Articles
Making provision for energy-efficiency
investment in changing markets: an
international review[1]
Alix Clark
Independent Energy Researcher & Associate of Energy and Development Research Centre
PO Box 1242, Faerie Glen, 0043, South Africa
This article is a condensed version of an extensive international review undertaken by the Energy
and Development Research Centre on power sector reforms and impact on energy efficiency investment. The purpose of the review was to draw lessons for South Africa on how power sector reforms
around the world have affected investments in demand-side management, and energy efficiency
investment in particular, and furthermore, what countries have done, within the context of changing
electricity markets, to advance investment in this area. Though the main objective has been to draw
lessons for South Africa, it is evident that lessons can be applied more widely. The article begins
with general discussion on the impact that power sector reforms have had on investments in demand-side management (DSM) and energy efficiency around the world. Broad conclusions reached
are that power sector reforms have not boded well for this type of investment. The paper then gives
general opinions on how research in this area is best conducted -- narrowly defined, and focussed
on local contexts and unique energy sector features. Rationale behind countries making efforts to
ensure investment in DSM and energy efficiency is provided as is description of some of the regulatory, financing and governance-related mechanisms employed. The paper concludes with broad
guidelines for South Africa and elsewhere on how to advance investment in this area, given changing
patterns of ownership and structure in the electricity industry.
1. Introduction
The South African electricity industry is on the verge
of being significantly restructured. Following international trends, it is likely that this reform process -- both
of the electricity distribution industry (EDI) and the
electricity supply industry (ESI) -- will have notable impact on the level and nature of investment in demandside management (DSM). In early 1999, the Energy and
Development Research Centre undertook to develop an
in-depth understanding of what might likely happen to
DSM investment as the restructuring process progresses. The main objective of our research has been
to make recommendations to the South African government, the National Electricity Regulator, Eskom (the
national electric utility) and municipal distributors on
how to promote investment in DSM in changing electricity markets.[2]
Our research includes an international review of how
investment in DSM programmes has fared as electricity
markets have changed, and also how various countries
have sought to ensure that adequate investments in this
area are made. Though the main research objective has
been to draw lessons for South Africa, it seems evident
that lessons can be applied more widely.
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2. In competitive electricity markets, the spectrum
of economically viable utility-induced DSM
investment narrows significantly
In assessing the impact that electricity industry restructuring has had on investment in DSM investment internationally, it became clear early on in the research that it is
necessary to differentiate between the various types of
DSM. These types of DSM can be grouped into two different categories. These are DSM investments that are in
the utilities’ financial interests to undertake and those that
are not. Generally, load management initiatives such as
load shifting, interruptibility, strategic growth, and a relatively small amount of energy-efficiency investments fit
well within the latter category, i.e., DSM investments that
contribute positively to the bottom-line of the utility.
‘‘Other’’ energy-efficiency investments fall within the second category, i.e., programmes that are not in the financial
interests of most utilities to undertake. These two different
types of DSM investment are illustrated in Figure 1.
Targeted mostly at large and sometimes small industrial
and commercial users of power as well as some residential
customers, the first category of load management-type
DSM initiatives generally attract investment funds when
such investments contribute to the bottom-line of the
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Figure 1. DSM options
utility and/or help to improve utilities’ service to customers. DSM initiatives in this category include:
• programmes that ensure customer retention, i.e., provide competitive advantage through DSM as a customer service option;
• programmes which are profitable in their own right -that is, DSM services which customers are prepared
to pay for;
• programmes which cost-effectively defer or limit generation and/or transmission and distribution capital expenditure and hence improve profitability (though due
to poor systems information these opportunities are
often not identified or not costed properly); and
• environmentally-driven programmes as committed by
national and regional governments or financed by international agencies [Surtees, 1998].
Generally, this first category of DSM investment occurs
irrespective of the threat of pending competition, or new
market structures and ownership arrangements. Indeed, in
certain circumstances, the move to new market and ownership arrangements can encourage investment in these
forms of DSM even more.
Our international review has indicated that DSM initiatives in the first category have not been as affected by
restructuring processes as have the second category of
energy efficiency-type DSM programmes. Programmes in
this second category involve training and education activities, information and awareness campaigns, demonstrations and audits, and direct installation programmes
targeted mainly at small industrial and commercial customers, as well as the residential sector. These types of
investments involve a more complex investment decision
for utilities. In general, as competitive pressures have
been introduced into countries’ electricity sectors, investment in this type of DSM has declined significantly. This
reluctance to allocate resources to this type of energy efficiency programme has the following two main causes.
• Restructuring generally seeks to harness competitive
forces to improve the economic efficiency of the system. Achieving this goal makes it more difficult for
players in the industry to invest in these types of energy efficiency programmes and remain price-competitive.
• Restructuring tends to fragment the industry structure
with the result that there is no major player in the
electricity market (supplier, distributor, customer or
other) that perceives both the (potentially high) longrun marginal costs of new supplies and the possibility
of benefiting from investments in end-use energy efficiency [Swisher, 1994].
Here, one of the most significant barriers impeding investment in this type of energy efficiency investment is
the barrier existing within the utility itself. Because energy efficiency implies a decrease in a utility’s total kWh
sales, it is not in a utility’s best interest to develop programmes in this area (unless, as noted, it pays a utility
to do so). This disincentive exists before and after restructuring. It is particularly prevalent after restructuring for
the abovementioned reasons (i.e., fragmentation and competitive pressures). Before restructuring, utilities are generally more prepared to invest in energy efficiency
programmes because of: (1) the institutional links between
generation, transmission and distribution; and (2) their
natural monopoly status that enables some degree of public-benefit investment.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the second category of energy efficiency investment, which, as noted, targets smaller industrial and commercial customers, as well
as households. In essence, this type of investment is that
which easily ‘‘falls between the gaps’’, particularly so
when broader industry restructuring initiatives are introduced, or even just proposed. Furthermore, this paper focuses on investments traditionally made by utilities, and
those that utilities in changing markets and energy service
companies (ESCOs) cannot easily justify taking responsibility for. Hereafter, this type of investment will be referred to as ‘‘public-benefit energy efficiency investment’’.
3. Electricity industries in flux
When seeking to develop an understanding of how to ensure adequate energy efficiency investment in the future,
the international review has highlighted the importance of
taking different electricity industry restructuring models
into account, as well as the different developmental stages
of the energy services industry.
