The Common Property Dilemma:
Governance of Common Pool Resources
with Regards to Livestock Production in
Grahamstown, South Africa
Authors: Martyn de Jong, Nicola Nowosiad, James Radloff, Deryn-Anne Swatton,
Joanne van Aardt and Angus van Wyk
Group 3
1 Abstract
A municipal commonage is an important component of South Africa’s land reform programme.
Looking specifically at Grahamstown, little is known about the governance and management
of such commonages. In this paper, a report is drawn up from a survey of randomly selected
households within Grahamstown, to determine what formal and informal institutions are
governing the access and use of the commonage and thus how do these multiple spheres interact
with one another at a household scale. After key informant interviews were conducted there
was a greater understanding regarding the community’s buy-in into the bylaws which remain
a draft since 2011. The Grahamstown commonage is essentially considered a common pool
resource, and thus there are certain principles that need to be achieved for such a strategy to
succeed (Ostrom, 2010). Due to the lack of man power and funding, management of the
commonage has proven to be difficult. The results of this study revealed that there was no
significant relation between the formal governance and the informal livestock practices due to
a lack of communication and trust between these two spheres.
i 2 Contents
1.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 4
2.
Objectives and Key Questions ............................................................................................ 8
3.
Study Area .......................................................................................................................... 9
4.
Methods ............................................................................................................................ 10
4.1 Key Informant Interviews .............................................................................................. 10
4.2 Household Surveys ......................................................................................................... 11
4.3 Data analyses .................................................................................................................. 12
5.
Results .............................................................................................................................. 13
5.1 Respondent background ................................................................................................. 13
5.2 Formal institutions.......................................................................................................... 14
5.3 Commonage boundaries ................................................................................................. 16
5.4 Informal institutions ....................................................................................................... 18
6.
Discussion......................................................................................................................... 19
7.
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 22
List of Figures
Figure 1.
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Figure 2.
13
Figure 3.
15
Figure 4.
17
Figure 5.
18
List of Tables
Table 1.
11
3 1. Introduction
The concept of ownership is one which has become central to the issue of governance, mainly
because it is understood that the ownership of an entity, within reason, grants an implicit control
over that entity to the owner (Haefele, 2011). Issues arise therefore, when no clear ownership
exists. In many cases, an entity or resource is either owned by no one, or everyone, such as in
the case of the oceans and the atmosphere, to name but a few (Haefele, 2011). Common pool
resources, as these resources which defy normal ideas of ownership are known, are therefore
the focus of much literature postulating about the factors which are at play in governing such
regimes and the management practices which are, or should be put, in place. The issue is of
particular relevance to developing urban areas, in which people are heavily dependent on the
natural environment to supplement their livelihoods (Twine, 2013). One of the most common
of these alternative sources of income is the rearing of livestock, with Africa having a higher
number of people engaged in extensive livestock farming than anywhere else in the world
(Swallow & Bromley, 1995). In South Africa for example, where common property regimes
in the form of municipal commonages are prevalent, the rearing of livestock such as cattle,
goats, and sheep plays a vital role in sustaining local communities within urban areas
(Davenport, Gambiza, & Shackleton, 2012).
In order to fully understand the issue at hand, one must first familiarise oneself with the
conceptual thinking and theoretical frameworks which have arisen around the dilemma posed
by common pool resources. The conundrum was first brought to light in Hardin’s 1968 paper
entitled, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, in which he highlights the inherent failings of a
system in which resources are freely accessible to all (Agrawal, 2014). In essence, Hardin
argues in favour of a “rational egoist” model to predict the behaviour of the resource users in
common pool resource regimes – behaviour which ultimately leads to overexploitation of the
resource in question (Anaafo, 2013). According to Hardin, such abuse occurs because the
benefits of using the resource go directly to the individual user, but the costs of degrading the
resource in the process are shared collectively amongst all of the resource users (Agrawal,
2014; Anaafo, 2013). This sets up a scenario in which the short-term benefits of resource
exploitation far outweigh the detriments, and users become incentivised to push the resource
to its very limits in the pursuit of individual gains (Agrawal, 2014; Anaafo, 2013).
