Part 92
Post Implementation Review
Part 92
Post Implementation Review
Part 92 PIR – V.3.2 – 230513
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Part 92
Post Implementation Review
Table of Contents
1.
Foreword................................................................................................................................. 8
2.
Introduction............................................................................................................................ 8
3.
Background to the Review Paper ....................................................................................... 10
3.2
Purpose of the Review Paper ............................................................................................. 10
3.3
Structure of the Review Paper ........................................................................................... 10
3.5
What was introduced by Part 92?....................................................................................... 11
3.6
The Rationale to the Changes from CAR 1988 to Part 92 ................................................. 11
3.7
The Staggered Implementation of Part 92 ......................................................................... 12
3.8
Implementation – Education and Advice – the Lessons .................................................... 12
3.9
Matters identified through the PIR and the proposed changes .......................................... 13
3.10
Developing the Part 92 Issues Register and Working Group ............................................ 15
3.11
Formulation of the Post-Implementation Review Working Group.................................... 16
4.
Significant issues – Proposed and Recommended ............................................................ 19
4.3
DG Occurrence Management and the making of DG Occurrence Reports by
Government agencies and stakeholders ........................................................................................ 19
4.4
Powers/Directions to Hold/Seize/Dispose of Suspected DG ............................................. 24
4.5
The authority to open and inspect Cargo and DG consignments ....................................... 29
4.6
The regulations should be amended to provide for issue of an Aviation
Infringement Notice (AIN) for absolute offences of unlawfully carrying/consigning DGs
and making a false statement with regard to the contents............................................................. 32
4.7
Allow additional provisions for small aircraft to carry DG into remote airstrips .............. 34
4.8
Authority to Access and Inspect Shipper, Forwarder and Training Organisation
records ........................................................................................................................................... 36
5.
Minor proposed changes ..................................................................................................... 37
5.2
Require packages, which have been opened for inspection, to be returned to a
proper condition after inspection .................................................................................................. 37
5.3
Require freight forwarders to screen, examine or inspect cargo for hidden DG and
to check that DG are properly prepared for transport ................................................................... 37
5.4
Require reporting of hidden and misdeclared Dangerous Goods Occurrences and
DG Accidents ................................................................................................................................ 38
5.5
Proposal to restrict the carriage of additional “accompanying persons” on cargoonly aircraft ................................................................................................................................... 39
5.6
Include penalty units and/or clearly state strict liability provisions for certain
regulations ..................................................................................................................................... 40
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5.7
Failure to Successfully Complete DG Refresher Training Should Result in
Suspension from Passenger or Cargo Handling Duties Regardless of Expiry Date ..................... 41
5.8
Provide an additional period of grace for DG training ...................................................... 42
5.9
Broaden the list of pilot activities for which DG training is not required.......................... 42
5.10
All DG training courses should be subject to CASA approval .......................................... 43
5.11 Training organisations should be compelled to maintain records for a minimum of
36 months and to surrender those records to CASA in the event that they cease business .......... 44
5.13 Review the need for shelf stock-pickers and packers to undertake a full DG
shipper’s course............................................................................................................................. 45
5.14 Permit State police close protection officers and valuable cargo escorts to carry
loaded weapons or ammunition in the aircraft .............................................................................. 46
5.15
Dangerous Goods of the Operator...................................................................................... 47
5.17 Introduce a mandatory challenge of passengers about whether they have any
dangerous goods in their baggage ................................................................................................. 49
5.18 Provide for controlled extracts of the DG manual/procedures to be made available
to employees.................................................................................................................................. 50
5.19 Provide for the carriage of large quantities of fuel in other single packagings
(jerricans and aluminum or steel drums) and provide for carriage of single packagings of
fuel on passenger aircraft .............................................................................................................. 50
5.20
Requirement to keep records of certain tests ..................................................................... 52
5.21
Create offence of tampering with label or package ........................................................... 53
5.22
Issue a Regulatory Approval for Packing Instruction 200 ................................................. 53
5.23 Provide for Law Enforcement Officers to carry Capsicum (OC) Spray and Electromuscular Incapacitating Devices as Checked-in Baggage ............................................................ 54
5.24
Require an operator to appoint a person to the role of DG compliance ............................. 55
5.25 Require the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations and reference material to be kept
up to date ....................................................................................................................................... 56
5.26 Create an offence to consign an item that has DG labels on it; when it does not
contain DG .................................................................................................................................... 56
5.27
6.
Provide for the Approval of packaging for transportation by Aircraft .............................. 57
Items Proposed and not recommended .............................................................................. 59
6.2
Require discrete CASA Permission to carry DG in accordance with the ICAO TIs ......... 59
6.3
Commercial DG packers/shippers should be licensed/regulated ....................................... 60
6.4
Seasonally employed workers in freight sheds and parcel sorting facilities be
excluded from the requirement to undertake DG training ............................................................ 60
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6.5
Statement of Contents not be required where package has been opened or clearly
evident that the item is not dangerous ........................................................................................... 61
6.6
Provide for the carriage of 44 Gallon (205 Litre) drums of fuel on their side ................... 61
6.7
Remove the requirement for CASA to approve Trainee DG Instructors ........................... 61
6.8
Provide for the automatic recognition of foreign courses .................................................. 62
6.9
Provide for the automatic recognition of foreign DG training........................................... 62
6.10
Provide for CASA to delegate the ability to issue a DG instructor approval .................... 62
6.11
That CASA set the DG exam ............................................................................................. 62
6.12 Broaden scope of load planner definition to include the loading functions
undertaken by ramp team leaders and pit crew leaders................................................................. 63
6.13
Remove the requirement for everyone to be trained in passenger provisions ................... 63
6.14 Exclude DG training requirements from regulation 92.185 – carriage of large fuel
containers ...................................................................................................................................... 64
6.15
Require a 24-Hour contact number for shipments of declared dangerous goods .............. 64
6.16 Require Transport Security Inspectors from the Office of Transport Security
(OTS) to undertake DG training ................................................................................................... 65
6.17 Provide for Passengers to Carry DG When – “No other provisions of the TIs
apply” 65
7.
Manual of Standards (MOS) proposal............................................................................... 67
7.2
DG Courses ........................................................................................................................ 67
7.3
DG Instructors .................................................................................................................... 70
7.4
Items which may be carried in a non-Class B or non-Class C Cargo compartment .......... 71
8.
8.2
Minor or Machinery issues ................................................................................................. 72
Repeal CASR 92.150 – Transitional arrangements ........................................................... 72
8.3
CASR 92.170(1) – Remove the date “1 Jan 2004” and replace with “time to time”
in the definition of Class B cargo compartments .......................................................................... 72
8.4
Broaden CASR 92.180 to include silver fountain flares .................................................... 72
8.5
Exclude professional “DG instructors of approved courses” as being required to
have undertaken a Group A or B course before instructing on a Group E course ........................ 73
8.6
Harmonise definitions between CASR 92.010 and ICAO for DG accident and DG
incident .......................................................................................................................................... 73
8.7
CASR 92.040 – Dangerous Goods Manuals – Restructure the regulation into a
plain-English format...................................................................................................................... 74
8.8
Introduce definitions for “Consignment”, “Cargo aircraft” and “Passenger aircraft”
to have the same meaning as the ICAO TIs .................................................................................. 74
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8.9
Screening Authorities – alignment of definition ................................................................ 74
8.10
Additional defence for passengers if they have been given wrong information ................ 75
8.11
Permit carriage of loaded weapons in certain circumstances ............................................ 75
8.12
Training Records – retention of training certificate ........................................................... 75
8.13
Exempt Sling Load helicopter operators from DG training ............................................... 76
8.14 DG able to be carried by passengers - Remove the Note in 92.030 and refer instead
to the CASA website or an Advisory Circular Discussion Points ................................................ 76
8.15
Repeal CAR 304 and provide a similar regulation in Part 92 ............................................ 77
8.16
Add subsection 23(2AA) to regulations 92.025, 92.030 and 92.035. ................................ 77
8.17 Amend Note 2 to Definition of Technical Instructions to reflect compliance with
the current edition of the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations ................................................... 77
9. Proposals or requests – unnecessary as the current legislation is adequate or for
which clarification may be via an Advisory Circular .............................................................. 79
9.2
Offshore employees and training in the DG manual.......................................................... 79
9.3
Do load planners of a “will not carry DG” operator have to undertake DG training? ....... 79
9.4
Can operators hired by Law Enforcement Authorities use CASR 92.160? ....................... 80
9.5
Does Mishandled baggage require a statement that the contents are not dangerous? ....... 80
9.6
Require a NOTOC for every flight – even if there are no DG on board............................ 80
9.7
Amend employee DG groupings to reflect the ICAO categories of employees ................ 81
9.8
Point of cargo/DG acceptance ............................................................................................ 81
9.9
Clarify the difference between “private operators” and “Private Operations” in
CASR 92.175 ................................................................................................................................ 83
9.10
Define “Strong Outer Packagings ...................................................................................... 83
10.
Residual Issues.................................................................................................................. 85
10.2
CASR 92.070(4) –the provision of information by check-in staff members ..................... 85
10.3
Statement of Contents – applicability to a Collection of Statement-Exempt items ........... 85
10.4
Narrow the range of Shipper’s employees requiring DG Training .................................... 85
10.5
Freight forwarder who packs dry ice. What category of employee are they?.................... 86
10.6
Assessment by Australian operator of foreign DG training ............................................... 86
10.7 Training - Require evidence that a test has been conducted and for the test to be
made available to CASA ............................................................................................................... 87
10.8
Do DG Training Certificates Have to be Issued?............................................................... 87
10.9
What is the definition of Cargo and how does it apply to CASR Part 92? ........................ 87
10.10
Amend “aviation turbine fuel” in CASR 92.185 ............................................................ 88
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10.11
Clarify pressurisation status ........................................................................................... 88
10.12
Is CASA approval of e-Documents required? ................................................................ 89
10.13
Provision of notices in baggage collection areas ............................................................ 89
10.14
Requirement to provide information with electronic tickets .......................................... 90
10.15 The Cost and difficulty in obtaining the ICAO TIs and their position as
“legislation”................................................................................................................................... 90
10.16 Define the ICAO “Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents
involving Dangerous Goods” in CASR 92.010 ............................................................................ 90
10.17 Define “Readily Accessible” in the context of employee access to the operator’s
DG manual .................................................................................................................................... 91
10.18 Add UN Numbers and Proper Shipping Names to the items that are provided for
carriage by passengers and crew ................................................................................................... 91
10.19
Clarify “forbidden under any circumstance” and “forbidden unless exempt” ............... 91
10.20
Cargo
Clarify mishandled baggage, unaccompanied baggage and Excess Baggage as
92
10.21 Define “Flight Crew” in CASR Part 92 to have the same meaning as in the
CARs (or Part 91) ......................................................................................................................... 92
10.22
Passenger Reservation Staff required to be DG Trained? .............................................. 92
11.
Explanatory material ....................................................................................................... 94
11.2
ACs amended ..................................................................................................................... 94
11.3
ACs developed ................................................................................................................... 94
11.4
Orphan CAAPs .................................................................................................................. 94
11.5
Proposed Advisory Circulars ............................................................................................. 95
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Acronyms
AC
ACS
ADGAT
ICAO ANNEX 18
AIN
AOG
ARN
AQIS
AvSEC
CAAP
CASA
CASR
CAO
COE
DG
DGI
DGP
DGR
ERG
GHA
IATA
ICAO
LEA
MOS
MSDS
NFRM
NPRM
NOTOC
OTS
PIC
PIR
Part 92 PIR WG
PSN
TI
ULD
UN
USOAP
Advisory Circular
Australian Customs Service
Australian Dangerous Goods Air Transport Council
ICAO Annex 18 to the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation
Aviation Infringement Notice
Aircraft on Ground
Aviation Reference Number
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
Aviation Security
Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations
Cargo Aircraft Only
The UN Economic and Social Council’s Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods
Dangerous goods
Dangerous Goods Inspector
ICAO Dangerous Good Panel
Dangerous Goods Regulations
Emergency Response Guide for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods
(ICAO Doc 9481 AN/928
Ground handling agents
International Air Transport Association
International Civil Aviation Organization
Law Enforcement Authority
Manual of Standards
Material Safety Data Sheets
Notice of Final Rule-Making
Notice of Proposed Rule Making
Notice to Captain
Office of Transport Security
Pilot in Command
Post Implementation Review
Post Implementation Review Working Group
Proper Shipping Name
Technical Instructions
Unit Load Device
United Nations
Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program
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Part 92
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Part 92 Post Implementation Review
1.
Foreword
1.1
On 5 October 2001, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) released a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking – NPRM 0104OS, titled, “Consignment and carriage of dangerous goods –
proposed CASR Part 92” for public comment. The comment period closed on 31 January 2002
and a number of suggestions were made and taken into account. CASA issued a Notice of Final
Rulemaking on 3 December 2003 and Part 92 came into effect on 1 January 2004.
1.2
CASA initiated a Post-Implementation Review (PIR) of Part 92, Project OS 05/01, on
28 March 2005; however organisational changes within CASA halted progress until the
appointment of a new project manager on 28 March 2008.
1.3
The delay in undertaking the PIR has resulted in a more thorough and expansive review
of Part 92 than would have occurred had the PIR been undertaken in 2005. Many wide-ranging
issues relating to the transport of Dangerous Goods by Air were considered by a PIR Working
Group (Part 92 PIR WG), which was composed of CASA Inspectors and Industry appointed
nominees.
1.4
The results of the Review will be taken forward into an NPRM as some of the issues
and subsequent recommendations from the Part 92 PIR WG are relatively significant and require
proper public consultation.
2.
Introduction
2.1
Part 92 – Carriage and Consignment of Dangerous Goods – came into effect on 1
January 2004. CASA conducts a Post Implementation Review after the introduction of new
legislation. The function of transporting Dangerous Goods by Air involves a wide variety of
participating stakeholders including those who pack, ship or forward the dangerous goods,
operators and agents involved in loading and unloading the goods; and training organisations who
are involved with the training of employees involved in the handling of passengers, dangerous
goods and cargo.
2.2
A fundamental tenet in the safe transport of dangerous goods by air lies in the
classification and identification of those things which have the potential to be dangerous in the
aviation environment; limiting the internal quantities per package; to constrain further those
volumes of DG per package on passenger aircraft; requiring DG training of all persons involved
in sending or handling declared dangerous goods; training to assist in the identification and
removal of potential and hidden DGs from the airfreight system; the preparation of emergency
procedures; and, DG incident reporting to CASA.
2.3
Concerns, issues and suggestions were actively solicited from across the DG industry
and then considered by a representative cross section of that industry, which composed the PIR
Working Group. Suggestions and issues were of varying complexity and all input was carefully
considered. The rationale to the Part 92 PIR WG’s support, or otherwise, of various issues, has
been detailed in this report.
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2.4
In recognising the variety of interests of different stakeholders, a set of matrices of
stakeholder identification and the correlation to related material of interest has been included at
Appendix 1; to assist those readers who would prefer to sort by issues that affect them.
2.5
Those readers who would prefer a summary at-a-glance and sequenced in the current
Part 92 legislative order; of the concerns raised and the matters that were proposed and their
respective outcomes, will find this option at Appendix 2.
2.6
Regulatory policies and regulatory framework, articulated in the CASA Standards
Development Manual, have been applied. The outcomes from the Part 92 PIR and some key
examples of those outcomes are:
•
Proposals to align and update Part 92 with ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices and the ICAO Technical Instructions, such as:
° All operator DG Training courses proposed to be CASA approved - this would
broaden the proportion of an operator’s employees requiring an approved training
course to include ramp, customer check-in and security screening staff courses.
Most of these employees already complete an approved course. There have been a
number of examples where un-approved courses are not being kept up to date.
° Failure of a DG recertification course exam is proposed to in future to preclude the
employee from continuing to accept dangerous goods.
° A requirement that persons who open packages for inspection, including regulatory
authorities and Customs Officers, return the package to a proper condition for
carriage (in alignment with the ICAO Technical Instructions).
° Occurrences of hidden or mis-declared dangerous goods being reported in
accordance with the requirements of the ICAO TIs..
•
Proposals to clarify Regulations which are the source of confusion:
° DG Manual – when is an operator required to have a DG Manual.
° Clarifying that DG Instructors under training are required to hold an instructing
approval.
•
Proposals to improve tools for enforcement:
° Introduction of complementary offences and penalties in the CASRs for the
unlawful carriage and consignment of DGs to those that exist in the Civil Aviation
Act 1988.
° The authority for certain CASA inspectors and other certain persons to open
packages to ensure that:
− dangerous goods are packed in accordance with the ICAO TIs; and that
− General cargo does not contain hidden or misdeclared DGs.
•
A proposal to clarify and document certain standards and common practises, without
imposing additional regulatory burden:
•
The development of a Manual of Standards relating to DG Training, DG Courses, and
DG Instructor Development.
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•
3.
Proposals to provide better guidance for the aviation industry:
° Reviewing and refining CAAP 262A-1(0) [now republished as AC 92-05(0) Use of
Compressed Oxygen: Carriage and Consignment of Live Aquatic Animals for
Transport by Air] and CAAP 35-4(0) Design and maintenance of containers:
transportation of live aquatic animals using oxygen.
° Articulating an application package for a new DG instructor.
° Reviewing AC 92-2 (DG Manuals) and including material which will provide a
clearer examples on certain sample topics (i.e. operator approved DG for
passengers).
° Production of an Advisory Circular on Permissions to Carry and Consign
Dangerous Goods (Section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act) [now published as AC 9204(0) and Form 361]
° Articulating requirements for correspondence and internet based courses in AC 921 (training).
° Production of an Advisory Circular on an overview of the DG Legislation [now
published as AC 92A-01(0)].
Background to the Review Paper
3.1
This section provides a summary of the Post-Implementation Review, the solicitation of
comments and concerns, the formulation and composition of a PIR Working Group and the
deliberations of that group.
3.2
Purpose of the Review Paper
3.2.1
This paper reviews the introduction of Part 92 (Consignment and Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Air) into the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. It recounts the education and
information dissemination process that was conducted in the lead up to gazettal and the
opportunities for improvement learned from the implementation, education and promotion of the
changes that arose through Part 92.
3.2.2
The paper also details PIR project; the identification of issues, concerns and deficiencies
within the Part 92 legislation; the formulation of the Part 92 PIR WG, the outcomes from the
deliberations of the working group and the proposals for further improvements to Part 92. A total
of 150 issues were submitted for review and consideration. For the purposes of this document,
comments of a similar nature or theme have been grouped together in order to minimise
repetition.
3.3
Structure of the Review Paper
3.3.1
This paper commences with a précis of the changes that Part 92 introduced; how the
industry education process and rollout of the implementation took place; and the opportunities for
improvement in future rollouts.
3.3.2
The paper then briefly explains the formulation of the Part 92 issues register, the
creation of the Working Group and principles adopted by the Part 92 PIR WG when considering
those issues.
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3.3.3
The sequence of issues contained within the paper has been listed in the order of:
•
Major issues and suggestions that have been proposed and recommended;
•
minor suggestions which have been proposed and are recommended;
•
the suggestions that were not supported or recommended; major and minor;
•
matters of a minor and/or machinery nature;
•
the proposal for a Manual of Standards; and.
•
those issues and concerns that were not of a problem with the current legislation, but
rather were areas that could be better explained or clarified, either within this review
paper, or in an Advisory Circular; or which might be clarified through the review paper.
3.4
What was introduced by Part 92?
3.4.1
Prior to the introduction of Part 92 in 2004, the dangerous goods legislation was
contained in Part XV of CAR 1988, and was composed of Regulations 262A through to 262V, in
the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988. The salient items that were introduced into dangerous goods
legislation through the concurrent repeal of Part XV and the introduction of Part 92 were:
•
All shippers of dangerous goods were required to undertake approved training courses
in dangerous goods. conducted by industry instructors, which was an act of
harmonisation with ICAO.
•
Cabin Crew DG training courses were to be approved by CASA.
•
The requirement for some additional operators to maintain a DG manual – an alignment
with changes by ICAO.
•
Employees to have the ability to gain necessary dangerous goods qualifications on a
single course.
•
All DG training was made to be valid for 2 years.
•
A period of anticipation of up to 3 months, for employees’ training expiry to enable
employees to re-qualify in dangerous goods training and being able to maintain training
to an anniversary date, a measure subsequently adopted by ICAO.
•
Automatic exemptions for certain operators from the requirement for dangerous goods
training and from the regulations for certain types of operations.
•
Regulations which provided the means for certain groups such as emergency and police
services to carry certain equipment and tools of trade, in certain circumstances.
•
Certain statutory exclusions i.e. display parachute jumpers; the carriage of DG in
helicopter underslung load, the carriage of DG in non-class B cargo compartments,
which removed the need for repetitive issuing of instruments.
•
Two advisory circulars on DG training and DG Manuals.
3.5
The Rationale to the Changes from CAR 1988 to Part 92
3.5.1
The primary drivers for change were:
•
The existing Regulations in CAR 1988, 262A-262V, were, in places, not aligned with
ICAO.
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•
DG training courses were exhibiting varying degrees of inconsistency, standards,
quality and effectiveness of underlying systems and infrastructure.
•
CASA’s DG Inspectors had been repetitively issuing a number of permissions to
facilitate everyday activities, which could be more efficiently accomplished through
statutory provisions within Subpart 92.D.
3.6
The Staggered Implementation of Part 92
3.6.1
Whilst Part 92 came into effect for most of the aviation industry on 1 January 2004, it
was decided that any imposts upon those industry participants that had not been previously
exposed to any legislative DG requirements were to be deferred for a six month period until 1
July 2004. The six-month deferral period was to enable an education and information process to
occur. These included:
•
A requirement for shippers of Dangerous Goods to be trained – (an alignment with
ICAO).
•
Ticket sellers and travel agents - Information to be issued with ticket.
•
Terminal building owner - Information to be provided.
3.6.2
An additional and unintended advantage of the deferral, or segregated implementation of
components of Part 92, was that the CASA DG Inspectors could focus upon and rectify concerns
as they arose. The two most significant changes were in respect of ticket sellers now having to
provide information and the volume of applications for training courses and instructors approvals.
3.6.3
In hindsight if the entire industry had a common implementation date for Part 92, then
CASA would not have had sufficient resources to manage the introduction of the various
components and to respond to the needs of the industry.
3.7
Implementation – Education and Advice – the Lessons
3.7.1
Part 92 commenced from developmental work in 1996, through the consultative and
legislative processes until 2003. In mid-2003, the production of advisory material, mailing lists;
and safety promotion distribution networks were established.
3.7.2
The biggest initial impost was upon the training industry which needed to amend and
prepare courses. The implementation date of 1 January 2004 was chosen to coincide with IATA
DGR changes. Aviation DG Training Organisations usually do not schedule training in
November and December as they use this time to prepare material to reflect the changes to the
ICAO TIs/IATA DGRs for the forthcoming year’s training. The existing DG training
organisations were notified and education commenced mid-way through 2003; although as the
event had been in the making since 1997, there was no real surprise and a number of training
organisations had made it clear that they would be choosing to exit the industry at this point.
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3.7.3
Clear statements were made to the industry that the CASA DG Inspectors would not be
taking an aggressive approach to Regulatory enforcement; that the approach would primarily be
around education. However, all training organisations were notified that those who were not
prepared to update materials/courses would have to cease training on 31 December 2003. There
were 54 Organisations and entities holding training course and instructor approvals before 31
December 2003. A significant number of these were either dormant and either not really in effect;
were delivered in an ad-hoc and haphazard manner; or used material that was significantly out of
date. Post 1 January 2004, 25% of training course approval holders chose to not continue in the
DG training industry.
3.7.4
CASA had four DG Inspectors who undertook travelling roadshows – explaining the
Part 92 changes to other CASA Inspectors in Regional Offices. The intention was that the broader
CASA inspectorate would then carry this information to their local operators. The lessons from
this exercise were:
•
There was inadequate roll-out by the CASA DG Inspectors – it was impractical for local
area office Inspectors, after a single briefing, to educate their operators on DGs and the
finer points of the new legislation.
•
The rollout and education to/of operators should have been done by a joint team of DG
Inspectors and dedicated Safety Promotion/Aviation Safety Advisors.
•
There should have been a follow up visit to each CASA Office, with additional
information sessions presented by the CASA DG Inspectors.
•
CASA produced educational material and posters which were effective in notifying the
industry of forthcoming changes.
•
It was subsequently discovered that training organisations had led the “education” of
shippers. Some organisations had conveyed the message zealously, with CASA DG
Inspectors receiving a number of calls to confirm the training requirement and
explaining the settling in period.
•
The other major, unanticipated, impact was that it became necessary to restructure the
CASA website and to provide direct linkages with relevant DG information, for
passengers and consignors of cargo and DG. This measure facilitated internet ticketing
agencies to electronically link their ticket to the CASA website on the DG information
that is relevant to passengers and for freight and courier companies to provide an
additional linkage for customers wanting to send DG and cargo.
3.8
Matters identified through the PIR and the proposed changes
3.8.1
Issue - Lack of compliance in certain areas with ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices.
Proposed solutions:
•
All operator DG Training courses to be CASA approved - this would broaden the
proportion of an operator’s employees requiring an approved training course to include
ramp, customer check-in and security screening staff courses. Most of these employees
already complete an approved course. There have been a number of examples where unapproved courses are not being kept up to date.
Part 92 PIR – V.3.2 – 230513
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•
Failure of exam in a DG recertification course would preclude the employee from being
authorised to accept dangerous goods.
•
A requirement that persons who open packages for inspection, including regulatory
authorities and Customs Officers, return the package to a proper condition for carriage
(in alignment with the ICAO Technical Instructions).
•
Hidden or misdeclared dangerous goods being required to be reported.
3.8.2
Issue - Clarify Confusing Regulations:
Proposed solutions:
• DG Manual – Clarify in regulation exactly which operators are required to have a DG
Manual
• Clarifying in regulation that DG Instructors under training are required to hold an
instructing approval.
3.8.3
Issue - Improved tools for compliance and enforcement:
Proposed solutions:
• The power for certain CASA inspectors to open packages to ensure that dangerous
goods are packed in accordance with the ICAO TIs.