Globally, electricity industries have been, or are being,
restructured with changes in the industries’ ownership
and/or structure. Generally, but not always, these reform
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Figure 2. The structural dimensions of electricity industries in transition
Source: Hunt and Shuttleworth [1996]
processes have followed the paths illustrated in Figures 2
and 3.
The research has investigated the attempts of the United
States, Norway, New Zealand, England, Wales, Brazil,
Thailand, Ghana, Chile and Argentina to protect publicbenefit energy efficiency investment. Most of these countries are at different stages in the electricity reform
processes described above (see Figure 4). With varying
degrees of private participation, full retail competition has
been introduced into electricity industries in the United
States, Norway, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Chile and
Argentina. To date, components of the electricity industry
have been conceded to the private sector in Brazil, and
in both the latter and Thailand, initial attempts are currently being made to introduce more competition into the
power industries. The power sectors in South Africa and
Ghana are on the verge of being significantly restructured.
Internationally, changes in industry structure, as well as
ownership, have impacted on levels of energy efficiency
investment. Table 1 outlines different stages of development of an energy services market, as defined by the
World Bank.
With the exception of the United States’ energy service
industry, energy service industries in most of the countries
studied under this research are in early stages of development. They have not yet advanced to Stage IV where
there is a strong emphasis on an integrated energy solution, where value-added inputs are the business drivers of
most investments, and where energy services are tailormade to customers’ specific requirements. The interna28
Figure 3. The ownership dimensions of electricity industries in transition
Source: Adapted from Hunt and Shuttleworth [1996]; Davis [1997]
tional review suggests that movements within these stages
are generally initiated both by electricity industry reform
and as a result of the natural evolution of the energy services market.
In devising ways of promoting energy efficiency in restructured electricity industries, it is interesting to view
how these two dynamic processes might fit together. This
is done somewhat simplistically in Figure 4.
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Table 1. Typical evolution of the energy services market
Stage I
Primary focus
Stage II
• Conservation
• Programmatic efficiency
• Price reform
• DSM
Stage III
Stage IV
• Private energy services
• Convergent services with
energy as the integrating
catalyst
• Resource allocation
Activities
• New regulations,
codes and standards
• Use of utilities as
implementing agents of
change
• Project orientation
• Value creation rather than
cost savings is driving
business decision
• Setting savings goals
and targets
• Formal programmes
with incentivised
measures
• Some variant of
performance contracting
• Energy and non-energy
services bundled to
provide increased
comfort, convenience,
productivity or
competitive advantage
• ‘‘Command and
control’’ (i.e., active
load management)
• Formal monitoring and
evaluation
• Success still denoted in
financial terms (i.e.,
paybacks, IRR)
• Maximum use of strategic
alliances to create
‘‘virtual’’ system integrators
• ‘‘Carrot approaches’’
(i.e., incentives,
moral suasion for
voluntary actions)
• ‘‘Success’’ denominated
almost exclusively as
cost savings or avoided
outlays
• Vendors/ manufacturers
actively enter service/
technology delivery chain
• IT permeates integrated
solutions.
• ‘‘Shock-cushioning’’
(i.e., providing
protection for
affected sectors less
able to cope with
rapid changes)
• Reliance on paid
contracts versus
strategic allies/
business partners
The illustration indicates approximately how different
countries are currently placed. (South Africa, for instance,
is on the verge of industry-wide change and its energy
service industry is in its infancy, characterised mainly by
utility programmes, command-and-control-type regulation
and legislation. Norway assumes its position by virtue of
the fact that its power industry is highly liberalised, while
its energy services industry is small and limited to activities fulfilling mandatory utility obligations.)
A review of energy efficiency investment in the countries studied illustrates the following facts.
• Structural and ownership changes in the electricity industry are neither preconditions nor necessary for significant advancement in the energy services industry.
For example, the energy services industry in the
United States took 25 years to reach Stage IV, and this
largely happened before significant electricity industry
restructuring took hold. By the same token, significant
structural and ownership changes in the electricity industry do not necessarily indicate progress in the energy services industry. The current situations in Chile
and Argentina are clear examples of this. In both countries retail competition has been introduced, while
their energy services industries -- related to energy efficiency in particular -- are almost non-existent.
• Movements in industry restructuring processes can
hinder or enhance the development of the energy services industry. In England and Wales, for instance, public-benefit energy efficiency investment arguably
increased as a result of regulatory reform and other
initiatives brought about by the huge transformation
in the power sector. In Chile and Argentina, on the
other hand, no regulatory or other attempt has been
made to ensure energy efficiency investment. This has
significantly retarded the development of the energy
services industry.
The international review highlights the importance of recognising that the electricity industries of different countries are at varying stages of reform. Regulatory and other
tools to support public-benefit energy efficiency investment differ -- sometimes considerably -- according to the
level of competition in the electricity industry[3].
Similarly, energy service industries might also be at different levels of development. Again, this has implications
for the types of solutions that are chosen. More broadly,
the review we undertook indicates that it is also important
to take into account a country’s level of economic development, national priorities and available resources when
searching for solutions to promote energy efficiency investment. It seems clear that the solutions available in the
United States, England, Wales, Norway and New Zealand
are considerably less limited than those in Ghana, Brazil,
India and South Africa. Different countries have varying
national priorities, which in some cases support electricity
sector reform and the growth and development of public
and private sector energy services, and in other cases do
not.
The broad implication of the above discussion is that
in seeking solutions to promote public-benefit energy efficiency investment, it is extremely important to be as
focused in the attempt as possible. Contextual and definitional issues can make a difference.
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Figure 4. Matrix illustrating energy service industries in different power sector contexts.
4. Countries around the world value public-benefit
energy efficiency for different reasons
The international review demonstrates that some governments and regulators have gone to great lengths to promote investment in public-benefit energy efficiency. Most
of these countries have sought to do this as a result of
significant declines in energy efficiency investment on introduction of restructuring and when it became clear that
mere reliance on market forces would not bring about adequate investment in this area. Before discussing mechanisms used, it seems fitting to understand why these
tremendous efforts to ensure public-benefit energy efficiency investment have been made, and thus why some
countries have invested in this area, while others have
chosen not to. Primary reasons for this investment are
listed below.
