William Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security 5/e

Cryptography and
Network Security
Chapter 18
Fifth Edition
by William Stallings
Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown
Chapter 15 – Electronic Mail
Security
Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to
appear, the Board's access to other sources of
information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided
documents taken from the files of the National Security
Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including
messages from the PROF system between VADM
Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were
conversations by computer, written at the time events
occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected
from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand,
contemporaneous account of events.
—The Tower Commission Report to President
Reagan on the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987
2
Email Security
 email
is one of the most widely used and
regarded network services
 currently message contents are not secure


may be inspected either in transit
or by suitably privileged users on destination
system
3
Email Security Enhancements
 confidentiality

protection from disclosure
 authentication

of sender of message
 message

integrity
protection from modification
 non-repudiation

of origin
protection from denial by sender
4
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
 widely
used de facto secure email
program
 developed by Phil Zimmermann
 selected best available crypto algs to use
 integrated into a single program
 on Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems
 originally free, now also have commercial
versions available
5
PGP Operation –
Authentication
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
sender creates message
make SHA-1160-bit hash of message
attached RSA signed hash to message
receiver decrypts & recovers hash code
receiver verifies received message hash
6
PGP Operation –
Confidentiality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
sender forms 128-bit random session key
encrypts message with session key
attaches session key encrypted with RSA
receiver decrypts & recovers session key
session key is used to decrypt message
7
PGP Operation – Confidentiality
& Authentication
 can



use both services on same message
create signature & attach to message
encrypt both message & signature
attach RSA/ElGamal encrypted session key
8
PGP Operation –
Compression
 by
default PGP compresses message
after signing but before encrypting


so can store uncompressed message &
signature for later verification
& because compression is non deterministic
 uses
ZIP compression algorithm
9
PGP Operation – Email
Compatibility

when using PGP will have binary data to send
(encrypted message etc)
 however email was designed only for ASCII text
 hence PGP must encode raw binary data into
printable ASCII characters
 uses radix-64 algorithm



maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars
also appends a CRC(A cyclic redundancy check is an
error-detecting code commonly used in digital
networks and storage devices to detect accidental
changes to raw data)
PGP also segments messages if too big
10
PGP Operation – Summary
11
PGP Session Keys
 PGP
makes use of four types of keys onetime session symmetric keys, public keys,
private keys, and passphrase-based
symmetric keys.
 need a session key for each message

of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or
IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES
Random numbers generated using ANSI
X12.17 mode
 uses random inputs taken from previous
uses and from keystroke timing of user

12
PGP Public & Private Keys

since many public/private keys may be in use,
need to identify which is actually used to encrypt
session key in a message



rather use a key identifier based on key



could send full public-key with every message
but this is inefficient
is least significant 64-bits of the key
will very likely be unique
also use key ID in signatures
13
PGP Message Format
14
A message consists of three components:
 the message component,
 a signature (optional),
 and a session key component (optional).
 The message component includes the
actual data to be stored or transmitted, as
well as a filename and a timestamp that
specifies the time of creation.

 The
signature component includes a
 timestamp,
 encrypted SHA-1 message digest,
 leading two digest octets for verification,
 and the Key ID of the sender’s public key.
 The session key component includes the
session key and the identifier of the
recipient's public key that was used by the
sender to encrypt the session key. The
entire block is usually encoded with radix64 encoding.
PGP Key Rings
 each


