THREE CAPES TRACK
FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
Prepared for
Parks & Wildlife Service, Tasmania
17th November 2011
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Front Cover photo: Cape Pillar (Photo provided by Tourism Tasmania and Joe Shemesh)
DOCUMENT TRACKING
I TEM
DETAI L
Project Name
Three Capes Track Fire Management Strategy & Emergency Response Plan
Project Number
11SGBBUS-0094
File location
G:\Synergy\Projects\11SGBBUS\11SGBBUS-0094 Three Capes Track Fire Management
Strategy\Report\Final Reports
Rod Rose
Prepared by
Nathan Kearnes
Julie Holden
Alastair Patton
Approved by
Rod Rose
Status
FINAL
Version Number
4
Last saved on
17th November 2011
This report should be cited as „Eco Logical Australia 2011. Three Capes Track Fire Management
Strategy & Emergency Response Plan. Prepared for Parks & Wildlife Service, Tasmania.‟
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This document has been prepared by Eco Logical Australia Pty Ltd with support from Parks & Wildlife
Service, Tasmania.
Disclaimer
This document may only be used for the purpose for which it was commissioned and in accordance with the contract between
Eco Logical Australia Pty Ltd and Parks & Wildlife Service, Tasmania. The scope of services was defined in consultation with
Parks & Wildlife Service, Tasmania, by time and budgetary constraints imposed by the client, and the availability of reports and
other data on the subject area. Changes to available information, legislation and schedules are made on an ongoing basis and
readers should obtain up to date information.
Eco Logical Australia Pty Ltd accepts no liability or responsibility whatsoever for or in respect of any use of or reliance u pon this
report and its supporting material by any third party. Information provided is not intended to be a substitute for site specific
assessment or legal advice in relation to any matter. Unauthorised use of this report in any form is prohibited.
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Contents
Contents ............................................................................................................................................. ii
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................... v
1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 9
1.1
Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................................. 9
1.2
Objectives ............................................................................................................................... 9
1.3
Overview of Approach ............................................................................................................. 9
1.4
Statutory Requirements ......................................................................................................... 12
2
Bushfire Behaviour Assessment ........................................................................................ 13
2.1
Methodology and Data Inputs ................................................................................................ 13
2.1.1
Terrain................................................................................................................................... 13
2.1.2
Vegetation and Fuel .............................................................................................................. 13
2.1.3
Climate and Weather ............................................................................................................. 15
2.2
Head Fire Intensity ................................................................................................................ 19
2.3
Head Fire Rate of Spread ...................................................................................................... 20
3
Bushfire Risk Assessment .................................................................................................. 20
3.1
Factors Which Affect the Chance of a Fire ............................................................................. 22
3.1.1
Fire Weather ......................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.2
The Fire Season .................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.3
Ignition Sources..................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.4
Fire History ............................................................................................................................ 22
3.1.5
Likelihood and Suppression ................................................................................................... 23
3.2
Three Capes Track Segmentation and Risk Analysis ............................................................. 28
3.2.1
Head Fire Intensity ................................................................................................................ 28
3.2.2
Head Fire Rate of Spread ...................................................................................................... 28
3.2.3
Track Walking Times to Refuge Area ..................................................................................... 29
3.3
Evacuation Priority Assessment ............................................................................................. 33
4
Fire Management Strategy .................................................................................................. 36
4.1
Fire Prevention ...................................................................................................................... 36
4.1.1
Ignition Risk........................................................................................................................... 36
4.1.2
Fire Detection ........................................................................................................................ 38
4.1.3
Enlarge PWS Response Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 38
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4.1.4
Prescribed Burning ................................................................................................................ 38
4.2
Fire Preparedness ................................................................................................................. 39
4.2.1
Fire Management Infrastructure ............................................................................................. 39
4.2.2
Training and Testing .............................................................................................................. 40
4.3
Management of the Bushfire Risk to Huts .............................................................................. 41
4.4
Management of the Bushfire Risk to 3CT Users ..................................................................... 41
4.4.1
Characteristics of the Bushfire Risk to 3CT Users .................................................................. 41
4.4.2
Pre-emptive Risk Reduction Measures by PWS ..................................................................... 42
4.4.3
Pre-emptive Risk Reduction by Track Users .......................................................................... 43
4.4.4
Walker Restrictions to Lower Risk .......................................................................................... 44
4.5
Fire Response Principles ....................................................................................................... 44
4.6
Evacuation Concepts and Principles ...................................................................................... 45
4.6.1
Bushfire Evacuation............................................................................................................... 45
4.6.1.1 Off-site Evacuation ................................................................................................................ 45
4.6.1.2 On-site Refuge areas............................................................................................................. 45
4.6.1.3 Emergency Only Refuges ...................................................................................................... 50
4.6.1.4 Evacuation Prioritisation ........................................................................................................ 51
5
Emergency Response Plan ................................................................................................. 52
5.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 52
5.2
How to use the ERP .............................................................................................................. 52
5.3
Legislative Responsibilities .................................................................................................... 53
5.4
Emergency Management Principles ....................................................................................... 53
5.5
BUSHFIRE: Preparedness actions ........................................................................................ 54
5.5.1
3CT Duty Officer.................................................................................................................... 55
5.5.2
3CT Hut Ranger .................................................................................................................... 62
5.6
BUSHFIRE: Incident Response Plan ..................................................................................... 66
5.7
Severe Weather Warning: Preparedness ACTIONS............................................................... 70
5.7.1
3CT Duty Officer.................................................................................................................... 70
5.7.2
3CT Hut Ranger .................................................................................................................... 72
5.8
SEVERE WEATHER: Incident Response Plan....................................................................... 74
5.9
WALKER INJURY: Incident Response Plan ........................................................................... 76
5.10
HUT FIRE: Incident Response Plan ....................................................................................... 78
5.11
Emergency Contacts ............................................................................................................. 81
6
Recovery .............................................................................................................................. 82
7
Implementation and Maintenance Schedule ...................................................................... 84
References ....................................................................................................................................... 87
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Appendices
APPENDIX 1 – HUT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION REPORT ....................................................... 88
APPENDIX 2 – AS3959 CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS SUMMARY ............................................ 105
APPENDIX 2 – SECTION A3.7 OF NSW PLANNING FOR BUSHFIRE PROTECTION ................... 106
List of Figures
Figure 1: Regional Context.................................................................................................................. 10
Figure 2: Study Area ........................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 3: Terrain ................................................................................................................................. 16
Figure 4: Vegetation Pattern ............................................................................................................... 17
Figure 5: Equilibrium Fuel Load ........................................................................................................... 18
Figure 6: Bushfire Risk Assessment Model (BRAM) ............................................................................ 21
Figure 7: Ignition Potential (BRAM) ..................................................................................................... 24
Figure 8: Fire History (1980 – 2010) .................................................................................................... 25
Figure 9: Likelihood Assessment (BRAM) ........................................................................................... 26
Figure 10: Suppression Capability (BRAM) ......................................................................................... 27
Figure 11: Head Fire Intensity and Ranking along 3CT ........................................................................ 30
Figure 12: Head Fire Rate of Spread and Ranking along 3CT ............................................................. 31
Figure 13: Track Walking Time to Refuge Area ................................................................................... 32
Figure 14: Indicative Evacuation Priority .............................................................................................. 35
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List of Tables
Table 1: Vegetation Type, Group and Likely Climax Fuel Load (t/ha) of the Study Area ....................... 13
Table 2: Rate of Spread Ranking ........................................................................................................ 33
Table 3: Walk Time to Refuge Ranking ............................................................................................... 34
Table 4: Combined Risk Analysis Assessment .................................................................................... 34
Table 5: Additional actions to minimise ignition risk ............................................................................. 37
Table 6: Suitability of fire response options under a range of FDR ....................................................... 47
Table 7: Limitations to off-site evacuation ............................................................................................ 48
Table 8: Prioritisation of evacuation ..................................................................................................... 51
Table 9: Legislation governing PWS response to emergencies ............................................................ 53
Table 10: Staff Preparedness and Response procedures at different Fire Danger Ratings (FDR) ........ 58
Table 11: Notification list for track restrictions ...................................................................................... 60
Table 12: Recommended Implementation and Maintenance Schedule ................................................ 84
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Glossary of Terms
TERM
Asset
DESCRIPTION
A place, object or area (including buildings, fences, areas of vegetation, archaeological
sites, powerlines etc) that needs to be protected from bushfire, because its value/s could
be destroyed or damaged by fire.
Building
Protection Zone
A BPZ (in this report) is the area between the building and the unmanaged vegetation.
Within the BPZ the fine fuels of <6 mm in diameter are either thinned or removed so as to
reduce the bushfire threat to an appropriate level. )
(BPZ)
Bushfire
An unplanned fire burning in bushland, grassland, heathland, moorland, plantation or other
vegetation or crops.
Ecosystem
An interactive system between living organisms (plants and animals) and their non living
surroundings.
Emergency only
A basic structure designed to provide a shield from the radiant heat and flame contact.
refuge
These will be located in sections of track that are modelled to have extreme fire conditions
or be greater than two hours walk from an on site refuge area (i.e. one of the five public
huts)
Fire Danger
A relative number denoting the potential rates of spread, or suppression difficulty for
Index
specific combinations of temperature, relative humidity, drought effects and wind speed.
Fire Danger
A relative class denoting the potential rates of spread, or suppression difficulty for specific
rating
combinations of temperature, relative humidity, drought effects and wind speed, indicating
the relative evaluation of fire danger.
Fire hazard
The potential severity of a fire. Usually measured in terms of intensity (kW/m). The factors
that influence a bushfire hazard include climate and weather patterns, vegetation (fuel
quantity, distribution and moisture) and slope.
Fire regime
The history of fire in a particular area, including the frequency, intensity and season of
burning.
Fire risk
Is the chance of a bushfire igniting, spreading and causing damage to assets of value to
the community. Risk may be rated as being extreme, major, moderate, minor or
insignificant and is related to the vulnerability of the asset.
Fuel
Any material capable of being ignited and sustaining fire, such as grass, live vegetation,
leaf litter and bark. Generally measured in tonnes per hectare of dry weight.
Fuel load
Amount of fuel in a given area at a given time.
Hazard
Works designed to attain planned resource management objectives, primarily the reduction
reduction
of fire threat.
Activities include:
Manual and mechanical thinning of vegetation (NOT broad scale clearing)
Controlled burning of a predetermined area, carried out under specified weather and
environmental conditions.
Head Fire
Intensity (HFI)
HFI is the intensity (measured in kW per metre of flame front) that is produced at that part of
a fire where the rate of spread, flame height and intensity are greatest. It is also commonly
understood as the intensity at the fire front.
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Prescribed
A controlled burn to a predetermined area, carried out under specified weather and
burning
environmental conditions, designed to achieve planned resource management objectives.
On site refuge
A location where the total anticipated number of persons within two hours walk of the on
area
site Refuge Area are able to obtain adequate shelter during a fire attack occurring under an
FDI 50. For the 3CT the five public huts are the on site refuge areas. Additionally, there are
likely to be four „emergency only refuges‟ to be built in higher-risk sections of the track (e.g.
sections that are more than two hours walk from a hut, and/or have potential highest fire
intensity).
Walker safety is not guaranteed at an On Site Refuge; however their chances of survival
will be dramatically increased.
Off site refuge
These areas include track heads (such as Noyes and Stormlea Road), where adjacent
area
private property offers a safer option than remaining on the track as the fire intensity will be
lower (under present conditions as cleared agricultural land).
As with the other types of refuge area, walker safety is not guaranteed by assembling in
these locations however their chances of survival will be dramatically increased.
Study area
The study area is PWS owned and managed land within the locality identified for the Three
Capes Track (Tasman National Park). The study has also considered the broader
landscape and landuse context of the lands surrounding the study area in the various
assessments undertaken.
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Abbreviations
TERM
DESCRIPTION
3CT
Three Capes Track
Aims
Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
APZ
Asset Protection Zone
ASL
Above Sea Level
BAL
Bushfire Attack Level
BPZ
Building Protection Zone
ELA
Eco Logical Australia Pty Ltd
FDI
Fire Danger Index
FMBZ
Fuel Modified Buffer Zone
Ha
Hectare
ICS
Incident Control System
IMT
Incident Management Team
PWS
Parks and Wildlife Service
RFDO
Regional Fire Duty Officer (within PWS)
SFDO
State Fire Duty Officer (within PWS)
TFS
Tasmania Fire Service
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1
Introduction
Eco Logical Australia (ELA) was engaged to prepare a Fire Management Strategy and Emergency
Response Plan for the Parks and Wildlife Service (PWS) Tasmania, for the proposed Three Capes
Track (3CT). The PWS is currently in the planning stage of this new 68km overnight walking track in
Tasman National Park, south eastern Tasmania, shown on Figure 1.
1.1
PURPO SE AND SCO PE
The 3CT will provide a 6 day, 5 night walk for up to 300 walkers plus staff. Walkers and staff will be
accommodated in 5 public huts and 4 commercial huts spaced along the track (see Figure 2). The
huts and the track itself are located within bushfire prone vegetation in a relatively remote landscape.
As such, there is a potential risk to track users, PWS staff and construction staff from bushfire attack.
This report provides an assessment of risk followed by a Fire Management Strategy (FMS) and an
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for the 3CT. It includes recommended mitigation and risk reduction
measures for bushfire and other potential risks.
The plan covers (i.e. the study area is) PWS owned and managed land within the locality identified for
the Three Capes Track (Tasman National Park), as well as adjacent private land and State forest, and
is in accordance with established fire management guidelines and risk assessment policy. The FMS
and ERP will assist PWS meet its statutory requirements and other obligations, particularly around
duty of care to recreational and staff users to the track and help establish and maintain the iconic
status sought for the 3CT.
1.2
O BJECT I VES
The strategy assesses the fire risks to the proposed 3CT and identifies management strategies to
reduce the risk of fire to life and track infrastructure. Operationally, the objectives of fire management
are to:
Reduce the risk bushfire poses to human life;
Reduce the risk of bushfire to buildings, facilities and property;
Reduce the risk of bushfire to the natural environment; and
Reduce the risk to life of other incidents requiring an emergency response.
1.3
O VERVI EW O F APPRO ACH
The assessment of bushfire behaviour within the landscape occupied by the 3CT, the use patterns
expected and the bushfire risk to the 3CT and its users provided the foundation to this strategy. These
were developed in consultation with PWS and other stakeholders, and were followed by the design of
appropriate management strategies and emergency response plans.
The project follows the risk assessment pathway recommended by the National Inquiry on Bushfire
Mitigation and Management (COAG 2004). The focus of the report is the risk to 3CT users and hut
infrastructure followed by and the design of infrastructure and use patterns along with the evacuation
and emergency response required to reduce these risks.
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Figure 1: Regional Context
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Figure 2: Study Area
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1.4
ST AT UT O RY REQ UI REMENT S
The draft Tasman National Park and Reserves Fire Management Plan (PWS 2006) outlines the
statutory responsibilities and planning framework for the study area and is reproduced below.
There are several pieces of legislation that guide the development of fire management
plans, these include the Nature Conservation Act 2002, National Parks and Reserves
Management Act 2002, Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 and the Fire Service Act
1979. Further the Tasmanian Reserves Code of Practice (2003) sets out guiding
principles for reserve management. Under this code the primary objective of fire
management is to protect human life and property from fire. Other objectives include the
maintenance of natural diversity of species and communities through applying
appropriate fire frequencies and the protection of conservation values from adverse
impacts due to fire in so far as these are consistent with the primary objective.
Under the Fire Service Act 1979 (Section 64) during the fire permit period land occupiers
have a legal responsibility to take diligent steps to extinguish fires or prevent them from
spreading from their property. The Inter-agency Protocol between PWS, Forestry
Tasmania and the Tasmanian Fire Service (2002-2003) assists agencies meet their fire
suppression responsibilities and states that “the most able fire fighting crew of any
agency will respond immediately to a reported fire as a priority”.
Other relevant planning documents include the Guidelines for Development in Bushfire Prone Areas of
Tasmania (TFS 2005) and the Draft Bushfire Prone Areas code (TPC 2011) which outline the
requirements for development in bushfire prone areas and the Fire Planning Policy (PWS 2009) and
Fire Management Policy (PWS 2006) which set the overarching PWS bushfire policy.
The Draft Tasman National Park and Reserves Fire Management Plan (PWS 2006) and Southern
Region Strategic Fire Management Plan (PWS 2011) provide relevant background to the study area
and context into reserve fire management.
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2
2.1
Bushfire Behaviour Assessment
MET HO DO LO G Y AND D AT A I NPUT S
The following sections outline the methodology and data utilised to assess bushfire behaviour likely to
affect the 3CT.
2.1.1
Terrain
The steepness of a slope, direction of fire spread on the slope, aspect of the slope and changes in
slope direction, not only affect bushfire behaviour, but also the characteristics of the risk to users and
infrastructure and ultimately the mitigation and fire suppression strategies that may be appropriate.
The terrain within the study area is highly varied and is dominated by a dramatic and rugged coastline.
Figure 3 shows a slope raster developed from a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) that was generated
from contour mapping of 10m interval. The slope across the study area varies from flat or slightly
undulating to extreme in areas dominated by the high and typically vertical sea cliffs. The track is
located mostly on flat or slightly undulating terrain however traverses gullies and other steep terrain
where it is benched to maintain a gentle to moderate track grade. Elevation of the study area ranges
from sea level to 490m ASL.
The steep and variable terrain within and adjoining the study area will have a major effect on fire
behaviour. This will include the rate and direction of fire spread, fire intensity, spotting distances and
will likely create variable and localised wind patterns. The influence of terrain and winds patterns will
mean accurate prediction of fire behaviour within the study area may at times be difficult.
2.1.2
Vegetation and Fuel
Vegetation mapping for the study area was provided by PWS. The vegetation types were classified
into vegetation groups and assigned with predicted climax fuel loads (t/ha) in consultation with PWS
staff. Table 1 displays the vegetation type, group and climax fuel load (t/ha) for the vegetation of the
study area. Figures 4 and 5 show the spatial distribution of the vegetation groups and fuel loads
(respectively) for the study area.
Table 1: Vegetation Type, Group and Likely Climax Fuel Load (t/ha) of the Study Area
Fuel Load
Vegetation Description
Vegetation Group
(t/ha)
Acacia dealbata forest
Non-Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
13.5
Fuel Behaviour
Model
McArthur Mk 5
(1962)
Marsden-
Agricultural,
Agricultural land
Urban
and
Exotic
Vegetation
Smedley et al
1.0
(1999)
McArthur Mk 5
Allocasuarina littoralis forest
Non-Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
Scrub,
Broadleaf scrub
Heathland
Complexes
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and
17.9
Coastal
(1962)
Catchpole et al
16.0
(1998)
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Fuel Load
Vegetation Description
Vegetation Group
(t/ha)
Fuel Behaviour
Model
Marsden-
Buttongrass
moorland
(undifferentiated)
moorland
(undifferentiated)
/
canopy
E.
obliqua
28.6
Heathland
and
Coastal
Complexes
Scrub,
Heathland
and
Coastal
16.0
17.9
Eucalyptus amygdalina forest and
17.9
Eucalyptus amygdalina forest and
Eucalyptus
delegatensis
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
17.9
Wet Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
14.3
17.9
Eucalyptus obliqua dry forest and
Eucalyptus
wet
Eucalyptus
ovata
12.2
forest
forest
13.5
and
woodland
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
17.9
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
17.9
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Eucalyptus tenuiramis forest and
woodland on dolerite
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Eucalyptus pulchella forest and
woodland
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Wet Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
(undifferentiated)
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
obliqua
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
woodland
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Eucalyptus globulus dry forest and
woodland
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
wet
forest (undifferentiated)
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
woodland on sandstone
(1998)
McArthur Mk 5
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
woodland on dolerite
(1998)
Catchpole et al
coastal
forest and woodland
(1999)
Catchpole et al
16.0
Complexes
amygdalina
Smedley et al
Moorland, Sedgeland, Rushland and
Scrub,
Coastal heathland
(1999)
Marsden-
Peatland
Coastal Scrub
Eucalyptus
28.6
Peatland
Buttongrass
Smedley et al
Moorland, Sedgeland, Rushland and
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
11.5
Eucalyptus tenuiramis forest and
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
woodland on sediments
Dry Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
11.5
Eucalyptus viminalis wet forest
Wet Eucalypt Forest and Woodland
14.3
(1962)
McArthur Mk 5
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Fuel Load
Vegetation Description
Vegetation Group
(t/ha)
Fuel Behaviour
Model
Marsden-
Lowland
Poa
Native Grassland
grassland
Nothofagus
Smedley et al
labillardierei
-
1.0
Atherosperma
rainforest
McArthur Mk 5
Rainforest and Related Scrub
Agricultural,
Plantations for silviculture
(1999)
Urban
and
14.3
Exotic
McArthur Mk 5
21.0
Vegetation
(1962)
(1962)
MarsdenSmedley et al
Moorland, Sedgeland, Rushland and
Restionaceae rushland
28.6
Peatland
(1999)
MarsdenSmedley et al
Restionaceae rushland / canopy
Moorland, Sedgeland, Rushland and
E. obliqua
Peatland
28.6
(1999)
Rock (cryptogamic lithosere )
Other Natural Environments
0.0
NA
Agricultural,
Urban
and
NA
Exotic
Urban areas
Vegetation
0.0
Water, sea
Other Natural Environments
0.0
NA
Marsden-
Scrub,
Wet heathland
2.1.3
Heathland
and
Smedley et al
Coastal
Complexes
28.6
(1999)
Climate and Weather
The climate and weather across the study area is described in PWS (2006) and is broadly
summarised below:
Weather conditions are highly variable according to the daily wind direction;
There is minimal variation in mean relative humidity although it decreases with distance from
the coast;
Minimum and maximum temperatures are also cooler and warmer (respectively) with distance
from the coast;
Terrain and distance from the coast have a strong influence on rainfall patterns with higher
rainfall on hilly, coastal areas. Local variation are also present; and
Dominant wind direction is westerly, but north-easterly to south-easterly winds are also
common from December to February. High winds are often experience on the exposed Capes
which can lead to irregular localised winds.
The fire weather conditions of most concern are outlined in Section 3.1.
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Figure 3: Terrain
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Figure 4: Vegetation Pattern
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Fuel Load
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2.2
HEAD F I RE I NT ENSIT Y
Analysis of the predicted Head Fire Intensity (HFI) has occurred through a spatially derived model
utilizing GIS techniques. The mapped output allows spatial ranking of the landscape according to HFI
and has been used to evaluate the risk to huts and to identify locations for other potential refuges
along the 3CT, The HFI model can also be used to better understand the bushfire risk profile of the
3CT in combination with other risk assessment tools such as proximity to walker refuges, fire
catchments, bushfire frequency/likelihood, ignition potential, suppression capacity and impact/damage
potential..
The HFI model has the following inputs:
Slope (in degrees);
Vegetation classified into groups and climax fuel loads (t/ha);
Fire Weather represented by a Fire Danger Index (FDI) of 50;
A direction of fire spread1 under the FDI 50 as follows:
o
North to West aspect recognised as uphill fire run;
o
East to South aspect recognised as downhill fire run;
o
North to East and South to West aspects recognised as a traversing fire run i.e. level;
GIS rules utilised the slope, vegetation and aspect inputs (described above) and fire behaviour
formulae applicable to different vegetation types to produce the HFI; the formulae used are as
follows:
o
McArthur Mk 5 (1962) for forests and woodlands;
o
Catchpole et al (1998) for heathlands; and
o
Marsden-Smedley et al (1999) for Buttongrass moorland;
The HFI map output is shown in Figure 11 and is discussed further in Section 3.
1
The direction of fire spread was changed to the North to East for the 3CT between Denmans Cove and Arthurs Peak
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2.3
HEAD F I RE RAT E O F SP READ
The head fire rate of spread (ROS) has been modelled in a similar way to head fire intensity using GIS
techniques and the formulas for the rate of spread calculation (McArthur Mk 5 (1962), Catchpole et al
(1998) and Marsden-Smedley et al (1999)) with the data inputs of slope, vegetation and fire weather
(FDI 50 and direction of fire attack2).
The map output of the head fire rate of spread is shown in Figure 12; it is useful for ranking the
bushfire risk to walkers on the 3CT. The higher the ROS, the higher the risk of walkers being caught in
locations where shelter from a bushfire is inadequate; this is discussed further in Section 3.
3
Bushfire Risk Assessment
A collaborative approach to the bushfire risk assessment was undertaken between ELA, PWS and
other stakeholders. The established PWS Bushfire Risk Assessment Model (BRAM) (PWS 2011) was
evaluated and discussed during initial phases of the project. It provides a relative risk ranking of the
3CT to other parts of Tasmania, but it was agreed that a more site and user specific ranking of risk
was required for the 3CT. A map of the PWS BRAM is however shown at Figure 6 for completeness.
The stakeholder agreed detailed bushfire risk assessment process for this project focussed on
analysing head fire intensity, head fire rate of spread and track walking times to an on site refuge area
(i.e. one of the five public huts. This assessment occurred through detailed investigation of segments
of the track which were identified as having similar fire behaviour attributes. Management strategies
have been designed in response to this detailed analysis and ranking of segments of the 3CT (see
Section 4 onwards).
This risk assessment process is congruent with the pathway recommended by the National Inquiry on
Bushfire Mitigation and Management (COAG 2004) which requires an analysis and evaluation of
bushfire risk and then identification of acceptable risk treatments that will avoid the risk, reduce the
likelihood, reduce the consequences, accept the risk, transfer the risk or retain the risk.
The assessment of bushfire risk for the 3CT and study area is outlined in the following sections.
2
The direction of fire spread was changed to the North to East for the 3CT between Denmans Cove and Arthurs Peak, the
southern portion of the Cape Raoul Track and the coastal portions of the Mount Brown Track.
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Figure 6: Bushfire Risk Assessment Model (BRAM)
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3.1
F ACT O RS WHI CH AF F ECT T HE CHANCE O F A F I RE
3.1.1
Fire Weather
Northerly, north-westerly and westerly winds are associated with the most significant fire behaviour
weather for the study area (PWS 2006). These winds are usually combined with warmer temperature
and lower relative humidity. Northerly to easterly winds may also be of concern in the summer months
particularly on warm to hot days and when it is associated with a reversal of the wind direction
affecting a going fire.
PWS (2006) states that “January and February are generally the driest and hottest months and
bushfires are more difficult to control”.
3.1.2
The Fire Season
The PWS (2011) define the fire season as “the period of time in which fires are most likely to occur”.
Fire seasons vary both by locality and temporally, however the fire season of the study area is
generally considered to be from September to March (PWS 2011). This period is longer than other
regions given the higher flammability of the moorland buttongrass vegetation (PWS 2011). As the
primary period of use of the 3CT is likely to be November to April it will fall within the period recognised
as the potential fire season.