• Governments and regulators have sought to protect the
interests of power sector customers. Governments and
regulators in, for example, England and Wales, Norway, New Zealand, the United States and South Africa
have created conditions that enable household and
business customers to make the best investment decisions around energy usage, and thus to reduce costs
associated with such energy usage (i.e., reduce energy
bills). Regulators are frequently required to carry this
responsibility out, albeit in conflict with other regulatory responsibilities, most notably keeping energy
prices low.
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Energy for Sustainable Development
• Governments and regulators are committed to achieving energy-environmental policy goals. With perhaps
the exception of Argentina and Chile, most of the
countries reviewed under this study have promoted energy efficiency investment because such investment is
seen to contribute substantially towards national sustainable development goals.
• Governments are committed to reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. Governments committed under the Rio
Declaration (1992) to substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have sought to promote energy
efficiency investment. As examples: the Office of the
Electricity Regulator (formerly OFFER and now
OFGEM) in the United Kingdom retained the services
of the Energy Savings Trust -- which was initially established as a means of meeting the UK’s obligations
under the Rio Declaration -- to promote energy efficiency investment. The primary objective of New Zealand’s Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority
is to ‘‘achieve governmental energy and environmental
policy goals, particularly with respect to CO2 emission
reductions’’. One of the two primary objectives of
South Africa’s Efficient Lighting Initiative is to contribute towards a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
• With growing capacity constraints, governments and
utilities encourage energy efficiency programmes that
will contribute towards reducing the need for new
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power sector investments. In most of the developing
countries that this review studied, energy efficiency
programmes have been seen as a means towards managing power sector capacity constraints. The government of Brazil, for example, established PROCEL to
fund or co-fund conservation projects carried out by
state and local utilities, universities, state agencies, private companies and research institutes. In South Africa, Eskom funds various DSM programmes whose
main objective is to defer the decision to invest in new
capacity. Similar peak savings are the objective of energy efficiency programmes in Thailand and Ghana.
• Investment in energy efficiency is seen to make a real
contribution to the economy. In some countries reviewed, energy efficiency investment is promoted because of a wide acceptance that it makes a real
financial/economic contribution. That energy efficiency investment results in win-win situations for
customers and implementers is undisputed. In such instances, energy efficiency investment is often undertaken as a component of an integrated resource
planning (IRP) framework (in particular, Norway and
the United States). Here regulators require planning
based on principles of IRP in order that the best, most
robust investment decisions are made.
• Utilities invest in energy efficiency programmes because they contribute towards customer retention/expansion programmes as well as improved customer
service. As noted, distributor utilities become loath to
invest in public-purpose energy efficiency programmes
as competition is introduced into the power sector. Indeed, it is rare in these contexts for utilities to invest
in this area of their own accord. When they do, however, it is mainly for other reasons, including adding
value to their service to customers in order to either
improve customer service or to retain/grow market
base.
5. Public-benefit energy efficiency investments can
be advanced through innovative regulatory,
financing and institutional arrangements
An analysis of trends in the United States, Norway, New
Zealand, England and Wales, Brazil, Chile and Argentina,
Thailand and Ghana has shown that as power sector restructuring occurs, a considerable decline in public-benefit energy efficiency investment takes place. In fact, this
decline in investment has generally occurred before restructuring processes are officially launched. Faced with
the mere threat of restructuring, utilities become increasingly wary about committing funds to this area (unless
they are for the value-added/customer retention purposes
described above). Furthermore, experience from the
United States, Chile and Argentina, England and Wales,
Brazil, Norway and New Zealand indicates that if mechanisms are not put in place to safeguard this type of DSM
investment, it will not occur. Indeed, public-benefit energy efficiency programmes become a ‘‘stranded benefit’’
of the restructuring process.
Mechanisms that have been put in place to safeguard
public-benefit energy efficiency investment include both
requirements and incentives that can be grouped as in the
subsections below.
• Regulatory efforts
In England and Wales, the United States, and Norway,
regulations requiring utilities to undertake a minimum
amount of public-benefit energy efficiency investment
have been introduced. In the United States, this was
done before restructuring, while in England, Wales and
Norway, regulation was introduced after it became obvious that in a restructured electricity industry environment, market forces alone would not ensure an
optimal level of investment in this area.
Four years after bold initial moves to privatise the
electricity industry in England and Wales, the Office
of the Regulator (OFFER) published its Standards of
Performance (SoP) requiring all regional electricity
companies (RECs) to achieve a certain level of energy
savings. Initially, in Norway, the Energy Act of 1991
included an obligation for utilities to undertake IRP.
Later, this obligation was removed, and replaced with
a stipulation that all distribution utilities undertake a
certain level of DSM activities such as information
programmes, demonstrations and audits. The effect of
both these regulatory stipulations has been that a minimum level of DSM investment has occurred.
Generally, regulatory authorities have sought to complement/support these mandatory requirements with
other regulatory measures. Most common are moves
to partially or fully ‘‘decouple’’ sales from profit;
and/or to allow utilities to be compensated for lost
revenues directly associated with energy efficiency
programmes. These mechanisms are described below
under financing options. Finally, regulatory authorities
have sought to establish independent public energy efficiency agencies/institutions to support regulatory imperatives in this area. This mechanism is described in
the subsection on independent institutional champions
below.
• Financing energy efficiency investments
As noted, regulatory authorities in different countries
have required that utilities undertake ‘‘some’’ publicbenefit energy efficiency programmes. These regulators have been faced with decisions about whether to
allow utilities to partially or fully recover the costs
and lost revenues associated with energy efficiency
DSM programmes, and/or whether to allow utilities to
profit from these initiatives.
In England, Wales and Norway, regulation allows utilities to recover the cost of energy efficiency programmes and, in some cases, lost revenues associated
with such programmes. In England and Wales, this has
been done in conjunction with moves to partially ‘‘decouple’’ sales from profits. In the past, regulators in
the United States have allowed utilities to recover lost
revenues and costs in addition to permitting utilities
to make a small profit on energy efficiency programmes. US regulators were of the opinion that since
utilities were permitted to earn a ‘‘reasonable’’ rate of
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return on supply-side investments, the same should apply to demand-side investments.
To enable utilities to partially and/or fully recover
costs and lost revenues associated with public-benefit
energy efficiency programmes, regulators have
adopted various financing mechanisms. Until recently,
utilities in the United States were allowed to recover
costs and lost revenues through net lost revenue adjustment mechanisms or through mechanisms that ‘‘decouple’’ sales from profits. Costs and revenue losses
were essentially built into prevailing tariff structures.