3.8.4
Issue - Provision of better guidance for the Aviation Industry:
Proposed solutions:
• Reviewing and updating certain CAAPs which no longer have an overarching
Regulation - CAAPs 89I-1 (Safety Distances for Explosive Laden Aircraft), and CAAPs
262A and 35-4 (Oxygen systems for live aquatic animals).
• Reviewing AC 92-2 (DG Manuals) and including material which will provide a clearer
examples on certain sample topics (i.e. operator approved DG for passengers).
• Production of an Advisory Circular – AC 92-04 – Permissions to Carry and Consign
Dangerous Goods (Section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act).
• Reviewing and updating the information contained in the AC 92-01 – DG training.
• Articulating requirements for correspondence and internet based courses in AC 92-03
(DG Training Courses and Instructors), including articulating an application package for
a new DG instructor.
• Production of an Advisory Circular that clarifies or answers a number of recurring
questions and themes – AC 92A-01 – an Overview of the DG Legislation
•
The proposed production of a number of more detailed ACs; which expand upon the
information in AC 92A-01. These are envisaged to be produced over the period 20112014 and, with indicative numbering only at this stage, would include the following
topics:
° AC 92-06 – Dangerous Goods Occurrences – prevention, preparation, management,
investigation and reporting
° AC 92-07 – Radioactive, Class 7, an overview and application of the transport by
air in Australia
° AC 92-08 – Dangerous Goods that may be carried by Passengers and Crew
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°
°
°
°
°
°
°
°
AC 92-09 – UN specification packaging
AC 92-10 – Statement of Contents
AC 92-11 – Operators that do Not Carry Dangerous Goods
AC 92-12 – Private Pilots* and Dangerous Goods
AC 92D-01 – Subpart D
AC 93E-01 – Information by Travel agents
AC 92E-02 – Information by Terminal operators and
AC 139-12 – An update of CAAP 89I-1(2) – Safety Distances for Explosive Laden
Aircraft
*The term “Private Pilot” will be revisited once Part 91 has been settled and an appropriately
equivalent synonym has been established.
3.9
Developing the Part 92 Issues Register and Working Group
Facilitation in identifying Part 92 issues
3.9.1
A number of opportunities were created to facilitate raising and reporting concerns with
the Part 92 legislation; including:
•
Adding functionality to the DG component of the CASA Website to enable the direct
registering of regulatory and guidance documentation concerns to the PIR Project
Manager.
•
PIR Project Manager receiving direct feedback from freight forwarders and operators.
•
An open industry forum, hosted by CASA in Canberra on 14 August 2008.
•
Reviewing the operational experience of the CASA’s Inspectors, including audit
observations, repetitive telephone queries and industry complaints.
•
Recording and monitoring of questions and queries raised by other CASA Inspectors.
•
Questions that had been raised in DG course classrooms and passed on by DG
instructors.
•
Matters raised in various ICAO DG Panel meetings, which require a consequential
amendment to Part 92, if Australia is to remain in harmony with international standards.
•
A total of 150 issues or comments were received and logged.
Contributors
3.9.2
A number of individuals and organisations from a broad cross-section of the Australian
aviation DG Industry, contributed towards the matters logged in the Issues Register:
•
ADGAT – A number of issues were raised through the forum of the Australian
Dangerous Goods Air Transport Council (“ADGAT”) and were not attributed to any
one person
•
Adrian Tusek – CASA DG Inspector
•
Anthony Rogan – Virgin Blue
•
Alan Fuller – Toll Priority
•
Barry Rogers – Australia Post
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•
Ben Firkins – CASA DG Inspector
•
Bob Timmins – CASA DG Inspector
•
Chris Reed – AITAC
•
Greg Worthington – CASA Flying Operations Inspector
•
Janet McCracken – Airsafe Transport Training
•
Jason Mallard – DGM
•
John Donkers – HazPac
•
John Orlowski – AvStar Solutions Pty Ltd
•
John Wall – Missionary Aviation Fellowship
•
Laurie Willoughby – Qantas Airways Limited
•
Michael Montuori – Qantas Airways Limited
•
Nic Nicolai – All Modes Dangerous Goods Training
•
Paul Osbourne – Australian Parachute Federation
•
Paul Steele – Department of Infrastructure and Transport
•
Peter McDermott – Australian air Express
•
Phil Naughton – Eastern Australia Airlines
•
Sue-anne Roberts – Civil Aviation Academy Australasia
•
Sam Bitossi – CASA Dangerous Goods Inspector
•
Wal Slaven – CASA Air Transport Inspector
3.10
Formulation of the Post-Implementation Review Working Group
3.10.1 ADGAT is a peak industry forum for parties involved in the transportation of Dangerous
Goods by air in Australia. CASA’s DG Inspectors are invited guests and the forum enables the
productive engagement between industry and CASA on Dangerous Goods safety-related matters.
ADGAT was invited to put forward a representative panel encompassing the stakeholder
activities of DG consignors, Freight Forwarders, Ground Handling Agents, operators and DG
training organisations.
3.10.2
Nominated Aviation DG Industry representatives to the Part 92 PIR WG were:
•
Barry Rogers (Dangerous Goods Compliance Manager, Australia Post, ex-DG
Instructor, Ansett).
•
Judy Silkens (Manager Ground Operations, Cobham Aviation)*
•
Laurie Willoughby (DG Safety and Compliance Manager, Qantas and DG Board
member, IATA).
•
Michael Montouri (Manager, Dangerous Goods and Compliance, Qantas and Training
Task Force member, IATA).
•
Paul Steele (Department of Infrastructure and Transport - Office of Transport Security
Cargo Supply Chain, former CASA Part 92 Project Manager and ex-DG Panel member,
ICAO).
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•
Peter McDermott (Operations Manager, Australian air Express).
•
Toni Farquharson (Dangerous Goods Operations and Compliance Support Manager,
Qantas)*
•
Tony Rogan (Dangerous Goods Specialist, Virgin Australia).
•
Trevor Amos (Manager Dangerous Goods Compliance and Standards, Qantas)*
* Participation commenced later in project and was as a replacement for a departing member
of the working group.
3.10.3
The CASA representatives to the Part 92 PIR WG comprised:
•
Adrian Tusek (Dangerous Goods Inspector, CASA and current DG Panel Member,
ICAO).
•
Andrew Ward (Senior Standards Officer, Part 92 PIR Project Officer, CASA)
•
Ben Firkins (Part 92 PIR Project Manager, Dangerous Goods Inspector, CASA).
•
Bob Timmins (CASA Dangerous Goods Inspector, and former DG Panel member,
ICAO).
3.10.4 The Working Group met on 19 March 2009, 19 April 2009, 15 July 2009, 28 April 2010,
20 August 2010, 13 July 2011, 3 August 2011 and 21 March 2012.
Summary of principles adopted by the Working Group
3.10.5
The Primacy of the PIR working group’s focus, in order was:
•
Safety of Passengers, Crew, the Operation and Persons on the Ground.
•
Recognising that the TIs are ICAO’s development of rules and standards that are
applicable to international trade and commerce.
•
Primarily catered around complex operators and interacting systems and large aircraft.
•
Considering the needs of regional Australians’ whilst attempting to ensure that they
received the same degree of equivalent safety.
•
The costs and impositions of regulations which hinder high levels of participation in the
aviation industry.
•
To improve Regulations so that they are clear, concise, specify the safety outcome
required and contribute to aviation safety and the environment without disproportionate
economic impact.
3.10.6 The Working Group applied a number of principles in considering the various issues that
were raised.
•
Principle 1: To seek the alignment of Part 92 with ICAO requirements unless there are
extenuating reasons for any provision that is either more or less restrictive than ICAO
requirements.
Note: Article 87 of the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation seeks “to secure the highest
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and
organisations in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services…”
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•
Principle 2: Australian situations should only be made more restrictive where it was
considered necessary from safety perspective, reflected an international emerging
practice, or thought likely that ICAO may adopt the Australian initiative.
•
Principle 3: Any new imposts should not constitute a major additional expense or
burden; that new measures should be encouraged rather than mandated, and that new
legislative measures ought not to be going beyond existing mainstream industry
practices.
•
Principle 4: Rather than CASA’s delegates repetitively issuing similar permissions
under Section 23 of the Act, statutory exclusions through Subpart 92.D, which maintain
an equivalent level of safety, and for which there is sufficient level of demand; should
be developed.
•
Principle 5: Where possible, consider the benefit of removing additional compliance
costs from burdensome regulations, particularly where there appears to be common
areas of responsibility or overlap with other Government agencies and departments, and
to publish safety related guidance material rather than generating new regulation.
•
Principle 6: To provide information and to encourage the adoption by industry of
safety-related practices and responsibilities.
•
Principle 7: To provide for additional flexibility in Regulatory outcomes.
3.10.7 The Working Group also considered that where there was confusion created through
differing interpretations of a regulation, and insufficient guidance, then changing the regulation
without producing guidance was still likely to result in confusion. It was considered to be more
preferable to produce guidance material to existing legislation and if there are still legislative
deficiencies identified in the future, then the regulation, and associated guidance material, could
be changed in the future based on experience and need.
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4.
Significant issues – Proposed and Recommended
4.1
These are major issues which have the potential to be contentious and which require
proper consultation with the Industry and public through an NPRM. In some cases, an
amendment to the Civil Aviation Act 1988 may be necessary to accomplish such changes.
4.2
The first four items in this section made need to be read and considered together.
4.3
DG Occurrence Management and the making of DG Occurrence Reports
by Government agencies and stakeholders
4.3.1
The National Aviation Policy White Paper “Flight Path to the Future”
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/nap/files_white_paper/091215_Full.pdf identified that:
“It is critical that Government Agencies across Australia have a common approach and work
together to augment CASA’s efforts by seeking a comprehensive, thorough and consistent means
of Regulations and enforcement;” and
“Increasing public awareness and fostering expertise across border and enforcement agencies
will further strengthen Australia’s ability to both prevent and detect the unlawful carriage of
dangerous goods on board passenger and freight aircraft.”
4.3.2
The PIR Working Group was of the view that there is a need to formalise the process
and to better support Australia’s ICAO Annex 18 obligations. ICAO Annex 18 Chapter 12 has
four paragraphs, the first imposes obligations in respect of DG accidents and incidents with an
International connection; the second paragraph recommends the same obligations be observed for
domestic DG incidents and accidents. The third paragraph imposes obligations in respect of DG
occurrences with an international connection and the fourth paragraph again recommends that
States apply the same Standards in respect of Domestic DG occurrences.
“12.1
With the aim of preventing the recurrence of dangerous goods accidents and incidents,
each contracting state shall establish procedures for investigating and compiling information
concerning such accidents and incidents which occur in its territory and which involve the
transport of dangerous goods originating in or destined for another state. Reports on such
accidents and incidents shall be made in accordance with the detailed provisions of the
Technical Instructions”
“12.2
With the aim of preventing the recurrence of dangerous goods accidents and incidents,
each contracting state should establish procedures for investigating and compiling information
concerning such accidents and incidents which occur in its territory other than those described
in 12.1. Reports on such accidents and incidents should be made in accordance with the detailed
provisions of the Technical Instructions.”
“12.3
With the aim of preventing the recurrence of instances of undeclared or misdeclared
dangerous goods in cargo, each Contracting State shall establish procedures for investigating
and compiling information concerning such occurrences which occur in its territory and which
involve the transport of dangerous goods originating in or destined for another State. Reports on
such instances shall be made in accordance with the detailed provisions of the Technical
Instructions”
“12.4
With the aim of preventing the recurrence of instances of undeclared or misdeclared
dangerous goods in cargo, each Contracting State shall establish procedures for investigating
and compiling information concerning such occurrences which occur in its territory other than
those described in 12.3. Reports on such instances should be made in accordance with the
detailed provisions of the Technical Instructions”
4.3.3
In essence, ICAO Annex 18 requires DG accident, incident and occurrences to be
investigated and reported. CASA is the Australian Government entity assigned with
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responsibility for ICAO Annex 18. Section 23 of the Act and CASR 92.065 imposes a reporting
requirement upon Commercial operators. Incidents and potential incidents that are detected either
before or after the operator’s involvement are sometimes reported. However, the potential safety
lessons to be gained from unreported incidents are lost.
4.3.4
Recent ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) audits conducted on
other States are focusing on the transportation and safety defenses in respect of DGs within the
aviation system, from Shipper to Consignee. Many States have already received adverse findings
for only focusing on the operator.
4.3.5
For the purposes of this PIR, it is proposed to collectively refer to DG accidents, DG
Incidents, and occurrences of hidden and misdeclared DG as “DG occurrences”. It is also
envisaged that a number of other instances of DG occurrence should be captured, including
mishandling and misloading of DG.
4.3.6
It is considered that the Civil Aviation Act may require amendment to provide a head-ofpower that relates to DG Occurrence reporting by people on discovery of an, Aviation-related DG
occurrence or a potential DG incident or upon discovery of hidden or misdeclared DGs.
Reporting will be in accordance with the Regulations.
4.3.7
The Office of Transport Security (OTS) is receiving a number of aviation related DG
occurrence reports from Customs, Australia Post, AQIS etc, which are not being reported to
CASA, nor to the operator that carried the goods or the passenger. The PIR WG considered that
DG occurrence reporting should be made by government agencies and stakeholders including
freight forwarders, security, AQIS, Australia Post, cargo terminal operators (CTOs), regulated air
cargo agents (RACAs), and accredited air cargo agents (AACAs). The WG view is that the
security occurrence reporting through to OTS also reflects the hidden and misdeclared DG
occurrence requirements of paragraphs 12.3 and 12.4 of ICAO Annex 18.
4.3.8
The Working Group was of the view that any definitions in the terminology needed to
match that of the security terminology – i.e. the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 defines
“Passenger” to include “intending passenger” and “cargo” to include cargo which is:
“intended to be transported by aircraft;” or
“in accordance with the regulations, regarded as being reasonably likely to be transported by
aircraft.”
4.3.9
From the safety-perspective, CASA is not receiving information that would be beneficial
for safety-trend monitoring and the subsequent opportunities to improve the safety-health of the
aviation industry in carrying DGs. There was a strong view that the incident reporting
requirements needed to include incident notification to the operator if an incident is detected postflight – for example, a freight forwarder discovering a leak of mercury from a consignment, so
that the aircraft can be inspected and decontaminated before damage of an insidious, serious and
long-term nature takes hold.
4.3.10 Security incidents are currently being reported to the Office of Transport Security
(OTS), in the Department of Infrastructure and Transport where the incident originates on
airports; including dangerous goods such as fireworks. These are also being detected by officers
of the Australian Customs Service in respect of passengers transiting through screening points;
but are not being on-reported to the operator or to CASA.
4.3.11 Enforcement options are not being adequately adopted by other agencies when they
detect DG incidents, for example, an episode of the television program “Border Security” showed
the Australian Customs Service releasing a passenger with a caution, when he was detected with
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a large amount of fireworks in his luggage. Coupling an incident reporting requirement with the
potential for issuing an Aviation Infringement Notice for various DG offences would strengthen
Australia’s ability to enforce aviation DG requirements.
4.3.12
The prevailing view from the industry participants was that they would prefer:
•
DG Incident reports to be made to carrier/operator and for the carrier to make the report
to CASA.
•
If the incident is picked up by security/screening agencies ahead of operator allocation –
then the screening agency should be making the report direct to CASA.
4.3.13 The amendment would assist CASA to discharge Australia’s assigned ICAO Annex 18
obligations.
4.3.14 There are two other incident reporting requirements in the ICAO Annexes, these are
security incidents in Annex 17, which is administered in Australia by the Office of Transport
Security, and the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation requirements of Annex 13, which
is administered by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
4.3.15 The WG also considered that a whole–of-government approach should to be adopted
with respect to DG occurrence reporting and which may be feasible through Australia’s ICAObased State Safety Program and hazard reporting measures. In essence, where an occurrence was
considered to be both a security matter and a DG safety issue, that operators should not have to
make two separate reports; although there was no objection to electronic auto-generated reports
transmitting the information to multiple agencies – it was preferred that the main concerning
issue be handled by the relevant agency; with the other agency either working with the first one
or deferring any formal investigation until the completion of the first. For example:
•
The lodgement of an improvised explosive device, which may contain items that are
DG, is clearly intended to cause harm. The intent and opportunity are made with malice
– it is clearly a security matter and the appropriate lead agency is OTS, who may call
upon the Federal Police.
•
The consignment of five litres of fuel, hidden and consigned with general cargo and
declared as “water sample - not dangerous”, but which does not leak in flight, is clearly
a safety matter. There is no apparent attempt at compliance; the appropriate organisation
to enquire further would be CASA or the Australian Federal Police, although reports
could also be made to ATSB and OTS
•
The consignment of 220 litres of Aviation Turbine Fuel, on a passenger aircraft, in
accordance with the TIs – that is packed, marked, labelled and declared and accepted as
a Class 3 (flammable Liquid) DG, and which leaks in flight, saturating other cargo, is
clearly a significant safety matter. There has been an apparent attempt at compliance;
but this was so close to a DG Accident, that the appropriate organisation to enquire
further would be the ATSB. However, given the DG expertise within CASA, it would
be appropriate to make the report to both agencies, where a memorandum on
cooperation and investigation is already in place.
•
The unlawful, but inadvertent carriage by a passenger of a gun and ammunition into the
cabin of an aircraft, is a safety concern from the perspective of improperly packaged
ammunition. The over-riding concern though, is of the opportunity available to those
who may have intent to do harm, and the failure in the security defence mechanisms that
might enable the opportunity to be replicated. In this circumstance, the lead agency will
be OTS. CASA will welcome the lodgement of a DG occurrence report and will take an
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interest in the investigation of the occurrence and the implementation of preventive and
remedial measures.
4.3.16 Irrespective of ICAO’s State Safety Program, it is the view of the WG that for reasons of
aviation safety and in compliance with Government Policy, it is necessary to provide for, and
require, DG occurrence reporting requirements to be extended to Customs, AQIS, Australia Post,
freight forwarders and other screening/regulatory agencies.
4.3.17 The value in post-flight DG occurrence reporting has been demonstrated already with
the post-occurrence investigation resulting in Australia making submissions to the ICAO DG
Panel to change the ICAO TIs; develop and deliver aviation safety education messages for the
travelling public, and undertake industry education and warning of emerging trends in
occurrences.
Outcomes:
4.3.18 It is proposed that a set of regulations be introduced under a new subpart 92.F that would
relate to DG occurrence investigation and reporting and which would formalise the current
practice of reporting instances of hidden and misdeclared DG to CASA and align the regulations
with ICAO requirements.
4.3.19 The WG recommends a context statement to Subpart 92.F that clarifies that the purpose
of reporting DG accidents, incidents and occurrences of hidden and misdeclared DG is for safety
related purposes.
4.3.20 The WG recommends a graduated process that escalates from safety education through
to integrated enforcement.
4.3.21 The WG recommends that to capitalise upon the occurrence reporting process with
security-related DG concerns already being reported through to OTS, that there be a
Memorandum between CASA and OTS on sharing DG related information. The general
concurrence amongst the industry was a preference to report information to Government once
and there was an expectation that irrespective of the Privacy Act, that CASA and OTS should be
sharing such information in the interests of aviation safety.
4.3.22 The WG recommends that CASA, OTS and ATSB explore the establishment of a
common, holistic and integrated aviation security and safety-related accident, incident and
occurrence reporting system.
4.3.23 The new regulations would require all DG occurrences to be reported to CASA. This
will require industry and other regulator education and there will need to be an appropriate
allocation of time and resources to facilitate such a program.
4.3.24 Where a regulatory agency such as Customs or AQIS, or screening authority, makes a
report of a detected DG incident to the operator that last carried the passenger or cargo, then the
reporting obligation of that entity would be considered to have been met.
4.3.25 The WG proposes that there be an authority for “you find it – you take it out of the
aviation system”. Currently items that are DG and found by routine Security screening in
passengers checked-in baggage, are removed from the baggage and the remainder of the baggage
continues to destination. Often the passenger is summoned to observe the investigation and
removal of the DG item, unless the passenger is in transit and has already left on their next flight
and the item is removed on the grounds of safety. It is proposed to formalize this arrangement and
to develop a similar proposal for cargo which is found to contain DG.
4.3.26
Where instances of hidden and misdeclared DG which have been detected prior to a
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screening point, do not need to be reported, although where circumstances indicate a deliberate
attempt to unlawfully consign DGs, then reporting is to be encouraged.
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4.4
Powers/Directions to Hold/Seize/Dispose of Suspected DG
4.4.1
CASA is the agency assigned with responsibility for ICAO Annex 18 – The Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. Chapter 12 specifies that with the aim of preventing the
recurrence of DG accidents, incidents and of undeclared and misdeclared DG in cargo, each
contracting State should establish procedures for investigating and compiling information from
such occurrences (refer quote at para 4.1.2 above).
4.4.2
It is envisaged that in the circumstances where a DG occurrence is discovered in
Australia, and which originated from overseas, that there is a need to hold onto goods for
purposes of foreign regulator being able to conduct an investigation into that occurrence and for
subsequent safety education and enforcement purposes. The Civil Aviation Act and CASRs are
applicable in all Australian aircraft and any aircraft flying to/from Australia. Where an
occurrence occurs through lack of compliance with the ICAO TIs, it is in Australian interests to
assist foreign Regulators.
4.4.3
The provision of an authority to hold onto/investigate/report DG incidents/accidents and
misdeclared & undeclared DGs, for a short period (i.e. up to five working days for domestic
incidents and 14 days for a foreign incident) would be a significant and effective tool to assist in
aviation compliance & enforcement. It is considered appropriate that if the holding period needs
to be extended, then this should be accomplished through the existing mechanism for seizure of
evidence by a CASA Investigator.
4.4.4
The amendment is also consistent with Government White Paper and CASA Corporate
plan objectives relating to “improving the Regulation of Dangerous Goods Transportation by
Air”.
4.4.5
Currently the only mechanism to legally retain DGs involved in an occurrence or
potential incident is through a CASA Investigator empowered under Part IIIA of the Civil
Aviation Act. This is a lengthy process and an impractical method.
4.4.6
Current industry practice is to hold onto any DG involved in an incident, or which have
been undeclared or misdeclared, for examination by CASA if needed/requested. with most
forwarders and operators relying on contractual fine-print conditions of carriage printed on the
Consignment note.
4.4.7
CASA DG Inspectors make an assessment of each reported DG incident, with the
majority of incidents being subjected only to a desk-top investigation or an active decision of nofurther investigation to be undertaken. Occasionally the forwarder/operator may be requested to
hold onto the goods a short while longer whilst the DG Inspector gathers further evidence as to
the potential seriousness of the incident, or where the shipper may have deliberately attempted to
unlawfully send DG. This assists in establishing a suitable window of opportunity to enable the
attendance of a CASA Investigator to affect formal seizure of the goods.
4.4.8
Operators and forwarders, whilst prepared to assist in these circumstances, are
nevertheless concerned that they are only holding the goods on the basis of an informal request.
4.4.9
There are a number of concerns in legislating for what would be tantamount to the
“automatic seizure” of goods involved in a DG occurrence, with some of the complexities
including:
•
safe storage;
•
compensation;
•
period of retention and the return and repatriation or disposal of the goods; and
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•
Occupational Health and Safety in the event that the goods are leaking etc.
4.4.10 The Working Group was of the view that it would be beneficial if CASA produced an
Advisory Circular that articulated current practices and provided DG incident reporting and
management guidelines.
4.4.11 When managing the discovery and investigation of a DG occurrence the working group
postulated the fundamental safety philosophies of:
•
“you find it – you take it out” of the aviation system;
•
CASA DG occurrence investigations are to be principally focussed on aviation safety as
the highest priority;
•
DG occurrence reporting should be coupled with systemic trend monitoring, for the
purposes of education and prevention of incident recurrences;
•
where the DG occurrence is of a minor, or low-scale in potential risk, or the breach was
inadvertent and not due to recklessness, carelessness or negligence, once sufficient
photographs of packaging and copies of relevant documentation have been obtained,
then in most instances, transportation of the goods should not be further delayed.
Examples of such instances are:
•
where it appears there has been an error/errors in regards to documentation, packaging,
labelling etc. for a declared D.G.,
•
an everyday item of DG that is permitted as checked or carry-on baggage but which has
been lodged within a freight consignment (tradesman's tools etc.) but Commercial
quantities (e.g. a full carton of aerosols) should be more thoroughly investigated,
•
radio-medical-isotopes or other potentially life-saving dangerous goods, or priority
items with a significant economical impact if delayed (such as an aircraft on ground
(“AOG”) or imminent plant shutdown) should continue to be moved as expeditiously
and lawfully as possible
•
the information provided by the reporters of DG Incidents should be sufficient to allow
follow up/ re-education of shipper to prevent recurrences; and the information
documented should be sufficient for follow-up actions to prevent recurrences and enable
the goods to be released;
•
the circumstance where goods should be held is where there appears to have been an
intention to ship undeclared D.G.s (by a customer/company who should be expected to
know better) or when the quantity or hazard level of the goods exceeds a reasonable
threshold.
•
That if the goods are leaking, or it is not safe to hold onto the goods, or adequate safe
storage cannot be provided or it is not practicable, then the goods are not required to be
held onto, but there are not to be put back into the Aviation system.
•
That a period of holding the goods should not normally exceed 5 working days.
•
That in the event the goods were found to be hidden or misdeclared dangerous goods,
then the shipper of the goods is responsible for bringing the consignment into a lawful
condition and repatriating the goods.
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•
That in the event of declared DG being found to be not in a proper condition for
carriage, then the shipper of the goods is responsible for bringing the consignment into a
condition that is in compliance with the ICAO TIs.
•
That in the event that the goods were found to be not meeting the classification criteria
as a DG, or that a DG consignment was in a proper condition for carriage, then the
operator/forwarder will return the consignment into the air transportation system.
4.4.12
The UK Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations 2002, at Section 18, provides:
18.—(1) An authorised person may examine, take samples of and seize any goods which the
authorised person has reasonable grounds to suspect may be dangerous goods in respect of
which the provisions of these Regulations have not been complied with.
(2) An authorised person may open or require to be opened any baggage or package which the
authorised person has reasonable grounds to suspect may contain dangerous goods in respect of
which the provisions of these Regulations have not been complied with.
(3)
(a) Subject to paragraph (5), any sample taken or goods seized by an authorised
person under this regulation shall be retained or detained respectively for so long as the CAA
considers necessary in all the circumstances and shall be disposed of in such manner as the CAA
considers appropriate in all the circumstances.