3.1.3
Ignition Sources
PWS (2006) says “arson or accidental fires are considered a major risk at significant visitor access
sites” and that given the remoteness (of Tasman National Park) “the greatest threat of fire is from fires
originating elsewhere”. Natural causes of bushfire, such as those caused by lighting, are not
considered a significant risk (PWS 2006).
Given the ignition risk within Tasman National Park, campfires are no longer allowed in all but one
camp ground (PWS 2006). This is the Fortescue Bay campground, which is vehicle accessible and is
the intended conclusion of the 3CT. Fuel stoves must be used for cooking in all other areas of the park
although they also pose a minor risk of accidental fire and escape.
The location of huts and the provision of cooking facilities within the huts considerably reduces risk of
3CT users being an ignition source. Therefore, the risk of fires starting from users of the 3CT is
considered by stakeholders as very low.
Figure 7 shows the ignition potential analysis across the study area from the BRAM.
3.1.4
Fire History
Figure 8 shows the recent mapped fire history across the study area including both recorded ignition
points and spatial extent of bushfire events. PWS 2006 describes the methods of ignition since 1979
as “31 fires starting by arson, 10 from escapes of planned burns, 4 accidental, 2 re-ignition of
bushfires, 1 lightning and 24 causes were undetermined”.
A number of smaller fires are evident in the White Beach locality, near Remarkable Cave and in State
Forest south-east of Taranna. Under different scenarios some of these fires could ultimately have
posed a direct threat to the 3CT route. Small fires have also occurred in remote locations such as
Perdition Ponds and Tunnel Bay and highlight the importance of managing such fire ignitions after the
establishment of the 3CT.
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Some fires, such as the Oakwood Hill fire of December 2003, can result in very large areas burned.
Fires burning over larger areas pose the greatest risk to users of the 3CT and to its infrastructure.
These fires are very difficult to control and with the advent of adverse weather can spread rapidly and
impact the 3CT in multiple locations. During a widespread fire it is more difficult for walkers to make
correct decisions and evacuation strategies and prioritisation are far more complex.
Generally bushfires in the region are small to moderate with “over 86% of the fires during 1966 to
2009 under 100ha” (PWS 2011) however there is a “significant percentage increase in the number of
fires occurring in the <1 hectare class”. Note that this increase is a reflection of an increased recording
effort by PWS of abandoned, unattended or illegal campfires that were often not recorded in the past.
Stakeholder comment suggests that the primary fire risk may occur from ignitions in the vicinity of
White Beach and Fortescue Road. Some risk was also described associated with forestry activities
and timber gatherers. Faster moving fire can be expected in areas of continuous fuels e.g. within State
Forests and Tasman National Park; with a generally slower moving fire through partially developed
areas such as off Stormlea Road.
3.1.5
Likelihood and Suppression
Figures 9 and 10 show the bushfire likelihood assessment and suppression capability analysis across
the study area from the BRAM. Bushfire likelihood is assessed as high for the western part of the
study area and generally low for the eastern part of the study area. Suppression capacity varies
between mostly slow to moderate for the western part of the study area and is generally moderate for
the eastern part of the study area.
TFS or PWS suppression resources typically cannot provide a rapid response to fires that threaten the
3CT and in most cases access will severely constrain the suppression options available. It is also
probable, at least under some fire scenarios, that no suppression resources will reach the fire ground
before the fire overruns the 3CT. Active suppression of the full fire perimeter of at least larger fires is
also highly unlikely. This means that should a fire be predicted as having the potential to become
widespread then there is a high probability that it will impact the 3CT at some time or other and
probably in multiple locations.
It is critical with the limited fire suppression capability that processes are adequate and resources
available to provide early warnings of a potential fire attack to 3CT users.
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Figure 7: Ignition Potential (BRAM)
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Figure 8: Fire History (1980 – 2010)
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Figure 9: Likelihood Assessment (BRAM)
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Figure 10: Suppression Capability (BRAM)
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3.2
T HREE CAPES T RACK SE G MENT AT I O N AND RI SK AN AL YSI S
3.2.1
Head Fire Intensity
Figure 11 shows the potential head fire intensity model for the study area (with a fire run from NW 3
under an FDI of 50) and a ranking of track segments according to the average head fire intensity that
may be experienced for each segment. Fire intensities above even a few hundred kW/m may cause
serious burns for unprotected track users caught in a fire; the model shows that the vast majority of
the 3CT may be affected by head fire intensity of greater than 2,000 kW/m under an FDI of 50. The
following observations are made after analysis of the model and track segmentation ranking:
Segments of the track affected by less than 2,000 kW/m under FDI 50 are only found on the
western side of the 3CT. These are the start point for independent walkers at Noyes Road, the
start point for commercial walkers at Stormlea Road, the private cleared agricultural land uphill
from the Maingon Creek hut site, and near Safety Cove. All sites could be considered refuge
areas provided they are maintained as cleared areas;
Day 1 of the walk (Mount Spaulding area to the Tunnel Bay area) has less exposure to the
higher HFIs with Days 2-6 of the walk all having portions exposed to potentially extreme HFI
under an FDI 50;
The most extreme HFI are likely in locations that include:
o
Tunnel Bay to Cape Raoul;
o
Lunchtime Creek to Cape Pillar;
o
Mount Fortescue to Red Dirt Bluff; and
o
The Cape Hauy track.
Lesser HFI are likely to occur in locations that include:
3.2.2
o
The Mount Spaulding Start Point to Tunnel Bay;
o
Remarkable Cave to West Arthur Head; and
o
Denmans Cove to Surveyors Cove.
Head Fire Rate of Spread
Figure 12 shows the potential head fire rate of spread for the study area (fire run from NW 4 under an
FDI 50) and a ranking of track segments according to the average rate of spread that may be
experienced for each segment. Note that the ROS modelling does not allow for the spotting of fires
that often occurs under extreme conditions, which can significantly increase the ROS. The following
observations are made after analysis of the model and track segmentation ranking:
3
see note in Section 2.3
4
see note in Section 2.4
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The rate of spread is predicted to be less than 2km per hour under FDI 50 for large portions
of the track;
The highest rates of spread are associated with steep terrain and denser fine fuel vegetation
types such as the heaths and button grass moorlands;
Track segments with highest rates of spread under FDI 50 are predicted for the steeper slopes
in areas such as Ship Stern Bluff, Cape Raoul, Cape Pillar and Cape Hauy; and
Rapid ROS is also predicted for locations traversed by Day 2-6 of the walk. Of most note are
locations where a broad band of higher ROS is predicted to the N-NW-W of the 3CT e.g.
between Lunchtime Creek Hut and Cape Pillar.
3.2.3
Track Walking Times to Refuge Area
Figure 13 shows the estimated walking times to a Refuge Area5 from different parts of the 3CT. A
Refuge Area is defined as a location where the total anticipated number of persons within 4 hours
walk of the Refuge Area are able to obtain adequate shelter during a fire attack occurring under an
FDI 50. Adequate shelter may be within an appropriate building (e.g. a hut) or a position where the
radiant heat flux (RHF) for person(s) in the open is expected to be <2kW/m2 (e.g. a very large clearing
with little or no ground fuel).
Walking times were estimated through consultation with PWS and are based on an average walking
speed of 3-4km/h. The sections of track with an elevation change of more than 100m over a kilometre
(e.g. Mt Fortescue, descent to Cape Hauy, descent to Ship Stern Bluff) the walking speed has been
reduced to 2km/hr. These walking speed estimates are considered reasonable given the quality of the
track (i.e. much of it will be benched and/or with slight grade), and that a majority of walker's pack
weights would be 10-15kg (rather than the 18-25kg many walkers would normally carry for multi-day
walks).
Figure 13 shows the time required to walk to the nearest Refuge Area, whether that be ahead or
behind (i.e. returning to a previous hut). The walking time analysis is shown in 30 minute intervals with
the maximum time required to reach a Refuge Area being 3 - 3.5 hours. Areas of the track with longer
walk times to a Refuge Area include: Cape Raoul, Arthurs Peak, Cape Pillar, Cape Hauy and the
Cape Hauy Track to Fortescue Bay.
5
Note that this includes both Off-site and On-site Refuge Areas (clarified in Section 4.6.1.1 and 4.6.1.2) but the lower standard
refuge or „emergency only refuges‟ have been excluded from this analysis and are discussed in Section 4.6.1.3
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Figure 11: Head Fire Intensity and Ranking along 3CT
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Figure 12: Head Fire Rate of Spread and Ranking along 3CT
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Figure 13: Track Walking Time to Refuge Area
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3.3
EVAC U AT I O N PRIO RIT Y ASSESSMENT
The head fire rate of spread model and the track walking times to refuges were combined in a GIS
model to provide an Indicative Evacuation Priority for the 3CT. The resultant map is a tool to help
identify evacuation priority but ONLY through interpretation of the predicted fire behaviour and
locations of track likely to be impacted. An appropriate use of the Indicative Evacuation Priority map is
to firstly predict the place(s) where a fire is likely to overrun the 3CT, and then consider the ranking for
those location(s) within the Indicative Evacuation Priority map to therefore guide evacuation response
(see Section 4.6.1.4 Prioritisation of Evacuation).
The Indicative Evacuation Priority model was derived from the ranking of the segments of the 3CT
according to Rate of Spread (ROS) using 5 classes as per Table 2 and combining the seven „Walk
Time to a Refuge Area‟ classes. The process of combining these attributes involved multiplying the
rankings of the two input datasets to create a Combined ROS and Walk Time value of between 1 and
35. The Combined ROS and Walk Time values were then assigned to five Indicative Evacuation
Priority classes in such a way as to achieve a similar length of 3CT for each of the five classes. Table
4 shows how the 35 Combined ROS and Walk Time values were placed into the five Indicative
Evacuation Priority classes with the highest ranking 1 and lowest 5.
Table 2: Rate of Spread Ranking
Rate of Spread
(km/h)
Ranking
3.181 - 63.044
1
2.410 - 3.157
2
1.967 - 2.382
3
1.394 - 1.965
4
0.832 - 1.384
5
Note: The range of ROS values were selected to achieve a similar length of 3CT in each ROS class
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Table 3: Walk Time to Refuge Ranking
Walk Time
(hours)
Ranking
3.5
1
3
2
2.5
3
2
4
1.5
5
1
6
0.5
7
Table 4: Combined Risk Analysis Assessment
Combined ROS + Walk
Indicative Evacuation
Time ranking
Priority
1-2
1
3-4
2
5-7
3
8-11
4
12-35
5
Note: The range of ROS/Walk time values were selected to achieve a similar length of 3CT for each of the five Indicative
Evacuation Priority classes
The 3CT track segment ranking of Indicative Evacuation Priority are shown on Figure 14, it indicates
higher priority evacuation may be required (see discussion in Section 4.6.1.3, Evacuation
Prioritisation) at or near Cape Raoul, Arthurs Peak, Cape Pillar and between Red Dirt Bluff - Cape
Hauy - Fortescue Bay.
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Figure 14: Indicative Evacuation Priority
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4
Fire Management Strategy
A draft Fire Management Plan for Tasman National Park, Pirates Bay State Reserve and Eagle Neck
Historic Site was prepared in 2006 (version 2) and represents the latest documented thinking by PWS on
fire management for the environs of the 3CT. The Fire Management Strategy discussed in Section 4 of
this report provides a general strategy specific to the planning area for the 3CT project. This strategy may
be used as a guideline for the finalisation of the Fire Management Plan for Tasman National Park and a
guideline for the designers, builders and managers of the 3CT.
The following Fire Management Strategy has been developed from the information and risk assessment
described in the preceding sections of this report.
4.1
F I RE PREVENT I O N
In the context of the 3CT, fire prevention aims to reduce the incidence and spread of fire, but recognises
that the bushfire risk cannot be totally removed or relocated. Bushfire prone vegetation is part of the
setting and attraction of the 3CT and it will burn periodically in a bushfire. Risk reduction can occur
through various management responses including fire prevention activities.
As the 3CT study area forms part of Tasman National Park the following fire prevention guidelines should
be used to finalise the Fire Management Plan for Tasman National Park:
4.1.1 Ignition Risk
Strategies that minimise the risk of fire ignition should be developed and implemented; these may include:
Elimination of all activities within the 3CT portion of the Park that may result in accidental fire (e.g.
Hot Works shutdowns when FDI>20 or RH<30);
Neighbour relations that openly discuss the ignition risks associated with their land use and
agreement sought on risk reduction measures;
Prioritisation of the ignition risk reduction directed to locations which have a history of fire ignitions
(e.g. White Beach, Fortescue Road) and/or represent locations where ignitions may have the
greatest potential impact on the 3CT. In addition to a priority being given to land-use activities
with higher ignition risks, higher priority should be given to locations with a larger expanse of
bushland to the north-west of the 3CT.
Table 5 provides some specific additional measures to reduce the risk of ignition.
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Table 5: Additional actions to minimise ignition risk
Factors Effecting Ignition Risk
Cigarettes smoking by users
Action to Minimise Risk
Toolbox talks conducted by staff and contractors prior to work on site
Have users identify whether they are smokers or not during their
registration. This could enable smokers to be specifically briefed on
bushfire concerns e.g. on-line and raise their concern and care to
take greater responsibility. In the event of a fire starting along the
track the potential for cigarettes as a cause can be better
determined.
Sell/Provide PWS or 3CT-branded cigarette butt containers and
provision of wall-mounted butt bins outside of huts
Forecast and current FDI
All walkers are to be provided with daily updates by 3CT hut staff on
weather, fires, evacuation etc.
SMS walkers who are not on the track that track will be closed and
advise of their walker permit refund rights e.g. with forecast FDI>50.
Lightning strike
Utilising existing reporting network, survey study area during the
walker season for ignitions immediately after dry storms have passed
through and take action to make safe any smouldering/burning
material. Lightning strike maps can also aid this process.
Employees, contractors and
Maintain high level of employee/contractor awareness (e.g. toolbox
consultants
talks)
Hazard reduction and biodiversity
Wherever possible undertake a deep and full perimeter mop up to
burns
minimise risk of re-ignition
TFS permitted burns on private
TFS to notify PWS of permitted burns within a 3km distance from the
property
Tasman National Park
Ignition Prevention by Track Users
The likelihood of fire ignitions triggered by track users is very low; however such an ignition could pose a
significant risk to other track users especially if it occurs during adverse fire weather conditions.
Prevention of fire ignitions caused by track users is therefore an important ignition risk reduction measure,
it can be achieved by:
Informing users how to minimise the risks of ignition if using portable fuel stoves;
Cooktop benches and tables in huts to have stainless steel surfaces and splashbacks to prevent
ignition;
Providing fire suppression response options in case of accidental ignition from cooking fires (e.g.
extinguishers and fire blankets in huts); and
PWS policy on the safe disposal of cigarette butts.
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Track users are to be informed of the above restrictions by PWS staff during the registration and planning
phases as well as through in-hut information.
4.1.2 Fire Detection
Attacking fires while they are small and accessible is a key to preventing fire impact on the 3CT and its
users, with early detection of bushfires essential under adverse fire weather conditions. Fire detection
performance in the 3CT environs may be improved by:
Developing a good fire reporting network (relationship) with neighbours;
Providing ground based patrolling to higher ignition risk locations in situations where the FDI is
forecast to exceed 20 (dependent on risk levels elsewhere and resource availability);
A direction from RFDO to have fire spotter planes fly further south of the existing route with a brief
to specifically consider higher risk locations near White Beach and Fortescue Bay Road;
Pursue a shared fire spotting arrangement/funding with the Norske Skog group (local pine
plantation managers);
Liaise with Forestry Tasmania to brief and update their fire spotters on specific risks/concerns
associated with the 3CT. Regular contact typically improves the timeliness and relevance of
shared fire detection information.
4.1.3 Enlarge PWS Response Jurisdiction
Given the scarcity of potential fire control and limited access within the 3CT section of Tasman National
Park and the bushfire risk to walkers it is desirable to increase the distance off-Park that PWS staff
routinely check for the purpose of fire suppression. This is balanced against the reality that PWS
resourcing is currently unable to support any such increase. If more resources become available, it is
recommended that this distance be increased to three kilometres, and noted via the inter-agency
agreement.
4.1.4 Prescribed Burning
Prescribed burning is significantly limited in its ability to reduce the risk to 3CT users. For example, a
bushfire burning in one year old fuels under an FDI 50 can reach an intensity that is fatal to bushwalkers
should they be overrun by the fire.
A fine-grained, spatio-temporal pattern of prescribed burning in the 3CT planning area has the potential to
mitigate the spread of bushfire and increase the suppression success rate. However, it is considered not
feasible to establish such a pattern of burning for the following reasons:
Potential burn control lines are rare and the resource cost to establish widespread temporary
lines e.g. with brush cutting is unrealistic;
Burning of some fuel types is difficult and the window of opportunity is narrow e.g. tall heaths;
A fine-grain, strategic mosaic of fire ages in the vegetation takes many years to establish and
may require up to 5 fires per year in the 3CT planning area to be truly effective in mitigating fire
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spread. This level of resource commitment is unrealistic; and weather conditions and funding are
likely to often result in annual targets not being met;
The cost/benefit of widespread prescribed burning as a risk reduction measure for 3CT users is
extremely unlikely to be validated.
Notwithstanding the above, limited and strategic use of prescribed burning may offer some benefits in the
3CT planning area; these include:
Maintenance of appropriate fire regimes for the conservation of biodiversity;
Increasing the range of weather and fire conditions under which a potential fire control line will
aid fire suppression or containment e.g. strip burning along a north-south orientated trail or
providing a connection between „natural fire barriers‟.
It is recommended that prescribed fire is used strategically in the 3CT environs to fulfil the
abovementioned benefits.
4.2
F I RE PREPAREDNESS
This section of the report focuses on the preparedness of 3CT users, including PWS personnel
specifically engaged in its management. It does not address the PWS general levels of bushfire
preparedness in the region which is beyond the project scope.
3CT users need to take measures which reduce the risk of encountering a bushfire. If 3CT users are well
prepared then the risk lowered and their chances of reaching a suitable Refuge Area prior to the arrival of
a bushfire greatly increased.
The following sections cover general fire preparedness concepts relevant for PWS. Section 4.4
(Management of Bushfire Risk to 3CT Users) identifies preparedness (and pre-emptive) measures to be
undertaken by PWS and 3CT users prior to the commencement of the walk.
4.2.1
Fire Management Infrastructure
Access
Roads and fire trails provide access to fires and offer potential control lines from where firefighter
suppression can occur. Vehicular access within the 3CT portion of Tasman National Park is only available
to Noyes Road (3CT start point for independent walkers), Remarkable Cave, Safety Cove and Fortescue
Bay; whilst this limits access for firefighting it also significantly reduces the potential risk of arson and
accidental fires starting within the Park. Fires that start from vehicular access to areas nearby the Park
may burn into the Park; however PWS have no control over this usage apart from cooperation with
neighbours over any access concerns.
Stakeholders agreed that the risk of fire ignition from walkers is very low. As far as is possible, walkers
should be confined to the constructed 3CT and restrictions on their use of the 3CT under adverse FDI
regulated as per Section 4.4.4.
The provision of additional roads or fire trails is not considered justifiable due to the infrequent nature of
bushfire in the planning area, limited capacity of nearby firefighting resources and the sensitivity of the
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3CT environs. This report reduces bushfire risk primarily through evacuation and refuge strategies and is
not reliant on additional vehicular access. As experience of the effects of bushfires on the 3CT and its
users is gained, the benefits of a strategic access point to expedite evacuation or aid fire suppression
should be reconsidered.
Water supplies
Given the limited access for firefighting vehicles, no additional water supplies are recommended apart
from 10,000L stored water for firefighting at each of the proposed huts. The stored water at the huts will
enable first aid fire protection measures by occupants after the passage of fire e.g. extinguishment of
burning material on and around the huts.
Refuge Areas
The proposed huts provide the primary Refuge Areas along the 3CT. Following stakeholder meetings for
this project, the huts are proposed to be built to a standard capable of withstanding bushfire attack and
providing refuge to 3CT users and PWS staff (as per Section 4.3). Another lesser form of refuge
(Emergency Only Refuges) are discussed Section 4.6.1.3.
4.2.2
Training and Testing
Five specific training measures (additional to what is routinely undertaken by PWS staff) are
recommended by this report for 3CT staff and relevant PWS Fire Operations staff. These are training in:
Awareness on the bushfire risk analysis and relevant risk reduction measures contained within
this report;
Initial response fire suppression in and around huts;
How to take shelter during a bushfire within On Site Refuge Areas (3CT public huts) and
„Emergency Only Refuges‟;
Implementation of the Emergency Response Plan (Section 5); including training in the specific
roles associated with evacuation e.g. guiding evacuees to On Site Refuge Areas and Emergency
Only Refuges;
Australian Inter-agency Incident Management System (AIIMS) for 3CT Duty Officers and
Supervisors; and
Authorised officer procedures under the National Parks and Reserve Management Act 2002, and
National Parks and Reserved Lands Regulations 2009 (for 3CT Hut Rangers primarily).
An evacuation exercise should be held prior to the 3CT becoming operational, to test the effectiveness of
the Emergency Response Plan. This exercise should be repeated every two years and no more than five
years. A review of the effectiveness of the Fire Management Strategies (Section 4) should also form part
of the two yearly exercise e.g. assessment of 3CT user awareness and preparedness of personal
bushfire protection measures and evacuation.
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This biennial exercise should include a debrief that provides recommendations for revision of the
Emergency Response Plan and refinement of outputs from the Fire Management Strategy (Section 4).
4.3
MAN AG EMENT O F T HE BU SHF I RE RI SK T O HUT S
A discrete component of this project was the assessment of the bushfire risk to the proposed public hut
locations. Specifically Task 3 of the project brief said:
“Provide design and construction recommendations for the Three Capes Track hut
infrastructure to enhance the safety of walkers and, where practical, the fire
resistance capacity of infrastructure.
Aspects to be considered include, but are not limited to:
a) Design features to enhance the fire resistance of new infrastructure (especially huts)
b) Fire infrastructure (building protection zones, fuel modified buffer zones, fire trails, etc)
c) Operational and evacuation procedures for track and construction workers on days with
dangerous Fire Danger Ratings (FDR)
d) Provide recommendations in a brief report.”
This report has been reviewed by PWS and their comments have been incorporated into an updated Hut
Design and Construction Recommendations report provided herein as Appendix 1. In essence the
updated „hut report‟ provides building construction standards and Bushfire Protection Zone requirements
for the five preferred hut locations. The evacuation procedures discussed in the „Hut Report” are
incorporated into the Emergency Response Plan portion of this report. Huts provide the most reliable and
effective evacuation strategy for 3CT users; Section 5 (Emergency Response Plan) includes information
on the appropriate response of 3CT users seeking refuge in huts.
4.4
MAN AG EMENT O F T HE BU SHF I RE RI SK T O 3CT USERS
4.4.1
Characteristics of the Bushfire Risk to 3CT Users
There is both a direct and indirect risk from bushfire to 3CT users including overnight walkers, day
walkers, PWS staff as well as emergency services personnel who may be assisting during an emergency
response. Risks from bushfire to track users include direct flame contact, excessive radiant heat exposure
and smoke inhalation/asphyxiation.
Section 3.2.1 identifies the predicted head fire intensity (HFI) under an FDI 50. Under fires of this
intensity, a person who was unable to find suitable refuge from the fire while on the 3CT would certainly
2
die. Furthermore, as the human body is only able to tolerate very low radiant heat levels (<2 kW/m ),
even the lowest intensity fire on the 3CT, is life threatening. Shelter from radiant heat is crucial; however
there are very few naturally occurring „shelters‟ along the 3CT where a walker with limited bushfire
knowledge could reasonably be expected to find and shelter safely.
Fortunately, the risk analysis suggests the likelihood of a fire occurring under adverse fire weather and
burning over the 3CT is low. The likelihood of a fire catching walkers prior to them evacuating off-site or to
a suitable Refuge Area is even lower. However, as the consequence of bushfire overrunning walkers is
serious injury or death the risks associated with such low probability events must be reduced as far as
possible.
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In addition to the direct impacts of a bushfire, some associated effects include smoke hazards restriction
of aircraft movements, and tree or limb fall from the strong winds that often accompany serious bushfires.
4.4.2
Pre-emptive Risk Reduction Measures by PWS
The provision of appropriate information to walkers both prior to the walk and during the walk is a critical
component of bushfire risk management. It is recommended that the following pre-departure
information is provided to 3CT users:
General information identifying the risk from bushfire and other emergency situations;
Advice on the action required to minimise the risk under different scenarios;
How to obtain additional and up-to-date information while on the 3CT (e.g. FDR or progress of
evacuation or fire);
How notification of a bushfire (or other threat) will occur;
Identification of evacuation options under different scenarios, how these will be coordinated and
the expectation and responsibility of 3CT users;
The location of On Site Refuge Areas and „Emergency Only Refuges‟ and how to use them;
Circumstances under which track closure or use restrictions may occur and how this will be
notified.
It is recommended that 3CT pre-departure information be provided to users in the following ways:
As part of the registration process; with a check box requirement where users confirm they have
read the information, and take responsibility for their preparation and response in accord with the
information and carry the required „equipment‟;
As part of the registration confirmation e.g. email;
Via the 3CT website;
the 3CT check-in centre;
As a checklist carried while on the 3CT;
At the 3CT entry points.
Information provided to track users during the walk should include:
Daily updates (such as by on-track PWS ranger staff and 3CT hut staff) covering the current and
predicted weather situation and Fire Danger Rating (FDR), any current emergency situations
within the region, and any current, likely or potential track restrictions;
Information on the next sections of track, including average walk times, location and time to „On
Site Refuge Areas‟ and „Emergency Only Refuges‟, and typical communication coverage;
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Signage along the track including navigational signs, distance and „time-to‟ signs, On Site Refuge
Areas and „Emergency Only Refuges‟;
Instructions mounted within On Site Refuge Areas (public huts) and „Emergency Only Refuges‟‟
on actions required in the event of a bushfire or other emergency.
PWS should also ensure all staff and contractors are appropriately prepared and trained (see Section
4.2.2) for evacuation and emergency response and ensure appropriate resources are available for an
evacuation or emergency. Management of evacuation and emergency response is the responsibility of
Emergency Services and PWS (at least initially); details are provided in Sections 6 & 7.
In support of the above, if 3CT Hut Rangers are appointed as an authorised person (under the National
Parks and Reserve Management Act 2002, and National Parks and Reserved Lands Regulations 2009) it
would enable them to give lawful directions to walkers, for example, specific directions in relation to
staying at a hut on days where FDI >50.