More recently, regulators have been introducing a nonbypassable system-wide benefit surcharge (based
either on usage (kWh), on demand (kW) or a combination of the two). In England and Wales, OFFER
elected to adopt a special revenue allowance to be used
by RECs to achieve energy savings on behalf of their
customers. This revenue allowance was to be raised
by collecting the equivalent of £ 1 from each franchise
customer account over a period of 4 years. In Norway,
energy efficiency investment is funded by a DSM
‘‘wires’’ or distribution charge of approximately 0.0002
NOK/kWh. In New Zealand, energy efficiency is
funded from the central government budget.
As noted, regulators in the United States have allowed
utilities to profit from energy efficiency programmes.
Thus, in addition to making the above mechanisms
available to utilities, regulators also incentivise energy
efficiency programmes through shared-savings mechanisms, mark-up mechanisms (rewards on a programme
basis) and bonus mechanisms (rewards on a per unit
energy savings basis).
• Independent institutional ‘‘champions’’
In many countries, government or power sector regulators have chosen to establish independent agencies
to champion energy efficiency. This approach has
made sense where government has lacked the capacity
to promote energy efficiency in-house, even though it
is seen as a priority, or because regulators have been
caught between keeping electricity prices low and promoting energy efficiency.
The mandate and outreach of these independent energy
efficiency agencies varies. In New Zealand, utilities
are not obliged by law or regulation to invest in energy
efficiency. Rather, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) is responsible for designing
and implementing energy efficiency and conservation
strategies within the country. EECA is funded from the
central budget. In England and Wales, OFFER has retained the services of the Energy Savings Trust (EST)
to assist RECs in designing and implementing energy
efficiency programmes. EST negotiates with OFFER
and the RECs to set each company’s energy savings
targets, evaluates all projects for compliance with the
SoP and assists in the development of these projects.
EST also develops and manages national projects on
behalf of the RECs. EST is funded by a grant from
the government. In Norway, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration (NVE) has estab32
lished a number of regional energy efficiency centres
(REECs) to undertake energy efficiency programmes
on behalf of distribution utilities. NVE believes that
these REECs are in a position to offer more objective
advice than is likely to be provided by distributors.
REECs’ activities include providing general information on energy efficiency, energy advice, audits and
demonstrations and information on environmental impacts of energy consumption.
In Ghana, the Ministry of Mines and Energy in collaboration with the Private Enterprise Foundation
(PEF) has established the Energy Foundation, mandated to promote energy efficiency and conservation.
Specific activities include promoting sustainable development, providing customer education on improving energy efficiency, undertaking policy advocacy,
strengthening private sector participation in the energy
service industry, and undertaking relevant related research and development activities. Finally, PROCEL
in Brazil funds or co-funds conservation projects carried out by state and local utilities, universities, state
agencies, private companies and research institutes.
These projects involve research and development,
demonstrations, education and training, marketing, direct installation of conservation measures, support of
ESCOs, development of legislation, and design and
implementation of energy efficiency programmes. For
the most part, Brazilian utilities only conduct token
energy efficiency programmes.
As noted, different countries have chosen to establish
regulations or legislation, funding mechanisms or independent bodies to promote investment in energy efficiency
programmes. The countries analysed here have chosen different paths to achieve greater levels of energy efficiency
investments. In England and Wales, much emphasis has
been placed on the EST, on the Standards of Performance
and investment by RECs. In the absence of a regulator in
New Zealand, emphasis is placed on the EECA spearheading energy efficiency investment. In Norway, public-benefit energy efficiency investment occurs because it is a
directive of legislation and because funding mechanisms
to enable this investment to occur have been established.
In the United States, regulatory measures in the early to
mid-1990s were key to the success of public-benefit energy efficiency programmes, while the role of (an) independent energy efficiency organisation(s) was minimal. In
Thailand, there are no regulations requiring energy efficiency investment. Rather, this investment is promoted by
a relatively powerful unit within Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT). EGAT is encouraged by
the Thai National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) to do this.
As energy efficiency programmes and restructuring
processes mature, indications are emerging that if ‘‘reasonable’’ levels of energy efficiency investment are to take
place, it is most likely that regulatory provisions, financing mechanisms and independent support are all necessary. Countries where these three functions have not all
existed are beginning to make provision for them. New
Zealand -- for instance -- is looking towards developing a
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regulatory framework, and US regulators are looking towards establishing not-for-profit independent energy efficiency agencies responsible for managing the proceeds of
a non-bypassable systems surcharge.
6. Guidelines for South Africa and elsewhere
6.1. The public sector’s role in encouraging optimal
investment in energy efficiency is critical
International experience indicates that without ‘‘some degree’’ of public sector involvement, it is unlikely that public-benefit energy efficiency programmes will be invested
in. This means that DSM programmes such as information
and education programmes, customer support services (including audits and demonstrations) and market transformation programmes will most likely be avoided. The role
of the public sector is to create an ‘‘enabling environment’’
that allows investment in this societal benefit to occur but
without economically prejudicing the implementing agency (i.e., distributor utility, ESCO or other).
This enabling environment has been created either
through legislative or regulatory action or through the
public sector establishment/support of an organisation that
‘‘champions’’ or promotes DSM. In Norway and Denmark,
for example, the governments have enacted legislation
that requires utilities to undertake a specified level of
DSM. In Denmark, the Danish Parliament seeks to
achieve this by requiring that all utility decisions are
founded on principles of IRP. In Norway, the Energy Act
(1991) initially included an obligation to undertake IRP.
Against much resistance from business, this obligation
was later removed although the Act still mandates distribution utilities to undertake some DSM. In both of these
instances, the obligations are being met, although in Denmark the willingness on the part of utilities to do this
seems greater. This is perhaps due to the fact that the
Norwegian government plays a far more passive role in
the electricity market than the Danish government does.
Regulation, which often complements or supports a legislative framework as well as allows for a greater degree
of public involvement and pragmatism, has been widely
used to ensure investment in DSM. The regulatory framework used in the United States for this purpose is illustrative of this. In fact, the impressive levels of DSM
investment in the US are almost entirely attributed to this
framework. In England and Wales, OFFER (the regulatory
authority) was initially reluctant to make direct provision
for DSM. Very little investment in DSM was consequently
made. In response to this situation, OFFER published the
Standards of Performance and retained the services of the
Energy Savings Trust. DSM targets are now being
reached.