(b) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-paragraph (a) any sample taken or goods
seized under this regulation may be retained or detained respectively:
(i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or
(ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence.
(4)
(a) The person from whom any goods have been seized by an authorised person under
this regulation may apply to the CAA for the item to be released to him.
(b) An application under this paragraph shall be made in writing and shall be
accompanied by evidence of ownership by the applicant.
(c) The function of deciding a case where such an application as is referred to in
subparagraph (a) has been made is hereby prescribed for the purposes of section 7(1) of
the Civil Aviation Act 1982: and for the purpose of making any decision in such a case a
quorum of the CAA shall be one member.
(d) Where the CAA is satisfied that the applicant is the owner of the item concerned and
that further retention of the item is not necessary for the purposes of any criminal
proceedings it shall arrange for the goods concerned to be returned to the applicant.
(5) Where further retention of goods is, in the opinion of the CAA no longer necessary and no
application has been made under paragraph (4) or any such application has been unsuccessful
the goods shall be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the directions of the
CAA.
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4.4.13 In the US, Title 49: Transportation, Part 109 deals with inspections and investigations,
the opening of packages and the removal of packages which pose an imminent hazard. The part
also provides for the transportation for examination and analysis and importantly, the closing of
packages and the safe resumption of transportation. Subsection 109.13 provides:
“(a) No imminent hazard found. If, after an agent exercises an authority under § 109.5, the
agent finds that no imminent hazard exists, and the package otherwise conforms to applicable
requirements in subchapter C of this chapter, the agent will:
(1) Assist in preparing the package for safe and prompt transportation, when practicable,
by reclosing the package in accordance with the packaging manufacturer's closure
instructions or other appropriate closure method;
(2) Mark and certify the reclosed package to indicate that it was opened and reclosed in
accordance with this part;
(3) Return the package to the person from whom the agent obtained it, as soon as
practicable; and
(4) For a package containing a perishable hazardous material, assist in resuming the safe
and expeditious transportation of the package as soon as practicable after determining
that the package presents no imminent hazard.
(b) Imminent hazard found. If an imminent hazard is found to exist after an agent exercises an
authority under § 109.5, the Administrator or his/her designee may issue an out-of-service order
prohibiting the movement of the package until the package has been brought into compliance
with subchapter C of this chapter. Upon receipt of the out-of-service order, the person in
possession of, or responsible for, the package must remove the package from transportation until
it is brought into compliance.
(c) Package does not contain hazardous material. If, after an agent exercises an authority under
§ 109.5, the agent finds that a package does not contain a hazardous material, the agent shall
securely close the package, mark and certify the reclosed package to indicate that it was opened
and reclosed, and return the package to transportation.
(d) Non-compliant package. If, after an agent exercises an authority under § 109.5, the agent
finds that a package contains hazardous material and does not conform to requirements in
subchapter C of this chapter, but does not present an imminent hazard, the agent will return the
package to the person in possession of the package at the time the non-compliance is discovered
for appropriate corrective action. A non-compliant package may not continue in transportation
until all identified non-compliance issues are resolved.”
4.4.14 It is notable that in many discoveries of hidden and misdeclared DG, which are detected
of the goods in transit by a freight forwarder, airline operator or their handling agent, that the
Australian aviation industry DG practice is consistent with CFR 49 Part 109. That is:
•
serious items will be held until the regulator has indicated that they have no need for
them;
•
less serious matters are out-sourced to a professional DG shipping company to bring the
package into compliance, usually at the original shipper’s expense; and
•
items which do not constitute DG are returned into the cargo supply stream.
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4.4.15 There was discussion around whether the Regulations ought to provide for the usage of
salvage packaging by a freight forwarder or operator in cleaning up a DG spillage and for the
costs of the clean-up and replacement of the salvage packaging to be passed onto the shipper or
other person/organisation responsible for the goods or for causing the spillage; however, it was
decided that this was more properly the province of existing contractual conditions of service and
civil law. The WG did consider that the Regulations ought to provide for the taking of samples
for testing in order to establish whether or not the goods met the criteria as a DG at the time of
the occurrence.
Outcomes:
4.4.16 It is proposed that CASA produce an AC on current practices in relation to DG
Occurrences.
4.4.17 It is proposed to amend the Civil Aviation Act, at such time as CASA is able to have this
done, so that articles or substances which have been involved in a DG incident or DG Accident,
or were hidden or misdeclared DGs, can legitimately and easily be retained where practicable,
pending an investigation, in accordance with the regulations.
4.4.18 It is proposed that with an amendment to the Act, there should be a coincident
introduction of a sub-part in Part 92 that relates to investigation and reporting of DG incidents.
4.4.19 DGs involved in minor and low-scale incidents should only be delayed long enough for
photographs of packaging and copies of the documentation to be taken, and to be returned into
the transportation stream as soon as reasonable practicable and once the package is in compliance
with the ICAO TIs..
4.4.20 Potentially life-saving DGs (pathology samples and radio-medical pharmaceuticals) or
items with significant economic impact (aircraft on ground or goods are required to prevent an
imminent major impact, such as a mine site/plant shutdown) should continue to be moved as
expeditiously and lawfully as possible. If the goods are not in a proper condition for carriage by
air, and cannot be brought into lawful condition for air transport, then they are be moved by other
modes of transport and in compliance with the relevant DG rules.
4.4.21 Where there appears to have been an intention to ship undeclared DGs, or the DGs have
been deliberately misdeclared or improperly packaged then regulations should be created to
automatically provide for the power to hold onto the DGs. Alternatively, any goods involved in a
DG occurrence are deemed to be removed from the air transportation system, until it has been
established that the goods are in a proper condition for carriage by air and that CASA has no
requirement for the goods to continue to be held.
4.4.22 There should be no compulsion upon any person or organisation to hold onto goods if
they are leaking; are a threat to the health, safety and welfare of employees, or they are not
physically able to store the goods.
4.4.23 It is proposed that the Regulations provide for the taking of samples for analytical testing
in order to establish whether the goods met the classification criteria as a DG at the time of the
occurrence and for the costs of the testing to be remitted to the shipper in the event that the item
was found to be DG.
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4.5
The authority to open and inspect Cargo and DG consignments
4.5.1
The Australian civil aviation safety system encompasses a number of government
agencies with specific functions and responsibilities. CASA is responsible for implementing
Australia's ICAO obligations under ICAO Annex 18 of the Chicago Convention – The Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. ICAO Annex 18 - Chapter 2 specifies that:
“Each contracting State shall take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with the
detailed provisions contained in the ICAO TIs.”
4.5.2
ICAO Annex 18 - Chapter 11 states:
“Each Contracting State shall establish inspection, surveillance and enforcement procedures
with a view to achieving compliance with its dangerous goods regulations.
4.5.3
The provision of an authority for CASA DG officers and, in certain very constrained
circumstances allowing designated industry persons, to be authorised to open and inspect cargo
consignments would be a significant tool to assist in aviation compliance and enforcement.
4.5.4
A recurring theme among contributors to the working group was the reliance upon the
shipper of freight to pack the item and make a proper declaration with regard to dangerous goods.
Any and all scrutiny is usually limited to an external examination of the package, although
security X-ray screening can be used in some cases for verification of the number of inner
packages. The suggestion was put that the Act/Regulations should provide for certain security
agencies and CASA staff to inspect declared Dangerous Goods for proper packing and packaging
and to inspect general cargo for hidden and mis-declared Dangerous Goods.
4.5.5
The PIR Working Group considered the questions of:
•
Who should have the power to open packages and why?;
•
the legal power to “inspect”;
•
the performance of the compliance inspection and recording of the result;
•
whether to mandate the return of the package to its original condition or other standard
that it is suitable for transport by air; and
•
whether a pamphlet/brochure should be included by agency that undertakes the check.
4.5.6
There have been several instances of reports to CASA by professional DG shipping
organisations where rejected DG consignments have, on opening, been found to not comply with
the ICAO Technical Instructions. Examples are:
•
internal volumes/weights exceeding those specified in the packing instructions;
•
leak proof liners not being leak proof;
•
required absorbent material has not been included;
•
the use of cushioning material instead of absorbent material;
•
inner packaging not conforming to the test report for the total package and
•
caps on inner packagings do not have a secondary means of securing and retaining the
cap.
•
The test report was either incomplete, or showed that the required tests had not been
performed and that the packaging was compliant for the transportation of DG by air.
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4.5.7
Subject to certain safeguards, the Working Group considered that certain CASA
Inspectors should have the authority to open packages of declared DGs to ensure that it has been
packaged in compliance with the TIs.
4.5.8
The Working Group also formed the view that CASA DG Inspectors and designated
industry persons should have the power to open packages where there is a reasonable suspicion
that the contents may contain hidden dangerous goods. At present, most hidden DGs in cargo are
discovered either:
•
when the package is damaged in transit;
•
during routine security screening;
•
when other suspicious concerns are identified (such as damp patches on the external
packaging, unusual smells, the sounds of an electronic device);
•
uneven or strange weight distribution within the package; and
•
a picking slip that does not tally with the consignment note description etc.
4.5.9
Currently, forwarders either rely upon the conditions of carriage, printed on the
consignment note, to open and verify that the consignment does/does not contain hidden
dangerous goods, or they contact the consignor and obtain permission to open the package and
check the contents.
4.5.10 The WG recommends that a new sub-Part be created in Part 92 that relates to the
opening of DG consignments and general cargo. The fundamental philosophies of regulations
around cargo opening and examination by Officers of regulatory authorities (Customs, AQIS,
Police, CASA etc) would be:
•
The person opening the package must be DG trained.
•
For CASA employees, the opening of the package and inspection is to be in the
presence of a responsible employee at the facility where package is currently located.
•
When package has been opened; then the consignor and consignee must be notified,
unless exigent circumstances exist (i.e. Customs or Policing laws/requirements).
•
If the package was not declared, marked or properly labelled as a DG, and the package
contents do not meet the criteria as a DG, then the package is to be returned to original
or lawful condition for transport and returned into the air cargo transport system.
•
If packaging or package contents are not satisfactory, then the consignment is to be
removed from the air cargo transportation system until it meets compliance with the TIs.
4.5.11 The WG considered circumstances where it would be reasonable to facilitate
forwarders/operators to also open packages, as a number of Operators strongly represented that
an Authority to Search would give them more confidence in securing Aviation Safety. It was
noted that forwarders are required to know their customer, and that many forwarders undertake
QA audits and educational/compliance visits upon their customers. Furthermore, freight
forwarders are also subject to Transport Security Programs, which in themselves, may envisage
the checking of a consignment for Security purposes. It was considered that forwarders and
operators may have a need to check a package for safety and security purposes; and that were the
Forwarder’s concern was for safety purposes only, then there should be additional suitable
safeguards – for example,
•
the forwarder/operator is to have documented procedures;
•
it is to have been a condition of carriage that the package may be inspected for safety
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and security purposes;
•
two responsible and DG trained persons are to conduct the opening, inspection and
return of the packaging to original condition; and
•
the company has a DG compliance officer, to authorise package opening and inspection
and to follow-up with any necessary investigation and reporting.
4.5.12 In the case of passengers, operators currently screen unaccompanied baggage, and if an
item of DG is found, it is removed and a note inserted into the baggage explaining why.
Alternatively, the passenger is paged and the bag opened in their presence and the dangerous
goods are dealt with accordingly. The Working Group does not advocate that CASA DGIs have
authority to open and inspect passenger baggage; there is sufficient capacity within the Transport
Security Regulations for appropriately authorised officers to undertake this activity.
4.5.13 The proposed additions are also consistent with Federal Government’s Aviation White
Paper - Flight Path to the Future - December 2009 and CASA Corporate plan objectives relating
to “improving the Regulation of Dangerous Goods Transportation by Air”
4.5.14 This proposal is also consistent with international practices – such as the US - Title 49
Part 109 Section 109.5
“(a) When an agent has an objectively reasonable and articulable belief that a package offered
for or in transportation in commerce may contain a hazardous material and that such a package
does not otherwise comply with this chapter, the agent may—
(1) Stop movement of the package in transportation and gather information from any person to
learn the nature and contents of the package;
(2) Open any overpack, outer packaging, or other component of the package that is not
immediately adjacent to the hazardous materials contained in the package and examine the
inner packaging(s) or packaging components.”
4.5.15 The proposed process is similar to that undertaken by Australian border protection
screening agencies including Australian Customs Service (ACS), Australian Quarantine
Inspection Service (AQIS) and Australia Post.
4.5.16
Proposed safeguards include:
•
Inspectors will not be able to open Australia Post mail – but would be able to seek
“authorised examination” via x-ray or request an authorised Australia Post Employee to
undertake the examination.
•
Inspection of cargo for the purposes of safety and security would be made a condition of
carriage.
•
Forwarders/operators would have authority to open a package where employee is
suspicious that it may contain hidden or misdeclared DG. It is further proposed that
there would be suitable safeguards; i.e. company has documented procedures and a “DG
Compliance Officer” who can authorise opening. It is also envisaged that in most
circumstances that efforts be made to contact the shipper.
•
Packages could only be opened where there was reasonable cause to suspect that the
contents may contain hidden or misdeclared DGs.
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•
It is proposed that if the package that has been opened does not contain hidden or
misdeclared DGs, then it must be returned to a proper condition for carriage and may be
transported by air. Information would be required to be included with the package
notifying the receiver:
° that it was opened;
° by which agency;
° under what authority; and
° who to contact for further information.
•
If the package was found to contain hidden or misdeclared DG, the consignor/consignee
would be required to be contacted and advised and instructions sought as to what is to
happen to the contents that meet the criteria as a dangerous good.
•
Options for repatriating cargo should hidden or misdeclared DG be found include, but
are not limited to:
•
Removal and disposal of the DG, with the remainder of the goods being sent onto
destination at customer expense.
•
Consignment of the package into the surface freight transportation system
•
Repacking the DGs into ICAO compliant packaging at customer expense.
Outcome:
4.5.17 It is proposed to create a sub-Part in Part 92 that relates to the opening of DG
consignments and general cargo for examination by
•
Officers of regulatory authorities (customs, AQIS, Police, CASA etc.).
•
Persons/agencies charged with undertaking such examinations (Australia Post, security
screening agencies etc.).
•
forwarders/operators where the company has documented procedures, a DG compliance
officer, a process to authorise package opening and inspection and appropriate warning
in the conditions of carriage.
4.5.18
The subpart will also deal with reporting and notification requirements.
4.6
The regulations should be amended to provide for issue of an Aviation
Infringement Notice (AIN) for absolute offences of unlawfully carrying/consigning
DGs and making a false statement with regard to the contents
4.6.1
Currently, there are a limited range of enforcement options for the situation where a
passenger or consignor of cargo unlawfully carries or consigns dangerous goods. Aside from
counselling, the only enforcement option with respect to those outside the aviation industry, for
offences involving DG, is prosecution through the Office of the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions (CDPP). In normal aviation-related circumstances, CASA generally has a
total of 6 enforcement measures including:
•
counselling;
•
issuing aviation infringement notices;
•
requiring authorisation holders to be tested/examined;
•
entering into enforceable voluntary undertakings with an authorisation holder;
•
taking administrative action to vary, suspend or cancel an authorisation; and
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•
referring matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions with a view to
the criminal prosecution of authorisation holders or others for offences under the civil
aviation legislation.
4.6.2
Not all of the above options directly translate to the DG environment however the
Aviation Infringement Notices (AIN) scheme does show particular promise for addressing
persistent or particularly dangerous issues..
4.6.3
The Working Group was of the view that is appropriate for there to be consequences of
general offences involving the breaching of regulations for:
•
carrying and consigning dangerous goods;
•
making a false statement with regards to describing or declaring the goods;
•
for employees who were not trained in respect of dangerous goods; and
•
with appropriate Penalty Units, and an available exercise of the provision for AINs.
4.6.4
The making of these Regulations and the ability to use Aviation Infringement Notices
would reduce the burden upon the investigatory agencies and the impost upon the courts. Persons
served with an Aviation Infringement Notice may elect to have the matter heard by a Court. The
Working Group proposed that there ought to be a suitable public education campaign between the
making of the Regulations and CASA commencing the use of AIN as an enforcement mechanism
in the unlawful transport of Dangerous Goods.
4.6.5
The WG also noted the experience of the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority with
infringement notices for DG offences and the cooperative arrangement with Aviation Security
(AvSec). Penalties have been primarily imposed on arriving passengers as CAANZ legislation
requires the offence to include the passenger having carried the DG. The enforcement
arrangement includes cooperation between officers from the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAF), Customs and AvSec. Usually Customs or MAF Officers will detect the
actual/potential DG and refer the passenger and the goods to AvSec for further investigation. An
AvSec Officer will make an assessment and may issue a Penalty Infringement Notice. AvSec will
also seize the DG as evidence. The passenger may either pay the penalty, or write to CAA NZ
seeking a review or elect to have the matter heard in court. Approximately one matter per month
is referred to CAANZ for review. The current penalty is $500. Once the fine has been paid, or the
matter dealt with by CAA or the court, the goods are then disposed of.
Outcomes:
4.6.6
It is proposed to create offences of absolute liability in Part 92 for the carriage and/or
consignment of dangerous goods, with appropriate Penalty Units.
4.6.7
It is also proposed to undertake a period of public education for at least six months prior
to the implementation of DG offences in the AIN scheme.
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4.7
Allow additional provisions for small aircraft to carry DG into remote
airstrips
4.7.1
Several contributors to the PIR sought a relaxation similar to legislation of New Zealand
and Papua New Guinea (based on NZ regulations) for the DG carriage requirements for
passenger operations in aircraft less than 5 700 kg.
4.7.2
It was observed that Part 12.9 of the Canadian regulations for the transportation of
dangerous goods also contained provisions relating to the transport of DGs to areas where access
is limited.
4.7.3
CASA is already facilitating some approaches through “round trip” permissions. The
key concept is based upon a full acceptance check taking place at the point of departure with
abbreviated procedures for re-packaging DGs, making the declaration and accepting the DG for
the intermediate legs and return component of the trip. This is currently only being considered for
Cargo-Aircraft in accordance with the definition of the ICAO TIs; that is, the goods may be
accompanied by the consignor.
4.7.4
Some operators hold permissions for collecting passengers from remote locations, with
procedures in the Operations or DG Manual that provide for written description/drawn hazard
labeling (for the benefit of attending emergency first aiders), abbreviated or combined shipper’s
declarations and checklists, NOTOCs and non-UN specification packaging. The aircraft for
which these permissions have been issued are predominantly small helicopters or single engine
fixed wing piston-engined aircraft with an MTOW <5700 Kg and 6 seats or less .
4.7.5
The Working Group’s considerations took into account the sort of additional safeguards
should be included to provide an equivalent level of safety for any additional passengers. The
aspect of operating in a remote location was not considered to be an issue of prime importance.
The view was that passengers should be afforded the same degree of safety from the risks
presented when their aircraft was carrying dangerous goods and that a passive “informed
consent” i.e., they were told about the DG on board and they did not decide to get off the aircraft,
was inadequate.
4.7.6
Additionally, the Working Group viewed that where dangerous goods fall within the
cargo aircraft only provisions, then only the person accompanying the goods (the owner of the
goods or an owner’s employee assigned to look after the goods in flight or who will use the goods
at destination) may be carried. There should not be any additional passengers who are
accompanying other cargo or consignments on the aircraft. The Working Group considered that
the following aspects were germane when considering the facilitation of permitting dangerous
goods in small aircraft:
•
The goods must in a suitable condition for carriage by air.
Note: In considering what would constitute a “suitable condition” the concept is that the
packaging:
•
•
•
•
need not be compliant with UN specifications, but
would still be marked and labelled, and
be sturdy enough to withstand the normal rigours of rough handling and air transport,
and
would conform to the concept of “Strong outer packagings”.
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For the carriage of liquids on passenger aircraft, packages
•
•
•
•
•
would need to be comprised of inner and outer packagings,
would need to be stowed upright,
must contain either cushioning material and a leak proof liner or sufficient absorbent
material to absorb all contents; and
have secure fastening of the inner caps or closure devices.
That there is potential relief from requiring a Shipper’s Declaration, acceptance
checklist & NOTOC; but that the operational need for the equivalency of these
documents ought to be met.
Note: Some operators have achieved this through a form which is a combined passenger
manifest, cargo manifest, shipper’s declaration, acceptance checklist and emergency
response guide.
•
Normal carriage must be permitted by the TIs; i.e. no “forbidden–unless-exempt” items
or package quantities that exceed the CAO limits of TIs for cargo aircraft or passenger
quantity limits for passenger aircraft.
•
Any DGs are to be stowed and secured in accordance with the operator’s DG manual.
•
The operator is to have Group A trained employees.
•
The operator is to appoint an appropriately trained, qualified and resourced DG
compliance officer.
•
The operator must have DG procedures in the Operations/DG manual, including
consignment inspection and acceptance, pre-flight passenger briefing, additional
emergency response procedures, post-flight package and cargo-hold inspection and, if
necessary, decontamination, additional DG training and retention of records.
•
The operator is to brief “persons accompanying the consignment” on emergency actions
in event of various emergencies, taking into account the nature of the hazard presented
by the DG being carried.
•
Any DG occurrence under these provisions becomes reportable to CASA (if not
immediately, then as soon as reasonably practical).
•
Records of freight manifests and associated DG documentation, including consignor’s
declarations, acceptance checklists and NOTOCs, be retained for 12 months. Note –
whilst longer than the current 3 month document retention period, the 12 month period
is to facilitate CASA audit of an activity that has been permitted significant leeway. The
audit purpose will be to explore the effectiveness of the arrangement and the
opportunities for improvement whilst maintaining aviation safety. It is not primarily
intended to be for fault-finding or punitive purposes)
•
The operator will be required to review and update procedures, at least annually, in the
light of operational experience and to reflect regulatory and international safety-related
developments.
•
The operator to complete an annual return, if requested, for statistical and trend
monitoring purposes.
•
The operator will be required to incorporate DG emergency Procedure training into their
CAO 20.11 or other annual recurrent training for flight and cabin crew.
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•
The provision will be limited to aircraft with an MTOW< 5700Kg and operating
unpressurised when carrying liquids.
•
CASA to provide guidance material in an AC.
Outcome:
4.7.7
It is proposed that there should be a new Subpart 92.D regulation that makes provision
for the carriage of dangerous goods in remote or difficult-to-access locations.
4.8
Authority to Access and Inspect Shipper, Forwarder and Training
Organisation records
4.8.1
Annex 18 requires that States establish inspection procedures with a view to achieving
compliance with its dangerous goods regulations.
4.8.2
CASA’s DG Inspectors rely to a large degree on goodwill and interpersonal
relationships in order to conduct safety related inspections and compliance related audit activities
on shippers, freight forwarders, ground handling agents and training organisations.
4.8.3
There have been rare occasions when some entities have refused to provide access to, or
copies of, records. There are various generic regulations which require documents to be provided
to CASA upon request, with penalty units for failure to comply; however, these “demands” are
perceived as being authoritarian and a perception is that they are for punitive purposes rather than
engendering a safety-related ethos. Certain records may be demanded under CAR 301. CAR 305
permits access to premises where records are required to be kept. The other tool for obtaining
information is through a search warrant.
CAR 305 “Subject to any aviation security requirements, an authorised person shall, at all
reasonable times, have access to any place to which access is necessary for the purpose of
carrying out any powers and functions vested in him or her in pursuance of these regulations”
4.8.4
Whilst this is little doubt that CASA’s Inspectors are able to be authorized to establish
the compliance of Operators with the requirements of the ICAO Technical instructions, under
CASR 92.025, it remains untested as to whether CAR 305 can be reasonably exercised to gain
access to premises for the purposes of inspecting training records (required under CASR 92.145),
transportation documents under CASR 92.070 or packaging, marking, labeling and documentary
materials under CASR 92.035 at the facilities of a freight forwarder, ground handling agents,
approved DG training organisation or a shipper of dangerous goods by air.
4.8.5
It is proposed that Part 92 be amended to formalise the access/inspection/audit
arrangements currently in place with the majority of these “DG-by-air” organisations.
Outcome:
4.8.6
To provide for an authorised person (being certain CASA officers) to have reasonable
access to premises and records, held by freight forwarders, shippers, GHAs, DG training
organisations and agencies performing functions of security screening, for aviation safety related
compliance inspection and assurance activities.
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5.
Minor proposed changes
5.1
The following are minor items from CASR Part 92 which have been identified as being
deficient and which are considered to be relatively non-contentious, nevertheless, they will still
consulted upon via an NPRM and any concerns and feedback will be taken into account.
5.2
Require packages, which have been opened for inspection, to be returned
to a proper condition after inspection
5.2.1
Currently the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of DG by Air, requires
that “any package, opened during an inspection must, before being forwarded to the consignee,
be restored by qualified persons to a condition that complies with these instructions”.
5.2.2
Certain persons are authorised under their respective legislation to open and inspect air
cargo, including certain employees of Australia Post, the Australian Customs Service and the
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service.
5.2.3
The obligation in the ICAO TIs arose after some DG packages were opened by Customs
Officers and were not correctly repacked, with the main error being that inner packaging’s
containing liquids were put in upside down. The obligation that persons, who have opened a
consigned shipment of DG, are to return the packaging to its original condition or a form that is
in compliance with the TIs has not been captured in Part 92 or the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
5.2.4
There is an impact upon aviation safety and a consequent training/policy impact for
officers of the ACS, AQIS and security screening agency employees. The identification and
opening of a DG consignment is a Workplace Health and Safety consideration; if these officers
are to return to package to a proper condition, rather than arranging for a consultant or specialist
DG shipper to do so; then it is appropriate for these Officers to be trained to either at least a
Group F standard or to a training syllabus that is tailored and relevant to the nature of their work
and which includes DG hazard class identification, classification, packaging test reports and
interpretation; identification of things likely to be DG, general packaging requirements. It is not
proposed that these Officers should be required to be trained to determine if a package is in
compliance with the TIs.
5.2.5
Furthermore, it was considered that it should not be an offence if the Officer re-packed
and resent the DG in apparent compliance with the TIs if the original packaging was not in
compliance.
Outcome:
5.2.6
To create a regulation that any person who opens a consigned DG package is to ensure
that the package, opened during an inspection must, before being forwarded to the consignee, be
restored by qualified persons to a condition that complies with the ICAO Technical instructions.
