Libertarian Agent Causation
1. Alternate Possibilities: There is an adage among ethicists, that ought implies can.
In other words, if you OUGHT to have acted in a certain way, then it had better be the
case that you COULD have acted that way. For instance, consider:
Shallow Pond: A child drowns in a nearby pond. I just sit there and watch,
without saving the child.
Typically, our intuition is that, morally, I OUGHT to have saved the child. Because I failed
to do what I OUGHT to have done, I am morally responsible for this child’s death, and
am therefore morally blameworthy; perhaps even deserving of punishment.
But, this assessment only makes sense if I COULD have saved the child. Contrast the
above case with the following:
Shallow Pond Paralysis: A child drowns in a nearby pond. A neurosurgeon has
installed a chip in my brain, which suddenly induces paralysis, and I am unable to
move. I just sit there and watch, without saving the child.
In this case, it seems that I am NOT morally responsible for the child’s death, and am
NOT blameworthy, or deserving of punishment. This is because I lacked the ability to
save the child. I COULD NOT have saved him. I lacked the ability to do otherwise.
But, if determinism is true, then no one ever has the ability to do otherwise. So, if
determinism is true, the it is never the case that anyone OUGHT to have acted differently
(since they COULD NOT have acted differently).
A Compatibilist Account of Alternate Possibilities: The compatibilist’s account of this is
unsatisfying. They say that, generally, we DO have the ability to do otherwise, since “I
could have done otherwise” just means, “If I had wanted to do otherwise, then I WOULD
HAVE done otherwise.” Compatibilists would agree that I am not morally responsible for
the child’s death in Shallow Pond Paralysis since, even if I wanted to save the child, I
would not have done so. But, in other cases, you ARE free. For instance, (1) “I could have
worn the blue shirt today instead of the red shirt” is true, because it simply means: (2) “If
I had wanted to wear the blue shirt today, I would have.”
But, note that, if determinism is true, I couldn’t even have WANTED to wear the blue
shirt today, since all of my desires and beliefs, etc., are completely determined and
therefore outside of my control. So, while statement (2) might be true, it doesn’t seem
to mean the same thing as statement (1), since (2) could be true while (1) is false.
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It just seems that the irresistible force of determinism is no different than the irresistible
coercion of the neurosurgeon. For this reason, Chisholm agrees with the hard
determinist and concludes that determinism is not compatible with free will or moral
responsibility (this view that compatibilism is false is called ‘incompatibilism’).
But, neither would we have freedom if there were some truly random indeterminacy in
nature; for, an un-determined action is one that has no cause at all. This can’t be the
source of freedom. What matters to freedom, Chisholm says, is CONTROL. To be
responsible for one’s action, one must be IN CONTROL of that action (in such a way that
one controls whether they either do X, or not do X). An undetermined action is one that
nothing is responsible for (there is no cause), and nothing is in control of.
Factors outside of our control can be EXTERNAL (as in Shallow Pond Paralysis), or
INTERNAL (as in ordinary determinism, where we act upon our inner beliefs and desires,
which are ultimately determined by the laws of nature and so are outside of our
control). It makes no difference. Either way, if we are not in control, then we are not free.
The Breaking Dam: Imagine what happens in our minds, if determinism is true: We must
always act on whatever our strongest desire is. Chisholm likens this to a breaking dam. If
there is a flood, and a dam is constructed poorly, we know that the dam MUST break.
There is no way that things could go otherwise. A person giving in to desire would be
just like this dam. Their will caves in to the flood of desire. The agent is not in control in
that case. There is no way that he can do otherwise. So, one who does bad is not
responsible—and therefore not blameworthy for her action.
The same would go not just for bad deeds, but for GOOD ones too. Consider a saintly
person who is SO good that they can’t bring themselves to do wrong. If beliefs and
desires CAUSED our actions, then THIS person is never in control either. When faced
with a choice, the desire to do GOOD is a flood that breaks the dam. When we praise a
moral saint who always does good for their good deeds, we think we are praising the
PERSON. But, if determinism is true, then we are merely praising their DISPOSITION
(which is outside of the person’s control).