4.4.3
Pre-emptive Risk Reduction by Track Users
The responsibility of each track user is as follows:
To read and acknowledge their responsibility to minimise the risk during the registration process
(as outlined above);
To know how to obtain bushfire risk (and other) information while on the 3CT and how the
emergency notification process will operate;
To know their requirements in an evacuation or emergency response;
To obtain daily updates in each hut from 3CT staff and notice boards;
To familiarise themselves with the characteristics of the walk including track, location of On Site
Refuge Areas and „Emergency Only Refuges‟‟;
To “check in” when starting the walk and “check out” when finalising the walk;
To have the following „emergency‟ equipment while on the 3CT:
o
Desirable equipment:

At least one mobile phone per group (with Telco provider offering adequate
coverage on 3CT); with a battery capable of maintaining charge for the expected
duration of the walk;

PWS provided bushfire safety/emergency guide;

At least one high-visibility „garment/pack-cover‟ per group to aid aerial detection
during evacuation or bushfire notification;

One small mirror/signalling device per group for attracting aircraft attention;
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4.4.4

First aid kit;

Detailed 3CT map;

Minimum of 2 L drinking water replenished each morning;

Bushfire appropriate clothing such as long sleeve and long legged wool
garments; and rubber soled, heavy duty boots; (minimise/avoid synthetic
clothing);

Global Positioning System (GPS) with batteries;

Personal Locator Beacon (PLB);

Satellite phone with a battery that is capable of maintaining charge for the
expected duration of the walk.
Walker Restrictions to Lower Risk
In order to reduce the risk to track users from bushfire, restrictions on accessing/using the track are
specified in this report (see Section 5 for detail). Essentially these restrictions will limit/minimise the
number of walkers that may be exposed to a bushfire by restricting additional walkers from starting on the
track under an FDI 50 or greater (estimated at 1-2 days/yr) and when a fire is reported. Also the
restrictions will specification required by walkers already on the track (i.e. restricting walkers to shelter in a
hut until conditions ease to an acceptable level).
Access restrictions are based on the FDR and whether there is an existing fire in the Park environs (See
Section 4 and 5.6).
4.5
F I RE RESPO NSE PRI NCI PL ES
Section 5.1 provides a stand-alone Emergency Response Plan for bushfire. Some of the fire response
concepts that underpin that Plan and this report are discussed below.
Whilst fire response is a critical part of any bushfire risk reduction strategy the limited vehicular access to
the 3CT and its environs, and the limited capacity of nearby firefighting resources means that Fire
Response cannot be relied upon as a major opportunity to reduce bushfire risk. This report has therefore
placed greater emphasis onto on-site refuge and off-site evacuation as the primary response to a
bushfire.
Where possible, fires that threaten the 3CT should be controlled/extinguished as soon as possible. Fires
that are small, accessible and burning under mild conditions could be extinguished without triggering an
evacuation. However, investment to improve local PWS fire suppression capabilities specifically to lower
bushfire risk on the 3CT is not considered justifiable.
Notwithstanding the above, early detection and rapid initial fire attack is fundamentally important in
reducing bushfire risk.
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4.6
EVAC U AT I O N CO NCEPT S AND PRI NCI P L E S
Section 5 of this report provides and Emergency Response Plan which includes evacuation procedures.
Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 (below) outline the rationale behind the evacuation design for bushfire and other
emergencies (respectively). The project stakeholder meetings agreed that the most important evacuation
requirements for the 3CT were associated with bushfire and to a lesser extent smaller scale incidents
such as individual or small group accidents and mishaps. Bushfire is considered the only event likely to
require mass, or total, evacuation of the 3CT.
4.6.1
Bushfire Evacuation
The Fire Danger Rating (FDR) and/or the occurrence of a nearby fire are used in this report as triggers for
various levels of prevention, preparedness, response and for evacuation action by users and PWS staff.
The bushfire evacuation design for the 3CT is based upon a fire occurring under an Fire Danger Index of
50.
Both on-site refuge and off-site evacuation strategies are recommended and these may occur
independently or in combination. More than one refuge/evacuation option should be provided for every
location and every user of the 3CT. The suitability of each evacuation and refuge option under different
Fire Danger Indexes (FDI) for each of the six sections of the 3CT are provided in Table 6.
4.6.1.1
Off-site Evacuation
Off-site evacuation (i.e. beyond the 3CT environs) offers the safest refuge in a bushfire; however there
are numerous fire, weather and user scenarios that could inhibit or prevent a safe, timely and effective
off-site evacuation process. Therefore, although off-site evacuation is an important option, it is considered
unreliable and unsuitable as the primary risk reduction strategy for the 3CT.
Table 7 identifies some of the limitations of off-site evacuation by the four primary modes available i.e.
helicopter, boat, vehicular and walking. Notwithstanding the limitations in Table 6, off-site evacuation
should provide part of a suite of evacuation options for managers. In some situations, walkers already on
the track may be closer to an Off Site Refuge Area than an On Site Refuge Area, and can „self-evacuate‟
(depending on fire direction, and prior advice from 3CT Hut Rangers). A combination of evacuation offsite and on-site Refuge Areas are considered to provide the most efficient and reliable way to maximise
walker safety in the event of a bushfire.
4.6.1.2
On-site Refuge areas
Taking shelter on-site requires appropriate and strategically located On site Refuge Areas for walkers to
shelter during the passage of a bushfire. The risk analysis revealed the only existing On site Refuge
Areas on the 3CT are located at the track start point and on Stormlea Road; no other naturally-occurring
On site Refuge Areas suitable for the full range of 3CT users during a fire under a FDI 50 exist.
The proposed huts are therefore to be constructed to provide additional On site Refuge Areas; they
represent the most reliable refuge option along the 3CT under all fire, weather and user scenarios. As the
primary type of refuge area, huts are to be constructed to withstand a level of bushfire attack at least
equivalent to that of a house under “Australian Standard AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfireprone areas”, see Appendix 1.
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Huts are also located along the 3CT at intervals which enable them to be the primary bushfire refuge. Use
of huts as a refuge requires an appropriate behavioural response during a bushfire attack by walkers; it is
expected that the required response actions can be communicated prior to departure (as per Section 4.4)
and posted in each hut.
If large areas of the 3CT are burned in a single fire event and huts are used as a shelter during the
passage of fire, it is important to extinguish any burning debris in the immediate vicinity of the hut for at
least a day after the fire front has passed. This ongoing surveillance may be best undertaken by PWS
staff after walkers are evacuated off-site by helicopter when conditions are suitable. Natural clearings for
helicopters to land exist nearby all huts except Lunchtime Creek. As part of the hut construction, helipads
will be created nearby each public hut site.
With huts providing the crux of the primary fire response strategy on the 3CT an assessment of the
likelihood of walkers being overrun by fire en-route to a hut is critical. Although it is not possible to
quantify this risk of „overrun‟, expert assessment aided by data provided in this report, is considered
adequate.
The factors considered by the authors and stakeholders in determining the risk of „fire overrun of walkers‟
en-route to On Site Refuge Areas (huts) included:
Bushfire history - frequency, severity, ignition points, fire cause, spatial pattern and duration,
and what factors will control/determine its extent etc. Figure 8 shows the recorded history of
bushfire within or nearby the planning area;
Fire weather patterns - how often days with a FDI >50 (and >38) are likely to occur and
whether these are likely to occur over consecutive days;
Potential Rate of Spread (ROS) and direction of spread of a bushfire under an FDI of 50;
Time from fire ignition (or from when fire is considered a threat) to when the fire is noticed by
walkers or to when walkers are likely to notified of the fire threat e.g. by PWS;
Time of day when fire is most likely to occur and where walkers are most likely to be along
the 3CT at this time;
Time required to walk to a On Site Refuge Area (hut) after notification or recognition of the
fire threat;
Location of walkers relative to the fire and its direction of spread, and the risk ranking of the
section of track between the walkers position and the refuge;
Time required to walk to a hut.
Application of the above considerations in evacuation design is complex, Section 4.6.1.4 Evacuation
Prioritisation provides some guidance on this decision making.
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Table 6: Suitability of fire response options under a range of FDR
FDR
Fire
response
0-11
12-24
25-49
>50
option
(Low – Moderate)
(High)
(Very High)
(Severe – Catastrophic)
Off-site
Evacuation
May not be necessary
Assisted off-site evacuation may be
All modes of relocation good
required e.g. if walkers can‟t reach
Site specific action may be required
hut before arrival of fire
e.g. if walkers are on a long upslope
Helicopter and boat evacuation
and downwind of a nearby fire
occasionally restricted
Assisted off-site evac required
Assisted off-site evac essential
Helicopter and boat evacuation may
Helicopter and boat evacuation typically
by restricted depending upon wind
highly constrained and may be unsuitable
and position of fire
Rapid implementation essential
On site refuge areas provide suitable
On site refuge areas and Emergency only
refuge
refuges unsuitable as shelter, but if no
On site refuge areas provide
Rapid movement required
alternative should be used
excellent refuge
Fire location and direction of spread
FDI >50 is beyond hut design standard
Depending on predicted fire spread
critical to evac direction
Walkers should not expect to be
less time available to move to huts
Mop and patrol fire at huts as
evacuated before fire front reaches hut
required
Mop and patrol fire at huts as required
On site refuge areas (Huts) will
On-site
provide excellent refuge
refuge
Slower rates of spread by fire allow
areas and
Emergency
only
refuges
walkers greater time to reach refuge;
For a nearby fire, walkers need to
move to a location different to that
predicted for fire;
Extreme, erratic fire behaviour
Fire spread can be rapid
Pre-emptive evacuation considered e.g.
All walkers must obtain shelter
Fire may be patchy and rate of spread
slow
Comment
On-site refuge areas typically
adequate
quickly
Rapid fire spread, sometimes
On-site refuge areas typically
extreme and erratic
adequate
Prioritisation of evacuation response
Prioritised evacuation assistance
is critical
important
Both onsite refuge areas and off-site
If fire remains uncontrolled and
evacuation required, whichever
weather forecast is unfavourable,
secures people safety first
progressive off-site evacuation
required
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in the absence of a fire ask walkers to
leave by the nearest 3CT egress
An extremely rare weather event and
even more rare fire event
Risks to emergency service personnel
high
Off-site evacuation highly preferred,
however insufficient time may exist in
which case consider using whatever gets
people to a on site refuge area first
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Table 7: Limitations to off-site evacuation
Type of off-site
Limitation
evacuation
Helicopter
Comment
Helicopters may not be able to operate when/where required due to weather, fire and smoke conditions; and this can be a major
Helicopters may be critical for
limitation due to need to operate downwind of the fire;
evacuating walkers who
Response times and availability may be compromised by other commitments e.g. major fires elsewhere;
cannot reach a suitable on-
Even when available, response and travel time to 3CT may be up to 1 hour;
site refuge area;
Maximum number of passengers is typically 5, requiring 20 return trips per 100 walkers;
Helicopter deployment to
Turnaround times to collect each load of passengers and relocate off-site may be >30 minutes, therefore >6 hours evacuation time
priority situations is essential
per helicopter per 100 walkers (plus refuelling time) is required;
to maximise its benefit, Figure
Time would also be required (at least in some situations) to notify walkers of the fire threat and to move to a pick-up point and the
14 will aid this process;
time taken for the walkers to move to that point. Mobile phone coverage may aid the evacuation coordination/communication
Helicopter aided mass
process;
evacuation from huts over a
Experienced helicopter crewmen are likely to be required to help at the loading and unloading point;
day or two may be required
Helicopter hire is expensive;
for a fire that is not controlled
No helicopter fuel is typically stored on the Tasman Peninsula, so a store would need to be established for this option to be effective
and poses an on-going threat;
The Tasmanian Government has changed the specifications of the Police Rescue helicopter. The new helicopter (contract to be
Passenger manifest is
awarded soon) will most likely be a medium helicopter (larger than the current one). This helicopter requires a larger area to land
required to record all walkers
meaning that there are more situations that the helicopter won‟t be able to land at and a greater requirement for winching;
evacuated.
Boats may not be able to operate when/where required due to sea, weather and fire conditions;
When above conditions are suitable, response and travel time to suitable pick up points may be up to 1 hour;
Walkers would may first need to be notified e.g. by helicopter that conditions are suitable to be picked up are identified „emergency
boat pick-up sites e.g. Denmans Cove. Mobile phone coverage may aid the evacuation coordination/communication process;
Boat
PWS currently only has a 6m
workboat
surveyed
for
6
Helicopter operations and notice of bushwalkers may be constrained by same limitations mentioned for helicopters above;
people, including 2 PWS crew,
Boat capacity is less likely to be restricted by carrying capacity, although a smaller craft may need to be carried to ferry passengers
so this would be inefficient on
from the shore out to the larger boat;
its own.
Evacuation times are uncertain but are expected to be less than that for helicopter, at least for the evacuation of larger numbers of
PWS may need an agreement
people;
with larger boat operator, that
Route to the nearest boat evacuation pick-up point for walkers may be threatened or cut by fire;
they are „on call‟ if needed.
It is likely that only two locations exist where boat evacuation would be practical in most sea conditions - Denmans Cove and
Fortescue Bay;
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Vehicular access does not exist to the 3CT except off Noyes Road (start point), Remarkable Cave, Safety Cove and Fortescue Bay.
Other tracks finish near to the 3CT and offer potential pick-up points at the ends of the following roads ; Stormlea Road, Thorntons
Road and Maingon Road;
Co-ordination of pick up points and times may be critical as some pick-up points do not offer adequate refuge;
Road routes into pick-up points may be cut by fire, or blocked by fallen trees which sometimes occurs in the strong winds associated
Vehicular
with serious fires;
Significant walk times may be required to get to a vehicular pick-up point;
Helicopter operations and notice of bushwalkers to move to a vehicular pick-up point may be constrained by the same limitations
mentioned for helicopters above. Mobile phone coverage may aid the evacuation coordination/communication process in the event
some walkers are carrying personal phones;
Suitable off-site to a refuge area for walkers are very limited. These sites need to provide a refuge standard at least equivalent to the
2
huts, or provide open space where the radiant heat flux (RHF) is <2 kW/m or a combination of the open space and a suitable object
to refuge behind.
Walking off-site to a refuge may be time consuming as walker speeds are slow compared to evacuation aided by motorised
Walking
transport;
Mobile phone coverage is not
Helicopter operations and notification of bushwalkers may be constrained by the same limitations mentioned for helicopters above.
reliable in all parts of the 3CT
Mobile phone coverage may aid the evacuation coordination/communication process in the event some walkers are carrying
personal phones;
The most appropriate nearby off-site refuge areas are cleared land: at the start of the walk, near Maingon Creek hut and near
Remarkable Cave.
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4.6.1.3
Emergency Only Refuges
The Emergency Response Plan (Section 5) guides evacuees to On Site Refuge Areas i.e. huts, and
Off Site Refuge Areas i.e. the start point of the 3CT (Noyes Rd) and Stormlea Road.
Depending upon the location and predicted spread of a bushfire, the Indicative Evacuation Priority
(Figure 14) shows the potential highest risk locations for bushwalkers. These higher ranked locations
reveal where the bushfire risk is most likely to require walkers to „fend for themselves‟ during a
bushfire threat as walking out to a hut prior to the arrival of a fire may not be feasible. In such
situations, with walkers unable to access a suitable refuge, even a bushfire burning under mild
conditions could result in loss of life.
Whilst the likelihood of walkers not being able to reach a hut for refuge may be very small, it is a high
consequence risk. In an emergency, and with no other option, walkers need to rapidly find shelter from
flames and radiant heat and remain sheltered for at least 10-15 minutes (depending on fuel type).
Shelter of this type can be rudimentary and designed to fit into the local landscape. A non-combustible
cave-like structure positioned where the duration and intensity of the radiant heat after the passage of
fire could provide a valuable „Emergency Only Refuge‟. A suitable helicopter landing location should
be nearby these Emergency Only Refuges and fuel reduction burning may be regularly required in a
small area around the Emergency Only Refuges.
Figure 14 shows existing „Off Site Refuge Areas and Emergency Only Refuges‟. These make-shift
refuges do not meet the standard of an On Site Refuge Area, however may be suitable when the fire
intensity is less than that predicted under an FDI 50, or a place where walker survival is likely to be
higher than elsewhere on the 3CT (except the Refuge Areas). The existing „Off Site Refuge Areas‟
and „Emergency Only Refuges‟ should not be used if walkers can reach a Refuge Area. „Emergency
Only Refuges‟ represent a more challenging refuge for walkers during bushfire attack than required in
a Refuge Area, but an enormous improvement in safety compared to being caught in the „open‟ along
the 3CT.
An analysis of the location of the On Site Refuge Areas (Huts), Off Site Refuge Areas and the existing
„Emergency Only Refuges‟ shown in Figure 14, along with the ROS, HFI data revealed four locations
where the risk to walkers is potentially higher; these locations are Cape Raoul, Arthurs Peak, Red Dirt
Bluff and Cape Hauy. The nature of the walker risk in these locations may justify additional
„Emergency Only Refuges‟.
Additional Emergency Only Refuges can be low cost, non combustible, cave-like constructions located
in specific places where the HFI is predicted to be lower and the chances of survival of the passage of
fire are greatest. It is recommended that an investigation of the placement and design of additional „
Emergency Only Refuges‟ occur at or near Cape Raoul, Arthurs Peak, Red Dirt Bluff and Cape Hauy.
Existing Emergency Only Refuges require specific guidelines for walker use and potentially minor
refuge enhancement e.g. sheltering behind specific larger rocks at Hurricane Heath or a specific
section of the beach on Fortescue Bay.
As there are potentially increased risk and liability with identifying „Emergency Only Refuges‟ it is
recommended that a detailed site-specific set of user-responses be developed for all „Emergency Only
Refuges‟. An „Emergency Only Refuge could be described to walkers as “locations that may be
suitable as a refuge if un-expectantly caught in a bushfire or if unable to reach an On Site Refuge Area
before being overtaken by a fire. They must not be used or relied upon if it is possible to safely reach
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an On Site Refuge Area”. Effective use of an Emergency Only Refuge is essential and this could be
best achieved through an action checklist carried by walkers and also posted within the refuge.
It is the author(s) opinion that enhancement of existing and provision of additional „Emergency Only
Refuges‟ offer a significant reduction in the risk to bushwalkers, and a potential life-saving option in the
event that an unusual fire scenario or evacuation constraint occurs.
4.6.1.4
Evacuation Prioritisation
A prioritisation system for evacuation of walkers in the event of bushfire near the 3CT is vital in
reducing the consequence of the risk. A simple triage-like prioritisation of evacuation is proposed as
shown in Table 8 (NB: Table 8 is also provided in the Emergency Response Plan, Section 5). As
prioritisation will alter with the actual and predicted fire spread and location of walkers, the evacuation
priority also needs to be kept under constant review.
Table 8: Prioritisation of evacuation
Priority
1
Description
Walkers at most risk of harm from the existing,
predicted or potential path of a bushfire
Walkers exposed to a lesser risk due to their
2
location, or the direction of fire spread or other
circumstance
Walkers able to reach an On Site Refuge Area
3
with minimal assistance well prior to the arrival of
fire
Action
Priority notification of imminent risk with a
recommended response. Priority for evacuation
assistance e.g. airlifted off-site
Second group notified of risk and recommended
response. Second priority evacuation assistance
Third group notified of risk and recommended
response. Evacuation assistance unlikely.
Effective mass evacuation of the 3CT may require considerable time. Evacuation prioritisation
increases in importance as the time and resources available to complete the evacuation becomes less
viable. Figure 14 provides an Indicative Evacuation Priority for the 3CT under northerly, north-westerly
and westerly winds. Figure 14 must be interpreted by people within an Incident Management Team
who have bushfire behaviour expertise and an understanding of the GIS model and its limitations.
Figure 14 provides five Indicative Evacuation Priorities. Depending upon the position of a fire and its
predicted path and ROS, the highest priority sections of the track require higher priority evacuation.
For example, if a fire has the potential to impact a 10 km portion of the track, then notification of
walkers on the higher evacuation priority sections of this 10 km may need to occur first.
Huts also require priority attention during bushfire evacuation. For example, if a fire threatens late in
the afternoon most walkers should be at or near a hut and PWS staff at the hut may need to hold all
walkers at the hut and ensure this message is delivered to every walker prior to the morning.
„Emergency Only Refuges‟ may, under some circumstances, be collection points for a „last minute‟
helicopter assisted off-site evacuation. They may also be priority areas for helicopter reconnaissance
after the passage of the fire front over the 3CT.
When appropriate (e.g. suitable weather conditions and evacuation lead time) helicopter, boat and
vehicle aided evacuation should be used to augment a walkers own actions in seeking on-site and offsite refuge. Tables 6 and 7 summarise some of the considerations in the implementation of walker
aided evacuation.
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5
Emergency Response Plan
5.1
INT RO D UCT IO N
This Emergency Response Plan (ERP) provides specific actions for PWS staff under specific bushfire
scenarios. It also includes specific actions related to other emergencies such as structure fire (e.g.
huts), storms and storm damage, and walker injuries. This full report (i.e. 3CT FMS & ERP) has
information helpful in situational analysis and decision making, with this blue font section deliberately
concise for efficient emergency response.
The ERP uses The Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) Incident Control
System (ICS).
The ERP covers the 3CT planning area portion of Tasman National park as a single response area.
All emergency response must give primacy to the protection of human life; both emergency service
personnel and those being responded to
5.2
HO W T O US E T H E E R P
‘Preparedness actions’ and ‘Incident Response Plans’ are provided herein as standalone documents
under bushfire and other emergencies. Use the hyperlinks in the index below to go to the checklist of
actions for the specific incident type.
The ‘preparedness actions’ are for when severe weather is predicted (e.g. storm, Fire Danger Rating
>38). The response required is linked to the predicted severity of the weather warning.
‘Incident Response Plans’ are used when there is an actual incident e.g. bushfire or storm.
Emergency Response Plan - TABLE OF CONTENTS (hyperlinks)
5.1
Introduction
5.2
How to use the ERP
5.3
Legislative Responsibilities
5.4
Emergency Management Principles
5.5
BUSHFIRE: Preparedness actions
5.6
BUSHFIRE: Incident Response Plan
5.7
SEVERE WEATHER WARNING: Preparedness Actions
5.8
SEVERE WEATHER: Incident Response Plan
5.9
WALKER INJURY: Incident Response Plan
5.10
HUT FIRE: Incident Response Plan
5.11
Emergency Contacts
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5.3
L EG I SL AT I VE RESPO NSI BI L IT I ES
A summary of relevant legislative responsibilities for PWS is provided in Table 9). They provide
obligations for the safety of visitors, staff, neighbours and commercial users of the 3CT.
PWS have legislative obligations to respond to bushfires within Tasman National Park plus formal
agreements to provide support to other agencies during emergencies including bushfire, storm, search
and rescue.
PWS responsibilities under the Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan are:
As an advisory agency and management authority for prevention/mitigation, preparedness
and response to fire situations within its parks and reserves;
As a recovery agency for rehabilitation of flora and fauna affected by an emergency within its
parks and reserves; and
As a recovery agency for the clearing and restoration of PWS roads, tracks, bridges,
structures and other assets within its parks and reserves.
Table 9: Legislation governing PWS response to emergencies
Legislation
Comment
National Parks and Reserves Management Act (2002)
Workplace Health and Safety Act (1995)~
Emergency Management Act (2006)
Emergency Services Act (1976)
Petroleum Products Emergency Act (1994)
Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act (1987)
Fire Service Act (1979)
Public Health Act (1997)
~ Note that this will be superseded by the Commonwealth Work Health and Safety Act that comes into force on 1 January 2012
5.4
EMERG ENCY MAN AG EMENT PRI NCI PL ES
The following principles apply to all 3CT emergency responses:
Ensure your own safety and the safety of others with you
Conduct a brief initial assessment and activate relevant control agency
Take control of the situation
Ensure the safety of the public
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Contact other PWS staff to arrange interim control arrangements until control agency
personnel arrive
Provide interim response to incident
Gather information and prepare situation report
Hand over to control agency staff.
5.5
BUSHF I RE : PREPAREDNESS ACT I O NS
Specific preparedness actions are listed for the PWS Duty Officer, the Three Capes Track Duty Officer
and the 3CT Hut Rangers (i.e. those stationed at huts). Note that the pre-event response is triggered
by the forecast Fire Danger Index (FDI) or a fire nearby the Tasman National Park (TNP).
The preparedness actions are listed in the order required for implementation.
Table 10 provides supplementary detail on preparedness and response procedures at different FDI as
is particularly relevant to PWS staff and contractors working on the 3CT.
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5.5.1
3CT Duty Officer
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Monitor FDI &
Prior to 5 pm daily, when 3CT is open, check FDI at „Severe Weather Online‟ in the Registered Users Page of the BoM website for next 3 days
Fires daily
Prior to 6 pm daily, notify 3CT Hut Rangers of next three day‟s forecast FDR/FDI
Respond to predicted FDI >38 as per below
Respond to fire reported outside TNP as per below
FD I>20
Advise all staff and any contractors working within the Tasman National Park or 3km of the boundary of relevant restrictions, e.g. No hot works
(use of tools or machinery that can cause sparks)
FDI >38
Instruct 3CT Hut Rangers closest to tent-based campers who may be in the NP should attempt to contact these campers and advise them of
Total Fire Ban.
Instruct 3CT Hut Rangers to warn existing walkers of possible 3CT closure and require early departures
FDI >50
Forecast for day 2 or 3
Attempt to contact walkers scheduled to enter 3CT, and walkers at check-in centre, to warn of possible track closure and subsequent process
Instruct 3CT Hut Rangers to warn existing walkers of possible 3CT closure and require early departures on days preceding >FDI 50
and
implement “3CT Hut Ranger Bushfire Preparedness actions‟
Instruct 3CT Hut Rangers closest to tent-based campers who may be in the NP to attempt to contact these campers and advise them on highrisk associated with fuel-stove use and request they come to the nearest hut to prepare any meals requiring fuel stoves
Forecast for next day
Close all entry points to 3CT, either with signage/barriers or stationing an authorised officer to enforce the closure.
Notify 3CT Hut Rangers to hold all walkers at hut for the entire day, or until advice is received that the FDI has dropped below 50, and danger is
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
significantly reduced (i.e. a cool change has moved in)
Attempt to notify walkers booked to start 3CT of closure and subsequent process
Notify Southern Region Office to discuss situation, issues and actions with Regional Manager and Manager Fire Operations
Design and respond to communication and media needs
3CT Hut Rangers closest to tent-based campers who may be in the NP should attempt to contact these campers and advise them on severe
fire-risk conditions and subsequent process (e.g. spend following day in communal section of hut)
Fire nearby
Obtain risk assessment to 3CT users from local Regional Fire Duty Officer and/or Fire Operations Manager
TNP
If fire is predicted to reach 3CT; immediately contact relevant 3CT Hut Rangers, close sections potentially impacted and close 3CT to all new
walkers
Existing walkers to be evacuated dependent upon predicted fire behaviour and fire path (this will be decided in consultation with State and/or
Regional Fire Duty Officer). If fire predicted to enter TNP or evacuation is required enact the Bushfire Incident Response Plan.