PGP user has a pair of keyrings:
public-key ring contains all the public-keys of
other PGP users known to this user, indexed
by key ID
private-key ring contains the public/private
key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID &
encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase
 security
of private keys thus depends on
the pass-phrase security
17
PGP Key Rings
18
PGP Message Generation
19
 The
sending PGP entity performs the
following steps:
 1. Signing the message:
 a. PGP retrieves the sender's private key
from the private-key ring using your_userid
as an index. If your_userid was not
provided in the command, the first private
key on the ring is retrieved.
 b. PGP prompts the user for the
passphrase to recover the unencrypted
private key.
 c. The signature component of the
message is constructed.
 2.
Encrypting the message:
 a. PGP generates a session key and
encrypts the message.
 b. PGP retrieves the recipient's public
key from the public-key ring using
her_userid as an index.
 c. The session key component of the
message is constructed.
PGP Message Reception
22
 PGP
crypto services (again ignoring
compression and radix-64 conversion for
simplicity). The receiving PGP entity
performs the following steps:
 1. Decrypting the message:
 a. PGP retrieves the receiver's private
key from the private-key ring, using the
Key ID field in the session key component
of the message as an index.
 b. PGP prompts the user for the
passphrase to recover the unencrypted
private key.

c. PGP then recovers the session key and
decrypts the message.
 2. Authenticating the message:
 a. PGP retrieves the sender's public key
from the public-key ring, using the Key ID
field in the signature key component of the
message as an index.
 b. PGP recovers the transmitted message
digest.
 c. PGP computes the message digest for
the received message and compares it to the
transmitted message digest to authenticate.

PGP Key Management

rather than relying on certificate authorities
 in PGP every user is own CA


can sign keys for users they know directly
forms a “web of trust”


trust keys have signed
can trust keys others have signed if have a chain of
signatures to them

key ring includes trust indicators
 users can also revoke their keys
25
PGP Trust Model Example
26
S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions)
 security




original Internet RFC822 email was text only
MIME provided support for varying content
types and multi-part messages
with encoding of binary data to textual form
S/MIME added security enhancements
 have

enhancement to MIME email
S/MIME support in many mail agents
eg MS Outlook, Mozilla, Mac Mail etc
27
S/MIME Functions
 enveloped

encrypted content and associated keys
 signed

data
data
encoded message + signed digest
 clear-signed

cleartext message + encoded signed digest
 signed

data
& enveloped data
nesting of signed & encrypted entities
28
S/MIME Cryptographic
Algorithms
 digital
signatures: DSS & RSA
 hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5
 session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA
 message encryption: AES, Triple-DES,
RC2/40 and others
 MAC: HMAC with SHA-1
 have process to decide which algs to use
29
S/MIME Messages
 S/MIME
secures a MIME entity with a
signature, encryption, or both
 forming a MIME wrapped PKCS(publickey cryptography specifications) object
 have a range of content-types:





enveloped data
signed data
clear-signed data
registration request
certificate only message
30
S/MIME Certificate
Processing
 S/MIME
uses X.509 v3 certificates
 managed using a hybrid of a strict X.509
CA hierarchy & PGP’s web of trust
 each client has a list of trusted CA’s certs
 and own public/private key pairs & certs
 certificates must be signed by trusted CA’s
31
Certificate Authorities
several well-known CA’s
 Verisign one of most widely used
 Verisign issues several types of Digital IDs
 increasing levels of checks & hence trust
 have
ClassIdentity ChecksUsage
1 name/email checkweb browsing/email
2 + enroll/addr checkemail, subs, s/w validate
3 + ID documentse-banking/service access
32
S/MIME Enhanced Security
Services
3



proposed enhanced security services:
signed receipts
security labels
secure mailing lists
33
Domain Keys Identified Mail
a
specification for cryptographically
signing email messages
 so signing domain claims responsibility
 recipients / agents can verify signature
 proposed Internet Standard RFC 4871
 has been widely adopted
34
Internet Mail Architecture
35
Email Threats
 see
RFC 4684- Analysis of Threats
Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail
 describes the problem space in terms of:



range: low end, spammers, fraudsters
capabilities in terms of where submitted,
signed, volume, routing naming etc
outside located attackers
36
DKIM
Strategy
 transparent
to user


MSA sign
MDA verify
 for
pragmatic
reasons
37
DCIM
Functional
Flow
38
Summary
 have




considered:
secure email
PGP
S/MIME
domain-keys identified email
39