2. (Libertarian) Agent Causation: So, we seem to be in a jam:
 Free Actions ≠ Uncaused: Free actions must have causes. UNcaused actions
are not ones that the agent is in control of.
 Free Actions ≠ Caused: Free actions can’t be caused either—at least, they can’t
be caused by the laws of nature, or by hypnotists, or even by our own beliefs and
desires—for actions that are caused in these ways are not ones that the AGENT is
in control of.
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What to do? Chisholm’s solution is to suggest that free actions DO have causes, but the
cause is merely the agent herself. Not the laws of nature, not her beliefs and desires.
Just... the agent.
We typically think of causation as a chain that stretches back and back. For any effect,
you can always inquire further about what caused that.
Child: Why are cookies hidden out of reach?
Dad: Because I moved them there.
Child: Why did you move them?
Dad: Because I willed my arms to move them.
Child: Why did you make your arms do that?
Dad: Because of reasons. You were eating too many, and they’re unhealthy.
Child: Why was I eating too many?
Dad: Because human beings love eating sweet things.
Child: Why do humans love eating sweet things?
Dad: Because, long ago, it was more difficult to get sugar, and we evolved to eat as much of
it as we could whenever we found it.
Child: Why did that happen?
Dad: Because… Etc. Etc. Something about evolution.
Child: Why?
Dad: Something about the origin of life.
Child: Why?
Dad: Something about the formation of Earth ; formation of the galaxy ; the Big Bang
On Chisholm’s view, the conversation should have gone like this:
Child: Why are cookies hidden out of reach?
Dad: Because I moved them there.
Child: Why did you move them?
Dad: Because I willed my arms to move them.
Child: Why did you make your arms do that?
Dad: Because I did. End of story.
Chisholm’s proposal is that causal chains can end in the “agent” (i.e., the free person).
The view goes back to Aristotle, who said 2,500 years ago, “The stone is moved by the
staff, which is moved by the hand, which is moved by the man.” The end. There is no
more of the story.
Digression: Prime Mover, Unmoved: Aristotle’s idea stems from an argument for
the existence of God: Things around you have causes. You can trace the causal
chain, back and back. But, it cannot proceed back infinitely. A beginningless series
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of causes is impossible. There must be a BEGINNING. A FIRST CAUSE, or a FIRST
MOVER. We call that God. But, that “prime mover” cannot itself be caused or
moved by anything outside of itself. It is the FIRST cause, or mover. As such, the first
cause was itself uncaused; the first mover was itself unmoved. Chisholm’s claim is
that we are like that. We are miniature gods or “prime movers, unmoved”.
That may sound weird, but Chisholm would say that we have no other choice. We clearly
ARE morally responsible for (many of) our actions, and this “in-between” view (in
between uncaused and caused-by-anything-other-than-the-agent) is the only view that
gets us that conclusion.
Inclination Without Necessitation: Note that Chisholm is not claiming that our beliefs
and desires have NO influence on our decisions. Chisholm admits that SOME of our
actions may be necessitated by these things. He notes that many pray to be delivered
from temptation for the very reason that they know that they will not be able to resist
certain temptations if confronted by them. And the rest of the time, our decisions are
still at least PARTIALLY based on them. It is just that they merely INCLINE us to act in
certain ways, but do not GUARANTEE (or NECESSITATE) that we will act in certain ways.
Agents are capable of going against what their beliefs and desires incline them toward.
[Objection: Is this coherent? Don’t we ALWAYS choose the thing that we have the most
REASONS or the strongest DESIRE to do? Is freedom just the ability to act irrationally?]
How do our beliefs and desires merely “incline without necessitating”? Answer: When
the following are true:
(1) Someone can resist DOING something to make A happen,
(2) But, that same person cannot resist the temptation to ALLOW A to happen.
As Chisholm explains it: He can resist the temptation to make A happen but he cannot
resist the temptation to allow A to happen.