Advise walkers of the phone number for fire condition updates, they can call/SMS to check on its status (if concerned while walking between
huts). Existing track users to be held at huts likely to be under threat until fire is declared not to be a threat to them or until evacuated.
Alert and
prepare
others
Monitor
situation
Alert all persons/agencies listed in Table 11 of restrictions; notify details of 3CT restriction and reasons; identify any actions required by them with
timeframes and whether confirmation of their completed action is required.
Monitor and record:
Fire ignitions. IF A FIRE STARTS ENACT THE BUSHFIRE RESPONSE PLAN
Current and forecast weather conditions
Progress of fire outside TNP
Progress of walkers to nominated Refuge Areas, dissemination of messages
Road and track conditions
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Need for escalation of resource commitment and enactment of Bushfire Response Plan
Report issues to appropriate agencies and/or Regional Office
End of
Warning
Lift all restrictions if there are no fires threatening to enter TNP or the FDI is forecast <50.
PWS determine appropriate action for walkers who were evacuated off-site. Where possible they should be assisted back onto the 3CT.
Debrief
Conduct Multi-Agency Committee debrief in accordance with PWS Fire Debrief Policy P-051 using the PWS Fire Debrief Minutes template
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Table 10: Staff Preparedness and Response procedures at different Fire Danger Ratings (FDR)6
FDR
Operational procedures
Safe Work Method Statements (SWMS) or Job Safety Assessments are to be prepared or updated prior to every entry onto the 3CT and include assessment and
response to the bushfire risk.
3CT staff to have passed a fire medical that season, and attended a fire season preparation day
SWMS/JSA are to assess the following:
All ratings in the
bushfire season
o
forecast FDR and appropriate response
o
assessment of potential of existing bushfires on the Tasman Peninsula
o
communication options available in the areas to be assessed
o
response in the event of bushfire occurring (including familiarity with location of fire safety equipment, e.g. tools, pump and fire hose, and its use)
Toolbox talk of bushfire requirements identified in JSA prior to entry onto 3CT
No cooking fires are to be lit. Any use of fire requires prior approval of the PWS RFDO or Senior Ranger including conditions and equipment required on site
A satellite phone carried by any PWS staff or contractor working in an area that does not have 2-way radio or mobile phone communications
Appropriate Personal Protection Equipment suitable for basic bushfire exposure to be worn by PWS staff and contractors e.g. avoid synthetic clothing. See TFS
guidelines
Pre-emptive risk reduction measures for 3CT users identified in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 adhered to
6
Does not include Evacuation response which is covered in Table 6
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Fire behaviour and spread predictions rapidly assessed to determine risk to 3CT users
0 - 16
Fire suppression undertaken as per above assessment of risk to 3CT users
Staff and contractors undertaking hot works (includes welding, brushcutting, chainsaws, moving equipment and other machinery likely to cause sparks) will monitor
and record weather conditions and take hourly weather observations once FDI of High 12 is reached;
Fire and weather status reports released by 6 pm each day (web-site, message bank, hut supervisors)
Morning check-in to local PWS office to obtain fire and weather update
16 - 20
Staff and contractors performing hot works (as per definition above) in reserves will take and record hourly weather observations and stop work if the fire danger
index rises to High 20, or above, or the relative humidity drops to 30% or below.
Local fire fighting resources (e.g. fire units) ready for immediate despatch
Deploy local suppression resources immediately a fire is reported within 3 kms of 3CT
Implement procedures as per FDI Low 0 to High 20
Fire and weather status reports released by 6 pm each day (web-site, message bank, hut supervisors)
Morning and midday check-in to local PWS office to obtain fire and weather update
No use of any equipment/machinery with fire starting potential. Hot works for emergency repairs may be allowed up to FDI 25 if a fire safety plan is approved by
the RFDO.
21 - 50
No work by staff or contractors to occur >30 minutes walk from a suitable refuge or evacuation point. Refuge sites to be prior approved by Regional Fire Duty
Officer (PWS)
Local fire fighting resources (e.g. fire units) on standby
Deploy helicopter or local suppression resources immediately a fire is reported within 10 kms of 3CT
Backup resources placed on standby or deployed
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A Total Fire Ban must be implemented if declared by the Tasmania Fire Service (this is usually at FDI 38).
Implement procedures as per Low 0 to Very High 50
3CT Hut Rangers to hold all walkers at hut for the entire day, or until advice is received that the FDI has dropped below 50, and danger is significantly reduced (i.e.
a cool change has moved in)Local and regional fire fighting resources (e.g. fire units) on standby
>50
Deploy helicopter or local suppression resources immediately a fire is reported
Backup resources placed on standby or deployed
Table 11: Notification list for track restrictions
PWS Contacts
Parks and Reserves Manager
Grant Hall – (03) 6214 8101
0428 319 016
Ranger in Charge
Stuart Dudgeon – (03) 6214 8105
0427 570 080
Regional Operations Manager
Shane Breen – (03) 6233 4756
0417 359 474
Regional Manager
Ashley Rushton – (03) 6233 9546
0438 519 235
Manager, Media and Communications
Liz Wren – (03) 6233 2109
0428 585 930
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PWS Contacts
3CT Business Enterprise Manager
To be advised
Seven-Mile Beach Field Centre (Monday
(03) 6214 8100
to Friday only)
Taranna Field Centre
(03) 6250 3980
Fortescue Bay Caretakers
Mark – (03) 6250 2433
Commercial and Community contacts
Commercial walk operator
To be advised
Commercial ferry operator
To be advised
Commercial bus operator
To be advised
3CT Shopfront
To be advised
Port
Arthur
and
Tasman
Tourism
To be advised
Association
Tourism Industry Council Tasmania
CEO
(03) 6224 1930
Tourism Tasmania
Media Relations
(03) 6230 8235
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5.5.2
3CT Hut Ranger
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Monitor FDI &
Ensure that by 6pm each evening notification from 3CT Duty Officer of next three day‟s forecast FDR/FDI is received
Fires daily
Provide any relevant information to 3CT Duty Officer when receiving this notification (ie. any particularly vulnerable walkers currently on 3CT)
Respond to predicted FDI levels as per below.
Respond to fire reported outside TNP as per below
FDI >20
No hot works (i.e. use of tools or machinery that can cause sparks)
Carry PPE when away from the hut
Advise smokers of high fire risk, and to contain their cigarette butts.
FDI >38
Forecast for next day
Those closest to tent-based campers (e.g. Lunchtime Creek) should attempt to contact these campers and advise them of Total Fire Ban, and
that although fuel stoves can still be used within 1m cleared area, the campers can use hut cooking facilities if they wish.
Provide evening briefing to walkers, include a recommendation for early departures on following day, and clarify location of Emergency Only
Refuges along the section of track they will be walking and procedure for using them in event of a fire.
FDI >50
Forecast for day 2 or 3
Warn existing walkers of possible 3CT closure due to fire weather
Communicate to walkers that:
If a fire occurs fire behaviour may be extreme and erratic
Risks to emergency service personnel high
Advise walkers that although they are able continue on the track, should FDI >50 be predicted for the next day as they continue the walk, they will
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
be held at the next hut.
Require early departures on days preceding forecast FDI >50
Ensure huts are prepared as far as possible with available resources in case a fire does occur.
Forecast for next day
Provide evening briefing to walkers advising of track closure (i.e. need to stay in hut for the day) and procedures in event of a fire threatening the
hut.
All entry points to 3CT will be closed (at direction of 3CT Duty Officer)
3CT Hut Rangers to hold all walkers at huts. No walkers are to commence the days walking.
Re-commencement of the walk shall be permitted when FDI <50 predicted for the next day. This will be confirmed by the 3CT Duty Officer.
If any walker refuses to be held back at the hut record the numbers who leave and report this back to the 3CT Duty Officer immediately.
Although re-commencement of the walk is likely to be permitted the next day (i.e. held back at hut for single day only) it is possible that the fire
weather situation may require walkers to be held at hut for more than one day.
Ensure huts are prepared as far as possible with available resources in case a fire does occur (e.g. fastening of window shutters – if provided,
blankets in communal area). Walkers held back may be able to assist with this preparation of huts by assisting with any vegetation removal which
may be required.
Fire nearby
Receive briefing including potential risk assessment from 3CT Duty Officer.
TNP
Provide any relevant information to 3CT Duty Officer when receiving this notification (i.e. any particularly vulnerable walkers currently on 3CT)
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
If fire is predicted to reach your Hut; this section of the track will be immediately closed.
All walkers are to be held at huts until fire is declared not to be a threat to them or until evacuated off site.
3CT Hut Ranger is not to leave the huts precinct (except to try to warn nearby tent based walkers of fire risk from fuel stoves). Notification to
walkers will be as they arrive at the hut precinct. Walkers on the track will be notified by telecommunications (arranged by Duty Officer).
If any walker refuses to be held back at the hut record the numbers who leave and report this back to the 3CT Duty Officer.
Prepare walkers for possible off-site evacuation. Confirm muster points and time of next predicted update.
Communicate to 3CT Duty Officer at regular intervals the details of the walkers who have arrived at the hut and received notification of fire event.
This will assist with identifying those still on the track.
Provide SITREPS to 3CT Duty Officer as conditions in your locality change.
Ensure huts are prepared as far as possible with available resources in case a fire does occur. Walkers held back may be able to assist with this
preparation of huts by assisting with any vegetation removal which may be required.
If off-site evacuation is required enact the Bushfire Incident Response Plan
Monitor
situation
Monitor and record:
Details of walkers at the hut and advised of warning
Current and forecast weather conditions
The number of walkers refusing to be held back
Ensure all walkers are provided updated information as it becomes available
Report any other relevant issues to 3CT Duty Officer.
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
End of
Warning
Communicate end of warning to walkers.
All walkers can re-commence their walk
Thank them for their cooperation and assistance.
Debrief
Attend and contribute to debrief
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5.6
BUSHF I RE : I NCI DENT RESPO NSE PL AN
This response plan applies to any fire within the 3CT portion of TNP or any fire predicted to enter this portion of TNP.
Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
Receive report
Ask Caller “Are you safe?” If not, move yourself and others near you to a safer location”
and note initial
o
If required provide advice on safer location options – consult 3CT Duty Officer or PWS Fire Operations
details from
Alert any other available staff in your immediate vicinity to listen in to the conversation
Caller
Ask caller for and record
o
Their name and current location
o
Fire‟s location, size, and direction of travel
o
Persons and visitor areas immediately at risk
o
Accessibility to scene
Ask “Have you reported the fire to TFS or anyone else yet?”
Obtain call back number and determine best method for further communication with caller
Alert PWS staff,
Alert all staff by voice or radio; muster those present and direct those staff in the field that are trained fire-fighters to head
Duty Officer and
towards the scene for reconnaissance and if appropriate initial attack
TFS
Delegate a staff member to call TFS on 000 and report or confirm the fire
Brief all staff on the situation, likely hazards and the anticipated action plan based on initial report details
Notify State Fire Duty Officer on 0418 345 896 to report the fire, the initial PWS response and to discuss further
resources required
Dispatch
Ensure staff have PPE, handheld VHF radio, megaphones, evacuation plans and road closure equipment
additional staff to
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Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
scene
Determine best access routes and transport options to scene – Vehicle, helicopter, vessel
Dispatch staff with a nominated on-scene commander
Ask first to arrive on-scene what assistance is required
REMEMBER – PROTECTION OF LIFE COMES BEFORE FIREFIGHTING!
Determine whether fire can be controlled with existing resources within a few minutes. If not, commence assessing
evacuation requirement for 3CT (see Section 4.6).
Request a more detailed SITREP from scene in 3-5 minutes.
Delegate tasks
Have a delegate call all remaining staff to return to office or proceed to the scene as appropriate
Have a delegate call Tasmania Police on 000 and request immediate assistance with evacuation
Establish Incident
Direct appropriate staff to establish Incident Control Centre
Control Centre
Establish radio and telephone communications
(ICC)
Follow AIIMS Incident Control System principles
Determine Likely
Impact
Discuss, record and plot
Plot fire location and record fire behaviour
Use expert judgement to predict fire behaviour; utilise information in this 3CT FMS & ERP
o
Consider FDI and capability of huts (designed for FDI below 50)
o
Determine where 3CT is likely to be impacted
Determine preferred access and evacuation routes
Consider whole fire event, not just area of initial impact on 3CT
Consider evacuation principles from Section 4.6
Confirm and record resources deployed to scene and discuss further resource requirements
Confirm current 3CT usage and staff currently on track (hut rangers)
Identify and plot specific areas threatened by fire
Record actions already taken and progress made on-scene.
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Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
Triage evacuation
Prioritise evacuation using principles from Section 4.6 and Table 8 (triage principle)
Design and
Design evacuation using principles from Section 4.6
implement
Effective ongoing communication with all on 3CT essential
evacuation
o
Communicate to highest risk people first!
o
What the hazard is; Timeframe for action; Where to go; How to get there
o
Consider shelter, water and welfare needs of relocated visitors and staff
If possible evacuate off-site, but huts are more likely to be most feasible given walker numbers and helicopter capacity.
Where walkers cannot reach hut prior to arrival of fire:
o
Evacuate using helicopter
o
Where helicopter evacuation is not feasible, remind walkers by loudspeaker on helicopter or light aircraft of
the nearest On Site or Off Site Refuge Area or Emergency only refuge
Monitor - obtain
Request and record SITREPs from on-scene commander, staff and fire crews at least every 30 minutes to ascertain:
SITREPs
Liaise with others
o
Fire size, rate of spread and direction of travel
o
Actions of fire crews and likelihood of fire containment or control
o
Current visitor locations and numbers at risk; progress of evacuation
o
Further resources required
Notify neighbouring properties at risk
Report progress and situation to State Fire Duty Officer and Regional Operations Manager
Liaise with TFS, Tas Police, etc as needed regarding fire control and evacuation
Escalation of
Use SITREP information to:
response
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o
Note evacuation and site protection effectiveness
o
Plot fire boundaries and behaviour
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Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
o
Re-assign staff to other sites for visitor welfare or firefighting
o
Consider additional support from SES, Tasman Council and other agencies
o
Consider welfare needs of relocated visitors
o
Consider staff welfare, rests and task rotation
Determine if escalation of fire suppression or evacuation resources is required
Reporting
o
Implement ICS principles
o
If escalation required, request immediate dispatch of PWS Level 2 IMT and helicopter
o
Inform State Fire Duty Officer and Regional Operations Manager of situation
Report on your actions and their effectiveness to Regional staff
Discuss issues, extra resources or regional support needed and your progress towards task completion
Monitor situation
Monitor the progress of your actions and report to fire controller and Tasmania Police when completed
If an IMT is established, hand over to the new IC in accordance with ICS principles
Scale down
Design scale-down strategy
Prepare for Recovery phase (see Section 6)
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5.7
SEVERE WEAT HER W AR NI NG : PREPARE D NESS ACT I O NS
This Pre-event Response Plan is triggered by a Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) Severe Weather Warning or Severe Thunderstorm Warning being issued
for the Tasman Peninsula.
5.7.1
3CT Duty Officer
Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
Monitor weather
warnings
Prior to 5 pm daily, when 3CT is open, check Severe Weather Warnings for next 3 days, at www.bom.gov.au/tas/warnings
Prior to 6 pm daily, notify 3CT Hut Rangers of next three day‟s forecast Severe Weather Warnings
Print ALL relevant warnings including road weather warnings
Issue warning on web-site and PWS 1300 number
Analyse warning
Nature of the forecast Severe Weather event (storm, flooding, damaging winds, etc)
Forecast time of severe weather event
Intensity of forecast severe weather event (wind speed and direction, rainfall in mm.)
Geographical areas forecast to be affected
If Severe Weather will impact upon the 3CT enact this Plan, see response to each warning type below
Contact BoM (Ph: 6221 2000) for localised forecast, if available
Wind warnings
Damaging winds (gusts <100 km/h, 80km/h if easterly component)
o
Notify walkers and staff via Hut Rangers. 3CT remains open. Walkers cautioned about exposed locations
and to avoid them if possible. Also if limb fall begins to occur return to a hut and if possible avoid forests and
woodlands.
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Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
Destructive winds (gusts <124km/h, <110km/h if easterly component)
Storm and
o
Close all entry points to 3CT
o
Notify Hut Rangers to close 3CT and hold all walkers at hut.
o
Attempt to notify walkers booked to start 3CT of closure and subsequent process
o
Notify Regional Office to discuss situation, issues and actions with Manager
o
Design and respond to communication and media needs
Check associated wind warnings and enact wind warning response as per above
flooding
Obtain advice from 3CT Hut Rangers and others on road and track restrictions and communicate to all 3CT Hut Rangers,
website, and relevant PWS contacts (e.g. receptionists for Hobart, Seven Mile Beach offices) and tourism centres.
Alert and prepare
others
Alert all persons/agencies listed in Section 5.11 of restrictions; notify details of 3CT restriction and reasons; identify any
actions required by them with timeframes and whether confirmation of their completed action is required.
Place appropriate staff on standby to activate Severe Weather Incident Response Plan
Monitor situation
Monitor and record:
Current and forecast weather conditions
Progress of walkers to nominated Refuge Areas and the dissemination of messages
Road and track conditions
Need for escalation of resource commitment and enactment of Severe Weather Response Plan
Report issues to appropriate agencies and/or Regional Office
End of Warning
Lift all restrictions when forecast is downgraded.
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Action
Considerations
Tick on
completion
o
If time permits, 3CT Hut Rangers are to release walkers to complete that day‟s walk.
o
Attempt to contact walkers due to start 3CT. If time permits (i.e. warning is lifted early morning) then that
day‟s independent walkers can start from Noyes Road. If warning is lifted late in the day, walkers are able to
commence walk at Stormlea Road entrance the following day and spend their first night at Hut 2: Maingon
Creek (thereby reducing their 3CT experience by one day).
o
If inadequate time is available to complete stage in the day, rescheduling of walker dispatch times from all
huts is to be coordinated by Duty Officer and Hut Rangers
5.7.2
3CT Hut Ranger
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Monitor FDI &
Ensure that by 6pm each evening notification from 3CT Duty Officer of next three days Severe Weather Warnings is
Fires daily
received
Provide any relevant information to 3CT Duty Officer when receiving this notification (ie. any particularly vulnerable walkers
currently on 3CT)
Wind strengths 75-
3CT remains open
100 km/h (or 6080km/h if easterly
component)
Walkers need to be aware of the high winds but will not be prevented from using the 3CT.
Walkers should however be advised to seek shelter in the huts. Safest option is to delay that days walk and remain at the
hut, however walkers will not be held back if they choose to continue to walk
Advise walkers that all decisions for action should be made early, late decisions for action will be potentially dangerous
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Notify all walkers of predicted wind strength and that the likely impact may include limbs being blown from trees
Caution walkers about exposed locations (e.g. Tornado Ridge, cliff edges along the track) and advise walkers to avoid
these locations if possible
Caution walkers that if tree limb fall begins to occur return to a hut and if possible avoid forests and woodlands.
Record details of walkers who choose to continue on the track and those who elect to remain at the hut. Communicate
these to the 3CT Duty Officer.
Damaging
(>100km/h)
3CT closed
and
Destructive
(>124km/h) winds
Close all entry points to 3CT
3CT Hut Rangers to hold all walkers at huts. No walkers are to commence the days walking.
Re-commencement of the walk shall be permitted when Severe Weather Warning end. This will be confirmed by the 3CT
Duty Officer.
If any walker refuses to be held back at the hut record their details and ensure these are communicated to the duty officer
immediately.
Although re-commencement of the walk is likely to be permitted the next day (ie. held back at hut for single day only) it is
possible that the weather situation may require walkers to be held at hut for more than one day.
Ensure huts are prepared as far as possible with available resources.
Monitor situation
Monitor and record:
Details of walkers at the hut and advised of warning
Current and forecast weather conditions
The number of walkers refusing to be held back
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Ensure all walkers are provided updated information as it becomes available
Report issues to 3CT Duty Officer
End of Warning
Communicate end of weather warning to walkers
All walkers can re-commence their walk. If time permits walkers to complete that day‟s walk, however recommencement
the following day is more likely
Co-ordinate walker dispatch time from hut so that starts are staggered
Thank them for their cooperation and assistance.
5.8
SEVERE WEAT HER: I NCI DENT RESPO NSE PL AN
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Report
Prepare to enact this response plan when a severe weather warning is issued, but may only be able to enact it after the severe
weather has passed.
Enact it upon notification of severe weather event impacting upon part of the 3CT track (localised events may not be picked up
in the forecasting and notification by BoM)
Assess
When receiving report that a severe weather event has impacted upon 3CT; seek and record as much information as possible,
including o
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
o
Details of infrastructure which may have been damaged. Assess extent and type of damage.
o
Any hazards which may have been created during the severe weather (ie, sections of track washed out)
o
Using information received about the weather event and its‟ impact, predict whether other areas of the 3CT
environs may have also been impacted and determine the need for further investigation of these.
o
Has help already been requested?
Determine if any situation is life threatening or may become life threatening. If so this must be addressed first.
Determine if 3CT (or parts of 3CT) should be closed until recovery actions are complete
Deploy staff
Deploy staff to any life threatening or potentially life threatening situations first.
Arrange full reconnaissance to confirm level of damage
Triage allocation of staff resources based on this (it is likely that this may need to be re-assessed as further impacts requiring
recovery actions are observed)
Assess capacity to complete required recovery actions without external assistance
Request external assistance if required to ensure recovery within adequate timeline
Monitor
situation
At all times the safety of responders is paramount
Those PWS staff or emergency services personnel on the scene should provide updates, to 3CT Duty Officer, if any conditions
change whilst recovery actions are being undertaken
Continue to manage recovery efforts until all impacts of the severe weather have been mitigated
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
End
This Response plan ends when the initial response is complete (Note that recovery actions may take weeks/months to finalise
depending on the extent of impact)
5.9
W AL KER I NJURY : I NCI DE NT RESPO NSE PLAN
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Report
Upon receipt of the report of an injured walker the following response plan will be enacted
Assess
When receiving report of injury; seek and record as much information as possible, including o
Details of the injured person
o
Nature of the injury
o
Exact location of the injured person and any factors which may impact upon evacuation
o
Capability of others present with the casualty to provide assistance
o
Determine the best contact methods for those on scene. Do not rely on the contact details of a single person if
possible.
o
Has help already been requested?
Immediately call for ambulance.
Determine if the injury is life threatening or may become life threatening or is not a life threatening situation.
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Life
Urgent medical evacuation required
threatening
injury
Helicopter evacuation preferred if possible due to faster response times
If no one with the injured walker can provide medical assistance, suitable 1 st aid trained 3CT Hut Ranger (or other PWS staff)
st
can be deployed to the site to provide 1 aid whilst awaiting evacuation.
Determine best helicopter landing site which the casualty can be moved to and prepare the site for helicopter landing. If no
landing site is nearby, identify any sites from which casualty can potentially be winched out by TASPOL rescue helicopter (e.g.
opening in canopy)
Helicopter response time is likely to exceed 20 minutes
Confirm with those at the site that the area identified for helicopter landing site is suitable as on-ground conditions may have
changed. Ensure requirements for helicopter landing sites are clearly communicated.
The closest helicopter landing site may not be the most suitable. Ensure that those on-ground with the casualty are aware that
the helicopter may have to land elsewhere as demanded by local conditions.
If casualty cannot be accessed or moved (due to location, medical condition or risks to responders)
this need to be
communicated to medical evacuation team immediately
Provide all assistance required by medical evacuation team
If helicopter evacuation is unable to be utilised, reassess situation and determine immediate priority ie medical team may need
to come on site if the casualty cannot be moved
Non-life
Medical evacuation will not be undertaken for non-life threatening situations (unless the injured party has activated a Personal
threatening
Locator Beacon, in which case TASPOL are required to search for it by helicopter)
injury
Priority is to get the injured walker to a hut, this may require backtracking to the closest hut
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Make 3CT Hut Ranger aware of injured walker returning to the hut.
st
If possible the 3CT Hut Ranger may leave the hut and meet the injured walker on the track to provide 1 aid assistance
The 3CT Hut Ranger to liaise with medical team about best care of the casualty. The casualty may require assistance to exit
the track once the injury has received initial treatment. This may involve medical evacuation in the event that the walker cannot
safety exit or continue.
If possible all actions should be based from the Hut, as these have adequate helicopter landing area if required and will have
better 1st aid facilities.
Monitor
situation
At all times the safety of responders is paramount
Those on the scene should provide updates if any conditions change whilst evacuation/treatment is being undertaken
End
This Response plan ends when the injured walker is under medical care
All 1st aid supplies used should be replaced to ensure fully stocked kits
5.10 HUT F I RE: I NCI DENT R ESPO NSE PL AN
Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
Fire in hut
This plan is to be enacted for any event where an internal fire occurs within 3CT huts
On-site
Immediately muster all people out of the hut to the evacuation assembly area
response
(3CT hut
Instruct people to move calmly to the evacuation assembly area and to leave all their belongings behind (if easily accessible
ranger)
they should take exposure protection ie. warm jacket as long as this does not slow their exit from the building)
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
If safe to do so, attack fire with extinguisher appropriate to fire type.
If it is unsafe to attempt to suppress the fire, immediately leave the hut and while standing in a safe position from the fire, direct
walkers to proceed to the assembly area. To avoid potential disorientation of walkers upon leaving a hut the Hut ranger should
only proceed to evacuation assembly area once satisfied that all occupants have vacated the building,.
If safe to do so attempt to extinguish any spot fires in vegetation
If safe to do so, contact 3CT Duty Officer to advise of fire, and the likely level of assistance required.
If safe to do so, turn off any gas supply at its source
If the vegetation surrounding the hut is ignited, take all necessary precautions to ensure walker safety (i.e. relocating them from
evacuation assembly area if that may be in path of fire).
Off-site
Immediately upon notification of hut fire place a bushfire fighting team on standby, in case the fire is transferred to the
response
surrounding vegetation. This will not be required for days of FDI low-moderate.
Consider the use of air support for rapid fire attack if the fire is transferred to the surrounding vegetation
Commence planning for evacuation of walkers (in case hut is destroyed and walkers are left without shelter). The requirement
for this will be partly determined by weather conditions at the time.
Monitor
situation
Do not re-enter the building until given the all-clear
For small fires there may not be any external assistance and it will be the PWS staff who decide when people can return to the
hut. All care must be taken to ensure that no risk remains before this is done.
