Autonomous Actors or Faithful Agents?
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations by Darren G. Hawkins; David A. Lake;
Daniel L. Nielson
Review by: Michael J. Tierney and Christopher S. Marcoux
International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer, 2007), pp. 262-264
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International
StudiesReview(2007) 9, 262-264
Autonomous Actors or Faithful Agents?
REVIEWBY CHRISTOPHER
S. MARCOUX
Political
Science,
VirginiaPolytechnicInstituteand State University
Departmentof
Delegation and Agencyin InternationalOrganizations.Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A.
Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and MichaelJ. Tierney.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
2006. 424 pp., $80.00 cloth (ISBN:0-521-86209-4),$34.99 paper (ISBN:0-521-68046-8).
Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney open Delegation and Agencyin InternationalOrganizationsby sketching two metaphors that capture contradictory popular understandings of international organizations (IOs).
For some, contemporary international organizations are "institutional Frankensteins terrorizing the global countryside" (p. 4). For others, they are little more
than willing tools of their creators. This distinction frames the book, which is
divided into two main sections. The first examines "when and why ... states delegate to an IO and what sets of rules govern that interaction" (p. 5). The second
focuses on the sources of IO behavior after they are established as well as the
ability of states to anticipate potential problems and maintain control.
To gain leverage over these questions, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, Tierney and
their contributors turn to principal-agent theory, arguing that it is equally relevant for international relations as it is for domestic politics. Given that principalagent theory has been less prominent in international relations than in the study
of US politics, the volume's most immediate contribution may lie in the Introduction's comprehensive and clear elaboration of the principal-agent framework.
Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney explain that "to be a principal, an actor
must be able to both grant authority and rescind it" (p. 7). Furthermore, delegation involves "a conditional grant of authority from a principalto an agent" (p. 7,
italics in the original). The editors define "agency slack" (unwanted independent action by an agent) as a potential problem with any delegation. They distinguish two forms of slack: shirking (in which an agent minimizes effort) and
slippage (in which agents divert policy away from principals' preferences toward
their own). They usefully distinguish between IO discretion (leeway in choosing
policies to bring about specified ends) from IO autonomy (the full range of possible actions available to international organizations, notwithstanding principals'
mechanisms of control). Finally, the editors sharpen their concept of delegation
by explaining clearly what delegation is not (namely, it is not unilateralism or
international agreement, implemented domestically).
Having defined these concepts, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney proceed
to outline the two primary goals of the book: (1) to explain why states delegate
authority to international organizations, accounting for variation in delegation,
and (2) to explain how principals attempt to control agents, and how agents
sometimes obtain significant autonomy. "By delegating, states reap gains from
specialization, as well as capture policy externalities, facilitate collective decisionmaking, resolve disputes, enhance credibility, and lock-in policy biases" (p. 23).
In contrast, delegation is hampered by preference heterogeneity (among principals) and asymmetry between state power and organizational decision rules. With
respect to the second goal, principals' attempt to control agents by (1) emphasizing specific rules and minimizing discretion, (2) monitoring agent behavior, (3)
@ 2007 InternationalStudiesReview.
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CHRISTOPHER
S. MARCOUX
263
carefully selecting agents with desired preferences, (4) creating checks and balances among agents, and (5) using sanctions.
The bulk of Delegationand Agencyin International Organizationsis dedicated to
exploring these two concerns. Part 2 addresses variation in principal preferences,
structure, decision rules, and private benefits. Part 3 addresses variation in agent
preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability. Although each chapter makes a
notable, unique contribution to the volume, a number of themes stand out.
Mona Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney (Chapter 2) introduce a typology of "principal
structure" that informs the rest of the volume. Principals may consist of one (a
single principal) or many actors. Multiple principals exist when each actor contracts separately with the agent. Collective principals require collective decision
making prior to delegation. Principal structure has important consequences for
agent autonomy. Lawrence Broz and Michael Hawes (Chapter 3) and Helen
Milner (Chapter 4) resist assuming unitary state interests, instead locating the
source of principals' control over international organizations in the preferences
of domestic political groups. A number of contributors point to principals' need
for information as a reason for delegation. Lisa Martin (Chapter 5) finds that
demand for reliable information in recipient countries "is probably the most
compelling explanation for staff agency that appears throughout IMF history"
(p. 164).