5.3
Require freight forwarders to screen, examine or inspect cargo for hidden
DG and to check that DG are properly prepared for transport
5.3.1
The observation was put forward to the working group that the employee of a freight
forwarder is required to be trained in dangerous goods; however, there is no legislative
requirement as to what they are supposed to do with that training. The practice and expectation is
that they examine freight for signs of hidden, obvious, typical or suspicious DGs and remove
them if found. Furthermore, in respect of declared dangerous goods, forwarders should also be
undertaking an acceptance check with the rationale is that fewer improperly prepared packages of
dangerous goods will be transported by air. On the latter practice, there is a mixed experience
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with a small minority of forwarders choosing to put the declared DGs through to the operator for
acceptance checking, without performing a check themselves. When the consignment is rejected,
the shipper is charged for the additional time in retrieving and re-lodging the consignment;
whereas a pre-lodgement check by the forwarder would have detected the deficiencies.
5.3.2
The working group concurred that there was a legislative deficiency and considered that
the legislation reflected neither contemporary safety practices nor desired industry practice.
5.3.3
Whilst “inspect cargo” implies physical opening of the package, the working group was
of the view that the legislation needed to reflect that employees were not compelled to open
freight. Furthermore, that if the hidden DGs were not possible to detect, then neither the freight
forwarder nor their employee is at fault.
5.3.4
Several submissions to the working group surmised that if screening agents are
examining for Security purposes then they should also be looking for DGs, especially as
screening staff are already required to be DG trained. Requiring that they check for potential DGs
and remove them if found, is considered to be a formalisation and authorisation of the function
that they already perform.
5.3.5
There was a view expressed to the working group that a context statement with regard to
the “responsibilities of a freight forwarder” would be beneficial, which should also cover training
and other obligations. The same approach should be adopted in respect of employees of security
screening agencies.
Outcome:
5.3.6
Proposal to amend Part 92 to introduce regulations relating to the responsibilities of a
freight forwarder.
5.4
Require reporting of hidden
Occurrences and DG Accidents
and
misdeclared
Dangerous
Goods
Note: This amendment is necessary to comply with ICAO Annex 18 and is largely a
formalisation of existing practices.
5.4.1
ICAO Annex 18, Section 12.3 requires:
“With the aim of preventing the recurrence of instances of undeclared or misdeclared
Dangerous Goods in cargo, each contracting State shall establish procedures for investigating
and compiling information concerning such occurrences which occur in its territory and which
involve the transport of dangerous goods originating in or destined for another state. Reports of
such instances shall be made in accordance with the detailed provisions of the Technical
Instructions”.
5.4.2
Currently, Part 92, at CASR 92.065, only imposes a reporting requirement in respect of
DG incidents and then only upon commercial operators. There is no requirement to report DG
accidents or occasions of misdeclared, mis-carried or undeclared DG.
5.4.3
As a current industry practice, and for many years, Australian operators, GHAs and
freight forwarders have been reporting hidden and misdeclared DG, which has been detected after
acceptance into the air cargo system, or where there is a suspicion that the shipper consignor has
made a deliberate attempt to consign DG in an unlawful manner.
5.4.4
It is considered appropriate to formalise this industry practice and to legislatively secure
compliance with ICAO Annex 18.
5.4.5
It is proposed to create an AC that will detail procedures for and facilitate the reporting
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of DG Occurrences including hidden and misdeclared DGs, DG accidents and DG incidents.
Outcome:
5.4.6
The amendment of Part 92 to require the reporting of:
•
Occasions involving hidden and misdeclared dangerous goods;
•
Occasions involving the mishandling and miscarriage of dangerous goods;
•
Dangerous goods accidents; and
•
DG Incidents.
5.5
Proposal to restrict the carriage of additional “accompanying persons” on
cargo-only aircraft
5.5.1
The ICAO Technical Instruction definition for “Passenger aircraft” is:
“an aircraft that carries any person, other than a crew member, an operator’s employee in other
than an official capacity, an authorized representative of an appropriate national authority or a
person accompanying a consignment or other cargo”
5.5.2
“Cargo Aircraft” is
Any aircraft, other than a passenger aircraft, which is carrying goods or property.
5.5.3
Consequently “cargo aircraft” has the effect of meaning that some dangerous goods are
restricted to transport on "cargo aircraft only". In this context such an aircraft may also carry
certain persons who, for other reasons, may have normally been regarded as passengers.
5.5.4
They are:
•
an authorised representative of an appropriate national authority (e.g. CASA);
•
a person accompanying a consignment or other cargo; and
•
an operator's employee in an official capacity.
5.5.5
A member of the operator's staff in an official capacity is taken to mean that they have
duties concerned with the preparation or undertaking of the flight, or on the ground once the
aircraft has landed although not necessarily in connection with any aircraft. It is not a provision
whereby employees may be carried to a destination for activities that are unrelated to the flight,
the cargo or inconsistent with their duties to the employer.
5.5.6
Cargo aircraft flights may have a number of persons accompanying their respective
pieces of cargo. It is not inconceivable for a cargo aircraft flight to have horse groomsmen,
bullion/valuable cargo security escorts and re-positioning crew whilst also carrying Cargo
Aircraft Only (“CAO”) consignments of Dangerous Goods.
5.5.7
The consensus of the Working Group was that cargo aircraft, when carrying persons
accompanying a consignment, should not also be carrying items/quantities of CAO dangerous
goods; in effect, the aircraft should be under cargo exclusive use. The legislation ought to limit
the category of persons accompanying cargo on aircraft carrying CAO DGs. Whilst other
accompanying persons may be told of the risk presented by these dangerous goods, it was not
viewed as being of the same freedom of choice as the informed consent that applies to the
carriage of persons in experimental aircraft.
5.5.8
The Working Group was also concerned as to whether operator’s aircraft emergency
procedures really considered, and catered for, these ancillary persons For example, whilst grooms
accompanying horses do receive Emergency Procedures training, it is often not conducted with
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the flight crew, which would be a more meaningful exercise.
5.5.9
Whilst the net effect of this proposal is to produce something that is more restrictive than
the ICAO TIs, it is considered to be warranted on the grounds that persons accompanying
consignments that do not meet the criteria of a dangerous good, should not be unknowingly
exposed to the risks presented by Cargo-aircraft only provisioned DGs.
5.5.10 The application of such a Regulation would be upon all aircraft in Australian airspace
and upon all Australian aircraft. It would also require the registration of a State Variation in the
ICAO TIs.
Outcome:
5.5.11 It is proposed to introduce a regulation that requires that aircraft carrying Cargo Aircraft
Only DG consignments may only carry persons accompanying that DG consignment.
5.6
Include penalty units and/or clearly state strict liability provisions for
certain regulations
5.6.1
Section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act prohibits the carriage of dangerous goods on
aircraft unless the person carrying or consigning the goods complies with any conditions imposed
by the regulations. A number of regulations impose various conditions, for example CASR
92.065 stipulates that commercial operators must report dangerous goods incidents within two
working days after the incident occurs. Failure to comply with the condition is a breach of section
23 of the Act and the offender is potentially subject to the penalties specified in section 23.
5.6.2
However, it is considered that prosecuting many of these types of offences through the
courts is an inappropriate drain upon the resources of the DPP and judicial system as well as
those of CASA. The law, as written, leads to potential penalties that are either too strong and
disproportionate to the offence, or too weak and not useful.
5.6.3
An additional enforcement mechanism, via the Aviation Infringement Notice, would be
appropriate and consistent with other regulatory provisions. Other regulations which impose
conditions, and for which non-compliance results in reversion to the penalties contained in
section 23 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 are:
•
CASR 92.045(2) – DG manuals not up to date, not distributed etc.
•
CASR 92.045(3) – DG Manual not in a readily accessible place
•
CASR 92.045(4) – operator to take reasonable steps to ensure that handling and carriage
of dangerous goods is in accordance with DG Manual
•
CASR 92-045(5) – Employee to be made aware of contents of DG Manual
•
CASR 92-065 – Reporting of DG Incidents by Commercial operators
•
CASR 92.070(1) – Dangerous Goods Statement
5.6.4
The option would remain for serious or deliberate contraventions or repeat breaches to
be prosecuted under the Act.
5.6.5
Generally speaking for a criminal offence to occur there must be two main elements:
•
the prohibited conduct; and
•
the mental element of a guilty mind or intention.
5.6.6
In most cases the prosecution must, in order to prove that a person has committed an
offence, show that both the above elements were present.
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5.6.7
The exception to the above is if an offence is a strict liability offence. Strict liability
offences only require the commission of the prohibited conduct for an offence to arise. That is, no
mental element is required. The following regulations were considered by the WG as being
appropriate for consideration as Strict Liability offences:
•
CASR 92.060 – Directions relating to dangerous goods manuals;
•
CASR 92-065 – Reporting of DG Incidents by Commercial operators;
•
CASR 92.070(1) – Dangerous Goods Statement;
•
CASR 92.200 – Information in passenger terminals; and
•
CASR 92.205 – Information with tickets.
Outcome:
5.6.8
It is proposed to introduce penalty units and strict liability for certain additional
provisions in Part 92 relating to the use, distribution and maintenance of the dangerous goods
manual, the reporting of DG incidents, and the provision of certain information
5.7
Failure to Successfully Complete DG Refresher Training Should Result in
Suspension from Passenger or Cargo Handling Duties Regardless of Expiry Date
5.7.1
Currently, dangerous goods training has to be undertaken every two years and retraining
may be taken up to 3 months before expiry of the initial course. During audits and requests for
exclusions from the training requirements of Part 92, it has been found that certain employees,
having failed their recertification training course, have continued performing duties associated
with Dangerous Goods, relying upon the expiry date from their previous training. The concern is
that if the employee is no longer competent to ship/accept/handle Dangerous Goods, then their
current qualification should be regarded as being no longer valid.
5.7.2
Consequently, it is proposed that where an employee commences DG training but fails a
recertification exam or fails to complete DG training within the two year period (as amended by
CASR 92.090), then the employee may not perform duties related to cargo or passenger handling,
until they have undertaken a training course. Note under CASR 92.135 a training course must
provide for a test. If the test is not passed, then the candidate is regarded has having not
undertaken the course
5.7.3
The Working Group did recognise that this has a potential impact upon those
organisations with a small core of employees. It was considered a potential option for training
organisations to submit courses for approval which reflected a graduated scale – i.e. a score of
between 70 & 80% which might constitute grounds or process for remedial development, either
by way of a knowledge deficiency review or make-up test.
5.7.4
It was also noted that training organisations may already develop and apply for the
approval of such courses in accordance with the existing legislation; and should be encouraged to
do so. The topic of remedial development-based courses will be addressed in a MOS, the concept
of which is outlined in Section 7 of this report. If the MOS proposal is not supported, then the
material at AC 92-03 will be updated.
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Outcome:
5.7.5
It is recommended that should an employee fail the test when undertaking a DG course,
then the employee will no longer being able to accept/handle DGs, cargo or passengers until they
complete an appropriate course, or undertake remedial training, and pass the test.
5.8
Provide an additional period of grace for DG training
5.8.1
The ICAO DG Panel has decided that from 1 January 2013, that the period in which DG
training may be undertaken, without causing any change to the anniversary date of that training,
will include the timeframe to the end of the month in which the training is due.
5.8.2
For example; currently Mary Smith’s DG training expires on 4 June 2012. Under the
current regulations, she can undertake training between 4 April 2012 and 4 June 2012 without
affecting her anniversary date of 4 June and a potential expiry date of 4 June 2014.
5.8.3
With the proposed change from ICAO, if Mary was in another country, she could
undertake training between 4 April 2014 and 30 June 2014 and she would have a new expiry date
of 30 June 2016. If the Australian legislation is not amended, then Mary would have to undertake
her training before 4 June 2014 and would still retain an anniversary expiry date of 4 June 2016..
Outcome:
5.8.4
In order to align with ICAO, it is recommended that the extended effect of two years,
provided in CASR 92.085, be amended to include the end of the month in which the training was
completed.
5.9
Broaden the list of pilot activities for which DG training is not required
5.9.1
Currently there is provision in CASR 92.095, for operators, whose pilots are employed
in a very limited range of activities, are not required to undertake dangerous goods training. The
list is regarded as being worthy of expansion with the following additional conceptual activities
being considered appropriate for inclusion.
5.9.2
Broadly the concept is that operations which only involve pilots who do not carry, and
which are very unlikely to carry DG, should not be compelled to undertake DG training.
Examples of such activities are those:
•
With charter passengers who take off from and land back at the same point with
minimal carry-on baggage (i.e. scenic joy flights and trial instructional flights); or
•
With any aerial work type activities that involve only the pilot and regular operating
crew where there is no DG, and no likelihood of crew bringing DG into the aircraft; and
•
The company operations manual has content about passenger screening and standard
provisions for DGs carried by passengers and crew.
5.9.3
The Working Group also considered the position of aerial work activities that do include
dangerous goods, such as:
•
incendiary dropping;
•
feral animal baiting;
•
aerial spotting;
•
aerial surveying;
•
aerial culling etc.; and
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•
similar activities involving the transport of company DG to and from the operational
area.
5.9.4
Whilst not opposed to a relaxation of the normal DG training requirements for flight and
operating crew, the WG still considered that there should be documented DG-related matters in
the Operations Manual and that crew should be trained in these and that such training should be
operator-specific and form part of the induction and periodic reviews.
Outcome:
5.9.5
It is proposed to broaden the list of activities, for which the DG training of flight crew is
not mandatory to include:
•
Charter operations carrying passengers who take off from and land back at the same
point with minimal carry-on baggage (i.e. scenic joy flights and trial instructional
flights); or
•
any Aerial work type activities that involve only the pilot and regular operating crew
where there is no DG, and no likelihood of crew bringing DG into the aircraft;
5.9.6
providing the company operations manual has content and procedures for informing
passengers about DGs; the screening of passengers; signage to passengers about DGs and
permitted DGs
5.9.7
5.9.6 To generate a list of aerial work activities that do involve the carriage and use of
DG as part of the operational role and for which employees are not required to undertake an
approved DG training course, providing that appropriate safety precautions and emergency
procedures are included in the operator’s DG or Operations Manual and is covered as part of the
employee’s induction training and periodic reviews.
5.10
All DG training courses should be subject to CASA approval
5.10.1 The current legislation does not require operator’s employees, who meet the criteria as a
Group E employee, to undertake a CASA approved course. These employees are those involved
in checking-in and screening passengers, and those involved in handling baggage or cargo. These
personnel are required to undertake a training course which:
•
satisfies certain syllabus criteria; and which is delivered by an instructor who has
completed a Group A or Group B training course.
5.10.2 Most operators train their employees through a DG Course which has been approved by
CASA for Group B and or Group C employees. Some operators that have large aircraft fleets and
a widespread geographic operation, have developed sophisticated company-specific on-line
courses, which have been examined during CASA audits of the AOC holder.
5.10.3 Through audits and industry enquiries the CASA DG Inspectors have come across some
unstructured and unregulated Group E DG courses where the identified deficiencies that were
discovered include:
•
the material used during the course was significantly out of date;
•
an approved course was plagiarised and the instructor did not have the knowledge to
maintain the course material nor to deliver it effectively; and
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•
incorrect certificates had been issued, purporting to represent the course as being
approved by CASA.
5.10.4 The ICAO Technical Instructions (Part 1; Section 4.1.2) requires that all operator
courses be approved. Australia has not filed a difference on this matter.
5.10.5 Many operators require their Group E employees to undertake a CASA approved course
(usually a Group B course). Therefore, the additional impost upon the industry in requiring Group
E courses to be approved is regarded as being minimal. Additionally, it is likely that the DG
training industry will develop courses that are more directly relevant to the specific activities of
passenger and cargo handling, with a resultant saving in the time that the employee is away from
work and receiving training.
Outcome:
5.10.6 It is recommended that Part 92 be amended to ensure that all DG training courses for
employees involved in aviation are to be approved by CASA.
5.11
Training organisations should be compelled to maintain records for a
minimum of 36 months and to surrender those records to CASA in the event that
they cease business
5.11.1 Currently, there is no Australian requirement for how long DG training records should
be kept for, nor whether training organisations must keep records of the people that they have
trained.
5.11.2 CASA has had experience of one training organisation that refused to maintain any
records of persons that they had trained. When attempting to follow-up on a training certificate of
questionable providence, it could not be established whether the training certificate was
counterfeit or genuine.
5.11.3 The Working Group also considered the need to impose the requirement upon training
organisation that already keep records and the need to cater for those persons who were trained
by organisations that have ceased to trade. CASA DG Inspectors have experienced difficulties
with a number of operators and training providers who have ceased to trade and who were either
unable to, or in one case, not prepared to release details of those employees that had been trained.
Whilst CASA DG Inspectors have no regulatory interest in the training records, it is the persons
who undertook that training course who seek confirmation that they were trained, the course
content, and the expiry date. One proposed option was that CASA DG Inspectors should make it
a condition of a DG course approval that records of persons trained are to be maintained and
passed to CASA should the course cease to be offered or should the entity holding the course
approval cease to trade; ultimately though, the Working Group was of the view that this should
be supported by regulation rather than imposed as a condition on the approval of a training
course.
5.11.4 The Working Group considered that the requirement to retain records should be aligned
with the ICAO TIs requirement to keep them for 36 months.
5.12
The Working Group also considered that whilst training organisations should keep
records, and the vast majority does; they should not be compelled to maintain records in any
particular form, i.e. they should not have to convert to Electronic Records if they do not already
do so.
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Outcomes:
5.12.1
t is proposed that Part 92 be amended to ensure that:
•
DG training course approval holders are to be required to keep records of the people that
they have trained.
•
To surrender those training records to CASA in the event that they cease to trade.
•
All entities required to keep DG training records are to maintain those records for 36
months.
5.13
Provide a different DG training system for shelf stock-pickers and packers
5.13.1 It was submitted that employees who are stock pickers/packers etc receive very little
value from the current DG courses that are comprehensive in covering all the DG classes. The
option exists for tailored courses to be produced which are more relevant to the functions of these
employees. However, approving a tailored course, relevant to their duties, is a cumbersome
bureaucratic process; which would take a long time to see a return on investment.
5.13.2 The requirement for shipper training came about in 2004 and stemmed from an ICAO
requirement whereby all shippers and not just “regular” shippers were required to be trained. The
opportunity exists under current legislative requirements for a tailored course, possibly based on a
series of modules.
5.13.3 From CASA DG incident investigations and audits, it has been observed that large
organisations would achieve more effective shipper training/safety results, if an ISO 9001 style
process was put in place for those employees involved in stock picking, packing, declaring and
dispatching of DGs.
Outcome:
5.13.4 It is proposed that Part 92 be amended to ensure that employees of companies which
regularly ship their own DG material, be exempt from the requirement of Subpart 92.C provided
that:
•
the company has a documented set of procedures that addressed management
responsibility and oversight;
•
the employer has ISO 9001 type QA procedures;
•
the process for picking, packing and labelling consignments is documented;
•
there is a responsible senior employee/supervisor/manager trained and current in DG
training for Group F employees;
•
there are processes for cataloguing and automatically flagging for employees that
certain goods meet the criteria as DG;
•
processes provide for an annual review of the procedures; and
•
the company appoints a person as being responsible for DG Compliance.
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5.14
Permit State police close protection officers and valuable cargo escorts to
carry loaded weapons or ammunition in the aircraft
5.14.1 There are two current approaches that have been adopted in respect of the carriage of
ammunition by personnel with weapons and who have a requirement to have the weapon close to
hand. These employees are principally air marshalls, close protection officers escorting VIPs and
security personnel who are protecting valuable cargo. One method, in compliance with the ICAO
TIs, uses the provisions relating to ammunition, requiring the firearm holder to unload their
weapon and surrender the ammunition prior to engine start to a crew member, with ammunition
being returned after engine shutdown. The alternative method is via a Regulation or CASA/OTSissued Permission for the firearm holder to retained either a loaded weapon, or to unload, but
retain the ammunition.
5.14.2 The suggestion was raised because of Occupational Health and Safety concerns that the
risk of an accidental discharge was greater during the loading and unloading of weapons, than
would be experienced with a holstered firearm. The Working Group contemplated the procedures
and safeguards that should be considered and noted that there were still security and Office of
Transport Security implications for Charter and RPT operations, including the respect and
maintenance of a sterile area.
5.14.3 The other approach is to seek and obtain permission from CASA to carry a loaded
weapon in flight; the assessment is based on operational risk and the measures to maintain
aviation safety.
5.14.4 The Working Group considered that a new provision in Subpart 92.D allowing carriage
of a loaded firearm would be acceptable in respect of:
•
A passenger aircraft being under a charter for exclusive use or a cargo aircraft with only
flight crew and armed escort on board.
•
That if the Police Officer/armed escort have approval to carry the firearm, then there
should be no impediment to the ammunition.
•
The operator/officer already holds permission under CAR 143 - carriage of a weapon
and/or CAR 144 – discharge of a firearm; or another regulatory permit whether it be
under Part 91 or issued by the Department of Infrastructure.
•
That the operator’s DG/Operations Manual must contain documented procedures
covering:
° Pilot notification.
° Verification that the firearm has approval for the weapon.
° Passenger briefing.
° Procedure for carrying and securing the weapon.
° Procedure for carrying/stowing the ammunition.
° Emergency procedures covering Safety issues: i.e. potential FOD, noise/distraction,
accidental discharge into critical components and/or decompression etc.;
° Occupational health considerations including hearing protection.
° Operational concerns such as shooter not to be pilot flying the aircraft; procedures
to include loading/unloading of weapon; and commencement/cessation of firing;
communication methods for immediate cessation of shooting activities.
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Outcome:
5.14.5 It is proposed to create a Regulation in subpart 92.D to exempt certain operations
involving Police and valuable cargo escorts and the carriage of ammunition from the
requirements of CASRs 92.020, 92.025, 92.030, 92.035 and subpart 92.C providing that
passenger and aviation safety considerations are taken into account and operational practices are
documented.
5.15
Provide for legislated State Approval for DG of the Operator
5.15.1 A number of submissions sought to simplify the requirements for “Dangerous Goods of
the Operator”, also often known as “operator’s property”, particularly in remote locations and
with small aircraft. This included scenarios around aircraft retrieval and the movement of
company equipment and parts i.e. life jackets/life-rafts, Batteries, Fuel Control Units, fuel, empty
fuel drums, etc.
5.15.2 The ICAO TIs permit a small degree of leeway to operator’s in the carriage of their own
DG property, in that where State Approval has been given, then the packaging does not need to
meet UN specification criteria. All other provisions of the TIs still apply including requirements
for a Shipper’s Declaration, marking, labelling and acceptance.
5.15.3 The Working Group considered the mechanism for creating a “State Approval” via
subpart 92.D which would provide for the carriage and/or replacement of operator’s DG items.
5.15.4 The Working Group also envisaged excluding the need for a Shipper’s Declaration and
acceptance checklist; although this would constitute a “State Exemption” and would not be
applicable outside Australia, nor in non-Australian registered aircraft inside Australia.
5.15.5 The past experience of some major airlines has been that stores personnel would put
immediately required parts for an unserviceable aircraft (Aircraft on Ground) onto the next flight
to the same destination and tell the captain of the additional DG load. The airline would then
experience a subsequent DG incident of a minor nature; hence they now mandate putting all DGs
through the Acceptance process. The issue was of one where the complexity of the airline
operation meant that these unusual situations would result in unintended outcomes; yet a lesscomplex aircraft operation would benefit from tailored procedures.
5.15.6 The Working Group also considered the concept of an amplified fly-away kit, possibly
supported with guidance provided through an AC. Irrespective of any guidance material, the
Working Group view was that procedures would still be required in the Operations/DG manual
and that there should be a specific “operator approval” from the Chief Pilot, a DG Compliance
Manager or other responsible officer to carry the goods. The other significant issue is not so
much flying replacement parts to a stranded aircraft, but in retrieving the used/defective parts; for
which preparation of the DG has to be accomplished in the field.
5.15.7 Where the “DG of the operator’s” procedures are documented in the operator’s
Operations/DG manual, the WG considered that it was unnecessary for the employee to undergo
Group A or Group F training, but that the operator’s procedures should be reviewed and updated
on an annual basis.
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5.15.8 As the concept is for a State Exemption, then these considerations would not be
available for Foreign Operators, nor would they be available outside Australia, unless an
equivalent Exemption was provided by (where applicable) the States of Destination, Origin,
Operator, Transit or Over flight.
5.15.9 In response to questions about whether an operator can carry the DG of another operator
under these procedures (for example Operator ABC charters Operator PQR to fly out to a
stranded ABC aircraft with a replacement aircraft battery; could PQR use ABC’s “DG of the
Operator” procedures); the considered opinion was that the second operator is being chartered for
the purposes of carrying freight and ought to have the full complement of DG requirements.
Outcomes:
5.15.10 It is recommended that there be a Subpart 92.D Regulation that provides leeway via a
State Approval, with regards to the packaging requirements for DG that is operator’s property.
The Regulation should also provide for State Exemption with regards to the documentation for
these dangerous goods. Equivalent-safety related requirements would include:
•
Packagings would need to be considered as being strong and fit for the purpose of
transporting the operator’s DGs and capable of withstanding the rigours of air transport.
•
Documented and controlled procedures for the packing and packaging of the DGs
•
The pilot to be informed of the DGs and provided with appropriate emergency response
procedures, including evidence of the provided information being retained on the
ground.
•
DG occurrence reporting to occur as soon as reasonably practicable.
•
Documented procedures to be reviewed at least annually in the light of operational
experience and any forthcoming changes to the ICAO TIs.
5.15.11 For carriage in aircraft with passengers, the DGs of the Operator should be packaged in
combination packagings for which a reasonable person would conclude as likely to exceed UN
specification conditions including:
•
inner packaging to withstand a 95 KPa pressure differential; (either with a test report
from the manufacturer, or an objective assessment such as standing on the item and then
inspecting for any external damage to the container.