For any fire which may have impacted the structural integrity of the building, no one is to return to the building until it has been
assessed as safe by a person with appropriate expertise (ie. builder/engineer)
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Action flow
Details
Tick on
completion
End
This Response plan ends when the building fire is extinguished
All fire fighting equipment (ie. discharged extinguishers) must be replaced
Mitigate
causal
factors
Determine cause of fire and take all possible steps to ensure that it has been adequately resolved to mitigate likelihood of
further fires from this cause.
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5.11 EMERG ENCY CO NT ACT S
General Emergency Contacts
Tasmania Police
000
Tasmania Fire Service
Tasmanian Ambulance Service
132 500 (business hours) or 000
State Emergency Service
(after hours duty officer)
Bureau Of Meteorology (Hobart)
Statewide Airdesk (only when the airdesk
is activated)
(03) 6221 2000
(03) 6230 8735
PWS Emergency Contacts
Parks and Reserves Manager
Grant Hall – (03) 6214 8101
0428 319 016
Ranger in Charge
Stuart Dudgeon – (03) 6214 8105
0427 570 080
Regional Operations Manager
Shane Breen – (03) 6233 4756
0417 359 474
Regional Manager
Ashley Rushton – (03) 6233 9546
0438 519 235
Southern Region Fire Duty Officer
0419 879 708
(During Fire Season)
State Fire Duty Officer
0418 345 896
(During Fire Season)
Seven-Mile Beach Field Centre (Monday
(03) 6214 8100
to Friday only)
Taranna Field Centre
(03) 6250 3980
Fortescue Bay Caretakers
Mark – (03) 6250 2433
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6
Recovery
Responsibilities
The roles of recovery are detailed in the Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan. PWS has
recovery responsibilities for:
Ensuring staff wellbeing;
Clearing and restoration of some roads, tracks, bridges and other assets within its parks and
reserves;
Rehabilitation of flora and fauna affected by an emergency within its parks and reserves;
Restoration of fire trails and control lines.
Recovery Planning
Recovery activities will normally commence following the completion of initial response activities.
Depending on the scale of the incident a recovery plan will be formulated by the local Ranger in
Charge, the Incident Management Team or, in the case of major events such as bushfire, staff
delegated by the Regional Manager.
A recovery plan should consider the following:
The current situation, the planned outcome of recovery activities, the resources required to
achieve this outcome and a timeframe for implementation.
Staff and community welfare issues, asset, cultural heritage, environmental and political
issues;
Consultation with other agencies involved in the incident or other organisations with relevant
expertise as required.
Debrief of relevant stakeholders and follow-up on recommendations;
Assessment and reporting of damage or injuries caused by the incident;
Repair of any damage to the 3CT infrastructure;
Restoration of visitor use of 3CT as soon as possible;
Public relations response to any adverse publicity related to the risks on 3CT;
Chapter 7 of the PWS Southern Region Strategic Fire Management Plan (May 2011) should also be
referred to in developing the recovery plan.
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Financial Considerations
The Regional Manager must approve expenditure and deployment of resources for non-fire
emergencies;
If the emergency causes damage to the PWS infrastructure refer to the TRMF for advice on
the Insurance Asset Replacement Process (also available on the intranet).
Staff Welfare
Every effort should be made to support staff involved in emergency response activities. Critical
Incident Stress Debriefing sessions for individuals or groups must be organised by the region
appropriate to the level of incident and staff impacts. Hard copies of details of counselling and trauma
management should be provided to all staff. Information on staff welfare including counselling and
trauma management can be located on the intranet.
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7
Implementation and Maintenance Schedule
A recommended implementation and maintenance schedule is provided in Table 12 below.
Table 12: Recommended Implementation and Maintenance Schedule
Task
Purpose
Frequency
Timing
Responsibility
Provide a current copy of the FMS and
Allow other agencies to respond effectively
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Planning Group
ERP to local TFS stations and other
to an emergency
To aid emergency navigation
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Planning Group
Progressively refine bushfire protection
To ensure huts and occupants have best
As required during design
Prior to finalising design &
3CT Planning Group
of huts during detailed design and
chance of surviving bushfire attack
and construction
during construction
To reduce risk of walker injury / loss of life
Once
Following hut design
3CT Planning Group
Construct huts and Emergency Only
To ensure On Site refuges areas and
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Planning Group
Refuges according to design
Emergency Only Refuges are operational
Once (and as needed)
Prior to and during track and
3CT Planning Group
Frequency - Once
relevant response agencies
Install track signage at every
intersection and at other relevant track
locations
construction
Develop design and specific siting
details for Emergency Only Refuges
for track users
Establish and implement appropriate
To protect track and hut construction
mitigation measures for track and hut
workers during the construction period
hut construction
construction workers
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Task
Purpose
Frequency
Timing
Responsibility
Develop 3CT user navigational
To aid in safe navigation
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Planning Group
To ensure all users are logged and
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Planning Group
Once
Prior to track commissioning
3CT Business Enterprise
information (walk map and on-track
information and signage)
Develop track registration system
appropriate details are collected
Develop information packs for
To inform prospective 3CT users of risk
prospective 3CT users
and mitigation
or Communications
Group
Frequency - Ongoing
Communicate with and inform potential
To ensure prospective 3CT users are
Ongoing (for each new
track users regarding bushfire risk and
informed of these matters
contact with prospective
mitigation measures
Maintain communications and
At or before registration
3CT Management Team
3CT user)
So that the plan can be implemented
Ongoing
Year round
3CT Management Team
On-track PWS staff to notify track
To ensure the track, huts and information
Ongoing
Year round
On-track PWS staff
managers of maintenance requirements
are maintained at an appropriate standard
Daily
evacuation capacity
regarding track, hut/s and signage or
track user information material
Frequency – Daily during walker season
Communicate with track users
To ensure track users are appropriately
Information update to be
On-track PWS staff and
concerning current risk and safety
informed and directed regarding safe track
provided at each hut every
3CT hut rangers
related information
usage
evening
Monitor current and expected FDI and
Advise on-track PWS staff (and users) of
weather patterns
this information
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Daily
Information update to be
3CT Duty Officer and
provided each morning
3CT hut rangers
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Task
Purpose
Frequency
Timing
Responsibility
Monitor region for fire activity
To allow for quick response when
Daily during the fire
Evening (and hourly when
3CT Duty Officer and
appropriate
season
fire within 20km)
3CT hut rangers
Communicate Emergency Response
To ensure all 3CT staff, relevant PWS staff
Annually
Immediately prior to the fire
3CT Management Team
Plan with staff and stakeholders
and stakeholders (e.g. TFS, SES) are fully
Frequency – Annually
season
briefed with proposed emergency
management arrangements
Maintain staff training (as per Section
Ensure all staff are appropriate trained
Annually
Prior to the fire season
3CT Management Team
Review effectiveness of information
To ensure track information is relevant,
Annually
Following the fire season
3CT Management Team
provision of track users
understandable and provided through the
To ensure relevant information is current
Every 10 years or
2021 or when needed
3CT Management Team
for land managers and emergency
whenever there are
response personnel
significant changes.
4.2.2)
best means
Frequency - Varied
Review this FMS & ERP
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References
Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC), 2010, Bushfires and Community
Safety Position Paper, Version 4.1.
Catchpole, W., Bradstock, R., Choate, J., Fogarty, L., Gellie, N., McCarthy, G., McCaw, L., MarsdenSmedley, J. and Pearce, G. (1998a) Cooperative development of equations for heathland fire behaviour.
In 'III International conference on forest fire research and 14th conference on fire and forest meteorology'.
Luso, Portugal. (Ed. D.X.Viegas) pp. 631-645.
Catchpole, W. R., Catchpole, E. A., Rothermel, R. C., Morris, G. A., Butler, B. W. and Latham, D. J.
(1998b) Rate of spread of free-burning fires in woody fuels in a wind tunnel. Combustion Science and
technology 131, 1-37.
COAG (2004). Report of the National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management. Council of
Australian Governemtns.
Emergency Management Australia (2004) Emergency Management in Australia: Concepts and
Principles. Australian Emergency Management Series, Manual 1. Emergency Management Australia,
Canberra.
Marsden-Smedley, J. B. and Catchpole, W. R. (1995) Fire modelling in Tasmanian buttongrass
moorlands I. Fuel characteristics. International Journal of Wildland Fire 5, 203-214.
McArthur, A. G. (1973). Forest Fire Danger Meter Mk5. Commonwealth of Australia. Forestry and Timber
Bureau.
PWS (2005) Fire Planning Policy. Parks and Wildlife Service Tasmania. Department of Primary
Industries, Parks, Water and Environment.
PWS (2006) Tasman National Park, Pirates Bay State Reserve & Eaglehawk Neck Historic Site, Fire
Management Plan. DRAFT Version 2. Parks and Wildlife Service Tasmania.
PWS (2010) Fire Action Plan 2010-11 Fire Season, Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and
Environment. (unpublished).
PWS (2011) Tasmanian Bushfire Risk Assessment Model V4. Department of Primary Industries, Parks,
Water and Environment. (unpublished).
PWS (2011) Southern Region Strategic Fire Management Plan. Parks and Wildlife Service Tasmania.
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment.
TFS (2005) Guidelines for development in bushfire prone areas of Tasmania. Tasmania Fire Service.
TPC (2011) Draft Bushfire Prone Areas Code. Tasmanian Planning Commission.
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APPENDIX 1 – HUT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION REPORT
1. Introduction
This project brief describes Task 3 as per below; this report provides the response required by
this task:
“Task 3 - Provide design and construction recommendations for the Three Capes
Track hut infrastructure to enhance the safety of walkers and, where practical, the fire
resistance capacity of infrastructure.
Aspects to be considered include, but are not limited to:
a) Design features to enhance the fire resistance of new infrastructure (especially huts)
b) Fire infrastructure (building protection zones, fuel modified buffer zones, fire trails, etc)
c) Operational and evacuation procedures for track and construction workers on days with
dangerous Fire Danger Ratings (FDR)
d) Provide recommendations in a brief report.”
It is anticipated that this „hut design and construction report‟ will be enhanced, or refined, as the bushfire
design aspects of the Three Capes Track (3CT) unfold e.g. from information gleaned from the detailed
risk analysis. Similarly, enhancement/refinement of the operational and evacuation procedures for track
and construction workers within this report is also likely to occur as the project unfolds. As this report will
form part of the final project report, that report will include all such design modifications, including that
obtained from stakeholder comment.
During the „bushfire planning‟ stakeholder meeting on the 13th July 2011 the following guiding principles
relevant to design and construction of the hut infrastructure emerged:
Huts may be required by walkers and management personnel as emergency refuge during
bushfires;
The proposed huts are a very high cost to design and construct and as such should, as far as
reasonably possible, withstand the passage of a bushfire with minimum human intervention;
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An „iconic‟ bushwalking experience at each hut site is desirable e.g. through positioning to
capture spectacular views; but if this is not feasible viewing platforms nearby a hut may provide
the „view experience‟;
Protection of human life is a priority in the hut infrastructure design strategy;
Bushfire protection planning/analysis for the project is to based upon a Fire Danger Rating of 50.
This report provides specific recommendations for each public hut site; however, it was agreed during site
inspections that site/hut specific recommendations could not be provided for the commercial huts as the
developers of these sites will, no doubt, desire specific design outcomes which at this stage are unknown.
2. Assumptions regarding hut functionality during bushfire attack
It was agreed at the stakeholder meeting that evacuation off-site of walkers and management personnel
from all parts of the 3CT potentially threatened by a bushfire may not be feasible with the fire and weather
conditions potentially occurring under a FDI of 50. Prior to this agreement the option of helicopter
evacuation was considered, however, the operational limitations of helicopter evacuation (weather,
smoke, carrying capacity and turnaround times etc) meant that it could not be relied upon as the primary
or sole source of walker and management personnel safety during bushfire events. More discussion on
the limitation of off-site evacuation will be provided in final project report.
It is expected that the proposed Radiant Heat Flux (RHF) modelling of potential „natural‟ refuge areas
(e.g. rocks, clearings etc) to be completed in the next stage of the project will show that there are very few
(if any) sites along the 3CT where the RHF, under FDI of 50, will provide a suitable refuge without the
addition of shielding from radiant heat. Whilst cleared lands nearby the Maingon Creek hut site are
potentially suitable, shielding of people would be required at all other apparently lower risk locations along
the 3CT e.g. the water‟s edge at Tunnel Bay. It is therefore assumed that the proposed huts need to
provide the primary refuge during a bushfire for walkers and management personnel along the 3CT.
There is no Australian Standard that specifically addresses the protection of people in the situations
proposed by the 3CT. Australian Standard AS3959 Construction of buildings in bushfire prone areas
provides for protection of buildings and a level of protection that is appropriate during the passage of a
bushfire past the building with occupants remaining inside. It is therefore, in a sense, a de-facto standard
for the protection of the occupants of a building. Under AS3959 the separation distance from a hazard
and a building‟s construction standard are determined to provide an appropriate standard of protection for
a building (and its occupants).
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The objective of AS3959 is “to prescribe construction details for buildings to reduce the risk of ignition
from a bushfire while a fire front passes”. In the absence of an Australian Standard for protection of
people such as bushwalkers, AS3959 offers a benchmark that is considered appropriate provided that:
Huts are designed and constructed under AS3959 to withstand the predicted Bushfire Attack
Level (BAL) for each hut site;
An accredited Bushfire Planning and Design (BPAD-A) certified company or person certifies that
the design and construction of each hut meets the BAL required;
Maintenance of the huts and associated Building Protection Zone (BPZ) is appropriate to ensure
the approved BAL for the huts is achieved under any bushfire attack scenario in the years
following construction;
Occupants of the huts behave during a bushfire attack in a manner similar to that implicit for
building occupants under AS3959 (management of this behaviour is to be covered in the
evacuation section of the final report). In essence, this behaviour requires people to shelter in the
building during the passage of the bushfire past the building (typically a matter of minutes not
hours) and exiting of the building when safe to do so. After exiting the hut people are to extinguish
any ignitions of the hut or move onto burned ground sufficiently distant from unburnt vegetation
and the fire edge to refuge from the radiant heat and smoke.
The Tasmania Fire Service publication “Guidelines for Development of Bushfire Prone Areas in
Tasmania” (2005) offers some additional perspective on appropriate bushfire protection design for the
huts and people. The objective of the guideline is “to minimise losses of life and property from bushfires
by making living and working places defendable from bushfires.”
The guidelines have primarily been used to ensure the separation distance from the unmanaged
vegetation around the proposed huts is appropriate; it is noted that the guidelines specifically state that it
is NOT a regulatory document. It is also noted that, much of the guideline is inapplicable to the 3CT as it
relates to residential environment where issues such as vehicular access, power and water supply are
important design elements.
Under “Guidelines for Development of Bushfire Prone Areas in Tasmania” building separation from a
hazard is provided by a Building Protection Zone (BPZ) and a Fuel Modified Buffer Zone (FMBZ). In this
report the FMBZ is treated as a BPZ as this will achieve a higher level of bushfire protection for the
proposed huts. This is considered necessary given the potential refuge purpose of the huts and the
potential need for the huts to survive a bushfire without human intervention e.g. if off-site evacuation were
to occur.
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The report has also considered Tasmania‟s draft Bushfire Prone Areas Code which is expected to be
enacted in the near future and well prior to the operation of the 3CT. Under the Code, the 3CT track falls
entirely on Bushfire Prone Land, however, the Panel responsible for developing the Code has agreed in
7
principle to an exception for bushwalking huts (Adrian Pyrke , Aug 2011, pers. comm.).
3. BPZ and BAL influence on design and position of huts and environs
Passive bushfire protection measures are generally regarded by fire authorities as the most reliable and
important measures for protection of life and property. Passive measures are not reliant on human
intervention for their effectiveness (except possibly for design and maintenance) and therefore would
minimise the need for walkers to ensure the effectiveness of huts as a refuge. Notwithstanding this,
appropriate walker and management response is important to augment the passive measures e.g.
appropriate behaviour while seeking refuge in a building during the passage of the bushfire.
The methods of passive protection suitable for the 3CT situation are the positioning of huts, separation of
the huts from the hazard, hut construction standard and the use of radiant heat barriers.
The general location of each hut site was predetermined by other 3CT requirements. Investigation of
each locality indicated that an appropriate standard for life and property could be achieved with a
potentially acceptable level of site disturbance. Therefore significant relocation of huts sites was not
explored apart from an alternate position for the Lunchtime Creek hut site which was investigated and is
commented upon in Table A4.
Some minor building footprint adjustment may be desirable at a later stage to protect a vulnerable
component of a hut or maximise occupant safety during ingress and egress e.g. slight rotation of building
or moving a metre or two in a specific direction. These minor positional refinements are best done by a
bushfire consultant in conjunction with site and building designers such as an architect.
The separation distance from the hazard and building construct ion standard offer the most important
bushfire protection measures for the huts. These two measures work in concert; if a hut has a larger
separation from the hazard (i.e. a Building Protection Zone (BPZ)) then a lower construction standard can
be used with a resultant lowering of construction costs and an increase in hut design flexibility.
7
Based upon advice given to Adrian Pyrke (TPWS Manager Fire Operations) during a Tasmanian Planning Commission workshop
in August 2001
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Conversely, if the BP Z needs to be reduced in size to avoid a sensitive site feature or simply minimise
the site disturbance, then the building construction standard can be increased.
It is however considered undesirable to diminish the BPZ to the extent that the Bushfire Attack Level
(BAL) is required to exceed BAL 29 as higher BALs (BAL-40 and BAL-FZ) may experience flame contact
and therefore material performance is less reliable and the refuge capacity of the hut is substantially less
appropriate.
To maximise the refuge capability of the huts this report recommends BAL 29 as the minimum BAL for the
three higher risk huts on the 3CT; this will not only improve their refuge capacity (with appropriate BPZ),
but will improve the ability of the hut to survive if hut occupants are evacuated off-site and no-one is
available to extinguish burning debris on or around the hut after the passage of the fire. The three higher
risk hut locations with a minimum BAL 29 are at Tunnel Bay, Maingon Creek and Lunchtime Creek.
It may, in some situations, be desirable to enlarge the BPZ beyond that required to achieve the BAL. For
example, minimising of the number of canopy trees to be removed within the BPZ will reduce the visual
impact of the hut site from elsewhere on the 3CT, maximise the aesthetic appeal of the hut environs,
reduce wind strength at ground level, minimise the damaging effect of wind turbulence associated with
sharp changes in the vegetation profile, and help capture burning debris prior to it landing on a hut.
All of these abovementioned factors have been considered in the recommended BPZ and BAL for each
hut site (see Tables 1 – 5).
Radiant Heat Shields have not been relied upon at this stage of hut design. These are likely to be useful
in fine tuning the protection and ingress/egress safety of some elements of some huts, but the need for
these cannot be determined until specific hut design and positioning is available. It is highly likely that
these barriers could be very useful on steeper sites such as both the public and commercial hut site
options at Maingon Creek. A low barrier ~ 1 m high at the outside of the BPZ may also be useful for huts
located within buttongrass dominated sites (i.e. Surveyors Cove and Retakuna Creek).
4. BPZ/BAL options and recommendation for each hut
Tables 1 – 5 provide the recommended BPZ and BAL for each hut and compare this with the BAL
required under AS3959. The slope and vegetation that most affects the bushfire attack level for a hut site
has been determined over a distance of at least 100 m in four directions away from each potential hut
footprint. Vegetation classification under AS3959 has occurred and an FDI of 50 was used with the BAL
determined using Table 2.4.4 in AS3959. The BPZ was selected to achieve an appropriate BAL (under
AS3959) for the site having consideration of each site‟s characteristics and the project objectives.
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The general vegetation modification and management required for a BPZ is identified in Section 5.
Specific variations to this design may be desirable at some huts; where these are identifiable at this stage
they are included in the comments section of each Table. It is expected that site specific vegetation
modification will be sought to maximise the visitor experience or achieve some other design element e.g.
retention of a specific feature tree. These detailed adjustments to the BPZ are best achieved with a
bushfire consultant on site with architects and other site planners. In some instances the retention of a
specific element of the vegetation may require an enlargement of the BPZ in a specific direction to
compensate and maintain the BAL standard selected.
Table A1 shows the bushfire attack assessment for Hut Site 1 at Tunnel Bay. Some refuge capacity
exists behind rocks/caves at the water‟s edge at this site; however these may not be suitable under some
surf conditions. Furthermore, the radiant heat exposure outside these rock refuges elsewhere along the
Tunnel Bay shoreline will not be suitable under some bushfire scenarios. The proposed hut therefore
offers the best refuge particularly given its location at the foot of a steep upslope to the west and northwest. The most likely direction of fire attack for this hut is from the North and possibly East.
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Table A1: Building Protection Zone and BAL for Hut Site 1 (Tunnel Bay)
BAL
Direction
Slope
from hut
Vegetation
BPZ
under
AS3959
BAL
Recommended
Comment
Long downhill fire approach from the west is beneficial and likely to
remove risk of crown fire from this direction. Older-aged Drooping Sheoak trees (Allocasuarina verticulata) occur immediately uphill, many of
West
0
Upslope 25
Forest
23 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
these will need to be removed within the BPZ. A small non-combustible
fence is also recommended uphill of the hut to catch any potential burning
material that rolls down the hill, especially as this is often occurs well after
the passage of the fire and potentially when there is no one at the hut.
Primary fire attack likely from this direction given shape of valley and
Upslope
North
Shrubland
0-50
19 m
BAL 19
BAL 29
been enlarged to suit BAL 19 but with BAL 29 applied.
Higher intensity fire could run upslope away from hut through the heath,
Upslope
East
Shrubland
0-50
10 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
this could result in significant increase in RHF around the water‟s edge.
BPZ kept small to minimise impact on watercourse.
Shrubland
South
potential direction of fire spread. Added protection provided as BPZ has
0
Downslope 0-5
(over
short distance to
10 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
rock & water)
94
Short fire run could be treated as remnant vegetation with BPZ and BAL
based upon rainforest if a lesser site impact (BPZ) is desired.
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Table A2 shows the bushfire attack assessment for Hut Site 2 at Maingon Creek. Whilst a number of site
options were assessed for the public hut the two on the upper slope had similar BAL and BPZ
requirements with the upper-most offering better views and closer proximity to the cleared lands (potential
off-site refuge) to the north; it is therefore considered the preferred site of the upper two options. The
lower site offers a smaller BPZ and lower BAL but does not take advantage of the „iconic view‟ from the
hut itself.
Overall the Maingon Creek site is considered the highest risk site of all five hut sites. This is because of
the forested vegetation and the steep slopes (particularly for the upper two sites) and the potential length
of fire run from the north-west. A BAL 40 has been recommended for the uppermost site to reduce the
size of the BPZ; evacuation off-site is also recommended for this upper site as it involves less than 5 mins
walk to a potentially suitable refuge in cleared areas. The most likely direction of fire attack for this hut is
from the North-west and North-east.
95
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Table A2: Building Protection Zone and BAL for Hut Site 2 (Maingon Creek)
Direction
from hut
BAL
Slope
Vegetation
BPZ
under
AS3959
BAL
Comment
recommended
Tree canopy spacing may require 25-50% reduction of trees
North-east
Downslope 300
BAL 29
Forest
BAL 40
40 m
within BPZ leaving a crown cover that has lower visual
impact. Height to lower branches of trees to be >3 m and is
relatively easy to achieve.
South-west
Downslope 270
Forest
40 m
BAL 29
BAL 40
Upslope
Forest
25 m
BAL 19
BAL 40
North-west
As above.
Exceeds AS3959 BAL for upper site as RHF will extend along
sides of the building. As above for tree canopy spacing and
thinning.
South-east
Downslope 200
Forest
30 m
BAL 40
BAL 40
As above for tree canopy spacing and thinning.
96
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Table A3 shows the bushfire attack assessment for Hut Site 3 at Surveyors Cove. A number of hut site options were assessed with the
recommended hut site being located within the woodland. The BPZ are designed to provide a BAL 19 and therefore a lower cost construction
option to other huts with the exception of the Retakuna Creek site which also has a BAL 19. The most likely direction of fire attack for this hut is
from the North and North-east.
Table A3: Building Protection Zone and BAL for Hut Site 3 (Surveyors Cove)
Direction
from hut
Slope
Vegetation
BPZ
BAL under
BAL
AS3959
recommended
North
Upslope 0-50
Woodland
22 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
East
Downslope 0-50
Woodland
26 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
South
Upslope 0-5
Woodland
22 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
West
Downslope 0-50
Woodland
26 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
0
97
Comment
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Table A4 shows the bushfire attack assessment for the preferred Hut Site 4 location at Lunchtime Creek.
On this site the fuel in the canopy of the trees is located higher above the ground fuels (15 m tree heights)
and this vertical separation, with an appropriate BPZ, reduces the risk of the tree canopies being involved
in crown fire under most fire attack scenarios. This site is considered a better option than those assessed
to the north where greater site impacts will occur with the establishment of a BPZ in tall shrubland. The
most likely direction of fire attack for this hut is from the North-west.
On the preferred site some eucalypt tree removal will be required (e.g. 50% reduction of existing crown
cover) but the final outcome will retain a somewhat consistent tree cover which will reduce the wind
penetration to a ground fire, help catch burning debris and retain a greater vegetation cover for the site
with a more aesthetically pleasing walker experience.
The north-east façade of the hut should be located so that a 15 m BPZ is available and a maximum of 2
m wide unmanaged vegetation above the cliff. This reduced BPZ is justifiable as the drop-off associated
with the cliff is so sharp that the radiant heat from a fire below the top of the cliff would not impinge of the
hut (as radiant heat can only travel in a straight line).
Table A4: Building Protection Zone and BAL for Hut Site 4 (Lunchtime Creek)
BAL
Direction
Slope
from hut
BPZ
under
AS3959
Downslope
North-west
Vegetation
Forest
34 m
BAL 29
BAL
Comment
recommended
BAL 29
0
BPZ could be reduced with use
of BAL 40
10
Smaller
Downslope
North-east
Forest
15 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
BPZ
is
appropriate
because the hut is shielded from
fire below the cliff-top. Also fire is
>450
very low probability from this
direction.
South-
Downslope
west
10
30 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
As above
0
Downslope
South-east
Forest
Forest
35 m
BAL 29
BAL 29
150
As above
Table A5 shows the bushfire attack assessment for Hut Site 5 at Retakuna Creek. It has a protection
assessment outcome similar to that at Surveyors Cove Hut Site. The most likely direction of fire attack for
this hut is from the North-west.
98
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Hardening of the ground surface of the BPZ may be required to carry the foot traffic, especially during
wetter periods. This may be achieved with a variety of landscaping techniques e.g. concrete pavers that
allow vegetation to grow through a hole in the middle. A low height masonry wall of about 1 m high is also
considered desirable around the outside of the BPZ; it may be added to reduce the size of the BPZ or
simply increase the BAL safety margin and help define the area around the hut that walkers utilise/impact.