[Objections: First, this seems like an arbitrary distinction. Can’t our beliefs and desires
incline us to ALLOW something to happen without guaranteeing that we will allow it?
But, more importantly, how do we resist the temptation to DO things? The determinist
would say: Because of pre-existing desires (e.g., the desire to be good), or pre-existing
beliefs (e.g., the belief that I will be arrested if I do it), or pre-existing dispositions and
inclinations (e.g., the disposition to refrain from doing bad things). In other words, it
seems that we are capable of resisting an inclination only if there exists within us a
COMPETING inclination.]
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Libertarian Free Will: This view is a version of libertarianism, which says that our
actions are NOT determined, and we DO have free will.
No “Science of Man”: If Chisholm is right, then there is no “science of man.” That is,
even if we knew ALL of someone’s thoughts, beliefs, desires, opinions, inclinations, etc.
and the exact strength of all of those at every moment, and ALL of the laws of physics
and so on, we still could not predict with certainty what a person would do in the next
moment. For, if our actions are truly independent from and not determined by our
beliefs, desires, and inclinations, then we must be able to sometimes act AGAINST our
beliefs, desires, and inclinations.
Rewinding Time: An implication of libertarian free will is this: Imagine your decision to
come to class. If we could somehow rewind time to that EXACT moment, keeping
EVERYTHING (your beliefs, desires, the laws of physics, the position of every particle in
the universe, etc.) the same—if we pushed “play” and let time move forward again, there
is no guarantee that you would make the same decision the second time around—even
though EVERYTHING at the moment of that decision was EXACTLY the same.
[Objection: Is this coherent? Is this what free will is?]
3. Objections: Here are a couple of worries:
(1) We don’t DO anything to our brains: In the causal chain just described, it seems like
what the agent would have to do is cause some neural event to occur. But, that is not
what we do. When I want to use a staff to push a stone, I do not think to myself, “I will
cause such and such neurons to fire.”
Reply: True, we don’t will something to happen to our brain. We do will to move the
hand or the staff. By willing this, however, we do cause a certain brain activity. By willing
our hand to move, we cause something that we didn’t will to occur: namely, we cause
some neurons to fire. This isn’t that weird, since, at the same time, we cause LOTS of
other things to happen that we didn’t will; for instance, I also cause some air molecules
to move, some shadows to change, etc. without willing these things to occur.
(2) The agent’s will would be undetermined: If the causal chain ENDS in the agent, and
this act of the agent is uncaused and undetermined by anything else, then the agent’s
act is just like those events that indeterminists talk about: Namely, random, inexplicable
events. As noted above, this is not freedom.
Reply: There is a difference between a random, uncaused event and an agent’s causing
some event to occur: namely, in the latter there is a cause! Namely, the agent!
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Digression: Causation: Chisholm admits that this reply is not very satisfying, as it
makes agent causation sound very mysterious. In his own defense:
(1) First, note that causation IN GENERAL is actually quite mysterious (David
Hume first pointed this out in the 1700’s). Consider one billiard ball rolling toward
another. What will happen? You know that the first ball will cause the second ball
to begin to move once they collide. But HOW do you know that? Imagine that you
had just popped into existence a moment ago. You would have NO IDEA what was
going to happen. You would be surprised when the first ball came to a halt and
the second one started moving. Now imagine that you see it happening a
SECOND time? What will happen? You still have NO IDEA. The fact that
something happened once doesn’t give you a reason to think it will happen again.
So HOW do you know what will happen when the balls collide? Hume says that
you form a belief based on an observation of REPEATED REGULARITY. You always
see the same patterns again and again, and this makes you believe that those
patterns will continue into the future. But, notice that all you ever observe is one
thing followed by another. What is the CAUSATION? It’s really very mysterious
when you think about it. So, this mysteriousness is not merely a problem for
AGENT causation, but causation in general.
(2) Second, we ARE intimately familiar with what it is for an agent to cause
something. We do it all the time. Lift your arm. That’s agent causation. YOU made
a decision, and YOU caused your arm to move. End of story. Chisholm thinks that
this is how we understand what agent causation is.
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