Legal Harmonization Seminar Sessions 1 and 2: Legal Origins Fernando Gomez Pomar Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona NYU School of Law NYU School of Law, Fall term 2012 Main goals • The basic motivation behind this seminar is to understand how legal fragmentation affects social and economic outcomes, and what are the factors and mechanisms that may work, and are actually used to, bring legal systems closer together • Obviously this does not mean that the desirable end result is that all jurisdictions have the same laws and legal institutions • This is not only implausible, it is also undesirable (and not simply for the lawyers!) Main goals • Legal harmonization may bring benefits, but it may also entail significant costs • Challenges and opposition to legal approximation is not purely the outcome of protectionist policies, nationalistic tendencies, or interest group pressure, as we will see • To analyze systematically what are the processes, and the benefits and costs of legal harmonization, and to draw some legal policy implications constitutes the core of the course Main goals • The purpose is quite general, and is not limited to a particular region of the world or area of the Law • We will, however, discuss some specific applications, cases and areas of past and present harmonization, mostly referred to business law issues (contracts, corporate law) and touching the European context • We start by looking at the relevance of the problem: Is the law and are the differences in law so important? Main goals • Legal Origins and Economic Growth – Understand the legal origins literature and its implications – Identify the possible shortcomings – Set grounds for inquiry into legal fragmentation and legal harmonization Basic summary of this literature: La Porta et. al., “Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature (2008); SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=1028081 Main goals • This literature has produced significant policy measures, essentially through World Bank-led or inspired projects and initiatives • Public Policy Dimension – www.doingbusiness.org – http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.a sp – http://worldjusticeproject.org/?q=rule-of-lawindex/index-2011 Law and Growth • Unsurprisingly, economic theory generally supports the idea that good legal institutions (clear and valuepromoting rules, high quality courts) facilitate economic growth • Economic growth crucially requires investment (of effort, of capital) with non-immediate returns These investments require: – Rules that protect liberty, property and contract • – Good, independent courts who enforce contracts and liberty and property, and by doing so encourage the investment which is crucial for economic development Law and Growth • Causation may work both sides: economic growth is likely to increase demand for good legal rules and high quality courts or other institutions to enforce them • In turn, improvements in the quality of the Law are likely to facilitate increases in growth, which will further increase demand for high-quality legal infrastructure • The empirical literature provides some support for the idea that a legal system of high quality encourages economic growth, but the specific causal channels remain unclear and much work is yet to be done Legal origins literature • • The legal origins literature, essentially stemming from research of a limited group of scholars (LLSV and coauthors) is based upon the following foundations: – Law and legal outcomes are measurable – Legal systems can be ascribed to legal origins or legal families that are markedly different – Legal origins have a deep impact on the laws and legal institutions of countries and these, in turn, produce important effects in economic outcomes Important “implications” according to this literature: – Confirmation of efficiency hypothesis of the Common Law – Judge-made law is more efficient than statute law – Common law courts are more effective in protecting from government bad behavior than civil law courts Legal origins literature • Results from this literature on legal origins: – Common law is better than Civil law (with differences between the Scandinavian, German and French origins, the latter clearly the worst according to the legal origins thesis) – Regression analysis show the effects of legal origins on important legal and economic variables both at Micro level: financial markets, credit protection and contract enforcement, entry of firms, government ownership of banks and media labor markets, legal formalism, etc. Macro level: growth, development, rule of law, quality of judiciary Legal origins literature • Results from this literature on legal origins: – For all the above variables, there is a clear and significant positive effect of having a Common law legal origin and a clear and significant negative effect of having a Civil law, especially French, origin Common Law origin is linked to more and better investor and creditor protection, less government regulation, more judicial independent and less formalistic and more creative courts Civil Law origin is linked to the reverse – The basic paper cited above contains a summary of regressions (Tables I, II, III) but just to give some illustrative data Total Private Issuances Source: Bloomberg Spain Year Equities Corporate Bonds Equities Corporate Bonds 2008 0.81 0.4 174.51 2,468.11 2009 3.76 2.8 228.96 2,519.36 2010 3.89 10.01 183.28 2,650.41 2011 9.79 0.7 168.75 2,196.42 GDP 2011 Year 2011 / gdp 2011 Insert filename here US 1,407.41 0.70% 14,582.40 0.05% 1.16% 15.06% Date of presentation 13 Legal origins literature : whence the results? – Pro-market bias of the Common Law Civil Law: policy implementing, socially conditioned private contracting Common law: dispute resolving, unconditioned private contracting Are we mixing the pro-big government bias of French politics with French law? Where is the historical origin of this legal/cultural divide? The Thirteenth century? Codification period? Twentieth century developments (think, for instance, of different attitudes across EU Civil Law countries concerning the role and power of courts)? Legal origins literature : whence the results? Stability, slow and organic change of the Common Law (Hayekian-type of argument) – Are legislators or Courts more prone to rapid change of rules? – Does codification help or undermine stability? Independent and powerful judiciary, resilient to government and interest group pressure, and not engaged in centralized bureaucratic control Does choice of law play a role? Legal origins literature : whence the results? Should not legal transplants play a role? – Evidence of path dependence and lack of convergence Are legal systems so internally coherent? Can legal systems be ascribed to a family in all areas and respects? Challenging