Table A5: Building Protection Zone and BAL for Hut Site 5 (Retakuna Creek)
Direction
from hut
BAL
Slope
Vegetation
BPZ
under
AS3959
BAL
recommended
Comment
BAL and BPZ can be
adjusted to if required
North
0
Upslope 5-10
Woodland
20 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
to provide lesser site
impact or lower cost
construction.
East
Upslope 0-50
South
Downslope >0-50
West
Downslope >0-5
Woodland
0
Tussock
Moorland
Tussock
Moorland
15 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
As above
15 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
As above
23 m
BAL 19
BAL 19
As above
99
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
5. Building Protection Zone design
The fuel modification within the BPZ should be established in accord with the prescription in Table A6
prior to construction commencing on each of the proposed hut sites. A different vegetation modification
strategy is proposed for the Forest/Woodland BPZ and the Shrubland BPZ. These strategies are to be
applied based upon the actual vegetation found within the BPZ distances identified in Tables A1-5, not
the predominant vegetation used to determine the BAL (i.e. as described in Tables A1-5).
Variation of the vegetation modification strategy is feasible if a specific site sensitive strategy is required;
such modification would require site specific assessment by a qualified bushfire consultant prior to
finalising of the hut design and footprint.
Table A6: Fuel management requirements of the Building Protection Zone
Vegetation
type
Tree layer
Mid-storey
Ground layer
No >3% of BPZ
Tree canopy to
have > 5m
separation
Forests
&
Woodlands
Lower limbs
pruned to 2 m
Remove rough
barked species
prior to smooth
barked spp
to be made up of
mid storey plants
any retained
grasses and ground cover
plants are to be <20 cm in
height, except where within
5 m of buildings where it is
to be <10 cm high
vegetation is to
be as small
leaf litter to be <2 cm deep
only non-combustible
isolated and
ground cover is to occur
discontinuous
within 2 m of all combustible
plants or plant
surfaces of buildings e.g.
clumps
gravel
grasses and ground cover
No >3% of BPZ
n/a
if trees are
planted in the
Shrublands &
Buttongrass
BPZ, then it
needs to be in
accord with
specification for
forests/woodlan
ds (above)
to be made up of
mid storey plants
any retained
plants are to be <20 cm in
height, except where within
5 m of buildings where it is
to be <10 cm high
vegetation is to
be as small
leaf litter to be <2 cm deep
only non-combustible
isolated and
ground cover is to occur
discontinuous
within 2 m of all combustible
plants or plant
surfaces of buildings e.g.
clumps
gravel
100
Comment
Small clumps of
trees are
acceptable
provided spacing
between clump
canopies > 5m
>3 m lower limb
pruning required at
Maingon Creek
upper-most site
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
6. Specific hut design measures
Tables 1 – 5 identify the BAL for each façade of each proposed hut. Appendix 1 provides an extract from
AS3959 relevant to BAL 19, 29 and 40 which are the recommended construction standards. Additional
ember protection measures to that listed in AS3959 are recommended for the huts to be constructed to
BAL 19, these measures are provided in Section A3.7 of the NSW Planning for Bushfire Protection
(provided here as Appendix 2).
Hut designers can select from various options for each building element (for each BAL) as shown in
Appendix 1. The options appear flexible enough to accommodate the external material selection desired
by TPWS. Where toughened glass is required (BAL 29 and BAL 40) it is recommended that the outer
glass layer only of double glazed areas comply with the standard. This outer toughened glass layer is
designed not to fail under the predicted BAL and thereby provides protection for the inner layer, even if it
fails. For BAL 19 windows screening of both the openable and fixed windows will be required unless
toughened glass is used.
Shutters are recommended for use on Maingon Creek and Lunchtime Creek Huts as this will give a much
higher level of protection for these higher risk sites. Shutters can be permanently attached to buildings or
stored in an appropriate on-site location to be fitted prior to evacuation off-site.
All huts are to be provided a stored water supply of at least 10,000L for firefighting purposes along with a
portable pump and hoses to facilitate „first aid‟ fire protection measures for the building. Further details on
water usage and response in a bushfire event will be provided in final report.
As far as possible, the overall external shape and construction of buildings on the 3CT should be guided
by Section 4d of Guidelines for Development of Bushfire Prone Areas in Tasmania.
101
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
7. Operational and evacuation procedures during construction
Detailed operational and evacuation procedures for walkers and management are to be provided in
later stages of the project; the guidelines in this report are for personnel during the construction phase
(only).
A good and practical indicator of bushfire risk during construction is the forecast Fire Danger Rating.
This information is communicated widely be media during the bushfire season and is routinely obtained
by TPWS offices for communication to staff, contractors and the public.
A different response is required at varying Fire Danger Ratings within the Bushfire Season; these are
summarised in Table A7.
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102
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
Table A7: Operational and evacuation procedures at different Fire Danger Ratings (FDR) during
construction of 3CT huts and track
FDR
Operational and evacuation procedures
Safe Work Method Statements (SWMS) or Job Safety Assessments are to be prepared or
updated prior to every entry onto the 3CT and include assessment and response to the
bushfire risk.
SWMS/JSA are to assess the following:
o
forecast FDR and appropriate response
o
assessment of potential of existing bushfires on the Tasman Peninsula
o
communication options available in the areas to be assessed
o
response in the event of bushfire occurring
Toolbox talk of bushfire requirements identified in JSA prior to entry onto 3CT
No cooking fires are to be lit. Any use of fire requires prior approval of the PWS FMO or
All ratings in the
Senior Ranger including conditions and equipment required on site.
bushfire season
A satellite phone carried by any crew working in an area that does not have 2-way radio or
mobile phone communications
Evacuation to be guided the location of the reported fire. Assessment of the fires rate and
direction of spread (risk) to be obtained by field crew from the bushfire‟s Incident
Controller. If off-site evacuation is required, move to appropriate location for helicopter
landing agreed to by Incident Controller.
On Site Refuge Areas and Emergency Only Refuges identified in 3CT bushfire report to
be established prior to major on-site works and utilised as required (NB: to be identified in
final report)
Appropriate Personal Protection Equipment suitable for basic bushfire exposure to be worn
e.g. avoid synthetic clothing. See TFS guidelines.
0 - 16
No additional provisions
No use of welding or potential fire starting equipment/machinery
16 - 24
Morning check-in to local PWS office to obtain fire and weather update
Off-site evacuation to occur at report of any fire within 10 kms of work site
No use of any equipment/machinery with fire starting potential
Morning and midday check-in to local PWS office to obtain fire and weather update
No work to occur >30 minutes walk from a suitable refuge or evacuation point. Refuge sites
25 - 50
to be prior approved by 3CT Building and Track Supervisor (to be added after advice)
Off-site evacuation to occur at report of any fire on the Tasman Peninsula south or west of
Eaglehawk Neck.
Personal fire protection tents to be carried (NB: for discussion only at this point)
>50
No personnel to be on 3CT. FDR forecast to be monitored at least 24 hours ahead so that
off-site evacuation can occur prior to FDI >50 day
103
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
8. Conclusion
This report is preliminary in that additional bushfire risk assessment and design of the 3CT will occur
over subsequent weeks; this along with stakeholder feedback will be used to refine the
recommendations contained herein. Recommendations within this report are primarily located within the
Tables 1 – 5 and within Sections 5 - 7. Understanding of these recommendations is obtained from other
parts of the report or from the author.
104
T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
APPENDIX 2 – AS3959 CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS SUMMARY
105
53
AS 3959—2009
SECT ION 6
CONSTRUCT IO N FOR BUSHF IR E
ATTACK L E VE L 1 9 ( B A L — 1 9 )
6.1 GENERAL
A building assessed in Section 2 as being BAL—19 shall comply with Section 3 and
Clauses 6.2 to 6.8.
NOTE: There are a number of Standards that specify requirements for construction; however,
where this Standard does not provide construction requirements for a particular element, the other
Standards apply.
Any element of construction or system that satisfies the test criteria of AS 1530.8.1 may be
used in lieu of the applicable requirements contained in Clauses 6.2 to 6.8 (see Clause 3.8).
NOTE: BAL—19 is primarily concerned with protection from ember attack and radiant heat
greater than 12.5 kW/m 2 up to and including 19 kW/m 2 .
6.2 SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for subfloor support posts,
columns, stumps, piers and poles.
NOTE: The exclusion of requirements for subfloor supports applies to the principal building only
and not to verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings (see Clause 6.7).
A1
C6.2 Ideally, storage of combustible materials beneath a floor at this BAL would not
occur and on this assumption, there is no requirement to enclose the subfloor space or
to protect the subfloor supports, or the bearers, joists and flooring from bushfire attack;
however, should combustible materials be stored, it is recommended the area be
protected as materials stored in the subfloor space may be ignited by embers and cause
an impact to the building.
6.3 FLOORS
6.3.1 Concrete slabs on the ground
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for concrete slabs on ground.
6.3.2 Elevated floors
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for elevated floors, including
bearers, joists and flooring.
6.4 EXTERNAL WALLS
A2
6.4.1 Walls
The exposed components of an external wall that are less than 400 mm from the ground or
less than 400 mm above decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings
having an angle less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in
width from the wall (see Figure D3, Appendix D) shall be:
(a)
Non-combustible material.
NOTE: Examples include, but are not limited to, full masonry or masonry veneer, with the
masonry being clay, calcium silicate, concrete, natural stone, aerated concrete, mud brick; or
in situ or panel walls of concrete, aerated concrete or rammed earth.
or
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AS 3959—2009
A2
(b)
54
Timber logs of a species with a density of 680 kg/m3 or greater at a 12 percent
moisture content; of a minimum nominal overall thickness of 90 mm and a minimum
thickness of 70 mm (see Clause 3.11); and gauge planed.
or
(c)
Cladding that is fixed externally to a timber-framed or a steel-framed wall and is—
(i)
non-combustible material; or
(ii)
fibre-cement external cladding, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
(iii) bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iv)
a timber species, as specified in Paragraph E1, Appendix E; or
(v)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above.
or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the exposed components of an
external wall that are 400 mm or more from the ground or 400 mm or more above decks,
carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings having an angle less than 18 degrees
to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in width from the wall (see Figure D3,
Appendix D).
6.4.2 Joints
All joints in the external surface material of walls shall be covered, sealed, overlapped,
backed or butt-jointed to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm.
A2
6.4.3 Vents and weepholes
Vents and weepholes in external walls shall be screened with mesh with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium, except where
they are less than 3 mm (see Clause 3.6), or are located in an external wall of a subfloor
space.
6.5 EXTERNAL GLAZED ELEMENTS AND ASSEMBLIES AND EXTERNAL
DOORS
6.5.1 Bushfire shutters
Where fitted, bushfire shutters shall comply with Clause 3.7 and be made from—
A1
(a)
non-combustible material; or
(b)
a timber species as specified in Paragraph E1, Appendix E; or
(c)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b), or (c) above.
6.5.1A Screens for windows and doors
A1
Where fitted, screens for windows and doors shall have a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium. Gaps
between the perimeter of the screen assembly and the building element to which it is fitted
shall not exceed 3 mm.
The frame supporting the mesh or perforated sheet shall be made from—
(a)
metal; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
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A2
(c)
AS 3959—2009
a timber species as specified in Paragraph E2, Appendix E.
6.5.2 Windows
Window assemblies shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 6.5.1.
or
A1
A2
(b)
They shall be completely protected externally by screens that comply with
Clause 6.5.1A.
or
(c)
(i)
A2
They shall comply with the following:
For window assemblies less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm
above decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings, having an
angle less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in
width from the window frame (see Figure D3, Appendix D), window frames
and window joinery, shall be made from:
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
or
A1
(B)
A timber species as specified in Paragraph E2, Appendix E.
or
(C)
Metal.
or
(D)
(ii)
A1
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel and the frame and
the sash shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural strength
of the member.
Externally fitted hardware that supports the sash in its functions of opening and
closing, shall be metal.
(iii) Where glazing is less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm above
decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings, having an angle
less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in width
from the window frame (see Figure D3, Appendix D), the glazing shall be
toughened glass minimum 5 mm, or glass blocks with no restriction on glazing
methods.
NOTE: Where double-glazed units are used, the above requirements apply to the
external face of the window assembly only.
(iv)
Where glazing is other than that specified in Item (iii) above, annealed glass
may be used. Where annealed glass is used, both the fixed and openable
portions of windows shall be screened externally with screens that comply with
Clause 6.5.1A.
A2
(v)
Where toughened glass is used, it shall be toughened glass minimum 5 mm and
the openable portions of windows shall be screened internally or externally with
screens that comply with Clause 6.5.1A.
A2
(vi)
Glazed elements that are designed to take internal screens shall use toughened
glass minimum 5 mm and the openable portion shall be screened with screens
that comply with Clause 6.5.1A.
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AS 3959—2009
A2
56
C6.5.2 Screening of the openable portions of all windows is required in all BALs to
prevent the entry of embers to the building when the window is open. Screening of the
openable and fixed portions of some windows is required in some BALs to reduce the effects
of radiant heat on some types of glass.
If the screening is required to reduce the effects of radiant heat on the glass, the screening
has to be external so that the glass in the openable portion of the window will be
‘protected’ when it is shut.
If the screening is required only to prevent the entry of embers, the screening may be fitted
externally or internally.
6.5.3 Doors—Side-hung external doors (including French doors, panel fold and
bi-fold doors)
Side-hung external doors, including French doors, panel fold and bi-fold doors, shall
comply with one of the following:
A2
(a)
Doors and door frames shall be protected by bushfire shutters that comply with
Clause 6.5.1.
or
(b)
Doors and door frames shall be protected externally by screens that comply with
Clause 6.5.1A.
or
(c)
Doors and door frames shall comply with the following:
(i)
Doors shall be—
(ii)
(A)
non-combustible; or
(B)
a solid timber door, having a minimum thickness of 35 mm for the first
400 mm above the threshold; or
(C)
a door, including a hollow core door, with a non-combustible kickplate on
the outside for the first 400 mm above the threshold; or
(D)
a door, including a hollow core door, protected externally by a screen that
complies with Clause 6.5.1A; or
(E)
a fully framed glazed door, where the framing is made from materials
required for bushfire shutters (see Clause 6.5.1), or from a timber species
as specified in Paragraph E2, Appendix E.
Where doors incorporate glazing, the glazing shall be toughened glass
minimum 5 mm.
(iii) Doors shall be tight-fitting to the door frame and to an abutting door, if
applicable.
(iv)
Where the door frame is less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm
above decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings having an
angle less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in
width from the door (see Figure D3, Appendix D), the door frame shall be made
from:
A2
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
or
(B)
A timber species as specified in Paragraph E2, Appendix E.
or
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(C)
AS 3959—2009
Metal.
or
(D)
(v)
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel and the door
assembly shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural
strength of the member.
Weather strips, draught excluders or draught seals shall be installed at the base
of side-hung external doors.
6.5.4 Doors—Sliding doors
Sliding doors shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 6.5.1.
or
A1
(b)
They shall be completely protected externally by screens that comply with
Clause 6.5.1A.
or
A1
(c)
They shall comply with the following:
(i)
Any glazing incorporated in sliding doors shall be toughened glass minimum
5 mm.
(ii)
Both the door frame supporting the sliding door and the framing surrounding
any glazing shall be made from:
A2
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
or
(B)
A timber species as specified in Paragraph E2, Appendix E.
or
(C)
Metal.
or
(D)
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel and the frame and
the sash shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural strength
of the member.
(iii) There is no requirement to screen the openable part of the sliding door.
However, if screened, the screens shall comply with Clause 6.5.1A.
NOTE:The construction of manufactured sliding doors should prevent the entry of
embers when the door is closed. There is no requirement to provide screens to the
openable part of these doors as it is assumed that a sliding door will be closed if
occupants are not present or during a bushfire event. Screens of materials other than
those specified may not resist ember attack.
(iv)
Sliding doors shall be tight-fitting in the frames.
6.5.5 Doors—Vehicle access doors (garage doors)
The following apply to vehicle access doors:
(a)
The lower portion of a vehicle access door that is within 400 mm of the ground
when the door is closed (see Figure D4, Appendix D) shall be made from—
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AS 3959—2009
58
(i)
non-combustible material; or
(ii)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iii) fibre-cement sheet, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
A1
(iv)
a timber species as specified in Paragraph E1, Appendix E; or
(v)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) above.
(b)
Panel lift, tilt doors or side-hung doors shall be fitted with suitable weather strips,
draught excluders, draught seals or guide tracks, as appropriate to the door type,
with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm.
(c)
Roller doors shall have guide tracks with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm
and shall be fitted with a nylon brush that is in contact with the door (see
Figure D4, Appendix D).
(d)
Vehicle access doors shall not include ventilation slots.
6.6 ROOFS (INCLUDING VERANDA AND ATTACHED CARPORT ROOFS,
PENETRATIONS, EAVES, FASCIAS, GABLES, GUTTERS AND DOWNPIPES)
6.6.1 General
The following apply to all types of roofs and roofing systems:
A2
(a)
Roof tiles, roof sheets and roof-covering accessories shall be non-combustible.
(b)
The roof/wall junction shall be sealed, to prevent openings greater than 3 mm,
either by the use of fascia and eaves linings or by sealing between the top of the
wall and the underside of the roof and between the rafters at the line of the wall.
(c)
Roof ventilation openings, such as gable and roof vents, shall be fitted with ember
guards made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or
aluminium.
6.6.2 Tiled roofs
Tiled roofs shall be fully sarked. The sarking shall—
A2
(a)
be located on top of the roof framing, except that the roof battens may be fixed above
the sarking;
(b)
cover the entire roof area including ridges and hips; and
(c)
extend into gutters and valleys.
6.6.3 Sheet roofs
Sheet roofs shall—
(a)
be fully sarked in accordance with Clause 6.6.2, except that foil-backed insulation
blankets may be installed over the battens; and
(b)
have any gaps greater than 3 mm (such as under corrugations or ribs of sheet roofing
and between roof components) sealed at the fascia or wall line and at valleys, hips
and ridges by—
(i)
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of
corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
(ii)
mineral wool; or
(iii) other non-combustible material; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
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AS 3959—2009
C6.6.3 Sarking is used as a secondary form of ember protection for the roof space to
account for minor gaps that may develop in sheet roofing.
6.6.4 Veranda, carport and awning roofs
The following apply to veranda, carport and awning roofs:
A1
(a)
A veranda, carport or awning roof forming part of the main roof space [see
Figure D1(a), Appendix D] shall meet all the requirements for the main roof, as
specified in Clauses 6.6.1, 6.6.2, 6.6.3, 6.6.5 and 6.6.6.
(b)
A veranda, carport or awning roof separated from the main roof space by an
external wall [see Figures D1(b) and D1(c), Appendix D] complying with
Clause 6.4 shall have a non-combustible roof covering.
NOTE: There is no requirement to line the underside of a veranda, carport or awning roof that is
separated from the main roof space.
6.6.5 Roof penetrations
The following apply to roof penetrations:
A2
(a)
Roof penetrations, including roof lights, roof ventilators, roof-mounted
evaporative cooling units, aerials, vent pipes and supports for solar collectors
shall be adequately sealed at the roof to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm. The
material used to seal the penetration shall be non-combustible.
(b)
Openings in vented roof lights, roof ventilators or vent pipes shall be fitted with
ember guards made from a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of
2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
This requirement does not apply to the exhaust flues of heating or cooking devices
with closed combustion chambers.
In the case of gas appliance flues, ember guards shall not be fitted.
NOTE: Gasfitters are required to provide a metal flue pipe above the roof and terminate with
a certified gas flue cowl complying with AS 4566. Advice may be obtained from State gas
technical regulators.
A1
(c)
All overhead glazing shall be Grade A safety glass complying with AS 1288.
(d)
Glazed elements in roof lights and skylights may be of polymer provided a
Grade A safety glass diffuser, complying with AS 1288, is installed under the
glazing. Where glazing is an insulating glazing unit (IGU), Grade A toughened
safety glass of minimum 4 mm shall be used in the outer pane of the IGU.
(e)
Flashing elements of tubular skylights may be of a fire-retardant material,
provided the roof integrity is maintained by an under-flashing of a material having
a flammability index no greater than 5.
(f)
Evaporative cooling units shall be fitted with butterfly closers at or near the
ceiling level, or the unit shall be fitted with non-combustible covers with a mesh
or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
6.6.6 Eaves linings, fascias and gables
The following apply to eaves linings, fascias and gables:
(a)
Gables shall comply with Clause 6.4.
(b)
Eaves penetrations shall be protected the same as for roof penetrations, as
specified in Clause 6.6.5.
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Eaves ventilation openings greater than 3 mm shall be fitted with ember guards
made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
Joints in eaves linings, fascias and gables may be sealed with plastic joining strips or timber
storm moulds.
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for fascias, bargeboards and
eaves linings.
6.6.7 Gutters and downpipes
This Standard does not provide material requirements for—
(a)
gutters, with the exception of box gutters; and
(b)
downpipes.
If installed, gutter and valley leaf guards shall be non-combustible.
Box gutters shall be non-combustible and flashed at the junction with the roof with noncombustible material.
6.7 VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS AND LANDINGS
6.7.1 General
A1
Decking may be spaced.
There is no requirement to enclose the subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps or
landings.
C6.7.1 Spaced decking is nominally spaced at 3 mm (in accordance with standard industry
practice); however, due to the nature of timber decking with seasonal changes in moisture
content, that spacing may range from 0–5 mm during service. The preferred dimension for
gaps is 3 mm (which is in line with other ‘permissible gaps’) in other parts of this Standard.
It should be noted that recent research studies have shown that gaps at 5 mm spacing afford
opportunity for embers to become lodged in between timbers, which may contribute to a
fire. Larger gap spacings of 10 mm may preclude this from happening but such a spacing
regime may not be practical for a timber deck.
6.7.2 Enclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
6.7.2.1 Materials to enclose a subfloor space
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the materials used to enclose
a subfloor space except where those materials are less than 400 mm from the ground.
Where the materials used to enclose a subfloor space are less than 400 mm from the ground,
they shall comply with Clause 6.4.
6.7.2.2 Subfloor supports
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for subfloor support posts,
columns, stumps, stringers, piers and poles.
6.7.2.3 Framing
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the framing of verandas,
decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
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AS 3959—2009
6.7.2.4 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for decking, stair treads and the
trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings that are more than 300 mm from a glazed
element.
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings less than 300 mm
(measured horizontally at deck level) from glazed elements that are less than 400 mm
(measured vertically) from the surface of the deck (see Figure D2, Appendix D) shall be
made from—
A1
(a)
non-combustible material; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a timber species as specified in Paragraph E1, Appendix E; or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b), or (c) above.
6.7.3 Unenclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
6.7.3.1 Supports
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for support posts, columns,
stumps, stringers, piers and poles.
6.7.3.2 Framing
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the framing of verandas,
decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
A1
6.7.3.3 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for decking, stair treads and the
trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings that are more than 300 mm from a glazed
element.
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings less than 300 mm
(measured horizontally at deck level) from glazed elements that are less than 400 mm
(measured vertically) from the surface of the deck (see Figure D2, Appendix D) shall be
made from—
A1
(a)
non-combustible material; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a timber species as specified in Paragraph E1, Appendix E; or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b), or (c) above.
6.7.4 Balustrades, handrails or other barriers
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for balustrades, handrails and
other barriers.
6.8 WATER AND GAS SUPPLY PIPES
Above-ground, exposed water and gas supply pipes shall be metal.
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SECT ION 7
CONSTRUCT IO N FOR BUSHF IR E
ATTACK L E VE L 2 9 ( B A L — 2 9 )
7.1 GENERAL
A building assessed in Section 2 as being BAL—29 shall comply with Section 3 and
Clauses 7.2 to 7.8.
NOTE: There are a number of Standards that specify requirements for construction; however,
where this Standard does not provide construction requirements for a particular element, the other
Standards apply.
Any element of construction or system that satisfies the test criteria of AS 1530.8.1 may be
used in lieu of the applicable requirements contained in Clauses 7.2 to 7.8 (see Clause 3.8).
NOTE: BAL—29 is primarily concerned with protection from ember attack and radiant heat
greater than 19 kW/m 2 up to and including 29 kW/m 2 .
7.2 SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for subfloor supports where the
subfloor space is enclosed with—
A2
(a)
a wall that complies with Clause 7.4, except that sarking is not required where
specified in Clause 7.4.1 (c); or
(b)
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the support posts, columns, stumps, piers and poles
shall be—
(i)
of non-combustible material; or
(ii)
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
NOTE: This requirement applies to the principal building only and not to verandas, decks, steps,
ramps and landings (see Clause 7.7).
C7.2 Combustible materials stored in the subfloor space may be ignited by embers and
cause an impact to the building.
7.3 FLOORS
7.3.1 Concrete slabs on ground
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for concrete slabs on ground.
7.3.2 Elevated floors
7.3.2.1 Enclosed subfloor space
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for elevated floors, including
bearers, joists and flooring, where the subfloor space is enclosed with—
A2
(a)
a wall that complies with Clause 7.4, except that sarking is not required where
specified in Clause 7.4.1 (c); or
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AS 3959—2009
(b)
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.3.2.2 Unenclosed subfloor space
A1
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the bearers, joists and flooring, less than 400 mm
above finished ground level, shall be one of the following:
(a)
(i)
(ii)
A2
Materials that comply with the following:
Bearers and joists shall be—
(A)
non-combustible; or
(B)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(C)
a combination of Items (A) and (B) above.
Flooring shall be—
(A)
non-combustible; or
(B)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(C)
timber (other than bushfire-resisting timber), particleboard or plywood
flooring where the underside is lined with sarking-type material or
mineral wool insulation; or
(D)
a combination of any of Items (A), (B) or (C) above.
or
(b)
A system complying with AS 1530.8.1
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for elements of elevated floors,
including bearers, joists and flooring, if the underside of the element is 400 mm or more
above finished ground level.
7.4 EXTERNAL WALLS
A2
7.4.1 Walls
The exposed components of external walls shall be:
(a)
Non-combustible material.
NOTE: Examples include, but are not limited to, full masonry or masonry veneer, with the
masonry being clay, calcium silicate, concrete, natural stone, aerated concrete, mud brick; or
in situ or panel walls of concrete, aerated concrete; or rammed earth.
or
(b)
Timber logs of a species with a density of 680 kg/m3 or greater at a 12 percent
moisture content; of a minimum nominal overall thickness of 90 mm and a minimum
thickness of 70 mm (see Clause 3.11); and gauge planed.
or
(c)
Cladding that is fixed externally to a timber-framed or a steel-framed wall that is
sarked on the outside of the frame, and is—
(i)
fibre-cement, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
(ii)
steel sheet; or
(iii) bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
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or
A2
(d)
A combination of any of Items (a), (b), or (c) above.