Since the publication of Hardin’s influential paper, much research has been conducted into the
“rational egoist” theory, with new models and frameworks being updated and created.
4 However, critics of the theory argue that it oversimplifies, or indeed overlooks, the complex
socio-political factors that play a role in governing such a common pool resource (Swallow &
Bromley, 1995). Indeed, there are many examples of common pool resources which have been
hailed as resounding success stories, such as the Swiss Alpine grazing commons, bringing into
question the applicability of Hardin’s model in certain contexts (Stevenson, 1991). Elinor
Ostrom (2014), a leading authority on collective action and its link to socio-ecological systems,
argues that there is a second group of individuals, overlooked by Hardin’s model, who allow
common pool resource regimes to succeed in non-market settings. This second group of
individuals abide by the social norms of fairness, trust, and reciprocity, and it is this group
which negates the influence of the ’rational egoists’, preventing the overexploitation of the
resource (Ostrom, 2014).
Poteete and Ostrom (2010) conceptualized that certain principles need be achieved to allow for
these common pool resource regimes to succeed. These include: a need for clear group
boundaries, rules governing use of common goods must to be matched to local needs and
conditions, those affected by these rules must be able to participate in modifying the rules, the
rule-making rights of the defined community must be respected by ‘outsiders’, a system needs
to be in existence and carried out by the community that monitors members’ behaviour,
sanctions must be available for rule breakers, there must be means for conflict resolution and
the responsibility for governing the common resource must be nested in all levels of the system
(Poteete & Ostrom, 2010). These eight principles have since gained much attention and
subsequently there is a large amount of research surrounding the topic however, very little is
known about the exact role these social norms play in such a scenario, or how they are passed
to and from individuals in the community. Ostrom (2014) herself alludes to this knowledge gap
in her 2014 paper, calling for further research to be conducted in the area, and citing the
influence of social norms as a possible solution to the classic “Tragedy of the Commons”
scenario (Ostrom, 2014). It therefore becomes imperative that further study is undertaken, as
these models influence not only the theoretical thinking of the time, but also have a far more
tangible effect by influencing policy.
The debate around the governance of common pool resources and the way forward is of
particular relevance to developing urban areas, in which people are heavily dependent on the
natural environment to supplement their livelihoods, and where poverty remains an underlying
issue in common pool resource usage (Twine, 2013). Rural to urban migration, coupled with
poor access to arable land, increasing population growth rates, and strained non-agricultural
5 employment sectors are all placing an ever increasing pressure upon natural resource bases,
especially in the developing world (Jayne, Chamberlin, & Muyanga, 2012). It becomes evident
that, if we are to be effective in combating issues such as land degradation, further research on
the contribution of common pool resources to unsustainable resource management practices is
desperately needed.
In terms of the developing world context, South Africa is a country which provides a unique
opportunity for the study of common pool resource regimes given its Apartheid history and
consequent land tenure laws which place a great deal of importance on municipal commonages.
With the enactment of democracy in 1994, the National Department of Agriculture and Land
Affairs set the goal of redistributing 30% of the land to black aspirant farmers by 2015
(Cartwright, Harrison, & Benseler, 2002). Land Reform Programmes introduced by the state
have since aimed at creating a more accessible form of the municipal commonage by giving
individuals’ access to land, creating livelihood opportunities, and developing local economies
(Davenport, Gambiza, & Shackleton, 2012). According to the White Paper on South African
Land Policy, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) will encourage local municipalities to help
develop commonages in large areas of the country, both rural and urban, which will allow poor
people to gain access to grazing lands in an effort to enhance food security in the country
(Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). The aim of these commonages is to promote and support
emergent farmers by supplying the poor with cattle that can be used for subsistence and/or
commercial farming purposes (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). The ownership of the land is
granted to the municipality and is controlled by a set of conditions (Cartwright, Harrison, &
Benseler, 2002). Once these municipalities have been allocated the land, the DLA does not
take responsibility for supporting or monitoring the commonage thereafter, leaving this task to
the local government (Cartwright, Harrison, & Benseler, 2002).
