longer want to work with them have either been killed by Taliban figures or
murdered by foreign forces allied with the Taliban leadership.
In other parts of his letter, Jalaluddin Haqqani informs the Taliban that the
leadership of the organization is not hereditary and that one family should not
the Taliban forever. Instead, he suggests that the Taliban leadership should be
to a person who is literate and knowledgeable about political issues. He should
have the ability to bring positive changes for the political development, unity
international relations of the Taliban. The Taliban needs to have productive
diplomacy around the world and Haqqani points out that not all countries and
lead
given
also
and
governments are foes of the Taliban. Criticizing past decisions of Mullah Omar,
Haqqani stresses that the leadership system of the Taliban with its poor decisions
and egotism has led to the infamy of the organization and threatened it with
collapse.
Although the authenticity of this letter has not been confirmed, many local observers
believe that the rift within the Taliban is both real and serious. To date, neither
Mullah Omar nor Haqqani have made any public statements regarding the letter’s
publication. The media sources which published the letter, Payman Daily and Kabul
Press, are both critical of the Karzai government. Kabul Press has a history of
receiving and publishing documents of this type and its editor was jailed for a time
last year by the National Security Directorate for his criticism of their activities.
Jalaluddin Haqqani has a strong influence in eastern Afghanistan and the North
Waziristan tribal agency of Pakistan, which puts him in a far stronger position than
any other leader of the Taliban except Mullah Omar. His “Haqqani Network” has
proved highly effective in striking government and Coalition targets, leading him to
be regarded in some quarters as already a greater threat than Mullah Omar. A
confrontation between Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani over the leadership of the
neo-Taliban, however, may provide the opportunity for a Coalition/Kabul government
success against the insurgents, who continue to control at least 40 percent of
Afghanistan.
A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part One
– North and South Waziristan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 18
September 22, 2008 10:09 AM Age: 3 yrs
By: Rahimullah Yusufzai
Militants operating in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) include both
Taliban and non-Taliban forces. However, the Taliban militants are much larger in
number and have a lot more influence in the region. The Pakistani Taliban have close
links with the Afghan Taliban and operate on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border, also known as the Durand Line after the British diplomat who demarcated the
boundary in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand. The non-Taliban militants, on the other hand,
are often pro-government and enjoy cordial ties with the Pakistan authorities and
security forces.
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of North and South Waziristan
Most of the Pakistani Taliban militants are grouped in an umbrella organization, the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The movement was launched on December 13, 2007, in a
secret meeting of senior Taliban commanders hailing from the South Waziristan, North
Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and Darra Adamkhel tribal
regions and the districts of Swat, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat,
Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan and Kohat (The News International
[Islamabad], December 15, 2007).
According to TTP deputy leader Maulana Faqir Mohammad and other senior commanders,
the militants formed the organization to pool the resources and manpower of
Pakistan’s Taliban to fight in self-defense if the security forces of Pakistan
attacked their areas and also to extend help to the Afghan Taliban taking part in the
“jihad,” or holy war, against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) troops in neighboring Afghanistan (Newsline.com.pk [Karachi], July 2008; The
News International, July 29, 2007). Due to the military operations undertaken by
Pakistan’s armed forces against them, the Pakistani Taliban now have a fight at home
and are therefore unable to send many fighters to Afghanistan to fight alongside the
Afghan Taliban.
The TTP is headed by Baitullah Mahsud, based in South Waziristan and currently the
most powerful Pakistani Taliban commander. In his late 30s, Mahsud is referred to as
the “Amir Sahib” by his followers. Like many other Pakistanis, he began fighting as
a young man during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation force in
Afghanistan and later joined the Afghan Taliban. Presently, he is stated to be ill,
suffering from kidney and heart diseases due to complications arising from diabetes.
He reportedly named three of his commanders to run the TTP on his behalf, including
Waliur Rahman who has been negotiating with the tribal jirgas, or councils, created
by the Pakistan government (The News International, August 24).
The TTP is not a disciplined organization as two fairly recent events showed. First
was the refusal of some components of the TTP to accept Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the
Pakistani Taliban commander from North Waziristan, as deputy leader of the Baitullah
Mahsud-led organization. Later in the winter of 2007-2008, Hafiz Gul Bahadur did not
cooperate with Baitullah Mahsud when the latter was under attack from Pakistan Army.
In fact, Bahadur warned Baitullah Mahsud against firing rockets at Pakistani forces
camps in Razmak, which is located in North Waziristan. His plea was that he and his
followers had signed a peace accord with Pakistan government in North Waziristan and
therefore no action should be taken against the Pakistani security forces there as it
would amount to violation of the agreement (see Terrorism Monitor, February 7). In
simple terms, he refused to become involved in the fighting that was then taking
place between Baitullah Mahsud’s Taliban and Pakistan Army in neighboring South
Waziristan (Newsline.com.pk, July 2008)
Opposition to Baitullah Mahsud
Hafiz Gul Bahadur is now head of an emerging group of Pakistani Taliban commanders
opposed to Baitullah Mahsud. The yet-to-be-named group also includes Maulvi Nazeer,
the Taliban commander for Wana area in South Waziristan, and Haji Namdar Khan, the
head of the Amr Bil Maruf Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice) group of militants operating in the Bara area of Khyber Agency. Namdar Khan was
recently killed in Bara by a young man who was allegedly sent by Baitullah Mahsud’s
group to eliminate him (The Nation [Islamabad], August 14). This was the second
attempt on his life. The earlier attack was a suicide bombing targeting him some
months ago, but he survived. Several of his men along with seminary students were
killed in the earlier attack which took place inside an Islamic school in Bara.
In the second instance of TTP indiscipline, the TTP failed to take action against the
Pakistani Taliban commander Omar Khalid (whose real name is Abdul Wali), in Mohmand
Agency even though Baitullah Mahsud had sent a commission to investigate charges
against him. In fact, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar had publicly stated that Omar Khalid
would be punished for attacking a rival group of Islamic fighters that had a training
camp in Mohmand Agency. Omar Khalid’s men killed the group’s commander Shah Khalid
and his deputy Obaidullah, along with several other fighters and captured more than
70 (Dawn [Karachi], July 20). The detained men, all belonging to the so-called Shah
group affiliated with the Salafi Ahle-Hadith sect, were subsequently freed through
the intervention of a jirga of religious scholars, including Maulana Sher Ali Shah,
an Islamic teacher at the Darul Uloom Haqqani seminary in Akora Khattak near
Peshawar. In the end, Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP just kept quiet and took no action
against Omar Khalid as this would have created disharmony in the organization and
possibly even caused a parting of ways between it and its chapter in Mohmand Agency.
South Waziristan
While discussing the leading figures of the ongoing insurgency in the NWFP, it would
be worthwhile to start in South Waziristan, where the Pakistan Army began its
military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in early 2004
and suffered heavy casualties in fierce clashes in Kalosha near the regional
headquarters at Wana. The Wana region is inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, which
has historically been a foe of the neighboring Mahsud tribe to which Baitullah Mahsud
belongs. Both Ahmadzai Wazirs and Mahsuds are Pashtun, the ethnic group to which the
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban belong, but they have long been traditional rivals in
South Waziristan and competed with each other for political and economic power.
Baitullah Mahsud was an obscure Taliban commander in 2004 when Nek Mohammad from the
Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in Wana was occupying the media limelight. The 27-year old
Pakistani Taliban commander had fought the Pakistan Army to a standstill and forced
it to conclude a peace accord with him largely on his terms. The signing ceremony was
held in one of his strongholds, Shakai, near Wana, where the Pakistan Army’s Corps
Commander for Peshawar, Lieutenant-General Safdar Hussain, publicly embraced and
garlanded Nek Mohammad and hailed him as a partner in peace. Subsequently in February
2005 when the government signed a similar peace agreement with Baitullah Mahsud in
Sararogha in South Waziristan, the same army general described Baitullah as a soldier
of peace (The News International, February 10, 2005).
Commander Nek Mohammad was killed in April 2004 in a US missile strike on his hideout
in a village near Wana. His death not only led to the collapse of the peace accord he
had signed with the government but also resulted in a rift among his Taliban
followers in Wana on the issue of his succession. Haji Mohammad Omar declared himself
the new head of the Taliban in Wana but certain other commanders declined to accept
his decision. Eventually, a five-member Shura, or council, emerged to jointly led the
Wana Taliban. The Shura included Haji Omar, his brother Haji Sharif Khan, Javed
Karmazkhel, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Mohammad Abbas. The Pakistan government
subsequently made a peace deal with this Shura, sometimes called the “Wana 5,” and
allowed it to form a so-called peace committee that was given an administrative role
to man roadside checkpoints and provide security to the people.
Conflict with the Uzbeks
In 2007, serious differences emerged among the Pakistani Taliban in Wana over the
presence of foreign militants belonging to Uzbekistan in the area. A majority of
Taliban and Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen decided to evict the Uzbek militants, led by
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) head Tahir Yuldashev, from Wana and Shakai.
Backed by the Pakistan government and military with arms and money, they fought the
Uzbeks and their tribal supporters and finally succeeded in expelling them from Wana.
A young Taliban commander, Maulvi Nazeer, led this campaign along with his two
deputies Malik Abdul Hannan and Maulvi Mohammad Iqbal. Hannan was allegedly killed in
July 2008 by pro-Uzbek tribesmen commanded by Noor Islam, who is the brother of Haji
Omar and Haji Sharif (of the Wana 5), while Maulvi Iqbal died fighting alongside the
Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan’s Paktika province in June 2008. Apart from Noor
Islam, other pro-Uzbek commanders of the Pakistani Taliban from Wana include Haji
Omar, Javed Karmazkhel, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Mohammad Abbas. They had to
take refuge with Baitullah Mahsud in the area populated by the Mahsud tribe in South
Waziristan after being evicted along with the Uzbek militants. In recent months, the
pro-Uzbek tribal fighters of this group have indulged in targeted killings of men
belonging to Maulvi Nazeer’s group (Newsline.com.pk, July 2008)
As mentioned earlier, Baitullah Mahsud is the most powerful and dangerous Pakistani
Taliban commander. He was accused of involvement in the assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and blamed for sending fighters to
Afghanistan to fight US-led coalition forces. He denied his involvement in Benazir
Bhutto’s murder but conceded on more than one occasion that he was indeed sending
his men to wage “jihad” against U.S., NATO and Afghan government forces in
Afghanistan (Newsline.com.pk, July 2008). Other Taliban commanders working under him
include Waliur Rahman, who could succeed him in case of his death, and Qari Hussain,
known for his strong anti-Shia views and also for training suicide bombers and
sending them on their fatal mission. There were reports that Qari Hussain was killed
in an airstrike earlier this year, but he appears to have survived (Daily Times
[Lahore], January 27).
In North Waziristan, the most important Pakistani Taliban commander is Hafiz Gul
Bahadur, who is also Amir (commander) of the Taliban shura there. He is now opposed
to Baitullah Mahsud and has been trying to build a rival alliance of pro-government
Pakistani Taliban without any appreciable success (see Terrorism Monitor, July 25).
Two clerics who wield considerable influence on the Taliban in North Waziristan are
Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq.(Newsline.com.pk, July 2008) Other
clerics affiliated to Pakistani parliamentarian Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam-F (Assembly of Islamic Clergy – JUI-F) also appear to have some
influence on the Taliban operating in North Waziristan.
(Editor’s Note: The next part of this Terrorism Monitor article will cover the
important Taliban and non-Taliban commanders in other tribal regions and districts of
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province)
Taming the ISI: Implications for Pakistan’s Stability and the War on Terrorism
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 20
October 24, 2008 03:40 PM Age: 3 yrs
By: Tariq Mahmud Ashraf
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency. As
such, it has found itself at the center of a dispute between Pakistan and the United
States over the prosecution of the War on Terrorism, a dispute fuelled by the two
nations’ varying strategic aims. Established just a year after the country’s
independence in 1947, the ISI has grown immensely in size, activity and influence
over the years. The concept of the ISI being a truly “joint” or “inter-services”
organization is a falsehood, since this organization has been always dominated by the
Pakistan Army, with barely a smattering of involvement from the other two military
services. Moreover, its Director General is always a serving Lieutenant General of
the Pakistan Army, answerable only to the Chief of the Army Staff and not to the
civilian government, the Ministry of Defense or the Joint Staff Headquarters. [1] By
this reckoning, the ISI is essentially an extension of the Directorate General
Military Intelligence (DGMI) at the General Headquarters (GHQ), rather than a triservice national-level institution.
The excessive involvement of the Pakistan Army in the affairs of state has led the
ISI to focus on internal/domestic intelligence gathering. While this internal
emphasis of the ISI has its roots in the Ayub Khan era (1958-69), its external
activities got a significant boost during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (19791989), when the ISI was put in charge of managing the Afghan mujahideen and their
fight against the Soviet invaders, with the active backing of the United States and
the financial support of Saudi Arabia.
The links of the ISI with the Islamic militants who routed the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan have remained intact ever since and became a major bone of contention
between the United States and Pakistan after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.
Many U.S. military and government officials have voiced their concern over ISI’s
links with the Taliban, and some have even blamed the ISI for sabotaging U.S. efforts
in Afghanistan. The American press has charged that the ISI has used the privileged
information it has about American attacks against the Afghan Taliban to forewarn the
latter. In fact, the American government believes that a recent suicide-bombing at
the Indian embassy in Kabul was carried out by the ISI. In India, the case is even
worse: the ISI is blamed for anything violent that happens inside India that the
Indian government cannot otherwise explain (Daily Times, September 17).
This backdrop precipitated three significant events: firstly, visits by high-level
U.S. intelligence officials on July 12 to meet the new Pakistani leadership and
apprise it of the evidence linking the ISI to the Taliban; secondly, the abortive
July 26 attempt by the elected government of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani to
place the ISI under the Ministry of Interior; and thirdly, U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Richard Boucher’s statement during an interview on September 17 that the
Pakistan Government needed to seriously rein in the ISI and curtail its sphere of
activities (The News [Islamabad], September 18).
U.S. Evidence of ISI’s Links with the Taliban
Stephen R. Kappes, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
accompanied Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on
a secret visit to Islamabad on July12. This visit was aimed at confronting
Pakistan’s most senior officials with new information about ties between the ISI and
militants operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The trip was a follow-up to a
previous secret visit to Pakistan in January, during which U.S. Intelligence
officials sought to press former President Pervez Musharraf to allow the CIA greater
latitude to operate in the tribal territories. According to one senior U.S. official,
Mr. Kappes delivered a very pointed message, declaring that “Look, we know there’s
a connection, not just with Haqqani but also with other bad guys and ISI, and we
think you could do more and we want you to do more about it” (New York Times, July
30).
During Prime Minister Gillani’s visit to the United States he was reportedly
provided with incontrovertible evidence of the ISI’s continuing links with
religious-extremist elements. The Prime Minister, on his return to Pakistan, blithely
denied there was a significant problem. Reportedly, PM Gillani had an exclusive
meeting with the CIA Director where he was briefed by the latter regarding ISI’s
continuing links with the Taliban and was provided with a U.S. “charge-sheet”
against the ISI (Dawn [Karachi], September 17).
Gillani’s Decision to Shift Control of ISI
In a move aimed at appeasing the United States while simultaneously projecting its
own control and influence, Prime Minister Gillani’s government issued instructions
on July 26 for control of the ISI to be shifted to the Ministry of Interior,
currently headed by Zardari’s trusted aide Rehman Malik. The timing of the decision
was significant, coming on the eve of PM Gillani’s visit to the United States and
just two weeks after the secret visit of Mr Kappes to Pakistan (The News, August 5).
As expected, the decision to place the ISI under the Ministry of Interior had to be
withdrawn almost immediately under pressure from the powerful Pakistan Army. In
retrospect, this decision served no other purpose than to re-establish the limits of
power of the democratic government in Islamabad vis-a-vis the Pakistani military.
While there is no doubt that some Pakistanis detest the ISI’s political shenanigans,
it is also true that most realize the good that the agency has done for the country
in the domain of warding off threats to Pakistan’s national security. Given the
current climate where the United States is increasingly perceived as following a
policy aimed at downsizing Pakistan geographically and militarily in favor of
strengthening India and securing the Central Asian theatre, it is not surprising that
the ISI has started being viewed as “Pakistan’s first line of defense” (The News,
August 5).
Richard Boucher’s Statement on ISI Reform
Expressing his dissatisfaction at the lack of control exercised by the Pakistan
government over the ISI, Deputy Secretary of State Boucher stressed the imperative of
reforming the ISI at a private luncheon in Washington, saying “It has to be done”
(Dawn, September 17). It might be possible that Gillani made some commitment
regarding reining in the ISI during his meetings with Bush administration officials
that he was unable to implement on his return, precipitating the outburst from
Richard Boucher. Diplomatic sources have indicated that the United States is trying
to work out an arrangement with Pakistan for curtailing ISI’s power. Under this new
arrangement, the ISI wing which deals with internal security is to be transferred to
the Interior Ministry and the agency is to be asked to reduce its role in the war on
terror.
The U.S. reckons that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the new civilian
government in Islamabad because it can end the agency’s interference in Pakistan’s
domestic politics and thus prevent future military takeovers. Taking away the
agency’s authority to deal with the militants could help the United States meet its
goal of severing the ISI’s alleged links to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
When the proposal was first discussed with Pakistan’s civilian government, they were
not sure they could accomplish this task since they felt that the civilians were
still too weak to take on the ISI. Boucher’s statements indicate that the Americans
believe that Asif Ali Zardari’s victory in the September presidential elections has
created a civilian regime in Islamabad with all the powers it needs to reform the ISI
(Dawn, September 17). In the hostile environment that exists in Pakistan today as a
result of U.S. cross-border raids into Pakistan and the conduct of the war in
Afghanistan, any American policy overture and declaration is bound to be viewed with
immense suspicion, and the calls to de-fang the ISI are no exception. With antiAmericanism on the rise, any person or institution targeted by the United States
automatically becomes popular and gains favor with the masses. While not all
Pakistanis are enamored with the ISI, most view its performance on the external front
favorably. To some extent, this is evident even in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), where in reaction to U.S. cross-border violations a tribal jirga in
Miranshah declared that they would fight alongside the Pakistan Army against any
intruders and threatened to attack Afghanistan if the violations did not stop. In the
same vein, the extremist militants hiding in FATA have gained greater sympathy and
support from the local tribesmen just because they are actively opposing the U.S. and
Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Implications for Pakistan’s Stability
Beset as it is with enormous internal challenges ranging from soaring inflation to
extreme insecurity to crippling energy shortages, the Zardari – Gillani government
truly finds itself in a bind. While the U.S. administration might incorrectly assume
that the civilian government is now in a strong enough position to take on the Army
by attempting to transform the ISI, the truth is that the ever-present danger of yet
another military take-over is precisely what must be giving Zardari and Gillani
sleepless nights. Given that the United States would like to ensure the stability of
the newly established democratic order in Islamabad, pitting the Zardari - Gillani
regime against the powerful Pakistan Army at this stage could well amount to tolling
its death bell. Many believe the ISI is indeed more powerful than the people sitting
in cabinet or holding other offices of power. Additionally, there is doubt over whom,
if anyone at all, controls this entity (The News, Sept.18). Having a military person
at the helm of affairs in former President Musharraf was precisely what was keeping
the Pakistan Army quiet and satisfied. With his departure from the scene, the Army
returned to viewing the political set-up with utmost wariness and would not hesitate
to intervene whenever it perceives that the vital national interests of Pakistan are
being compromised by the civilian government.
Impact on the War on Terrorism
From the Pakistani perspective, supporting the Taliban stemmed from the country’s
security imperative of “strategic depth,” predicated on having a friendly regime on
the north-western frontier. President Musharraf’s decision to withdraw all support
for the Taliban and support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan created a quandary that
left the ISI stuck in the middle – it could neither go against what Musharraf wanted
nor could it allow its influence and linkage with the Taliban to be completely
broken. As such, a dichotomy crept up into Pakistan’s posture towards Afghanistan in
general and its support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism in particular. It is highly
probable that Musharraf went along with this duplicitous policy of simultaneously
supporting the United States without compromising the ISI’s links with the Taliban.
Despite its help in fighting al-Qaeda, the ISI is viewed with deep suspicion by U.S.
officials who believe that it retains links to the Taliban and other militants blamed
for supporting attacks on U.S. forces. While it is true to state that the ISI has
strong links with the Taliban, it is equally important to understand that the
maintenance of those links is perceived by most in Pakistan to be an insurance
against the possibility of an anti-Islamabad and pro-India Afghanistan. While
eliminating the menace of religious extremism and militancy from FATA is definitely
construed by Pakistan to be in its national interest, the possibility of an
unfriendly Northern Alliance-dominated and pro-Indian regime in Kabul is certainly
not in line with Pakistan’s national aims and objectives. From the Pakistani
perspective, the war in Afghanistan must end with a favorable and supportive regime
in power in Kabul, even if this is made up of the Taliban. From the U.S. point of
view, the possibility of the Taliban being allowed to come into power is not
considered. It is against this backdrop that one must view the involvement of the ISI
with the Taliban – not as abetting terrorism but as protecting Pakistan’s national
interest.
An approach based on separating al-Qaeda from the Taliban might allow the U.S. and
Pakistan to work together to achieve their respective aims. Currently, the threat
faced in Afghanistan is two-fold: the one posed by the international jihadis of alQaeda and the other from the local Taliban. While the former is the focus of U.S. and
Coalition forces, the latter is the primary threat with which the Afghanistan and
Pakistan governments must contend. Whereas the former is threatening virtually the
entire world with acts of terrorism, the latter is essentially a liberation struggle
against a foreign invasion of Afghanistan. In order to win in this campaign, it is
vital that a rift be driven between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In the implementation
of this strategy, the ISI can play a significant role, not only because of its links
with the Haqqani group but also its ties with Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
In a significant development, the latest shuffle at the senior level of the Pakistan
Army saw Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj, the ISI Director General, being replaced
after merely a year in office by Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. While some
construe this as an attempt to remove known Musharraf loyalists from power, others
contend that this could well be an attempt to harmonize the efforts of the military
and the ISI in fighting terrorism, since the new DG ISI oversaw the conduct of all
military operations against terrorist elements in FATA in his previous assignment as
Director General Military Operations at GHQ (Dawn, Sept. 30).
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the imperative of curtailing of its involvement in Pakistan’s
domestic situation, the ISI’s external role needs to be maintained, and its links
with the Taliban need to be exploited by the United States and Pakistan to their own
respective advantage. To avoid the possibility of setting Pakistan’s democratic
development back at least a decade, it is vital that any strategy implemented must be
seen to further the interests of both allies rather than being perceived as being
detrimental to the interests of either. The appointment of Lieutenant General Ahmed
Shuja Pasha as the DG ISI is a significant step in the direction of harmonizing the
military and intelligence components of the War on Terrorism and could be a major
step in removing U.S. apprehensions regarding the ISI.
Notes:
1. The only exception to this rule was the appointment during the late Benazir
Bhutto’s tenure as Prime Minister of Lieutenant General (Retired) Shamsur Rehman
Kallu, which was very short-lived and has never been repeated.
Afghanistan Deployment puts Germany in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs
Publication: Terrorism Focus Volume: 6 Issue: 3
January 28, 2009 03:41 PM Age: 3 yrs
By: Raffaello Pantucci
Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier tours a German ISAF contingent in
Afghanistan (German Federal Foreign Office photo)
Speaking in accented but fluent German, Abu Talha al-Alamani made al-Qaeda’s most
direct threat to the German nation yet in a recent video, saying that Germans were
“naive and gullible” if they thought they could “emerge unscathed” from being the
third-largest troop provider in the NATO alliance in Afghanistan (al-Faloja.info,
January 19). The video, released by al-Qaeda’s al-Sahab media wing and entitled
“Das Rettungspaket Fuer Deutschland” (The Rescue Package for Germany), first
emerged on jihadi websites on January 17 (though it is dated October 2008). The video
showed a turbaned individual identified as Abu Talha al-Alamani (Abu Talha the
German) brandishing weapons in a rocky environment, before switching to a direct
picture of him preaching to the camera. In the half-hour video, Abu Talha declares
that it has been his “wish to blow myself up for Allah since 1993,” and provides a
nuanced overview of the German political environment highlighting the nation’s
involvement in Afghanistan. [1] Germany currently provides over 3,300 troops to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has agreed to
increase the size of its deployment to 4,500 troops.
The speaker in the video was identified by Germany’s Interior Ministry as Bekkay
Harrach, a 31-year-old Moroccan-born German citizen from Bonn who is a long-term
jihadi. Injured by Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank in 2003, Harrach has been
in a training camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region since 2007 and was
already on the radar of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, the German external
security service) (Der Spiegel, January 24; Bild, January 19). German authorities
have verified that they believe the recording is authentic and stated that Harrach is
believed to be in contact with the higher echelons of al-Qaeda, with further contacts
to militants in Frankfurt, Brunswick, and Ulm (Munich Focus Online, January 22).
There are reports that Abu Talha is part of the cross-border Haqqani Network, living
in Waziristan under the personal protection of Siraj Haqqani, noted for his extensive
use of suicide tactics (Spiegel Online [Hamburg], January 25). As Interior Ministry
State Secretary August Hanning put it, Harrach is a “very serious Islamist” and the
direct targeting of Germany in this way “is a cause for concern” (AFP, January 20,
2009).
The video release came as a suicide car bomber struck near the German Embassy in
Kabul, killing four civilians and an American soldier. In a subsequent claim of
responsibility, the Taliban declared that the mission was carried out by a local
named Shum-ul-Rahman and claimed that the attacker was targeting vehicles carrying
German forces near the Embassy (Dawn [Karachi], January 17; Daily Times [Lahore],
January 17, The Times, January 18). An unspecified number of suspects in the Embassy
attack were seized in overnight raids on January 23 by Afghan troops supported by
ISAF forces (AFP, January 23).
In propaganda terms, Germany has long been a rhetorical and ideological target for
other groups based in the Pakistani border regions. The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an
off-shoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), has been operating out of
Waziristan with direct tentacles into Germany. [2] The group releases videos with
German, Russian, Uzbek, Turkish, and Arabic translations and has claimed
responsibility for a group of plotters called the “Sauerland Group,” who were
arrested in Germany in September 2007 while planning a bombing campaign timed to
coincide with a Bundestag (German Parliament) vote on whether to extend the German
military’s mandate in Afghanistan (Der Spiegel, September 4, 2008; and see Terrorism
Monitor, November 8, 2007). A few months later, the group also claimed responsibility
for sending young Turkish-German Cüneyt Ciftci to carry out a suicide bombing that
killed two U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan (Der Spiegel, March 15, 2008). Another German
convert active with the group, Eric Breininger (who was a roommate to one of the
Sauerland plotters), has released videos taunting the German intelligence services
who claimed that he was on his way back to Germany to carry out an attack (Bild,
September 26, 2008). Breininger (a.k.a. Abdul Ghafar al-Alamani) remains at large.
More recently, in the week before Harrach’s video surfaced, the IJU released another
video which showed forces fighting in Afghanistan, including an attack on a
helicopter. In the same week, a further video was issued by the IMU in German, in
which four individuals who appeared to be Arab and spoke good German called upon
their German brethren to come and join the fight in Afghanistan. Since the release of
Harrach’s video, al-Sahab has re-released a previous video showing the June 2008
attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad with German subtitles. A recent statement
from the German Ministry of the Interior warned, “Attacks in Afghanistan are
increasingly targeting Germans. Germany is being named more and more in warnings
published on the Internet. The latest threat explicitly warns Germany only” (AFP,
January 18).
This rhetorical escalation comes as more details emerge of the threat to Germany from
al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Afghan-Pakistan region. The IJU’s increased
use of German in videos, the presence of German nationals (both converts and second
generation immigrants of Turkish or Arab descent), and clear evidence that a network
appears to exist to send individuals back and forth from Germany to “jihad lands.”
The connective tissue between these young Germans and al-Qaeda’s core has been
provided by individuals like 45-year-old Pakistani-German Aleem Nasir, who is
currently on trial in Germany on charges of supporting terrorism. Nasir was picked up
by Pakistani intelligence services while seeking to board a plane back home from
Lahore on June 18, 2008, and claims he was beaten in Pakistani custody (Pak Tribune,
August 31, 2007; IHT, September 23, 2007). Nasir has also been identified as Bekkay
Harrach’s contact with al-Qaeda (Der Spiegel, January 24).
For German authorities, the specter of the 2004 Madrid bombings hangs in the air. In
that instance, al-Qaeda claimed a strategic victory when they ascribed the defeat of
the Aznar administration (which had sent Spanish forces into Iraq) by the current
Zapatero administration (which subsequently withdrew the forces in line with a
campaign promise) to the Madrid bombings. Public reaction to terrorist attacks can be
unpredictable and the known public antipathy in Germany to their forces’ deployment
in Afghanistan is something that al-Qaeda has likely identified as a possible target.
With this new targeting of a German audience by al-Qaeda’s media wing, rather than
the IJU’s, the pressure is clearly being ratcheted up further.
Notes:
1. For a complete open source translation, please see:
http://www.nefafoundation.org/<wbr></wbr>miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/<wbr></wbr>nefasa
habgerman0109.pdf.
2. For a detailed analysis of the IJU, please see, Guido Steinberg, “The Islamic
Jihad Union,” SWP Comments, (German Institute for International and Security Affairs
- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), April 2008: http://www.swpberlin.org/en/<wbr></wbr>common/get_document.php?asset_<wbr></wbr>id=4883.
Roundup of Kabul Suicide Gang Reveals Ties to Pakistan
Publication: Terrorism Focus Volume: 6 Issue: 5
February 19, 2009 05:04 PM Age: 3 yrs
By: Mukhtar A. Khan
Suicide bombings have become a regular insurgent tactic in Afghanistan since 2005,
with a special focus on Kabul in the last year. The number of such attacks have grown
considerably during the recent years in Kabul, culminating in the February 12 suicide
bombings that targeted public buildings in the Afghan capital, killing 26 people and
injuring more than 50 (Afghan Daily [Kabul], February 12). Perhaps to the surprise of
Afghanistan's national security services, these devastating attacks came only days
after security forces announced the roundup of a gang of suicide bombers in Kabul.
Since January 2008, Kabul has witnessed six deadly suicide attacks. In most cases,
they were claimed by the Taliban. On February 3, Afghanistan's government announced
it had traced and broken up the terrorist group behind these attacks. The group is
alleged to have drawn its members from two jihadi groups - the Haqqani network and
the Kashmir-based Harakat-ul-Mujahideen. Afghanistan's National Directorate of
Security (NDS) announced the arrest of seventeen members of the Kabul suicide group
in connection with six suicide bombings since March 2007. This terrorist group was
headed by a 23-year-old Pakistani bomb-maker known as Yasir, with all six of the
suicide bombers coming from Pakistan (PakTribune, February 3; Deutsche Welle,
February 3). An NDS spokesman named two other Pakistani ringleaders as Ezatollah and
Rahimollah. Other members of the group were responsible for laying mines, carrying
explosives, guiding the suicide bombers and scouting locations for attacks (Pajhwok
News, February 9).