The public sector can also create an ‘‘enabling environment’’ through the establishment or support of an independent or dedicated organisation that seeks to promote
DSM. These organisations tend, generally, to support prevailing legislation and regulation. This was done fairly
successfully in England and Wales, and in New Zealand.
It is perhaps too soon to assess the impact Ghana’s Energy
Foundation has had on investment in public-benefit energy
efficiency investment.
The tools described above facilitate investment in
DSM. International experience shows that DSM does not
necessarily fail if each of these different tools are not employed. In New Zealand and Denmark, for example, the
electricity utilities are not subject to the requirements of
the regulatory authorities but at the same time abide by
prevailing legislation. Adequate DSM investment is being
achieved. International experience does indicate that if
there are no legislative or regulatory guidelines, or champion agency for DSM, it is very likely that public-benefit
energy efficiency investment will fall by the wayside. This
is what appears to have happened in Chile and Argentina
and is threatening to happen in Brazil.
6.2. ‘‘Rules of the game’’ should be established prior
to restructuring and, ideally, should be ‘‘right from the
start’’
If key role-players in the electricity sector are in any way
uncertain about the direction or end-point of restructuring
(and in particular, if retail competition is to be introduced
or not), utility programmes delivering public-benefit energy efficiency services will be among the first to be
downscaled. This has been the experience in a number of
countries including the United States, United Kingdom
and Norway. To avoid this disinvestment in DSM, it is
important therefore that the end-point, goals and boundaries of the restructuring process are well defined before
the commencement of the restructuring process. Furthermore, it is important that, early on, the government and
the regulatory authority define the role or place for DSM
investment in the coming context (whether it is viewed
as being an important outcome of the restructuring process or not). In other words, the government’s approach to
fostering the DSM context, whether it be through legislation or regulation, should be announced in time. For the
sake of industry stability, this should preferably be agreed
upon before the ‘‘game beginning’’. Establishing the regulatory (as well as human and physical) infrastructure for
the electricity industry in general as well as for energy
efficiency programmes more specifically is a formidable
challenge which if not addressed in time can delay the
restructuring progress as well as DSM programme implementation for years.
In many of the countries this review has visited, regulatory and legislative frameworks have changed fundamentally over small periods of time since restructuring
processes have begun. Examples of this include the following.
• In the early days of privatisation in England and
Wales, the regulatory authority’s hands were somewhat
tied. While OFFER was mandated to ensure low energy prices, it was also given the responsibility of taking care of DSM investment. OFFER initially chose
to adopt a fairly passive approach to DSM, contending
that the market forces would result in an optimal
amount of energy efficiency. As already mentioned,
with the introduction of restructuring in England and
Wales very little DSM investment occurred. It became increasingly obvious that OFFER would have
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to intervene if DSM were to survive. OFFER thus published the Standards of Performance and retained the
services of the Energy Savings Trust which now represent the key drivers for energy efficiency in England
and Wales. The early days of privatisation also saw a
change in regulatory approach vis-à-vis DSM. Initially,
the price cap mechanism provided distributors with
strong incentives to maximise electricity sales with no
associated mechanisms to claim DSM programme
costs. Later, volume sales were decoupled from profit
and provision was made for a special revenue allowance to be used for DSM activities.
• Traditionally, the regulatory framework in the United
States was based on a cost-of-service approach for
both supply- and demand-related investment. When
DSM was first introduced, state regulators generally
allowed utilities to recover the cost of DSM programmes through general tariff increases. For rentseeking purposes, it still made sense for utilities to
maximise their sales, and thus to avoid DSM investment. In consequence, state regulators moved towards
not only removing the disincentives to invest in DSM,
but also offering additional incentives for DSM. Supply-side investment continued to be treated on a costof-service basis.
• In Norway, the legislative framework originally called
for utility decisions to be based on IRP principles. Due
to extensive pressures from business and then the residential sector, this requirement was later diluted -- requiring utilities to undertake a specified amount of
DSM.
These and other countries’ experiences have shown that
it is very difficult to rectify regulatory and legislative
processes already in motion. Generally, amendments to
legislative and regulatory frameworks take time to occur
and are costly. Most importantly, changes usually create
uncertainties and confusion in the market, they often do
not improve the regulator’s or government’s credibility record, and they slow the restructuring process down. These
changes may even absorb a portion of the economic gains
expected of the restructuring processes. In learning from
these international pioneers, South Africa is in a promising position to ‘‘get the rules right before the game begins’’.
6.3. Regulatory reforms can dramatically and rapidly
change the strength and scope of utility DSM
programmes
In some countries, regulators have chosen to ‘‘command
and control’’ utilities’ investment in public-benefit energy
efficiency programmes. According to this approach, the
regulator specifies what the utility should do. The regulator then closely monitors subsequent utility actions for
compliance. The way in which this approach has been
most commonly administered is through licence requirements. To allow firms to operate the distribution/transmission network, or distribute electricity, regulatory
authorities have required that a given extent of DSM activity be implemented. This mechanism is used in Norway,
for example, where distribution utilities must undertake
34
to inform customers about the electricity product as well
as opportunities for efficiency. In Norway this regulatory
requirement is combined with a DSM tax on all kWh sales
which funds the information activity either by the utility
or by a utility-sponsored organisation.
With very few global exceptions, the command-andcontrol approach has not encouraged any more investment
than is officially required by the regulatory authority. With
little business incentive to undertaken DSM, utilities have
often sought to manipulate the regulatory requirements,
undertaking customer retention activities under the guise
of DSM information and marketing campaigns, and making windfall profits. This has resulted in the establishment
of unavoidable and impressively costly ‘‘DSM verification’’ infrastructure. This has been the case in England
and Wales, as well as in Norway. Hence the move in some
states in the United States a few years ago towards providing economic incentives to utilities that run exemplary
DSM programmes[4].