While the framework devised by the DLA to govern these commonages is, in theory, sound, in
practice there are many issues that prevent such policy from being effective. For example, in
most instances the local municipalities put in charge of these commonages have insufficient
funds and limited to no training (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). This has a trickle-down effect
on the users of the commonage, who are often uneducated and financially unstable, and
therefore rely on the municipality for this kind of support (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009).
Furthermore, this lack of municipal expertise means that knowledge circulates poorly, and the
majority of the farmers are unaware of their rights with regards to the DLA’s policy which
6 states that farmers may apply for funds to purchase their own agricultural land (Davenport &
Gambiza, 2009).
On an administrative level, the DLA’s commonage policy is at times ambiguous and legal
arrangements are often unclear, resulting in the land being used communally without proper
rental agreements being enforced (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). This, in conjunction with
poor municipal organisation and irregular support from the Department of Agriculture, means
that the commonage vulnerable to the abuse outlined by Hardin, which is discussed above.
Bearing these problems in mind, it becomes clear that the status quo is severely lacking, and
that further research is needed in order provide insight into how to create clearer and more
effective policy frameworks, but also, how to overcome challenges, such as a lack of funding,
which are unlikely to improve in the near future. Indeed, South Africa provides an invaluable
opportunity for researching the effectiveness of the social norms approach suggested by
Ostrom (2014). Social norms could act as a form of informal institutions which step in where
formal institutions have failed, due to externalities such as poor municipal governance and a
shortage of funds.
Grahamstown, a town located in the Eastern Cape where rural and urban lines are blurred,
epitomises the issues of common property regimes experienced by South Africa and therefore
serves well as a case study, providing an accurate representation of the conditions experienced
elsewhere in the country. In addition, the Grahamstown Commonage is a common pool
resource which has been fairly extensively studied, meaning that future research in the area
will be based on a solid foundation and a holistic image of the commonage may be built over
time.
The issues experienced on a local level in Grahamstown are similar to those experienced on a
national level by other common property regimes throughout South Africa. For example,
according to Davenport and Gambiza (2009), the municipality lacks the capacity to manage
the commonage effectively in terms of both manpower and a lack of funding. This type of poor
governance can have particularly devastating effects in areas such as Grahamstown where the
levels of reliance on the commonage are so high. The conditions experienced in Grahamstown
area will be further discussed under the ‘Study Area’ section of this paper.
While a great deal of research has been conducted into the workings of the Grahamstown
Commonage, stakeholders continue to experience problems with its governance, pointing to
the need for on-going research in the area. Furthermore, the data which has been collected from
7 the commonage is now several years old, and its accuracy will have decreased over time. New
studies need to be undertaken, collecting data which can then be compared to previous findings,
allowing policy makers on both a local and national level to assess the progress and
effectiveness of action which has been taken to resolve the issues experienced in Grahamstown.
Within the context of the above, this study seeks to determine what institutions governing
access and use of the commonage currently exist and in what way these multiple spheres
interact at the household scale. Furthermore, the actual perceptions of these institutions and to
what extent is there is community buy-in to the relevant institutions was also studied at the
same scale. We achieved this with the use of key informant interviews and household surveys
administered within a single district of Grahamstown’s commonage area, Eastern Cape, South
Africa.
2. Objectives and Key Questions
Using Grahamstown and its commonage as a study area, and building upon the research which
has already been conducted in the region, the following objectives and underlying key
questions were explored:
2.1.What institutions governing access and use of the commonage currently exist?
2.1.1. What formal institutions exist?
2.1.2. What informal institutions exist?
2.1.3. In what way do these tow spheres (formal and informal) complement and/or
contradict one another?
2.2.What are the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the enforcement
of institutions?
2.2.1. In law, who is responsible for applying and enforcing rules governing the
use of the commonage?