Most recently, the group is believed to be responsible for the deadly January 17
suicide attack on a convoy travelling the road between an American base, Camp Eggers,
and the German embassy in the central Kabul district of Wazir Akbar Khan. Five
people, including a U.S. soldier, were killed in the bombing (Daily Outlook
Afghanistan, [Kabul], January 20). The NDS claims the suicide bomber was a native of
Pakistan's Swat region named Abdullah. Located in Pakistan's restive North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), Swat has been the scene of intense fighting in recent
months between Taliban militants and Pakistani security forces. Afghan officials
claimed that it was the same gang of Kabul suicide bombers who entered the Ministry
of Culture and Information - in the heavily fortified part of Kabul - and killed two
people last October (AFP, October 31, 2008).
The group was also suspected of a November 27 suicide attack near the US embassy that
killed four civilians and wounded up to 17 (Daily Annis [Kabul], February 6, 2009).
In a single week, from November 27 to December 5, 2008, the gang conducted three
suicide attacks. A November 30 suicide attack on a convoy of German embassy diplomats
missed the target and resulted in the killing of two Afghan civilians. Only a few
days later, on December 5, a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into an
Afghan army convoy, killing 13 people including six Afghan National Army soldiers.
(Radio Television Afghanistan/ RTA, [Kabul], February 7).
The cross-border Haqqani network currently poses the most serious threat to Coalition
forces, having expanded its suicide operations from east Afghanistan into Kabul and
Afghanistan's southern regions (see Terrorism Monitor, March 24, 2008; Terrorism
Focus, July 1, 2008). The network is led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran
jihadi leader in his late 70s believed to have close ties with Taliban supreme leader
Mullah Muhammad Omar and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. His son, Sirajuddin
Haqqani, alias Khalifa ("the Successor"), is considered to be the mastermind of most
suicide attacks inside Afghanistan for the last two years. The network is based in
Danda Darpa Khel, a town near Miran Shah, the headquarters of the North Waziristan
tribal agency in Pakistan, close to the border with Afghanistan. Sirajuddin, who is
in his early thirties, is highly influential on both sides of the border, especially
among the new generation of young and aggressive Taliban fighters. The United States
has placed a $200,000 bounty on his head.
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is a Pakistani militant group which was established in
1985, aiming to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. However, at the end of
Soviet-Afghan war in 1989, the group entered Kashmir to fight Indian troops. It is
suspected that during the past few years HuM has once again started exerting
influence in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan's tribal areas and the NWFP. The
United States has added HuM to its list of designated terrorist organizations (U.S.
Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2007).
The continuing suicide attacks inside Kabul have gained momentum at a time when the
new administration of President Barack Obama is planning a troop surge in Afghanistan
and possibly a new counterterrorism strategy. A suicide bombing in Urozgan Province
that killed 27 policemen at the same time the NDS was announcing the roundup of the
Kabul cell demonstrates the difficulty authorities face in eliminating the threat of
suicide attacks (Voice of Jihad, February 2; Afghan Islamic Press, February 2).
Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 9
April 10, 2009 10:50 AM Age: 3 yrs
By: Sadia Sulaiman
Militants of the Waziristan Taliban
Perhaps no one has greater stature or importance in the Pakistani Taliban leadership
than Hafiz Gul Bahadur, supreme commander of the North Waziristani Taliban. A direct
descendant of Mirza Ali Khan, a legendary Waziristani freedom fighter who fought
against the British Indian government and later against the newly established
Pakistani State, Bahadur is known for hosting foreign militants, mainly al-Qaeda and
other Arab groups, as well as Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani of the cross-border Haqqani
network.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur is 48 years old and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai
Wazir. He is a resident of Lwara, a region bordering Afghanistan and is reported to
have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa (seminary) in Multan
(The Post [Lahore], August 19). Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic
revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-eIslam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Bahadur fought in Afghanistan during
the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s and again during Taliban rule.
The militant leader rose to fame in 2005, when the Pakistani government initiated
military operations in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) to evict foreign militants,
especially al-Qaeda, from the Tochi river valley. The operations began as fleeing alQaeda militants arrived from the adjoining South Waziristan Agency (SWA), where the
military conducted incessant operations from October 2003 to February 2005, first
against Ahmadzai Wazir (October 2003-April 2004) and later against the Mahsud tribe
(April 2004-February 2005). [1] During the course of military operations, Bahadur
directed the course of the war against the Pakistani government with two other
militant commanders, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani.
In June 2006, the NWA Taliban entered into a ceasefire with the Pakistani government
that culminated in the infamous September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. The
ceasefire and the agreement were largely made possible due to the involvement of
Afghan Taliban leaders such as Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani and the late Mullah
Dadullah. According to reports, a letter signed by Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar
asked “all local and foreign fighters [in North Waziristan] … not to fight against
Pakistan, since this is in the interest of the U.S.” [2] The peace agreement also
called for the eviction of foreign militants from North Waziristan, to which Bahadur
agreed. This created tension between the foreign militants and Bahadur and also
created rifts between the NWA Taliban commanders, some of whom wanted the foreigners
to stay. Most of these dissenting Taliban commanders belonged to the Mirali area.
Bahadur’s decision was, however, supported by his fellow commanders, Noor and
Haqqani. The foreign militants, particularly non-al-Qaeda Arab militants and Central
Asian militants (Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc) of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), accused Bahadur and Noor of betraying them by jumping into
the government camp to demand their eviction from the tribal territory (The News
[Islamabad], November 12, 2006).
Before the signing of the September 2006 Peace Agreement, the Central Asian militants
expressed their disapproval with the June ceasefire agreement and refused to comply
with Bahadur’s directives, saying that they never consented to the agreement. This
led Bahadur to assemble a five-member jirga comprised of senior NWA Taliban
commanders to negotiate with the Central Asian fighters. According to reports, the
jirga sent a clear message to the Central Asians that they had no other choice but to
honor the truce (Daily Times [Lahore], August 4, 2006).
The conflict between Bahadur and the Central Asian militants arose due to the
latter’s interference in the local affairs of the region. However, the Central Asian
militants were able to stay in the Mirali area of the Tochi River valley due to
support from local Taliban leaders such as Manzoor Daur, who openly opposed
Bahadur’s decision to expel the foreign militants. However, Bahadur distinguishes
between various militant groups operating in the region and greatly values his
relationship with al-Qaeda militants, who have never interfered in local affairs. The
eviction decision was, therefore, not intended for al-Qaeda.
After the signing of the peace agreement, Bahadur became the overall head of the NWA
Taliban. Unlike South Waziristan, where Taliban groups are divided on a tribal basis
– Ahmadzai Wazir and Mahsuds – the NWA Taliban remain united. Taliban from both the
Uthmanzai Wazir and Daur Tribes have strengthened Bahadur’s position by accepting
him as their supreme commander. Bahadur has established a parallel Taliban government
in the region since the peace agreement. In October 2006, the NWA took a major step
towards Talibanization when the NWA shura headed by Bahadur issued a pamphlet in
which they outlined the levy of new taxes and prescribed harsh penalties for various
offenses (Dawn [Karachi], October 23, 2006).
The peace agreement broke down in July, 2007 amid accusations by both sides. Bahadur
announced an end to the peace accord and ordered his fighters to start guerilla
attacks against the security forces deployed in NWA. In August 2007, a new peace
initiative was launched by both the sides to bring an end to the fighting. A
breakthrough was achieved when a tribal jirga from Orakzai Agency was able to
convince both sides to agree to a ceasefire (The News, July 17, 2007; August 17,
2007; October 17, 2007).
While the negotiations were going on between the government and Bahadur, the latter
joined many other Taliban commanders from various parts of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to form the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007. Baitullah Mahsud was chosen as the head of
the TTP while Bahadur was appointed first deputy head of the organization. However,
Bahadur quickly distanced himself from the terrorist entity after Mullah Omar opposed
the formation of the TTP and asked the Pakistani Taliban to focus their attention and
resources on Afghanistan (Asia Times Online, January 24, 2008).
As the peace negotiations between Bahadur and the government drew to a conclusive
end, Pakistani security forces initiated a punitive military operation against
Baitullah Mahsud in January 2008. To ward off the pincer movement of the security
forces attempting to encircle the commander in the Ladah-Makeen area, Baitullah
intended to use the Razmak area of NWA to attack Pakistani security forces. Bahadur,
however, barred Mahsud from using NWA territory, saying his peace negotiations with
the government were in the final stage and would be jeopardized by Mahsud attacks on
security forces. On February 18, 2008, the government and tribes of North Waziristan
revived the peace agreement, bringing an end to attacks on government installations
and forces (Daily Times, February 19, 2008).
Meanwhile, Baitullah Mahsud started expanding his influence in the FATA region after
the formation of the TTP and attempted to subdue rival and dissenting Taliban
commanders. This alarmed the Ahmadzai Wazir and Uthmanzai Wazir Taliban, who agreed
on June 30, 2008 to merge their ranks to form the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local
Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri alliance.” Hafiz Gul Bahadur assumed the role of
the supreme leader, while Mullah Nazir of the Ahmadzai Wazir became his deputy (Dawn,
July 1, 2008). This alliance proved to be a deterrent to Baitullah Mahsud, as he
found his Mahsud tribe encircled from the north, west and south by the Waziri
coalition.
A breakthrough was achieved on February 22, 2009, when the three leading Taliban
commanders – Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Baitullah Mahsud and Mullah Nazir – formed the Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Council for United Holy Warriors) (The News, February 23).
The three declared they had overcome all of their differences. The newly created
alliance is an effort to coordinate their actions in Afghanistan in the face of a
renewed focus on Afghanistan by the international community and the pending
deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. troops and 5,000 NATO soldiers in 2009. The
alliance was formed under instructions from Mullah Omar, who asked the Pakistani
Taliban to abandon their differences and unite their ranks (Daily Times, February
24).
Unlike Baitullah Mahsud, both Bahadur and Nazir remain pro-government in the sense
that they do not conduct attacks on government property and personnel in FATA and
elsewhere in Pakistan, nor do they undertake the Talibanization of the NWFP. Both,
however, act free of government control while conducting cross-border attacks in
Afghanistan and carrying out the Talibanization of their tribal lands. Both Bahadur
and Nazir are very careful persons, and unlike Baitullah Mahsud, they follow the
policy of lying low while advancing their agenda at the same time. Baitullah, on the
other hand, is more inclined towards cheap publicity and intends to become the Mullah
Omar of Pakistan. Hence, unlike Baitullah, both Bahadur and Nazir maintain a good
reputation within their tribal territories, as well as among their respective
tribesmen.
Notes
[1] The military operations in South Waziristan Agency resulted in the signing of
the April 2004 Shakai peace agreement with the Taliban and the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe,
and the February 2005 Sararogha peace agreement with the Taliban and the Mahsud
tribe.
[2] Graham Usher, “The Pakistan Taliban,” Middle East Research and Information
Project (MERIP), February 13, 2007, www.merip.org/mero/mero021307.html
Pakistan’s Most Wanted: A Profile of Tehrik-e-Taliban Leader Baitullah Mahsud
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 10
April 24, 2009 11:02 AM Age: 2 yrs
By: Mukhtar A. Khan
Baitullah Mahsud (Reuters)
By threatening to attack the White House and making a bizarre claim of responsibility
for the shooting rampage at a U.S. immigration center in Binghamton, New York, the
Tehrik-e-Taliban [TTP] chief in Pakistan’s restive tribal areas – Baitullah Mahsud –
has been making big headlines in global media. Once regarded as a “soldier of
peace” by Pakistani military officials and more recently as a “patriotic
Pakistani,” the hardened militant commander is now considered to be Pakistan’s
enemy number one (see Terrorism Focus, January 9, 2008; Daily Times [Lahore], April
6; Dawn [Karachi], March 26).
Baitullah is the second Pakistani to carry a U.S. government bounty of $5 million on
his head. The first Pakistani on the U.S. wanted list was Mir Aimal Kasi, who was
deported from Pakistan to the United States, where he was tried and executed in 2002
for the murder of two CIA agents outside the agency’s headquarters in 1993.
Baitullah Mahsud, who is locally referred to as “Amir Sahib,” has been designated
by the US State Department as a key al-Qaeda facilitator in the South Waziristan
tribal region of Pakistan (BBC Urdu, April 8).
From Seminary to Top Taliban Commander
Only five years ago, Baitullah Mahsud was an unknown talib (student). His name first
surfaced when he filled the vacuum after the Taliban commander in South Waziristan,
Nek Muhammad Wazir, was killed in a 2004 U.S. drone attack. Baitullah shot to
prominence as a charismatic Taliban leader when he signed a peace deal, known as the
Sararogha agreement, with the Pakistani government in February 2005.
Now in his mid-30’s, Baitullah was born in Dawud Shah village of the Bannu district
of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), bordering the restive North Waziristan
tribal agency. As his name indicates, Baitullah Mahsud belongs to the Shubi Khel
branch of the Mahsud tribe. Baitullah’s father Maulana Muhammad Haroon Shah was not
a well-off man. He was the imam of a small mosque in Dawud Shah where the local
people had collectively rented him a house. Baitullah had five brothers – the
youngest, Yahya Mahsud, was killed last year by unknown assailants in Bannu. Among
the others, Baitullah’s elder brother Zahir Shah and a younger brother, Muhammad
Ishaq, are both associated with the banned TTP. Baitullah’s father died a few years
ago and his mother now stays with Baitullah in South Waziristan (BBC Urdu, April 8).
Until recently, Baitullah lived in Bannu. He received his early religious education
in a village madrassa (seminary). Baitullah also had some formal/secular education in
a government school but dropped out, leaving his education incomplete. He then went
to a religious seminary in Miranshah, North Waziristan, headquarters of the militant
Haqqani Network. Even here, Baitullah did not complete his grades but nevertheless
went back to Bannu and served there as an imam for a short period of time (BBC Urdu,
April 8).
Baitullah was soon inspired by the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. He already had an
acquaintance with some Taliban leaders from his stay in a seminary close to the
Haqqani madrassa. He joined the movement and fought alongside the Taliban against the
Northern Alliance in Bagram. Victory there encouraged him to fight on other fronts in
Afghanistan as well.
Baitullah fled Afghanistan and settled in the Mahsud area of South Waziristan after
the Taliban regime was overthrown by the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001. Baitullah
married a few years ago in Bannu, but contracted another marriage last year with the
daughter of tribal elder Malik Ikramuddin because he had no children from his first
wife.
Baitullah’s Links with the Media
Until
other
media
Local
recently, Baitullah was not as media-savvy as his predecessor Nek Muhammad or
local Taliban leaders like the late Abdullah Mahsud. Baitullah used to shun
appearances but has now realized the importance of both media and media-men.
tribal journalists say that he is very friendly to them now. In January 2008,
he made his first TV appearance on al-Jazeera. Four months later he invited a group
of journalists from Islamabad and Peshawar for a feast and his first-ever public
press conference in South Waziristan. When a journalist in Swat, Musa Khan Khel, was
killed in February 2009, Baitullah issued special directives to his deputies to look
into the matter. The journalists based in tribal areas and the frontier province
claim to feel more threatened by Pakistani intelligence agencies than Baitullah and
his commanders (Geo TV, April 11).
Baitullah has exploited this trust relationship with the journalists to get his
message across. Despite his hatred for the West (and the United States especially),
he has appeared in interviews on the BBC and even the U.S. Voice of America network
(BBC, January 29, 2007; VOA, March 31). Baitullah has avoided having his picture
taken by the media, a trait he shares with the Taliban Supreme leader, Mullah
Muhammad Omar, to whom he has pledged his allegiance.
Baitullah’s Military and Political Acumen
Despite the fact he has very little education, Baitullah is known for his political
acumen and tactical skills. He has the charisma to unite local fighters and keep his
following intact. He has a private militia of more than 20,000 who are skilled in
various guerilla tactics. Baitullah demonstrated his military might in late 2007 when
his men arrested some 250 Pakistani soldiers and kept them hostage for more than two
months in South Waziristan. They were released in exchange for 25 Taliban militants,
among them several who had been trained to carry out suicide bombings (Dawn
[Karachi], December 31, 2007). Baitullah is believed to have sharpened his guerilla
skills under the leadership of veteran jihadi commander Jalaluddin Haqqani – who
fought against the Soviet Union and then sided with the Taliban before providing a
safe haven in the North Waziristan tribal agency to top al-Qaeda militants after the
U.S. bombing of Afghanistan’s Tora Bora Mountains in early 2002.
Baitullah Mahsud has used the terms “shari’a” and “jihad” to consolidate his
power-base in South Waziristan before extending it to the rest of the tribal areas
and parts of the NWFP. He introduced the tactics of suicide bombing and beheading of
anti-Taliban “spies.” More than 200 pro-government tribal elders have been killed
on such charges in order to silence any voice of dissent or traditional authority.
The phenomenon of suicide bombing was something new for Pakistani society when it was
introduced in 2007. Commander Qari Hussain, a close aide to Baitullah, has trained
numerous suicide bombers, most of them poor and uneducated boys, some as young as 7
years-old. Qari Hussain was a member of the banned anti-Shi’a outfit, Sipah-eSahaba, before joining Baitullah’s TTP. In the last year alone, some 725 people were
killed in suicide bombings across Pakistan - mostly police and army officials, along
with a significant number of bystanders (Daily Times [Lahore], December 31, 2008).
Baitullah has tactfully exploited almost all the “peace deals” and “cease-fire
agreements” reached with the government and military officials in his own favor. He
struck the first peace deal in February 2005 and the second in February 2008. Both
raised his stature and allowed him time and space to raise his militia. These deals,
however, were made to be broken, with a huge consequent loss to the government of
Pakistan. The peace deals in nearby Swat and Bajaur were also inked after Baitullah
gave a green light to his deputies.
After forming the TTP in December 2007, Baitullah Mahsud faced tough resistance from
Commander Maulvi Nazir in Wana and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in Miranshah, which he overcame
by bringing them under the umbrella of the Shura Ittihad al-Mujahideen (United
Mujahideen Council – UMC) in February 2009 (Daily Khabrain [Islamabad], March 10).
Baitullah still faces a challenge from the local Abdullah Mahsud group, consisting of
followers of the late commander led by Qari Zainuddin Mahsud and Turkistan Bitani. On
March 26 a TTP suicide bomber killed 11 people in an attack on a restaurant where
fighters belonging to Turkistan Bitani’s command were eating. A TTP spokesman said
the attack was revenge for the killing of 35 TTP fighters by Bitani’s men last year
(Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26).
Baitullah Mahsud is still a suspect in the murder of Pakistan’s former premier,
Benazir Bhutto, a case in which he denies any involvement. However, he has accepted
responsibility for several suicide and guerilla attacks in various places, including
the recent attacks on a police training academy in Lahore, a police station in
Islamabad and a suicide attack on a military convoy in Bannu. He has threatened more
serious attacks inside Pakistan unless the U.S. drone strikes are halted (Daily Times
[Lahore], April 3). As a revenge for the drone attacks, he claimed to have engineered
the Binghamton shooting on April 3, but such statements have only made him a laughing
stock (The News [Islamabad], April 5).
Conclusion
Despite Baitullah’s recent boasts, he is still very cautious and calculated. He
avoids being photographed and moves with heavy security and special guards. He may
think he could still be a strategic asset for the Pakistani security establishment
but he also fears the risk to his life from the targeted drone attacks and the U.S.
bounty on his head. His claim that he is planning an attack on the White House
actually indicates that he has no intention of doing so – if he was planning such an
attack he wouldn’t specify the target in advance. Baitullah has the ability to
conduct terrorist attacks inside Pakistan and Afghanistan but has not acquired the
capacity to engineer transnational operations.
As well as being a regional force with the skills needed to unify the scattered local
jihadis, Baitullah Mahsud acts as an al-Qaeda facilitator. He has sufficient acumen
to be a player in local politics but plays only a small role in global politics. He
can send a young suicide bomber to attack an easy target inside Pakistan or
Afghanistan but cannot transport him to a European country or the United States. In
his ideology, Baitullah is more impressed by Mullah Omar than Osama bin Laden. Like
Mullah Omar he is waging jihad aimed at creating an Islamic government in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. He still has a localized agenda but wants foreign troops to leave
Afghanistan. Despite several peace deals with the Pakistani government, he has never
stopped his men from attacking U.S. and NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan.
The Death of Baitullah Mahsud: A View from Afghanistan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 26
August 20, 2009 03:36 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: Wahidullah Mohammad
Officials in Afghanistan see the killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mahsud
as a great victory for his opponents and say his death may result in the breakup of
the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) organization. The loss of the TTP leader comes as
Pakistani jet fighters and helicopter gunships continue to pound Taliban positions in
South Waziristan in preparation for an expected ground offensive.
Baitullah Mahsud was killed in a U.S. drone missile attack on his father-in-law’s
house in South Waziristan. Although officials in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United
States have stood behind reports of the death of the insurgent leader, the Taliban in
Pakistan still insist their leader is alive, an increasingly unsustainable position.
The Taliban in Afghanistan have refused comment on this issue.
Hamed Elmi, deputy spokesperson to Afghan president Hamid Karzai, feels certain that
Baitullah is dead, but the government is still waiting for more credible evidence of
the insurgent leader’s death from the Pakistani government [1] Elmi says that
Baitullah and his group are linked to al-Qaeda, but his death does not lead the
government to expect a decrease in Taliban attacks within Afghanistan. “This is one
hundred percent true that the Pakistani Taliban leader is killed… We can see that
after he was killed there was a big clash between his two top commanders, Wali-urRahman and Hakimullah Mahsud over who would replace him.” Elmi says that the Afghan
government wants the Pakistani government to close all those religious madrassas
(religious schools) where thousands of Taliban have been trained as terrorist
insurgents. “There are hundreds of madrassas on the Pakistan side that are training
young boys as terrorists. We want these madrassas to be closed and to be changed into
modern schools. Their curriculums should be under government control. We have always
insisted the Pakistani government should have control over the religious madrassas.
The centers for terrorist training should be destroyed. We also have religious
madrassas in different cities of Afghanistan but none of them [are] used for
terrorist activities because we have full control over our madrassas.”
Elmi said the Defense Ministry was happy with the killing of the Taliban leader.
“His death is a big success for the killers and can have a big positive impact not
only on the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. His death is good for the region
and even for the world.”
Kabul-based political analyst Fazal Raman Orya says that killing the TTP leader will
have a short term positive impact on the security situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and the region. [2] According to Orya, Mahsud was a main player for Pakistani InterServices Intelligence and was killed at the ISI’s suggestion. “He was very
powerful; he had more than 30,000 armed people but sometimes he was not listening to
the ISI and was out of their control - that is why they decided to kill him.”
Orya says the ISI will now look for a good replacement and will reorganize the TTP
structure. “The truth is that ISI wants to replace him with a new person. The new
person will be more powerful than Mahsud but he will always be listening to ISI. Once
Baitullah is replaced by the new person I think the situation will become much worse
in Afghanistan.”
Afghan Taliban spokesperson Qari Yusuf Ahmadi refused to speak on the repercussions
of the TTP leader’s fate, saying that the movement will have comments once Baitullah
Mahsud’s death is confirmed by the Pakistani Taliban. “We do not want to give any
comments on the death of Baitullah Mahsud. His friends have not confirmed his death
yet.” [3]
General Mohammad Zaher Azimi, spokesperson for Afghanistan’s defense ministry, said
the ministry is still collecting information regarding Baitullah’s death, but says
if his elimination is confirmed, it will have a direct positive impact on the
security situation in the region and in Afghanistan in particular. General Azimi
maintains there was a very close connection between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and
Baitullah Mahsud, especially his connection with the Haqqani network in Miramshah.
“They were working together to plan suicide attacks in Afghanistan, training and
sending suicide bombers into Afghanistan.” [4]
General Azimi is confident that the death of Baitullah Mahsud will gradually improve
the security situation in Afghanistan. “It won’t have a high-speed, positive impact
on [the] security situation in Afghanistan and the region very soon, but in the
coming few months its positive impact will be seen.”
Notes:
1. Hamed Elmi deputy spokesperson to the President Hamed karzai was interviewed on
August 12, 2009.
2. Fazal Rahman Orya political analyst was interviewed on August 13, 2009.
3. Taliban Spokesperson Qari Yusuf Ahmadi was contacted on August 12, 2009.
4. General Zahir Azimi spokesperson for the Afghanistan defense ministry was
interviewed on August 13 2009. For the Haqqani network, see Terrorism Monitor, March
24, 2008; Terrorism Focus, July 1, 2008.
Bekkay Harrach: The Face of German Terror
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 30
October 1, 2009 04:12 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: Raffaello Pantucci
Germany’s federal elections passed without incident on September 27, though they
took place against a backdrop of intense concern in the German security services
about a growing number of increasingly pointed al-Qaeda videos threatening Germany
over its military deployment in Afghanistan. These messages included a videotape from
Osama bin Laden on September 25, entitled “To the Peoples of Europe.” The video had
English and German subtitles along with footage of German cities and monuments (AlFajr Media Center, September 25). The message appeared only two days before the
German elections. Germany has 4,200 troops in northern Afghanistan, where they have
come under more frequent attack in the last year as the Taliban insurgency spreads.
While the message from bin Laden is alarming, it appeared to only incidentally
target Germany, without the terrorist leader naming it specifically. A more direct
threat came from a series of videos released by Bekkay Harrach (a.k.a. Abu Talha alAlamani), a Moroccan-born German citizen who has joined al-Qaeda in the AfghanistanPakistan frontier region.
Harrach specifically threatened Germany, telling Muslims to avoid places that are not
“essential to daily life” in the post-election period, though he stated that the
city of Kiel would remain safe (Der Spiegel, September 18). In the first video of
this series, entitled “Security - A Shared Destiny,” Harrach appears clean shaven
in front of a red curtain wearing a suit and blue tie – a marked contrast to previous
videos in which he appeared as a veiled and turbaned fighter. Two days after this
threat, a second video surfaced online, entitled “O Allah, I Love You (1),” this
time showing Harrach turbaned once again. Instead of threatening Germany in this
second message, Harrach extols the joys of jihad to his fellow countrymen while
engaging in highly personal reflections on his relationship to Allah and jihad:
“I also want to take part in the jihad, be like a mujahid, live like a mujahid, love
like a mujahid, and feel like a mujahid. However, my problem is that I am committing
too many sins. Can I take part in the jihad despite all these sins, even if I do not
manage to stay away from sins? Or do I have to first be free of sin?” (As-Sahab,
September 20).
This was followed days later by a third German-language video, this time entitled “O
Allah, I Love You (2),” which more pointedly threatened Germany once again (al-Fajr
Media Center, September 24).
Bekkay Harrach’s star has ascended rapidly in jihadist circles. A figure who was
once relatively unknown outside security circles, he has rapidly moved to become the
face of what might be called the German jihad – a catch-all term that best describes
the active phenomenon of young German Muslims who choose to go to the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region to train alongside either al-Qaeda or affiliated groups
like the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The
depth of the problem was reinforced by the tale of a group from Bonn (including six
German citizens) who left Germany with their families to join the jihad in
Waziristan. They were arrested on the border and allegedly beaten by Pakistani police
(Der Spiegel, September 21). Reports indicate that they remain in detention there.
Harrach was born in Morocco to a family that moved to Germany in 1981 when he was 3
or 4 years old. Once in the country, he spent most of his time in Bonn, where he was
apparently active in social circles around the King Fahd Academy, an alleged local
hotbed of extremism (Der Spiegel, January 27). He attended a night-school in his 20s
in Bonn, where he was studying to be an engineer. He ultimately elected to attend a
university at the nearby Koblenz Institute for Technology, where he studied laser
technology and business mathematics (Bild, April 22, 2009). However, his studies were
regularly interrupted by trips abroad to seek glory in the fields of jihad, including
a trip to the West Bank in 2003. Upon his return, blood was found on his belongings
and it is believed he was injured in a skirmish with Israeli troops. He is also
believed to have traveled twice to post-Saddam Iraq and may even have spent time in a
Syrian jail (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, September 22). While on return from one of these
trips to Iraq (where he claimed he was on a “humanitarian mission”) he was stopped
by Germany’s security services, who attempted to recruit him (Der Spiegel, January
27).
In 2004, he gave up on his studies and took on a role at the local Muhadshirin Mosque
in Bonn where he preached in a lively and extreme fashion. Towards the end of 2006,
Harrach was introduced to Aleem Nasir, a German-Pakistani “gemstone dealer” who was
recently incarcerated for being an al-Qaeda facilitator. It is believed that the man
who introduced them was Omer Ozdemir, a German of Turkish heritage who is currently
on trial with another man on charges of belonging to al-Qaeda and helping procure
funds and equipment for the group (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 14).
Nasir gave Harrach a formal letter providing him with an introduction to an al-Qaeda
training camp before Harrach headed off to Waziristan through Iran in early 2007,
leaving behind a pregnant wife. Once in Pakistan, he rapidly established himself as a
bright light amongst the ranks of foreign fighters there, apparently being trained by
master al-Qaeda bomb-maker Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and operating under the protection of
the Haqqani network (Der Spiegel, January 27).
A clue to Harrach’s potentially important role can be found in a statement given to
Der Spiegel by a Pashtun commander in the Haqqani Network, who claimed; “If we want
to do something, we always ask the German for his opinion” (Der Spiegel, January
27). Harrach’s background as an engineer has apparently made him something of an
expert in bomb-making.
However, it is likely Harrach’s role as a connection to the German-speaking world
that has made him so important within the networks based in Pakistan. German is
increasingly used in al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-affiliate video releases – in particular
those from the IMU and the IJU. The latter group was apparently behind the
“Sauerland Cell” plot to attack American targets in Germany (see Terrorism Focus,
January 28, 2009; November 8, 2007). Descriptions from those who knew him portrayed
Harrach as a personable chap, recalled by acquaintances who knew him in Bonn as not
bearing the outward appearance of an extremist yet capable of persuading his wife, a
German convert to Islam, to leave the comfort of Bonn to join him with their young
child in the less accommodating badlands of Waziristan (Sueddeutsche Zeitung,
September 22; Spiegel, January 27).