In the early days of DSM in the United States, England
and Wales, electric utilities were encouraged by the prevailing regulatory regimes to sell more electricity. To address these investment barriers, various regulatory
mechanisms have been applied. In the United States, utilities were initially subject to traditional cost-of-service or
rate-of-return regulation which discourages utilities from
pursuing customer energy efficiency programmes because:
(1) utilities may not recover DSM programme expenses
when these expenses have not been included in some previous tariff-setting process; (2) utilities may lose revenues
from sales not made because of the success of customer
energy efficiency programmes; and (3) utilities may forgo
earning opportunities because resources are devoted to
DSM programmes rather than to other profit-making activities [Nadel et al., 1994][5]. To remove the disincentives
associated with traditional rate-of-return regulation, US
regulators sought to decouple utility sales from revenues
and profits, and/or employ new lost revenue adjustments.
To offer additional incentives to invest in DSM, sharedsaving, bonus and mark-up mechanisms were introduced
(see above). Experience with a combination of additional
incentives and decoupling in many states of the US has
shown clearly that regulatory reforms can dramatically
and rapidly change the strength and scope of utility DSM
programmes [Hirst and Blank, 1994].
In England and Wales, distributor utilities’ activities
were initially subject to a performance-based price cap
mechanism, which again discouraged investment in DSM.
As a result of poor ensuing investment performance in
DSM, OFFER sought to partially decouple utility sales
from revenues and profits. OFFER also introduced the
Standards of Performance, and made provision for a revenue allowance to be collected and used to finance utility
DSM programme activity. Interestingly, very little of the
REC’s own money has been spent and most of this has
been on ‘‘passive’’ services -- that is, call centres, bill-stuffers, etc., rather than actual or ‘‘active’’ DSM [Thomas,
1999].
Thus, while OFFER in England and Wales chose to
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partially remove the disincentives arising from the performance-based price cap mechanism, most regulators in
the United States have sought not only to remove these
investment disincentives but also to offer additional incentives to utilities investing in DSM[6]. In other words,
regulators in the United States have allowed utilities to
profit from DSM programmes, while in England and
Wales OFFER has permitted DSM programme cost recovery. As is to be expected, more utilities have been willing
to undertake DSM programmes in the United States than
in England and Wales.
With pending electricity industry restructuring in the
United States, spending on DSM has declined significantly, even though regulators continue to allow utilities
to earn profits on DSM programmes. Utilities are now
loath to invest in DSM because these investments translate into uncompetitive rate increases. In response to this,
a number of state regulators have given initial indication
that a non-bypassable systems benefit charge may provide
a solution to this. All utilities would be obliged to collect
a non-bypassable fee on a per-customer or per-kWh sales
basis to fund a small amount of DSM activity. It is yet
unclear whether utilities will be able to earn profits on
these programmes: if utilities are not permitted to recover
their costs, as well as additional benefits, it is likely that
the same consequences as have flowed in most other
countries reviewed in this report will result -- that is, only
a minimal amount of DSM investment will be made.
6.4. It is unclear that utilities should continue to
administer DSM programmes as they have done in the
past
Experiences from all corners of the world show that it is
no longer obvious that utilities should be responsible for
funding and/or implementing public-benefit energy efficiency programmes. On the one hand, it is argued that it
is not a natural attitude of an electric utility to discourage
in any way the use of electricity. Because utilities tend to
give precedence to investments that are in their own selfinterest and not necessarily socially optimal, they are not
best placed to orchestrate a diversified mix of resources
for meeting the economy’s electrical service needs at the
lowest possible life-cycle costs. It is also argued that,
since utilities have not invested in energy efficiency programmes when more competition has been introduced,
they should not be responsible for these programmes at
all. If energy efficiency programmes are viewed as yielding social benefits, and therefore worthwhile investments
for society as a whole, then surely a more reliable mechanism should be identified to ensure the provision of these
particular services? Surely this would make it possible for
utilities, consultancy firms and users to compete on delivering the best and cheapest energy conservation?
On the other hand, distribution utilities and supply utilities for large customers are in constant and automatic contact with end-users. They know who their customers are,
know their energy consumption habits, communicate with
them every month, and have well-established payment
collection mechanisms at hand, and are in a position to
collect and analyse data. They are traditionally responsi-
ble for providing network energy services. They have the
technical know-how and human, technical and often financial resources. They are therefore seen to be in a
unique position to assist customers with energy efficiency.
Many distribution and supply utilities are currently arguing that they want to undertake/administer energy efficiency programmes because they want to ensure that the
‘‘right’’ messages gets across to their customers.
There is no conclusive answer to this. Countries have
chosen to manage this dilemma in different ways. In the
United States, regulators have required utilities to invest
in energy efficiency programmes and have allowed them
to profit from these programmes. This seems to work,
although it should be noted that verification agencies have
had to be established to ensure that utilities’ activities
genuinely lead to energy savings and are not just ‘‘good
on paper’’ or that utilities undertake the specific activities
they receive incentives for. These verification activities
have proven very costly, sometimes over 10 per cent of
DSM costs. In an attempt to remove utilities’ incentives
to conduct anti-competitive behaviour, the Norwegian
government strongly urges distributing utilities to transfer
their energy efficiency obligations, together with the special revenue collected specifically for energy efficiency,
to independent regional energy efficiency centres
(REECs). The regulatory authority believes that these
REECs are in a better position to offer objective advice
than distributors are likely to be. In the United Kingdom,
OFFER has retained the service of the Energy Savings
Trust to ensure that REC’s investments in DSM comply
with the Standards of Performance. In New Zealand, the
government has established the Energy Efficiency Conservation Authority (EECA) to promote energy efficiency
while leaving load management programmes to distributor
utilities. Eletrobras in Brazil has chosen to undertake energy efficiency programmes of its own accord, but it
should be remembered that its restructuring initiatives are
still in their infancy and it looks like they are threatening
these utility initiatives.
6.5. Secured funding and independence are critical
success factors for agencies/programmes dedicated to
promoting energy efficiency
In Brazil, PROCEL was established to fund and promote
energy conservation projects carried out by state and local
utilities, state agencies, private companies and other research institutes. Over the last decade or so, PROCEL
initiatives have gained considerable momentum, cumulatively achieving notable energy savings. These energy
savings have been achieved, however, in direct proportion
to the funding that Eletrobras (the national generating and
transmission utility) has allocated to it (PROCEL is managed by an Executive Secretariat subordinate to Eletrobras). Practice has shown that when the electricity sector
has been in financial crisis (i.e., sales are down), PROCEL’s budget and staff have been cut considerably. Conversely, when the outlook in the sector has improved,
PROCEL’s funding has been reinstalled. Now that the
electricity sector is being restructured, signs have already
emerged that PROCEL’s budget will be suspended once
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more. A similar situation has developed in Thailand,
though its DSM programme has also been funded by the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Overseas
Economic Co-operation Fund of Japan as well as through
the electricity tariff and is therefore not as dependent on
EGAT on funds as PROCEL is on Eletrobras.