2.2.2. In practice, who currently assumes these responsibilities?
2.2.3. To what extent is there buy in to formal and informal institutions?
8 3. Study Area
Fingo Village is a relatively small district zonation within Grahamstown, Eastern Cape,
coordinates: 33°18′36″S 26°31′36″E and located within the Cacadu district. The predominantly
Xhosa speaking Makana municipality (within which Fingo is located) has an estimated
population of 74 054 with a population density of 16.1 persons per km2 (Council, 2012).
Grahamstown has an estimated unemployment rate of 39.4%, a low Human Development
Index (HDI) at 0.55 and high Gini Coefficient at 0.67. Grahamstown may arguably be classified
as a relatively poor, amorphous South African town (Council, 2012). A set of urban pull factors
including that of, increased infrastructure, housing development, improvement of healthcare
and increased social grants has aided in the 84.47% urbanisation rate and in conjunction with
the aforementioned demographics, has created strain upon the towns common pool resources,
including that of the commonage areas (Council, 2012).
Figure 1. Map of Grahamstown Commonage Areas (Puttick, Hoffman, & Gambiza, 2014).
Grahamstown is comprised of both privately and municipally owned land. The land
surrounding Grahamstown, known as the Grahamstown Commonage (Figure 1), is managed
by the Parks and Recreation Division of the Makana Municiplaity, and is a particularly
important common pool resource, with 2462 households in the surrounding area being reliant
on the commonage for their livelihoods (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). Of these 2642
households, 26% were found to be livestock farmers (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009).
9 The Commonage is subdivided into three sections (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). The
southern, old and new commonages make up an area of ± 1896 ha, ±1300 ha and ±2926 ha
respectively with the new commonage having, in the past, been purchased by the Department
of Land Affairs (DLA) and converted into seven farmlands aimed at supporting emergent
farmers (D.L.A, 1997; Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). The old and new commonages combined
are estimated to support between 2000 and 2005 cattle and roughly 1900 sheep (Davenport &
Gambiza, 2009). Fingo Village, situated within the old commonage, is an area which was
demarcated for the use of subsistence farmers by the DLA who were considered previously
disadvantaged and is of particular interest given its close proximity to the urban sector of the
town creating an urban-rural ‘blurring’ (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). Lastly, the southern
commonage is located within the Oldenburgia conservancy and due to having restricted
livestock access, was not an area included in the study.
4. Methods
Two methods of data collection were utilised in this research, namely key informant interviews,
and household surveys. The majority of key informant interviews were conducted first and the
information generated from them was used as to continuously inform the nature and specificity
of the questions asked in the household surveys.
4.1 Key Informant Interviews
Key informant interviews were conducted with individuals whom were selected on the basis
of their professional capacity and knowledge of specified topics. Defined as key informant
interviews, these were interviews with a select group of individuals whom were deemed likely
to provide needed information, ideas, and insights on a particular subject. In this instance,
interviews were conducted with individuals with specialist knowledge relating to the
governance of livestock within the Grahamstown area, including the current laws, their
implementation and consequent functioning of informal institutions. Individuals whom were
identified as possible interviewees included: the Agricultural Extension Officer for the Makana
District, the head of the Makana Stock Theft Unit and the director of Makana Parks and
Recreation department. Snowball sampling, as defined by Atkinson and Flint (2001) is a
method for finding and acknowledging an individual with knowledge of the topic, where the
10 said individual gives the investigator a possible name or names of other people whom can
provide more insight into the topic played a key role in the attainment of the key informants.