Whatever his actual role in al-Qaeda, his messages to his adopted land have put
German authorities on the highest alert. Armed police patrol major airports and rail
stations and security forces detained two men “of Arabic origin” in Munich after a
judge approved their preventive detention until the Bavarian city’s Oktoberfest beer
festival is over. Increased security at the event led one German news source to say
“Oktoberfest has been transformed from a beer festival into a beer fortress”
(Spiegel, September 29). One of the men detained was in contact with Harrach, while
the other apparently knew him through a relative (Spiegel, September 28). Police
previously arrested a young Turkish man in Stuttgart for allegedly posting one of
Harrach’s videos online (Hurriyet, September 25).
It is the specificity of the threat that has alarmed watchers. While earlier official
alerts have been sent out to German companies operating abroad (especially in North
Africa), the focus on Germany and the specific timeline hinted in this new set of
videos has officials particularly alarmed. The numbers being leaked to the press are
equally disturbing - German officials say they are concerned about some 180
individuals who “have received or intend to receive paramilitary training.” About
80 of these individuals have returned to Germany but only 15 are in custody (Spiegel,
September 28). Whether Harrach is able to draw from this pool to live up to his
threat of giving Germany a “rude awakening” seems unclear, but it is certain that
he was able to force the issue of Germany’s military role in Afghanistan onto the
political agenda.
Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 36
November 25, 2009 12:21 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: Wahidullah Mohammad
Northern Afghanistan, a secure and stable area until last spring, is now an insecure
and fearful place. Although Taliban and al-Qaeda activities have been limited mostly
to southern Afghanistan over the past eight years, the Taliban were able to expand
their terrorist activities to central Afghanistan and since spring 2009, the
insurgents have focused their efforts on the most secure place in the country,
expanding their terrorist activities to northern Afghanistan.
The expansion of Taliban activities to northern Afghanistan shows that the terrorist
networks are getting stronger day to day, causing fear in ordinary Afghans. Taliban
attacks on Afghan and international forces are frequently reported from Kunduz and
some other northern provinces. Kunduz was the main stronghold of the Taliban in
northern Afghanistan during the course of their rule, until 2001. Throughout this
period the Taliban organized their raids in other northern provinces from Kunduz.
This may be the reason that the insurgents once again want to use this province as a
center for organizing terrorist attacks in the northern provinces.
The Taliban Return to Kunduz
The chief of police in Kunduz province, General Abdul Razaq, says the Taliban
selected Kunduz as a center for their activities in northern Afghanistan because
Kunduz was their stronghold in Afghanistan and they already had some old friends in
this province. Though they were dispersed after the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in
2001, the Taliban wants to reorganize them and use their power to make northern
Afghanistan insecure. [1]
According to General Abdul Razaq, the Taliban came to northern Afghanistan while NATO
and Afghan forces carried out operations against the insurgents in southern
Afghanistan. With the Pakistani government conducting an offensive against the
terrorists in southern Waziristan at the same time, the Taliban had no place to hide
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Taliban therefore came to northern
Afghanistan to expand their activities and switch Afghan and NATO attention from the
south to the north.
General Abdul Razaq says Afghan and NATO forces have strengthened their military
operations against the insurgents in northern Afghanistan and reduced their terrorist
activities. According to the General, an ongoing, three-month-long offensive by NATO
and Afghan forces has killed most of the terrorists. Others have been arrested while
some have again fled to the southern provinces or Pakistan. “We were able to scatter
the insurgents from northern Afghanistan. More than 200 terrorists were killed. A
number of them were arrested and some of them fled back to other places. Now the
security situation is getting better, only in some of remote areas of some districts
we still have some insurgency problems which will be solved soon” said General Abdul
Razaq.
Northern Afghanistan has borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
According to Afghan security officials and analysts most of the terrorists in
northern Afghanistan belong to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the network
of Taliban leader Jalaludin Haqqani (who has strong connections with al-Qaeda) or
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e- Islami Afghanistan (Afghanistan Islamic Party), the
biggest and most influential mujahideen party during the war against the Soviet
Union.. According to General Abdul Razaq, natives of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Chechnya are present among Taliban in northern Afghanistan and are always on the
frontline of battles with Afghan and NATO forces.
A Lack of Political Will?
Fatima Aziz is a female member of Afghan Parliament from Kunduz province. She blames
the government for the insecurity in northern Afghanistan and says that in the
beginning, Taliban activities were very limited in northern Afghanistan but the
government did not care to keep the Taliban from reaching the northern provinces.
“The government could very easily keep the terrorists from reaching the north of the
country but they did not. They let the insurgents become very strong and when they
made Kunduz and other northern provinces insecure the government and ISAF conducted
military operations against them.” [2]
General Abdul Razaq denies charges the government did not take serious steps to
counter insurgency in the north, saying that the security forces always used all
their facilities to counter insurgency and ensure security for people. According to
General Abdul Razaq, terrorism is a regional problem and needs a regional solution,
adding, “By the assistance of local people we were able to destroy all those
terrorist groups that were active in the north of the country and we exterminated all
their plans.”
The Deputy Director of the counterterrorism department at the Ministry of the
Interior, Sayed Anwar Ahmadi, agrees with General Abdul Razaq and says that most of
the insurgent groups have been destroyed in northern provinces. “Fortunately, due to
the last military operations the insurgents are now too weak.” [3]
According to Ahmadi, the Taliban have some forces in northern Kunduz and Baghlan
provinces as well as some districts of Faryab province. Ahmadi says that the Taliban
is trying to expand their terrorist activities to the north to enable them to attack
NATO supply convoys coming through Central Asia and northern Afghanistan.
Cold Weather or Counter-Insurgency Operations?
The security situation is improved in the northern provinces nowadays, but according
to Fatima Aziz, the situation improved because the insurgents left the area and went
to Pakistan and the southern provinces due to cold weather in the north. She says
that the situation will get worse if the insurgents return next spring.
Deputy Director of counterterrorism Sayed Anwar Ahmadi says that before the weather
became cold they conducted an offensive against the insurgents and the Taliban fled
the area. “The security personnel are always ready to defeat the insurgents. We were
never heedless about the insurgency…Cold weather also can be a natural reason for
the improving security situation in the north, but [the Taliban] became very weak and
had no alternative but to leave the area.”
According to Ahmadi, the insurgents in the north are organizing attacks in small
groups against security forces. “There are 15 to 20 groups of insurgents in each
province, like Kunduz, Baghlan and some bordering districts of Faryab province. Each
group has around twenty people. Besides the networks of Hekmatyar, Tahir Yuldash and
Juma Namangani, they have [a] very close connection with the Quetta and Peshawar
councils of Taliban in Pakistan.” [4]
Threatening NATO Supply Lines
Political analyst and member of the Afghan Parliament from Kunduz, Moeen Marastyal,
sees the NATO decision to ship supplies from Central Asia through Tajikistan to
Afghanistan as the main reason for the Taliban presence in northern Afghanistan. [5]
Marastyal says that the Taliban want to expand their network first to northern
Afghanistan and then to Central Asia where the Uzbek and Tajik Taliban are already
active. “By reaching northern Afghanistan they can easily attack NATO supply
convoys. Besides reaching their targets in the north they also want to expand their
network to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” said Marastyal, who claims that local people
played a major role in removing terrorists from the northern provinces.
Kunduz province was the first in northern Afghanistan to be captured by Taliban after
they seized Kabul in 1996. It remained a Taliban stronghold until October 2001, when
U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan and the Taliban regime collapsed. Kunduz was the
last province to be cleared of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies. Kunduz was a
strategic province in northern Afghanistan for the Taliban regime and could again
become a place for insurgents to organize their attacks in the north.
Afghan journalist and political analyst Mohammad Qasim Akhgar says that NATO supply
convoys from Central Asia through northern Afghanistan are one of the reasons for the
Taliban presence in the north. [6] According to Akhgar, there are some countries that
want to make Afghanistan insecure and are helping the Taliban to expand their
presence to the north of Afghanistan and then to Central Asian nations. Akhgar did
not name any of the countries that are helping the insurgents to reach their targets
in the north except Pakistan. “Regretfully there are some countries like Pakistan
that are helping the Taliban make Afghanistan insecure. Besides foreign countries,
there are some people in the Afghan government who also help the Taliban,” said
Akhgar.
According to Akhgar the insurgency cannot be solved simply by conducting military
operations. “The Afghan insurgency problem needs an economic, political, cultural
and military solution. It cannot be solved only by military operations. In
Afghanistan the overall situation needs to be changed and become better.”
Notes:
1. Author’s interview with Kunduz chief of police General Abdul Razaq, November 16,
2009
2. Author’s interview with Kunduz MP Fatima Aziz, November 12, 2009
2009
3. Author’s interview with Ministry of the Interior deputy director of
counterterrorism Sayed Anwar Ahmadi, November 15, 2009
4. Tahir Yuldash was reported killed by a drone attack in August 2009. Juma Namangani
was killed by an airstrike in Afghanistan in late 2001. Both were leaders of the IMU.
5. Author’s interview with Kunduz MP Moeen Marastyal, November 17, 2009
6. Author’s interview with political analyst Mohammad Qasim Akhgar, November 17,
2009
Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 5
February 4, 2010 03:28 PM Age: 2 yrs
By: Lieutenant General Talat Masood
Pakistani military during an offensive in South Waziristan
The United States has been pressuring Pakistan for several months to extend its
counterinsurgency operations to North Waziristan. The U.S. perspective is that strong
militant entities, especially the Haqqani group, the Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin
Hekmaytar and Taliban forces under Hafiz Gul Bahadur are using the safe haven of
North Waziristan to conduct raids on American, NATO and Afghan troops. Pakistan is
resisting the immediate expansion of the conflict due to several factors, one of
which is that Islamabad feels its military is already overcommitted in South
Waziristan, Swat and Malakand and needs time to consolidate the gains it has achieved
in these places before undertaking any further operations. More than 150,000 military
and paramilitary forces are currently deployed in the tribal agencies and the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) in order to clear pockets of resistance, prevent the
recurrence of militant attacks, and hold the territory that has been cleared until it
stabilizes. The military has claimed the capture and killing of hundreds of militants
during the operations, but the Taliban’s top leadership and many hard-core militants
managed to escape in thickly forested areas or flee to adjoining tribal agencies.
Conditions in Bajaur and Momand remain fairly volatile and clashes between security
forces and militants are frequently reported. Remote areas of South Waziristan close
to the border with North Waziristan continue to provide sanctuary to the Taliban and
other militant entities that are now the target of U.S. drones.
Prioritizing North Waziristan
In the current operational environment, North Waziristan is not an immediate priority
for Pakistan’s army. The militant entities in this area are not hostile toward
Pakistan. It is generally believed that there is a tacit understanding that the
Pakistan Army will not launch an operation if the tribes and militant groups stay
neutral while operations against the Mahsud tribes and stabilization efforts continue
in South Waziristan. The militant groups have not kept entirely to their undertaking
and have given refuge to both al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders of South Waziristan.
Another factor inhibiting a future offensive is the possibility of all the tribes
uniting against the Pakistan Army in the event it launched an operation in North
Waziristan. This would bring the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban closer, posing a
formidable threat to regional security. The Taliban in North Waziristan number
anywhere from 10,000 to 12,000 fighters and they have the advantage of local terrain
that is very inhospitable to forces from other parts of the country. The local
Taliban in North Waziristan have support from a cross-section of people. Those who
oppose them fear retaliation as the government’s writ is practically non-existent in
the region.
North Waziristan has been a victim of gross neglect by successive governments.
Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan anti-communist jihad, the subsequent
abandonment of the region by the United States and the international community and
finally the impact of the events of 9/11 have totally destroyed the social, tribal
and administrative structure of the area, encouraging the Taliban to fill the vacuum.
They are in fact running a parallel administration, providing justice in accordance
with their harsh interpretation of Islam and maintaining security by imposing
ruthless measures. The Haqqani Network and other groups have militias of 3,000 to
4,000 fighters and could draw more from the adjoining provinces of Afghanistan if
Islamabad launches a military operation. Militants fleeing from South Waziristan and
other parts of the tribal agencies have also sought refuge in the area.
Islamabad does not want to antagonize the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups
residing in North Waziristan, knowing that it will have to deal with them once
American and NATO forces leave. The new U.S. strategy on Afghanistan already
envisages a withdrawal of forces commencing in 18 months and there is talk of
bringing the reconcilable Taliban to the negotiating table. The other Coalition
contributors have no intention to remain in Afghanistan any longer than necessary. In
such unpredictable conditions, Pakistan would like to keep its options open and watch
closely how U.S. policy and the military situation evolve.
The Indian Equation
The Indian factor is crucial to the strategic calculus Pakistan uses in formulating
policy on Afghanistan and the Taliban. With tensions high since the Mumbai terrorist
attack and several provocative statements by Indian military and political leaders,
Pakistan finds it difficult to relocate its forces from its eastern Indian border
west to the Afghanistan border. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ statement in
New Delhi that India’s patience would be exhausted in the event of another terrorist
attack on India by jihadi groups has given additional reason to be more circumspect
in shifting forces (The Hindu, January 20).
A further inhibiting factor in the extension of military operation in North
Waziristan is the danger that it could trigger a fresh wave of suicide attacks in
many parts of Pakistan, as was experienced during military operations in Swat and
more recently in South Waziristan. The high human and financial cost is another
important consideration. Pakistan has lost more than 2,000 men from its security
forces and thousands of civilians in its fight against militants. The financial cost
of insurgency is already taking its toll, with the defense budget exceeding the
allocated amount by over 35 % while demands for more money, weapons and equipment are
rising. It is estimated that Pakistan has suffered a loss of nearly $28 billion for
being a front line state in the fight against militants. [1] When U.S. assistance is
withheld due to bureaucratic hurdles it compounds Pakistan’s ongoing financial
crisis.
A recent statement by Army spokesperson General Athar Abbas made it clear that the
army has no intention of launching a major military operation for the next six to
twelve months as it is already over-committed and busy consolidating its position in
the areas of Swat, Malakand and South Waziristan (Dawn [Karachi], January 22). This
must have come as a rude shock to the U.S. military commanders who have been pressing
Pakistan’s military to expand its area of operations to North Waziristan. The United
States wants Pakistan’s army to take on the Haqqani Network, which has close ties to
Arab militants and is alleged to be involved in a number of deadly suicide attacks,
including the recent suicide bombing of the CIA station in Khost province by a
Jordanian triple agent (see Terrorism Monitor, January 28).
The Need for Stabilization and Consolidation
The absence of a military operation in the near future means that the frequency of
drone attacks on North Waziristan will continue or even intensify. It gives rise to
considerable local resentment and sharpens anti-American sentiment while presenting a
moral and political dilemma for the government, notwithstanding its tactical
advantage.
There is no doubt that operations in Swat, Malakand and South Waziristan have been
largely successful, but there are pockets of these areas still in the hands of the
militants, though the leadership has fled into other tribal agencies, principally
North Waziristan, Orakzai and Momand.
It is estimated that there are roughly 100 hard-core al-Qaeda operatives and about
2,000 auxiliary members and supporters. In the frontier region, Uzbeks constitute the
largest group among al-Qaeda’s foreign mujahideen, with Arabs, Uighurs, Tajiks and a
few individuals from African countries constituting the rest. Nearly a dozen of the
mainly Arab hard-core al-Qaeda have been killed or captured in the last few months.
Rebuilding Local Administrations
The civilian administration has yet to be made fully functional in Malakand division
and in South Waziristan. Tribes opposed to the Taliban are being mobilized to take
care of local security and support the government’s efforts in establishing an
administrative structure commensurate with tribal traditions. This may take time but
is a very critical part of the operation. Several pro- government leaders opposed to
the Taliban have been killed, which has been demoralizing for pro-government tribes
and groups. Furthermore, there has been a large internal displacement of people
during the military operations. From South Waziristan alone, nearly 300,000 persons
were displaced and remain either in camps or as guests in adjoining settled areas.
Hospitable conditions need to be created so these people will not fall prey to the
machinations of the Taliban when they return. There is already considerable
resentment among them that they were caught in the crossfire of the military and
Taliban.
It is encouraging, however, that the fight against militancy is being pursued more
enthusiastically now than it was during President Musharraf’s rule. With the support
of the civilian government, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has
shown the determination and will to seriously engage in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations according to the government’s priorities.
Conclusion
The government is currently unprepared to negotiate with the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) leadership. At this stage it aims at ruthlessly pursuing the leaders
and their groups. However, it is important to understand that the TTP is a loose
network of motley and disparate groups that have coalesced to leverage their impact
but have little in common. In South Waziristan, the heartland of the resistance, the
Taliban could be characterized as ideologically motivated. In North Waziristan the
situation is similar. In Khyber Agency, however, criminals, smugglers and the drug
mafia have worn the mantle of the Taliban to challenge the authority of the state.
In Khurram Agency sectarian groups are fighting for turf and in Orakzai and Bajaur a
mix of ideology and criminality acts as an incentive for insurgency. These groups
will continue to cause trouble for quite a while. However, if the government and the
military remain steadfast and pursue the militant leaders and their groups vigorously
according to a well-conceived plan involving both military and other elements of
national power, there are good prospects for pacifying the area in two to three
years. Much, of course, will depend on how the situation unfolds in Afghanistan and
the extent of international support to Pakistan.
Notes:
1. According to economist Shahid Hasan Siddiqui, Pakistan has spent $40 billion on
the war on terrorism while being compensated only $12 billion by the United States.
See Pakistan German Business Forum, Seminar on Post Budget Implications on Business
by PGBF, February 1, www.pgbf.com.pk/press-7-28-09.asp ).
The Asian Tigers – The New Face of the Punjabi Taliban
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 20
May 20, 2010 05:02 PM Age: 1 yrs
By: Arif Jamal
The emergence in North Waziristan of the Asian Tigers, a previously unknown jihadi
group, has several messages for jihad watchers. Two of them are very important.
First, the Punjabi Taliban are slowly but surely growing in strength and numbers.
Second, their war is primarily against the state of Pakistan (read their former
handlers) and may eventually surpass that of their Afghan comrades in intensity.
Although the exact identity of the Asian Tigers is not known, Pakistani intelligence
agencies believe it is a front group for the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), headed
by Ilyas Kashmiri (The News [Islamabad], May 1). The Asian Tigers’ first operation
was to abduct Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan Air Force squadron leader who gained
notoriety as a jihadist ideologue in the 1980s, and then execute him on April 30 in a
dramatic manner, leaving his body with a note saying he was a CIA agent and all such
others would be treated likewise (Dawn [Karachi], April 30).
Some time in March, Khalid Khawaja traveled to North Waziristan on an Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)-sponsored mission to cleanse the Pakistani Taliban of “bad
Taliban.” Khawaja was accompanied by Brigadier Amir Sultan Tarar (a.k.a. Colonel
Imam), Shah Abdul Aziz, a former mujahideen commander who became a member of
Parliament under General Musharraf, and Mehmud al-Samarai, described by the Taliban
as a former Iraqi intelligence agent but now believed to be involved in Saudi peace
efforts in Afghanistan. The three pleaded with Taliban leaders Sirajuddin Haqqani,
Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rehman to convince them to change their targets.
According to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman, “They tried to convince
Hakimullah Mahsud and Waliur Rahman Mahsud to stop attacking the Pakistan army and
discussed a mechanism to target NATO supply lines only. They offered to help
Hakimullah set up pockets in different parts of the country from where they could
attack NATO supplies going to Afghanistan” (Asia Times, April 28).
The trio also appealed to the TTP to expel 14 senior Taliban commanders who were
suspected by the ISI of being on the payroll of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW),
India’s external intelligence agency. Most of these 14 commanders are Punjabis (see
The News, May 1 for the full list of names). A four-wheel drive vehicle belonging to
Waliur Rehman which Khawaja used during this visit was hit a few days after
Khawaja’s departure by a U.S. drone, though the attack failed to kill Waliur Rehman
(Asia Times, April 28; Dawn, April 30).
Although the drone attack and other suspicious behavior noted by the militants may
have prompted the Punjabi Taliban to take his life, the real reasons are to be found
elsewhere. Khalid Khawaja remained loyal to the ISI even after his retirement and
shared its vision of liberating Kashmir by using jihad as an instrument of defense
policy as well as using the Afghan Taliban to establish strategic depth in
Afghanistan against India. For Khawaja, like his mentors in the ISI, all those who
were out of the ISI’s control were Indian agents. The Punjabi Taliban are irked by
this policy and fail to understand why jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir is good but
jihad against the Pakistan army, allied with the same infidel forces that occupy
Afghanistan, is bad. Mohammad Omar, a spokesman for the Punjabi Taliban, told a
Pakistani journalist that Khawaja was killed partly because he would call the Punjabi
Taliban “terrorists” but refer to the Afghan Taliban as “mujahideen” (The News,
May 2).
According to a TTP spokesman, during his visit to Waziristan Khawaja promised to
return with others, and when he did, the Taliban were prepared to abduct and
interrogate him. Khawaja returned on March 25 with Colonel Imam and Asad Qureshi, a
Pakistani journalist with British citizenship whom the Asian Tigers accused of
working for the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Before
killing Khawaja and dumping his body on a roadside in Mir Ali, the Asian Tigers sent
five video clips to selected media outlets which contained the “confessions” of the
former ISI officers. The Urdu-language videos appear to have been heavily edited and
include incomplete sentences. Khawaja in particular appears to be under duress and at
times seems to be reading from notes on his lap.
In the videos, Khawaja confesses to having conspired with Maulana Fazlur Rehman,
leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F, a major Islamist political party) and
Grand Mufti Maulana Rafi Usmani to bring down the radical Lal Masjid movement, named
after the Islamabad mosque that acted as its headquarters. The military’s July 2007
siege of Lal Masjid marked the beginning of a new and especially violent wave of
Islamist militancy in Pakistan. The second crime Khawaja confessed to was being an
agent of both the ISI and the CIA. Khawaja also alleged in his “confession” that
Harkat ul-Mujahideen commander Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Jaish-i-Mohammad founder
Maulana Masood Azhar and Jaish-i-Mohammad commander Abdullah Shah Mazhar were ISI
proxies. “Jihadi organizations like Laskhar-e-Taiba, al-Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad,
Harkat ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat ul-Mujahideen etc. operate with the financial assistance
of the Pakistani secret services and they are allowed to collect their funds inside
Pakistan" (Asia Times, April 24).
The kidnapping operation of the Asian Tigers is shrouded in mystery. Only Colonel
Imam and Asad Qureshi (who remain in their custody) may have the answer to the
identity of the Asian Tigers. One report claimed senior Afghan commanders negotiating
for the release of Colonel Imam (who is very close to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad
Omar) had suggested the Asian Tigers appeared to have the backing of someone
powerful, as the group was moving freely through the region despite its small numbers
(The News, May 1). If true, this would show that part of the military establishment
in Pakistan has become radical and is siding with those who have rejected the
official policy.
Haqqani Network Shifting from North Waziristan to Pakistan’s Kurram Agency
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 45
December 16, 2010 04:31 PM Age: 304 days
By: Arif Jamal
Members of the Haqqani Network
Residents in the Kurram Agency of tribal northwest Pakistan believe that the
Pakistani military has once again postponed military operations in North Waziristan
Agency after its plan to shift the so-called “moderate Taliban” (including the
notorious Haqqani Network) was exposed and severely criticized by some elements of
the Pakistani press in November. According to a Kurram Agency Shi’a leader, “the
military seems to have put its plans to launch a military operation in the North
Waziristan Agency on hold for now as it is no longer trying to shift their strategic
assets from North Waziristan to Kurram Agency with the same vigor in anticipation of
an operation in North Waziristan under US pressure. We are not sure if it is because
of the criticism of this policy in the Pakistani press or the WikiLeaks
revelations.” [1] The northern part of Kurram is dominated by Shi’a tribes
(particularly the Bangash and Turi), while the southern half is dominated by Sunnis.
It is not only the press that has opposed the shift of Taliban fighters to new bases.
When the local population in the Shalozan area of Kurram successfully resisted
Taliban infiltration, there were reports of army gunships intervening to protect
their “jihadist partners” (Daily Times [Lahore], November 4). There have been a
number of recent attacks by gunmen in the Kurram Agency on members of the Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including one in November that killed militant commander
Hikmat Shah Khoedadkhel (Nawa-e Waqt [Rawalpindi], November 9; The News [Islamabad],
November 8. For background information on the Shi’a-Taliban struggle for Kurram see
Terrorism Monitor, April 17).
From the Pakistani military’s viewpoint, Kurram Agency is important for two reasons.
First, this agency can become a new sanctuary for the pro-military Taliban, such as
the Haqqani Network. However, the second reason is more important. The Kurram Agency
has served the route to Afghanistan for the mujahideen since 1980. The Kurram Agency
would have fallen long ago to Taliban militants, as have other tribal agencies, if it
had not been for the courage of the local Shi’a population, which has been fighting
bravely against the Taliban since 2007.
NATO targeted the Taliban sanctuaries in Kurram with helicopter strikes in September,
which resulted in the death of some Pakistani soldiers and created a diplomatic storm
between Pakistan and NATO nations. It is now clear that the Haqqani Network was using
the village of Mata Sangar in Kurram to carry out attacks on the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) posts in Khost, Afghanistan. Network leader
Sirajuddin Haqqani was reported to be in the area at the time of the NATO attack
(Daily Times, November 4). Another local Shi’a leader in Kurram said that “the
slowdown in moving more Taliban from North Waziristan and elsewhere to Kurram is
temporary, no matter what the reasons are. They would soon resume this in view of the
strategic importance of the Kurram Agency, particularly if or when the Americans
withdraw from Afghanistan.” [2]
Officials and analysts in Islamabad believe that the postponement of the military
operation in North Waziristan is more likely a reaction to the Wikileaks revelations
of Pakistani support for the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups, than
the press revelations of military support for a transfer of militants from North
Waziristan to Kurram. According to a senior official:
"The Pakistani army cares little about the revelations in the press. The Wikileaks
disclosures are more damaging to the army’s image than to the politicians’ images.
Politicians are always under attack in Pakistan. However, it is the first time that
the dirty linen of the Pakistan army has been washed in the open in such a way. They
are very angry. The army will evaluate the impact of the Wikileaks and rethink its
strategy before it acts in North Waziristan." [3]
The Parachinar-Thall road, the Kurram Agency’s link to Pakistan, has remained
effectively closed to the Shi’a population of Kurram by Army-supported blockades by
the local Sunni Taliban since the sectarian battles of 2007. In a recent statement,
the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) announced that the
Parachinar-Thall road had been opened for traffic. However, Sajid Hussain Turi, an
MNA from Kurram Agency, said that the road still remains unsafe and only convoys with
security can travel on the road (Dawn [Karachi] December 5). At the end of October,
the Pakistani military announced its plans to close down the Parachinar-Gardez-Kabul
road, the only other route out of the Kurram Agency. This virtually trapped the
people of Kurram in their homeland with a pair of blockades (Daily Times, November
4). Some local analysts believe the closure of the remaining border crossings to
Afghanistan is intended to compel the Shi’a tribes of Kurram to welcome the Haqqani
Network. In return for allowing their presence, the Haqqanis would convince the TTP
militants to allow Shi’a access to the road from Kurram to Peshawar (The News,
December 12). A leading daily reported unsuccessful secret meetings in Islamabad
between Haqqani Network commanders (including Qari Taj), TTP leaders (including Karim
Mushtaq) and elders of the Shi’a tribes of Kurram Agency designed to reopen the
Parachinar-Thall road, which would be used for the movement of TTP fighters as well
as local Shi’as (Dawn, November 30).
Notes:
1. Interview with a Shi’a leader through a research assistant, Kurram Agency,
December 3, 2010.
2. Interview with a Shi’a politician through a research assistant, Kurram Agency,
December 6, 2010.
3. Interview with a Pakistani official through a research assistant, Islamabad,
December 5, 2010.
The Khurasan Mujahideen Seek to Eliminate Espionage in Waziristan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 13
April 1, 2011 02:43 PM Age: 198 days
By: Zia Ur Rehman
Although Pakistani Taliban militants have killed hundreds of people accused of spying
for the United States or Pakistan’s intelligence agencies over the past few years in
the lawless tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, the incidents of such
execution are on rise since the beginning of the year. The killings, some of which
were carried out in brutal fashion and videotaped as a warning to would-be-spies,
come as many important leaders of al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban militant groups have
been killed in the escalated drone attacks in the region.
Local tribal elders believe that the recent rise in the incidence of such killings is
a warning by the militants to the local population against facilitating the drone
campaign in the tribal areas by providing intelligence information. [1] This was
confirmed by the Pakistani military’s official version of U.S. attacks in the tribal
region, which claimed that most of the people killed in drone attacks were hardcore
al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and a fairly large number of them were of foreign
origin. On March 9, Major General Ghayur Mehmood, who commands troops in North
Waziristan, said in a briefing in Miramshah that between 2007 and 2011, 164 drone
strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed. Of those
casualties, 793 were locals and 171 were foreigners. General Mehmood claimed the
latter included Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans, though
proof of these assertions was not provided (Dawn [Karachi], March 9).
Because of drone attacks, the militants who once freely roamed markets have now
receded to compounds. High-value targets move as many as three times a night, avoid
funerals and trackable technology, and rely on motorbikes or their feet to move
about. Most drone attacks are based on intelligence from sources on the ground and
information from local citizens, said Brigadier (Retd.) Mehmud Shah, a former
secretary of security for the tribal area (Central Asia Online, January 28).
The killings of important leaders of al-Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
the Haqqani Network and other militant groups have compelled the militants operating
in North and South Waziristan to execute people suspected of spying and leave their
bodies on the roadside with notes pinned to their chests branding them as "U.S.
spies" and traitors. [2] The bodies are often mutilated and beheaded. In North
Waziristan, corpses appear in fields and roadsides almost daily with a dark warning
pinned to their tunic: “All U.S. spies will meet the same fate.”
The killings of people accused of spying are mainly carried out by the Ittehad-eMujahedeen-e-Khurasan (IMK - Alliance of the Militants of Khurasan), a relatively
little-known militant organization. The IMK is a coalition of all the local militant
groups and various groups of foreign militants operating in the region. Its main
function is intelligence collection and the identification and elimination of spies.
The IMK came into existence one year ago at a meeting of all the militant groups in
North Waziristan following the deaths of important militant leaders in a series of
drone attacks. In order to eliminate the network of local spies providing information
on the Taliban to U.S. forces, a 200-member special task force was formed consisting
of trusted militants from each group. IMK operatives rely on a strong network of
informants in every village and town to find suspected spies. Masked armed men of
this secretive organization can select any person belonging to any militant group or
clan and kill him if he is proved to be a spy. Except for their top leadership, even
the militants do not know the membership or modus operandi of the IMK. [3]
In North Waziristan, Urdu pamphlets issued by the IMK and posted on the walls of the
Miramshah Bazaar said no family should help its members if they spy on the Taliban.