7.4.2 Joints
All joints in the external surface material of walls shall be covered, sealed, overlapped,
backed or butt-jointed to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm.
A2
7.4.3 Vents and weepholes
Vents and weepholes in external walls shall be screened with a mesh with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium, except where
they are less than 3 mm (see Clause 3.6).
7.5 EXTERNAL GLAZED ELEMENTS AND ASSEMBLIES AND EXTERNAL
DOORS
7.5.1 Bushfire shutters
Where fitted, bushfire shutters shall comply with Clause 3.7 and be made from—
A1
(a)
non-combustible material; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.5.1A Screens for windows and doors
Where fitted, screens for windows and doors shall have a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium. Gaps
between the perimeter of the screen assembly and the building element to which it is fitted
shall not exceed 3 mm.
The frame supporting the mesh or perforated sheet shall be made from—
(a)
metal; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
7.5.2 Windows
Windows shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 7.5.1.
or
(b)
A2
They shall comply with the following:
(i)
Window frames and window joinery and shall be made from:
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
or
(B)
Metal.
or
(C)
© Standards Australia
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel, and the frame and
the sash shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural strength
of the member.
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(ii)
AS 3959—2009
Externally fitted hardware that supports the sash in its functions of opening and
closing shall be metal.
(iii) Glazing shall be toughened glass minimum 5 mm.
A1
A2
(iv)
Where glazing is less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm above
decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings having an angle
less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in width
from the window frame (see Figure D3, Appendix D), that portion shall be
screened externally with a screen that complies with Clause 7.5.1A.
(v)
The openable portions of windows shall be screened internally or externally
with screens that comply with Clause 7.5.1A.
C7.5.2 Screening of the openable portions of all windows is required in all BALs to
prevent the entry of embers to the building when the window is open. Screening of the
openable and fixed portions of some windows is required in some BALs to reduce the effects
of radiant heat on some types of glass.
If the screening is required to reduce the effects of radiant heat on the glass, the screening
has to be external so that the glass in the openable portion of the window will be
‘protected’ when it is shut.
If the screening is required only to prevent the entry of embers, the screening may be fitted
externally or internally.
7.5.3 Doors—Side-hung external doors (including French doors, panel fold and
bi-fold doors)
Side-hung external doors, including French doors, panel fold and bi-fold doors, shall
comply with one of the following:
A2
(a)
Doors and door frames shall be protected by bushfire shutters that comply with
Clause 7.5.1.
or
(b)
Doors and door frames shall be protected externally by screens that comply with
Clause 7.5.1A.
or
(c)
(i)
A1
Doors and door frames shall comply with the following:
Doors shall be—
(A)
non-combustible; or
(B)
a solid timber door, having a minimum thickness of 35 mm for the first
400 mm above the threshold; or
(C)
a door, including a hollow core door, protected externally by a screen that
complies with Clause 7.5.1A; or
(D)
a fully framed glazed door, where the framing is made from
non-combustible materials or from bushfire-resisting timber (see
Appendix F).
(i)
Externally fitted hardware that supports the panel in its functions of opening
and closing shall be metal.
(ii)
Where doors incorporate glazing, the glazing shall be toughened glass
minimum 6 mm.
(iii) Where glazing is less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm above
decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings having an angle
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less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in width
from the door (see Figure D3, Appendix D), that portion shall be screened
externally with screens that comply with Clause 7.5.1A.
A1
A2
(iv)
Door frames shall be made from:
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F).
or
(B)
Metal.
or
(C)
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel and the door
assembly shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural
strength of the member.
(v)
Doors shall be tight-fitting to the door frame and to an abutting door, if
applicable.
(vi)
Weather strips, draught excluders or draught seals shall be installed at the base
of side-hung external doors.
7.5.4 Doors—Sliding doors
Sliding doors shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with Clause 7.5.1.
or
A1
(b)
They shall be completely protected externally by screens that comply with
Clause 7.5.1A.
or
A1
(c)
They shall comply with the following:
(i)
Both the door frame supporting the sliding door and the framing surrounding
any glazing shall be made from:
A2
(A)
Bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
(B)
Metal;
or
(C)
(ii)
A2
Metal-reinforced PVC-U. The reinforcing members shall be made from
aluminium, stainless steel, or corrosion-resistant steel and the door
assembly shall satisfy the design load, performance and structural
strength of the member.
Externally fitted hardware that supports the panel in its functions of opening
and closing shall be metal.
(iii) Where sliding doors incorporate glazing, the glazing shall be toughened glass
minimum 6 mm.
(iv)
Sliding doors shall be tight-fitting in the frames.
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AS 3959—2009
7.5.5 Doors—Vehicle access doors (garage doors)
The following apply to vehicle access doors:
(a)
Vehicle access doors shall be made from—
(i)
non-combustible material; or
(ii)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iii) fibre-cement sheet, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
(b)
Panel lift, tilt doors or side-hung doors shall be fitted with suitable weather strips,
draught excluders, draught seals or guide tracks, as appropriate to the door type,
with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm.
(c)
Roller doors shall have guide tracks with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm
and shall be fitted with a nylon brush that is in contact with the door (see
Figure D4, Appendix D).
(d)
Vehicle access doors shall not include ventilation slots.
7.6 ROOFS (INCLUDING VERANDA AND ATTACHED CARPORT ROOFS,
PENETRATIONS, EAVES, FASCIAS, GABLES, GUTTERS AND DOWNPIPES)
7.6.1 General
The following apply to all types of roofs and roofing systems:
A2
(a)
Roof tiles, roof sheets and roof-covering accessories shall be non-combustible.
(b)
The roof/wall junction shall be sealed, to prevent openings greater than 3 mm,
either by the use of fascia and eaves linings or by sealing between the top of the
wall and the underside of the roof and between the rafters at the line of the wall.
(c)
Roof ventilation openings, such as gable and roof vents, shall be fitted with ember
guards made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or
aluminium.
(d)
A pipe or conduit that penetrates the roof covering shall be non-combustible.
7.6.2 Tiled roofs
Tiled roofs shall be fully sarked. The sarking shall—
A2
(a)
be located on top of the roof framing, except that the roof battens may be fixed
above the sarking;
(b)
cover the entire roof area including ridges and hips; and
(c)
extend into gutters and valleys.
7.6.3 Sheet roofs
Sheet roofs shall—
(a)
be fully sarked in accordance with Clause 7.6.2, except that foil-backed insulation
blankets may be installed over the battens; and
(b)
have any gaps greater than 3 mm (such as under corrugations or ribs of sheet roofing
and between roof components) sealed at the fascia or wall line and at valleys, hips
and ridges by—
(i)
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of
corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
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(ii)
A2
mineral wool; or
(iii) other non-combustible material; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
C7.6.3 Sarking is used as a secondary form of ember protection for the roof space to
account for minor gaps that may develop in sheet roofing.
7.6.4 Veranda, carport and awning roofs
The following apply to veranda, carport and awning roofs:
(a)
A veranda, carport or awning roof forming part of the main roof space [see
Figure D1(a), Appendix D] shall meet all the requirements for the main roof, as
specified in Clauses 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.6.3, 7.6.5 and 7.6.6.
(b)
A veranda, carport or awning roof separated from the main roof space by an
external wall [see Figures D1(b) and D1(c), Appendix D] complying with
Clause 7.4 shall have a non-combustible roof covering and the support structure
shall be—
(i)
of non-combustible material; or
(ii)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iii) timber rafters lined on the underside with fibre-cement sheeting a minimum of
6 mm in thickness, or with material complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
7.6.5 Roof penetrations
The following apply to roof penetrations:
A2
(a)
Roof penetrations, including roof lights, roof ventilators, roof-mounted
evaporative cooling units, aerials, vent pipes and supports for solar collectors,
shall be adequately sealed at the roof to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm. The
material used to flash the penetration shall be non-combustible.
(b)
Openings in vented roof lights, roof ventilators or vent pipes shall be fitted with
ember guards made from a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of
2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
The requirements of this Item (b) do not apply to the exhaust flues of heating or
cooking devices with closed combustion chambers.
In the case of gas appliance flues, ember guards shall not be fitted.
NOTE: Gasfitters are required to provide a metal flue pipe above the roof and terminate with
a certified gas flue cowl complying with AS 4566. Advice may be obtained from State gas
technical regulators.
A1
A2
(c)
All overhead glazing shall be Grade A safety glass complying with AS 1288.
(d)
Glazed elements in roof lights and skylights may be of polymer provided a
Grade A safety glass diffuser, complying with AS 1288, is installed under the
glazing. Where glazing is an insulating glazing unit (IGU), Grade A toughened
safety glass minimum 4 mm, shall be used in the outer pane of the IGU.
(e)
Flashing elements of tubular skylights shall be non-combustible. However, they
may be of an alternative material, provided the integrity of the roof covering is
maintained by an under-flashing made of non-combustible material.
(f)
Where roof lights are installed in roofs having a pitch of less than 18 degrees to
the horizontal, the glazing shall be protected with ember guards made from a
mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
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AS 3959—2009
A1
(g)
Evaporative cooling units shall be fitted with butterfly closers at or near the
ceiling level, or the unit shall be fitted with non-combustible covers with a mesh
or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
A2
(h)
External single plane glazed elements of roof lights and skylights, where the pitch
of the glazed element is 18 degrees or less to the horizontal, shall be protected
with ember guards made from a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
7.6.6 Eaves linings, fascias and gables
The following apply to eaves linings, fascias and gables:
(a)
Joints in eaves linings, fascias and gables may be sealed with plastic joining strips
or timber storm moulds.
(b)
Gables shall comply with Clause 7.4.
(c)
Fascias and bargeboards shall—
(i)
where timber is used, be made from bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
(ii)
where made from metal, be fixed at 450 mm centres; or
(iii) be a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
(d)
Eaves linings shall be—
(i)
fibre-cement sheet, a minimum 4.5 mm in thickness; or
(ii)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
(e)
Eaves penetrations shall be protected the same as for roof penetrations
(see Clause 7.6.5).
(f)
Eaves ventilation openings greater than 3 mm shall be fitted with ember guards
made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
7.6.7 Gutters and downpipes
This Standard does not provide construction-specific material requirements for downpipes.
If installed, gutter and valley leaf guards shall be non-combustible.
With the exception of box gutters, gutters shall be metal or PVC-U.
Box gutters shall be non-combustible and flashed at the junction with the roof, with
non-combustible materials.
7.7 VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS AND LANDINGS
7.7.1 General
A1
Decking may be spaced.
There is no requirement to enclose the subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps or
landings.
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C7.7.1 Spaced decking is nominally spaced at 3 mm (in accordance with standard industry
practice); however, due to the nature of timber decking with seasonal changes in moisture
content, that spacing may range from 0–5 mm during service. The preferred dimension for
gaps is 3 mm (which is in line with other ‘permissible gaps’) in other parts of this Standard.
It should be noted that recent research studies have shown that gaps at 5 mm spacing afford
opportunity for embers to become lodged in between timbers, which may contribute to a
fire. Larger gap spacings of 10 mm may preclude this from happening but such a spacing
regime may not be practical for a timber deck.
7.7.2 Enclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
A2
7.7.2.1 Materials to enclose a subfloor space
The subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings are deemed to be
‘enclosed’ when—
(a)
the material used to enclose the subfloor space complies with Clause 7.4, except that
sarking is not required where specified in Clause 7.4.1 (c); and
(b)
all openings greater than 3 mm are screened with a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or aluminium.
7.7.2.2 Supports
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for support posts, columns,
stumps, stringers, piers and poles.
7.7.2.3 Framing
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the framing of verandas,
decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
A1
7.7.2.4 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.3 Unenclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
7.7.3.1 Supports
Support posts, columns, stumps, stringers, piers and poles shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.3.2 Framing
Framing of verandas, decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists) shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
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AS 3959—2009
7.7.3.3 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.4 Balustrades, handrails or other barriers
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades less than 125 mm from any glazing or any
combustible wall shall be—
A2
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades that are 125 mm or more from the building
have no requirements.
7.8 WATER AND GAS SUPPLY PIPES
Above-ground, exposed water and gas supply pipes shall be metal.
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SECT ION 8
CONSTRUCT IO N FOR BUSHF IR E
ATTACK L E VE L 4 0 ( B A L — 4 0 )
8.1 GENERAL
A building assessed in Section 2 as being BAL—40 shall comply with Section 3 and
Clauses 8.2 to 8.8.
NOTE: There are a number of Standards that specify requirements for construction; however,
where this Standard does not provide construction requirements for a particular element, the other
Standards apply.
Any element of construction or system that satisfies the test criteria of AS 1530.8.1 may be
used in lieu of the applicable requirements of Clauses 8.2 to 8.8, see Clause 3.8.
NOTE: BAL—40 is primarily concerned with protection from ember attack, increased likelihood
of flame contact and radiant heat greater than 29 kW/m 2 and up to and including 40 kW/m 2 .
8.2 SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
A2
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for subfloor supports where the
subfloor space is enclosed with a wall that complies with Clause 8.4, except that sarking is
not required where specified in Clause 8.4.1(b).
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the support posts, columns, stumps, piers and poles
shall be—
A1
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
NOTE: This requirement applies to the principal building only and not to verandas, decks, steps,
ramps and landings (see Clause 8.7).
C8.2 Combustible materials stored in the subfloor space may be ignited by embers and
cause an impact to the building.
8.3 FLOORS
8.3.1 Concrete slabs on ground
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for concrete slabs on ground.
8.3.2 Elevated floors
A2
8.3.2.1 Enclosed subfloor spaces
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for elevated floors, including
bearers, joists and flooring, where the subfloor space is enclosed with a wall that complies
with Clause 8.4, except that sarking is not required where specified in Clause 8.4.1(b).
8.3.2.2 Unenclosed subfloor spaces
A1
A1
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the bearers, joists and flooring, shall—
(a)
be non-combustible; or
(b)
have the underside of the combustible elements of the floor system protected with
a non-combustible material (e.g., fibre-cement sheet or metal sheet); or
(c)
be a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
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(d)
AS 3959—2009
be a combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
8.4 EXTERNAL WALLS
A2
8.4.1 Walls
The exposed components of external walls shall be:
(a)
Non-combustible material.
NOTE: Examples include, but are not limited to, full masonry; or masonry veneer, with the
masonry being clay, calcium silicate, concrete, natural stone, aerated concrete, mud brick; or
in situ or panel walls of concrete, aerated concrete; or rammed earth.
or
(b)
Cladding that is fixed externally to a timber-framed or a steel-framed wall that is
sarked on the outside of the frame, and is—
(i)
fibre-cement external cladding, a minimum of 9 mm in thickness; or
(ii)
steel sheeting; or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
or
(c)
A system complying with AS 1530.8.1.
or
(d)
A combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
8.4.2 Joints
All joints in the external surface material of walls shall be covered, sealed, overlapped,
backed or butt-jointed to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm.
A2
8.4.3 Vents and weepholes
Vents and weepholes in external walls shall be screened with a mesh with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze except where they are less
than 3 mm (see Clause 3.6).
8.5 EXTERNAL GLAZED ELEMENTS AND ASSEMBLIES AND EXTERNAL
DOORS
8.5.1 Bushfire shutters
Where fitted, bushfire shutters shall comply with Clause 3.7 and be made from
non-combustible material.
A1
8.5.1A Screens for windows and doors
Where fitted, screens for windows and doors shall have a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze. Gaps between the
perimeter of the screen assembly and the building element to which it is fitted shall not
exceed 3 mm.
The frame supporting the mesh or perforated sheet shall be metal.
8.5.2 Windows
Window assemblies shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 8.5.1.
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or
A1
(b)
They shall comply with the following:
(i)
Window frames and hardware shall be metal.
(ii)
Glazing shall be toughened glass minimum 6 mm.
(iii) Both the openable and fixed portions of the window shall be screened
externally with screens that comply with Clause 8.5.1A.
(iv)
Seals to stiles, head and sills or thresholds shall be manufactured from materials
having a flammability index no greater than 5 or from silicone.
8.5.3 Doors—Side-hung external doors (including French doors, panel fold and
bi-fold doors)
Side-hung external doors, including French doors, panel fold and bi-fold doors, shall
comply with one of the following:
A2
(a)
Doors and door frames shall be protected by bushfire shutters that comply with
Clause 8.5.1.
or
A1
A2
(b)
Doors and door frames shall comply with the following:
(i)
A2
A1
Doors shall be—
(ii)
(A)
non-combustible; or
(B)
a solid timber door, having a minimum thickness of 35 mm for the first
400 mm above the threshold and protected on the outside by a metalframed screen door with a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze; or
(C)
a fully framed glazed door where the framing is made from
non-combustible material.
Externally fitted hardware that supports the panel in its functions of opening
and closing shall be metal.
(iii) Where doors incorporate glazing, the glazing shall be toughened glass
minimum 6 mm.
(iv)
Where glazing is less than 400 mm from the ground or less than 400 mm above
decks, carport roofs, awnings and similar elements or fittings having an angle
less than 18 degrees to the horizontal and extending more than 110 mm in width
from the door (see Figure D3, Appendix D), that portion of the glazing shall be
screened externally with a screen that complies with Clause 8.5.1A.
(v)
Seals to stiles, head and sills or thresholds shall be manufactured from materials
with a flammability index no greater than 5 or from silicone.
(vi)
Door frames shall be metal.
(vii) Doors shall be tight-fitting to the door frame and to an abutting door, if
applicable.
(viii) Weather strips, draught excluders or draught seals shall be installed at the base
of side-hung external doors.
8.5.4 Doors—Sliding doors
Sliding doors shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with Clause 8.5.1.
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AS 3959—2009
or
A1
(b)
They shall comply with the following:
(i)
Both the door frame supporting the sliding door and the framing surrounding
any glazing shall be metal.
(ii)
Externally fitted hardware that supports the panel in its functions of opening
and closing shall be metal.
(iii) Where sliding doors incorporate glazing, the glazing shall be toughened glass
minimum 6 mm and both the fixed and openable portions of doors shall be
screened externally with screens that comply with Clause 8.5.1A.
(iv)
Seals to stiles, head and sills or thresholds shall be manufactured from materials
with a flammability index no greater than 5 or from silicone.
(v)
Sliding doors shall be tight-fitting in the frames.
8.5.5 Doors—Vehicle access doors (garage doors)
The following apply to vehicle access doors:
(a)
Vehicle access doors shall be non-combustible.
(b)
Panel lift, tilt doors or side-hung doors shall be fitted with suitable weather strips,
draught excluders, draught seals or guide tracks, as appropriate to the door type,
with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm.
(c)
Roller doors shall have guide tracks with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm
and shall be fitted with a nylon brush that is in contact with the door (see
Figure D4, Appendix D).
(d)
Vehicle access doors shall not include ventilation slots.
8.6 ROOFS (INCLUDING VERANDA AND ATTACHED CARPORT ROOFS,
PENETRATIONS, EAVES, FASCIAS, GABLES, GUTTERS AND DOWNPIPES)
8.6.1 General
The following provisions apply to all types of roofs and roofing systems:
(a)
Roof tiles, roof sheets and roof-covering accessories shall be non-combustible.
(b)
The roof/wall junction shall be sealed, to prevent openings greater than 3 mm,
either by the use of fascia and eaves linings or by sealing between the top of the
wall and the underside of the roof and between the rafters at the line of the wall.
(c)
Roof ventilation openings, such as gable and roof vents, shall be fitted with ember
guards made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
(d)
A pipe or conduit that penetrates the roof covering shall be non-combustible.
Roof-mounted evaporative coolers are excluded from this level (i.e., BAL—40).
A2
8.6.2 Tiled roofs
Tiled roofs shall be fully sarked. The sarking shall—
(a)
be located on top of the roof framing, except that the roof battens may be fixed above
the sarking;
(b)
cover the entire roof area including ridges and hips; and
(c)
extend into gutters and valleys.
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76
8.6.3 Sheet roofs
Sheet roofs shall—
(a)
be fully sarked in accordance with Clause 8.6.2, except that foil-backed insulation
blankets may be installed over the battens; and
(b)
have any gaps greater than 3 mm (such as under corrugations or ribs of sheet roofing
and between roof components) sealed at the fascia or wall line and at valleys, hips
and ridges by—
(i)
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of
corrosion-resistant steel or bronze; or
(ii)
mineral wool; or
(iii) other non-combustible material; or
(iv)
A2
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
C8.6.3 Sarking is used as a secondary form of ember protection for the roof space to
account for minor gaps that may develop in sheet roofing.
8.6.4 Veranda, carport and awning roofs
The following apply to veranda, carport and awning roofs:
(a)
A veranda, carport or awning roof forming part of the main roof space [see
Figure D1(a), Appendix D] shall meet all the requirements for the main roof, as
specified in Clauses 8.6.1, 8.6.2, 8.6.3, 8.6.5 and 8.6.6.
(b)
A veranda, carport or awning roof separated from the main roof space by an
external wall [see Figures D1(b) and D1(c), Appendix D] complying with
Clause 8.4 shall have a non-combustible roof covering and the support structure
shall be—
(i)
of non-combustible material; or
(ii)
timber rafters lined on the underside with fibre-cement sheeting a minimum of
6 mm in thickness, or with material complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(iii) a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
8.6.5 Roof penetrations
The following apply to roof penetrations:
A2
A1
A2
(a)
Roof penetrations, including roof lights, roof ventilators, aerials, vent pipes and
supports for solar collectors, shall be adequately sealed at the roof to prevent gaps
greater than 3 mm. The material used to flash the penetration shall be noncombustible.
(b)
Glazed assemblies for roof lights and skylights shall have an FRL of –/30/–.
(c)
External single plane glazed elements of roof lights and skylights, where the pitch
of the glazed element is 18 degrees or less to the horizontal, shall be protected
with ember guards made from a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
(d)
Where roof lights are installed in roofs having a pitch of less than 18 degrees to
the horizontal, the glazing shall be protected with ember guards made from a
mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosionresistant steel or bronze.
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AS 3959—2009
8.6.6 Eaves linings, fascias and gables
The following apply to eaves linings, fascias and gables:
(a)
Joints in eaves linings, fascias and gables may be sealed with plastic joining strips
or timber storm moulds.
(b)
Gables shall comply with Clause 8.4.
(c)
Fascias and bargeboards shall comply with AS 1530.8.1.
(d)
Eaves linings shall be—
(i)
fibre-cement sheet, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
(ii)
calcium silicate sheet, a minimum of 6 mm in thickness; or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
(e)
Eaves penetrations shall be protected the same as for roof penetrations as
specified in Clause 8.6.5.
(f)
Eaves ventilation openings greater than 3 mm shall be fitted with ember guards
made of non-combustible material, or a mesh, or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
8.6.7 Gutters and downpipes
This Standard does not provide construction-specific material requirements for downpipes.
If installed, gutter and valley leaf guards shall be non-combustible.
Gutters shall be non-combustible.
Box gutters shall be non-combustible and flashed at the junction with the roof with noncombustible materials.
8.7 VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS AND LANDINGS
8.7.1 General
A1
Decking shall not be spaced.
There is no requirement to enclose the subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps or
landings.
A1
8.7.2 Enclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
8.7.2.1 Materials to enclose a subfloor space
The subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings are deemed to be
‘enclosed’ when—
A2
(a)
the material used to enclose the subfloor space complies with Clause 8.4, except
that sarking is not required where specified in Clause 8.4.1(b); and
(b)
all openings greater than 3 mm are screened with a mesh or perforated sheet with
a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
8.7.2.2 Supports
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for support posts, columns,
stumps, stringers, piers and poles.
8.7.2.3 Framing
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the framing of verandas,
decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
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78
8.7.2.4 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.1, or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
8.7.3 Unenclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
8.7.3.1 Supports
Support posts, columns, stumps, stringers, piers and poles shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
8.7.3.2 Framing
Framing of verandas, decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists) shall be—
A1
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
8.7.3.3 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.1; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
8.7.4 Balustrades, handrails or other barriers
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades less than 125 mm from any glazing or any
combustible wall shall be of non-combustible material.
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades that are 125 mm or more from the building
have no requirements.
8.8 WATER AND GAS SUPPLY PIPES
Above-ground, exposed water and gas supply pipes shall be metal.
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AS 3959—2009
SECT ION 9
CONSTRUCT IO N FOR BUSHF IR E
ATTACK L E VE L F Z ( BA L — F Z)
9.1 GENERAL
A building assessed in Section 2 as being BAL—FZ shall comply with Section 3 and
Clauses 9.2 to 9.8 and have a minimum setback distance of 10 m from the classified
vegetation.
In circumstances where the 10 m setback distance cannot be achieved, those elements of the
building that are less than 10 m from the classified vegetation shall comply with
AS 1530.8.2.
NOTE: There are a number of Standards that specify requirements for construction; however,
where this Standard does not provide construction requirements for a particular element, the other
Standards apply.
Any element of construction or system that satisfies the test criteria of AS 1530.8.2 may be
used in lieu of the applicable requirements contained in Clauses 9.2 to 9.8, see Clause 3.8.
NOTES:
A1
1
BAL—FZ is primarily concerned with protection from flame contact together with ember
attack and radiant heat of more than 40 kW/m 2 .
2
Construction in the Flame Zone BAL—FZ may require reliance on measures other than
construction. The requirements for construction of a building in the Flame Zone are regulated
by the building authorities having jurisdiction in the States and Territories of Australia.
9.2 SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for subfloor supports where the
subfloor space is enclosed with a wall that complies with Clause 9.4.
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, systems, including support posts, columns, stumps,
piers and poles, shall—
(a)
have an FRL of at least 30/–/– and shall be non-combustible; or
(b)
be a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(c)
be a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
NOTE: This requirement applies to the principal building only and not to verandas, decks, steps,
ramps and landings (see Clause 9.7).
C9.2 Combustible materials stored in the subfloor space may be ignited by embers and
cause an impact to the building.
9.3 FLOORS
9.3.1 Concrete slabs on ground
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for concrete slabs on ground.
9.3.2 Elevated floors
9.3.2.1 Enclosed subfloor spaces
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for elevated floors, including
bearers, joists and flooring, where the subfloor space is enclosed with a wall that complies
with Clause 9.4.
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9.3.2.2 Unenclosed subfloor spaces
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the floor system, including bearers, joist and
flooring, shall—
A1
(a)
have an FRL of at least 30/30/30 and the surface material shall be noncombustible; or
(b)
have the underside of the combustible elements of the floor system protected with
a 30 min resistance to incipient spread of fire system; or
(c)
comply with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the underside; or
(d)
be a combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
9.4 EXTERNAL WALLS
9.4.1 Walls
A2
The exposed components of external walls shall be:
(a)
Non-combustible material.