Snowball sampling proved invaluable as a means for obtaining respondents in such a societal
structure where there were few individuals or where some degree of trust was required to
initiate contact (Atkinson & Flint, 2001)
The questioning technique used was in the of a semi-structured interview and a systematic list
(prepared in advance) enabled the interviewer to advance points needed to be discussed yet
permitted for the interviewer to continuously adjust the questions and allow for the informants
to voice their own opinions (Newing, 2010). Within these interviews, a combination of both
closed and open ended questions were used with a large proportion of the interview being
structured around the open ended questions. These enquiries included; knowledge on local
livestock associations, management satisfaction, presence of communication between users
and management, knowledge of commonage laws and boundaries and perception of existing
governance (Davenport & Gambiza, 2009). In order to secure the detailed versions of the
interviews, electronic recording devices were used and the resulting recording transcribed into
text.
Using such an interviewing structure created a balance between being targeted yet, allowing
for flexibility. Furthermore, Newing (2010) emphasises the usefulness of such an approach
when attempting to gain information upon a complex topic/system whereby the researchers do
not have an adequate enough understanding to design precise questions.
4.2 Household Surveys
Households, as defined by Ellis (2000), are a central unit, consisting of core members who live
in the house permanently, and depend upon complex socio-economic interdependencies among
each other. Households which own livestock within the boundaries of the proposed study site
were used as the study unit for the household surveys throughout data collection. The
households selected to participate were selected using the aforementioned snowball sampling
technique. The survey took the form of a structured interview with a pre-prepared set of
questions aimed at discovering the institutional constructions surrounding governance of
livestock by respective owners and was asked by the interviewer to the member of the
household who was responsible for the livestock.
11 Building upon the structured questionnaire format originally proposed by Davenport and
Gambiza (2009), the method of measuring variables within socio-economic characteristics was
comprised of a questionnaire survey containing both closed and open ended questions. The
overarching purpose of these surveys was to answer our key questions, paying particular
reference towards the existence, perception and interaction between both informal and formal
institutions. In this study 30 household surveys were done.
4.3 Data analyses
Due to the combination of both open and closed ended questioning techniques being used when
collecting the data, the data obtained was of both qualitative and quantitative structure. For this
reason, two methods of data analysis were used.
The quantitative data provided mainly by the closed questions was analysed using descriptive
statistics. This method, defined by Newing (2010) as mathematical quantities which sum up a
given set of data represented in a sample such as mean, median and standard deviation, with
the use of Microsoft Excel, allowed for commonalities and key results to be extrapolated and
understood. The purpose of using descriptive statistics was therefore aimed at describing the
data attained and furthermore, is understood to be a valuable tool allowing for exploratory
analyses and obtaining easily presentable results (Newing, 2010)
The qualitative data obtained via the open ended questions of household surveys and key
informant interviews required a different analysis technique. The method of coding was used
to draw out significant information from relatively large bodies of text. Coding, as proposed
by Puri (2010), is an efficient technique that organizes and interprets data and provides a means
to link the interpretations into quantitative methods. Such a method permitted for the distinction
of short words or phrases as important fragments within text which were symbolic of the
participant’s deeper understanding upon the specified topic (Puri, 2010). Ultimately, links
within the transcribed text were created between the data and that of the arrangements of ideas
and common perceptions (Newing, 2010).By building a coding list related to previously
obtained transcribed text, quantitative analyses using specifically assigned colour coding and
alphabetical letters were analysed as opposed to merely original worded responses allowing for
further statistical analyses to take place (Newing, 2010). Using a combination of the two
aforementioned data analysis techniques proved vital in our attempt to understand the inherent
complexity of the issue upon which our key questions were based.
12 5. Results
5.1 Respondent background
The respondent backgrounds (Table 1) play an integral role in the understanding of the
population studied within Fingo Village. Being previously described as a low income, formerly
disadvantaged community by Davenport, Gambiza, & Shackleton (2012) the following
demographics highlight the little movement away from this income bracket. The most
prominent statistic being that of the 67% unemployment rate at the average age of 49 years. At
this mean age, a large proportion of individuals should arguably still have the ability to be
employed full time and earn an income. What may be hindering this however, is the evidently
low average level of education amongst the respondents. Drawing upon Davenport, Gambiza,
& Shackleton (2012) once more, this relatively low level of education may be contributed to
the previous conditions of the state given that the average age of our respondents places them
in this context during their schooling and tertiary education years.