The pamphlets also stated that there should be no interference if the Taliban kidnap
someone on suspicion of spying for the United States and anyone caught doing so could
possibly be “killed immediately” (Daily Times [Lahore], May 19, 2010). Militants
belonging to the IMK distributed pamphlets ordering people they describe as “dacoits
[bandits] under the guise of Taliban” to return the money they have looted from
local residents. The pamphlet threatened that those involved would meet the same fate
as the decapitated spies if they did not return the stolen goods (Express Tribune
[Karachi] June 27, 2010).
The massive escalation in U.S. drone attacks in North and South Waziristan tribal
agencies since the beginning of 2011 has also seen an unprecedented rise in
assassinations of suspected spies:
•
On February 5, four bodies of tribesmen were found in Karak district, pinned
with notes accusing them of spying for Indian and Jewish intelligence agencies (The
News [Karachi] February 6; Dawn [Karachi], February 6).
•
On February 8, militants killed Afghan refugee Bakht Jan for allegedly spying
for the United States in North Waziristan. His body was found on the Miramshah- Datta
Khel road (Daily Times [Lahore], February 9).
•
The bodies of two khasadars (paramilitary personnel) were found in a sack with a
warning that anybody else accused of spying on the Taliban would meet the same fate
(Central Asia Online, February 10).
•
Four bullet-riddled bodies of unidentified persons were found in a deserted
place in the Karak district on February 14. Letters recovered from the pockets of the
bodies stated that those spying for Israel and India would meet the same fate (The
News [Islamabad], February 15).
•
On March 1, militants in North Waziristan Agency killed four tribesmen suspected
of providing intelligence to U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies and dumped
their bodies on a Miramshah roadside. Notes pinned on their chests read: “We killed
them because they were spying for the U.S. Anyone who acts like this will face the
same fate” (Dawn [Karachi], March 1).
•
Four bodies of unidentified persons were found on March 21 in a deserted place
in the Datta Khel region of North Waziristan. Notes found in their pockets described
their alleged roles in the controversial March 17 drone attack in the region that
killed 30 people (Dawn [Karachi], March 21).
•
Militants are also reported to have killed more than 50 people in North and
South Waziristan since the beginning of 2011, though these murders were not reported
in the media because of a lack of media access and other factors. [4]
According to local tribal elders, in most cases militants execute so-called spies
just to terrorize ordinary tribesmen (Central Asia Online, Jan 28). In some cases,
the IMK’s militants are also known to put suicide vests on those accused of spying
and detonate the vests in front of large crowds to demonstrate the power of the
Taliban. An example of this method was found in the public execution of two men
accused of being U.S. spies in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan last year
(Reuters, May 21, 2010).
The organized vigilance of the IMK in hunting down suspected spies has left local
tribesmen frightened and reluctant to provide vital intelligence to guide the United
States. No senior al-Qaeda or TTP leaders have been killed in drone attacks in tribal
areas since the beginning of 2011, which shows the growing number of executions has
had a negative effect on U.S. intelligence collection in the tribal agencies.
Notes:
1. Author’s interview with a local journalist and elders of the Wazir tribe.
2. Author’s interview with a TTP associate and elders of the Wazir tribe.
3. Author’s interview with a TTP associate.
4. Author’s interview with a Bannu-based journalist.
Haqqani Network Growing Stronger at the Expense of the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 31
August 4, 2011 05:34 PM Age: 73 days
By: Arif Jamal
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seems to be slowly disintegrating as various
commanders try to pull it in different directions. A clear indication of this process
came when the TTP Commander in the Kurram Agency, Fazal Saeed Haqqani, announced that
his group had seceded from the TTP (for Fazal Saeed Haqqani, see Militant Leadership
Monitor, July 2011). Fazal Saeed Haqqani also announced the formation of a new group
called Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP) (Dawn [Karachi] June 28). Haqqani said
his group was not happy with the TTP’s policy of attacking civilian targets, a major
reason for the split. However, Haqqani and his group have been involved in the
murders of innocent Shi’a Muslims. In the very first statement to dissociate his new
group from the TTP, Haqqani announced that his group would not carry out any attacks
on the Pakistani security forces (The News [Karachi] June 28). He also announced
that the United States is the TTIP’s “main enemy” (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28).
The action of Fazal Saeed Haqqani has completely eliminated the TTP from the Kurram
agency, as Haqqani vowed that he would not allow the TTP to operate there: “It is
my area and I will ensure that no locals or outsiders oppose our policies and create
problems for us in Kurram Valley” (The News, June 30). Like Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is closely allied with the Haqqani Network in
Afghanistan (Dawn, July 5). The Haqqani Network desperately needed a foothold in the
Kurram agency, which only Fazal Saeed Haqqani could provide. According to Mansur Khan
Mehsud of the FATA Research Center, Fazal Saeed Haqqani is occupying a portion of the
main road, the Thall-Parachinar road, connecting Kurram Agency with the rest of the
country. While still a TTP commander, Fazal Saeed Haqqani did not allow Shi’a Muslim
residents to use that road. Consequently, they had to go to Afghanistan first to go
to other parts of Pakistan. [1] With Fazal Saeed Haqqani in charge of that road, the
Haqqani Network and other Taliban militants can use the Kurram Agency as their base
to carry out attacks inside Afghanistan or to provide sanctuary. [2]
NATO forces in Afghanistan identified the Haqqani Network as the group responsible
for a brazen attack using nine suicide bombers against Kabul’s luxury
Intercontinental Hotel on June 28 that killed 20 people, including the suicide
bombers (AP, June 30). Shortly afterward, the Haqqani Network suffered a major blow
when NATO troops and Afghan Special Forces mounted a raid on a Haqqani Network
training camp in Afghanistan’s Paktika Province. The July 20-22 operation killed
more than 50 insurgents in a base said to be used as a staging point for Haqqani
Network and foreign fighters. A large stockpile of arms was seized in the operation,
which NATO sources said was based on intelligence provided by disenchanted insurgents
(Daily Times, July 23; AFP July 22; Reuters July 22).
Nevertheless, Fazal Saeed Haqqani’s rebellion against the TTP has immensely
strengthened the Haqqani Network while weakening the TTP. According to one report,
TTP commander Hakimullah Mehsud has become more and more isolated over the last year
(Express Tribune [Karachi], July 5). On June 27, Hakimullah suffered a setback when
unknown persons killed Shakirullah Shakir, a spokesman for the Fidayeen-e-Islam
[suicide-bombing] wing of the TTP. Shakirullah was to replace Qari Hussain Mehsud,
who was killed in an October 2010 drone strike and was known as Ustad-e-Fidayeen
(master [or teacher] of the suicide bombers) (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28).
Commander Tariq Afridi’s Taliban group in Darra Adamkhel and Khalid Omar’s Mohmand
group are already operating independently of the TTP. Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber
Agency, led by Mangal Bagh, is pro-Army and does not accept TTP patronage. The TTP
breakup is a great success for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which
has been working for some months to deliver Kurram Agency to the Haqqani Network so
that it could operate more freely in view of the emerging regional scenario (see
Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). Distrust among the TTP militants seems to be
growing. According to another report, Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman
rarely meet; when they do, they do not meet alone and only after making sure neither
of them is carrying arms (Dawn, July 5).
Fazal Saeed rebelled against the TTP on the eve of the military operation that
started on July 3. Army troops moved into the central Kurram agency from the town of
Sadda and Tal area in Hangu District, backed by helicopters, tanks, and artillery.
The aim of the operation was to destroy the militants still loyal to Hakimullah
Mehsud (The News, July 4). Although this military operation was ostensibly initiated
against the militants, Shi’a Muslim residents believe it is equally directed against
them. A knowledgeable Pakistani columnist, Dr. Mohammad Taqi, says that the operation
is aimed at opening the Thall-Parachinar road for the Haqqani Network and other proArmy jihadi groups (Daily Times, July 7). More importantly, it is aimed at punishing
those people in the Kurram Agency who have resisted the Haqqani Network and the
Pakistan Army’s support for the Taliban. The balance of power has shifted in favor
of the Haqqani Network for the first time with Fazal Saeed Haqqani openly on their
side. Although several local Shi’a leaders in Upper Kurram vow to fight back, it is
safe to say that they are losing the battle, at least for now. [3]
Notes:
1. Mansur Khan Mehsud, “TTP Divided in Kurram Agency,” FATA Research Center, n.d.,
www.frc.com.pk/linkc/articlecont/41.
2. For the strategic importance of this road for the Pakistan army and the Haqqani
Network, see Dr. Mohammad Taqi, “Comment: The Sham operation in Kurram,” Daily
Times, Lahore, July 7. Available at www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp.
3. Telephone interviews with some local leaders through research assistant, July
2011.
Pakistan’s Military Urges Tribal Uprising against Militants in North Waziristan
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 34
September 9, 2011 12:49 PM Age: 37 days
By: Zia Ur Rehman
While U.S. pressure on Pakistan for a full-scale operation against the Haqqani
Network and other militant groups in the North Waziristan Agency is growing, the
Pakistani military is urging the local Wazir and Dawar tribes of the North Waziristan
to initiate a “Wana-like uprising” to expel foreign militants from their area and
minimize the chance of the government taking military action should the situation
grow worse (Daily Times [Lahore] August 18).
With the help of militants led by South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir, the Ahmadzai
Wazir tribes of South Waziristan successfully flushed out Uzbek militants of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) from Wana and other Wazir-dominated areas of
South Waziristan in a spring 2007 popular uprising sparked by the brutality of the
Uzbeks. [1] Many of the Uzbek militants who arrived in the area when their bases in
Afghanistan were closed in late 2001 relocated to North Waziristan after their
eviction from South Waziristan.
Elders of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes said that they would not allow fleeing Uzbeks and
militants of the Mahsud tribe in their areas who might attempt to sneak in from North
Waziristan if the military goes on the offensive against the Haqqani Network and
other local militant groups (Daily Times, June 1).
Located between the Khost Province of eastern Afghanistan and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
Province of northwest Pakistan, North Waziristan is the second largest tribal region
of Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). It is considered today to
be the epicenter not only of violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also a major
source of international terrorism. Along with its geographic isolation, difficult
terrain, and relatively stable coalition of tribal militants, the region has become
the most important center of militancy in FATA because of the impunity with which
militants in the area have operated. [2]
The most important militant group operating in the region is the Haqqani Network, an
Afghan insurgent group led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani left his native
Khost province and settled in North Waziristan as an exile during the republican
Afghan government of Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan in the early 1970s. His son
Sirajuddin, who became a key insurgent leader in Afghanistan in mid 1980s, manages
the network’s organization from the North Waziristan and carries out attacks on U.S.
and NATO forces in Afghanistan (see Terrorism Monitor, March 24, 2008; August 4). [3]
The second most important North Waziristan-based militant group is led by Hafiz Gul
Bahadur, a key militant leader known for hosting foreign fighters belonging to alQaeda and other Arab groups as well as the Haqqani Network (see Terrorism Monitor,
April 10, 2009). Bahadur was announced as Naib Amir (deputy head) under the
leadership of Baitullah Mahsud upon the formation of the 2007 Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of various militant groups operating in FATA
(The News [Islamabad], December 15, 2007). However, Bahadur later formed an anti-TTP
bloc by joining hands with Maulvi Nazir’s South Waziristan-based group because of
tribal rivalries with the Mahsuds and disagreements over TTP attacks against Pakistan
security forces, stating that the bloc had been formed to defend the Wazir tribes in
North Waziristan and South Waziristan (Daily Times, July 2, 2008). Bahadur and Nazir
belong to the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai sub-clans of the Wazir, respectively. [4] The
Haqqani Network and Bahadur are considered “good Taliban” by the Pakistan military
authorities as they don’t carry out attacks inside Pakistan and focus only on
Afghanistan.
Besides the Haqqani Network and Bahadur’s group, North Waziristan also provides
shelter to several local and foreign militant groups, such as the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Army of Great Britain,
Ittehad-e-Jihad Islami (IJI), the TTP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami, the Fidayeen-e-Islami, Harkat-ul Mujahideen, the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (The News [Islamabad] August 18). Mir Ali area and Shawal valley of
North Waziristan have been a safe haven for successive waves of all sorts of
militants fleeing U.S. or Pakistani military operations. [5]
The United States considers the role of the Haqqani Network and other militant groups
in North Waziristan in the insurgency in Afghanistan to be among the most difficult
challenges NATO faces. Due to intense American pressure, the Pakistani military is
thinking of carrying out a limited operation in North Waziristan primarily targeting
al-Qaeda, foreign militants and the TTP rather than the Haqqani Network (Dawn
[Karachi] June 1). Because of the reluctance of Pakistan authorities to act in the
region, U.S. drones have targeted the Mir Ali, Dattakhel and Miramshah areas of North
Waziristan extensively, with five out of six drone strikes in Pakistan now being
recorded in North Waziristan. [6]
North Waziristan elders say that the local population is very frustrated with the
presence of foreign militant groups, especially the Central Asians, for their
encroachment on Wazir lands and insensitivity to local tribal customs. The
foreigners’ land ownership is a direct challenge to the tribal power structure of
Waziristan. Unlike the Central Asians, the Arab militants of al-Qaeda never
interfered in local tribal affairs. Lately some innocent people belonging to the
Utmanzai Wazir tribe have been killed by foreign militants who accused them of spying
on al-Qaeda and Taliban movements to direct CIA-operated drones. The murders have
only created more hatred for the foreigners among local tribesmen. [7]
The tense relationship between local and foreign militant outfits operating in North
Waziristan has been displayed several times in the past years, particularly in
November 2006, when the IMU and IJU openly accused Bahadur and other Waziri militant
commanders of betraying them and jumping into the government camp by demanding their
eviction from North Waziristan (The News [Islamabad], November 12, 2006). Because of
their interference in the local affairs of the territory, Central Asian militants are
now compelled to stay in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan, where they have the
support of a local militant group led by Maulvi Manzoor Dawar. North Waziristan
elders report that General Mehmood told elders of the Utmanzai Wazirs and Dawars that
military action will be taken if the two tribes didn’t move against the foreign
militants (Daily Times, August 18).
Though members of militant groups in tribal areas have almost the same anti-U.S. and
pro-al-Qaeda worldview, they are not especially disciplined when it comes to tribal
matters. Pakistan’s military is trying to exploit the tribal nature of Taliban
militant groups operating in North Waziristan and South Waziristan. This
characteristic has become apparent many times, especially when Bahadur-led militants
warned the Mahsud-led Taliban in neighboring South Waziristan not to launch attacks
against the Pakistan security forces and formed an anti-TTP coalition based on tribal
rivalries with the Mahsuds. [8] Pakistan military officers in the region are
encouraging the tribes of North Waziristan to follow the example of the Ahemdzai
Wazir tribes and have announced their support of such actions. However, the situation
is quite different from South Waziristan, where local Ahmadzai tribes stood united
behind Maulvi Nazir. The North Waziristan situation is complicated by a lack of
tribal unity. An offer of money from al-Qaeda or other sources can obstruct such
uprisings in North Waziristan. As there is no consensus yet for the launch of a
united front against the foreign militants as well as the TTP’s Mahsud militants,
the Pakistani military is likely to assign the mission of uniting the Utmanzai Wazir
and Dawar tribes to Bahadur (Daily Times, August 18).
A tribal uprising against foreign militants in North Waziristan at the behest of the
Pakistani military will not only help in flushing out the foreign militants from the
territory but will also maximize the disunity among the militants and put pressure on
the Mahsud militants of the TTP. However, the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda will
obviously try to obstruct the government’s plan to incite tribal rebellion against
foreign militants.
Notes:
1. Telephone interview with an elder of Ahmadzai sub-tribe, August 26, 2011; see also
Terrorism Monitor, January 14, 2008.
2. Telephone interview with Ahmed Wali, a senior journalist and researcher, August
28, 2011.
3. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists who wished not to be named,
August 26, 2011.
4. Telephone interview with an elder of the Utmanzai sub-tribe, August 26, 2011.
5. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists, August 26, 2011.
6. Telephone interview with Abdullah Khan, director of Conflict Monitoring Center,
Islamabad, August 22, 2011.
7. Telephone interview with an elder of Utmanzai sub-tribe, August 26, 2011.
8. Telephone interview with Bannu-based journalists, August 26, 2011.
The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban
Jul 01, 2011
Daud Khattak
At the end of June 2011, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[1] experienced a major blow
when senior commander Fazal Saeed Zaimusht defected from the group and formed his own
organization, Tehrik-i-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP).[2] Fazal Saeed revolted
against the TTP leadership less than two months after the killing of Usama bin Ladin,
marking the first split in the TTP since its formation in 2007. The rift is widely
perceived as part of an effort by the Pakistani security establishment and the
Haqqani network to court an important faction of the TTP: Fazal Saeed’s militia in
Kurram Agency. Although the split may weaken the TTP, many analysts believe that it
will strengthen the Haqqani network and the militant factions that are focused solely
on fighting in Afghanistan—activities in which the Pakistani security establishment
appears to have some involvement.
This article explains the importance of Fazal Saeed, and places his defection from
the TTP in context with the interests of both the Haqqani network and the Pakistani
security establishment.
The Role of Fazal Saeed
Fazal Saeed, 39-years-old, is from Uchat village in Central Kurram district.[3] He
enjoys the support of hundreds of local tribesmen in Kurram Agency, which is located
in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border with
Afghanistan. Saeed joined the TTP when it was founded by Baitullah Mehsud in 2007.[4]
Since then, he played an active role in the TTP on various levels, but he has been
the group’s primary asset in Kurram.[5] He opposes Pakistan’s alliance with the
United States, but is equally against attacks inside Pakistan. He supports fighting
against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and shows allegiance to Afghan Taliban
leader Mullah Omar.
Saeed’s support in Kurram extends beyond his involvement with the Taliban. Kurram is
geographically separated between Sunni and Shi`a Muslims, and there have been
historic hostilities between the two sects in Kurram. Tribesmen in Kurram rallied
behind Saeed to create a united militia against rival Shi`a militias. The ongoing
conflict between Sunni and Shi`a has displaced thousands of families from Upper and
Lower Kurram. Leaders of both sides finally negotiated, and they signed the Murree
Agreement in November 2008.[6] As part of the agreement, both sides agreed that the
Pakistani government should remove armed outsiders and conduct an operation against
militant forces in the agency. The agreement, however, was never implemented,
exacerbating the conflict.
In February 2011, the Murree Agreement was revitalized after negotiations occurred in
Islamabad. Saeed, who was leading the TTP in Kurram at the time of the February peace
accord, welcomed the agreement during a news conference and pledged that his
loyalists would take action against any side found to be violating the truce.[7]
Various reports also suggest that the Haqqani network supported the peace agreement
as well. A key element of the Haqqani family, Haji Ibrahim, for example, attended the
February talks.[8]
Although the Peshawar-Tal-Parachinar roadway—a key route that Shi`a in Upper Kurram
use to travel—was opened in February 2011 after more than three years of closure, the
first violation of the peace agreement came on March 5 when militants killed four
Shi`a traveling on the road. On March 13, armed militants killed 11 passengers in the
Mamo Khwar area of Tal tehsil. On March 25, armed men attacked a convoy of
passengers, killing 13 and abducting more than 25 Shi`a in Bhaggan village. These
violations crippled the peace agreement only weeks after it went into effect.[9]
The violations are reportedly one reason why Fazal Saeed separated from the TTP.
According to sources in the region, Fazal Saeed believed that the TTP had no interest
in supporting the Sunni-Shi`a peace agreement in Kurram—a position to which he
disagreed.[10] When explaining his reasons behind leaving the TTP, he said, “We
abhor killing innocent people through suicide attacks and bomb blasts, attacks on our
own army and destruction of social infrastructure.”[11] Fazal Saeed also apparently
no longer wanted to pay the TTP a percentage of the funds he earns from imposing
taxes on Kurram traders.
Saeed’s defection should have a positive effect for stability in Kurram, an outcome
wanted by both the Haqqani network and the Pakistani security establishment. The
Haqqani network seeks stability in Kurram so that it can increase its presence in the
tribal agency. Kurram is viewed as a strategic territory for executing attacks inside
Afghanistan. In addition to bordering Afghanistan, it also borders Pakistan’s North
Waziristan Agency, Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, and Hangu District. Due to its
location, it is considered coveted territory for militants in Waziristan to cross
into Afghanistan to conduct attacks against U.S. and NATO troops. By providing the
Shi`a with peace and stability in Kurram, the Haqqani network and other Afghanistanfocused militants will expect the Shi`a to allow Sunni militants to traverse their
territory in Upper Kurram to access the agency’s northern border with Afghanistan.
The Role of the Pakistani State
The Pakistani security establishment has played an important role in developments in
Kurram as well. Elements in Pakistan’s security establishment largely distinguish
militants operating in the country between so-called “good Taliban” and “bad
Taliban.” The “good Taliban” are those fighters solely focused on attacking
targets in neighboring Afghanistan. These militants use Pakistan as a safe haven
where they are largely free from attacks by U.S. and NATO forces—although they remain
the target of repeated drone strikes. Moreover, there are allegations by Western
governments, journalists, and analysts that Pakistan’s security establishment
provides some support to these fighters to maintain political influence in
Afghanistan. The best example of the so-called “good Taliban” is the Haqqani
network.
The “bad Taliban,” on the other hand, are those fighters that see the Pakistani
state as an enemy, and regularly target Pakistani forces and interests. These
fighters may be involved in executing attacks in Afghanistan, but they also seek to
destabilize the Pakistani government due to its counterterrorism support to the
United States, among other motives. The best example of the “bad Taliban” are those
fighters associated with the TTP.
For Pakistan’s security establishment, launching operations against the “good
Taliban” is likely seen as counterproductive and against the country’s interests.
If it were to execute attacks against the Haqqani network, for example, it would turn
those fighters against it, thus strengthening the ranks of the “bad Taliban” and
fighters intent on attacking the Pakistani state. Moreover, by supporting the “good
Taliban,” the Pakistani security establishment increases its ability to influence
developments in neighboring Afghanistan, especially after the eventual departure of
international troops.
This explains why the Pakistani security establishment has been reluctant to launch a
military operation against Haqqani fighters in North Waziristan Agency. Analysts
believe that both the Pakistani security establishment and the Haqqanis are seeking
peace in Kurram to provide another safe haven for Haqqani fighters, where they can
further establish their presence and continue cross-border attacks in
Afghanistan.[12] Convincing the TTP’s Kurram asset, Fazal Saeed, to defect is key to
this possible strategy. For Pakistan, a strong Haqqani network with access to all the
key areas of Afghanistan would provide its security establishment with sizeable
influence in any future government in Kabul.
As evidence of this strategy, Pakistan recently launched a counterterrorism operation
in Kurram Agency. Yet the operation has not targeted Fazal Saeed or his militia in
Kurram. Additionally, many Pakistani analysts believe that one of the motives behind
the Kurram operation is to help provide cover to Haqqani assets. As stated by
Mohammad Taqi in the Daily Times,
“A side benefit of the chaos created in the Kurram Agency is that it would be a lot
easier to hide the jihadists in the midst of the internally displaced people (IDP),
making the thugs a difficult target for precision drone attacks. Also, the
establishment’s focus has been to ‘reorient’ the TTP completely towards
Afghanistan. The breaking away from the TTP of the crook from Uchat village, Fazl-eSaeed Zaimusht (who now interestingly writes Haqqani after his name) is the first
step in the establishment’s attempt to regain full control over all its jihadist
proxies.”[13]
A number of displaced families who are living in the newly-established IDP camp in
New Durrani area of Sadda town complained that the same militants who used to
terrorize them are now living with them inside the camp.[14] “The terrorists who
used to impose taxes on us are living among us in the camp and getting more
facilities than us,” said one of the IDPs.[15] Moreover, due to the IDPs, it would
be difficult for the United States to avoid collateral damage if it were to escalate
drone strikes over Kurram.
Conclusion
Fazal Saeed’s declaration on June 27 of establishing the TTIP is a serious blow to
the TTP. The rift could encourage rebellion among other TTP factions.[16] This
becomes especially relevant considering that Hakimullah Mehsud has not been seen on
the ground or in the media during the past several months. Therefore, while Saeed’s
decision may increase stability in Pakistan, it could have the opposite effect in
Afghanistan. Stability in Kurram may allow the Haqqani network and other Afghanistanfocused fighters more territory to recruit and train, as well as provide them with
more territory to access Afghanistan. It will also make it more difficult to convince
the Pakistani security establishment to focus its resources on defeating militias
that have no interest in attacking Pakistani interests—but only targets in
neighboring Afghanistan.
Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech Republic.
Besides working in Afghanistan as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from 2005-2008, Mr.
Khattak worked with Pakistani English daily newspapers covering the situation in KP
and FATA. He also worked for Sunday Times London and contributed articles to the
Christian Science Monitor. In 2010, his paper on the situation in Swat, “The Battle
for Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published by the New America Foundation.
[1] The TTP is an umbrella of a dozen militant organizations in the Pakistani tribal
areas. The organization was formed in December 2007 with Baitullah Mehsud as its
head. Baitullah was killed in a drone strike in 2009.
[2] “Taliban Commander Fazal Saeed Leaves TTP,” Dawn, June 27, 2011.
[3] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP Commander Claims his Group is Getting Offers of
Support,” The News International, June 30, 2011.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Farhat Taj, “A Report From Kurram,” Daily Times, January 1, 2011.
[7] “Taliban Welcome Kurram Truce,” Dawn, February 8, 2011.
[8] A key tribal elder, who attended the talks in Islamabad, confirmed to the author
that Haji Ibrahim, brother of Jalaluddin Haqqani, attended the meetings and urged the
two sides to sign the peace accord.
[9] “Militants Kill 8, Kidnap Dozens in Kurram Ambush,” Express Tribune, March 25,
2011.
[10] A key elder, who joined all the peace talks, told this to the author in an
interview.
[11] Hussain Afzal, “Kurram Commander Quits TTP over Suicide Attacks,” Dawn, June
28, 2011.
[12] Hasan Khan, “No Peace in Kurram,” Dawn, April 6, 2007.
[13] Mohammad Taqi, “The Sham Operation in Kurram,” Daily Times, July 7, 2011.
[14] Personal interviews, IDPs and their family members living in Peshawar and in the
camp, via telephone, June/July 2011.
[15] Ibid.
[16] The faction led by Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency, for example, invites closer
scrutiny. Faqir Muhammad was the deputy of former TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud. Upon
Baitullah’s death, Faqir declared himself as the new “acting chief” of the TTP. He
adopted a meaningful silence, however, after Hakimullah Mehsud was named as the new,
permanent TTP leader.
The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Aug 15, 2009
Jeremy Binnie, Joanna Wright
Uzbek-led jihadist groups have become important actors in the Afghanistan and
Pakistan insurgencies. The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is increasingly involved in
attacks in Afghanistan, likely coordinated with the Haqqani network. The IJU releases
regular propaganda statements and videos encouraging Central Asians and Turks to join
the fighting. While the IJU’s one European terrorist plot in September 2007 may
prove to be an anomaly, it is actively trying to reestablish itself in Central Asia.
Moreover, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), another Uzbek-led terrorist
group, is following the IJU’s lead and is now releasing its own propaganda and video
statements encouraging Muslims to join the fighting in South Asia. Whereas the IJU is
more focused on Afghanistan, the IMU has concentrated its attacks on Pakistan’s
security forces, likely coordinated with Baitullah Mehsud’s militant faction.
The Uzbek-led jihadist groups are useful allies for the Taliban. Many fighters are
experienced combat veterans, and newer recruits will also likely have some prior
training as conscripts in the Uzbek or other Central Asian militaries. The Uzbek-led
fighters have little choice but to remain loyal to their hosts, making them more
reliable allies than local tribal groupings.
This article will examine the emergence of the IJU and its escalating activities in
Afghanistan, the role that the two Uzbek-led groups play in supporting the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban and evidence that al-Qa`ida has facilitated this process.
The IJU Emerges
The IJU splintered from the IMU in 2002 under the leadership of Najmiddin Jalolov
(also known as Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih) [1]. It is speculated that the two groups
broke apart because the IJU’s Jalolov fell out with IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev (also
known as Muhammad Tahir Farooq) over ideological issues after the fall of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. Yuldashev wanted to transform the IMU into a regional
organization, changing its name to the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, while Jalolov
remained focused on conducting attacks in Uzbekistan [2]. Jalolov’s group remained
unknown until it claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan
in March and July 2004 [3]. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov also mentioned his
name in connection with the unrest in the country’s Andijan Province in May 2005
[4].
Despite this early domestic focus, the IJU has since eclipsed the IMU in terms of
international notoriety, largely due to its role in an alleged bombing conspiracy in
Germany. In September 2007, German police arrested three men (two German converts to
Islam and a German national of Turkish descent) and seized a large quantity of
concentrated hydrogen peroxide, a chemical that can be used to make explosives. The
three suspects and a fourth defendant who was extradited from Turkey have been
charged with several crimes, including preparing bombings and belonging to a
terrorist organization. The IJU did not help the suspects’ defense when it issued a
statement claiming responsibility for the alleged plot, saying the plans were to
attack the U.S. Air Force base at Ramstein—which plays a major role in supporting
coalition forces in Afghanistan—as well as Uzbek and U.S. diplomatic buildings in
Germany [5]. The statement said that it hoped the attacks would force the closure of
the airbase at Termez in southern Uzbekistan, which the German military uses to
support its deployments in northern Afghanistan. Since then, however, the IJU has
primarily been involved in attacks in Afghanistan.
The IJU’s Role in Afghanistan
Since 2008, the IJU has released statements and videos identifying members of the
group from various countries who have carried out suicide bombings in Afghanistan,
including Turks, Kurds and Azerbaijanis. One of the more recent attacks was carried
out by Abu Ismail Kurdi during the night of July 3-4, 2009 in Paktika Province [6].
This seems to correspond with an assault on a base in Zerok district in northern
Paktika that involved a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and
rocket fire that left 10 attackers and two U.S. soldiers dead [7].
The IJU has coordinated attacks with the Haqqani network, an Afghan-led faction that
operates autonomously under the Taliban name [8]. The two groups have a close
relationship. This coordination was revealed by a March 3, 2008 suicide bombing.
During the attack, a suicide bomber drove a VBIED to the Sabari district center in
the eastern province of Khost. The bombing killed two U.S. soldiers and two Afghans
[9]. It was initially claimed by Zabihullah Mujahid, one of the two Taliban spokesmen
who act as conduits for all official communiqués from the “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.” The insurgent commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, however, broke with this
protocol and telephoned Pakistani journalists to claim that he personally
masterminded the attack [10]. A few days later, the IJU released a written statement
to Turkish language jihadist websites that claimed credit for the bombing and
identified its perpetrator as Cüneyt Ciftci (also known as Saad Abu Furkan), a German
national of Turkish descent. The IJU claim was supported by the subsequent release of
a video showing Ciftci cheerfully helping to construct his VBIED, heaping bags onto
the back of a small truck to disguise the explosives. The video included footage of
the explosion [11].