This dilemma is characteristic of that faced by many
energy efficiency programmes/agencies around the world.
Strategic plans and perspectives of lead power sector utilities largely shape programme activities. Because of the
problems associated with this, proponents of energy efficiency argue that these programmes or agencies should
be made entirely independent and/or secure, or at least
given more autonomy. In developing countries especially,
DSM programme activities would probably not exist without affiliation to and the lifeline of utilities.
As electricity utilities are unbundled, the independence
concern disappears to some extent. As shown around the
world, with restructuring, it becomes less and less likely
that utilities would support/fund programmes such as
these. In New Zealand, when it became obvious that an
‘‘energy efficiency service gap’’ was appearing, the government chose to set up the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority. The EECA is funded out of
general-purpose taxes, and is thus not directly dependent
on utility funds. In Norway, regional energy efficiency
centres have been established to undertake distributors’
energy efficiency obligations. These REECs are funded
by a DSM wires charge, so again are not entirely dependent on utilities’ planning processes. In the United Kingdom, the Energy Savings Trust is funded by the
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions,
although the special revenue allowance levied on energy
sales for energy efficiency is still channelled through the
RECs (distributor utilities). Originally, the utilities were
expected to finance the activities of the EST. When the
gas utility refused to do so government stepped in. Interestingly, it has been argued that the key to the success of
Thailand’s DSM effort was that a specific cost recovery
mechanism for the utilities (through a fuel charge adjustment clause) was provided for upfront. Without this cost
recovery mechanism, full-scale implementation would
have been delayed for years, as has been the case for DSM
efforts in other Asian countries [Du Pont, 1998].
The agencies described here have been positioned quite
differently. New Zealand’s EECA seeks to promote energy
efficiency in high-level government policy processes as well
as ‘‘on the ground’’. The EST’s main mandate is to act as
an intermediary between OFFER and the RECs, ensuring
that the latter’s projects comply with the Standards of Performance. The Norwegian REECs undertake energy efficiency activities on behalf of the distributors. Thailand’s
energy efficiency programme promotes energy efficiency for
the utility, EGAT, as does PROCEL for Eletrobras.
Key international lessons in establishing energy efficiency agencies/programmes are the following.
• It is important for the energy efficiency agency to be
given autonomy from other utility business -- i.e., if
possible, utilities should not directly influence the viabil36
ity and nature of these agencies/programmes.
• Funding for the short term (at least five years) should
be secured before the commencement of business. It
is preferable that these funds come from either committed government or international funds, or through
a wires/distribution charge. It is not desirable for utilities to fund these agencies at their discretion.
• The scope of activities of the agency/programme
should be identified from the start, and should be focused on DSM objectives, rather than utility interests.
6.6. While very important, the ESCO industry cannot
entirely replace utility-sponsored public-benefit energy
efficiency programmes
As a greater degree of competition is introduced into electricity sectors around the world, and as the role of traditional utility DSM programmes becomes less clear, it
seems natural to assess the role of ESCOs in the newly
shaped and rapidly emerging energy efficiency industry.
In the United States, various different types of ESCOs,
which all seek to service the rapidly emerging energy
service industry, have emerged. These include ‘‘vendor
ESCOs’’, ‘‘contractor ESCOs’’, ‘‘engineering ESCOs’’ and
finally, ‘‘utility ESCOs’’. The first three types of ESCOs
listed here work independently of utilities while ‘‘utility
ESCOs bid to serve as providers of utility-sponsored DSM
programmes, and are paid by utilities to achieve guaranteed levels of MW and MWh savings’’ [Shippee, 1996].
Interestingly, ESCOs’ activities have all tended to be restricted to large commercial/industrial or institutional customers: because sales cycles in the ESCO industry are
long and transaction costs are high, transactions have to
be ‘‘worthwhile’’. Frequently, utilities and ESCOs compete
to receive the rights to provide these services. Thus, importantly, energy efficiency services for the residential
sector in the United States remain largely within the domain of distributor utilities (or government). As the electricity industry restructures, and a non-bypassable systems
benefit surcharge is possibly introduced, the distinct role
for utilities and for ESCOs will become more evident.
While it is widely agreed that the ESCO industry will not
be an appropriate vehicle to administer public funds, it
would make sense that ESCOs support utilities that could
do so.
Other countries have also tried to foster the growth and
development of the ESCO industry to assume a similar
‘‘utility-supportive’’ role as has occurred in the United
States. As yet, it is unclear though whether the impressive
growth experienced in the ESCO industry in the United
States would be achievable elsewhere. This is because the
viability of some ESCOs in the United States has depended quite significantly on spin-off activities arising
from utility DSM programmes. As competition is introduced into the electricity industry, spending on these programmes is now in decline. As similar restructuring
processes occur in other countries around the globe, it is
unlikely that the DSM wave as experienced in the United
States during the ’80s and early ’90s could ever be
replicated.
The Energy Savings Trust (EST) and the Energy Efficiency
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and Conservation Authority (EECA) have been mandated
to both safeguard and promote energy efficiency, in England and Wales, and New Zealand respectively. In establishing these agencies, the governments concerned have
officially recognised that energy efficiency services are
valued by society, and that where new electricity industry
structures have not naturally provided these services, government intervention would be necessary. In some respects, the activities and responsibilities of New Zealand’s
EECA are viewed as being wider than those of the EST.
While the services of the latter were retained primarily to
oversee DSM investments made by the RECs but also to
promote energy efficiency in general, the EECA undertakes many of the activities that RECs in the United Kingdom may have otherwise assumed. In other words,
distributor utilities in England and Wales are expected to
play a more active role in providing public-purpose energy efficiency programmes than in New Zealand. This
said, two of the main objectives of these independent
agencies have been to (1) promote market transformation
programmes which would completely alter the choice of
technologies available on the market; and (2) to foster the
growth of the ESCO industry in the respective countries,
so that the market would be able to service more of society’s energy efficiency requirements. Both of these activities form part of a longer-term strategy of transforming
consumer demand for energy as well as creating a vehicle
to support this demand. Interestingly, in attempting to create a market for energy efficiency services, the EECA,
and to a lesser extent the EST, have been charged with
‘‘stunting’’ or ‘‘crowding out’’ emerging ESCOs!