Given that Fingo Village is one of the oldest commonage communities in the Grahamstown
area, it would be expected that those involved in livestock rearing may have been supported by
this livelihood for a relatively long period of time (Muller, 2005). The sampled population
13 however, displays a relatively moderate mean number of years of livestock ownership with the
shortest ownership period being one month as opposed to the longest period of 41 years. Given
this statistic, the assumption that the respondents have actual knowledge upon the commonage
and its surrounding institutions may be supported given that a period of 12 years is an adequate
period of time to attain knowledge. This assumption may be further supported by the mean
number of livestock owned per household being relatively high and diverse, with the livestock
owned falling into 6 categories including: cattle, goat, swine and donkey.
5.2 Formal institutions
Making use of both key informants as well as respondents of Fingo Village, the perceptions of
formal institutions pertaining to the commonage were studied. Arguably underpinning the
success of the formal implementation of laws is that of awareness by those affected by such
laws. Of the 30 respondents, 23% were aware of the formal institutions pertaining to the
commonage (Figure 2). This low statistic may be occurring due to the lacking ability of those
in power to implement or create education surrounding the laws. According to the Extension
Office of Makana municipality, there are no proper commonage management plans in place,
but rather it is “horticulture copy and paste type thing” (Extension Officer, Makana
Municipality, Grahamstown), being created for a more national approach, rather than looking
at the local commonage, municipality and resources available.
This is further convoluted by the bylaws governing the commonage remaining but a draft, even
though they were created in 2011 (Department of Parks and Recreation, Makana Municipality).
Therefore, making management and implementation of these institutions very difficult, as
explained by the Department of Parks and Recreation, the livestock owners are not willing to
accept these bylaws because they are not fully established. Our informant further explains that
these bylaws are relevant and applicable, but need to be established officially, and he says
“there is a public participation that needs to take place”.
Lacking communication and collaboration between the respondents (as livestock owners) and
the various forms of management proved evident in Figure 2. The proportion of respondents
whom, relied, were satisfied with the management and could communicate regularly and
effectively with the municipality were all below 45%. This was an issue highlighted to be of
great importance to the key informants. There are meeting held by the municipality for the
livestock owners, to encourage public participation, as well as to teach them about management
14 skills, and to vocalise the bylaws of the commonage and thus reduce the internal fighting of
livestock owners within the commonage and with the municipality (Department of Parks and
Recreation, Makana Municipality). However, the attendance to these meetings is minimal, as
explained by the Extension Office of the municipality. The Extension Officer explained “most
of the people who are touchable, those who are sort of benefiting from the commonage use do
not normally attend such meetings, and then you’ll find there is no proper contribution from
the beneficiaries themselves”. This lack of involvement by the local community makes it
challenging for the municipality to develop a management plan which would benefit everyone.
Figure 2. Respondents’ perceptions regarding formal governance of the commonage (n=30).
Another challenge facing meeting attendance is the fact that most of the people who are
commonage users are not necessarily registered within the municipality, making it difficult to
identify who is benefiting from the commonage, and also making it difficult to invite all the
people who are involved with the commonage usage (Extension Office, Makana Municipality).
This is in conflict to the information received by the Stock Theft Unit. According to the Unit,
the majority of the livestock owners were heavily reliant upon them for the formalisation of
livestock ownership. This would entail a adhering to the Animal Identification Act, 2002 (ACT
NR 6 OF 2002) whereby:

All owners of cattle, sheep, goats & pigs must register an identification mark at the
office of the registrar of animal identification.
15 
Each owner must mark his/her animals in the prescribed manner.

All cattle, sheep, goats & pigs of which the identification mark have become indistinct
or invisible, must be re-identified in accordance with the legal provisions.

Any owners of an animal with an identification mark on it, who wants to sell, barter or
give away the animal within 14 days after he/she became the owner of such animal,
must provide the new owner with a document of identification. This means that within
14 days the animal can be disposed of without having being branded with the new
owner’s mark since it already has the previous owners mark on it & a document of
identification has been issued.