The video propelled Ciftci into the jihadist “hall of fame” and also shed light on
the complexity of the Afghan insurgency. All three of the ostensibly rival claims
were accurate. The attack was a joint operation by the IJU and the Haqqani network,
and the Afghan Taliban claimed formal responsibility. Since then, with the exception
of one attack in Jalalabad, all the suicide bombings claimed by the IJU have been
carried out in the Haqqani network’s sphere of influence in eastern Afghanistan,
demonstrating the continuing close relationship between the IJU and the Haqqani
network.
Turkish Connection and Al-Qa`ida’s Influence
The IJU’s growing international prominence is underpinned by its Turkish language
propaganda drive since 2007, which has made the group a focus for Turkish jihadists.
This public relations campaign is presumably the work of internet savvy Turkish
speakers who translate and republish statements from the IJU and other groups. The
IJU and sympathetic websites such as Sehadet Zamani (Martyrdom Time) encourage Turks
to join or support the jihad and promote slain fighters as “martyrs” worthy of
emulation. It is not clear how these Turkish cyber-jihadists teamed up with the IJU,
but there is some evidence that Turks who are arriving in the Pakistani tribal areas
to fight with the Taliban are being assigned to the Haqqani network.
This embedding process was outlined by Commander Abu Zer, the leader of a Turkish
group called Taifetul Mansura (Victorious Sect). In an interview published by the
Elif Media, Abu Zer said his group had been fighting in the North Caucasus for 15
years, but had moved to Afghanistan in early 2009 where it had been assigned ansar
[12] (local helpers) with whom to work [13]. Another statement released by the same
group in June announcing the death of two of its members in Khost suggested that the
Haqqani network is the ansar in question [14]. While there is no evidence of an
explicit link between Taifetul Mansura and the IJU, Turkish volunteers are apparently
being channeled toward the Haqqani network’s bases in North Waziristan Agency in
Pakistan, where there are established contingents that speak their language [15].
There have been hints of al-Qa`ida’s involvement with the IJU-Haqqani alliance, and
al-Qa`ida likely considers the IJU’s connections to the Turkish jihadist community
an asset. The development of operational links between the groups would allow alQa`ida to tap into new networks that could be used to facilitate attacks in Turkey
and Europe, or allow the IJU to use al-Qa`ida’s expertise for its own operations in
Central Asia.
The clearest example of al-Qa`ida’s connections to the IJU occurred when al-Qa`ida
leader Abu Yahya al-Libi appeared alongside IJU leader Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih in an
IJU video dated May 28, 2009 [16]. This was the first time an al-Qa`ida leader has
publicly endorsed the IJU. Shaykh Sa`id Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, al-Qa`ida’s “general
commander” for Afghanistan, then released a statement on June 10 appealing to Turks
for financial support [17].
When pushed by an al-Jazira journalist to explain al-Qa`ida’s support for the
Taliban, Abu’l-Yazid said in a recent interview:
“Last year’s operation in Khost was reported in the media. It was an attack against
the U.S. command headquarters at the Khost airport. God be praised, this was arranged
by al-Qa`ida with the participation of our brother Taliban. This was one of the major
operations in which we participated. Many of the martyrdom operations that took place
in Khost, Kabul and other areas were planned by our brothers and we participated in
them” [18].
This is almost certainly a reference to attacks on Forward Operating Base Salerno, a
major U.S. base near Khost city, on August 18-19, 2008 [19].
Al-Qa`ida is clearly trying to associate itself with the perceived operational
success of the Haqqani network and trying to capitalize on the IJU’s ability to
mobilize the Turkish jihadist community. It seems plausible that al-Qa`ida has played
a role in networking between the Uzbeks, Turks and the Haqqani network, but there is
insufficient open source evidence to conclude that al-Qa`ida was instrumental in
developing the IJU into a repository for non-Arab fighters joining the Taliban.
Separately, the IJU proved it is more than a Taliban proxy by carrying out an attack
in its homeland on May 26, 2009. Uzbek authorities confirmed that a police checkpoint
was attacked near Khanabad on the border with Kyrgyzstan early in the morning and
that a suicide bomber blew himself up later that day in Andijan. The IJU claimed
responsibility for the incidents in its May 28 video, thereby proving that it was
still determined to carry out attacks in Uzbekistan that are completely unrelated to
the insurgency in Afghanistan.
The IMU Avoids Being Overshadowed
Like the IJU, the IMU now appears to be heightening publicity for its operations in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In January, March and April of 2009, it released its own
videos featuring Germans encouraging their fellow countrymen to join them in
Afghanistan [20]. On July 11, 2009, the IMU released an Uzbek-language video claiming
that one of its members carried out a suicide bombing on April 4 in Miran Shah in
Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency. This corresponds to an incident that reportedly
killed one Pakistani soldier and seven civilians [21]. This seems to be the first
time that the IMU has explicitly claimed a suicide bombing [22]. That video
identified militants from various countries, including China, Germany, Russia,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
The location of the suicide bombing claimed by the IMU reflects the targeting
priorities of its host. While the IJU is likely embedded with the Haqqani network and
has focused on Afghanistan, the IMU has been fighting for Pakistani Taliban leader
Baitullah Mehsud’s faction since April 2007 when it was evicted from the Wana area
of South Waziristan by rival Taliban commander Maulvi Nazir [23]. Baitullah’s
faction and its allies have been engaged in an escalating war with the Pakistani
state, during which the Uzbeks have earned a reputation as loyal and capable
fighters. The IMU also operates in Afghanistan’s northern Zabul Province and
southern Ghazni Province [24].
Conclusion
Both the IMU and IJU are competing to showcase their international memberships and
their enthusiasm for carrying out suicide bombings. The IJU apparently has permission
to claim attacks independently of the established Taliban propaganda system: as the
group’s hosts, the Haqqanis would be in a position to end the IJU claims if they
disproved of them. This is probably a reflection of the perceived usefulness of the
propaganda campaign in recruiting more volunteers to carry out similar attacks,
thereby ensuring a steady supply of ideologically committed bombers.
The IMU now seems to be pursuing a similar strategy, and can be expected to claim
more suicide bombings. It will probably claim bombings carried out on behalf of the
Pakistani Taliban and targeting security forces, rather than civilians, to ensure the
attacks are widely perceived as legitimate. If it continues to emulate the IJU, the
IMU will also look to return to action in Central Asia, thereby demonstrating to its
core audience that it can confront the regimes of the former Soviet republics.
For al-Qa`ida’s part, it will continue to associate itself with the IJU in an
attempt to gain access to the group’s network in Europe and Turkey and to achieve
propaganda gains from the IJU’s increased frequency of attacks.
Jeremy Binnie is the senior terrorism and insurgency analyst at IHS Jane’s. He is
the editor of Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor and an associate editor (terrorism
and insurgency) of Jane’s Intelligence Review.
Joanna Wright is a journalist who spent eight months working on assignment for Janes
in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2008-2009.
Notes
[1] Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih confirmed in an interview dated May 31, 2007 that the
group was formed in 2002. The interview can be found at
www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1203. The U.S. Department of the
Treasury confirmed that Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih is Najmiddin Jalolov when it
blacklisted him on February 18, 2008. The state-controlled Uzbek media identified
Jalolov as an IMU member as early as October 2000.
[2] There are references to the IMU adopting the name Islamic Movement of Turkistan
from 2003, and the name change was confirmed by a captured member of the group
interviewed by Moskovskiye Novosti on November 25, 2005. The group, however, has
since reverted to its original name.
[3] These claims were issued in the name of the Islamic Jihad Group, which was
proscribed as a terrorist group by the United States in May 2005. It seems to have
adopted the name Islamic Jihad Union around this time.
[4] A transcript of Islam Karimov’s televised May 14, 2005 speech can be found using
BBC’s monitoring services.
[5] “IJU Claims Responsibility for Foiled Attacks in Germany,” German Federal
Ministry of Interior, September 11, 2007.
[6] The IJU statement can be found at
www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2154.
[7] “U.S. Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan,” BBC, July 4, 2009.
[8] Regarding the Haqqani network’s area of operations, see “Unravelling Haqqani’s
Net,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 30, 2009. Combined Joint Task
Force 82 issued a press release called “Coalition Forces Focus on Haqqani Network”
on October 19, 2007 stating that Sirajuddin had taken over from his father. The
statement is no longer available online.
[9] A U.S. military spokesperson confirmed the details of the attack to the authors.
[10] Regarding the Taliban’s claims, see “Taliban Attack US Military Camp in
Kost,” The News, March 4, 2008.
[11] The video can be found at www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1911.
[12] The word ansar is a reference to the citizens of Yathrib/Medina who helped the
Muslim exiles from Mecca, known as the muhajirin, during the hijra (622 AD).
Contemporary jihadists use the words ansar for local forces and muhajirin for foreign
fighters.
[13] The interview can be found at www.elifmedya.wordpress.com/2009/05/29/17/.
[14] The statement can be found at www.elifmedya.wordpress.com/2009/06/22/zulum-sonbuluncaya-kadar-savasacagiz/.
[15] It is not clear how this process is organized. Some likely arrrive in Peshawar
where they are eventually directed to Turkish speakers in North Waziristan. Others
are probably led in by facilitators. For example, see Paul Cruickshank, “The 2008
Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).
[16] The video can be found at www.sehadetzamani.com/reklam_detay.php?id=79.
[17] The Turkish translation of the Arabic statement can be found at
www.taifetulmansura.com/71811_Seyh-Ebu-Yezid’den-Mesaj-Var.html.
[18] The interview was broadcast by al-Jazira on June 21, 2009.
[19] Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source, FOB Salerno, Afghanistan,
February 2009. For more details of the attack, see “Unravelling Haqqani’s Net.”
The incident was also mentioned in a document summarizing the interrogation of Bryant
Neal Vinas, a U.S. al-Qa`ida recruit captured in Pakistan in November 2008. Vinas
said it was planned by al-Qa`ida’s leaders and that it went badly. He identified one
of the suicide bombers as a Turk, although the IJU does not seem to have claimed him
as one of its own.
[20] Links to the IMU video released in April can be found at
www.ansarnet.info/showthread.php?p=8113.
[21] “Eight Killed in Miranshah Suicide Bombing,” Daily Times, April 5, 2009.
[22] Links to the video can be found at www.ansarnet.info/showthread.php?t=1998.
[23] The alliance between Baitullah Mehsud and the Uzbek jihadists has been well
documented by the Pakistani press and was further evidenced by footage of Hakimullah
Mehsud, a key lieutenant of Baitullah at the time, driving a captured Humvee in the
IMU’s “Soldiers of Allah” video.
[24] Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source, FOB Sharana, Afghanistan,
January 2009.
Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies
Aug 15, 2009
Hayder Mili, Jacob Townsend
There is a renewed public appreciation for the role of tribal allegiances and tribal
governance in the Afghanistan and Pakistan insurgencies. This is indicated by the
U.S. government’s announcement of an inter-agency effort to study the insurgencies’
tribes, including a search for “reconcilable” elements [1]. The behavior of most
insurgent groups along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is conditioned by tribal
identities, allegiances and interests. Some fighters are motivated by pan-tribal or
global religious sentiment. Most, however, are strongly influenced by the interests
and demands of their tribe. Tribal leaders are often forthright in explaining that
their decision to support or undermine the Taliban revolves around tribal interests,
not through belief in the insurgency’s inherent virtue vis-à-vis the Afghan
government or foreign forces [2]. Many young men are committed to the insurgency by
their elders, becoming indistinguishable in battle from other fighters who belong to
the Taliban “proper” or to the Haqqani network. In theory, these tribal fighters
could be separated from the insurgency by persuading tribal leaders to withdraw them.
If attempts to employ tribes against insurgents are to succeed, the emphasis must be
on Pashtun tribes. Although other ethnicities participate in the insurgency, their
role is in large part defined by their relationship to the Pashtun tribes that
saturate the region. This is true of groups such as the Uzbek fighters, whose
fortunes and strength have been heavily conditioned by the hospitality of their
hosts, such as the Darikhel, Tojikhel and Yarghukhel (sub-tribes of Ahmadzai Wazir in
Pakistan’s Waziristan) [3].
This article focuses on the intersection of tribalism and insurgency. It provides a
history of the three major Pashtun confederations in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
examines how the Haqqani network and global jihadists have exploited Pashtun
tribalism; and identifies how tribal militias have recently been used to combat the
Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Drifting to the Durrani
Approximately two-thirds of Afghan Pashtuns belong to the Ghilzai and Durrani
confederations [4]. The tribes of the smaller Karlanri confederation live in
Afghanistan’s eastern and southeastern provinces [5], providing the strongest
kinship bridges into Pakistan. Ghilzai and Durrani tribes, however, are numerically
dominant in most of Afghanistan. As a general rule, tribal allegiances and systems of
governance are stronger among the mountainous tribes of the Ghilzai and among the
Karlanri, while Durrani governance rests more on cross-tribal structures of feudal
land ownership [6].
A broad historical view of the Pashtun tribes would depict the Durrani tribes as
political leaders and the Ghilzai as providing the fighters [7]. From Afghanistan’s
founding to the Taliban’s ascendancy, all of Afghanistan’s rulers have been from
Durrani tribes with the exception of the ill-fated Mohammad Noor Taraki (and a brief
interlude of nine months in 1929). For some, the confrontation between the Durrani’s
Hamid Karzai and the Ghilzai’s Mullah Muhammad Omar is a continuation of the
confederations’ traditional roles as rulers and insurgents, respectively.
Fighting between tribes and sub-tribes of the same confederation is one indication
that the confederation level of analysis has never been adequate [8]. A notable shift
in the current phase of insurgency, for example, has been the groundswell of Durrani
fighters beneath the Ghilzai-dominated Afghan Taliban leadership. Distinguishing
cause and effect is difficult, but the increasing prominence of Durrani fighters and
commanders correlates with the geographical spread of the insurgency through Durrani
areas in Helmand, Nimroz, Farah and Herat provinces. Durrani are being recruited at
lower-levels and their traditional leaders are becoming insurgent leaders, with
varying degrees of integration into the Taliban “proper.” Some intra-insurgency
tensions appear to be the result of locally-empowered Durrani Taliban commanders
disliking the rotation of senior Ghilzai Taliban commanders into “their” territory
[9]. Notably, in 2008 such tensions included disagreement over tax revenue, with a
specific concern for drug-derived money [10].
The result is that a government dominated by Tajiks and Durranis is facing off
against a Ghilzai-led Taliban that has incorporated significant numbers of Durrani
fighters [11]. To the extent that the power bases of the Durrani in government depend
on rural constituencies in provinces such as Helmand and Farah, they must balance
official interests with maintaining tribal satisfaction in anti-government areas.
Moreover, within this mix are the Karlanri tribes, providing major ethnic bridges
between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban by virtue of straddling insurgent
strongholds in southeastern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The Zadran and the Haqqani Network
The Haqqani network is an excellent example of how global jihadists and Taliban
fighters have been able to exploit Pashtun nationalism. Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin
Haqqani are prominent members of the Pashtun Zadran tribe, and a great deal of their
political capital was amassed by Jalaluddin in fighting the Soviets. Former U.S.
Congressman Charlie Wilson famously called Jalaluddin “goodness personified” [12]
and he received a disproportionate share of U.S. money [13]. The Haqqanis have also
been effective in attracting Arab donations due to their tactical efficiency and
assisted by Jalaluddin’s marital and linguistic connection to the Gulf states [14].
The present strength of the Haqqani network owes much to Jalaluddin’s fighting
prowess, accompanying fundraising skills and the power these skills gave Jalaluddin
in the Zadran tribe.
Much of the Zadran population live in Afghanistan’s Spera (Khost), Zadran (Paktia)
and Gayan (Paktika) districts, which have long histories of resisting foreign
influence [15]. The arrival of international forces in 2001 energized a struggle for
control over the Zadran between the Haqqanis and Padcha Khan Zadran, a warlord with
his power-base in Khost Province. The latter was hardly pro-government, but he
positioned himself as anti-Taliban and utilized foreign assistance [16]. In that
sense, Padcha Khan was an old-style leader who placed tribal power and independence
over external allegiances and interests [17]. Since 2002, the Haqqanis’ reversion to
jihadist-aligned resistance has leveraged Jalaluddin’s continuing fame and obtained
protection from the Zadran in much of their territory. By contrast, Padcha Khan has
entered the Wolesi Jirga (Afghanistan’s upper house of parliament) and his powerbase has narrowed, a move supported by Hamid Karzai in an effort to neutralize his
anti-government appeal [18]. By cooperating with the Karzai government, Padcha Khan
has allowed the Haqqanis and, by extension, al-Qa`ida and the Taliban to become the
Zadran’s main option for resisting international and government influence.
The Haqqani network’s solid control of Miran Shah in Pakistan and most Zadran
districts in Khost, Paktika and Paktia in Afghanistan [19] gives it an effective base
for operations in Afghanistan. The Haqqanis have consistently pledged their
allegiance to the Taliban, but United Nations and ISAF sources agree that the
Haqqanis have demonstrated greater imagination, intent and capability for complex
attacks than regular Taliban commanders [20]. While difficult to confirm, the
Haqqanis have also been credited for driving the growth of suicide bombings in
Afghanistan [21].
The Haqqanis’ continuing effectiveness draws on and reinforces their long-standing
relationship with al-Qa`ida’s leaders. Historically, this was demonstrated in Usama
bin Ladin’s choice of Haqqani territory for al-Qa`ida’s first significant training
camps in Afghanistan [22]. Currently, Western and Afghan intelligence officials
assess that al-Qa`ida places greater trust and accompanying funding in the Haqqani
network to execute complex attacks [23].
The Haqqanis’ reliance on Zadran territory is not a fatal vulnerability, but it does
offer the possibility of constraining their operational capability. Jalaluddin’s
apparent implacability and Sirajuddin’s turn toward greater radicalism [24] make it
highly unlikely that Zadran areas can be pacified through engagement with the
Haqqanis. A better strategy would work from the ground up, particularly in Paktia,
where leaders combine affection for Jalaluddin with an often stronger concern for the
local welfare of their tribe [25]. In the short-term, the most realistic
accomplishment would be to increase the reluctance of Zadran community leaders to
allow direct access to and through their villages by the Haqqani network. As in other
“pro-insurgent” areas, some Zadran communities would prove willing to cooperate
with the government when enjoying an ongoing security presence and constructive
engagement to support self-policing and immediate reconstruction benefits.
Lashkars and Arbakees
The Afghanistan and Pakistan governments have also tried to leverage tribal networks
to support their objectives. Both countries have armed and supported anti-insurgent
tribes to combat the Taliban, the Haqqani network and al-Qa`ida. In FATA, this has
taken the form of lashkars, tribal militias formed either within one tribe or through
an alliance of several tribes following a jirga decision.
The Mamond tribes and the Salarzai tribe (a small sub tribe of the Tarkani Pashtuns
who live in two valleys of Bajaur Agency) have raised their own lashkars and can be
legitimately considered anti-Taliban/al-Qa`ida [26]. The price has been high and
scores of tribal elders have been assassinated since the start of the movement. For
example, in November 2008 four “elders” of the Mamond tribe and several Mamond
lashkar members were killed after a suicide bomber detonated at a tribesman’s house
in Bajaur [27]. Other tribes that reportedly raised lashkars are the Orakzai of
Orakzai Agency in FATA [28]. This has naturally created tensions between the Orakzai
and more militant tribes such as the Mehsud in South Waziristan [29].
Overall, however, these efforts have not resulted in any significant losses for the
Taliban. In fact, until the recent forays by the Pakistani military against the
Taliban, the Taliban encountered relatively little tribal resistance as they quickly
and brutally established their hold across FATA and the NWFP. The tribes in FATA are
quite scattered and little unity exists, particularly against a Taliban movement
recruiting from almost every tribe (excluding Shi`a Turis). This failure was most
obvious in North and South Waziristan when the lashkars of 2003 and 2007 were
effectively impotent [30]. Nevertheless, the lashkars have had some positive effects
in pressuring the Taliban; for example, Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar’s August 2009
arrest was credited to the work of a lashkar in Mohmand Agency [31].
Another region where Pashtun tribal militias have been utilized is in southeastern
Afghanistan’s Loya Paktia, the area encompassing Paktika, Khost and Paktia provinces
[32]. In this region the Afghan equivalent of lashkars exists. Apparently an
institution limited to Loya Paktia [33], the arbakee (guardians) are the traditional
tribal security of the southeast. The arbakees (like the lashkars) do not exist
permanently in every district, but are an ad hoc and reactive force. The arbakee is
also used by the jirga as a law enforcement tool, which makes the jirga in this
region far more powerful than in southern and eastern Afghanistan where this
tradition does not exist [34].
The capacities of Afghan military and law enforcement are minimal in Loya Paktia and
they often count on the support of arbakees. The tribal elders identify those
citizens who will be used to support the police to ensure effective interventions.
According to the Tribal Liaison Office, a European-funded NGO, “Despite the fact
that each arbakee has a clear leader (amir), accountability goes back to the tribal
council (jirga or shura) that called upon the arbakee, which in turn is accountable
to the community. Furthermore, arbakees only function within the territory of the
tribe they represent. Their fighters are volunteers from within the community and are
paid by the community. This emphasizes again that their loyalty is with their
communities and not an individual leader” [35].
One important demonstration of the government’s reliance on arbakees was the
continuous funding until at least 2007 for 40-60 arbakee members in each district in
the southeast, including a sizeable expansion of force numbers to secure the 20042005 elections [36].
Conclusion
As Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s insurgent conflicts drag on, the stress on tribal
structures will continue, pressured by jihadists and the international community
alike. Both antagonists have a long-term interest in undermining tribalism, but both
also have an interest in using tribalism to support immediate military aims.
For the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and their international supporters,
this implies a difficult trade-off. Immediate military interests in bargaining with
tribes require subordination of interests in issues such as human rights and good
governance. Notably, as the arbakee tradition illustrates, a resort to triballymediated security structures implies a continuing devolution by the central
government of its core responsibilities. This may be functional in the short-term,
but will likely leave unchanged the uneasy relationship between relatively
progressive governments and conservative tribal traditions—an uneasiness that proved
fertile ground for jihadism in the first place.
Hayder Mili is an independent researcher. He has published analytical and academic
articles on terrorism, the drug trade and law enforcement responses. He holds
master’s degrees in Strategic Studies and International Relations from the Sorbonne
University in Paris. He is currently based in Central Asia.
Jacob Townsend is an independent analyst focused on insurgency and transnational
organized crime. He has worked with the United Nations in Central Asia, South Asia
and the Asia-Pacific. He is currently based in Kabul.
Notes
[1] Bryan Bender, “US Probes Divisions within Taliban,” Boston Globe, May 24, 2009.
[2] See, for example, Darin J. Blatt et al., ‘Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan,”
Special Warfare 22:1 (2009); Jerome Starkey, “Tribal Leaders to Sabotage West’s
Assault on Taliban,” Independent, December 4, 2008.
[3] Vern Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View,”
Small Wars and Insurgencies 18:3 (2007): pp. 492-510.
[4] A 1996 estimate suggested that Durrani tribes comprised 29% of Afghan Pashtuns
and the Ghilzai 35%. The estimate appeared in “Afghanistan: A Country Study,”
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1997.
[5] Tribes of the Karlanri confederation are demographically strong in Afghanistan’s
Paktia, Paktika, Logar, Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.
[6] The strength of tribal governance derives from economic, demographic and
political circumstances. The Karlanri, for example, tend to inhabit isolated
communities with small land-holdings and an overwhelming dominance of a single tribe
in each village. See Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst
of Fire,” International Security 32:4 (2008); Thomas J. Barfield, “Weapons of the
Not so Weak in Afghanistan,” in Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States:
Transactions and Identities, Yale University, February 23, 2007; David B. Edwards,
Before Taliban (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).
[7] Barfield.
[8] The “confederation level of analysis” refers to the notion that the conflict is
mainly between Durrani and Ghilzai. As stated by the International Crisis Group,
“animosities between particular Durrani tribes far exceed any ill feeling between
Durrani and Ghilzai.” See International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Problem of
Pashtun Alienation,” August 5, 2003.
[9] Personal interviews, ISAF intelligence officials, May 11, 2009.
[10] In previous years, little opium tax actually made it up to the senior
leadership. In 2008, there appeared to be a concerted effort to move more revenue to
the higher levels. This caused tension for two reasons: 1) low-level commanders use
drug tax for subsistence purposes, not to mention their own enrichment; and 2) tribal
leaders–with whom the Taliban have varying degrees of integration–resented efforts to
send money out of their communities (for the same reason they resist government
taxation that appears to redistribute revenue out of the villages). Personal
interviews, ISAF personnel, May 24, 2009. David Mansfield also refers to increasingly
antagonistic relations over taxation between insurgents and the population: “it was
suggested that this…was a result of many of their fighters in Helmand and Kandahar
not being from the local area.” See “Sustaining the Decline?” Afghan Drugs InterDepartmental Unit of the UK Government, May 2009.
[11] This evolution has often been described as “neo-Taliban.”
[12] George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Grove Press, 2007).
[13] “Interview: Steve Coll,” PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006; Anand Gopal, “The
Most Deadly US Foe in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 2009.
[14]
“Haqqani Network,” Institute for the Study of War, available at
www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani-network.
[15] A CIA assessment in 1980 noted Paktia as an area of strength for the insurgency,
drawing on “the most traditionally minded” tribes. See CIA Directorate of
Intelligence, “The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia,” CIA Declassification
Release, September 23, 1980.
[16] Michael Hirsh and Scott Johnson, “A Defiant Warlord Threatens to Sink the New
Afghan Leader,” Newsweek, February 13, 2002; Michael V. Bhatia, “Paktya Province:
Sources of Order and Disorder,” in Michael V. Bhatia and Mark Sedra eds.,
Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2008).
[17] At one point, Padcha Khan was fighting Tani tribal leaders, resisting the
government’s writ and attempting to undermine Haqqani’s influence over the Zadran.
See Illene R. Prusher, Scott Baldauf and Edward Girardet, “Afghan Power Brokers,”
Christian Science Monitor, June 10, 2002.
[18] Personal interview, Western intelligence official, Kabul, June 16, 2009.
[19] UN assessment of district-level control, provided in a briefing to the author in
May 2009.
[20] Personal interviews, UN and ISAF officials, Kabul, June 2009.
[21] Gopal; Haqqani Network; Jonathon Burch, “Q+A: Afghanistan – Who are the
Haqqanis?” Reuters, March 23, 2009.
[22] Marc W. Herold, “The Failing Campaign,” Frontline 19:3 (2002).
[23] This appears to be a generalized trust, however, instead of one requiring
consultations with al-Qa`ida on targets and tactics. Personal interviews, UNAMA, ISAF
and ANDS officials, Kabul, May-June 2009.
[24] Haqqani Network; Burch; Imtiaz Ali, “The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border
Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor 6:6 (2008).
[25] Personal interviews, UNAMA officials, May 2009. While the Haqqanis receive
widespread respect as warriors, this does not necessarily translate into obedience
from tribal leaders who must answer directly to their communities. In the words of
one village elder in Herat Province, speaking to the author on July 16, 2009, “they
[Taliban leaders] have respect for being good fighters, but fighting does not always
bring us bread.” In southeastern Afghanistan, Darin Blatt and colleagues suggested
that “all the tribes are concerned mostly with providing for their immediate
future.” See Blatt.
[26] It should be noted, however, that individuals belonging to these same tribes
have joined the Taliban.
[27] Dawn, November 18-24, 2008.
[28] Shaheen Buneri, “Pashtun Tribes Rise Against Taliban In Pakistan Tribal Area,”
AHN, July 19, 2008.
[29] Shazadi Beg, “The Ideological Battle: Insight from Pakistan,” Perspectives on
Terrorism 2:10 (2008).
[30] Mukhtar A. Khan “The Role of Tribal Lashkars in Winning Pakistan’s War on
Terror,” Terrorism Focus 5:40 (2008).
[31] Noor Mohmand, “TTP Mouthpiece Nabbed,” Nation, August 19, 2009.
[32] Masood Karokhail, “Integration of Traditional Structures into the State
Building Process: Lessons from the Tribal Liaison Office in Loya Paktia,” Tribal
Liaison Office, 2006, available at www.tloafghanistan.org/fileadmin/pdf/SchAfgahnEn.pdf.
[33] In Paktia specifically, the tribal structures were preserved and have emerged
more or less intact from communist rule and years of conflict. This includes a
functioning system of traditional justice.
[34] Karokhail.
[35] Karokhail. This cooperation between tribal levees and Afghanistan’s “proper
military” has a long tradition. Indeed, the 1929 rebellion was catalyzed by the
government’s attempt to change the system and recruit the army on a national basis,
cutting through the role of tribal leaders in organizing self-defense. The ANA is
considered a relative success partly because it is recruited and rotated nationally,
yet few Pashtuns in the ANA come from the areas in which arbakees are common.
[36] B. Schetter et al., “Beyond Warlordism: The Local Security Architecture in
Afghanistan,” Internationalie Politik und Gesellschaft 2 (2007).
Al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni Expatriate Faction in Pakistan
Jan 01, 2011
Evan F. Kohlmann
Ever since Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up a transatlantic commercial
airliner on Christmas Day 2009, public attention has been firmly fixed on alQa`ida’s latest regional franchise based in Yemen—a focus that has only increased in
intensity following a subsequent cargo bomb plot thwarted in late 2010. Unbeknownst
to many Americans, there is another prolific and deadly Yemeni terrorist network
within al-Qa`ida that is operating far beyond the confines of the Arabian Peninsula.
This network includes skilled bomb makers, martyrdom operatives, and senior
commanders tightly ensconced with al-Qa`ida’s top leadership in the rugged terrain
on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. During the past year, these individuals have
demonstrated their remarkable ingenuity, tech-savvy, and deadly precision. They have
been linked to some of the most serious attacks to take place in the Afghan-Pakistani
region, including the dramatic suicide bombing in late December 2009 that killed
seven agents from the Central Intelligence Agency and a Jordanian intelligence
officer at an Afghan forward operating base near the border with Pakistan.
The significance of the Yemeni terrorist network based in North Waziristan has
gradually come into view during the past year due in large part to their public
communications on internet web forums. Although these men range in age from their
early 20s to late 40s, and despite the fact that they come from a country that is
hardly known for its extensive web connectivity, these Yemeni nationals have taken to
the online world with an unusual gusto, employing jihadist-themed social networking
forums to broadcast biographies of “martyred” militants, to appeal for assistance
and technical support, and to send messages back to al-Qa`ida fighters who are still
based in Yemen.
