A Project to Establish Whether Species Cross Contamination Occurs

Interim report
A Project to Establish Whether Species Cross Contamination Occurs in UK Meat
Processing Plants during the GMP Production of Mince Meat –
Update October 2013
1. Introduction
Food authenticity and food fraud are becoming increasingly problematic owing to pressures on
food production and the current climate of financial constraint. The recent global horse meat
scandal has impacted on confidence of the UK food supply chain and has shown that the
presence of undeclared species in meat products is of concern to consumers. Low level
presence of foreign species is of special concern to consumers who choose to exclude certain
species on the basis of faith.
A number of samples analysed by industry and as part of the FSA survey following the
horsemeat scandal were reported to contain low concentrations of pork which gave rise to the
question of whether the pork was present as a result of adventitious contamination or
deliberate fraud. This in turn led to the question of whether adventitious cross contamination
of meat could occur and if so what concentrations could be expected. The issue of meat
species carry over is not new and has been dealt with on a small scale in terms of butchers’
shops where local authorities have monitored and taken successful prosecutions in cases of
gross carry over of one meat species into another. However, the question of the level of
species carry over that could occur in commercial meat processing plants has not been
previously addressed.
This aim of this project is to establish whether species cross contamination occurs in UK meat
processing plants during the good manufacturing practise (GMP) production of fresh mince
meat and at what level. This project will provide robust data on the levels of pork meat carry
over into beef meat that occurs with different cleaning regimes and different species handling
processes. This data will be interpreted into meaningful information that can be used to inform
consumers and specialist consumers and allow evidence based differentiation between
deliberate fraud and adventitious contamination.
The project is being conducted in two phases:

Phase 1, Pilot plant – assessing what levels of cross contamination can be achieved under
controlled conditions in a pilot plant for three different cleaning scenarios.

Phase 2, Industry practise – assessing what levels of cross contamination occur in UK meat
processing plants. The plants will be chosen to reflect three risk ratings; low, medium and
high risk of species cross contamination.
2. Results of Phase 1
a. Low risk scenario - a deep clean was performed between the mincing of 100kg fresh pork
meat and 100kg fresh beef meat. This process was performed in triplicate. 240 samples of
beef were analysed for the presence of pork. Pork was not detected in any of the samples.
Thus it was concluded that ‘deep’ cleaning industrial mincing equipment and conveyor belts is
effective in preventing the carry over of pork meat into beef meat during the production of
mince meat according to good manufacturing practice.
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b. Medium risk scenario – a high pressure water wash was performed between the mincing
of 100kg fresh pork meat and 100kg fresh beef meat. This process was performed in
triplicate. 240 samples of beef were analysed for the presence of pork. Pork was not
detected in any of the samples.
Thus it was concluded that cleaning industrial mincing equipment and conveyor belts with high
pressure water in between species is effective in preventing the carry over of pork meat into
beef meat during the production of mince meat according to good manufacturing practice.
However, some of the areas swabbed gave ATP failures using the limits specified by the
manufacturer. This is not surprising as the samples processed were raw meats and ATP swab
samples were taken, according to the manufacturers instructions, prior to the sanitisation step.
It is anticipated that swabs taken after sanitisation would afford negative ATP results; this will
be verified in Phase 2 of the project.
c. High risk scenario - no cleaning was performed between the mincing of 100kg fresh pork
meat and 100kg fresh beef meat. This process was performed in triplicate. 240 samples of
beef were analysed for the presence of pork. The results showed that when no cleaning of
industrial mincing equipment and conveyor belts is performed between species:
• Carry over of pork meat into beef meat does occur and detectable concentrations could end
up in finished products depending on the size of the batch processed
• Is most significant in the first 0.75 kg of meat where concentrations ranged from 99% to
54% pork
• Detectable carry over of pork meat was found intermittently throughout 100kg beef meat
• The mean pork content of 100kg beef, minced directly after 100kg pork was found to be
653g with a range of 405 - 1032g.
d. Limit of Detection (LOD)
The LOD of the method used was found to be <0.1% pork meat in beef meat on a weight :
weight basis. Using a similarly diligent method of sample preparation, the region below 0.1%
pork meat in beef meat was studied and an LOD of <0.03% pork meat in beef meat on a weight
: weight basis was achieved.
3. Phase 2
Planning for Phase 2 is currently in progress and it is anticipated that sampling in ‘high’ and
‘medium’ risk rated plants will commence within the next month.
14 October 2013
For further information contact:
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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