An owner of an animal who wants to sell, barter or give away an animal, must mark the
animal with his/her own mark before disposing of it. The owner must also provide to
the new owner a document of identification. The new owner must keep the document
of identification for a period of one year. This means that after 14 days the animal
cannot be disposed of without having being branded with the new owner’s mark & a
document of identification (S.A.P.S, 2002).
However, the Stock Theft Unit elaborated upon the dire need for manpower and
infrastructure from the government. As a result of a lapse in both, they continue to struggle
to monitor and govern the owners of livestock which may explain the relatively dominant
role played by the Grahamstown SPCA. The SPCA became an unseen enforcer of
legislation exemplified by respondent 5 elaborating upon her lack of reliance pertaining to
the municipality and stating, “We get punished by SPCA if our livestock (cows) go into
town”. This governance was again evident by respondent 22 and 10 stating, “We rely upon
the SPCA for issues” and “there is no fence so our donkeys go into town and then SPCA
takes (impounds) them” respectively.
5.3 Commonage boundaries
The knowledge pertaining to the commonage boundaries may be closely linked to the
communication issues between the respondents and that of formal management elaborated
upon in the previous section. The inability of management to educate upon and inforce formal
legislation may have led to a knowledge lapse in the sampled population of livestock owners.
There is evidently a lack of knowledge upon the commonage boundaries and a relatively
16 negative perception towards their definition as the average respondents agreeing with these
statements were 50% and 47% respectively (Figure 3).
The supervision and maintenance of the commonage is the responsibility of the Department of
Parks and Recreation. This department faces challenges however, regarding a lack of funding:
“there is a problem within those commonages in terms of management because we (Makana
Municipality) do not have the funds”. This has resulted in a deficiency of necessary man power
for efficient monitoring (Stock Theft Unit, Makana Municipality) as well as lack of
infrastructure needed, such as fencing and storage facilities. This lack of adequate fencing
makes it difficult to manage grazing, as the commonage will not be stocked according to the
normal stocking rates, or according to adequate stocking densities thus, causing the land to be
over-utilised because it is not possible to control the animal numbers (Extension Office,
Makana Municipality). Unfortunately, the Department of Parks and Recreation have the skills
and programmes to teach livestock owners’ proper land management skills but the lack of
infrastructure makes it, in reality difficult to practice such skills (Department of Parks and
Recreation, Makana Municipality).
Figure 3. Respondents’ awareness pertaining to commonage boundaries and livestock owners
associations (n=30).
Further hindering the understanding of the commonage boundaries is the lack of awareness of
the various livestock owners associations. What may be a means of disseminating knowledge
17 and opinions between the livestock owners and formal management is not being utilized by the
majority of the respondents. According to the Department of Parks and Recreation, the
unstructured nature of these governing bodies may be having an effect on their lack of
following. This lack of structure was linked to the self-establishment of individuals as leaders
of an association. What the individuals gain in the community as a leader of an association
(such as respect and status) drives them to appoint themselves unjustly thus, causing conflict
within the associations, mismanagement and lack of by in from the external livestock owners
skills (Department of Parks and Recreation, Makana Municipality).
5.4 Informal institutions
As opposed to the formal laws in the previous sections, the ‘on the ground’ informal institutions
of the livestock owners were also studied. The initial inspection of Figure 4, exhibited strong
evidence of individualistic action by the respondents when handling their livestock. This
individualistic action is demonstrated by; 93% of the respondents relying upon no other
individual but themselves to determine when and where they place their livestock upon the
commonage, only 3% believe that there was a maximum number of livestock they could place
on the commonage and below 20% were actually aware of the number of livestock owned by
their fellow commonage users. These statistics, viewed in light with the majority of the
respondents leaving their livestock unattended, align with the perceptions of the Stock Theft
Unit whereby trust between commonage users remains elusive due to the high stock theft. This
perception may however, not be the ultimate circumstance.