This article profiles three operatives part of this network: Ghazwan al-Yemeni, Abu
Dujanah al-Sanaani and Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani. The lesson of their stories is
that despite the recent flurry of plots emanating from the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the threat from al-Qa`ida’s core network in the
Afghan-Pakistani border region remains just as potent, in part due to the ongoing
role of Yemeni operatives in South Asia. Perhaps the only positive note is that many
of the most prominent Yemeni personalities operating in South Asia are now dead,
having been quietly removed in an unrelenting torrent of U.S. drone missile strikes
and mysterious explosions.
Ghazwan al-Yemeni
The real danger posed by this expatriate Yemeni al-Qa`ida faction was only exposed in
the aftermath of the December 30, 2009 suicide bombing targeting CIA agents at Camp
Chapman—an attack carried out by a former jihadist web forum administrator from
Jordan known as Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani (also known as Humam al-Balawi). While the
CIA believed it had turned al-Balawi into a key and trusted asset, in the months
leading up to his death the Jordanian was instead confidently reassuring his online
friends, “when the love of jihad enters the heart of man, it will not leave him even
if he wished it to…Can any sane person accept that? Not me.”[1] During a scheduled
meeting with his handlers at Camp Chapman to discuss the whereabouts of al-Qa`ida’s
deputy commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Balawi detonated a suicide bomb and singlehandedly wiped out some of the CIA’s most experienced personnel in the region.
Although the devastating attack was immediately claimed by the Pakistani Taliban,
which produced a video of al-Balawi sitting alongside top Pakistani Taliban leader
Hakimullah Mehsud, the Camp Chapman bombing nonetheless appeared to bear the telltale
fingerprints of hard line foreign jihadists. The CIA quickly vowed to take revenge
for its losses, and soon missiles began raining down from U.S. drone aircraft
circling over Pakistan’s tribal regions at an unprecedented rate. Early in the
evening of March 9, 2010, a group of suspected militants who had gathered at a
mujahidin base near the town of Miran Shah in North Waziristan became the next target
of the CIA’s wrath.[2] A barrage of Hellfire missiles struck the compound,
inflicting numerous casualties—including a Yemeni national in his early 30s with the
name Saddam Hussein al-Hussami, better known under the pseudonym Ghazwan al-Yemeni.
According to a senior U.S. official cited by the Associated Press, al-Yemeni was an
al-Qa`ida leader who had “specialized in suicide operations” and was “believed to
have played a key role in the bombing of a CIA post in Afghanistan last
December…[He] is considered an important al-Qaida planner and explosives expert who
had established contact with groups ranging from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militant groups.”[3]
Less than four days after he was killed, tributes to Ghazwan al-Yemeni began pouring
into online social networking forums frequented by jihadists. On March 13,
administrators from the notorious Falluja Islamic Network issued a statement
confirming that “the brave mujahid commander” had actually been a registered
participating user in its own web-based chat forum.[4] The archived messages posted
by Ghazwan al-Yemeni on the Falluja Islamic Network—the same online social networking
venue preferred by CIA bomber Humam al-Balawi—offer an unprecedented inside look into
his activities on the battlefield in Afghanistan. In early October 2009, al-Yemeni
had posted a flurry of requests via the chat forum on behalf of “the Jalaluddin
Haqqani Organization in the Shadow of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”[5] In one
such message, he appealed, “we, your brothers from the Jalaluddin Haqqani
Organization, have encountered some problems in regards to the subjects Tawheed and
Aqeedah, and we want the email or website of the renowned shaykhs in this field so we
can direct to them our questions and seek fatwahs.”[6] Another post from Ghazwan alYemeni highlighted an urgent need for translating “Shari`a and military guides
printed in the Russian language…into Arabic. If you can assist me, whether with
software, websites, or translators, may Allah reward you generously.”[7]
Fellow mujahidin comrades of Ghazwan al-Yemeni from the frontline on the AfghanPakistani border added their own voices to the chorus of discussion. On March 12,
2010, a registered user on the Falluja Islamic Network calling himself “Abu
Abdelrahman al-Qahtani in Waziristan” offered a first-person biography of the late
Yemeni al-Qa`ida commander:
“We were not able to recover the first body until midnight, and our mujahid brother
Ghazwan al-Yemeni [was one of the dead]. He had not even completed his third year [in
jihad]. His journey with jihad and martyrdom began when he was captured in alHaramain along with his traveling companion Azzam al-Yemeni, due to their activities
and communications with their mujahidin brothers. He was in prison in Sana`a for a
long period of time and then he was released…He turned his gaze towards the precious
land of…Afghanistan, passing through a third country where they stayed for a lengthy
period awaiting entrance visas to Iran. Eventually, Allah permitted for them to
enter, and from the first day here, they enrolled in the training camps…I remember
the first time I saw him in Wana and he came to learn about explosives from an expert
in the Afghani field—in fact, the expert of all aspects of jihad, as they were all
the students of Abu Khabab al-Masri…eventually, he went back to North [Waziristan]
and…settled in Miran Shah, where he organized and trained the Taliban and assisted
in making preparations for many of their military needs.”[8]
By all accounts, Ghazwan al-Yemeni had served as a key liaison and conduit between a
variety of local armed jihadist factions, including al-Qa`ida, the Jalaluddin Haqqani
network, and the up-and-coming Pakistani Taliban.
Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani
Less than two months later, mujahidin online chat forums again began to light up with
discussion of the latest Yemeni national “martyred” in North Waziristan—Mohammed
Naqaa al-Hamli, also known as Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani.[9] Indeed, the same voices who
had expressed such personal grief over the passing of Ghazwan al-Yemeni stepped
forward once again to acknowledge the fate of his brother-in-arms al-Hamli. Falluja
Islamic Network user Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani issued an announcement on March 9 to
“the members of the Falluja forum [about] the joyful news regarding the martyrdom of
your brother from the forum, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, may almighty Allah have mercy
upon him and…allow him to join his fellow brethren. The brother was preparing
himself for a martyrdom operation in Kabul.”[10]
A follow-up statement posted later that day by another user, “al-Qairawani,”
repeated that “Abu Hatem Mohammed Naqaa’ Qaed al-Hamli al-Yemeni (Abu Dujanah alSanaani) has…passed away in the evening due to his severe injuries. These were
caused by the premature detonation of an explosive device he was preparing to roast
the flesh of Allah’s enemies, the crusaders and apostates.”[11] Al-Qairawani
claimed to have
“participated with him for three years in actions and operations, and I only knew
him to be a brave, heroic man, and a roaring lion who had no fear of death. May Allah
have mercy on him, he specialized in the science of explosives and he mastered it to
the point that he became a reference to all the brothers in this regard. In this
field, he demonstrated a degree of ingenuity that distinguished him and was of great
benefit to the mujahidin. He also worked to spread this art and teach it to the rest
of the mujahidin, and he left behind him, praise to Allah, a number of brilliant
Taliban students.”[12]
In an interview with the online jihadist media outfit “al-Balagh” only days before
his death, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani introduced himself as “from the children of Hijja
province, the municipality of Khiran bani Hamla; a graduate from Sana`a University,
and a teacher at the Ministry of Education. I studied Shariah education at al-Iman
University, which is headed by Shaykh Abdulmajid al-Zindani…I am married and I have
one daughter and two sons.”[13]
He insisted that “thoughts of my family and children” would not cause him any
hesitation in carrying out a “martyrdom operation”:
“No, as my trust in Allah is very big…I phoned my wife and I asked her to keep
praying to Allah to grant me martyrdom, moving on and not returning, and she promised
me she would do that, may Allah reward her goodness…No, there’s no part of me
feeling hesitation or weakness, but…to the contrary, I feel saddened in putting it
off any further…We promised the infidels, when our brother Ghazwan al-Yemeni was
killed, that we would strike back twice as hard in response, and this operation,
Allah-willing, will be an unforgettable lesson to the infidels.”[14]
Just like Ghazwan al-Yemeni,
to web-based jihadist social
Network. In January 2010, he
mentor, Shaykh `Abd al-Majid
respectful, if not congenial
Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani was also a prolific contributor
networking forums, particularly the Falluja Islamic
posted a lengthy open diatribe addressed to his former
al-Zindani, in Yemen. At first, the message took a
tone:
“I give you the good news that we are here on the land of Khorasan
(Afghanistan)…Every day we excel in power and number and equipment while our enemy
is humiliated and degraded. I assure you about the conditions of my comrades, the
students from al-Iman University; they are in the frontline on the battlefields
against the cross-worshippers. Your students here and in Iraq are leading the
mujahidin with their Shari`a knowledge, which they learnt from you…You were cautious
to raise young men who support this religion and sacrifice for its sake, and here is
the land of Afghanistan which can testify to that.”[15]
Despite these rather friendly opening words, Abu Dujanah then suddenly veered into a
sharp and personal attack on al-Zindani’s credibility as a Muslim leader:
“My Shaykh, I was preparing explosive devices in order to kill Allah’s enemies—the
cross-worshippers and their apostate puppets—when I heard on the radio that the wellknown activist Abdulmajid al-Zindani has declared that any American interference in
Yemen is considered occupation, and in a speech he calls for jihad [only] when an
American force invades Yemen!…Are you still ignorant and unaware that America
invaded the Arabian countries a long time ago and first of all in Yemen?…You did not
do a thing! Excuse me my shaykh, you have reached an older age so when will you leave
politics…Please, stand with yourself and redeem yourself before it’s too late, and
we are ready to support you with people and equipment; O’ shaykh, be devout to Allah
and come to the frontline to fight the enemies of Allah.”[16]
He continued to demand that al-Zindani “besiege the American Embassy” with a group
of his followers, further suggesting that “a group of brothers [should] take control
over the airbase in Sana`a,” “besiege the Republican Palace in Yemen,” “carry an
operation against the apostates in the Gold Mohur [Hotel] in Aden,” and “storm the
Ministry of Interior and kill the apostates there and the Interior Minister.” He
closed with, “This is what we wish for and want to see in the faith and wisdom
valleys of Yemen…Your brother, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani (Afghanistan).”[17]
The Yemeni bombmaker was much more approving in his web commentary when it came to
the merits of recent military operations carried out by al-Qa`ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP). When al-Qa`ida attempted to assassinate the British ambassador to
Yemen in April 2010, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani posted a public message of solidarity
with his Yemeni brothers-in-arms: “O’ lions of jihad, even if the British dog
escaped from your swords this time, don’t slacken in your persistent efforts against
the infidels and apostates so that they will receive their share of your arrows…and
that day will be coming soon…from Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani in Afghanistan.”[18]
As for the military operations taking place on the battlefield where he was based,
Abu Dujanah informed his online audience in March 2010 that “what is mentioned in
the news is just the tip of the iceberg, and our enemies are reeling from their
successive defeats, praise be to Allah. In Pakistan, the government retreats each day
under the painful blows of the mujahidin, and the same is true in Afghanistan.”[19]
He warned of “armed drone aircraft…dispatched by the enemies of Allah…which fly
across the sky of Waziristan, and an army of spies on the ground in the tribal areas
as well, seeking to obtain intelligence data on the location of the mujahidin…and
so, the infidels were able to kill many of our fighters, especially those of Arab
origin and other non-Arab foreign fighters.”[20]
Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani
Perhaps a testament to the deadly effectiveness of U.S. drone missile strikes, by
this past November even those above Ghazwan al-Yemeni and Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani in
the hierarchy of al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni expatriate contingent found their lives in
jeopardy. Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani was not only a registered user on the Falluja
Islamic Network, but was also a 45-year-old Yemeni national who had spent “half of
[his life] in the fields of jihad.”[21] Al-Qahtani reportedly first arrived in
Afghanistan during the late 1980s and “fought the communist Russians during the days
of the Soviet invasion—and after the order came for mobilization after the American
Crusade attack…he went back to the land of Khorasan to fight the Americans just as
he fought the Russians before.”[22]
Despite being relatively older, al-Qahtani was nonetheless sharply attuned to the
value of internet-based communications, and relied on web chat forums to disseminate
news updates and recruitment calls carefully crafted to target an online audience. In
February 2010, he took pains to emphasize that a “major operation” had recently
taken place in North Waziristan which “included a number of beloved users from the
jihadi forums—among them, your brother ‘Abu Kandahar [al-Zarqawi],’[23] brother
‘Ansar 13,’ and brother ‘Khattab al-Lubnani.’ All of them send you their
greetings and salutations, and [advise you] not to forget them in your prayers.”[24]
On the evening of November 16, 2010, in the midst of Eid celebrations, more missiles
fired from a U.S. drone demolished a makeshift mujahidin encampment on the Afghan
border, killing several fighters—including Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani. According to a
statement posted on jihadist web forums, “Allah awarded them to spend Eid there in
the highest levels of Paradise, with their beloved ones and brothers Ghazwan alYemeni, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, and Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani. Just as He gathered
them in life, He has gathered them in the afterlife.”[25] The author of the
statement confessed that in being tasked to “bring you the glad tidings about the
martyrdom of our brother Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani al-Yemeni…I write and the words
refuse to come out of heart; as it is not easy to mourn your beloved, and it is not
easy to receive like this news without your body shaking and your emotions
disturbed.” For anyone still unclear, he again confirmed, “Brother Abu Abdelrahman
was the one together with us on the Falluja [network].”[26]
Networking with European Fighters?
In a rather disturbing twist, al-Qa`ida’s Yemeni expatriate faction based in North
Waziristan has also apparently been working closely on the ground with high-profile
European exiles who have likewise traveled to the region in hopes of joining alQa`ida and the Taliban. The web statement announcing the death of Abu Abdelrahman alQahtani advised “those who seek more information about the martyrdom of the
brother” to “correspond with my beloved brother al-Qairawani”—who is, in fact, the
same online forum user who previously had helped spread details about the untimely
passing of Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani in an accidental explosion.[27] Al-Qairawani has
indicated, in separate posts, that he is currently fighting with the mujahidin in
Afghanistan and “used to live in Europe.” He has further acknowledged that “my
family and a number of our brothers were on trial in Brussels.” In one case, he
vividly described to fellow online jihadists how he was “rushing to reach one of the
call centers before they closed, because I was hoping to learn some news from one of
the internet websites” about the progress of the trial taking place back in
Belgium.[28] Based on the rather specific personal details and hints volunteered over
time by al-Qairawani, his real identity appears to be that of most-wanted Tunisian
national Moez Garsallaoui, an extremist who left Belgium for Pakistan’s tribal areas
in late 2007.[29] Garsallaoui is the husband of the notorious “black widow” Malika
el-Aroud, who reportedly posted a statement on the web on his behalf in September
2008, urging Muslims in Europe that “the solution, my brothers and sisters, is not
fatwas but boooooooms.”[30]
Conclusion
There are a number of important lessons to be learned from the cases of Ghazwan alYemeni, Abu Dujanah al-Sanaani, Abu Abdelrahman al-Qahtani, and their various other
contemporaries within the Yemeni mujahidin network perched on the Afghan-Pakistani
border. The degree to which these hard line foreign fighters have become closely
intertwined with local allies from the Pakistani Taliban and the Jalaluddin Haqqani
network could be quite problematic in the long-term, especially if the United States
hopes to scale back its military forces deployed in the region.
It may be tempting in the wake of Abdulmutallab’s attack and the most recent cargo
jet bomb plot in late 2010 to shift attention away from the activities of al-Qa`ida
operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan to their ambitious ideological cousins in
Yemen, or other regional hotspots. Yet just like AQAP, the Yemeni expatriate network
in South Asia is equally dedicated to the principle of launching pinpoint strikes on
their enemies—on a global scale—and have mobilized extensive resources to actualize
their mission, including networking with European recruits and spreading their viral
message on sympathetic internet social networking forums. These men hardly fit the
popular stereotype of bedraggled buffoons hiding in remote mountain caves. Defanging
this evolving terrorist threat will require the U.S. government to maintain an
aggressive tempo of action, including the use of controversial-but-demonstrablyeffective tactics such as drone missile strikes. Although the Yemeni al-Qa`ida
contingent has undoubtedly suffered a series of debilitating losses during the past
12 months, if focus should start to stray, it is only a matter of time before a new
group of fresh recruits will step forward to help fill the void.
Evan F. Kohlmann is a Senior Partner at Flashpoint Global Partners, a New York-based
security consulting firm. He is the author of Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The
Afghan-Bosnian Network.
[1] Vanguards of Khorasan 1:15 (2009).
[2] Lolita Baldor and Matt Apuzzo, “Top Al Qaeda Operative Reportedly Killed In U.S.
Drone Attack,” Associated Press, March 17, 2010.
[3] Ibid.
[4] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107824 on
March 13, 2010.
[5] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=86082 on
October 1, 2009.
[6] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=86086 on
October 1, 2009.
[7] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=86082 on
October 1, 2009.
[8] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107512 on
March 12, 2010.
[9] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=115776 on
May 9, 2010.
[10] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=115649 on
May 9, 2010.
[11] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=115776 on
May 9, 2010.
[12] Ibid.
[13] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=116142 on
May 11, 2010.
[14] Ibid.
[15] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=100239 on
January 18, 2010.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=113444 on
April 25, 2010.
[19] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=106985 on
March 10, 2010.
[20] Ibid.
[21] This information was available at www.shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=84143 on
December 9, 2010.
[22] Ibid.
[23] On December 18, 2010, other users on jihadist web forums announced the death of
“Abu Kandahar al-Zarqawi” (also known as Jordanian national Haithem bin Mohammed
al-Khayat) during renewed clashes on the Afghan-Pakistani border.
[24] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=101792 on
February 3, 2010.
[25 ]This information was available at www.shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=84143 on
December 9, 2010.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] This information was available at www.alfaloja.net/vb/showthread.php?t=124200 on
June 22, 2010.
[29] Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘al Qaeda Cell’ Linked to 2006
Airline Plot,” CNN, February 10, 2009.
[30] Ibid.
The Implications of Colonel Imam’s Murder in Pakistan
Apr 01, 2011
Rahimullah Yusufzai
On February 19, 2011, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released a videotaped execution
of Colonel Imam, a retired Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operative.[1]
Colonel Imam, whose real name was Sultan Amir Tarar, wielded significant influence
over Islamist fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war against the Soviet
Union in the 1980s. He trained large numbers of Afghan fighters battling Soviet
forces, and befriended scores of mujahidin leaders and commanders, including
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud and Maulvi Jalaluddin
Haqqani, as well as the founder of the Afghan Taliban movement, Mullah Omar. During
the 1980s, Colonel Imam escorted several U.S. and Western leaders—including the thendeputy director of the CIA, Robert Gates, and Congressman Charlie Wilson—during their
visits to the Afghan mujahidin. Yet despite his legendary status in Pakistan, Colonel
Imam was shot in the face by a Taliban gunman as TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud
supervised the execution.
The kidnapping and subsequent murder of Colonel Imam is indication of the
generational gap among Islamist militants in South Asia. In the previous decade,
Colonel Imam would have been welcomed and honored by Islamist militants in the border
region. Today, however, TTP militants considered him an enemy, and saw his status
merely as a tool to bargain for a ransom and the release of imprisoned TTP fighters.
This article identifies the sequence of events that led to the murder of Colonel
Imam, while also explaining what his death reveals about the evolution of the TTP.
The Kidnapping
In March 2010, Colonel Imam, former ISI operative Khalid Khwaja, British documentary
maker Asad Qureshi, and their local driver Rustam Khan were kidnapped in North
Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).[2] Colonel Imam
and Khwaja accompanied Qureshi to help the filmmaker create a documentary on the
impact of drone strikes on civilians. The two former ISI operatives hoped to use
their old contacts and goodwill in the region to gain access to North Waziristan, the
stronghold of local and foreign militants.[3] Their decision to travel to North
Waziristan seems ill-advised, as both former operatives had publicly criticized the
Pakistani Taliban in media statements—claiming that the Pakistani Taliban were
working as part of a foreign agenda to destabilize Pakistan. Indeed, after the
kidnapping, one of the kidnappers defended the action by saying that Colonel Imam and
Khwaja had called the Pakistani Taliban terrorists: “It is wrong of them to describe
us as terrorists. We too are fighting jihad.”[4]
Others, however, argued that Colonel Imam and Khwaja went to North Waziristan on a
peace mission to reconcile the militants with Pakistan’s security establishment.[5]
These analysts reported that the former ISI operatives were trying to alert the TTP
leadership about the presence of pro-India elements in their ranks and wanted to open
a line of communication between the Taliban and the United States. None of these
assertions can be confirmed, and the dominant view, which is shared by this author,
is that the former ISI operatives were in the region to assist in the documentary,
and that they miscalculated their standing among the militants.[6] They also likely
thought that their plans to make a documentary on drone strikes with the help of
Pakistan-born, British journalist Asad Qureshi would endear them to the militants,
who have been arguing that the missiles kill a disproportionate number of civilians.
Regardless of their true intentions, the mission did not go according to plan. A
previously unknown group called the Asian Tigers took credit for the kidnappings, but
it later became clear that the group’s name was simply an alias to conceal the cell
members’ identities. It eventually emerged that the Punjabi Taliban—jihadists who
left Kashmir-focused militant groups and joined the TTP—were involved in the
kidnapping operation. Usman Punjabi, or Mohammad Omar as he identified himself when
contacting the media, became the link between the militants holding the four men and
the outside world.[7] Usman Punjabi was also reportedly the man who invited the
unsuspecting former ISI operatives to North Waziristan. The group actually holding
the four men was led by Abdullah Mansoor, who had split from the anti-Shi`a militant
group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and aligned with the splinter faction, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi alAlami.[8]
Khalid Khwaja was the first to be executed. On April 30, 2010, a month after the
kidnapping, his body was found dumped in a stream in Karamkot village near Mir Ali in
North Waziristan. A note was attached to his body, stating that Khwaja was an agent
of the ISI and CIA.[9] After the killing of Khwaja, the militants received a hefty
ransom for the release of Asad Qureshi and his driver, Rustam Khan. The “Asian
Tigers” initially demanded $10 million for Qureshi’s release, although the ransom
amount was reportedly less than that.[10]
With Khwaja dead and Qureshi and his driver released, differences emerged among the
militants—who were still holding Colonel Imam. The differences led to violence when
another militant leader, Sabir Mehsud, killed Usman Punjabi and five of his men.
Although it is likely that TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud was aware of the kidnapping
operation, Usman’s murder angered Hakimullah, who sent his men to kidnap and execute
Sabir Mehsud and members of his militia, taking custody of Colonel Imam.[11]
Hakimullah appeared to have intervened once the situation deteriorated after the two
militant leaders, who were partners, turned on each other over disputes.
Once Hakimullah gained custody of Colonel Imam, it became clear that conditions for
his release only became more stringent. Hakimullah wanted the release of a number of
his men from Pakistani jails, in addition to the payment of a massive ransom.
Although the demands were never made public, the media reported that the TTP demanded
Rs 50 million ($590,000) and the release of an unidentified number of jailed
militants.[12]
Colonel Imam’s family tried to pool money to pay the ransom. At one point, hopes for
a deal emerged.[13] For that reason, his execution was sudden and shocking for all
those trying to negotiate; the talks with the TTP had not yet broken down at the time
of the execution. Even Afghan Taliban commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, other Afghan
mujahidin leaders as well as Pakistani religious scholars failed to convince
Hakimullah to release the former ISI operative.[14] In the filmed execution, which
appears to have occurred in late January, Hakimullah is clearly visible, supervising
the murder. Hakimullah’s presence in the video also dispelled rumors of his own
death.[15]
In the videotape, Hakimullah accused Colonel Imam of a litany of offenses. Hakimullah
appeared convinced that Colonel Imam had specifically traveled to North Waziristan to
spy on the TTP and provide intelligence for Pakistan Army strikes as well as U.S.
drone attacks. In the eyes of Hakimullah and the TTP, both Khalid Khwaja and Colonel
Imam were spies, and their punishment was death. Their role as spies does not seem
likely, as both retired military officers were critical of Pakistan’s alliance with
the United States and unhappy at Islamabad’s decision to break with the Afghan
Taliban after 9/11. Additionally, if they truly were spies, one would suspect that
the military would have made more of an effort to save them. The TTP also seemed to
have miscalculated the importance of the two former ISI operatives, and as a result
drafted demands that Pakistan’s government and military were unwilling to meet.[16]
Implications
The killings of Khalid Khwaja and Colonel Imam reveal the evolution of jihadist
groups in Pakistan. While in the past these groups had ties to the Pakistani state,
the government and security apparatus have lost control over many of the Islamist
fighters operating in the border region. Pakistani Taliban militants remain committed
to attacking government interests, and Islamabad is still struggling to respond.
Nevertheless, there has been some fallout for the overall Taliban movement in the
wake of Colonel Imam’s death. The execution may have placed a wedge between the TTP
and other Islamist militants, particularly the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani
network. Jihadist leaders who used to operate with Colonel Imam during the antiSoviet jihad were clearly unhappy with the TTP and Hakimullah Mehsud, privately
criticizing him for executing the former ISI operative.[17] In fact, some significant
doubts have arisen about Hakimullah’s agenda after the incident. Although the Afghan
Taliban and Haqqani network have refrained from publicly condemning Hakimullah for
killing the former operative, they are unlikely to trust him in the future.
Rahimullah Yusufzai is a senior Pakistani journalist and political and security
analyst presently working as Resident Editor of the English daily The News
International in Peshawar. He has been reporting on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and
Baluchistan since the early 1980s.
[1] “Taliban Release Video of Killing of Col Imam,” Express Tribune, February 19,
2011; “Pakistani Taliban Claim Shooting Colonel Imam Dead,” Associated Press,
February 19, 2011.
[2] “Former ISI Operatives Kidnapped in North Waziristan,” The Nation, March 27,
2010; Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Colonel Imam Abducted in North Waziristan,” Asia Times
Online, April 28, 2010.
[3] Personal interview, Khalid Khwaja, March 2010.
[4] Personal interview, Usman Punjabi, Winter 2010.
[5] Hamid Mir, “What Was the Last Mission of Khalid Khwaja?” The News
International, May 2, 2010; Shahzad.
[6] Asad Munir, “The Death of Colonel Imam,” Express Tribune, January 26, 2011;
Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Kidnapped,” The News International, April 27, 2010.
[7] Personal interview, Usman Punjabi, Winter 2010; Shahzad; Amir Mir, “Kashmiri
Behind Khwaja’s Murder,” The News International, May 1, 2010.
[8] Amir Mir, “Imam was Killed Last Month for Spying,” The News International,
February 21, 2011.
[9] Zahir Shah, “Hakimullah in TTP Video of Colonel Imam’s Killing,” Dawn,
February 19, 2011.
[10] Mir; “Col Imam is Still in Taliban Custody,” Express Tribune, February 15,
2011.
[11] Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Kidnapped Ex-ISI Official, British Journalist Likely to be
Released Soon,” The News International, May 7, 2010.
[12] “Taliban Release Video of Killing of Col Imam,” Express Tribune, February 19,
2011.
[13] Yusufzai, “Kidnapped Ex-ISI Official, British Journalist Likely to be Released
Soon.”
[14] This information is based on the author’s confidential sources.
[15] Shah.
[16] Munir.
[17] Although Taliban leaders will not go on the record criticizing Hakimullah
Mehsud, many prominent Taliban leaders told this author that the TTP is hurting their
cause. They argue that Pakistani citizens are less likely to support the mujahidin
due to the brutality of the TTP.
After Action Report
Nuanced Diplomacy in Zerok, Afghanistan
Jul 15, 2008
Captain John G. Gibson, U.S. Army
Enemy machine gun fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) slammed into my convoy as
two tracer rounds punched through the turret of my up armored vehicle. My third
firefight in four days and the summer was only starting. It was mid-June 2007 in the
mountains of the sprawling Paktika Province. I quickly realized that the enemy knew
my name, number of vehicles, departure times and plans; I had just left a meeting
with its informants, the Zerok tribal shura.
I was a company commander responsible for Sar Hawzeh, Naka and Zerok districts in
northern Paktika Province. Zerok district is part of the Zadran tribal arc. The
Zadran tribes span from the mountains of Pakistan’s Waziristan tribal areas to the
Afghan cities of Khost and Ghazni. The Zadran claim, as one of their own, the proTaliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. After six years of progress in Afghanistan, Zerok
district remained a haven for foreign fighters, Taliban, Haqqani network fighters and
corrupt government officials. In May 2007, however, the 10th Mountain Division
created a series of small combat outposts near and along the Afghan-Pakistan border,
and I inherited a combat outpost called Zerok COP. The outpost housed a small number
of paratroopers and a large mortar tube. It was co-located with an Afghan National
Army (ANA) contingent and shared a wall with the Zerok District Center. I was able to
quickly interact with the tribal leaders (the shura) and the district governor. Upon
the departure of my counterpart, the Zerok COP was ready for operations. Zerok
district would become the setting for a lesson in corruption, violence and hope.
Identify the Problem
Zerok district sits as the most northern district in Paktika Province. Paktika
comprises 18 districts that create a border province in the southeast of Afghanistan.
The capital is the city of Sharona. Nine districts form eastern Paktika, the Area of
Operation Eagle. Zerok district consists of two main unpaved roads, 9,000-11,000 foot
mountains, and people from the Zadran tribe. Two sub-tribes in Zerok make up the
population base of the district. The people subsist on farming and small trade. The
district is approximately 33 square miles and sits just 12 miles from the Pakistan
border.
Corruption and collusion were the bedrock of Taliban operations focused on the
destabilization of Zerok district. The first three weeks of my deployment consisted
of several operations designed to simply assess the environment and create
relationships with local district leaders, Afghan National Police, elders and shura
members. Counter-insurgency doctrine states that creating separation between the
enemy and the people is the first step of transforming the environment. I spent the
month of May and the first two weeks of June 2007 attempting to create separation by
using a technique called Key Leader Engagement (KLE), or Village Engagement (VE). My
company completed a series of patrols focused on meeting as many Afghans as possible
in the neighboring district of Naka.
I had one platoon at the Zerok COP and planned to re-enforce the outpost with my
headquarters, another platoon and several jingle trucks [1]. On June 13, however, one
of my platoons responded to an attack along the only useable road leading to the
Zerok COP. Enemy fighters engaged a combat engineer route assessment patrol with
machine gun, RPG and AK-74 fire. My platoon responded and was also engaged in a
firefight with the same insurgents. The following day, my headquarters, several
jingle trucks, an ANA platoon and a U.S. platoon moved up the same route to reenforce the Zerok COP. That convoy was also engaged. This time, the enemy was able to
kill two ANA soldiers and damage several vehicles.
