Insolvency Practice and the Credit Process Philip D. Sherman Senior Adviser in Asia The Risk Management Association November 2004 1 Outline • Banks must take risks . . . They need to have a process to manage the risks and the inevitable losses . . . and a capital cushion • The insolvency community deals with the risk failures, whether of process problems or due to the environment or borrower or both • Banks need to tap insolvency knowledge to improve their process and decision-making so that they can – minimize exposure at the time of default – recover as much as possible of that amount • We can look at process and capital in terms of the modern credit risk equation: Expected Loss = Probability of Default X Exposure at Default X Loss Given Default . . . with focus on the last two terms 2 The “Credit Equation” Summarizes the Methodology for Risk Measurement Expected Loss (EL) = Probability of Default (PD/ PoD) X Exposure at Default (EAD) X Loss Given Default (LGD) plus correction factors for tenor and correlations. EAD and LGD loom large in the arithmetic 3 LGD Is Particularly Important in Asia •Problems of client information mean PD is hard to estimate . . . •Collateral . . . which is a focus of LGD . . . Is a the center of the process •LGD must therefore be managed very well Collateral Refinancing Restructuring of Business & Management 4 Bank Credit Processes Lay Out the Drill for Credit Portfolio Maintenance Credit Policy & Port-folio Management Portfolio Acquisition Marketing Credit Application Credit Approval Documentation & Disbursement Monitoring Workout Credit Organization and Culture The Basel Committee requires •An Orderly, professional and imaginative process •The measurement of risk and the use of measurement in all credit activities 5 The Credit Equation Ties Closely to the Credit Process Process Element Credit Policy Credit Equation Term Uses all Marketing Based on policy Credit Application PD Credit Approval PD Documentation & Disbursement Monitoring Workout LGD EAD, PD LGD Feedback •Process •Credit Specifics 6 Capital Is Allocated Against “Unexpected” Losses 7 The Credit Equation is Used to Determine Credit Capital by Way of “Risk Weights Standardized Approach Mandates Capital in Accordance with Rated or Unrelated Risks, incorporating all equation elements Rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- Risk Weight 20% 50% Pillar I Capital 1.6% 4% BBB+ to BB100% 8% Below BB- Unrated 150% 100% 12% 8% The Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) produces a range of requirements based on Expected Loss, with a mandated LGD (Foundation) or a calculated LGD ( Advanced) Rating AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below BB- Unrated Standard Capital 1.6% 4% 8% 12% 8% IRB Capital* 1-2% 2-4% 4-11% 11-30% NA *Mandated LGD assumption in Foundation Process 8 Banks Build the Equation into Their Credit Management System •Some banks already used Expected Loss •A much larger group uses “Risk Ratings” and some LGD assumption •“Facility Ratings are another way to manage LGD and potentially EAD •Ratings translate into action guidelines in risk management: Low Facility Rating, e.g. High LGD High facility Rating, e.g. Low LGD Manage Risk, Monitor client, Collateral Low EL -– Manage returns High Risk Rating, i.e., Low PD High EL Avoid Manage Risk, Monitor client, collateral Low Risk Rating, i.e. High PD 9 Basel Sets Requirements for Collateral Management. . . •Legal enforceability •Objective market value •Frequent revaluation •First claim •Clear credit policy for collateral •Appropriate liquidation analysis in credit approvals •Distinct operational unit to manage collateral •Adequate insurance •Property monitoring, e.g., to ensure taxes paid •Environmental liability risk management 10 . . . and LGD Estimation Basel LGD Estimate Process •Estimates have to be used for management • “Track record” in using data for at least three years. •Assessment of principal drivers supported by analysis •Adequate time frame •Historical experience/empirical evidence •Adequate statistical base and analysis, with consistent application and with appropriate validation procedures •External comparisons Collateral Analysis •Dependence between borrower and •Stress testing collateral value •Comprehensive view of “loss” •Currency mismatch •Consistency of default definition •Conservative valuation/estimation of workout period •Key characteristics of borrower/facility/product •Conservatism!!!! •Country and industry factors •Clear, consistent collateral policy •Legal factors including insolvency regime keeping in mind creditworthiness of obligor •Procedure for overrides of grades •Robust collateral management systems •Collateral analysis •Concentration monitoring/action •Policies on appropriateness of collateral, liquidation potential and revaluation procedures 11 