the legal origins theory • Several lines of arguments challenging the legal origins thesis Can Law and legal institutions be reliably measured? – How can you measure “constitutional acceptance of case law”, for instance? Or even “contract enforcement”? – Is measuring “Law in the books” the same as measuring “Law in action”? – How can we measure the latter? • Survey data • Data on actual outcomes Challenging the legal origins theory • Several lines of arguments challenging the legal origins thesis One-size-fits-all critique: – Legal systems are not monolithic, they do not respond to Weberian “ideal types” – Legal systems evolve over time in different ways and subject to different influences – Dimensions of legal institutions affecting legal and economic outcomes are varied and have different origins and bases Challenging the legal origins theory • Several lines of arguments challenging the legal origins thesis Static vision critique: – Legal systems change significantly over time, but effects on outcomes are determined at just one moment, the present time – Legal origins fails to identify what is the permanent elements that have not evolved and are influencing current outcomes Challenging the legal origins theory Alternative theories: the true explanatory variable is not legal origin but some other one correlated with the former – Culture: prevailing cultural values and practices are the true substance behind the differences in "legal cultures". Different legal cultures are a by-product of those other, deeper, cultural variations that explain the economic outcomes – Religion: closely linked to the cultural explanation above, but with an emphasis on religion, and religion-inspired social values and practices Challenging the legal origins theory Alternative theories – Politics is the key explanatory variable behind the identified diversified economic performance of countries: • Pro-government biases in given polities • Influence of social democratic grand policies deeply affecting the economy and the role of government at certain moments • Political views about the relationship between political power and Law: Courts as political actors; legal control of political power Challenging the legal origins theory Alternative theories – History matters: • Economic outcomes and performance changes and even reverses over time: the debate concerning financial market development in early XXth century and the relative advantage of Civil Law jurisdictions • Dramatic historical events are overlooked (the inter-wars period, WWII and its aftermath) that had a profound impact on XX century policies and economic outcomes Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the evidence Reasons to doubt the empirical and econometric credibility of the analysis: – Important problem with coding legal variables • Most variables reflect Law in the Books • Legal outcomes do not have exogenous importance, but are endogenous to the type of legal system (checks, formalities, etc.) • Law in action variables may be systematically biased Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the evidence Reasons to doubt the empirical and econometric credibility of the analysis: – Important problems with econometric specifications [omitted variables, lack of robustness checks] – More advanced econometric techniques do not work: slow pace of legal change makes panel data unusable; instrumental variables problematic due to independent effects of instruments on economic outcomes; high degree of correlation between institutional variables Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the evidence Correlations found do not ensure causality Results are too sensitive to specifications of the econometric model: when multiple cultural variables are added together, some of them are significant, and produce lack of significance and even produce a reversal of the sign of coefficients The strength of the empirical support for legal origins is more doubtful than it looks like Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the theory The theories in support of the efficiency of the Common Law encounter important problems: – Posner: Common Law judges having a preference for efficiency • No evidence of such a preference – Priest: the asymmetric litigation rates of inefficient and efficient rules • Requires sufficient pressure from litigation and certain initial conditions Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the theory The theories in support of the efficiency of the Common Law encounter important problems: – Gennaioli & Shleifer: complex evolutionary theories in which the interplay between following precedent and distinguishing and overruling may lead to efficient outcomes • The assumptions for the validity are very exacting Advantage of several Common Law countries, especially US and Canada is fairly recent in the entire history of legal families Main criticisms of the legal origins theory – Disputing the theory Problems with the rent-seeking theory of the advantage of judge-made Law Problems to explain mixed jurisdictions that have remained so: – Intercolonial transfer (southern US, Quebec) – International merger of systems (Scotland) – Heavy transplants of core legal institutions (Constitutions and courts in Latin America) Importance of legal origins theory – Despite criticisms, it is true that legal origins theory Has been deeply influential in academia and public policy, and still is It has opened new ground for a more quantitative and comparativist analysis of legal rules, legal institutions and legal outcomes Has raised important questions about the channels through which Law and legal institutions affect societal and economic outcomes Importance of legal origins theory – Despite criticisms, it is true that legal origins theory Has placed Law and legal institutions (the Court system especially, but not exclusively) at the core of factors influencing economic growth and setting strategies for development in less developed countries Law and legal institutions in Private Law (contracts, corporations, capital markets, property) do not only influence how corporate actors behave, they are able to influence the life and destiny of almost everyone in society Importance of legal origins theory – Despite criticisms, it is true that legal origins theory For our purposes, it has paved the way for making the issues of legal diversity and legal harmonization and approximation an area of debate that affects not only the more “technical” aspects of law, but also important social and economic goals of countries It has promoted the use of economic tools, both theoretical and empirical, for understanding and evaluating diversity of legal rules and institutions and the ways in which diversity may be altered, reduced and eventually eliminated
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