•
caps/stoppers etc. to be securely retained by a secondary means;
•
leak proof liner and cushioning material;
•
leak-proof liner and sufficient absorbent material capable of absorbing the entire
contents;
•
be sturdy enough to withstand the normal rigours of rough handling and air transport;
•
conform to the concept of “Strong outer packagings”;
•
be stowed upright;
•
external packaging to be marked and labelled with the nature of the hazard of the
contents;
•
procedures to be documented in the operator’s Operations/DG manual including:
° packing;
° marking;
° labelling;
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°
°
°
°
°
°
°
°
°
°
equivalent documentation;
acceptance for carriage;
inspection;
loading and stowage;
decontamination;
notification to crew;
emergency procedures;
DG occurrence reporting;
documented procedures to be reviewed at least annually with the hindsight of
operational experience and the foresight of forthcoming changes to the ICAO Tis;
and
no Cargo aircraft only items would be permitted on a passenger aircraft (i.e.
Chemical Oxygen Generator).
5.16
Introduce a mandatory challenge of passengers about whether they have
any dangerous goods in their baggage
Note: This is regarded as a formalisation of existing practices.
5.16.1 A number of proponents suggested that there should be a mandatory challenge of
passengers about whether they have any dangerous goods in their baggage i.e. during check-in
there should be some form of challenge, whether it is via terminal kiosk, on-line or by a dedicated
check-in staff member.
5.16.2 The Working Group considered that for the challenge to hold purpose and validity, it
was necessary for the operator to provide information as to the types of things that constituted
Dangerous Goods.
5.16.3 At one level, the working group considered that this represented a formalisation of
existing practices. It recognised that the operator must already provide information to the
passenger about dangerous goods, but it also took into account that the technology continues to
evolve and that the change of pace is rapid, certainly faster than the legislation. The Working
Group considered the need to cater for mobile phone check-in and other expedited passenger
check-in arrangements. It also took into account that within ICAO, a challenge is currently
voluntary.
5.16.4 The Working Group noted that this approach would result in making Australia more
restrictive than ICAO; and potentially contrary to the desire to harmonise with ICAO. It reflected
that the proposal was the formalisation of a cultural norm and that past experience in similar
safety-related approaches was that such leads were adopted.
5.16.5 The Working Group recommended that the “challenge” only be mandated for Australian
port check-in on International Flights and for all domestic flights.
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Outcomes:
5.16.6
It is recommended Part 92 is amended so that:
•
an operator must “challenge” passengers as to whether they are carrying dangerous
goods;
•
the operator must provide information about the types of things that are likely to be
dangerous; and
•
that the operator challenge is only mandated for international check-in at an Australian
port; and all domestic flight check-in.
5.17
Provide for controlled extracts of the DG manual/procedures to be made
available to employees
5.17.1 Several contributors observed that the current Part 92 legislation prevents the usage of
extracts of the DG/Operations Manual; consequently, operators are required to provide the entire
DG manual for employees who may need to access it. A number of operators have segregated
activities, for example, freight and passengers will never be accepted/processed in the same
location, and therefore, providing the full DG manual, including cargo and DG acceptance
procedures at the check-in desk was represented as being inefficient, onerous and less clear to the
employee.
5.17.2 The Working Group considered that the “extracts” need to fall under the same document
control regime as the operator’s DG manual, and include mechanisms to ensure that the contents
remained up to date and relevant to the employee’s duties.
Outcome:
5.17.3
It is recommended that:
•
CASR 92.055 be amended in order for operators to provide up to date procedures,
forms, quick reference guides and other associated extracts which are a subset of the DG
Manual, and which are relevant to the employees duties in the handling of DG, may be
made available to the employee in lieu of provision of the whole DG Manual to the
employee; and
•
Part 92 be amended to require operators, who use extracts of DG manuals, to implement
adequate processes to ensure that only up-to-date extracts are used.
5.18
Provide for the carriage of large quantities of fuel in other single
packagings (jerricans and aluminum or steel drums) on cargo-only aircraft and
provide for carriage of fuel in combination packagings on passenger aircraft
5.18.1 CASR 92.185 permits carriage of fuel in up to 220 litre single package containers in 1A1
non-removable-head steel drums or 1B1 non-removable-head steel drums only on cargo aircraft.
Several proponents suggested allowing for carriage of fuel in steel or aluminum 3A1, 3A2, 3B1
& 3B2 drums or UN Specification plastic 3H1 & 3H2 jerricans.
5.18.2 Some proponents also sought the carriage of fuel in jerricans and other single
packagings on passenger aircraft, also with a relief from the documentary requirements that
accompany the normal carriage of DG.
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5.18.3 The original statutory exclusion articulated in CASR 92.185 is, designed to cater for
unique conditions experienced in remote Australian operations. It has been adopted and used by a
number of territory and remote-area operations in WA and the NT. It permits carriage of fuel in
larger containers, but does not relieve the operator from compliance with documentation,
(including shippers’ declaration, acceptance checklist or NOTOC), or other requirements such as
training, inspection, storage and loading, etc.
5.18.4 There are a number of operators, who conduct activities in remote locations, and which
have been issued permission under s.23 which permits the carriage of fuel in certain jerricans.
The operator procedures include additional inspection procedures for testing the integrity of the
packaging, including standing on the filled jerrican and holding the jerrican/container upside
down to check for spillage/leakage.
5.18.5 The Working Group gave detailed consideration to the primacy of the welfare of
passengers and were unable to countenance a wide-based statutory exemption that introduced any
reduction in packaging standards, or any increase in the volume per package, for aircraft
operating as a passenger flight. It was considered that passengers should not be subjected to
additional risks for the carriage of the Operator’s fuel beyond that already espoused in the ICAO
TIs without measures to increase their awareness and safety. Therefore, any requests either to
carry fuel in single-packagings, or in volumes of more than 5 litres per containers, on a passenger
aircraft, should continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis by the Regulator.
5.18.6 Furthermore, in considering the need to carry fuel on passenger aircraft, it was
considered that the standards sought by the ICAO TIs should be maintained and that the main
option for any leeway lay in the documentation. Whilst single-packaged metal jerricans might be
considered appropriate for use, concern was raised in respect of the metal generating a spark.
5.18.7 Irrespective of the aircraft status (cargo vs passenger) carrying the fuel, the Working
Group considered that current ICAO TI obligations in respect of package marking and labelling,
inspection and decontamination, storage and loading, information to crew, emergency procedures
and occurrence reporting had to be maintained.
5.18.8 The question was also asked as to whether fuel canisters meeting Australian Standard
AS 2906 automatically met UN Specifications. There is a common belief amongst many
operators that they do; however, a number of Working Group members believed that the quality
of some AS2906 containers would not stand up to the UN mandated drop test. The WG also
considered that the likelihood of a plastic jerrican rupturing on dropping is more likely to be in a
ground handing incident rather than a safety in-flight incident; nevertheless, is was considered
prudent to additionally require that the jerrican be loaded, stowed and restrained such that it could
not fall in flight.
5.18.9 Another consideration with plastic jerricans lay in the increased likelihood of them being
damaged by other items in critical incident. For example, a sharp metal object might move during
a crash and puncture the jerrican, turning a survivable crash into an unsurvivable fire.
5.18.10 Also of concern to the PIR WG was that the temperatures experienced by plastic
jerricans in an aircraft cabin in summer could lead to weakening and deformation of the container
and whether passengers ought to be exposed to the additional risks presented by operators
tankering their own fuel.
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Outcome:
5.18.11 It is recommended that a Subpart 92.D regulation be created which permits commercial
operators to carry fuel in single packagings on cargo aircraft, and in combination packagings in
passenger aircraft with less than nine seats; providing that:
•
refuelling, loading, stowage, documentation, packaging inspection, decontamination
incident reporting and flight crew emergency procedures are contained in the Operator’s
DG manual;
•
where the packagings are single, that there be additional package integrity testing prior
to loading the package onto the aircraft and at each subsequent point of transit prior to
take-off;
•
packages containing fuel to be stowed and secured upright, i.e. that there are no closures
on any extremity of the package other than upright;
•
packages to be marked and labelled as per the hazard and contents;
•
packages being carried on passenger aircraft are not to exceed the passenger aircraft DG
provisions;
•
flight crew cyclic emergency procedure training and testing includes the operator
procedures;
•
the operator includes maintenance procedures for the jerricans, including jerrican still
being within useful life (5 years since manufacture for plastic jerricans), storage to
prevent contamination of contents, and inspection processes to ensure continued fitness
for use; and
•
the operator’s procedures and processes are reviewed annually to ensure that packaging
standards and safety processes remained up to date with contemporary standards from
the ICAO TIs.
5.19
Requirement to keep records of certain tests
5.19.1 It was observed that the ICAO TIs do not require certain records to be kept, in particular
stack and drop tests for Limited Quantity packagings and test results for the compliance of
Lithium batteries with the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria.
5.19.2 From an aviation safety perspective, it was considered that an assurance that where tests
had been passed, that there should be a verifiable audit trail to prove that the tests had been
complied with and passed. It was not necessary to retain the physical items that had been tested,
but there should be an appropriate record of who had conducted the tests, on which dates and
other relevant matters such as the composition of the materials, the environmental factors, the
testing process that was adopted, the results of those tests and preferably some evidence, such as
photographs, as to the damage received by the packaging or otherwise.
5.19.3 It was suggested that records ought to be retained for the life of product plus an
additional two years.
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Outcome:
5.19.4 It is recommended that there be a subpart 92.B regulation that requires the retention of
records of tests for articles, substances and packagings and which have been conducted for the
suitability of those articles, substances or packagings to be carried by air.
5.20
Create offence of tampering with label or package
5.20.1 There have been occasions, discovered through an investigation of a DG occurrence, that
persons have tampered with, or attempted to remove or obliterate markings or labelling on the
consignment or on the internal packagings.
5.20.2 The rationale for the tampering has been to attempt to ship a previously declared
dangerous goods, which has been rejected either at point of acceptance, or during transit, and to
portray the goods as not being dangerous.
Outcome:
5.20.3 It is proposed to amend Part 92 to create an offence to tamper with a consignment of
dangerous goods, its marking or any labelling affixed to that package The offence would not be
applicable if the contents did not meet the classification criteria as a DG, or where the act was in
compliance with the ICAO TIs (for example removing the Cargo Aircraft Only label in
accordance with AUG-05, or the replacement of torn or lost labels).
5.21
Issue a Regulatory Approval for Packing Instruction 200
5.21.1
Within the ICAO TIs, Packing Instruction (PI) 200 requires that:
“Cylinders, other than UN Marked and certified cylinders may be used if the design,
construction, testing, approval and markings conform to the requirements of the appropriate
national authority in which they are approved and filled.”
5.21.2 The Oil and Gas industry uses cylinders which are lowered down bores/shafts and which
gather samples under the pressures experienced at those depths. The samples are then brought
back to the surface, with the contents still under pressure. The principle DG is of a flammable
hydrocarbon. These cylinders are usually approved by one State, not necessarily the one in which
they are manufactured, and are repeatedly used all over the world. The cylinders may be
approved in the US or Europe, and will often have a number of conditions attached to the
approval, including pressure testing, package marking and labelling, and incident reporting
requirements.
5.21.3 One difficulty with Packing Instruction 200 is that often the State where the cylinder is
being filled does not have any local requirements. In Australia, this necessitates an application for
permission under Section 23 to consign and/or carry these cylinders on Australian aircraft or
to/from/over/through Australia.
5.21.4 It is considered to be suitably safe and expedient to provide for foreign certifications to
these non-UN cylinders and impose additional requirements – for example; time since last
hydrostatic test etc.
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Outcome:
5.21.5 It is proposed to create a subpart 92.D Regulation which provides for packing instruction
200 to include cylinders which meet foreign certifications, providing that the cylinder has been
subjected to a hydrostatic test in the preceding 5 years; that the contents are not incompatible with
the cylinder materials and are restricted ot the gases approved by the country of the cylinder’s
origin; that a copy of the foreign certification is to be attached to each copy of the shippers
Declaration; and any DG occurrence to be reported as soon as reasonable practicable.
5.22
Provide for Law Enforcement Officers to carry Capsicum (OC) Spray and
Electro-muscular Incapacitating Devices as Checked-in Baggage
5.22.1 Currently law enforcement officers are permitted to carry ammunition in accordance
with the normal passenger provisions for Part 8, Chapter 1 of the ICAO TIs; however, officers
who are on deployment are not able to carry their other tools, such as Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
Spray and electro muscular incapacitants, which are preferred for their non-lethal results.
5.22.2 A number of law enforcement agencies have established procedures for the safe
preparation and carriage of these additional enforcement tools, and arrangements are in place
with major operators to facilitate their transport.
5.22.3 OTS and the Transport Security Act and Regulations require that the goods must be
stored in an inaccessible hold.
Outcome:
5.22.4 It is proposed to introduce into subpart 92.D a regulation that permits operators to give
written approval to Law Enforcement Officers to carry OC Spray and electro muscular
incapacitating devices in checked in baggage. Safeguards will include:
•
Packaging - OC Spray is to be triple packaged and contained within a watertight and
rigid protective case.
•
LEA Procedures - The Law Enforcement Agency is to have a set of controlleddocument procedures and clear policies as to the preparation, booking, and presentation
of the goods at the airport and collection point.
•
The LEA Procedures are to also relate to the safe preparation of the Dangerous Goods
for carriage on the aircraft. The LEA procedures are to have due regard to the hazards
presented by the Dangerous Goods, the safety of the aircraft and any person who may
be involved in the handling of the checked-in baggage.
•
The LEA Procedures are to specify a nominated senior officer responsible for an annual
review of the procedures and for ongoing compliance by the personnel of that LEA.
•
The Law Enforcement Agency must issue a copy of the LEA procedures, and any
amendments, to the Operator.
•
Operator – The operator is to make assessment of LEA procedures.
•
The LEA procedures and the Operator Approval procedures must be made available to
CASA upon request.
•
The Operator is to establish appropriate safety procedures (Operator procedures),
relating to the proper identification of the persons and the checking of the proper
packaging of the dangerous goods in the company Dangerous Goods Manual, or
Operations Manual or a supplement to either of those manuals..
•
An Operator may elect another operator to hold the LEA procedures and to conduct a
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safety assessment on their behalf.
•
An Operator is to give written “Operator Approval” to the persons or the Law
Enforcement Agency. If a written Operator Approval is given, it must specify:
° the name of the Law Enforcement Agency; and
° identify the LEA Procedures that are to be complied with; and
° an expiry date of the ‘Operator Approval’ which is a date not longer than 2 years or
12 months after the last review date of the LEA procedures and
° any other conditions that the Operator imposes in the interests of Aviation Safety.
•
A copy of the Operator Approval is to be submitted to CASA.
•
Carriage - The goods will only be permitted to be carried in an inaccessible hold.
•
The dangerous goods must only be carried in the checked baggage of the persons
travelling on official work related travel.
•
Any DG occurrence is to be reported as soon as reasonably practicable.
•
The carriage of these Dangerous Goods is limited to domestic flights within Australian
Territory only.
5.23
Require an operator to appoint a person to the role of DG compliance
5.23.1 It was suggested that where an operator chooses to carry DG, then there ought to be a
person within the organisational structure who is responsible for DG compliance requirements.
5.23.2
It was suggested that the responsibilities of a DG compliance officer would include:
•
DG training;
•
DG Manual;
•
DG Procedures; and
•
DG Occurrence management, investigation and reporting.
5.23.3 It was noted by the Part 92 PIR WG that these responsibilities fell to the Chief Pilot;
who might in turn delegate them to Quality/Safety personnel, however, the group felt that there
was merit in providing for a DG Compliance Officer and articulating appropriate duties and
responsibilities.
5.23.4 The question was also posed in respect of Freight Forwarders and Ground Handling
Agents, noting that a number of the major entities in this field already have people appointed to
the role of DG Compliance.
Outcome:
5.23.5 It is proposed to add a regulation to Subpart 92.B, or alternatively within CAO 82.0,
requiring an operator to appoint a person who is responsible for DG Compliance within the
operator’s organisation; and for a Note to the Regulation that clarifies that in the absence of a
person being appointed and notified to CASA, that the person responsible will be the Chief Pilot.
5.23.6 It is proposed to add a note encouraging Freight Forwarders and Ground Handling
Agents to nominate a person who is responsible for DG compliance.
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5.24
Require the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations and reference material to
be kept up to date
5.24.1 During a number of CASA audits, it was found that whilst the current edition of the
relevant reference manuals, such as the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGRs) were onsite
and in use, they were not being kept up to date with the addenda being incorporated or in close
reference proximity to the IATA DGRS. In a number of cases, the addenda contain material of a
safety-related nature.
5.24.2 The Part 92 PIR WG noted that CASR 92.045(2) requires a DG Manual to be kept up to
date, but that it does not apply to procedures or instructions that are not in the DG Manual.
5.24.3 The Part 92 PIR WG also noted that s.28BH and Civil Aviation Order 82.5 and its
replacement Part 119 all require a reference library, and similarly, many operators call up
compliance with the IATA DGRs in the company DG Manual. Whilst it was opined that CAR
215 would require the reference material to be kept up to date, it was determined that regulation
92.045 ought to be amended to put beyond doubt that procedures and instructions are also
required to be kept up to date.
Outcome:
5.24.4 It is proposed to amend CASR 92.045(2) to reflect that procedures and instructions are
also to be kept up to date.
5.25
Create an offence to consign an item that has DG labels on it; when it
does not contain DG
5.25.1 One proponent suggested that there should be an offence for the act of consigning
something as a DG; when it did not contain DG. The conceptual arguments against the proposal
included the examples of people who re-used DG packaging and inadvertently did not remove all
prior markings and labellings. Another group who would be penalized were those who suspected
that the contents may meet the criteria as a DG and sent them in that manner to be safe; pending
confirmation or refutation that the goods did meet the DG classification criteria.
5.25.2 The proponent clarified that their concerns went to persons who deliberately consigned
non-DG items as a declared DG. Examples were the shipping of non-hazardous consignments as
a radioactive, to “test” the transport chain; and the sending of valuable cargo as a DG, as the
“more gentle” handling and safe-hand transfer process gave the shipper more comfort that the
goods were less likely to be interfered with during the transportation process.
5.25.3 The proponent then cited the impact on operators, emergency responders and regulators
in the additional costs and impacts upon resources in investigating and aircraft downtime whilst
an occurrence was managed and through the aircraft inspection, decontamination and return to
service.
Outcome:
5.25.4 It is proposed to introduce a subpart 92.B regulation that prohibits the consignment of a
package as a dangerous goods consignment when the package does not contain dangerous goods.
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5.26
Provide for the Approval of packaging for transportation by Aircraft
5.26.1 Packaging standards are set by the UN’s Economic and Social Council’s Committee of
Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (COE) and are set out in the Model Regulations on
the Transport of Dangerous Goods (the “Orange Book”) and in the UN Manual of Tests and
Criteria. This latter document provides for the testing standards of UN specification packaging.
5.26.2 The UN Model Regulations and Manual of Tests and Criteria are maintained and
updated at regular intervals, and the recommendations form the basis for the transportation of
dangerous goods by road and rail in Australia (through the Australian Dangerous Goods Code
managed by the Department of Infrstructure and respective State Government agencies), by sea
(through the IMDG code, managed by IMO and AMSA) and air (through the TI’s, managed by
ICAO and CASA). There are different timing cycles in the maintenance and updating of the
respective ADG/IMO/ICAO codes/instructions, and some modal differences in the adoption of
the UN Model Regulations.
5.26.3 In Australia, testing of UN specification packages is carried out by laboratories that have
been accredited by the National Association of Testing Authorities (NATA).
5.26.4 If packaging meets the criteria specified by the UN, then the test results are sent through
to an appropriate Government Authority to issue an approval for the packaging. These are
predominantly State Government agencies, although AMSA has recently commenced issuing
packaging approvals where the IMDG requirements are more stringent that the UN Orange Book:
Marine Orders, Part 41, Appendix 1, Section 3 3 Packaging Approval
3.1 Subject to clause 3.2, packagings for dangerous goods must be tested to the requirements of
Part 6 of the IMDG Code and approved by the competent authority.
Note 1 Part 6 of the IMDG Code is ‘Construction and testing of packagings, immediate bulk
containers (IBCs), large packagings, portable tanks, multiple element gas containers and road
tank vehicles’.
Note 2 Packagings approved by State and Territory government competent authorities to the
requirements of the Australian Dangerous Goods Code, or the UN Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods (colloquially known as the ‘Orange Book’) are acceptable,
provided that such requirements are not inferior to those in the IMDG Code.
3.2 All Type B packaging for radioactive materials must be approved by the Manager, Ship
Inspections.
5.26.5 It has also been recently brought to CASA’s attention that at least one State Government
agency is now explicitly stating in their packaging approval that the approval does not cover air
or sea transport.
5.26.6 One proponent suggested that CASA, as the Competent Authority, ought to approve DG
packaging, where that packaging is to be used in shipping dangerous goods by air. CASA does
not have resources to test packages; and the acquisition of such resources would fail a
cost:benefit analysis. There is also no obvious need to duplicate NATA’s accreditation of testing
facilities, rather it would be more effective to build upon the existing arrangements. Prior to
assessing the application or issuing the approval; there would be a requirement for a test report
being submitted for all the relevant packaging tests, particularly including those that are unique
for air transportation, having been completed.
5.26.7 CASA, as the appropriate competent authority, approves Type B packagings for
radioactive air transport; although the sole authority is held by the Director and is unable to be
delegated.
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Outcome
5.26.8
It is proposed that a Regulation be created by which CASA may approve DG packaging.
5.26.9 It is recommended that CASA maintains a register on the website of State Government
approved packaging approvals which have also been issued an approval for air transport.
5.26.10 It is recommended that approvals for packagings involved in air transport would be valid
for a fixed period, of the order of five years, before retesting would be required.
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6.
Items Proposed and not recommended
6.1
This section contains a summary of those issues that were suggested and deliberated,
and for which the Working Group did not support change. The information is provided for
completeness of the Part 92 PIR and to explain some of the arguments for and against the
rationale to retain the status quo. CASA recognises that there will be differing views held by the
wider aviation industry and that matters of “no change recommended” should form part of the
NPRM and consultation process, with the opportunity being afforded to the industry in order to
facilitate wider comment and the presentation of additional differing comments.
6.2
Require discrete CASA Permission to carry DG in accordance with the
ICAO TIs
6.2.1
One operator experienced difficulties with overseas regulatory authorities and obtaining
permission to carry DG. The Australian legislative approach is that if an operator wishes to carry
DG, then they are permitted to do so providing they comply with the ICAO TIs. One view is that
this approach facilitates operators to carry DG at any time, and the operators may “opt-out” of
carrying DG. A number of other States issue express and individual permissions to Operators to
carry DG – an “Opt-in” approach.
6.2.2
DG.
It was suggested that CASA ought to issue a letter of approval to an operator to carry
6.2.3
During the life of the Part 92 PIR project, CASA’s AOC and Operational Specification
format changed and now includes a generic statement that the operator may carry DG in
accordance with the ICAO TIs.6.1.4 The rationale to retaining the current system is that:
•
a move to issuing a discrete permission to carry DG would not add any safety benefit to
those operators who currently and safely transport DG; and
•
there would be a cost to CASA, and ultimately borne by the industry, in the regular
issuing of permissions to carry DG.
6.2.4
Also posited is the argument that Annex 18 is about the safe transportation of DG and
DG is a subset of cargo. The carriage of cargo ought to be universal and that the safe carriage of
DG should be an everyday activity of no special concern or activity; that is, it is better for
operators to be encouraged to safely transport DG as a matter of routine, rather than treat DG as a
non-core, optional activity.
6.2.5
Measures which make the transporting of DG less accessible, may encourage the
unlawful shipping of DG.
6.2.6
The counterarguments and opposing considerations to retaining the status quo includes:
•
The current AOC Operational Specification could be viewed as a “fail-unsafe”
mechanism; that is, an operator may see on their Op Spec that they may carry DG and
then do so without the appropriate processes, processes or DG acceptance-level training
in place.
•
Australia is not aligned with a number of other leading States where discrete
permissions are required to carry DG.
•
That the Operational Specification should be more prescriptive and reflect the activities
that the operator is able to conduct at the time the Operational Specification is issued,
not what they could do, if they made changes to their manuals, policies, practices,
procedures and undertook training.
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6.2.7
During the course of the PIR, an Advisory Circular was produced, AC 92A-01, which
clarifies the Australian Regulatory approach and which can be referred to by Operators and
Foreign Regulators.
6.2.8
There will be on-going work between the two ICAO Panels which administer Annexes 6
and 18, in order to develop closer co-operation on the assessment and approval process within the
issuance of Operational Specifications, and which will result in evolving guidelines to States
appearing in the ICAO SUPP.
6.3
Commercial DG packers/shippers should be licensed/regulated
6.3.1
There were suggestions and support for the formal licensing of commercial DG
packers/shippers.
6.3.2
CASA’s DG Inspectors do not have a legal authority to undertake compliance audits on
packers/shippers of DGs. Inspections are conducted through positive engagement and in a cooperative spirit of improving aviation safety. Nevertheless, the anecdotal feedback from ICAO
Safety Oversight auditees is that ICAO considers that ICAO Annex 18 is applicable to shippers,
forwarders, ground handling agents and other aviation-related cargo transport entities. The view
has also been expressed that States are obligated to establish inspection, surveillance and
enforcement procedures with these groups, in order to achieve compliance with the DG
Regulations.
6.3.3
The Working Group envisaged difficulties with the logistics and administrative burden
for a formal licensing scheme. It would present an opportunity to raise standards but at extra cost
to industry, and in a cost-recovery environment of a relatively small industry, would be a
significant expense for each company. The Working Group also considered other, less expensive,
means which might achieve the same result. A registration/notification scheme, where
participants merely notify or register on-line with CASA would be low-cost and efficient method
to enable CASA to be aware of commercial shippers who should then be on the radar. However,
the disadvantages of a registration scheme include other difficulties such as removing noncompliant persons from the industry; providing an industry credibility of being “CASAregistered”. The questionable benefit of a registration regime as a ‘radar system’ which informs
CASA of who is operating in the industry – is that the existing shippers are already known and
the new entrants generally come to light very quickly.
6.3.4
The general consensus of the Working Group was that improved tools for empowering
compliance inspections and enforcement will produce improved safety for less cost than a
licensing/registration system.
6.4
Seasonally employed workers in freight sheds and parcel sorting facilities
be excluded from the requirement to undertake DG training
6.4.1
There was an observation that CASR 92.105 – Training for Employees of Freight
Forwarders - places a significant burden on employees and employers who attend seasonal jobs at
freight forwarder and postal authority facilities. It was represented that these employees may be
employed for one or two weeks over short term periods such as Christmas, under supervision,
and yet they have to sit down for several hours to discuss dangerous goods – all for possibly 40 to
80 hours of employment.