Basel Defines “Default” and “Loss” Default Per paragraph 272 of the final Accord document, a default occurs when one or more of the following conditions obtain: •It is determined the obligor is unlikely to pay its debt obligations (principal, interest, fees) in full •A credit loss even associated with any obligation of the obligor, such as charge-off, specific provision, interest or fees •The obligor is more than 90 days past due on any credit obligation •The obligor has filed for bankruptcy of similar protection from creditors Loss “This should include the discount effects, funding costs and direct and indirect costs association with collecting on the instrument in the de termination of loss. Banks should not simply measure the loss recorded in accounting records, although they should be able to compare the two” (Basel Accord, Para 339). 12 LGD Studies Are Thin and U. S. Orientated •Shortage of data and focus on bond markets and syndicated loans •Many definitions and calculation algorithms, particularly “default” and “loss,” are far from being agreed or implemented. •Individual bank universes of defaults are much narrower •Difference between studies of losses “when all is said and done” and losses as measured by security prices subsequent to default •Both EAD and LGD are very reflective of the bank credit process/willpower •In Asia, there are wide differences by country. 13 S & P Has Developed “Loss Stats” Date Type General recovery data unsurprising, but 2003 a bad year Available Recovery % 1988-2001 Recovery % 19982002 Recovery % 2003 Bank 84 74 72 Senior Secured Bond 69 46 29 Senior Unsecured Bond 52 37 21 Senior Subordinated Bond 35 21 NA Subordinated Bond 30 15 NA Junior Subordinated Bond 17 3 NA Ultimate Recovery % Debt below (i.e., how senior?) 16 Collateral 13 Debt above 10 Aggregate default rate 7 Industry factor 7 GDP 0 Recovery heavily correlated to structural financing factors 14 Fitch Produces Similar General Results, but Clarifies a Skewed Distribution Type Loan Recovery % Bond Recovery% Senior Secured 72 62 Senior Unsecured 52 42 15 Moody’s Results Are Congruent but Lower Rating Agency LGD Models • • S & P Loss Stats Moody’s LossCalc • Fitch’s DART 16 Other Studies • Edward Altman of NYU’s Stern School has delved into LGD and collateral management issues. papers.stern.nyu/~ealtman/ – • Altman and colleagues link recovery and default rates, which is currently not part of Basel thinking. A Bank of Italy group produced “Italian Banks Workout Activity: Costs, Timing and Recovery Rates,” which was presented at third FAIR. Principal conclusions: – – – – – – Private agreements were much more important in case settlement than bankruptcy proceedings/foreclosure Recovery timing ranged from 6-7 years for bankruptcy/composition proceedings to around two years for private agreements. Foreclosures take longer than proceedings based on pledged securities. Foreclosure takes longer in southern and central Italy (PDS note: which have environments closer to Asia than the north) than in northern Italy. Annual recovery cost estimated at 1.2% of NPL’s Average recovery “by 1999” (it was not clear the period covered but obviously fairly long since the recovery periods were up to 264 months!) was 37% with considerable dispersion amongst banks. (PDS: Bank differences would seem to be a key element for further study) Short recovery periods led to higher recovery rates Consumer recoveries were better than enterprise recovering; “producer families” were above the mean 17 An RMA Paper Digs into Causes Define: LGD = (Charge-off - charge-off recovery) / Outstanding balance at default α: The beta distribution’s center parameter and can be derived from equations below β: The beta distribution’s shape parameter and can be derived from equations below Min: Minimum of all cases Max: Maximum of all cases α and β are then derived from the following equations: where μ, δ2 are population mean and variance respectively. 2. We then transform LGD from a beta to a normal distribution suitable for use in OLS regressions, using the definitions of α and β as calculated above. 18 RMA Conducts Cooperative LGD Studies Data Model •Facility and Customer Number •Type of Company •Syndication indicator •Country •Facility risk rating •Obligor risk rating •Authorized limit •Amount outstanding at default •Spread index and per cent •Industry •Collateral •Collateral value and evaluation frequency •Unfunded risk protection information •Credit mitigation produce •Facility type •Seniority •Facility purpose •Credit event •Cash flow information •Expense information •Resolution event Loss Calculations There are very extensive breakdowns with in categories. Methodology to calculate actual economic losses is defined in some detail as well as is the event of default, which for purpose of this study includes: •Past