I immediately met with the elders, shura members, the district governor and the ANP
chief at the Zerok District Center. I discussed security, governance and development
in the district. I asked the shura members if they knew anything about the enemy
forces operating in the area. The entire room responded with a resounding “no.”
Frustrated by the response, I reminded the group that jobs and economic development
were impossible without security.
I moved my entire convoy element back down the route to Forward Operating Base Orgun.
My battalion was planning a major operation in the Zerok area and we were to start
preparations and rehearsals during the next few days. We departed Zerok COP under
cover of darkness. Five miles south of my outpost we were hit again. My convoy stayed
the night at the location of the firefight. We spent the next 24 hours combing the
area, talking to Afghans and searching for intelligence. A tip came from an
unexpected source. One of my paratroopers received a tip from a police officer at the
Zerok COP. Sharing a coveted American cigarette, the policeman told us that the
Taliban were in the district center and knew the exact moment our patrol departed the
COP for FOB Orgun. It turned out that enemy forces were operating in the district
center that shared a wall with my combat outpost. This, of course, caused me to
suspect that many of my Afghan leaders were enemy or openly supporting them.
Taking a Hard Line: No Development
My district was rife with enemy corruption and active collusion. I had two
shuramembers and a district governor that began meeting with me in secret. One of my
platoon leaders confirmed that the police chief actually allowed the Taliban to climb
into the towers of the district center to survey our activities. The district
governor was disillusioned with the provincial government by a personality conflict
with the provincial governor. He was also ineffective due to the elders and members
of theshura being a de facto Taliban organization. Only two individuals in Zerok
pursued me to talk seriously about the problems facing the people of Zerok district.
Two elders became my trusted agents and the core of my battalion commander’s
security shura initiative. LTC Michael R. Fenzel ordered us to develop trusted agents
that would discuss important issues honestly. Not to be confused with intelligence
sources, the security shura members talked about politics, personalities,
development, governance and security. My two security shura men began to make secret
trips to visit me, and over cups of hot chi told me how to proceed with Zerok. They
explained that the Taliban were directly testing the will of my unit and, further,
the task force. I decided to take a hard line with the Zerok shura. I called a
meeting in the district center and admonished the tribal council for not providing
security for the people of Zerok and informed the council that no new economic
project would come to Zerok until security was established. I told the shura that my
forces and the ANA would inform the people of Zerok that the shura decided no
projects or humanitarian and civic assistance should come to the district. The
meeting was terrible and the elders were upset.
The two security shura men were surprised at this decision. They later reported that
the shura fully expected me to announce the start of an economic initiative. The head
of the shura, Haji Tadai, was furious. Haji Tadai’s nephew was a Taliban commander
in northern Paktika Province, working for Haqqani. The situation in Zerok was
treacherous, and the next 11 months proved difficult and violent. In 13 months, my
company fired more than 3,590 120mm mortar rounds, directed 79 airstrikes,
participated in 21 firefights, received 43 enemy rocket and mortar attacks and spent
more than $2 million on projects in districts other than Zerok.
Small Steps of Progress
We continued to engage the population of Zerok in meetings, patrols and behind closed
doors. My battalion was able to assist me in removing three corrupt police officials.
The provincial government replaced the district governor twice. We talked to the
people and continued to spend money in other districts. The elders continued to
harbor the Taliban as attacks persisted and security waned. The resounding theme of
each weekly meeting was projects. Repeatedly, the shura suggested that projects would
benefit the district. I continued to remind the leaders that security was the only
requirement. Meanwhile, my other two districts flourished with projects. New road
construction, well construction projects, and humanitarian and civic assistance
missions took place in each district, except Zerok.
In March 2008, I began to plan projects for Zerok district as preparation for
improved security. A municipal water system for a small village, two new water wells,
three mosque refurbishments, a flood abatement wall, a solar light array, two school
roofs and a food distribution were announced to the shura. The projects represented
an employment opportunity for more than 150 Afghans. The members of the shurabegan to
claim allegiance to the government and provide names of contractors. The contracts
began, and for the first time in a year attacks stopped. The district remained quiet
for 47 days. Enemy activity was reported by locals in the bazaar, Afghan contractors
and several shura members. I was confident that the population was effectively
separated from the enemy. Real transformation seemed possible for the first time.
Conclusion
Zerok District is a microcosm of Afghanistan. Day-to-day life in the area has not
changed drastically in the last 200 years. The people have vehicles and a few
telephones, yet farming and family ties rule the day. The situation in Zerok is ripe
for progress. For example, compare this small area with the progress of the area
surrounding Kabul or even the provincial seat, Sharona. The government of Afghanistan
makes improvements and reaches the people near significant population centers, but
small districts such as Zerok are not relevant to the provincial or national
government. Nevertheless, the government must focus on remote, isolated, underdeveloped districts. Taliban and forces opposed to the Afghan government place
critical importance on the mental and physical disposition of districts such as
Zerok. Remote districts, left unattended, provide the Taliban with sanctuary, food,
men, weapons and fertile ground for continued opposition to the Afghan government.
Projection of Afghan security and Afghan governance in the sanctuary of an insurgent
force will sway the people of Zerok far greater than a thousand projects or an
outpost. I often thought about the challenges of leaders in past conflicts and kept
returning to this quote by T.E. Lawrence from The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: “[War]
upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” War in districts
such as Zerok is slow and messy indeed.
CPT John Gibson is an Infantry Officer currently serving with 1-503rd Infantry
(Airborne), 173rd ABCT. He recently completed company command in Afghanistan after 13
months deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom VIII. CPT John Gibson also
served in OIF I and OEF VI. CPT Gibson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, West
Point, in 2000 with a BS in International & Strategic History and Latin American
Studies. CPT Gibson’s awards include the Combat Infantryman’s badge, the Airborne
badge, and the Ranger Tab.
Notes
[1] “Jingle trucks” are local flat-bed vehicles that are used for transport
purposes.
The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Jun 01, 2011
Ben Brandt
Throughout the history of the post-9/11 insurgency in Afghanistan, reports have
emphasized the Afghan Taliban’s impressive ability to collect and exploit
intelligence effectively. Researchers and media outlets describe the Afghan Taliban
as possessing an “impressive intelligence network”[1] which conducts numerous
functions such as giving Taliban fighters early warning of U.S. or International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patrols, or providing U.S. forces with misleading
information.[2] U.S. and ISAF soldiers have been consistently quoted regarding the
efficacy of Taliban intelligence operations, stating that “the enemy intelligence
network is on top of every move we make,” “there is always someone who can be
listening to what we are saying,” and that the group has sources “in many
places.”[3] A striking example of the Taliban’s intelligence collection capability
occurred last year, when UK Prime Minister David Cameron was forced to cancel plans
to visit a military outpost in Helmand Province after intercepts indicated that the
Taliban was aware of his itinerary.[4]
Given the efficacy of the insurgents’ intelligence operations, detailed analysis of
the history, scope, and structure of the Taliban’s intelligence function is crucial
for successful counterinsurgency operations, as is an understanding of the collection
and counterintelligence tactics it employs, and the aims which it seeks to achieve by
the use of intelligence.
Taliban Intelligence Operations Prior to 9/11
Media and government accounts indicate that the Taliban possessed a massive and
effective, if somewhat fractious, intelligence apparatus prior to 9/11. It operated
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and was responsible for gathering information on
opponents to the regime, as well as covert actions such as bribing Northern Alliance
commanders to switch sides and conducting assassinations.[5] Taliban intelligence
officials maintained extensive ties with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI),[6] as well as with members of the Pakistani political party Jamiat-i-Ulama-iIslam (JUI)[7] and foreign terrorists. Evidence presented at the administrative
review board of former Taliban Deputy Intelligence Minister Abdul Haq Wasiq, who is
currently imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, described Wasiq as having “arranged to have
an Egyptian Al Qaida member, Hamza Zobir, teach Taliban intelligence officers about
intelligence work.”[8]
Accounts of the Taliban’s pre-9/11 intelligence infrastructure indicate that in
addition to the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue
and Prevention of Vice was an important collector of intelligence,[9] with the two
ministries sharing information on an informal basis.[10] Contemporary accounts
suggest that the Ministry of Intelligence possessed some 20,000 spies and 100,000
informants in 2001, with children or former KHAD agents constituting many of its
informants.[11] Informants were reportedly recruited on every city block to monitor
neighborhoods, while foreign journalists were closely monitored.[12] The Ministry for
the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice reportedly supplemented this with
informants in ministries, hospitals, aid agencies, and military units.[13] The
Ministry of Intelligence was notorious for detaining suspected spies and Northern
Alliance personnel, and using torture tactics such as electric shocks and beatings
during interrogations.[14]
The leadership of the Taliban’s intelligence ministry appears to have changed
frequently, likely due to Mullah Omar’s commonly described predilection for
reshuffling ministerial portfolios.[15] Mullah Khaksar Akhund was described as having
been the head of intelligence prior to September 1996,[16] Khairullah Khairkhwa was
described by the U.S. State Department as the Taliban’s minister for intelligence in
late 1997,[17] and Mullah Hamdullah was listed as intelligence minister in 1998.[18]
Qari Ahmadullah, who was later killed in a U.S. airstrike, was the Taliban’s
minister for intelligence when 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom occurred.[19]
Maulawi Mohammad Wali, reportedly a close ally of Mullah Omar, appears to have
retained control of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice
from 1998-2001.[20] The Taliban enjoyed a number of significant intelligence
successes, such as the capture and execution of Pashtun opposition leader Abdul
Haq,[21] and the possible uncovering of a U.S. plot to assassinate Usama bin
Ladin.[22] At the same time, Taliban intelligence suffered setbacks such as the
escape of imprisoned Northern Alliance leader Ismail Khan in 1999,[23] and the
failure to detect a former intelligence chief who defected to the Northern Alliance
in late 2001 after maintaining a secret dialogue with Ahmad Shah Massoud for several
years.[24]
Taliban Intelligence Operations Post-9/11
Operation Enduring Freedom had a major impact on the Taliban’s intelligence
services, with numerous key leaders such as Khairullah Khairkhwa, Qari Ahmadullah,
and Ahmadullah’s deputy Abdul Haq Wasiq captured or killed by U.S. and Afghan
forces.[25] At least some Taliban intelligence personnel, however, managed to evade
capture or death, and appear to have assisted in the formation of insurgent
efforts.[26] In addition, the ISI provided significant support for fleeing Taliban
members (Ahmed Rashid has described how ISI officials “waved” fleeing Taliban
fighters across border checkpoints into Pakistan and helped facilitate Mullah Omar’s
arrival in Quetta),[27] and lingering pro-Taliban sympathies coupled with grievances
against U.S. and ISAF forces helped the Taliban quickly reactivate formidable
intelligence networks in southern provinces such as Helmand, and commence plotting
attacks.[28]
Military authors have described the Taliban’s current intelligence gathering
structure as being one where local Taliban units collect intelligence and share it
with neighboring units and the Taliban’s “higher hierarchy,” which provides top-
down intelligence support as well.[29] At the same time, a recent article in the Los
Angeles Times argued that the Taliban’s decentralized structure makes it difficult
for the group to collate and effectively analyze the information gathered; if so,
increased U.S. and ISAF efforts against the Taliban’s field commanders are likely to
have exacerbated this weakness.[30] In addition to collection efforts by local
Taliban units and other personnel who conduct intelligence collection alongside
alternative roles,[31] the Taliban possess dedicated intelligence officers.[32] These
are deployed to at least the regional and provincial levels, and presumably help
facilitate the flow of information and run informant networks.[33] At least one
Western official has stated that the Afghan Taliban have a de facto head of
intelligence, although the identity of this individual remains unclear.[34] With this
in mind, it is reasonable to speculate that Hafiz Abdul Majeed, a member of the
Quetta shura with significant intelligence experience, continues to oversee Taliban
intelligence efforts to some extent.[35]
The Taliban continue to utilize a wide variety of largely human intelligence and open
source intelligence based collection methods, with the group’s signals intelligence
capability stunted by an inability to listen in on the heavily encrypted radio
transmissions of U.S. troops.[36] As during the pre-9/11 era, village and
neighborhood level intelligence networks continue to provide the Taliban with a large
quantity of information on U.S. and ISAF movements[37] and potential spies or
government collaborators,[38] as well as providing a population control function:
fear of the Taliban’s purportedly omnipresent spies is a major factor in many
Afghans’ decision to obey the Taliban’s edicts and avoid assisting
counterinsurgency efforts.[39] Taliban intelligence efforts focus heavily on Afghan
government employees (such as police) and Afghans working for foreign militaries
(such as interpreters), who are monitored while entering or departing foreign
military bases, and later targeted for intimidation or murder.[40] As noted in many
media outlets, the Taliban derive actionable intelligence from informants within
military bases, prisons, and in the Afghan security forces, including those hired by
military contractors; these have been used to identify informants,[41] provide
intelligence on military movements and facilities of interest to the Taliban,[42] and
intimidate or coerce other Afghan personnel.[43] The Haqqani network is believed to
possess high-ranking informants within Afghan security forces as well.[44] Given a
recent spate of attacks against security facilities and the reported collusion of
guards in a recent mass escape of Taliban prisoners from a facility in Kandahar city,
it is possible that Taliban informants are used to help facilitate direct action as
well.[45]
Taliban informants appear to be motivated by multiple factors, including ideological
fervor and financial inducements.[46] It is unclear where the Taliban’s dedicated
intelligence personnel receive their training, although it is possible that the ISI
continues to train some individuals. It should be noted as well that the Afghan
Taliban and its close ally the Haqqani network likely obtain information from liaison
with the ISI.[47]
As noted above, the Taliban have attempted to exploit open source intelligence to
gain useful information on U.S. and ISAF operations, with perhaps the best-known
example being the Taliban’s stated intent to search Afghanistan-related reports
posted on Wikileaks to uncover possible government informants, following the failure
of the Wikileaks organization to remove identifying information about informants such
as their names, home villages, and family members.[48] Although the U.S. military
later concluded that no intelligence sources had been compromised by the leaked
documents,[49] numerous tribal elders in southern Afghanistan reportedly received
death threats within days of the Wikileaks release.[50]
The Site Institute has also reported that the Taliban appear to have attempted to
gather information via Twitter, noting that the group’s account was following the
Twitter feeds of several U.S. military personnel as of early 2011.[51] One of the
individuals followed by the Taliban’s Twitter account was a U.S. Air Force logistics
officer, whose Twitter account linked to a personal blog containing discussions of
military passenger screening at airports and Afghan military personnel’s
unwillingness to wear the trauma plate inserts in their body armor, as well as photos
of his base and Afghan National Army counterparts.[52] In addition to social media,
Richard Barrett, the coordinator for the Al Qaida Taliban Monitoring Team at the
United Nations, has noted that the Taliban monitor the foreign news media and NGO
publications, citing as examples the Taliban’s prompt responses to a UN report on
civilian casualties, and articles in Time and the Sunday Telegraph.[53] An
International Crisis Group report in 2008 indicated that the Taliban monitor Afghan
media and engage in retribution against journalists deemed unsympathetic to its
cause;[54] the Taliban’s prompt disavowal of a bloody suicide attack in Jalalabad in
February 2011 following the airing of CCTV footage of the attack on Tolo TV indicates
that the group continues to monitor Afghan media closely.[55]
As illustrated above, the Taliban utilize its own network of informants in attempts
to identify and eliminate suspected spies for the Afghan government and ISAF,[56] and
has also occasionally forced cell phone service providers to shut down their networks
in southern Afghanistan either after dark or altogether due to the group’s concerns
about ISAF informants equipped with cell phones.[57] This phenomenon recently
occurred in Helmand, where the Taliban induced private Afghan cellular networks to
shut down for two weeks in March-April 2011, affecting nearly a million cell phone
users.[58] In addition, the group has made efforts to improve its communication
security (COMSEC) regime over the years to deny ISAF access to signals intelligence;
Taliban COMSEC tactics now include the use of radio codes, throwaway phones, and
shorter range radio communications.[59] Some reports have claimed that the Taliban
use Skype for secure communications, although it is unclear how widely this is
used.[60] Couriers are also used to avoid U.S. and ISAF signals intelligence
efforts,[61] along with use of local business owners to pass along messages.[62]
Looking Forward
The U.S. troop surge and increased counterinsurgency operations under Generals
Stanley McCrystal and David Petraeus have had a disproportionate effect on lower and
mid-ranking Taliban leadership, degrading their ability to communicate, and possibly
to share intelligence in a timely manner.[63] In addition, it remains possible that
the defection or desertion of a reported 1,000 Taliban members in recent months may
have degraded the Taliban’s intelligence network in specific locations, as well as
providing intelligence to U.S., ISAF, and Afghan forces.[64] Should Afghan citizens
begin to perceive that the Taliban are in retreat and that their ability to monitor
and punish transgressions has diminished, the Taliban’s intelligence collection and
early warning capability could be affected further.[65] At the same time, Afghan
citizens emboldened by the Taliban’s weakened capabilities and the establishment of
the Afghan Local Police program[66] could provide additional intelligence to
government forces, a process which ISAF claims is currently underway.[67] Lastly,
attempts by NATO to vet army and police recruits,[68] as well as train
counterintelligence agents, may help stanch the Taliban’s efforts to infiltrate
Afghan security forces.[69]
Although the trends described above provide some grounds for optimism, it is worth
noting that the reportedly 1,000 Taliban members who have defected or deserted
represent a relatively small fraction of the group’s strength. Furthermore, the
majority of these personnel are from Afghanistan’s northern, central, and western
regions, which have historically displayed greater antipathy to the Taliban’s
cause.[70] Pakistani intelligence has reportedly used the presence of many Taliban
commanders’ families in Pakistan to ensure loyalty, while the ability of ISAF and
Afghan forces to protect reintegrated Taliban members from reprisal attacks remains
uncertain.[71] The issue of the planned withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces[72] and
subsequent handover of security responsibilities to the Afghan government is an
additional source of uncertainty for Afghans as well, many of whom doubt their
government’s ability to provide effective security without significant foreign
assistance,[73] and they may hedge their allegiances accordingly.
Given the aforementioned questions regarding the government’s ability to reconcile
Taliban members and protect civilians from reprisals, the effort to degrade the
Taliban’s intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities may prove to be a
difficult and protracted endeavor.
Ben Brandt is currently a threat analyst in the private sector, prior to which he
monitored South Asian extremist issues at the NJ Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, and researched terrorist attack planning methodologies at Booz Allen
Hamilton. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University.
[1] Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2009.
[2] C.J. Chivers, “In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Taliban’s Shadowy
Rule,” New York Times, February 6, 2011.
[3] James Astill, “Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on South,” Guardian, December 11,
2003; Bill Graveland, “Troops Told Loose Lips Can Kill, Taliban Spies Everywhere,”
The Canadian Press, 2008; Tim Shipman, “Taliban Have Spies Everywhere,” Daily Mail,
August 27, 2010.
[4] Matthew Green, “More on the Taliban Plot to Kill Cameron,” Financial Times,
June 10, 2010.
[5] “Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Consider the Security and Human
Rights Situation in Afghanistan,” Danish Immigration Service, November 1, 2001;
“Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: Afghan Officials,” Agence FrancePresse, January 2, 2002.
[6] Ibid.; B. Raman, “Buddha, Taliban & Gen. Musharraf,” South Asia Analysis Group,
June 3, 2001. Raman, a former head of the Indian intelligence agency Research and
Analysis Wing, described Taliban intelligence as being “run” by ISI officers. Other
reports indicate that Pakistani intelligence officers were heavily involved in
training their Taliban counterparts.
[7] Mashal Lutfullah, “Al Qaida Planning Next Phase,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 28, 2001.
[8] Summarized transcripts from Abdul Haq Wasiq’s administrative review board, July
18, 2005.
[9] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). Rashid
described the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice as the
Taliban’s most effective intelligence agency.
[10] “Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Consider the Security and Human
Rights Situation in Afghanistan.”
[11] Julian West, “Child-Spy Network a Key Weapon in Intelligence War,” Telegraph,
October 31, 2001. The Taliban’s use of children to conduct espionage continues in
the post-9/11 era as well. For details, see Alex Crawford, “Ruthless Taliban Using
Children As Spies,” Sky News, October 17, 2010.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Taliban Intelligence Head Reported Killed in U.S. Bombing,” CNN, January 2,
2002.
[15] “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Decision-Making Process and Leadership
Structure,” U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 31, 1998.
[16] “Biographical Data on Mullah (Omar) and the Council of Ministers,” U.S.
Department of Defense, November 2001.
[17] “Afghanistan: Taliban Decision-Making and Leadership Structure,” U.S. Embassy
Islamabad, December 30, 1997.
[18] “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Decision-Making Process and Leadership
Structure,” U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 31, 1998.
[19] “Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: Afghan Officials,” Agence
France-Presse, January 2, 2002.
[20] “Terrorism Finance: Updating the Taliban Names Designated under UNSCR 1267,”
U.S. SecState Cable, May 2002.
[21] Rahimullah Yusufzai and Tim McGirk, “Taliban Spies: In The Cross Hairs,” Time,
November 12, 2001.
[22] Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Knopf, 2006).
[23] Khan was assisted in his escape by a Taliban intelligence officer. See Carlotta
Gall, “A Nation Challenged: Warlords,” New York Times, January 27, 2002.
[24] Peter Baker, “Bin Laden Reportedly Used Cash to Curry Taliban Favor,”
Washington Post, November 30, 2001.
[25] According to his own account, Ahmadullah had been tasked by Mullah Omar with
organizing a guerrilla effort prior to his death. See Mashal Lutfullah, “Al Qaida
Planning Next Phase,” Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 2001.
[26] “Taliban Names Anti-U.S. Leadership Council,” Reuters, June 24, 2003;
Representative Robert E. Andrews, “Message of the Day,” May 6, 2002.
[27] Tim McGirk, “Rogues No More?” Time, April 29, 2002; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into
Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Central Asia (New York: Viking Press, 2008).
[28] James Astill, “Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on South,” Guardian, December
11, 2003; “Car Blast Kills 4 Near U.S. Afghan Airfield,” Washington Post, April 14,
2003.
[29] Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational
Analysis,” Military Review, May-June 2008.
[30] Borzou Daragahi, “Afghan Taliban Intelligence Network Embraces the New,” Los
Angeles Times, April 13, 2011.
[31] Dexter Filkins, “Karzai is Said to Doubt West Can Defeat Taliban,” New York
Times, June 11, 2010; “Taliban Member Responsible for Selecting Suicide-Bomb Sites
Targeted,” ISAF, December 29, 2010.
[32] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Dirty Dozen,” Newsweek, April 10, 2011.
Additionally, Amrullah Saleh, the former director of Afghanistan’s intelligence
service, and General Hilaluddin Hilal, a former Afghan deputy interior minister, have
made reference to “senior Taliban intelligence officials.” For details, see
Filkins, as well as “Government’s Writ Extended to 95% of Afghanistan: Saleh,”
PakTribune.com, March 5, 2008.
[33] Ron Moreau, “Do the Taliban Get PTSD?” Newsweek, December 6, 2010; Sami
Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “How the Taliban Lost Its Swagger,” Newsweek, February
27, 2011.
[34] Daragahi.
[35] Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” The Long War Journal,
February 23, 2010.
[36] Daragahi. It is unclear whether the Taliban conducted signals intelligence
collection prior to 9/11. However, given numerous accounts of Northern Alliance
personnel listening to Taliban radio frequencies and impersonating Taliban fighters
on the radio to gather intelligence during Operation Enduring Freedom, it is
reasonable to assume that the Taliban possess a similar capability. For an example of
the Northern Alliance’s use of signals intelligence, see “Interview: U.S. Special
Forces ODA 555,” PBS Frontline, undated.
[37] One article described members of the Taliban’s informant network using mirrors
and smoke signals to provide advance warning of U.S. patrols. See C.J. Chivers,
“Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government,” New York Times, February 6, 2011.
[38] Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009).
[39] Gretchen Peters, Crime and Insurgency (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism
Center, 2010).
[40] See, for example, Ruhullah Khapalwak and Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Kill Afghan
Interpreters Working for U.S. and its Allies,” New York Times, July 4, 2006;
Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government.”
[41] Carol Grisanti and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban-style Justice for Alleged U.S.
Spies,” NBC News, April 17, 2009.
[42] Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government.”
[43] “Inquiry into The Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in
Afghanistan,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, September 28, 2010.
[44] Matthew Rosenberg, “New Wave of Warlords Bedevils U.S.,” Wall Street Journal,
January 20, 2010.
[45] NATO has indicated that 10 of the 21 incidents since March 2009 where a
purported member of the security forces attacked coalition troops were executed by
Taliban members impersonating Afghan government security personnel, while a number of
the remaining incidents were related to combat stress. With this in mind, it is
possible that Taliban informants in the security forces helped provide attackers with
credentials, schedules, and access. See Rahim Faeiz and Lolita Baldor, “9 Americans
Dead after Afghan Officer Opens Fire,” Associated Press, April 27, 2011.
[46] Giustozzi; “If you have a problem, the Taliban solves it,” Herald Scotland,
January 3, 2009.
[47] Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010).
[48] Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, “Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of Wikileaks,”
Newsweek, August 2, 2010; Robert Mackey, “Taliban Study WikiLeaks to Hunt
Informants,” New York Times, July 30, 2010.
[49] Robert Burns, “Wikileaks: US Says Limited Damage from Leak of Afghan War
Logs,” Associated Press, October 15, 2010.
[50] Moreau and Yousafzai, “Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of Wikileaks.”
[51] “Social Jihad Network: Taliban Twitter,” Site Institute, February 21, 2011.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Richard Barrett, “What the Taliban Reads,” wwword, 2009.
[54] “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” International Crisis Group,
July 24, 2008.
[55] Habib Khan Totakhil and Matthew Rosenberg, “Taliban in PR Scramble After
Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2011.
[56] The Taliban have promulgated rules designed to create a system of due process
for the punishment of suspected spies; it is unclear how widely this system is
followed, however. See Christopher Dickey, “The Taliban’s Book of Rules,”
Newsweek, December 12, 2006.
[57] Night being when U.S. and ISAF forces conduct raids against suspected Taliban
members.
[58] Rahim Faiez and Patrick Quinn, “Taliban Turn Cell Phones Back on in
Afghanistan,” Associated Press, April 5, 2011. The Taliban’s ability to enforce
such a decree despite intensive counterinsurgency operations in Helmand Province
raises questions regarding the level of success achieved by such operations.
[59] Rowan Scarborough, “Taliban Outwits U.S. Eavesdroppers,” Human Events,
February 16, 2009. In his article, Scarborough quotes a “senior intelligence
source” as stating that Iranian agents have advised the Taliban on how to secure its
communications.
[60] Antony Savvas, “Taliban Use Skype VoIP Bug to Evade Capture,” Computer Weekly,
September 15, 2008.
[61] Afsar et al.
[62] Peters.
[63] Carlotta Gall, “Losses in Pakistani Haven Strain Afghan Taliban,” New York
Times, April 1, 2011.
[64] “50 Taliban Surrender to Kandahar Government,” Associated Press, April 13,
2011; Deb Riechmann, “900 Afghan Militants Join Reintegration Program,” Associated
Press, February 7, 2010; Yousafzai and Moreau, “How the Taliban Lost its Swagger.”
[65] It is difficult to assess at present whether the Taliban’s intelligence
networks have been degraded significantly at the village level, although recent highprofile attacks have illustrated the group’s continuing ability to develop and
exploit intelligence on hard targets such as the Afghan Defense Ministry.
[66] The ALP program serves as an armed community watch designed to maintain security
at the village level. There are indications that the program has been beset by
logistical problems, as well as concerns that armed ALP members may prove to be an
additional source of instability. See, for example, Rob Taylor, “Afghan Local Police
Stoke Fears of New-Generation Militia,” Reuters, April 25, 2011. At the same time,
at least some reports indicate that the ALP program is a source of concern to the
Taliban leadership. For details, see “Afghanistan: Glimmers of Hope,” Economist,
May 12, 2011.
[67] Matt Millham, “Coalition, Afghan Forces Continue to Seize Insurgent Weapons,”
ISAF HQ Public Affairs, March 10, 2011.
[68] Rahim Faeiz and Heidi Vogt, “Taliban Militant Kills 2 Inside Defense
Ministry,” Associated Press, April 18, 2011.
[69] Mohammed Abbas, “West Trains Spies to Hunt Taliban in Afghan Forces,” Reuters,
April 12, 2011.
[70] Riechmann.
[71] Ibid.
[72] The recent death of Usama bin Ladin has further aggravated some Afghans’ fears
that the United States will seek to withdraw forces from Afghanistan without
establishing stable governance first. See Alissa J. Rubin, “Afghans Fear West May
See Death as the End,” New York Times, May 2, 2011.
[73] “NATO Pressuring Harper’s 2014 Afghan Withdrawal,” CTV, November 19, 2010.
Should the U.S. and Afghan governments reach an accord on establishing permanent
bases in Afghanistan after 2014, it may or may not serve to address such concerns.
The Debate over Taliban Reconciliation
Feb 15, 2009
John A. Gastright, Kara L. Bue
The challenges to peace and stability in Afghanistan spiked in 2008. The Taliban
resurgence that began in 2006 continued to gain strength, with militants now capable
of exerting influence over wide swaths of the countryside. Roadside bombs,
assassinations, and carefully coordinated attacks on government and military targets
have become common place. In the face of this rising violence, increased attention
has been paid on how to resurrect positive momentum in a war and nation-building
effort that has played second fiddle to Iraq for the last five years. Strategy
reviews have been initiated, additional troops called for, and for the first time
high level U.S. officials are talking openly about engaging in dialogue with the
Taliban. While many believe that rethinking the existing strategy in Afghanistan is
necessary, mere mention of talking to the Taliban has engendered heated debate. For
some, it is a black and white issue, guided by principles of right and wrong. For
others, the issue is grey, rooted in practicality. In the end, however, it is one
that needs to be addressed in the context of a larger strategy. Overall, it is
critical to view the concept of negotiating with the Taliban as one strategic element
among others that has the potential to improve the chances for success in
Afghanistan.
U.S. Officials Open to Reconciliation
Much of the conjecture about engagement began in 2008 following a flurry of media
reports about possible negotiations with the Taliban. The reports fanned speculation
of a formal dialogue by highlighting a meeting hosted by Saudi King Abdullah in
September with representatives of the Taliban and of the Afghan government [1]. The
reports quoted Britain’s commander in Afghanistan, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith,
who said that negotiations with the Taliban could bring needed progress [2]. Other
reports focused on Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s appeal for peace to Taliban
leader Mullah Omar [3]. This approach has since been publicly endorsed by both senior
envoys from Afghanistan and Pakistan, who met at a two-day Pakistan-Afghanistan
tribal elders jirga in Islamabad [4]. Even Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
of Hizb-i-Islami and one of the most brutal commanders in Afghanistan, has reportedly
displayed a readiness for peace talks with the Karzai administration [5].