6.4.2
The comment was also made in respect of DG training for employees who were being
given trial employment with an employer, in that it is onerous to the forwarder, to provide DG
training if the employee was not going to be employed in an ongoing manner.
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6.4.3
The general view from the Part 92 PIR WG was that personnel involved in handling
freight & air mail parcels must be trained to identify potentially hidden dangerous goods. If the
situation was to be amended such that these employees were not trained in respect of DGs, then
Australia would be adopting a stance that was not harmonised with ICAO and the Technical
Instructions.
6.5
Statement of Contents not be required where package has been opened or
clearly evident that the item is not dangerous
6.5.1
A current remote location and mining charter aviation industry practice is that where a
consignment is presented, and which does not have a dangerous goods statement attached, then
the package may be opened by an operator’s employee to verify that there are no dangerous
goods contained within the package. A submission suggested that this type of scenario should be
added to the other current grounds for excluding the need for a Statement of Contents in CASR
92.070(4).
6.5.2
The view of the Working Group was that the consignment may still travel yet further on
another transitioning aircraft and that there could still be a statement made by the employee who
inspected that cargo, that the contents are not dangerous.
6.5.3
In a similar vein was a suggestion that the Statement of Contents Provisions should also
exclude items which are obviously not dangerous, from needing a statement – i.e. newspapers,
cartons of cut flowers, bread, fruit and vegetables, etc.
6.5.4
The prevailing PIR WG view was that there should be a consistent approach to the
Statement of Contents requirements and a reluctance to add further items to 92.070(4).
6.6
Provide for the carriage of 44 Gallon (205 Litre) drums of fuel on their side
6.6.1
CASR 92.185(c) provides for the carriage of large fuel drums, a measure which supports
regional and remote community needs. The ICAO TIs require that the bungs on any packages of
liquid DG be uppermost. The suggestion was made to provide for carrying fuel drums on their
side in aircraft where they cannot be stowed upright – i.e. in a Cessna 206. The bungs are
therefore then located on the sides and not uppermost.
6.6.2
Consideration was given to issues of ullage, expansion, altitude, emergency risk for
occupants and other safety precautions that should be instituted. The Working Group came to the
view that the current arrangements in CASR 92.185 are already a major relaxation from
international requirements and recommended that any variations in line with this type of request
continue to be treated as one-off permissions and assessed on their own merits.
6.7
Remove the requirement for CASA to approve Trainee DG Instructors
6.7.1
Part 92 requires that instructors be approved; this includes trainee instructors. The
suggestion was put forward that provision be made for instructors who are under training, to be
able to deliver an approved course under the supervision of an approved instructor without the
need to hold a CASA approval, and/or amend CASR 92.140 to clearly include trainee DG
instructors.
6.7.2
CASA approval of trainee instructors enables monitoring of school instructor
development programs, the quality and output of the instructor and facilitates the additional
monitoring/oversight during the period of increased operational risk.
6.7.3
Guidance has been provided in AC 92-03 to assist professional training organisations in
the preparation of trainee instructors. It is proposed to improve this guidance material, based upon
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the benefit of operational experience and industry feedback, either in the next iteration of the AC
or else to move it into the MOS.
6.7.4
At the time of the review, the PIR WG did not support the proposal, but did support a
streamlining of the instructor-development process via a future MOS.
6.8
Provide for the automatic recognition of foreign courses
6.8.1
One respondent questioned whether an IATA or other regulatory authority training
course or Instructor approval should automatically qualify for an Australian DG approval for the
course and/or instructor.
6.8.2
The Working Group’s consensus was that, at present, there isn’t the demand to
necessitate such a regulation and that each instructor/course should continue to be assessed on
their own merits.
6.9
Provide for the automatic recognition of foreign DG training
6.9.1
It was suggested that CASA should consider a simplified arrangement for recognising
overseas training for employees coming to Australia. Currently an organisation can apply for a
training exclusion for the particular employee. The assessment takes into account the overseas
training, whether it delivered by an IATA accredited school or issued by an organisation that has
been approved by a National Aviation Authority. Any exclusions are normally set to expire at the
same time as the overseas training.
6.9.2
CASA receives very few applications for overseas recognition. The Working Group
consensus was that there are too many variables to take into account in ensuring an equivalent
standard and that costs in developing a process for so few applicants would outweigh the benefits.
The preference was to continue with current exclusion arrangements with CASA assessing each
case on its own merits.
6.9.3
Nevertheless, a number of DG training organisations, instructors and courses are
approved by both CASA and the CAA of New Zealand, with each State conducting surveillance
and compliance inspections on those organisations. In recognition of the principles of the Trans
Tasman Mutual Recognition Act, negotiations are taking [place between CASA and NZ CAA
with a view to adopting more formal recognition of training courses and approvals issued by each
State.
6.10
Provide for CASA to delegate the ability to issue a DG instructor approval
6.10.1 It was proposed that for large organisations, than an authority to assess, develop and
approve DG instructors should be a function that could be delegated to that organisation.
6.10.2 The suggestion was that CASA should develop appropriate guidelines and assessment
methods and criteria. However, the proponent was unable to identify or articulate the cost-saving
benefit when taking into account the low turn-over rates of DG Instructors in the industry.
6.10.3 It was also envisaged that there could be some difficulties with auditing delegates; and a
concern that a lack of regulatory oversight may lead to a reduction in standards. Also it was
anticipated that there would be very few operators having the DG instructor’s turnover at a rate
that necessitated an appointed delegate being on staff.
6.11
That CASA set the DG exam
6.11.1
One proponent suggested that CASA should set the DG exam.
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6.11.2 This model is used in some ICAO States, sometimes with the cost and function
outsourced to a third party. The benefits of this model ensures consistency of the standard of DG
training delivered to employees and that emergent issues can be readily incorporated into the
exam by CASA.
6.11.3 The disadvantages reside in the additional costs that are borne by the industry. If CASA
were to develop and administer a DG exam, then the cost would also have to be passed on.
6.11.4 Before imposing additional costs, and expanding the number of CASA employees, it is
necessary to explore whether the current system is failing. Guidance with regard to the content
and range of exam material is identified in AC 92-03 and the training course provider submits the
exams to CASA as part of the course package.
6.11.5 Whilst there is a degree of overall variability between the exams of different providers,
there is consistency to the standards of those courses; that is students from Course provider A and
who pass the exam will generally be capable of passing the exam from Course provider B.
6.11.6 The CASA DG Inspectors undertake periodic audits on DG training providers and
reviews the exams that have been completed by candidates, including frequency of failure and
consistency in same right/wrong answers by candidates. The preferred approach is one of cooperation to achieve high professional standards.
6.11.7 Courses that have been approved by CASA are currently recognised and delivered in a
number of overseas States.
6.11.8 The PIR WG felt that the potential cost to industry in CASA setting and administering
the DG exam, with the attendant problem of the unscrupulous instructors who may then teach to
the exam; would outweigh the benefits of the current system.
6.12
Broaden scope of load planner definition to include the loading functions
undertaken by ramp team leaders and pit crew leaders
6.12.1 The suggestion was made that CASR 92.085 should be amended to broaden the
definition of a load planner to include anyone who physically loads DG onto an aircraft as
persons who decide where to physically stow the DG, should have the same DG knowledge as
the load planner who may instruct in which cargo hold DG should be loaded.
6.12.2 Currently a load planner is a person, nominated by the operator, who is responsible for
any of the functions of:
•
specifying where DG may be stowed on the aircraft;
•
specifying any necessary segregation;
•
preparing information for the pilot in command; or
•
providing DG emergency response information for the pilot in command.
6.12.3 The view of the Working Group was that if the load planner has made a decision on
where the goods are to be stowed in the aircraft; then a Group C course is the appropriate level of
training. However, in the case of an who employee is only loading but not responsible for
determining the stowage requirements, a Group E course is appropriate for these ramp staff and
they should not be compelled to undertake a Group C course.
6.13
Remove the requirement for everyone to be trained in passenger
provisions
6.13.1
CASR 92.135 2 (a) Item 12 of Table 92.135-2 essentially requires that all DG courses
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include the provisions made for passengers’ dangerous goods.
6.13.2 One proponent considered that although it was a great idea it should not rest on the
freight industry to educate passengers on dangerous goods, especially as the greater majority of
employees have not and probably never will fly. 100% screening of passengers’ baggage occurs
by airlines in many airports and this should eliminate this onerous task from a freight persons
training. Current OTS screening requirements of passenger’s hold stowed baggage and carry-on
items should adequately address this issue.
6.13.3 The WG reflected that the freight industry is not being expected to educate passengers.
They are expected to have an understanding of the types of things that may be dangerous and the
specific provisions for passengers and crew with part of the rationale being that they themselves
are very likely to be passengers, and when interacting with others, in a social setting, are likely to
be asked about DGs.
6.13.4 Furthermore, the WG noted that having all Australian DG courses cover the provisions
for passengers and crew is aligned with the ICAO Technical Instructions at Part1; Chapter 4,
Table 1.4. In addition, the WG also noted recent discussions at ICAO, regarding similar
proposals, had resulted in the position that the DG Panel was not prepared to remove this
requirement either.
6.14
Exclude DG training requirements from regulation 92.185 – carriage of
large fuel containers
6.14.1 t was suggested that the training requirements of Subpart 92.C should also be exempted
in regulation, 92.185 which relates to the carriage of large fuel containers.
6.14.2 The training requirement in this regulation is only pertinent to AOC operators. Private
operators can already carry these types of dangerous goods under CASR 92.175, which has been
exempted from the DG training requirements of Subpart 92.C.
6.14.3 The Working Group considers that the employee/operator should be aware of the risks
and have company-relevant procedures for documenting, labeling, stowing, segregating,
notifying the plot in command and emergency response procedures.
6.14.4 Accordingly, it was considered appropriate that the employees of an operator with an
AOC should be properly trained.
Note: The making of PIR amendments to Part 92 is likely to be after Part 91 - General
operating and flight rules. Part 91 uses different terminology and is not predicated
upon the extant concept of Private Operations as expressed in CASR 92.175. It is
expected that CASR 92.175 will be modified to reflect the new terminology and be
expressed in terms of operations not conducted under an AOC.
6.15
Require a 24-Hour contact number for shipments of declared dangerous
goods
6.15.1 There were several requests for CASR 92.010 to include a definition of “24- hour
accessible emergency contact phone number (International or domestic)” and/or that CASR
92.035 are amended to require a 24 hour emergency contact number be put on shipper’s
declarations.
6.15.2 There is a current developing practice with 24-hour contact numbers, appearing on
Shipper’s Declarations, where those contact numbers are being tested by forwarders/operators
prior to completion of acceptance check and that if the contact is not fruitful, then the item does
not travel.
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6.15.3 The consensus of the Working Group was that whilst some States had legislated for 24hour contact numbers, the practice was not universally mandated, that most declared DG
shipments rarely experience spillage/leakage and that a definition is not required. The Working
Group recognised that if the requirement for 24-hour contacts is formally adopted by the ICAO
TIs, then it will be automatically picked up through Part 92’s incorporation of the ICAO TIs.
6.16
Require Transport Security Inspectors from the Office of Transport
Security (OTS) to undertake DG training
6.16.1 It was suggested as Transport Security Inspectors are often dealing with passenger and
cargo screening systems and conducting audits, that they ought to also be trained in an awareness
of DG.
6.16.2 A closer relationship between CASA and OTS inspectors is encouraged along with an
increased awareness of those areas where responsibilities overlap. A Transport Security
Inspector’s primary function is in respect of security programs including the review and
monitoring of the program implementation. An in-depth knowledge of DG and the safety issues
that surround the safe transportation of DG would not improve aviation security.
6.17
Provide for Passengers to Carry DG When – “No other provisions of the
TIs apply”
6.17.1 For a number of dangerous goods, some of the provisions of the ICAO TIs do not apply
if certain conditions are met. A recurrent question is whether items of dangerous goods, that do
not fall within the normal provisions of passengers and crew, are permissible if “no other
provisions of these instructions apply”.
6.17.2 One view is that Parts 1-7 of the ICAO TIs relate to DG as Cargo and that Part 8 is in
relation to DG for passengers and crew. Accordingly it is inferred that whilst “no other provisions
apply” to cargo, the items are still deemed as DG and have not been allowed to be carried under
the provisions of Part 8.
6.17.3 An alternative view is that if no provisions apply, then the item does not meet the criteria
for DG and is no longer something which Part 8 is required to provide for. The International
debate on the differing views appears to be set to continue for a while longer.
6.17.4
It is noted that the ICAO TIs at 1:1.2 states:
“No person shall carry dangerous goods or cause dangerous goods to be carried aboard an
aircraft in either checked or carry on baggage or on his/her person, unless permitted by
8;1.1.2”
6.17.5 The Part 92 PIR WG considered the risk to the safety of operations and personnel
involved in loading and unloading baggage and to other passengers should these types of items be
prepared in a manner that precluded the applications of DG-as-cargo provisions. The ICAO DG
Panel considered a paper which ought to settle much of the interpretative differences as to
whether or not passengers may carry DGs which are “not subject to the TIs - Working Paper 43
found at http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Pages/WG11-WPs.aspx
6.17.6 The current evolving practice that has been adopted in Australia by major operators is
that whilst there may not be restrictions to those items from being able to be carried by
passengers, they still require and give Operator Approval, providing guidance on how the item is
to be prepared and presented at check-in, and annotate the passenger records accordingly. This
approach is supported as the airlines have personnel that are trained in DG and are able to make a
safety-related risk assessment whilst also facilitating the needs of their customer.
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6.17.7 Since the review commenced, the ICAO DG Panel has also been actively considering
when passengers may carry DG. The current common perception is that where the Tis stipulate
“…..(type of DG) meeting the requirements of….are not subject to these instructions when
carried as cargo…”(emphasis added) then passengers are not permitted to carry those DG.
6.17.8 Where the Tis specify that something is “….not subject to these instructions”; then
passengers may carry that item.
Outcome:
6.17.9 It is proposed that an Advisory Circular (AC) for Part 92 be developed to provide
guidance to passengers on what dangerous goods they may carry.
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7.
Manual of Standards (MOS) proposal
7.1.1
This section proposes the concept of a Manual of Standards (MOS) relating to
Dangerous Goods courses and instructors of DG courses. A draft MOS has not yet been
developed. If the concept is generally supported, then a MOS will be formulated, in consultation
with the Aviation and DG training industries, and will also undergo the normal consultation in
accordance with the requirements of CASR Subpart 11.J.
7.1.2
Manuals of Standards are documents which support Regulations by providing detailed
technical material, such as technical specifications or standards. Manuals of Standards are
legislative instruments and are subject to registration and disallowance under the Legislative
Instruments Act 2003.
7.2
DG Courses
DG Course Standardisation
7.2.1
A number of submissions related to the lack of standardisation with regard to dangerous
goods training courses. The consistency in DG courses across the industry was improved in 2004
when a review conducted by CASA DG Inspectors resulted in agreement on an appropriate
standard for a DG course. AC 92-03 was subsequently developed and circulated for several years
in draft form. The material, in the Appendices of the AC that articulated the acceptable subject
matter of the various DG syllabus items, and was strongly supported by industry. Positive
feedback was also received from overseas readers. The AC was formally published in 2009 and
CASA continues to monitor feedback. A number of residual issues have since been raised or
articulated and these have led the Working Group to consider that a Manual of Standards may be
an appropriate mechanism. The alternative is to further refine AC 92-03 – DG Course and
Instructor Approvals.
7.2.2
It was opined that CASA should be more active in setting necessary standards and that
much of the course material in current approved courses is how to read the IATA DGRs, not how
to do the task.
7.2.3
If the concept of a MOS for DG Training, Courses and Instructors is adopted, then the
MOS will evolve gradually and be consulted upon prior to implementation. It is envisaged that a
MOS would articulate:
•
DG course standards (depth and competency required) with much of the material being
taken from the current appendices to AC 92-03 and being further expanded and
clarified.
•
DG Exam – the AC already includes some guidance material, but may need to be
expanded to provide additional detail as to the desired complexity and standards
required to be demonstrated through of the exam.
•
DG Instructor Development – including the preferred standards of knowledge and
instructional capability and also to guide larger training organisations in the in-house
development of new instructors.
•
It is also envisaged that there may be reference to maintaining instructor consistency
across the school and defining or requiring subject matter knowledge and instructional
recency
7.2.4
A number of contributors expressed concern at the regulatory overlap between CASA
and the OTS in the Dept of Infrastructure in training requirements for freight forwarders. This
was also expressed by the Government in the Aviation White Paper Flightpath to the Future.
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http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/nap/white_chapters.aspx
7.2.5
CASA and OTS have differing mandated obligations that is, respectively, “Safety” vs.
“Security” and whilst there will be a significant degree of correlation between the two
responsibilities, the obligations are not always aligned with each other and occasionally be in
direct conflict. Nevertheless, there is a need for government departments and agencies to work
more closely, particularly with regard to harmonizing definitions and training in order to reduce
the impost on industry and the public.
7.2.6
A combined course to cover off CASA & OTS training could be developed and
delivered, especially where there is commonality on topics. A combined course could also be
developed for multi-modal DG courses (i.e. a combined Air/Sea course). The only issue from
CASA’s perspective is to ensure that the aviation safety-related DG syllabus items are covered to
an appropriate and relevant depth. The WG did not view with concern a “combined” certificate
that addressed several industry sector needs.
Set standards for DG Courses
7.2.7
The current part 92 Regulations specify a number of syllabus items that employees are
required to be trained in, relevant to their duties. Advisory Circular AC 92-03 was produced to
provide guidance on the depth of subject matter in particular syllabus areas that were relevant to
differing employee groups. The AC was well received with positive responses received in
relation to the improved relevance of course content. A number of course providers have adopted
the guidance provided in the AC. It has been suggested that the material in the AC would form a
good basis for a Manual of Standards.
7.2.8
The benefit of a MOS is that it clearly sets out the standards to be achieved and it is
enforceable, whereas the current material in the advisory circular is guidance and not mandatory.
A MOS is classed as an instrument disallowable by Parliament and is registered in the Federal
Register of Legislative Instruments.
Outcome:
7.2.9
It is recommended that the matters covered by Advisory Circular AC 92-03 be expanded
and reformed into a Manual of Standards which contains DG course content.
Recertification training and course duration
7.2.10 There were a number of proposals around recertification training and the purpose
surrounding it; especially when an employee is accepting dangerous goods for transport by
aircraft on a daily basis.
7.2.11 The principle suggestion was that for a recertification course – the instructor should be
able to consider of the depth of knowledge that is possessed and the degree to which it has been
used by the employee. If the employee has good knowledge and has handled DG on a daily basis
for an extended period then the instructor should be able to conduct an assessment, fill the
knowledge and skill gaps and release the employee. If the student has good knowledge but has
not had much involvement with DG in the preceding 6 months – then a two day refresher may be
more appropriate for the course. If the student had barely handled any DG in the preceding two
years, then a full course that approximated the initial course could be more relevant.
7.2.12 Concern was also raised in respect of an Approved refresher course in the transport of
infectious substances.
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7.2.13 Consideration was also given to suggestions from the WG that it may be appropriate for
refresher training to cover recent and forthcoming TIs changes followed by a test. The test should
be relevant and objective with appropriate weightings and knowledge deficiency training then
being tailored to the questions that were failed.
7.2.14 Similarly, a pre-course test might be valuable to differentiate between genuine
recertification “refreshers” and “abbreviated initial” courses.
7.2.15 Ultimately it was considered the test should be objective – i.e. Can the employee
undertake the duties in understanding what constitutes a DG, assisting in the safe transportation
of declared DG and in ensuring that hidden and mis-declared DG do not enter, or are removed
from, the air transportation system?
Outcome:
7.2.16 It is recommended that either AC 92-03 be further amended or the MOS created from it
to clearly articulate that differing types of recertification courses may be developed and submitted
for approval.
7.2.17 CASA setting a fixed time/duration for a course would encourage setting and completion
of DG courses to a higher standard
7.2.18 Concern was expressed that there has been a compression of DG courses to fit with time
that employees are able to be released from operational duties, and which was having an impact
upon the achievement of an appropriate standard. It was opined that there was a trend for
employers to select training organisations that would deliver the course in the shortest time, and
that in order to maintain market share, training organisations are competing to offer the training
in the shortest timeframe. It was suggested that setting a minimum time for the course duration
would relieve the various training organisations from the pressure to condense the training.
7.2.19 There was a proposal for a minimum duration of three days for an initial
acceptance/shipper course and two days for recertification courses. It was also observed that
traditionally courses were of a longer duration in other ICAO States.
7.2.20 The WG also considered that specifying a minimum time for a course to be undertaken
would not necessarily deliver an effective learning experience and the necessary competency to
the students. A classroom of 10 mixed capability students will take longer than an individual
receiving one-on-one instruction.
7.2.21 Whilst the complaint at the outset of the issue was industry competitiveness, leading to a
self-imposed reduction in training of the material standards to fit in with the available time;
prescribing a minimum timeframe was not regarded as being the method to ensure that training
standard outcomes were consistent across the industry.
Outcome:
7.2.22 It is proposed that time estimates for various syllabus items will be produced and
disclosed in the MOS.
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7.3
DG Instructors
Introduce a fit & proper requirement for DG Instructors and DG Course approval holders
7.3.1
There were several suggestions that CASA ought to require DG Instructors to be fit and
proper. The working group deliberated as to whether there was there an identified need for fit &
proper requirements; and if so, what should be the applicable standards of fitness & propriety.
7.3.2
Ultimately, the Working Group was uncomfortable with the wide degree of subjectivity
in attempting to define “fit & proper” in the limited context of a DG instructor. The Working
Group considered that:
•
DG instructors should be credible, competent to teach and knowledgeable of the topic
material prior to approval;
•
persons with DG-related convictions should be barred from being DG instructors; and
•
If the instructor was unable to maintain contemporary DG knowledge or to instruct and
impart that knowledge;
then there ought to be provision for the revocation of approval to instruct, or to not issue one
initially.
7.3.3
Part 11 of CASR 1998 provides for such approvals to issue subject to the meeting of
criteria such as qualifications, practical experience, completed training, recency or currency of
training or educating experience, and attributes of character or standard of proficiency, required
by or under the Regulations.
Outcome:
7.3.4
It is proposed that Subpart 92.C be amended to require that DG instructors meet
appropriate standards relating to pertinent qualifications, practical industry experience, completed
training, recency or currency of training or educating experience, and attributes of character and
proficiency.
7.3.5
It is proposed that a MOS further articulate the standards required of a DG instructor.
Specify instructional currency for DG Instructors
7.3.6
One Working Group member was of the view that DG instructors should have a
regulated requirement for currency/recency in providing training in a particular course and that
this would align with the ICAO requirements at 1:4.3.2.
“Instructors delivering initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programs must at least
every 24 months deliver such courses, or in the absence of this, attend recurrent training.”
7.3.7
The Working Group noted that instructors are issued with an approval to instruct for
two-yearly intervals and that these instructors and their courses are subject to surveillance/audit
by CASA. Most instructors are regularly delivering DG training and that the concern about a lack
of currency is unsubstantiated. Part of the renewal process is to enquire about instructor recency
and if the existing instructor approval is not being used, then the qualification will lapse and not
be renewed. Similarly, if there has been a lengthy gap in instructing, then operational
Surveillance will be scheduled in order to ensure that the instructor is still knowledgeable on the
topic. Introducing a regulatory requirement for currency would impact very few DG instructors
per year.
7.3.8
Rather than introduce a regulation, the WG preference was for a renewal form for DG
Instructors where the amount of recent training was required to be documented – this has already
commenced implementation.
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7.3.9
A future Part 92 MOS could achieve the same objective by specifying instructor
currency requirements and articulating how an instructor might regain familiarity with the course
material and thus continue to meet a suitable standard.
Outcomes:
7.3.10 The preferred approach is that the proposed Part 92 MOS include requirements for
instructors to maintain currency in the delivery of DG courses in line with ICAO.
7.4
Items which may be carried in a non-Class B or non-Class C Cargo
compartment
7.4.1
CASR 92.170 contains a list of dangerous goods that may be carried in main-deck cargo
compartments that do not meet the classification as Class B or Class C cargo compartments.
These cargo compartments are defined in aircraft certification standards and generally go to fire
and smoke suppression and detection.
7.4.2
This list was originally generated by the UK Office of Government Chemist and from
there, came to be recorded in the ICAO SUPP. The Working Group reviewed and considered
whether other methods would be a better proposal to keep this list up-to-date.
Alternatives
7.4.3
Under the current legislative arrangement, if the ICAO SUPP List becomes more
restrictive, CASA could issue a Part 11 Direction as a means of providing for safety prior to the
regulation being amended. Should the ICAO SUPP become less restrictive, then CASA could
issue a permission to enable a broader range of DGs to be carried. However, Permissions and
Directions effectively impacting CASR 92.170 would not be an appropriate long-term
mechanism to harmonise with international legislation.
7.4.4
Also considered was whether CASR 92.170 could be amended to require appropriate
compliance with International Standards when carrying certain items in non-Class B or C cargo
compartments, with the detail of the items from the ICAO SUPP being published as an
Acceptable Means of Compliance via an Advisory Circular.
7.4.5
It is considered that a Part 92 Manual of Standards relating to the carriage of these
certain items, would be a more appropriate mechanism for ensuring on-going harmonisation with
international standards, whilst also delivering an appropriate level of regulatory oversight.
Outcome:
7.4.6
It is proposed to align the material currently in the SUPP and CASR 92.170 and to place
them into the proposed Part 92 MOS and to repeal CASR 92.170.
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8.
Minor or Machinery issues
8.1
This Section contains those issues which were considered to be very minor,
uncontentious or were of a routine nature. For completeness of the Review process, they have
been summarised and provided; and, unless concerns are raised and presented, they will be
automatically adopted in the Regulatory improvement to Part 92 and the Notice of Final Rule
Making (NFRM).