With 76% of the respondents believing that they can fully trust their fellow livestock owners,
these perceived individualistic actions may not be the result of a haphazard governance
structure portrayed by the Stock Theft Unit but may be driven by strong underlying trust
amongst users. There may be little need for the respondents to consult with their fellow owners
if they believe that they may be trusted to perform their informal duties upon the commonage.
With relatively high trust and only 10% of the respondents identifying with the Stock Theft
Unit as official livestock owners, there may be a functioning informal structure in which the
owners can trade and govern livestock successfully. This statement may be further supported
18 by the majority of the respondents being completely satisfied with their own methods of
governance.
Figure 4. Characteristics of commonage use relating to livestock handling (n=30).
6. Discussion
When evaluating the results in the context of the current thinking surrounding the common
property issue, as well as with reference to the theoretical frameworks already discussed in the
paper, it becomes evident that the situation being experienced in Grahamstown does not fit in
to any particular model. Rather, the results point to a reality which is far more complex,
displaying elements of both Hardin’s rational egoist model, as well as Ostrom’s social norms.
The governance of the Grahamstown commonage can be viewed as the culmination of two
different systems which function independently, each with their own stakeholders and
characteristics (Figure 5). Firstly, there is the realm in which the identified formal institutions
exist and operate. This system consists of municipal bodies such as the Parks and Recreation
Department, the Agricultural Extension Office, and the Stock Theft Unit, as well as those
19 livestock owners who have registered with the Stock Theft Unit and have consequently
received a license number to use in livestock branding. It is in this realm that the majority of
previous research into the governance of the Grahamstown commonage has been set, more
than likely due to the ease with which information about this system can be accessed and
analysed. Through the assessment of information gathered through key informant interviews,
it was established that the main problems experienced in this realm are those of: overgrazing
of the commonage, lack of funding for municipal bodies, lack of communication between
municipal bodies and livestock owners, as well as the high personnel turnover rate experienced
within the municipal bodies. Indeed, based solely on the findings of the key informant
interviews it would be easy to conclude that the Grahamstown commonage is dysfunctional,
displaying many attributes characteristic of a “Tragedy of the Commons” scenario.
Formal Institutions •
Municipality bodies; •
•
Informal Institutions
Department of Parks and Recreation •
Unregistered owners livestock •
Characterised by; •
Stock Theft Unit •
•
Agricultural extension officer Individualistic behaviour •
Trust •
Blurred boundaries •
Sanctions Registered livestock owners Commonage
Figure 5. Sphere interaction between formal and informal institutions that exist within the
commonage.
20 However, the inclusion of the results from the household surveys paints a strikingly different
picture. Of the 30 livestock owners surveyed, 56% indicated that they were satisfied with the
status quo. This finding indicates that the commonage may not be as dysfunctional as it is
portrayed by the key informants, and alludes to the existence of a secondary system, which
operates beneath the primary system already discussed. This system consists of a community
of unregistered livestock owners in the Fingo Village area who operate almost entirely
independently of the municipality and other formal institutions. Indeed, 90% of the livestock
owners interviewed were not registered with the Stock Theft Unit. In addition to the lack of
formal institutions, this system is further characterised by undefined commonage boundaries,
as well as highly individualistic behaviour. Little collaboration between livestock owners was
reported, with each individual deciding independently where and when to graze livestock on
the commonage. Ordinarily, such individualistic behaviour, coupled with undefined boundaries
and therefore a lack of excludability, would lead to the breakdown of a common pool resource.
However, in this instance, the system also displays two other very important characteristics,
namely trust relationships and the ability to apply sanctions. It is, in fact, this high degree of
trust (76% of livestock owners said they trust their fellow livestock owners) that enables
livestock owners to function independently of one another. Furthermore, the ability to apply
sanctions not only allows for the punishment of wrong-doers, but also provides a disincentive
for wrong-doing within the community. It is these two characteristics which allow the
commonage to function to the satisfaction of more than half of the livestock owners surveyed.
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