In Part 3, Alexander Thompson (Chapter 8) points out that agent characteristics can also influence the informational function of an international organization. Specifically, the heterogeneous preference structure of the UN Security
Council permits it to serve as a reliable signal of the legitimacy of a potential use
of force. Another common theme, noted particularly by Hawkins and Wade
Jacoby (Chapter 7) and Martin, is that a higher congruence between the interests of agents and principals is likely to lead to greater levels of delegation. The
nature of delegated tasks also influences the level of delegation. Karen Alter
(Chapter 11) notes a variety of reasons why the behavior of international courts
is difficult to control. Similarly, Erica Gould (Chapter 10) points to a number of
reasons why the International Monetary Fund is a "particularly costly agent"
(p. 304) for principals to monitor effectively, and Hawkins and Jacoby sketch a
number of strategies available to agents to increase their autonomy.
The chapters, individually and collectively, make a substantial contribution to
scholarship on international organizations, demonstrating the promise of principal-agent theory. In the Conclusion, Lake and Mathew McCubbins reach
beyond these contributions to explore the "research frontier" of principalagent approaches in the study of international organizations. Specifically, they
examine the use of third parties as a potential mechanism for strengthening
principals' control over such organizations. Even though they are no doubt correct when they assert that exploring the role of third parties will be a productive avenue for future research, Lake and McCubbins' claim that the study of
principals' use of third parties to reassert control over international organizations will be "central to future research" (p. 347) will doubtless leave some
readers frustrated.
This conclusion deviates from the original focus of Delegation and Agency in
International Organizations.It essentially abandons the original agnostic stance
toward IO agency in favor of successful delegation and moves away from the
volume's earlier commitment to viewing "agents as actors" (p. 31). Lake and
McCubbins correctly claim that the strategies they identify for increasing principals' capacity respond to skeptics of IO control (Barnett and Finnemore 1999,
2004). Yet their response does not fully engage the substance of this criticism.
To the extent that states sometimes choose to delegate authority absent
strict controls (as suggested by Alter) and to the extent that international organizations are sometimes valued for their commitment to general principles
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264
Autonomous
ActorsorFaithfulAgents?
(as Milner suggests), it is unclear whether IO agency necessarily is a problem in
need of fixing. It is even less clear that more control is necessarily the solution.
Increasing the accountability of international organizations to member states
represents one critical avenue for future research, but it is only one avenue. The
commitment to international organizations as actors, advanced at the outset of
the volume, suggests that the principal-agent framework may be potentially useful for examining a broader range of concerns, such as organizational change.
Additionally, it opens the possibility that international organizations may exert
reciprocal influence on state interests. In Milner's study, domestic public opinion
shapes states' choices regarding whether to provide foreign aid unilaterally or
multilaterally. Yet, it is also plausible that international organizations influence
domestic public opinion regarding the value of "humanitarian," as opposed to
targeted, aid. Similarly, Alter describes "legitimacy politics" (p. 336) as a strategy
by which international organizations may influence principals. Finally, Mark
Pollack (Chapter 6) finds evidence for social learning in that delegation to the
European Union influenced other states' decisions to delegate to international
organizations. Thus, perhaps the greatest contribution of the volume may be to
create space for a genuine dialogue between sociological and rationalist
approaches to explaining specific empirical puzzles of international organizations.
Delegation and Agency in International Organizationsconvincingly demonstrates
the promise-and the potential limits-of principal-agent approaches to the
study of international organization generally. It also contributes to our understanding of a number of specific international organizations. The book deserves,
and will find, a wide audience among scholars of international organizations.
References
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(1999) The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. InternationalOrganization53:699-732.
BARNETT, MICHAEL, AND MARTHA FINNEMORE.(2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in
GlobalPolitics.Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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