due •Unlikely to pay •Non accrual •Credit loss •Facility sale •Distressed restructuring •Bank-filed bankruptcy •Obligor-filed bankruptcy •Unknown (which please minimize) 19 Asia Begins to Implement Basel Country Response on Pillar I Singapore The three banks will use IRB Hong Kong Big banks to use IRB, as they will anyway, flexibility for smaller banks Malaysia Implementation over time. Standardized - 2008 and IRB (voluntarily) - 2010 Indonesia Basel-like framework introduced but details to come Thailand Appears will adopt Basel II but details still to come Philippines Standardized in 2007, IRB possibly by 2010 PRC/India/Sri Lanka Not hostile to Basel II but sticking to Basel I for now 20 RoC’s JCIC Pioneers Data Collection Cash Flow Recovery Seniority Collateral Type Direct Costs Legal/Trustee Fees Accountant Indirect Costs Management fee Duration of workout Behavior Opportunity cost Moral hazard Adverse selection APR rule Choice of auctioning vs. restructuring. Singapore banks work with S & P, results not in yet 21 Specific Asian Issues in LGD Study •Poor historical data —it has been lost, was never created, is difficult to locate and extract •Mergers mean data is either lost or non-comparable •Data on paper, not digitized •Definition difficulties (which however can be resolved up to a point) •Problems in defining what needs to be measured – some elements, e.g., management willpower – are more measured in results which are still hard to compare 22 Asia’s NPL Estimates Appear Too Low Country 2002 Av. NPL% 2003 Est. Singapore 8 7-7 “Reliability ahead of region.” Hong Kong 5 5-6 Same as Singapore Malaysia 16 13-14 “Numbers fairly reliable” 16% on three months basis, disclosed by regulator for whole industry although bank standard is six months. Thailand 30 28-9 “Impaired assets 75% above official levels.” which were 16.5%. Loose rules on loan rescheduling to avoid default, which is at 90 days. Philippines 32 30 Similar to Thailand. includes large volume of real estate collateral owned by banks, not easily saleable Taiwan 13 10 “Impaired assets twice official levels” of 6.4%. Interest can be allowed to run for 180 days 20 46 incl. IBRA 15-17 “Impaired assets 150% above official levels” of 8%. Most bad loans were shipped off to IBRA and the low number industry number reflects the low level of lending 23 30 Indonesia India Comments Indian NPL rules set at 180 days although change planned for 2004. Source: S & P Asia-Pacific Banking Outlook 2004 23 Asian LGD’s Vary A Lot by Country, but Are High Relative to the U. S. Country Est. LGD Hong Kong 50 India 70 Indonesia 85 Malaysia 55 Philippines 75 Singapore 25 Taiwan 60 Thailand 70 Source: S & P Asia-Pacific Banking Outlook 2004 24 Many Factors Affect LGD Management • External – Economic Environment – Legal Environment – Financial Markets • “Banking” – – – – – • Structure of Facilities Structure of Borrowers Structure of Lenders Documentation Collateral Management – – – – Monitoring Valuation & Collateral Management Personnel and staffing Decision-making and Willpower 25 An Informal “Expert Panel” Generally Confirms the List EAD/LGD Factors Importance for LGD in Asia, 1998-2004 Too many or too diverse banks or too unstructured banking groups 10 No truly lead bank group 7 Local legal environment did not support collection/restructuring efforts 13 Deal documents missing 5 Deal documents poorly drawn 9 Security documents missing 5 Securities not properly registered 6 Security documents poorly drawn 7 Unrealistic collateral valuations 10 Security value is the same as the enterprise value, e.g., machinery, building project 5 Collateral deteriorated in liquidation value but this was not recognized 8 Collateral monitoring, especially property, did not take account of the risk of "boom" prices 6 Collateral concentrations 5 Deal structure too aggressive in terms of local law and regulations 8 Deal structure too complicated 8 Group financial structure too complex and hard to understand/control 10 Inadequate general credit monitoring allowed advances which could have been avoided 7 26 Recommendations for Action in Asia 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Banks to be required to focus on LGD, data gathering Regulators to set LGD coefficients Regulators should use Basel definitions and standards Regulatory papers to deal with LGD in depth, collateral and recovery process FAIR to recommend a Basel Committee treatment of “recovery” Asian regulators to develop “Asian” treatment for collateral Regulators and banks to collaborate to improved legal environment FAIR to increase bank involvement in its activities 27 Philip D. Sherman Senior Adviser in Asia The Risk Management Association [email protected] or [email protected] Telephone: 65-6836-1297 Mobile: 65-9788-5001 28
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