Comments made last fall by senior U.S. officials spurred much debate. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates and U.S. Army General David Petraeus each offered public
support for engagement with insurgents who are willing to reconcile with the
government as a means of reducing violence and isolating hardcore militants. As noted
by Gates, “That is one of the key long-term solutions in Afghanistan, just as it has
been in Iraq…Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to
work with the Afghan government going forward” [6].
To many, these comments appeared to signal a significant change of approach in
Afghanistan. Not only had the Taliban intentionally been excluded from the 2001 Bonn
Agreement establishing the new Afghan state and institutions, but it had been pursued
vigorously by international and Afghan forces with little inclination to talk.
Suggesting that elements of the Taliban may now be allowed back into the fold through
a form of political reconciliation seemed a sharp turn of events that was given all
the more credence because of Petraeus’ incoming role in Afghanistan as commander of
U.S. Central Command. Petraeus had been the chief architect of the “Anbar
Awakening” in Iraq, where the U.S. military successfully leveraged nationalist Sunni
Arab insurgents as a means of driving a wedge between them and Sunni jihadists; a
counterinsurgency strategy that many assumed he would employ against insurgents in
Afghanistan.
Critics Remain Doubtful
For critics of this approach, the once unthinkable idea of talking to the Taliban
remains so. How could the Afghan government, the United States, and their allies
consider negotiating with fundamentalist Islamist extremists who once brutally ruled
Afghanistan, harbored terrorist Usama bin Ladin, and continue to be al-Qa`ida’s
allies and protectors? Would not a re-emergence of the Taliban amount to a human
rights disaster and a giant leap backwards for the fledgling democracy? [7] Moreover,
what message would that send to hopeful Afghans about the future of their country, as
well as to the Taliban and other insurgent groups about the United States and its
seriousness in the war on terrorism? [8] According to some, “the sudden courting of
the Taliban leaders appears to be more an act of desperation, than strategy” [9] in
the face of growing threats in a complex and costly war. For others, it reflects an
attempt by Karzai, in advance of upcoming elections, to cover up inadequacies of his
often incompetent government [10].
Today, with the worsening security situation and gains made by the Taliban, it is
unclear whether they have any incentives to negotiate. This is especially true given
that a portion of the movement’s motivation stems from ideology and not politics. As
Taliban commander Mullah Sabir told Newsweek magazine in November, “This is not a
political campaign for policy change or power sharing or cabinet ministries. We are
waging a jihad to bring Islamic law back to Afghanistan” [11].
Furthermore, there is the nature of the Taliban itself. Although the “Taliban” are
identified as a group, it is more correctly identified as a loose alliance, united in
common violence. As Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau
of South and Central Asian Affairs, explained,
“the component entities have different motivations for fighting, including religious
ideology, political aspirations, tribal solidarity, and even temporary employment.
They work together tactically when their interests converge, but there is a lack of
real centralized command and control. To the extent there is a leadership group, it
resides in Quetta, Pakistan, with Mullah Omar as a titular head. Other key figures
include the extremist warlords, Hekmatyar and Siraj Haqqani, as well as many local
figures who fight on the provincial or district level for autonomy, tribal, or other
reasons.”
In addition to this complexity are the questions about what it means to “talk” to
the Taliban and whether any one element could enforce an agreement. It is also
doubtful whether the approach used in Anbar Province could be easily transferred to
Afghanistan, where elements of the Taliban share much of al-Qa`ida’s harsh brand of
Islam and believe that they are running their own war; two factors that did not exist
for Sunni nationalists in the Iraqi context.
Engagement Strategies
The rationale for engaging the Taliban in substantive talks rests primarily on the
belief that the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily and any lasting peace requires
a reconciliation process [12]. As General Petraeus said at a Heritage Foundation
forum in October 2008, “This is how you end these kinds of conflicts.” There is
“no alternative to reconciliation.”
That baseline assessment results in a differing opinion on whether the Taliban can be
reconciled. Those who are encouraging engagement suggest that the looseness of the
Taliban organization actually supports the argument for engaging in dialogue. It is
the lack of a strong central command and Taliban elements’ varied motivations for
fighting that make them vulnerable to division [13]. The focus in this context would
be to appeal to the non-ideological insurgents who are tired of the fight and ready
to return to a more peaceful daily life. For the ideologically disposed and senior
members of the Taliban, it is recognized that such approaches may be insufficient
absent military action but that “the availability of these talks as a political
solution is important to Afghanistan’s eventual peace” [14]. In either case,
supporters of engagement acknowledge that certain preconditions are necessary prior
to any dialogue. Current U.S. policy, for example, demands the following
preconditions: the Taliban must accept the Afghan constitution, abandon violence, cut
all ties with al-Qa`ida, and not be given power-sharing deals or territory to
control. The United States also has consistently held that any such negotiation talks
be Afghan-led.
The idea of an engagement strategy is not a new concept in the Afghan struggle. In
April 2003, President Karzai first announced plans for a reconciliation policy in a
speech before a gathering of ulama in Kabul, and in 2005 the Afghan government
established the Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission. In subsequent years,
the Afghan cabinet adopted an action plan regarding reconciliation, and the
Afghanistan National Assembly approved legislation on amnesty. As noted by Mohammad
Masoom Stanekzai, an adviser in the Afghan government, “attempts at outreach and
reconciliation on a more local level also have been initiated with modest success by
a number of actors—namely the Afghan government, nongovernmental organizations and
the international community” [15].
Most would agree, however, that reconciliation efforts to date have lacked
consistency and depth. As Stanekzai suggested, “The Afghan government and its
international partners have offered conflicting messages, and there has been no
consensual policy framework through which to pursue reconciliation in a cohesive
manner” [16]. The veracity of this argument can be appreciated when taking into
account how Afghan officials offered amnesty to individuals such as Mullah Omar in
direct contravention of UN Security Council resolutions that sanctioned those very
leaders [17].
Engagement Just One Element to Success
In the discussions about engagement, it has been easy to characterize the issue as
binary—whether or not to talk to the Taliban. Given the complex nature of the Taliban
and the social fabric of Afghanistan, however, the issue is far from that simple.
Moreover, it is clearly not a question of whether talking to the Taliban will win or
lose the war. Even supporters of engagement acknowledge that the Taliban have not
publicly participated in talks and have not shown signs they are serious about
negotiating. Even if they did, there is no guarantee any accommodation could be
reached. Much more is required to secure a lasting peace in Afghanistan. What is
important is to view the concept of talking to the Taliban for what it is: one
element with the potential for improving chances of success in Afghanistan that needs
to be considered as part of a larger, more coordinated strategy guided by welldefined goals.
That strategy would of course involve increased military forces and action. What is
clear is that any discussions with the Taliban must be approached from a position of
strength. To appeal to the Taliban in the current environment would likely embolden
them further and validate their strategy. In this regard, the ongoing combat
operations and additional forces bound for Afghanistan remain essential.
Despite the importance of increased troop levels in Afghanistan, they themselves
cannot bring victory. Reconciliation is a necessary component of an overarching
strategy. This does not only refer to reconciliation with Taliban elements, which has
the potential for being part of the solution by offering an avenue for insurgents to
come in from the cold, but it also refers to reconciliation of the Afghan government
with its people. As Joanna Nathan, an Afghanistan analyst with the International
Crisis Group, was quoted as saying in Time Magazine last year, “real reconciliation
should be taking place at the grass roots, with Afghans who have become alienated
from the government. If they can be persuaded that the government is looking after
their needs, they are less likely to support the Taliban” [18].
This means truly connecting the Afghan people to their government through more
focused and effective development efforts that provide basic services to ordinary
Afghans, real security sector reform such as that proposed by Afghanistan’s new
Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, an Afghan government seen as rooting out corruption,
and the development of a capable national army. Without real progress in development
and increasing the capacity of the government to provide for its citizens, it is
difficult to imagine that any amount of military action against the Taliban and its
associates will lead to a lasting peace. Reconciliation must also involve regional
actors such as Pakistan and India to resolve some of the root causes of strife in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Action needs to be taken to end the use of Afghanistan as a
proxy Indo-Pakistani battleground, as well as to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries in
Pakistan.
Indeed, there is much to reconcile. To the extent that the prospect of talking to or
reconciling with the Taliban, or elements of it, has garnered peoples’ attention, it
should be viewed in context as a single, complex, and possibly necessary element of a
much larger strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan.
Kara L. Bue is a partner at Armitage International, L.C. She served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2003-2005 and as
Special Assistant for South Asia to Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage
from 2001-2002. Prior to her service at the State Department, Ms. Bue practiced
corporate law in Washington, D.C. and held other positions in government at the
Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She currently serves
on the Board of Directors of National Interest Security Company, Kaseman LLC, and
Freedom Fields USA. She also is a member of the Board of Advisers of the Center for
Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School and serves as the Military
Outreach Fellow for the Center for U.S. Global Engagement.
John A. Gastright is Vice President for Government Affairs at DynCorp International.
From 2005 to 2007, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, as well as the interagency Coordinator for Afghanistan.
From 2003 to 2005, he was Special Assistant for South Asia to Deputy Secretary of
State Richard L. Armitage. Prior to his service at the State Department, Mr.
Gastright held several positions on Capitol Hill, including Chief of Staff to
Congressman Jack Kingston and Projects Director and Military Assistant to Senator
Strom Thurmond. From 1988 to 1994, he served on active duty as an officer in the U.S.
Navy.
Notes
[1] Jason Burke, “Revealed: Secret Taliban Peace Bid,” Guardian, September 28,
2008.
[2] Christina Lamb, “War on Taliban Cannot be Won, says Army Chief,” Sunday Times,
October 5, 2008.
[3] Aryn Baker, “Facing Reality in Afghanistan: Talking with the Taliban,” Time,
October 13, 2008.
[4] Paul Koring, “Time to Talk with the Taliban, Governments Say,” Globe and Mail,
October 28, 2008.
[5] Javed Hamim, “Hekmatyar Show Readiness for Conditional Peace Talks,” Pajhwok
Afghan News, October 29, 2008.
[6] Jason Straziuso, “Taliban, Afghan Officials Meet in Saudi Arabia,” USA Today,
October 6, 2008.
[7] Terry Glavin, “The Price of ‘Peace’ with the Taliban,” Vancouver Sun,
February 5, 2008, reflecting on comments by Dr. Sima Samar, the chairperson of
Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission.
[8] Cheryl Benard, “Talk to the Taliban? Not Now,” United Press International,
November 11, 2008.
[9] Baker.
[10] Ann Marlowe, “Don’t Negotiate with the Taliban,” Wall Street Journal,
November 18, 2008.
[11] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Taliban Two-Step: Can’t Sit Down Yet,”
Newsweek, November 10, 2008.
[12] Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, “Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic
Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report,
September 2008, p. 2.
[13] Fareed Zakaria, television interview of Dr. David Kilcullen, an Australian
counterinsurgency specialist who advises the U.S. and British governments, CNN,
November 16, 2008.
[14] These comments were made by Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher.
[15] Stanekzai, p. 10.
[16] Ibid., p. 1.
[17] The Security Council resolutions in question refer to UNSCR 1267 (1999) and 1735
(2006).
[18] Baker.
The Punjabi Taliban
Causes and Consequences of Turning Against the State
Jul 03, 2010
Ben Brandt
the kidnapping and murder of former Inter-Services Intelligence officer and Usama bin
Ladin confidant Khalid Khwaja in March 2010 generated a wave of analysis throughout
the counterterrorism community.[1] Although analysts have offered a variety of
theories regarding both the nature of the “Asian Tigers” group that executed Khwaja
and their motives in killing him, most have correctly noted that the incident is
symbolic of a broader splintering between Punjabi militants espousing allegiance to
the Pakistani state and a younger generation that has aligned itself with al-Qa`ida
and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), turning their guns on the Pakistani government
and the West. It is important to understand the manifestations of this fracture, as
well as its causes and potential consequences, to better gauge the threat posed to
the United States by what is frequently called the “Punjabi Taliban.”[2]
Various Manifestations of Anti-State Sentiment
Khalid Khwaja’s execution is perhaps the most graphic manifestation of a trend that
has been occurring for some time, particularly within terrorist groups that had
previously designated India or rival Muslim sects as their targets. One of the best
documented fissures within a Pakistani terrorist group dedicated to jihad against
India is that which occurred within Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JM) in 2002-2003. In 2002,
members of JM were implicated in a number of attacks targeting Pakistani Christians
in Punjab, while in 2003 Masood Azhar, the founder of the group, expelled a dozen
ranking JM members after revelations that they had organized attacks against Western
and Christian targets in Pakistan without his authorization.[3] In July of the same
year, he reportedly informed the Punjab governor that he had made the expulsions,
that he should not be held responsible for the actions of the expelled members, and
that the expelled members should be arrested.[4]
Azhar’s decision caused a major schism within the group, as members deserted Azhar
and joined the expelled individuals to form Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JuF).[5] Members of JuF
were consequently arrested in connection to an assassination attempt against thenPrime Minister Shaukat Aziz in 2004, and Rashid Rauf, who helped mastermind the 2006
liquid explosives plot that targeted trans-Atlantic flights, was described by an
intelligence source as having utilized cooperation from members of JuF.[6] Today, JuF
is thought to constitute part of the so-called Punjabi Taliban, which has executed
attacks throughout Pakistan; Maulana Abdul Jabbar, who previously served as Azhar’s
deputy, is described as being involved with training fighters for JuF in North
Waziristan.[7]
Other Pakistani terrorist groups focused on Kashmir have exhibited noteworthy
fissures as well. A group calling itself Harkat-ul-Mujahidin al-Alami (HuMA) emerged
from Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM) in 2002, executing a string of attacks in Karachi
against Western businesses, the U.S. Consulate, and then-President Pervez
Musharraf.[8] The sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) has also seen members
leave to attack targets associated with the Pakistani state and the West.[9]
It is important to note that most Punjabi militants sympathetic to al-Qa`ida and the
TTP move away from their parent groups in less dramatic fashion than JuF and HuMA,
and many appear to maintain links with both their original organization and al-Qa`ida
and the Pakistani Taliban. A report last year chronicled the saga of a JM commander
wounded in a drone strike while meeting with Taliban leaders. He was protected from
arrest by his men while recuperating in Bahawalpur[10] and was later believed to have
sought refuge in a JM seminary.[11] His case shows the overlapping memberships that
many individuals hold in the region.
In the case of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI), the group’s leadership appears to
have been involved in the decision to turn against the state. Amir Qari Saifullah
Akhtar and operational commander Ilyas Kashmiri currently reside in Waziristan and
enjoy strong ties to al-Qa`ida and the TTP. The status of the sectarian group
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) appears to be similar to that of HuJI, as many of LJ’s amirs
have been implicated in plotting attacks against the state.[13]
The role of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT, or LeT), perhaps Pakistan’s most prominent
terrorist group following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, is less clear. Although the LT’s
leadership has remained relatively loyal to the Pakistani military, members of the
group have broken away to assist in attacks against the state. An example of this can
be seen in the case of Umar Kundi, an LT member who left after quarreling with the
group’s leadership over its subservience to the Pakistani government and later
assisted in attacks against Pakistani law enforcement and intelligence
facilities.[14] LT’s decision to establish a presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas
and interact with al-Qa`ida and TTP members operating there has likely facilitated
this process.[15]
A 2009 LT plot to attack the U.S. and UK embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh has given
rise to rumors about the emergence of a faction within the group advocating open
attacks against Western interests. The fact that a retired Pakistan Army major
affiliated with LT helped David Headley plot a terrorist attack in Denmark last year
further amplifies these concerns.[16] If elements within LT continue to plot
increasingly brazen attacks against Western interests, it could force an open schism
within the group, and drive members espousing an anti-Western agenda into greater
conflict with LT’s leadership and the state.
Causes for Splintering Among Punjabi Militant Groups
Various factors have caused fissures within Punjabi terrorist groups and between
these groups and the state. The July 2007 storming of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), a
notorious center of Deobandi militant activity in Islamabad, is frequently and
correctly noted as an important catalyst in Punjabi militants’ decision to strike
the state.[17] This point is graphically illustrated by the massive increase in mass
casualty terrorist attacks in Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi since mid-2007.
According to data provided by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, for example,
terrorist attacks in Lahore killed a total of 30 people from May 2004-July 2007, yet
have killed approximately 229 people from August 2007-June 2010.[18] Similarly,
terrorist attacks in Islamabad killed 25 people from July 2004-July 2007, yet 171
people since.[19] The significance of the attack on Lal Masjid is also illustrated by
the attack on the Manawan Police Training School outside Lahore in March 2009, where
attackers reportedly shouted “Oh red mosque attackers, we have come” during their
assault.[20] Similarly, the Ghazi Force, which has staged several attacks against the
Pakistani state, was named for Abdul Rashid Ghazi, one of the two brothers who served
as heads of Lal Masjid.[21]
Despite the likely role of the Lal Masjid assault in furthering breaches between
militants, other factors have contributed as well. Journalist Nicholas Schmidle has
noted that Abdul Rashid Ghazi stated two months prior to the storming of the mosque
that organizations such as SSP and JM were experiencing an increasing number of
defections among their ranks.[22] Multiple assassination attempts against Musharraf
in December 2003 and other members of Pakistan’s military and government by members
of Punjabi terrorist groups prior to July 2007 also illustrate this phenomenon.
The relationship between many Punjabi terrorist groups and the former Taliban
government of Afghanistan is another cause for the ongoing rifts within Pakistan’s
jihadist community. During the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan, a large number of
Deobandi terrorist groups established strong relations with al-Qa`ida and the Taliban
government (which shared their adherence to Deobandi Islam[23]), established training
camps in the country, and fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance
and ethnic minorities such as the Hazara.[24] The tight linkages between the
Pakistani groups and the Taliban regime were exemplified by HuJI’s Qari Saifullah
Akhtar’s reported status as political adviser to Mullah Omar, as well as by Masood
Azhar’s visit to Mullah Omar following his release from an Indian prison.[25] The
U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 engendered strenuous resistance by many
Punjabi terrorist groups; Amjad Farooqi (a member of HuJI later tied to an
assassination plot against Musharraf) reportedly led fighters into Afghanistan to
battle NATO forces.[26]
Anger among members of Punjabi terrorist groups was compounded by the Musharraf
government’s acquiescence to the U.S. invasion, as well as its decision to assist
the United States by curtailing militant operations in Kashmir to improve relations
with India.[27] Members scorned the corresponding acquiescence of many leaders of
terrorist groups to Musharraf,[28] despite their previous fiery denunciations of the
United States.[29] One particularly cutting comment on this subject came from ranking
JM member Abdullah Shah Mazhar, who gave as his reason for leaving the group:
“Maulana [Masood] Azhar has nothing to do with jihad anymore and that was why we
broke away from him.”[30] Similarly, Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah has stated
that when leaders of SSP and LJ were flown in to negotiate with former members of
their groups when the latter attacked the Pakistan Army’s general headquarters last
year, the leaders were reportedly told, “You are traitors, you have left the right
path.”[31]
A final factor that may cause splintering among Punjabi terrorist groups is the
influence of al-Qa`ida, which has preached violence against both the West and the
Pakistani government.[32] As noted previously, members of Punjabi terrorist groups
developed ties to al-Qa`ida during their sojourns in Afghanistan, interacting with
and training alongside each other and thus creating an opportunity for ideological
cross-fertilization.[33] Lashkar-i-Tayyiba possesses additional bonds with al-Qa`ida,
such as its adherence to the Salafi-like sect Ahl-e-Hadith, and the reported role of
al-Qa`ida-affiliated individuals in its founding.[34] Additional personal ties were
forged during the exodus of jihadists from Afghanistan following Operation Enduring
Freedom. It is reported that Amjad Farooqi developed ties with al-Qa`ida operations
chief Abu Faraj al-Libi in this period, later leading to the two working together in
attempts to assassinate Musharraf.[35] Al-Qa`ida’s uncompromising adherence to
struggle against the United States and its allies in the Pakistani government likely
proved attractive to Pakistani militants frustrated with the relative inaction of
their own leadership.[36] Similarly, al-Qa`ida’s call for a global jihad against the
West gained stronger resonance when Punjabi groups operating in Afghanistan were
directly affected by the U.S. invasion in 2001.
Consequences and Future Trends
Various outcomes can be anticipated from splintering within Punjabi terrorist groups
and the alignment of many of their members with al-Qa`ida and Pakistani Taliban
groups. The mainline factions of groups wishing to avoid conflict with the state will
likely become marginalized as they continue to hemorrhage members to anti-statist
groups. A recent estimate from a minister in Punjab estimated that between 10-20% of
JM, SSP, and LJ members have joined the Punjabi Taliban.[37] At the same time, many
dissidents may remain involved with their former organizations to some extent, and
attempt to co-opt their resources and personnel.[38] The extensive training of many
members of Punjabi terrorist groups and their access to the resources of their former
organizations helps augment the ability of al-Qa`ida to train Westerners for attacks
overseas, and may help it mitigate the effects of drone strikes that have killed many
of the group’s most experienced operational commanders.[39] As illustrated by the
aforementioned LT plot against the U.S. and UK embassies in Dhaka, Punjabi militants
aligned with al-Qa`ida could potentially use their organizations’ resources to
strike against Western interests throughout South Asia.
At the same time, many analysts have argued that al-Qa`ida’s involvement with
Pakistani militants engaged in bloody attacks against Muslims has strained its
relationship with its longtime allies among the Haqqani network and the Afghan
Taliban.[40] If this is true, al-Qa`ida risks further alienating these groups by
drawing closer to anti-statist elements. Al-Qa`ida’s affiliation with the TTP and
Punjabi militants has also significantly damaged its image in the eyes of Pakistanis:
the Pew Research Center recorded that the number of Pakistanis who viewed al-Qa`ida
favorably dropped from 25% in 2008 to 9% in 2009.[41] This affiliation could
potentially erode the group’s credibility among Muslims worldwide as well,
particularly if the Punjabi militants aligning themselves with al-Qa`ida are granted
official permission to use the al-Qa`ida brand. A precedent for this can be seen in
the group’s previously unpopular affiliation with Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.[42]
The consequences of the decision by many Punjabi militants to turn against their
state sponsors and frequently away from their own militant organizations will
continue to play out in the months and years to come. Although the activities of
these groups and individuals may weaken al-Qa`ida’s global appeal in the long-term,
they pose challenges to Pakistan’s internal stability and to the security of the
United States in the interim.
Ben Brandt is currently a threat analyst in the private sector, prior to which he
monitored South Asian extremist issues at the NJ Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, and researched terrorist attack planning methodologies at Booz Allen
Hamilton. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University.
[1] For details, see Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Kidnapping and Execution of Khalid
Khwaja in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 3:5 (2010); Nicholas Schmidle, “How Did A
Pakistan Ex-Spy End Up Dead?” The New Republic, May 4, 2010.
[2] Hassan Abbas has defined the Punjabi Taliban as “a loose conglomeration of
members of banned organizations of Punjabi origin” that work with Tehrik-i-Taliban
to execute attacks inside Pakistan. Abbas described the Punjabi Taliban as being
primarily composed of members of the groups Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-iJhangvi, and Jaysh-i-Muhammad; disaffected anti-statist members of several other
groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin
may be considered part of the Punjabi Taliban as well. For details, see Hassan Abbas,
“Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).
[3] Amir Mir, “The Maulana’s Scattered Beads,” Outlook India, September 1, 2003.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Ibid.
[6] For more information, see the South Asia Terrorism Portal file on “Jaish-eMohammed (Army of the Prophet),” located at www.satp.org.
[7] Amir Mir, “South Punjab Threat,” The News International, October 25, 2009;
Asif Shahzad, “Pakistani Militancy Spreads to Country’s Heartland,” Associated
Press, June 16, 2010.
[8] For more information, see the South Asia Terrorism Portal file on “Harakat-ulMujahideen Al-alami (HuMA),” located at www.satp.org. There is some debate as to
whether Harkat-ul-Mujahidin al-Alami represented a true splinter faction of Harkatul-Mujahidin, or was merely a ruse used by the group to stage attacks. Given the
Asian Tigers’ recent vilification of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin and its long-time commander
Fazlur Rahman Khalil as “proxies” of the ISI, however, it appears reasonable to
assume that it represents a genuine splinter.
[9]
Shahzad; Schmidle.
[10] Bahawalpur is a major hub for Jaysh-i-Muhammad; Masood Azhar was born in the
city and currently resides there.
[11] Matthew Rosenberg, “Taliban Wages War on Police in Pakistan,” Wall Street
Journal, May 28, 2009.
[12] Bill Roggio, “Top Al Qaeda Leader Linked to 5 Americans on Trial in
Pakistan,” The Long War Journal, April 17, 2010.
[13] LJ is closely affiliated with the SSP. For details, see “Obituary: Qari
Mohammad Zafar,” BBC, March 2, 2010.
[14] Sabrina Tavernise and Waqar Gillani, “Frustrated Strivers in Pakistan Turn to
Jihad,” New York Times, February 27, 2010.
[15] Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” New
America Foundation, February 2010.
[16] U.S.A. v. Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, “Criminal Complaint,” Northern District
of Illinois, 2009.
[17] The Deobandi militant groups reacted more vehemently to the storming of Lal
Masjid than did LT. First, because LT is an Ahl-e-Hadith organization and therefore
was not as well-connected to the pro-Taliban Deobandi elements at Lal Masjid. Second,
because of its Ahl-e-Hadith identity and organizational history of abjuring attacks
in Pakistan, LT was also less involved with the Deobandi actors who constituted the
already brewing insurgency. This information is based on personal interview, Stephen
Tankel, July 2010.
[18]
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, U.S. National Counterterrorism Center,
accessed June 16, 2010.
[19]
Ibid.
[20] Sabrina Tavernise, Waqar Gillani, and Salman Masood, “Rampage in Pakistan Shows
Reach of Militants,” New York Times, March 30, 2009.
[21] Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed in the security assault on Lal Masjid. For
details, see Animesh Roul, “Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the
Punjabi Jihad?” Terrorism Monitor 8:28 (2010).
[22]
Schmidle.
[23] LT did not enjoy similarly close ties to the Taliban leadership due to its
adherence to the Ahl-e-Hadith sect, but did train in the Afghan provinces of Kunar
and Nuristan during the 1990s. For details, see Daan Van Der Schriek, “Nuristan:
Insurgent Hideout in Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor 3:10 (2006).
[24] See, for example, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2001); Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc. (New York: Free Press, 2001); Kanchan Lakshman,
“Deep Roots to Pakistan’s Sectarian Terror,” Asia Times Online, July 9, 2003.
[25] Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” The News International, September 23,
2008.
[26] Bill Roggio, “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Attack on Pakistan Army
Headquarters,” The Long War Journal, October 10, 2009.
[27] Amir Mir, “The Jihad Lives On,” Asia Times Online, March 11, 2005; Tim
McGirk, “The Monster Within,” Time Magazine, January 19, 2004. Musharraf noted in
his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, that Mohammed Jamil, a suicide bomber who
attempted to kill him in 2003, swore an oath against him after becoming embittered
after fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan. Ahmed Rashid described Jamil as a member
of Jaysh-i-Muhammad in his book Descent into Chaos. Some reports also suggest that
members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi joined with al-Qa`ida due to Musharraf’s decision to
ban Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and engage in a major crackdown on the group. For details, see
Lakshman.
[28] One example is Azam Tariq, then-amir of Sipah-i-Sahaba, who was released from
prison and allowed to sit in Pakistan’s National Assembly, providing political
support to Musharraf’s government until Tariq’s assassination by a Shi`a activist
in 2003.
[29] According to the Indian government, Azhar called for “jihad” against the
United States upon his release from an Indian prison. Similarly, Fazlur Rahman Khalil
of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin was a signatory of Bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa that called upon
Muslims to kill Americans. Also see Steve Coll, “Time Bomb,” New Yorker, January
28, 2008.
[30] Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal
Books, 2004).
[31] Shahzad. Amir Mir reported that Fazlur Rahman Khalil of HuM and Mufti Abdul
Rauf, younger brother of Masood Azhar, were flown in to negotiate as well.
[32] Usama bin Ladin reportedly called for Musharraf’s overthrow in 2002, and Ayman
al-Zawahiri did so in 2003, four months before twin assassination attempts against
Musharraf.
[33] As is well known, a 1998 cruise missile strike against training camps in
Afghanistan associated with Bin Ladin killed a number of Harkat-ul-Mujahidin members,
while Nicholas Schmidle reports that Qari Saifullah Akhtar arranged a meeting between
Bin Ladin and Maulana Abdullah of Lal Masjid in 1998.
[34] These include, for example, Usama bin Ladin’s mentor `Abdullah `Azzam and Bin
Ladin associate Abu Abdul Aziz “Barbaros.” For details, see Bill Roggio,
“Pakistani Court Orders Release of Lashkar-e-Taiba Leader,” The Long War Journal,
June 2, 2009; Evan F. Kohlmann, “Expert Witness: Synopsis of Testimony from Regina
v. Mohammed Ajmal Khan, Palvinder Singh, and Frzana Khan,” NEFA Foundation, undated.
[35] Roggio, “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Attack on Pakistan Army
Headquarters.”
[36] The leadership of some groups, however, was involved in tacitly assisting alQa`ida directly after 9/11. LT’s leadership directed elements within the
organization to provide safe houses and other forms of logistical support to foreign
fighters, including members of al-Qa`ida, fleeing Afghanistan after 9/11. Personal
interview, Stephen Tankel, July 2010. Tankel is conducting research for his book,
Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
[37] Shahzad. It should be noted that the minister in question, Punjab Law Minister
Rana Sanuallah, has been criticized for his ties to Sipah-i-Sahaba.
[38] There is precedent for this form of cooption in the decision of many Pakistani
terrorist groups to recruit at the annual ijtema of the apolitical Deobandi movement
Tablighi Jama`at. Similar trends have been spotted in other theaters of operations as
well: Noordin Top exploited his connections with Jemaah Islamiya to build his
splinter group al-Qa`ida in the Malay Peninsula.
[39] The impressive tradecraft displayed by both David Headley’s reconnaissance
efforts and by the subsequent LT assault on Mumbai are indicative of the skills
Punjabi militants could conceivably leverage on behalf of al-Qa`ida.
[40] Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan:
Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” New America Foundation, April 2010;
David S. Cloud and Julian S. Barnes, “Some U.S. Officials See a Growing Taliban-Al
Qaeda Rift,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2010.
[41]
“Pakistani Public Opinion,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, August 13, 2009.
[42]
“Confidence in Osama bin Laden,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009.