NOTE: Examples include, but are not limited to, full masonry or masonry veneer, with the
masonry being clay, calcium silicate, concrete, natural stone, aerated concrete, mud brick; or
in situ or panel walls of concrete, aerated concrete or rammed earth with a minimum of
90 mm in thickness.
or
(b)
A system complying with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the outside.
or
(c)
A system with an FRL of 30/30/30 or −/30/30 when tested from the outside.
or
(d)
A combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
9.4.2 Joints
All joints in the external surface material of walls shall be covered, sealed, overlapped,
backed or butt-jointed to prevent gaps greater than 3 mm.
A2
9.4.3 Vents and weepholes
Vents and weepholes in external walls shall be screened with a mesh with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze, except where they are less
than 3 mm (see Clause 3.6).
9.5 EXTERNAL GLAZED ELEMENTS AND ASSEMBLIES AND EXTERNAL
DOORS
9.5.1 Bushfire shutters
Where fitted, bushfire shutters shall comply with—
A1
(a)
Clause 3.7, except that perforations are not acceptable over the door system; and
(b)
AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the outside.
9.5.1A Screens for windows and doors
Where fitted, screens for windows and doors shall have a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze. Gaps between the
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A1
AS 3959—2009
perimeter of the screen assembly and the building element to which it is fitted shall not
exceed 3 mm.
The frame supporting the mesh or perforated sheet shall be metal.
9.5.2 Windows
Window assemblies shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 9.5.1.
or
A1
(b)
The openable portion of the window shall be screened internally or externally
with a screen that complies with Clause 9.5.1A; and either—
(i)
the window system shall have an FRL of at least –/30/–; or
(ii)
the window system shall comply with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the
outside.
9.5.3 Doors—Side-hung external doors (including French doors, panel fold and
bi-fold doors)
Side-hung external doors, including French doors, panel fold and bi-fold doors, shall
comply with one of the following:
A2
(a)
Doors and door frames shall be protected by bushfire shutters that comply with
Clause 9.5.1.
or
(b)
A1
A1
(i)
(ii)
Doors and door frames shall comply with the following:
All door systems, including door frames and doors with glazed panels, shall—
(A)
have an FRL of at least –/30/–; or
(B)
comply with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the outside.
Doors shall be tight-fitting to the door frame and to an abutting door, if
applicable.
(iii) Weather strips, draught excluders or draught seals shall be installed at the base
of side-hung external doors.
(iv)
Seals shall not compromise the FRL or the performance achieved in AS 1530.4.
9.5.4 Doors—Sliding doors
Sliding doors shall comply with one of the following:
(a)
They shall be completely protected by a bushfire shutter that complies with
Clause 9.5.1.
or
(b)
(i)
(ii)
They shall comply with the following:
All sliding door systems, including those with glazed panels, shall—
(A)
have an FRL of at least –/30/–; or
(B)
comply with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the outside.
Sliding doors shall be tight-fitting in the frames.
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9.5.5 Doors—Vehicle access doors (garage doors)
The following apply to vehicle access doors:
(a)
Vehicle access doors shall be non-combustible.
(b)
Where the garage is attached to the building, the requirements of Clause 3.2.2(b)
shall apply.
(c)
Panel lift, tilt doors or side-hung doors shall be fitted with suitable weather strips,
draught excluders, draught seals or guide tracks, as appropriate to the door type,
with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm.
(d)
Roller doors shall have guide tracks with a maximum gap no greater than 3 mm
and shall be fitted with a nylon brush that is in contact with the door (see
Figure D4, Appendix D).
(e)
Vehicle access doors shall not include ventilation slots.
9.6 ROOFS (INCLUDING VERANDA AND ATTACHED CARPORT ROOFS,
PENETRATIONS, EAVES, FASCIAS, GABLES, GUTTERS AND DOWNPIPES)
9.6.1 General
The following apply to all types of roofs and roofing systems:
A1
(a)
The roof or roofing system shall comply with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the
outside.
(b)
The roof/wall junction shall be sealed, to prevent openings greater than 3 mm,
either by the use of fascia and eaves linings or by sealing between the top of the
wall and the underside of the roof and between the rafters at the line of the wall.
(c)
Roof ventilation openings, such as gable and roof vents, shall be fitted with ember
guards made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a
maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
(d)
Pipe or conduit that penetrates the roof covering shall be metal, excluding
aluminium.
Roof-mounted evaporative coolers are excluded from this level.
9.6.2 Veranda, carport and awning roofs
The following apply to veranda, carport and awning roofs:
(a)
A veranda, carport or awning roof forming part of the main roof space [see
Figure D1(a), Appendix D] shall meet all the requirements for the main roof, as
specified in Clauses 9.6.1, 9.6.3, and 9.6.4.
(b)
A veranda, carport or awning roof separated from the main roof space by an
external wall [see Figures D1(b) and D1(c), Appendix D] complying with
Clause 9.4 shall have a non-combustible roof covering and the support structure
shall be—
(i)
of non-combustible material; or
(ii)
timber rafters lined on the underside with fibre-cement sheet a minimum of
6 mm in thickness, or with material complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(iii) a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(iv)
a combination of any of Items (i), (ii) or (iii) above.
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AS 3959—2009
9.6.3 Roof penetrations
The following apply to roof penetrations:
(a)
Roof penetrations, including roof lights, roof ventilators, aerials, vent pipes and
supports for solar collectors, shall be sealed with mineral fibre at the roof to
prevent gaps. Where the gap between the roof covering and the roof penetration is
greater than 3 mm, the material used to seal the penetration shall be noncombustible.
NOTE: As a general principle, the service penetration should not significantly compromise
the performance of the element of construction it penetrates nor should it be a means to allow
the passage of burning embers or heat transfer such that fire may spread to the interior of a
structure.
(b)
(i)
Roof lights and roof ventilators shall be one of the following:
A system complying with AS 1530.8.2 when tested from the outside.
or
(ii)
A system with an FRL of 30/30/30 or −/30/30 when tested from the outside.
9.6.4 Eaves linings, fascias and gables
The following apply to eaves linings, fascias and gables:
(a)
Joints in eaves linings, fascias and gables may be sealed with plastic joining strips
or timber storm moulds.
(b)
Gables shall comply with Clause 9.4.
(c)
Fascias and bargeboards shall comply with AS 1530.8.2.
(d)
Eaves linings shall be—
(i)
a system with an FRL of –/30/30; or
(ii)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
(e)
Eaves penetrations shall be protected the same as for roof penetrations, as
specified in Clause 9.6.3.
(f)
Eaves ventilation openings greater than 3 mm shall be fitted with ember guards
made of non-combustible material or a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
9.6.5 Gutters and downpipes
This Standard does not provide construction-specific material requirements for downpipes.
If installed, gutter and valley leaf guards shall be non-combustible.
Gutters shall be non-combustible.
Box gutters shall be non-combustible and flashed at the junction with the roof with noncombustible materials.
9.7 VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS AND LANDINGS
9.7.1 General
A1
Decking shall not be spaced.
There is no requirement to enclose the subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps or
landings.
A2
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9.7.2 Enclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
9.7.2.1 Materials to enclose a subfloor space
The subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings are deemed to be
‘enclosed’ when—
(a)
the material used to enclose the subfloor space complies with Clause 9.4; and
(b)
all openings greater than 3 mm are screened with a mesh or perforated sheet with
a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion-resistant steel or bronze.
9.7.2.2 Supports
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for support posts, columns,
stumps, stringers, piers and poles.
9.7.2.3 Framing
This Standard does not provide construction requirements for the framing of verandas,
decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
A1
9.7.2.4 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
of fibre-cement sheet; or
(c)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
9.7.3 Unenclosed subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps and landings
9.7.3.1 Supports
Support posts, columns, stumps, stringers, piers and poles shall be—
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
9.7.3.2 Framing
Framing of verandas, decks, ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists) shall be—
A1
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(c)
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
9.7.3.3 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces of ramps and landings shall be—
A2
(a)
of non-combustible material; or
(b)
fibre-cement sheet; or
(c)
a system complying with AS 1530.8.2; or
(d)
a combination of any of Items (a), (b) or (c) above.
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AS 3959—2009
9.7.4 Balustrades, handrails or other barriers
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades less than 125 mm from any glazing shall be of
non-combustible material.
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades that are 125 mm or more from the building
have no requirements.
9.8 WATER AND GAS SUPPLY PIPES
Above-ground, exposed water and gas supply pipes shall be metal.
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35
S ECT ION
3
CO NST RUCT I O N
AS 3959—2009
GE N E RA L
3.1 GENERAL
This Section specifies general requirements for the construction of buildings for all
Bushfire Attack Levels (BALs).
NOTE: There are a number of Standards that specify requirements for construction; however,
where this Standard does not provide construction requirements for a particular element, the other
Standards apply.
The BALs and the corresponding Sections for specific construction requirements are listed
in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1
BUSHFIRE ATTACK LEVELS AND CORRESPONDING SECTIONS FOR
SPECIFIC CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
Bushfire
Attack Level
(BAL)
Classified vegetation
within 100 m of the site
and heat flux exposure
thresholds
BAL—LOW
See Clause 2.2.3.2
BAL—12.5
≤12.5 kW/m 2
Ember attack
3 and 5
BAL—19
>12.5 kW/m 2
≤19 kW/m 2
Increasing levels of ember attack and
burning debris ignited by windborne
embers together with increasing heat flux
3 and 6
BAL—29
>19 kW/m 2
≤29 kW/m 2
Increasing levels of ember attack and
burning debris ignited by windborne
embers together with increasing heat flux
3 and 7
3 and 8
3 and 9
Description of predicted bushfire attack
and levels of exposure
There is insufficient risk to warrant
specific construction requirements
BAL—40
>29 kW/m
≤40 kW/m 2
Increasing levels of ember attack and
burning debris ignited by windborne
embers together with increasing heat flux
with the increased likelihood of exposure
to flames
BAL—FZ
>40 kW/m 2
Direct exposure to flames from fire front
in addition to heat flux and ember attack
2
Construction
Section
4
3.2 CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC STRUCTURES
3.2.1 Attached structures
Where any part of a garage, carport, veranda or similar roofed structure is attached to, or
shares a common roof space with, a building required to comply with this Standard, the
entire garage, carport, veranda or similar roofed structure shall comply with the
construction requirements of this Standard, as applicable to the subject building.
Alternatively, the structure shall be separated from the subject building by a wall that
extends to the underside of a non-combustible roof covering, and that complies with one of
the following:
(a)
(i)
The wall shall have an FRL of not less than 60/60/60 for loadbearing walls and
−/60/60 for non-loadbearing walls when tested from the attached structure side
and shall have openings protected as follows:
Doorways—by FRL –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
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(ii)
Windows—by FRL –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed
position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
or
(b)
The wall shall be of masonry, earth wall or masonry-veneer construction with the
masonry leaf of not less than 90 mm in thickness and shall have openings
protected as follows:
(i)
Doorways—by FRL –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
(ii)
Windows—by FRL –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed
position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
3.2.2 Garages and carports below the subject building
Where a garage or carport is below a building required to comply with this Standard, it
shall comply with the construction requirements of this Standard, as applicable to the
subject building.
Alternatively, any construction separating the garage or carport (including walls and
flooring systems) from the remainder of the building shall comply with one of the
following:
(a)
The separating construction shall have an FRL of not less than 60/60/60 for
loadbearing construction and −/60/60 for non-loadbearing construction when
tested from the garage or carport side and shall have openings protected in
accordance with the following:
(i)
Doorways—by –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
(ii)
Windows—by –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
or
(b)
Where part or all of the separating construction is a wall, the wall need not
comply with Item (a) above, provided the wall is of masonry, earth wall or
masonry-veneer construction with the masonry leaf of not less than 90 mm in
thickness and the wall has openings protected in accordance with the following:
(i)
Doorways—by –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
(ii)
Windows—by –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
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AS 3959—2009
3.2.3 Adjacent structures
Where any garage, carport, or similar roofed structure is not attached to a building required
to comply with this Standard, the entire garage, carport, or similar roofed structure on the
subject allotment shall comply with the construction requirements of this Standard.
Alternatively, the adjacent structure shall be separated from the subject building by one of
the following:
(a)
A distance of not less than 6 m from the building required to comply with this
Standard.
or
(b)
A wall that extends to the underside of a non-combustible roof covering and has
an FRL of not less than 60/60/60 for loadbearing walls and –/60/60 for nonloadbearing walls when tested from the attached structure side. Any openings in
the wall shall be protected in accordance with the following:
(i)
Doorways—by FRL –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
(ii)
Windows—by FRL –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed
position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
or
(c)
A wall that extends to the underside of a non-combustible roof covering and is of
masonry, earth wall or masonry-veneer construction with the masonry leaf of not
less than 90 mm in thickness. Any openings in the wall shall be protected in
accordance with the following:
(i)
Doorways—by FRL –/60/30 self-closing fire doors.
(ii)
Windows—by FRL –/60/– fire windows permanently fixed in the closed
position.
(iii) Other openings—by construction with an FRL not less than –/60/–.
NOTE: Control and construction joints, subfloor vents, weepholes and penetrations for
pipes and conduits need not comply with the above [Item (iii)].
3.3 EXTERNAL MOULDINGS
Unless otherwise required in Sections 4 to 9, combustible external mouldings, jointing
strips, trims and sealants may be used for decorative purposes or to cover joints between
sheeting material.
3.4 HIGHER LEVELS OF CONSTRUCTION
Construction requirements specified for a particular Bushfire Attack Level (BAL) shall be
acceptable for a lower level. For example, if the site has been assessed at BAL—12.5,
BAL—12.5 construction is required; however any element or combination of elements
contained BAL—19, BAL—29, BAL—40 and BAL—FZ levels of construction may be
used to satisfy this Standard.
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3.5 REDUCTION IN CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS DUE TO SHIELDING
The construction requirements for the next lower BAL than that determined for the site may
be applied to an elevation of the building where the elevation is not exposed to the source
of bushfire attack. An elevation is deemed to be not exposed to the source of bushfire attack
if all of the straight lines between that elevation and the source of bushfire attack are
obstructed by another part of the building (see Figure 3.1).
The construction requirements for a shielded elevation shall be not less than that required
for BAL—12.5, except where the exposed elevations have been determined as BAL—LOW.
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AS 3959—2009
D i r e c ti o n of f i r e a t t a c k
Wa ll s s hi e l d e d f r o m f i r e at t a c k
FIGURE 3.1 EXAMPLES OF WALLS SUBJECT TO SHIELDING
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3.6 VENTS, WEEPHOLES AND GAPS
Where a circular probe of 3 mm diameter is capable of being passed through external vents,
weepholes or gaps, the vents, weepholes and gaps shall be screened as specified in
Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, except for weepholes from the frames of windows and glazed
doors.
To determine the maximum aperture size of screening material, it shall not be possible to
pass a circular probe of 2 mm diameter through the aperture.
Gaps between doors and the door jambs, heads or sills (thresholds) shall be as shown in
Figure 3.2. Alternatively, gaps shall be protected by draught excluders.
C3.6 Weepholes from the frames of windows and glazed doors and those gaps between
doors and door jambs, heads or sills (thresholds) that may exceed 3 mm (see Figure 3.2)
are exempt from screening because they do not provide a direct passage for embers to the
interior of the building or building cavity.
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AS 3959—2009
A1
Head
Head
3 mm or less
3 mm or less
3 mm or less
3 mm or less
Door
Door
Approved draught excluder
fitted either inside or outside
Approved draught excluder
fitted either inside or outside
3 mm or less
3 mm or less
S ill
3 mm or less
S ill
(a) O p e n o u t
( b) O p e n i n
Ja mb
Ja mb
3 mm or less
Door
3 mm or less
(c) Ei th e r o p e ni n g i n o r o u t
FIGURE 3.2 GAPS BETWEEN DOORS AND THE DOOR JAMBS,
HEADS OR SILLS (THRESHOLDS)
3.7 BUSHFIRE SHUTTERS
Bushfire shutters shall—
(a)
be fixed to the building and be non-removable;
(b)
when in the closed position, have no gap greater than 3 mm between the shutter
and the wall, the sill or the head;
(c)
be readily manually operable from either inside or outside;
(d)
protect the entire window assembly or door assembly;
(e)
consist of materials specified in Clauses 5.5.1, 6.5.1, 7.5.1, 8.5.1 and 9.5.1 for the
relevant BAL; and
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(f)
42
where perforated, have—
(i)
uniformly distributed perforations with a maximum aperture of 3 mm when the
shutter is providing radiant heat protection or 2 mm when the shutter is also
providing ember protection (such as where the openable portion of the window
is not screened in accordance with the requirements of the respective BAL); and
(ii)
a perforated area no greater than 20% of the shutter.
If bushfire shutters are fitted to all external doors then at least one of those shutters shall be
operable from the inside to facilitate safe egress from the building.
3.8 TESTING TO AS 1530.8
A1
Where any material, element of construction or system satisfies the test criteria of either
AS 1530.8.1, for BAL—12.5, BAL—19, BAL—29 and BAL—40 or AS 1530.8.2 for
BAL—FZ, it satisfies the requirements of that BAL.
If any material, element of construction or system satisfies the test criteria without
screening for ember protection, the requirements of this Standard for screening of openable
parts of windows or doors shall still apply.
3.9 GLAZING
Glazing requirements shall be in accordance with Sections 5 to 9 of this Standard.
See AS 1288 for an explanation of the terminologies used to describe various types of glass
in this Standard.
A2
3.10 SARKING
Where sarking is required in Sections 5 to 9, it shall have a flammability index of not more
than 5 when tested to AS 1530.2.
A2
3.11 TIMBER LOG WALLS
Where the thickness of a timber log wall is specified in Sections 5, 6 and 7, two criteria are
nominated, as follows:
(a)
The nominal overall thickness is the overall thickness of the wall.
(b)
The minimum thickness is the thickness of the wall at the interface of two logs in
the wall.
For most log profiles, the thickness of the log at the interface with an adjacent log is less
than the overall thickness of the wall.
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T hree Cap es T rack F MS & ERP
APPENDIX 2 – SECTION A3.7 OF NSW PLANNING FOR BUSHFIRE PROTECTION
106
Appendices
Table A3.5.1 – Conversion of vegetation classification from David Keith’s Ocean Shores to Desert Dunes
(used in PBP) to the AUSLIG Pictorial Analysis in AS3959-2009. This conversion is based on what is
considered the best representation of similar bush fire behavior potential.
Appendix 3
David Keith’s Ocean Shores to Desert Dunes
Forests (Wet & Dry Sclerophyll)
Pine Plantations
Forested Wetlands
Woodlands (Grassy, Semi-Arid)
Tall Heath (Scrub)
Freshwater Wetlands
Short Heath (Open Scrub)
Arid Shrubland
Alpine Complex (Sedgelands)
Rainforest
Grassland
For the purposes of Table A2.6 in Appendix 2,
the requirements for Alpine Resorts should be
developed using Table 2.4.4 of AS3959-2009.
Generally, most development applications within
the Alpine Resorts consist of alterations and
additions to existing buildings and therefore
would be treated as infill development.
Developments involving new leases or new alpine
resorts must contact the RFS to determine the
APZ requirements.
A3.6 Construction Considerations
within the Flame Zone
There is potential for flames to ignite the external
facade of a building which can continue to burn
after the passage of the fire front. Therefore
some degree of conservatism in relation to the
exposure period is appropriate.
PLANNING FOR BUSH FIRE PROTECTION
APRIL 2010
In NSW there are no recognized deemed-to-satisfy
arrangements for construction of buildings within
the Flame Zone. Where sustained flame contact
is likely, the radiant heat and convective heat
exposures are considerable and overwhelms
most materials.
While AS3959 can be used as a guide to improve
building safety, this is subject to additional control
measures not included in this document. The
design and construction of a building is just one
means of mitigating the bush fire risk and will
normally require supplementation by a range of
other mitigation measures to the satisfaction of
the authority having jurisdiction. The extent of
additional measures required will be dependent
upon the bush fire hazard and its proximity to
the buildings. In addition to the construction
requirement of AS3959, applicants should also
address the Performance Requirements of the
BCA and consider the siting and the design
principles in Section 4.3.5 of PBP.
AUSLIG (1990) Pictorial Analysis (AS3959-2009)
Forest
Woodland
Scrub
Shrubland
Mallee/Mulga
Tussock Moorland
Rainforest
Grassland
the process of developing alternative solutions.
Alternative solutions will be considered on
their merits.
A3.7 Additional Construction
Requirements
Planning for Bush Fire Protection is designed
to provide for improved bush fire protection
outcomes through the planning system, whereas
the construction requirements are established
through the operation of the BCA. However,
based on a review of AS3959-2009 and recent
developments through the interim findings from
the Victorian Royal Commission, the RFS has
concerns over the levels of safety for ember
protection at lower BAL levels (BALs 12.5 and 19)
provided by AS3959-2009. The RFS is concerned
that by adopting the new Standard there would be
a reduction in safety created from that afforded by
the previous NSW application of AS3959-1999
in relation to ember protection. In this regard, the
RFS will aim to maintain the safety levels previously
provided by AS3959-1999. In particular, the
areas of concern arise from requirements for:
•
•
•
•
Sarking
Sub floor screening
Floors
Verandas, Decks, Steps, Ramps And Landings
In addition, in order to provide a suitable
combination of bush fire protection measures
the NSW Rural Fire Service will, as part of the
planning assessment process, recommend /
require additional construction requirements
beyond those prescribed in AS3959-2009 as
deemed appropriate.
Planning requirements for grasslands are
contained within the main body of PBP.
8
Where new testing regimes are developed and
deemed appropriate by the NSW Rural Fire
Service, these may be incorporated as part of
As part of the planning requirements, the
following will create part of the suite of protection
Appendices
SARKING
Any sarking used for BAL-12.5, BAL-19, BAL-29
or BAL-40 shall be:
a. Non-combustible; or
b.
Breather-type sarking complying with AS/NZS
4200.1 and with a flammability index of not
more than 5 (see AS1530.2) and sarked on
the outside of the frame; or
c.
An insulation material conforming to
the appropriate Australian Standard for
that material.
SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
For BAL-12.5 and BAL -19, Clause 5.2 and 6.2
shall be replaced by the provisions of Clause 7.2.
In this regard, Clause 7.2 states:
ELEVATED FLOORS
For BAL-12.5 and BAL-19, Clause 5.3 and 6.3
shall be replaced by the provisions of clause 7.3.
In this regard, clause 7.3.2 states:
“7.3.2 Elevated floors
7.3.2.1 Enclosed subfloor space
This Standard does not provide construction
requirements for elevated floors, including
bearers, joists and flooring, where the subfloor
space is enclosed with—
a. a wall that complies with ….. (Clause 5.4 or
6.4 as appropriate); or
b.
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion
resistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
Appendix 3
measures required to form compliance with
Planning for Bush Fire Protection.
7.3.2.2 Unenclosed subfloor space
“7.2 SUBFLOOR SUPPORTS
b.
a mesh or perforated sheet with a maximum
aperture of 2 mm, made of corrosion
resistant steel, bronze or aluminium; or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the
bearers, joists and flooring, less than 400 mm
above finished ground level, shall be one of
the following:
Materials that comply with the following:
a.
(i)
Bearers and joists shall be—
A. non-combustible; or
B. bushfire-resisting timber
(see Appendix F); or
C. a combination of Items (A) and (B)
above.
Where the subfloor space is unenclosed, the
support posts, columns, stumps, piers and poles
shall be—
(i) of non-combustible material; or
(ii) of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix
F); or
(iii) a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
(ii) Flooring shall be—
A. non-combustible; or
B. bushfire-resisting timber
(see Appendix F); or
C. timber (other than bushfire-resisting
timber), particleboard or plywood
flooring where the underside is lined with
sarking-type material or mineral wool
insulation; or
NOTE: This requirement applies to the principal
building only and not to verandas, decks, steps,
ramps and landings (see Clause 7.7).”
D. a combination of any of Items (A), (B) or
(C) above. or
b.
A system complying with AS 1530.8.1
This Standard does not provide construction
requirements for elements of elevated floors,
including bearers, joists and flooring, if the
underside of the element is 400 mm or more
above finished ground level.”
PLANNING FOR BUSH FIRE PROTECTION
APRIL 2010
This Standard does not provide construction
requirements for subfloor supports where the
subfloor space is enclosed with—
a. a wall that complies with ….. (Clause 5.4 or
6.4 as appropriate); or
9
Appendices
Appendix 3
VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS AND
LANDINGS
For BAL -12.5 and BAL-19, Clause 5.7 and 6.7
shall be replaced by the provisions of clause 7.7.
In this regard, clause 7.7 states:
“7.7 VERANDAS, DECKS, STEPS, RAMPS
AND LANDINGS
7.7.1 General
Decking may be spaced.
There is no requirement to enclose the subfloor
spaces of verandas, decks, steps, ramps or
landings.
7.7.2 Enclosed subfloor spaces of verandas,
decks, steps, ramps and landings
7.7.2.1 Materials to enclose a subfloor space
The subfloor spaces of verandas, decks, steps,
ramps and landings are considered to be
‘enclosed’ when —
a. the material used to enclose the subfloor
space complies with …. (Clause 5.4 or 6.4
as appropriate); and
b.
all openings greater than 3 mm are
screened with a mesh or perforated sheet
with a maximum aperture of 2 mm, made
of corrosion-resistant steel, bronze or
aluminium.
7.7.2.2 Supports
This Standard does not provide construction
requirements for support posts, columns, stumps,
stringers, piers and poles.
7.7.2.3 Framing
PLANNING FOR BUSH FIRE PROTECTION
APRIL 2010
This Standard does not provide construction
requirements for the framing of verandas, decks,
ramps or landings (i.e., bearers and joists).
10
7.7.2.4 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable
surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces
of ramps and landings shall be—
a. of non-combustible material; or
b.
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.3 Unenclosed subfloor spaces of verandas,
decks, steps, ramps and landings
7.7.3.1 Supports
Support posts, columns, stumps, stringers, piers
and poles shall be—
a. of non-combustible material; or
b.
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.3.2 Framing
Framing of verandas, decks, ramps or landings
(i.e., bearers and joists) shall be—
a. of non-combustible material; or
b.
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.3.3 Decking, stair treads and the trafficable
surfaces of ramps and landings
Decking, stair treads and the trafficable surfaces
of ramps and landings shall be—
a. of non-combustible material; or
b.
of bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F);
or
c.
a combination of Items (a) and (b) above.
7.7.4 Balustrades, handrails or other barriers
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades less
than 125 mm from any glazing or any combustible
wall shall be—
a. of non-combustible material; or
b.
bushfire-resisting timber (see Appendix F); or
c.
a combination of Items (i) and (ii) above.
Those parts of the handrails and balustrades that
are 125 mm or more from the building have no
requirements.”
[Type text]
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[Type text]
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