8.2
Repeal CASR 92.150 – Transitional arrangements
8.2.1
The Working Group was of the view that Regulation 92.150 had once served a purpose
for the transition of the Regulations in 2003/2004, but it is no longer necessary and ought to be
repealed. Regulation 92.150 was made to ensure that the validity of any DG training that had
been undertaken prior to 31 December 2003, continued until two years after that training. The
need for this regulation ceased on 31 December 2007.
Outcome:
8.2.2
It is proposed that CASR 92.150 be repealed.
8.3
CASR 92.170(1) – Remove the date “1 Jan 2004” and replace with “time to
time” in the definition of Class B cargo compartments
8.3.1
The Working Group considers that tying the definition of a Class B cargo compartment
to the definition that was in force in 2004 will result in a regulation that is out of step with the rest
of the world. Given that one principle was to maintain harmony with the international legislation,
the definition should maintain pace with that of the international aviation community.
8.3.2
This regulation was also prepared from a draft guideline produced by the Office of the
UK Government Chemist version which was subsequently modified before being incorporated
into the ICAO SUPP. Consequently, some UN numbers are missing from CASR 92.170 and
some additional ones have been included. This will be rectified either through a machinery
amendment or removed altogether and incorporated via the proposed Part 92 MOS detailed in
Section 7 of this document.
Outcome:
8.3.3
If the proposal for the Manual of Standards is not accepted for the carriage of DG in
non-Class B or C cargo compartments, then it is proposed to remove the date “1 January 2004”
from CASR 92.170(1).
8.4
Broaden CASR 92.180 to include silver fountain flares
8.4.1
The Part 92 regulations provide for the carriage of certain Division 1.4 explosives
(fireworks) to be carried in aircraft for the purposes of parachute displays. Occasionally
permission under s.23 of the Act is sought for the carriage of silver fountain flares (Fireworks,
UN0335, Division 1.3G). All fireworks carried by APF members in a parachute display, are
carried in accordance with the operational requirements of the Australian Parachute Federation.
8.4.2
The Working Group concurred with the rationale of the request, but considered that
carriage of the fireworks must be in accordance with parachuting peak-body rules should be as an
additional condition at paragraph 92.180(f).
Outcome:
8.4.3
It is proposed that CASR 92.180 be amended to include UNxxx Silver Fountain Flares.
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8.5
Exclude professional “DG instructors of approved courses” as being
required to have undertaken a Group A or B course before instructing on a Group
E course
8.5.1
CASR 92.140(5) requires that the instructor of a Group E training course must have
undertaken an approved training course for Group A or Group B employees within the previous
two years. The rationale was that instructors of Group E courses should maintain an awareness of
recent developments and would therefore be enabled to continue to deliver up to date material.
8.5.2
An unintended consequence of this regulation has had an impact on mainstream DG
instructors. Where an instructor of an operator or a DG training organisation conducts DG
training, they are issued an approval from CASA to do so. However, where that instructor then
delivers a Group E course, they must either have undertaken a Group A/B training course or
obtain an exclusion from CASA.
8.5.3
This was an oversight during the development of Part 92 which was subsequently
managed through the issuing of a class exclusion under CASR 92.155.
Outcome:
8.5.4
If the proposal that all DG Courses will have to be approved by CASA is not accepted
then this change will not be required, instead the sub-regulation will be repealed.
8.6
Harmonise definitions between CASR 92.010 and ICAO for DG accident
and DG incident
8.6.1
One Working Group member suggested that the definitions in 92.010 for DG accident
and DG Incident are not aligned with the ICAO definitions. During the course of the PIR, it
became apparent that the Air Navigation Commission were proposing to change the definition to
include an impact on the environment.
8.6.2
The proposed definitions will become:
“DG Accident means an occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous
goods by air which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property or
environmental damage.”
“DG incident means An occurrence, other than a Dangerous Goods Accident, associated with
and related to the transport of dangerous goods by air, not necessarily occurring on board an
aircraft, which results in injury to a person, property or environmental damage, fire, breakage,
spillage, leakage of fluid or radiation or other evidence that the integrity of the packaging has
not been maintained. Any occurrence relating to the transport of dangerous goods which
seriously jeopardizes the aircraft or its occupants is also deemed to constitute a dangerous
goods incident.”
Outcome:
8.6.3
It is proposed to amend the definitions in CASR 92.010 for DG Accident and DG
Incident to harmonise with the definitions which will be in ICAO Annex 18.
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8.7
CASR 92.040 – Dangerous Goods Manuals – Restructure the regulation
into a plain-English format
8.7.1
Regulation 92.040 has been the source of frequent confusion amongst readers of the
regulations. The wording is complex and confusing, particularly in respect of Subregulations (2)
& (3) where the “double-negatives” leads to confusion amongst the industry and regulators. The
meaning of the regulation has been clarified through AC 92A-01, nevertheless the Part 92 PIR
WG still recommends that the regulation be restructured into a clearer form.
Outcome:
8.7.2
It is proposed that CASR 92.040 should be restructured into a clearer format
8.8
Introduce definitions for “Consignment”, “Cargo aircraft” and “Passenger
aircraft” to have the same meaning as the ICAO TIs
8.8.1
It was suggested that by not defining the terms “consignment”, “cargo aircraft” and
“passenger aircraft” within Part 92, then normal dictionary definitions and other interpretations
would apply to these terms. The ICAO TI definitions are as follows:
•
Consignment – one or more packages of dangerous goods accepted by an operator from
one shipper at one time and at one address, receipted for in one lot and moving to one
consignee at one destination address” .
•
Passenger Aircraft – An aircraft that carries any person other than a crew member, an
operator’s employee in an official capacity, an authorised representative of an
appropriate national authority or a person accompanying a consignment or other cargo.
•
Cargo aircraft. – Any aircraft, other than a passenger aircraft, which is carrying goods
or property.
8.8.2
The provisions regarding “passenger aircraft” and “cargo aircraft” have been articulated
in AC 92A-01; however, in order to remove doubt, it is proposed to add these definitions into
CASR 92.010, which are only applicable to Part 92. It is also noted that these terms may be
defined in the Dictionary accompanying the introduction of Part 91 and may therefore be subject
to further review.
8.8.3
The term “consignment” is defined in the TIs and ICAO Annex 18 as a form of
collective noun. The term appears in Part 92 as an act or in verb form. It is therefore proposed
that CASR 92.010 will not contain a definition for “consignment”.
Outcome:
8.8.4
It is proposed to add the ICAO definitions for “Passenger Aircraft” and “Cargo Aircraft”
into CASR 92.010 in order to provide an internationally harmonised context for these aircraft
operations when carrying dangerous goods.
8.9
Screening Authorities – alignment of definition
8.9.1
One suggestion proposed to amend the definition of “screening authority” in CASR
92.085 to no longer have the same meaning as that in the Air Navigation Act 1920, as the term
“screening authority” has been removed from that Act.
8.9.2
A screening authority is now defined as a person specified by notice under regulation
4.03 of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005.
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8.9.3
The Part 92 PIR WG noted and considered the desire of retaining common definitions
between the security and safety regulations. It also noted that the security legislation continues to
evolve.
8.9.4
The WG considered that it would be practical to amend the term “screening authority” in
the definition of Group E Employee in CASR 92.085 to “screening agency” and then to define
“screening agency” in 92.085 to become an agency or persons undertaking authorised activities
involved in the safety and/or security related activities in the screening or examination of
passengers, baggage or cargo; any of which: is to be carried, is likely to be carried, or has been
carried or consigned by air”.
Outcome:
8.9.5
It is proposed to define “Screening agency” in CASR 92.085.
8.10
Additional defence for passengers if they have been given wrong
information
8.10.1 It is an offence for passengers to carry dangerous goods on an aircraft. Unless those DG
fall within the items permitted under Part 8 of the ICAO TIs.
8.10.2 CASR 92.030(a) provides a defence for passengers if inaccurate information was given
to the passenger by the operator or an employee of the operator, and it was reasonable to rely
upon that statement.
Outcome:
8.10.3 It is proposed to amend CASR 92.030(a) to include “…employee of the operator; or as
information provided in accordance with Subpart 92.E, to the effect…”
8.11
Permit carriage of loaded weapons in certain circumstances
8.11.1 Currently persons who are authorised to carry weapons in an aircraft under CAR 143,
and to discharge those weapons under CAR 144, are considered to be carrying dangerous goods
(the ammunition) in a form that does not comply with the ICAO TIs, and which does not
necessarily fit within the concept of being regarded as “DG of the operator”
8.11.2 It is proposed to create a Subpart 92.D Regulation that provides for exclusion from
Subparts 92.B and 92.C, for the carriage and use of ammunition providing that the operator
ensures that the dangerous goods are in a proper condition for carriage; establishes effective
communication methods, safety precautions, preflight checks and briefing and emergency
procedures for certain situations.
Outcome:
8.11.3 It is proposed to create a regulation in Subpart 92.D that facilitates the carriage of
ammunition when the operator holds an approval for the carriage and discharge of weapons from
an aircraft.
8.12
Training Records – retention of training certificate
8.12.1 Where an entity’s employees must have undertaken DG training, then they are required
to maintain up-to-date training records (CASR 92.145(2)). They must also keep a copy of any
certificate issued and provide a copy of that certificate if CASA requests it.
8.12.2 One Working Group member suggested that paragraph 92.145 (3) (a) should be
amended to acknowledge “certificate” or “appropriate record”.
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8.12.3 The WG reflected that a Certificate of DG Training is issued under the provisions of
CASR 135. The initial expectation was that records ought to be on site for supervisors to manage
staff training needs, to schedule training needs and to facilitate the employee’s release from work
to undertake that training. Any localised record keeping was an ancillary benefit during CASA
audits but should not in itself be the prime reason for retaining local copies of records. Whilst the
CASA DGIs will routinely seek local records, they accept regional and National-based record
keeping.
8.12.4 It was also considered that there was an element of unnecessary duplication in having to
retain the certificate as the employer was already maintaining an up to date record per 92.145(2).
It was acknowledged that for some very large organisations retaining both a record and the
certificate was an additional burden, especially in storing these certificates. It was considered to
be appropriate to introduce additional flexibility for employers by removing the obligation to
hold and provide a certificate, where a certificate had been issued.
8.12.5 It was also considered appropriate to amend 92.145(2)(b) to include providing a copy of
the training record to CASA, if CASA so requested.
Outcome:
8.12.6 It is proposed to remove from CASR 92.145(3)(a) the requirement for employers to
retain a copy of the certificate and to include the term “other appropriate record of DG training”
in paragraph 92.145(3)(b).
8.13
Exempt Sling Load helicopter operators from DG training
8.13.1 An operator who exercises the provisions of CASR 92.170 – the carriage of DG in a
sling load, sought clarification as to whether Group A training was required when accepting DG
for carriage in the sling, and if so, whether they could be exempted from the training requirement.
8.13.2 It was considered that the current regulations required Group A training, but that was an
onerous requirement when taking into account the nature of the risks presents and the hazards
faced when carrying DG.
8.13.3 The Part 92 PIR WG considered that Group C training was an appropriate level of
training for persons involved in accepting the goods for carriage, and subsequent loading, in an
under-slung load.
Outcome:
8.13.4 To amend CASR 92.170 to also exempt Subpart 92.C and add the requirement that the
person supervising the loading of the sling has undertaken Group C training.
8.14
DG able to be carried by passengers - Remove the Note in 92.030 and refer
instead to the CASA website or an Advisory Circular Discussion Points
8.14.1 It was observed that the note in 92-030 was a mechanism to provide, in legislation, the
“current” provisions for DG able to be carried by passengers and crew. This note had been
unamended since publication in 2004. Alternative means were proposed and considered,
including:
•
Publication on the CASA website;
•
Publication in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP);
•
Publication as a MOS; and
•
Publication as an Advisory Circular.
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8.14.2 The purpose of publication was regarded as being necessary on to principle counts – to
assist operators in advising the travelling public of the DG that could be carried by those
passengers; and to provide an easily maintainable mechanism to “publish” the provisions, set out
by ICAO, in Part 8 of the ICAO Tis, for the purposes of compliance and enforcement.
8.14.3 The WG were also familiar with the differences in presentation between the wordy
presentation of ICAO TI Part 8 and the table-formatted, operator-centric version contained in
Table 2.3A of the IATA DGRs; noting that neither were optimal for educating passengers.
8.14.4 The WG observed that the CASA website was a preferred resource for travelling
passengers, as public expectation was that the information was to be reliable and trusted.
Passengers travelling on multiple airlines would also prefer to refer to one site.
Outcome:
8.14.5 It is recommended that CASA produce an Advisory Circular that replicates the material
in ICAO Tis Part 8, relating to the provisions for dangerous goods carried by passengers and
crew. The AC should also contain simplified guidance to passengers; with the material being
available on the CASA website.
8.15
Repeal CAR 304 and provide a similar regulation in Part 92
8.15.1
It was identified that CAR 304 provides:
304 Directions and instructions — section 23 of the Act
(1) CASA may give or issue directions or instructions to all or any of the persons holding
permissions under section 23 of the Act, being directions or instructions with respect to matters
affecting the safe navigation and operation, or the maintenance, of aircraft.
(2) A person must not contravene a direction or instruction.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
(3) An offence against subregulation (2) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
8.15.2 It is appropriate that the provision of CAR 304 be removed from CAR 1988 and
replaced with an equivalent provision in Part 92.
Outcome
8.15.3
It is proposed that CAR 304 be repealed and a similar regulation be provided in Part 92.
8.16
Add subsection 23(2AA) to regulations 92.025, 92.030 and 92.035.
8.16.1 Subsequent to the making of Part 92, Section 23 of the Act was amended with the
addition of subsection s.23(2AA) which provided for being negligent when carrying or
consigning dangerous goods. The subordinate regulations were not updated at the time.
Outcome
8.16.2 It is proposed that regulations 92.025, 92.030 and 92.035 be amended to provide for
subsection 23(2AA) of the Civil Aviation Act.
8.17
Amend Note 2 to Definition of Technical Instructions to reflect compliance
with the current edition of the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations
8.17.1 Note 2 to the definition of “Technical Instructions” in CASR 92.010 reflects the general
industry practice of using and relying upon the IATA DGRs. The note was originally included at
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the request of the aviation DG industry in order to provide a degree of comfort in continuing to
use the IATA DGRs as the commonplace, standard text. There have been occasional slight and
unintentional differences where the IATA DGRs have been less restrictive than the ICAO Tis; the
operational experience has been of proactive rectification by IATA when these differences have
been detected and brought to attention.
8.17.2 It was put forward by one contributor that the current wording of the note did not
stipulate that the current, amended version of the IATA DGRs should be used.
Outcome
8.17.3 It is proposed to amend Note 2 to the definition of “Technical Instructions” so that the
last two sentences read:
“The requirements of the IATA Regulations are either the same as, or more stringent than, the
requirements of the Technical Instructions. If that is so, compliance with the current, amended,
edition of the IATA Regulations will automatically result in compliance with the Technical
Instructions”.
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9.
Proposals or requests – unnecessary as the current
legislation is adequate or for which clarification may be
via an Advisory Circular
9.1
This Section contains those issues and concerns which were considered to be of a nature
where the current legislation was adequate or concerns that were of an individual interpretative
approach that was not necessarily consistent throughout the industry. In some cases, publication
of the desired standard in an AC would suffice. For completeness of the Review process, they
have been summarised and provided below. Unless there is commentary from the industry, there
will be no further action on these issues other than clarification in an AC will either only be
explained in an AC or in the body of this report.
9.2
Offshore employees and training in the DG manual
9.2.1
A number of submissions suggested that CASR 92.055(5) imposes a requirement for
offshore deemed employees to be trained in the requirements of the operator’s DG manual.
9.2.2
Offshore employees are not required to be trained in the operator’s DG manual; they are
“required to be made aware of the contents of the operator’s dangerous goods manual so far as it
is applicable and relevant to the employee’s duties before the employee first performs those
duties”. There are a variety of methods to achieve this awareness, of which training is just one
option.
Outcome:
9.2.3
The relationship between offshore employees (including deemed employees) and the
operator’s DG manual, will be clarified in AC 92A-01.
9.3
Do load planners of a “will not carry DG” operator have to undertake DG
training?
9.3.1
There was concern that a load planner of a “Will not carry DG” operator is not required
to do DG training and the perception that this does not align with ICAO.
9.3.2
The Working Group view was that a load planner of a “will-not carry DG” operation
should still do the syllabus items of
•
general philosophy;
•
limitations;
•
marking & labeling;
•
recognition of undeclared DG;
•
passenger provisions; and
•
emergency procedures.
9.3.3
The group also considered the broad interpretation & application of term “load planner”
in ICAO vs. its narrow application in Australia, where load planners are often located remote
from the actual site and do not see the load.
9.3.4
An ICAO-termed load-planner, of a will-not-carry operator, who does see the load and is
involved in loading/stowage etc., would be considered to fall into the category of a ramp leading
hand or pit crew leader in Australia. The employee would therefore be required to undertake a
Group E course.
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9.3.5
The considered view is that DG training is required; and that the training requirement is
aligned with the ICAO TIs.
Outcome:
9.3.6
The scenario of load planners of a “will not carry DG operator” will be incorporated into
the next iteration of AC 92-01.
9.4
Can operators hired by Law Enforcement Authorities use CASR 92.160?
9.4.1
CASR 92.160 states that the aircraft is to be operated by the Law Enforcement
Authority. A recurring question is whether this Regulation would include or permit wet lease or
charter by the Law Enforcement Authority (LEA).
9.4.2
The relief afforded to LEAs via 92.160 is in recognition that they operate their own
aircraft and carry their own personnel. The primary responsibility for conducting the risk
assessment, particularly in the domain of para-military policing operations, rests with the relevant
LEA.
9.4.3
If the aircraft (and crew) is being chartered by the LEA – then the activity is being
conducted under another organisation’s AOC. In these cases, the intent was, and will continue to
be, that the operator will need to apply for permission to carry those forbidden, and other
dangerous goods, which do not comply with the ICAO TIs. These requests should continue to be
assessed case-by-case and on the merits of each case, where consideration also needs to be made
of the operator risks; the need for a DG manual, training, periodic review and emergency
procedures.
Outcome:
9.4.4
This has been clarified in AC92A-01 and will be further clarified in a proposed advisory
circular – AC 92D-01.
9.5
Does Mishandled baggage require a statement that the contents are not
dangerous?
9.5.1
It was suggested to the Working Group that CASR 92.070 – Statement of Contents does not exempt mishandled baggage from the provisions regarding the making of a Statement of
Contents.
9.5.2
The regulation specifies that it is baggage which “is to be carried on” – which is broader
than “is carried”. The intentions in the initial drafting of Part 92 was that mishandled baggage
was not subject to Statement of Content Provisions, this is consistent with the ICAO TIs and the
Working Group still believe this is the case.
Outcome:
9.5.3
The matter will be considered for proposed advisory circulars on both DG carried by
passengers and Statement of Contents.
9.6
Require a NOTOC for every flight – even if there are no DG on board
9.6.1
If DG are to be carried on an aircraft, then a NOTOC is issued to the pilot in command.
The NOTOC is a mechanism advising of the goods on board, the nature of the risk and the
procedures to be adopted in the event of various emergency scenarios. There have been occasions
where a NOTOC has been prepared but gone astray and the pilot is not aware of the DG that are
on board. The mechanism of a “nil NOTOC” aims to curtail this fail-unsafe scenario of DG being
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stowed on an aircraft and the pilot not being handed a NOTOC. By issuing a NOTOC for each
and every flight, and in the majority of flights, it will be a “Nil NOTOC” the scenario should not
arise.
9.6.2
Some operators already employ a “nil NOTOC” process in their day-to-day operation.
9.6.3
The Working Group viewed the practice of “nil NOTOC” as being an operator decision.
The need to mandate this approach is not supported up by DG incident data. Often is it systemic
failures which lead to DGs not being off-loaded from an aircraft at a transit point.
9.6.4
The application of a nil-NOTOC arrangement needs to be commensurate with the size of
the operation and should be a recommendation, not a legislative requirement.
Outcome:
9.6.5
The concept recommending a nil-NOTOC has been articulated in AC 92A-01.
9.7
Amend employee DG groupings to reflect the ICAO categories of
employees
9.7.1
It was suggested that the employee DG training Groups of A through to F, in Part 92
should be changed to reflect the ICAO employee training categories of 1 through to 16. The
Australian Groupings were introduced in Part 92 in January 2004 and were constructed in a
manner that was consistent with the ICAO groupings at that time.
Outcome:
9.7.2
The corresponding equivalencies between ICAO and Australian employee groupings
have been explained in AC 92A-01.
9.8
Point of cargo/DG acceptance
9.8.1
One commentator observed that CASR 92.010 defined “Accept” as , “used in relation to
a package or consignment, has the same meaning as in the technical instructions” but that the TIs
did not define the word “accept”. He also observed that “Acceptance” is referenced, but not
defined, in the ICAO TIs in Chapter 7-1-1. He also observed that “Accept” is not addressed in the
Orange Book of definitions.
9.8.2
A number of other respondents enquired into at what point is cargo actually accepted?
•
When it was collected by a pick-up driver?
•
When the driver returned to the depot and the consignment was put through the
cubing/weighing system and allocated to a ULD/aircraft?
•
When the DG was subjected to an acceptance checklist and passed?
•
When the cargo/DG was recorded on the cargo manifest?
•
When the cargo/ULD had left the freight shed and was loaded on to the aircraft?
9.8.3
Many of the queries around the point of acceptance were generated by DG Incident
reporting obligations.
9.8.4
The WG noted that whilst “Accept” is not explicitly defined in the ICAO TIs; in respect
of dangerous goods, what is relevant is the actions to be taken prior to an operator being able to
accept a package, which are set out at Part 7; Chapter 1.paragraph 3.1. ICAO Annex 18; 8;8.1
also contains a succinct requirement.
9.8.5
The WG considered that an employee has not accepted the package until they had
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performed “acceptance checks” If accept and acceptance remained undefined, then it would take
an ordinary dictionary meaning. The WG reluctant to impose an arbitrary acceptance point on the
operator/forwarder as many forwarders, operators and GHAs had already established within their
business models, the point at which acceptance of cargo took place and that the appropriately
trained (often Group B employees) were positioned and fulfilling their role..
9.8.6
CASR 92.065(3) refers to DG Incidents – however, there were questions to the working
group about the definition of “accepted” and at what point is an item considered to have been
accepted into the air transport system. Some correspondents felt that the concept is not adequately
defined and it is therefore unclear in some circumstances whether a DG incident report was
required. The operator is not required to report a DG incident where the goods have not been
accepted for carriage by air; there was also a view that the common dictionary definition of
“accepted” was not adequate.
9.8.7
The Working Group considered that the value in DG incident reporting lay in:
•
trend monitoring and the potential to prevent recurrences;
•
the point of “acceptance” in a DG incident was irrelevant;
•
that the purpose of reporting is outlined in ICAO Annex 18;
° is to prevent recurrence; and
° that DG incident reports should not be used for punitive purposes.
9.8.8
The approach adopted by CASA DG Inspectors in any response to a DG incident report,
is based on a philosophy of using the incident for aviation safety education and systemic
improvement.
9.8.9
Because the operator is compelled to report the incident, it is generally considered
inappropriate to adopt a punitive approach. The preference is for the operator to examine the root
causes and latent failures that led to the incident occurring. Where the operator does not rectify
the systemic deficiencies and suffers recurring incidents of a similar causal nature, then stronger
enforcement options are more likely to be considered.
9.8.10 The working group preferred such reports to be made where a deliberate intent was
present and evident prior to the goods being accepted. There was also value in reporting preacceptance items so that the focus can be put into improving safety education and safety defenses.
There was a need to strike balance so that sufficient incidents are reported to enable trend
monitoring.
Outcome:
9.8.11 It is recommended that CASA clarify the requirement and the desirability of making DG
Incident reports, in a purpose-developed advisory circular on DG Incidents.
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9.9
Clarify the difference
Operations” in CASR 92.175
between
“private
operators”
and
“Private
Note: This issue arose through a belief that CASR 92.175 was able to be used by operators
who were conducting private operations. The terminology is now in conflict with Part
91 and so this provision will need to be made consistent with the new regulations.
http://casa.gov.au/newrules/parts/091/download/casr91_consultdraft.pdf. Please note
the concept of ‘Private’ does not feature in these regulations at all. Operations under
Part 91 rules only (i.e. excluding any of the suites of air transport or aerial work or
flight training rules that are additional to Part 91) is the closest thing in the new suite of
CASRs to the delineation of the concept described as “Private” in Part 92.
9.9.1
The concept for Regulation 92.175 was originally for private pilots going away for the
weekend; not for commercial operators carrying DG for company purposes. It was suggested that
a definition be added to CASR 92.010 about private (non-commercial) operators.
9.9.2
The other consideration was private operators where the company did not hold an AOC
and which used its own aircraft to transport its own employees and goods. For these operators,
exercising the provisions of CASR 92.175, no DG manual is required, neither is DG training, and
the limitation on no more than ten seats was taken from a classification of operations policy that
was in place in 2003.
9.9.3
It was also suggested that the PIR needed to consider the aircraft owner, who might be
leasing/hiring the aircraft to a private pilot for a private operation.
9.9.4
If a commercial operator has DG manual, procedures and training for day-to-day
operations/activities then any “private” activities must in accordance with those manuals and
procedures.
9.9.5
A corresponding view was that the commercial operator either carries DG and has a DG
manual, trained employees and acceptance processes; or the operator does not carry DG. If the
operator wishes to only carry DG on flights where it does not carry passengers, then that is a
policy decision which should be expressed in the company DG manual. The emphasis in the
regulation is on private “operator”; not private “operations”.
9.9.6
If a flying club or other organisation/individual wishes to hire its aircraft to a pilot, and
that pilot will be undertaking private activities and is likely to avail themselves of the provisions
of CASR 92.175, then that is an arrangement between the hirer and the owner. The onus is on the
owner to ensure that the rental agreement stipulates any requirements or limitations in respect of
dangerous goods.
Outcome:
9.9.7
An outline of the current relevant matters in CASR 92.175 has been clarified in AC
92A-01. The material will be further amplified in an AC on Subpart 92D.
9.9.8
As Part 91 is settled and comes into force, there will be a further review of CASR
92.175.
9.10
Define “Strong Outer Packagings
9.10.1 Some entries in the ICAO TIs call for “Strong Outer Packagings”. Whilst the term is not
defined, the packagings should be sturdy, robust and strong enough to withstand the normal
rigors encountered in air transport. This includes variations in temperature and pressure, exposure
to vibration, moisture and the impacts that are encountered in normal manual handling, including
dragging, sliding, throwing and dropping.