The cases of the United States, New Zealand, England
and Wales are illustrative of global attempts that have
been made, primarily by the public sector, to establish a
balance between utility-administered DSM programmes
and initiatives led by private sector ESCOs, and in the
cases of New Zealand, England and Wales, the contributions of independent energy efficiency agencies. The experiences of these countries illustrate that it is not easy
to establish this balance but that it is important to try to
do so. It is no longer clear that utilities should continue
to administer DSM programmes as they have done in the
past. It is equally unclear that the ESCO industry should
take on these programmes either. International experience
indicates that a collaborative effort to saturate the energy
efficiency market is likely to be worthwhile.
7. Conclusion
International experience shows that, to have successful
public-benefit energy efficiency programmes, it is not
necessary to have fully-integrated utilities and heavyhanded regulation as has been in force in the United States
in the recent past. Nor is it necessary to have expensive
rebate programmes. Utility structure and ownership is important, but not necessarily fundamental, to determining
the success or otherwise of DSM. Where adequate policy
and economic incentives to the utility and other actors in
the investment processes are in place, this investment can
occur in a widely varying range of circumstances. In the
absence of removing disincentives to such investment, or
alternatively to extending these to strong incentives, a
range of other measures would be needed to encourage
public-benefit energy efficiency investment. Such measures could include minimum efficiency standards, building codes and regulations that emphasise energy
efficiency, and procurement programmes opening up markets for energy efficiency products.
This review has visited a number of different countries
that have sought to promote energy efficiency benefits in
restructured electricity markets. This has been done
through a combination of market forces operating within
a supportive and selective framework of regulation and
legislation, and/or through the establishment of independent agencies and national networks. Market barriers,
not only already existing but also those likely to be introduced by restructuring, should be considered when establishing the appropriate balance between these public
sector interventions.
This review represents the first in a series of reports
emanating from a project which will ultimately deliver
recommendations to the government, National Electricity
Regulator, and Eskom on how to ensure that DSM is built
into the restructuring process set to occur in South Africa.
The second report in this series investigates barriers currently inhibiting investment in DSM in South Africa.
Thereafter, a series of scenarios describing possible electricity industry outcomes that restructuring may bring has
been constructed. We sought to assess which of the market
barriers noted in the second report remain as restructuring
progresses as well as identify new barriers introduced by
restructuring. The third report outlines what the prospects
for DSM at each of the stages in these models could be.
The fourth report in this series delivers funding-, governance- and regulation-related recommendations to the government, the National Electricity Regulator and the
distribution industry to ensure investment in adequate
public-benefit energy efficiency programmes in new
power contexts in South Africa.
The author can be contacted at:
E-mail: [email protected]
Notes
1. This article is based on the following two research reports: [Clark, 1999] and [Clark and
Barberton, 1999].
2. The Energy and Development Research Centre (EDRC) would like to thank Eskom for
the financial and other support that made this research possible
3. Given that the most ‘‘desirable’’ end-state of most restructuring initiatives appears to be
that which offers customers a choice of electricity supply, one might argue that in suggesting ways to promote energy efficiency investment in restructured markets, it is most
relevant to keep this end-state in mind, and perhaps even plan towards achieving energy
efficiency investment in this particular context. The counterpart argument to this is that
for many countries, retail competition seems to be an end-state that is extremely far
from current situations and priorities, and that it is more important to plan for outcomes
which are within reach. This research seeks to address both of these needs.
4. Profit incentives have been offered in states with the most extensive DSM programmes
(California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Vermont). Interestingly, while
profit incentives help, strong environmental politics also play a role. Even with profit
incentives, utilities tend to be more responsive since they generally want to keep regulators happy, and regulators respond to elected officials [Nadel, 2001].
5. Treatment of lost utility revenues arising out of successful DSM programme implementation has received the highest degree of attention in the United States and elsewhere
because this is generally where, in the short run, the largest negative financial consequence of a successful energy efficiency programme lies.
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6. These responses correspond well with the regulatory approaches the United States,
England and Wales have adopted vis-à-vis DSM in competitive markets: federal and
state regulators in the United States have played a major role in this area, while in
England and Wales, OFFER has chosen to be more passive.
International Institute for Energy Conservation, Bangkok.
References
Nadel, S., 2000. Personal communication.
Ciliano, B., 1999. ‘‘Changing the mindset and business model for energy efficiency: lessons
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Arabia, November 14-15.
Nadel, S., Reid, M., and Wolcott, D., 1994. Regulatory Incentives for Demand-Side Management, Research report, American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, Washington,
D.C.
Clark, A., 1999. Demand-side Management in Restructured Electricity Industries: an International Review, Research report, Energy and Development Research Centre, University of
Cape Town.
Clark, A., and Barberton, C., 1999. Barriers Inhibiting Investment in DSM in South Africa,
Research report, Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town.
Hirst, E., and Blank, E., 1994. ‘‘Solutions to regulatory disincentives for utility DSM programmes’’, Utilities Policy, 4(2), pp. 105-112.
Hunt, S., and Shuttleworth, G., 1996. Competition and Choice in Electricity, London, Bookcraft.
Shippee, G., 1996. ‘‘The future of energy service companies: changes and trends’’, Electricity
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Surtees, R., 1998. Demand Side Intervention in the Electric Utility Business: Development
of Appropriate Policy Principles for South Africa, Unpublished Master’s dissertation, Henley
Management College.
Davis, M., 1997. An International Review of Institutional Reform in the Power Sector, Research report, Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town.
Swisher, J., 1994. ‘‘Barriers and incentives for utility energy efficiency programmes in deregulated markets’’, Proceedings of the ACEEE 1994 Summer Study on Energy Efficient
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Du Pont, P., 1998. Lessons from Thailand: Transferring DSM Tools to Asia, Research report,
Thomas, S., (University of Sussex) 1999. Personal communication.
As regular readers are aware,
Energy for Sustainable Development has
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during 2000 and 2001. More special issues
are planned on the following subjects:
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The WGES energy perspective for China
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Energy efficiency
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