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9.10.2 Some guidance for consideration of the suitability of outer packaging to be deemed as
“strong outer packaging” and conforming to various parts of the ICAO Technical Instructions are
where the completed package should be capable of withstanding, without breakage or leakage of
any inner packaging and without significant reduction in effectiveness:
•
the following free drops onto a rigid, non-resilient, flat and horizontal surface from a
height of 1.8 m:
° one drop flat on the bottom;
° one drop flat on the top;
° one drop flat on the long side;
° one drop flat on the short side; and
° one drop on a corner at the junction of three intersecting edges;
•
a force applied to the top surface for a duration of 24 hours, equivalent to the total
weight of identical packages if stacked to a height of 3 m (including the test sample).
Note: Operators should not undertake this test on a completed package which has been
presented for transport as it may contain delicate machinery or other fragile cargo. The
guidance is provided more as an objective guide for the shipper and a subjective
assessment criteria for the operator/forwarder.
Outcome:
9.10.3
Guidance material on “Strong Outer Packagings” has been provided in AC 92A-01.
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10.
Residual Issues
10.1.1 These suggestions and comments were considered and for which it was decided that
there should be no further action other than noting or an explanation in the Review Paper. The
majority of the residual issues are:
•
common practices;
•
clarification of the subject matter and for which explanation is not required in guidance
material; or
•
the recording of the issue raised and the disposition of the matter.
10.2
CASR 92.070(4) –the provision of information by check-in staff members
10.2.1 One contributor suggested that 92.070(4)(b) “the cargo is checked baggage that is to be
carried on the same aircraft as the person who checked the baggage” was ambiguous and could
be interpreted as the cargo being checked baggage that is to be consigned on the same aircraft as
the “airline employee” who checked (inspected) the baggage. It was suggested that “the person”
in 92.070(4)(b) should be clarified as the passenger and not the check-in staff member.
10.2.2 The working group noted that the antecedent for “the Person” in 92.070(4)(b) is “a
person” cited in 92.070(1), which would be the passenger. Furthermore, for the suggested
ambiguity to stand, it also requires differing interpretations to the two occasions that “checked” is
used in 92.070(4)(b).
Outcome:
10.2.3
No further action required.
10.3
items
Statement of Contents – applicability to a Collection of Statement-Exempt
10.3.1 The question was asked that where an item of cargo is something which is comprised of
a collection of exempted items, for example boxes and bags of letters and other small parcels
which are exempt from the Statement of Content provision, then is that collection of exempt
items also exempt from the Statement of Content provisions?
10.3.2 The Working Group considered that a collection of exempt items is not in itself exempt
from the Statement of Contents requirements of CASR 92.075(1)(b); which specifies describing
the contents of the cargo. It was suggested that a description similar to “postal articles not subject
to Statement of Content requirements” would suffice.
Outcome:
10.3.3
No further action required.
10.4
Narrow the range of Shipper’s employees requiring DG Training
10.4.1 It was suggested that employees who only performed a small role in the shipping of DG
by air, should not be required to undertake DG training.
10.4.2 Part 92 currently requires that an employee of a shipper of goods, whose duties include
packing dangerous goods, or supervising someone else whose duties include packing dangerous
goods, in the course of the goods being consigned for transport on an aircraft, must complete an
approved course. A person is taken to pack dangerous goods if he or she does any of the
following in relation to the goods:
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•
enclosing the goods in packaging; or
•
marking or labelling the package or consignment; or
•
preparing a dangerous goods transport document for the consignment.
10.4.3 It was suggested that training for shippers of dangerous goods should be broken down
into two categories; those who perform all the activities and those who undertake only limited
parts of the process of shipping DGs.
10.4.4 There are commercial organisations which will take another company’s or individual’s
DG and carry out the whole process of identifying, declaring, packing, marking, labeling and
consigning DGs. For employees of these commercial organisations, it is appropriate that they
undertake a full course.
10.4.5 There are also companies that receive, or manufacture goods wholesale and then prepare
retail sized consignments of various DG and non-DG products. Some employees sole function is
to pick those stock items from the shelves, whilst another employee packs them in packaging and
a third employee who prints a computer generated shippers declaration, whilst a fourth employee
applies the hazard labels and other markings. It was suggested that it was unduly onerous for
these employees to be undertaking a 3 day training course for employees of a shipper of
dangerous goods and that they ought to be undertaking a more relevant DG course.
10.4.6 The Working Group was of the view that structured and functionally specific DG
courses can already be developed under existing provisions and that this should be articulated in
an AC. The WG also considered that if the MOS concept is not accepted, then provision could be
considered for employees working for ISO 9001 accredited organisations that package and ship
DG Alternatively, if the MOS concept is accepted, then the MOS would be the appropriate
vehicle for clarifying the necessary standard for such courses.
Outcome:
10.4.7 Proper training is necessary in the transportation of DG by Air. The current provisions
allow sufficient flexibility and development of appropriate courses.
10.5
Freight forwarder who packs dry ice. What category of employee are they?
10.5.1 If the forwarder is packing dry ice into a container, then they are performing the role of a
Group F employee (i.e. an employee of a shipper) and will need to have undertaken the
appropriate course.
Outcome:
10.5.2
No further action required.
10.6
Assessment by Australian operator of foreign DG training
10.6.1 Some contributors contended that for Australian operators with foreign-based
employees, there is a belief that the operator must conduct an assessment in accordance with
CASR 92.130(4) – It was suggested that it was onerous upon operators to have to assess all
foreign training courses every two years.
10.6.2 The Working Group noted that the regulation requires an “evaluation of training” and
that the “evaluation process to be included in operator’s audit program.
10.6.3 It was considered that the current wording does not mandate an audit of every foreign
course every two years, but encourages a risk based approach to validating the training that
employees and agents receive from their overseas training. For example, courses from countries
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with low levels of regulatory oversight of DG training should be subjected to a more in-depth
evaluation of the training. States with higher trigger levels of non-compliance with operator
Procedures or originating DG incidents should also trigger greater in-depth evaluation. If the
same training provider is being used two years later – then a much less detailed evaluation would
be necessary and may be limited to verifying that the course and instructor continue to be
approved.
Outcome:
10.6.4 A clarification of assessment of foreign DG training will be provided in an Advisory
Circular.
10.7
Training - Require evidence that a test has been conducted and for the
test to be made available to CASA
10.7.1 It was suggested that CASR 92.145 did not reflect the requirements in the ICAO TIs at
Part 1 Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.5 e) regarding training records – i.e. evidence that a test has been
satisfactorily completed and for the test to be made available to appropriate national authority.
10.7.2 The Working Group noted that CASR 92.135(3) already requires provision of a test. It
also noted that currently, most training organisations retain these tests and make them available to
CASA inspectors upon request. This usually occurs during scheduled system-based audits of the
training organisations and when following-up upon suspicions of training certificates having been
unlawfully altered or forged. They are also often requested by CASA DG Inspectors when
investigating the circumstances of a DG Incident.
Outcome:
10.7.3
CASR 92.135(3) is consistent with ICAO TIs. No further action required.
10.8
Do DG Training Certificates Have to be Issued?
10.8.1 There was an interpretation that 92.135(5) is a requirement to issue DG training
certificates; with the observation that for companies with thousands of employees, this is an
unnecessary, cumbersome and onerous regulation, especially when there is low staff turn-over, It
was suggested that the regulation should be modified to just provide for the issuance of a
certificate on demand.
10.8.2 It was noted and known that some large organisations did not issue a certificate for
completion of DG training and the training was provided annually and embedded within the
operator’s CAO 20.11 training program.
10.8.3 The Working Group noted that AC 92-02(0) at paragraph 12.2 clarifies that provision
should be made for the certificate to be provided if the employee ceases employment, which
would also indicate that the intent at the time of formulating 92.135, was that certificates did not
have to be issued when training was completed, but that the training provider must be able to
provide for the certificate to be issued.
Outcome:
10.8.4 DG training certificates do not have to be issued when the training is completed, but that
the training provider must be able to provide for the certificate to be issued.
10.9
What is the definition of Cargo and how does it apply to CASR Part 92?
10.9.1
The difficulties to this issue lay in the interpretation of the term “Baggage” and whether
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or not baggage constituted “cargo”. The definition becomes more pertinent when taken in the
context of an Operators DG manual, which is inferred as requiring that the Operator’s DG manual
is to be kept wherever passengers’ bags are checked in.
10.9.2 CASR 92.085 contains a definition, which is a clarification that for the purposes of DG
training, that “Cargo does not include carry-on or checked baggage”. This definition does not
apply in respect of CASR 92.040-92.055.
10.9.3 The CASR Dictionary defines “cargo means things other than persons carried in an
aircraft.”
10.9.4 The ICAO TIs defines Cargo as “for the purposes of these instructions, any property
carried on an aircraft, other than mail and accompanied or mishandled baggage.”
10.9.5 The result is that Part 92 is more restrictive that ICAO, in that a DG manual is required
at places where passenger’s bags are accepted.
10.9.6 If the proposal to permit controlled extracts of the DG manual to be made available is
accepted, then it is considered that a definition of “baggage not being cargo” for the purposes of
Part 92, and therefore not requiring the DG manual to be made available to persons who accept or
screen passengers’ bags will no longer be an issue.
10.9.7 Should controlled extracts not be permitted, then the appropriateness of defining cargo,
for the purposes of Part 92 as having the same meaning as the definition in the ICAO TIs would
be recommended.
10.10
Amend “aviation turbine fuel” in CASR 92.185
10.10.1 One proposal was to amend CASR 92.185(b) to reflect the proper shipping name “fuel
aviation turbine”, as it appears in the ICAO TIs, rather than the current “Aviation turbine fuel” as
it is worded in CASR 92.185. It was inferred that with the incorrect layout of the Proper Shipping
Name, that there might be confusion for operators when looking up “Aviation turbine fuel”.
10.10.2 Whilst the current wording is not how it appears in the ICAO TIs;, it was considered that
some readers would prefer the plain English flow of “aviation turbine fuel” and will be reluctant
to change to “fuel aviation turbine” as per the DG list.
10.10.3 The working group also noted that the nomenclature of “Aviation Turbine Fuel” in the
Regulation is not inconsistent with the ICAO TIs at Part 3, section 1.2.2.
“When qualifying words are used as part of the proper shipping name, their sequence on
documentation or package markings is optional, For instance, “Dimethylamine Solution” may
alternatively be shown as “Solution of Dimethlamine”. However, the entry…. …. reflects the
preferred sequence”.
10.10.4 Furthermore, CASR 92.185(b) also includes the UN Number, which will assist operators
in locating the item in the DG list and therefore any confusion will be short-lived.
Outcome:
10.10.5 No further action required.
10.11
Clarify pressurisation status
10.11.1 Some clarification was sought in respect of CASRs 92.175 & 92.190 and whether
“unpressurised” as a status meant that the aircraft was fitted with pressurisation equipment but
not turned on or the aircraft was not equipped with pressurisation capability).
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10.11.2 Whilst the matter may still require legal clarification, the working group was of the view
that both scenarios were equally valid and that the prime consideration should be given to the
risks presented by the hazardous properties of the DG being carried and the increased potential
for failure of the packaging as the pressure differential between the internal package and the
external environment of the cabin or cargo hold increased.
10.11.3 One consideration of a difference is in respect of the capability of the aircraft to reach an
altitude where pressure differential between the internal contents of the DG package and the
cabin were likely to result in significantly increased stress upon the package.
10.11.4 Liquid DG, properly packaged, should be in inner containers which are capable of
retaining their contents with a pressure differential of 95 kPa, which approximates to altitude of
40,000”.
10.11.5 For example, an aircraft, not equipped with pressurisation systems and which can only
operate in the vicinity of 10,000 feet or below, then paint tins are unlikely to lose their lids and
spill their contents (notwithstanding the container ought to be able to withstand a 95 kPa pressure
differential).
10.11.6 An aircraft that is capable of operating at much higher altitudes and which is equipped
with a pressurisation system, is more likely to experience a more significant failure of the
containers of DG when at higher altitude and with the pressurisation equipment turned off.
10.11.7 In this context, it was considered irrelevant as to whether pressurisation equipment is
“not fitted” or “fitted but turned off”. What is relevant is the pressure differential between the
internal package pressure and the cabin/cargo hold and that if an aircraft with a pressurisation
system operates at a lower altitude with the pressurisation system not activated, then the risk of
the DG occurrence will be equal.
Outcome:
10.11.8 No further action required, although this information may be replicated in an AC at a
later date.
10.12
Is CASA approval of e-Documents required?
10.12.1 The question was asked whether CASA approval of e-documents, relating to the carriage
and consignment of cargo and dangerous goods was required.
10.12.2 The working group was of the view that this was already captured under the ICAO TIs
which already includes e-documents and therefore no change to Part 92 was required.
Outcome:
10.12.3 No further action required.
10.13
Provision of notices in baggage collection areas
10.13.1 The observation was made that airline operators are not required to provide information
in respect of dangerous goods at baggage collection areas, whereas terminal operators are
compelled to. CASR 92.200(2) requires terminal operators to prominently display DG
information at baggage collection areas; this is not captured by an air transport operator at
terminals under 92.025(2)(xv). The question was raised as to whether the requirement should be
made consistent.
10.13.2 It was noted that the ICAO TIs used to require operators to display notices/information
in baggage collection areas, but no longer does so. It was also noted that the requirement is
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mentioned in the ICAO SUPP and IATA DGRs. Furthermore, operators that specify that they
will operate in compliance with the IATA DGRs, are also required to comply with displaying
signage in baggage collection areas. Lastly it was also noted that most operators do display
signage in baggage collection areas, using the opportunity as another convenient means to
promote their corporate identity.
10.13.3 The Working Group was of the view that the matter should be referred back to ICAO to
re-include the requirement for the display of DG information in baggage collection areas.
Outcome:
10.13.4 CASA to formulate a working paper for presentation to the ICAO DG Panel.
10.14
Requirement to provide information with electronic tickets
10.14.1 One contributor sought guidance as to whether it was a requirement to provide DG
information with an electronic ticket, especially in view of technological developments such as
mobile phone check-in and an imminent move away from paper-based “tickets”.
10.14.2 The working group noted that referencing to tickets would automatically include
electronic versions and was necessary for the purposes of the Chicago Convention.
10.14.3 Current operator practices are to give information about tickets & to make a DG
challenge to passengers on check-in.
10.14.4 The CASA DG Inspectors had been involved in the development of new generation
ticketing and check-in systems and these still included the practice of ensuring a means to present
information about dangerous goods and to actively challenge the passenger on check-in.
Outcome:
10.14.5 No further action required.
10.15 The Cost and difficulty in obtaining the ICAO TIs and their position as
“legislation”
10.15.1 Several contributors referred to the cost of purchasing the ICAO TIs and the IATA
DGRs. It was suggested that if the TIs are “legislation” then they should be easily and freely
accessible.
10.15.2 This matter is being considered by the ICAO DGP and the Australian representative will
continue to press for the TIs to be made available in a form that reflects reasonable access that
accords with their legislative status. A similar standpoint is being taken by a number of other
representatives. A number of issues for ICAO include the fees to be paid by States which would
address the production costs as well as ensuring an equitable approach for all States.
10.15.3 CASA will continue to be involved in ICAO DGP deliberations and to present the
argument that as the TIs are widely adopted internationally as legislation and therefore should be
easily and affordably accessible.
Outcome:
10.15.4 It is proposed that CASA will continue with the current position and representations.
10.16 Define the ICAO “Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents
involving Dangerous Goods” in CASR 92.010
10.16.1 The suggestion was made that the term “Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft
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Incidents involving Dangerous Goods” (ERG) should be defined in CASR 92.010. The ERG
relates to an ICAO document and already appears in Part 92 as part of a definition under CASR
92.170(1).
10.16.2 Given that the only appearance of the ERG is at CASR 92.170 then defining the term or
document elsewhere in Part 92 is neither required nor warranted.
Outcome:
10.16.3 No further action required.
10.17 Define “Readily Accessible” in the context of employee access to the
operator’s DG manual
10.17.1 The Working Group considered that “readily accessible” was a term that was already
adequately defined by its dictionary definitions. The employee’s access to the operator’s DG
manual did not need to be “immediately accessible”; however, it should not be just “accessible”.
That is, when making an objective assessment as to the accessibility of the manual, if it was in a
nearby supervisor’s office, then it was “readily accessible”
10.17.2 If the supervisor’s office was locked; then it was not readily accessible. If the manual
was in a terminal building on the other side of the airport, then it too was no longer accessible. If
it could be accessed via the company’s intranet system, by the employee, at their work location,
then it was still readily accessible; but if the intranet linkage was down, then it was no longer
“readily accessible”.
Outcome:
10.17.3 The WG considered that normal dictionary meanings of “readily accessible” are suitably
adequate and provide an appropriate degree of flexibility to the operator.
10.18 Add UN Numbers and Proper Shipping Names to the items that are
provided for carriage by passengers and crew
10.18.1 The ICAO TIs make provisions for certain DGs to be carried by passengers and crew.
This information is reproduced at CASR 92.030 Note 2. It was suggested that this note be
amended to include the UN numbers & proper shipping names (PSN) in order to better identify
the DGs that can be carried by passengers and crew.
10.18.2 The Working Group observed that the information in Note 2 is a direct reprint of Part 8
of the ICAO TIs and that the preference was to keep the information as a direct reprint. They also
observed that adding UN numbers and PSNs would not assist the lay-person or passenger in
identifying the DGs that they could, or could not, carry.
Outcome:
10.18.3 No further action required.
10.19 Clarify “forbidden under any circumstance” and “forbidden unless
exempt”
10.19.1 There was confusion detected in a number of training organisations, instructors and
operators as to the several different types of “forbidden” in the ICAO TIs and the connection
between a “Permission” under s.23 of the Act and an approval or Exemption under the ICAO TIs.
10.19.2 The correlations have now been articulated in AC 92A-01.
10.19.3 Permissions issued under s.23 of the Act are now reflecting their constitution as an
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Approval or Exemption and whether Australia is the State of Origin, operator, Destination,
Transit and/or Overflight.
Outcome:
10.19.4 No further action required.
10.20 Clarify mishandled baggage, unaccompanied baggage and Excess
Baggage as Cargo
10.20.1 Where the passenger presents at the airport, with their baggage, and intending to fly,
they are permitted to take certain items of DG in accordance with Part 8 of the TIs. If the
passenger’s baggage is mishandled or goes astray in transit, then these items of DG do not need
to be removed.
10.20.2 If the passenger sends their baggage ahead of their flight, then it must be sent as cargo
(unaccompanied baggage) and they cannot send those DG items inside their unaccompanied
baggage.
10.20.3 With the increase in low-cost carriers and the penalty rates that are levied for excess
baggage a number of service providers are offering an “excess baggage as cargo” service. The
question has arisen as to whether the DG items permitted in passengers and crew’ normal
baggage, apply in the case of “excess baggage as cargo”.
10.20.4 Providing the passenger has attended at the airport intending to fly that day with their
baggage, the service provider may take the excess baggage, including the normal DG items
contained inside the baggage, and forward it as “excess baggage as cargo”. The service provider
is still required to have DG training, display prominent signage and comply with the operator
Approval provisions for those DG items which require the approval of the operator.
Outcome:
10.20.5 The terms and expected standards of compliance for mishandled baggage,
unaccompanied baggage and excess baggage as cargo, may be articulated in a future Advisory
Circular.
10.21 Define “Flight Crew” in CASR Part 92 to have the same meaning as in the
CARs (or Part 91)
10.21.1 One request was for a change to CASR 92.085 to include a definition for “flight crew”
and to define the term as having the same meaning as the CARs. The concern was that flight crew
should include cabin crew and other personnel associated with the operation of the aircraft in
flight. The working group also considered the suggestion in light of Part 91, as the update to the
CARs, containing a definition for flight crew.
10.21.2 CASR 92.085 differentiates between the roles of flight crew (Employees with Group C
responsibilities) and Cabin Crew (Employees with Group D responsibilities) and the working
group therefore considered that a separate definition for flight crew was not required.
Outcome:
10.21.3 No further action required.
10.22
Passenger Reservation Staff required to be DG Trained?
10.22.1 Clarification was sought as to whether an operator’s passenger reservation employees,
whose duties include taking reservations from passengers and dealing with them, were required to
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undertake Group E DG training.
10.22.2 The Working Group considered that where the employees are likely to encounter
questions about special handling, including passenger’s oxygen, wheelchairs and other items that
require the approval of the operator, then they were essentially performing the necessary DG
functions in the handling of the passenger that would require DG training. If however, an
operator had dedicated staff to undertake these activities, and the general passenger reservation
staff were instructed to refer these enquiries to appropriate people, then DG training was not
necessary.
Outcome:
10.22.3 No further action required.
10.23
Additional suggested Definitions
10.23.1 One proponent suggested the inclusion of definitions of “Instructor”, “approved
Instructor” and “Close supervision”.
10.23.2 None of these terms appear in Part 92 and therefore definitions are unnecessary.
10.23.3 One contributor suggested that the WG should clarify references to “goods”, noting that
a number of regulations refer to dangerous goods and then subsequently within the regulation to
“goods”, yet there is no definition of “goods” either in the Regulations, the TIs or the Orange
Book.
10.23.4 By way of example - regulations 92.025, 92.030 and 92.035 refers to “dangerous goods”
and then “such goods” and “the goods”. The WG considered that the terms “such goods” and “the
goods” were adequately identifiable by the antecedent “dangerous goods”; and that no further
clarification was required.
10.23.5 It was suggested that there should be definitions for “consignor” and “consignment” as
the UN Orange book contained these definitions.
10.23.6 The WG noted that the ICAO TIs contained a different definition for “consignment” to
the UN Orange book and considered that Part 92 and the Australian industry practice was more
aligned with ICAO than the UN definition. Part 92 also appears to use the noun and verb forms of
“consignment”, which would preclude making a single definition. The preference was to have the
terminology separately reviewed for clarity and consistency.
10.23.7 Define “Commercial Operations” in CASR 92.010 and amend CASR 92.040-92.055 to
provide consistency between Foreign and Domestic Operations.
10.23.8 During the progress of the PIR, CASA was also undertaking a review of the
classification of various aircraft operations, and subsequently, the development and introduction
of Part 91.
10.23.9 The carriage of dangerous goods was considered to be an ancilliary activity when
reviewing the fundamental basis of classifying aircraft operations, and not directly related to the
overarching classification policy. Rather than continue to delay the PIR whilst Part 91 was
settled, it was decided by the WG to close this item and have it reviewed at a later stage; probably
as part of a PIR of Part 91.
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Part 92
Post Implementation Review
11.
Explanatory material
11.1
This Section contains a short summary of the guidance material that was in place at the
commencement of the Review, material which has been updated or generated during the course
of the review, as well as material that is proposed to be generated in the future.
11.2
ACs amended
11.2.1 During the progress of the Part 92 PIR process, one Advisory Circular – AC 92-01(0) –
Dangerous Goods Training – was updated in light of operational experience from CASA’s DG
Inspectors and was republished in August 2009. It was also enhanced in order to maintain a focus
on DG training for employees whilst material that related to dangerous goods courses and
instructors was removed.
11.3
ACs developed
11.3.1 During the progress of the Part 92 PIR, there were five new ACs which have been
produced:
•
AC 92-03(0) – Dangerous Goods Training Courses and Instructor Approvals. This
provided indicative guidance to DG course producers with an expansion on the syllabus
items and examples of what should e covered in a DG course for various types of
employees. This new AC also articulated the process and form of application to be
undertaken when developing and submitting a course. It was published in August 2009.
•
AC 92-04 – Dangerous Goods Permissions. The legislation and the articulation of
how to apply for a permission to carry dangerous goods in Australia, where those goods
are not packaged in accordance with the ICAO TIs. This AC was published in March
2010.
•
AC 92A-01 – The consignment and carriage of dangerous goods on all aircraft in
Australian territory and on Australian aircraft overseas. An overview of the
legislative framework and procedures. This Advisory Circular provides an overview of
the dangerous goods legislation in the aviation environment and its application in
Australia and was published in February 2011.
•
AC 92-05 – Use of Compressed Oxygen: Carriage of Live Aquatic Animals in Air
Transport was produced, based on an update of existing material in CAAP 262A-1, in
order to reflect contemporary practices and improvements. The AC was published in
May 2011.
•
AC 92-07 – Radioactive, Class 7; An Overview To Transport By Air In Australia
was produced to provide a general overview to the transport of radioactive materials and
how to obtain competent authority approval for radioactive packagings. The AC was
published in March 2013.
11.4
Orphan CAAPs
11.4.1 Civil Aviation Advisory Publications are advisory documents which are usually linked
to regulations from the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988. When the previous dangerous goods and
aerodrome licencing legislation was repealed, the information contained within the CAAPs was
not reviewed or maintained, yet continued to be referred to. Two pertinent CAAPS were:
•
CAAP 262A-1 – Use Of Compressed Oxygen: Carriage Of Live Aquatic Animals In
Air Transport; and
Part 92 PIR – V.3.2 – 230513
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Part 92
Post Implementation Review
•
CAAP 89I-1(2) – Safety Distances For Explosive Laden Aircraft.
11.4.2 CAAP 262A-1 has been reviewed and the content has been updated and made into AC
92-05. The CAAP has been cancelled.
11.4.3 CAAP 89I-1(2) has been similarly reviewed and cancelled and the material has been
updated and incorporated into AC 139-12.
11.5
Proposed Advisory Circulars
11.5.1 The following Advisory Circulars have been proposed and will be progressively
researched, developed, consulted upon and published between 2013 and 2016:
•
AC 92-06 – Dangerous Goods Incidents – Preparation, Management, Investigation And
Reporting
•
AC 92-08 –Dangerous Goods that may be carried by Passengers and Crew
•
AC 92-09 – UN specification packaging
•
AC 92-10 – Statement of Contents – Dangerous Goods
•
AC 92-11 – Operators that do Not Carry Dangerous Goods
•
AC 92-12 – Private Pilots and Dangerous Goods
•
AC 92D-01 – Subpart D
•
AC 93E-01 – Information by Travel agents
•
AC 92E-02 – Information by Terminal operators
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