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Group B
Garson 200
Rough Draft
15 Nov 2013
Rough Draft
INTRODUCTION RELAYING FACTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ETC
The demands that the Kyoto protocol places upon its member states include measures
that the signatories believe will eventually help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
protocol is internationally binding; as long as a state remains a member, the state is expected to
comply with the agreed upon emission reduction targets. In addition to the member states
complying with the reduction of emissions, the Kyoto Protocol also requires its signatories to
monitor the expressed levels of allowed emissions using several different mechanisms. These
structures include registry systems, national reporting, a specialized compliance system, and a
system created to assist with any changes that the protocol may have to adapt to. The Kyoto
protocol calls for these systems to enable each of the member states to not only keep track of
their own success in compliance, but also to hold one another accountable (Kyoto Protocol). The
registry and compliance systems also help in the event that one nation is having problems
observing their quota, by putting in place three mechanisms that are able to supplement the
required primary, national funding (Registry Systems, Compliance).
These three mechanisms were put in place to stimulate, assist, and encourage the
countries to reach their goals in attempting to combat climate change. They are Emissions
Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation (Mechanisms).
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Emissions Trading allows countries with unused units to sell them to those who may be in
danger of going over capacity (Emissions Trading). On the other hand, both CDM and Joint
Implementation are mechanisms that allow a Kyoto protocol signatory to earn emission
reduction units through projects in non-member, or developing countries and other member
states, respectively (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation). All of these systems
and mechanisms that have been put in place to ensure that the member states of the Kyoto
Protocol have no excuse not to comply with the emission targets.
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on the 11th of December in 1997, however it was not
until 2005 that it entered into force. As late as 2008, however, was when the first commitment
period began. For the first commitment period, which ended in 2012, the member nations agreed
to commit to "reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions to an average of five percent against 1990
levels" (Kyoto Protocol). During the current and second commitment period, the nations chose to
raise the commitment to at least 18 percent below 1990 levels. This is obviously a large step
from the first commitment period's five percent, however the second commitment period has
been granted for an additional three years to the first commitment period. The numbers are based
upon the December 2012 adopted "Doha Agreement," which not only granted the second
commitment period, but also revisited the list of greenhouse gases that will be required to report
on, as well as amending the issues that the signatories believed needed updating for the second
commitment period (Doha Amendment).
The emissions targets for each of the individual member nations were set based upon
three main criteria. James Garvey explains each of the three criteria in his book The Ethics of
Climate Change: Right and Wrong as historical responsibilities, present capacities, and
sustainability. As far as historical responsibilities for present climate change are concerned, it is
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obviously already developed countries that have caused the changes. In addition, developed
countries are currently in a better position to help stave off the consequences of climate change.
The framework of the Kyoto protocol calls for all of the member nations to ensure that the
carbon dioxide emissions around the globe do not exceed the assigned amount for the
commitment period (Massai 67). Not all nations, however, were considered to be responsible to
signing and upholding the protocol. These three criteria put forth by Garvey are also the main
reason why only developed countries are included in the Kyoto protocol. Countries such as
China and India, who were considered to be developing countries in 1997, are not held to the
same standards because, historically, they are not as responsible for the current changes in
climate and, more currently, they are not in a similar position to help reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
One of the main issues that the developers of the Kyoto protocol, as well as systems that
attempt to limit greenhouse gas emissions, is the debate over what amount of emissions can be
allowed morally, that are also scientifically possible. Because emissions had no caps when
already developed countries were beginning to develop, a lot of progress was made while
perhaps testing the bounds of what is morally sound and safe for the environment. While most
scientists now agree that there has to be a way to limit the global emissions of greenhouse gases,
the same scientists struggle with whether or not that is feasible when much of a nation's
economic success rests on the ability to use factories and technology that do emit greenhouse
gases.
Despite claims that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was for the greater global good, its
immediate benefits would be largely intangible. That is to say, signatory countries would be
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required to ante up large sums of money in order to meet CO2 reduction deadlines, but would not
see any kind of immediate economic or environmental rewards as a result. Overall, international
cooperation was generally low with regard to this treaty, especially in the cases of those
countries whose economies depend heavily on many of the processes that the Kyoto Protocol
would limit. Although it was projected that this protocol would have had considerable success in
limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the costs that it represented to potential signatory countries
overshadowed much of the reasoning that supported it. In addition, the original Kyoto Protocol
that was proposed in 1997 at the 3rd Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework
Convention of Climate Change left questions unanswered pertaining to its implementation,
which compounded much of the skepticism that already existed around it. For example,
information about the credits that would be awarded for carbon sinks was ambiguous, and it was
also unclear as to the tradability of emissions rights between countries.
Ultimately, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto protocol because both the Clinton
and Bush administrations saw it as a fundamentally flawed treaty economically, morally, and
because of the amount of uncertainty that still surrounds issues of climate change. One of the
most prominent reasons that the United States chose not to ratify the treaty was because the
Clinton and Bush administrations both claimed that it would threaten jobs and greatly affect the
US economy. The fact of the matter is that the United States is responsible for roughly 25% of
greenhouse gas emissions, and it leads in consumption of both coal and oil. The potential
economic deficit increases further when one considers that large sums of money would also have
to be allocated to studies and buildup of alternative fuel sources and jobs in the wake of this
significant shift away from fossil fuels.
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The United States was also unhappy with the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that it was
unfair that developing countries like Japan and China were subject to much looser restrictions.
Unlike the industrialized West, these countries were in some cases even allowed to increase their
CO2 production, albeit only temporarily. The justification for this was that these countries
deserved to develop themselves in order to increase their economic standing and their overall
quality of life. Then they would curb their output and submit to harsher output quotas. It was also
argued that heavier restrictions were immediately placed upon countries like the United States
because they were most directly and consistently responsible for the largest CO2 outputs, but
realistically, this policy would put these countries at a disadvantage against newly industrializing
countries. Consequently the opinions of American voters concerning the fairness of the Kyoto
Protocol were dismal, and resulted in a general sentiment that it was morally defective because it
was intrinsically unfair.
The effects of climate change, even just a temperature increase of a few degrees, can be
disastrous. Climate change threatens global biodiversity, water supply, habitable land, food
supply, and is the potential cause of extreme weather events. Climate change can jeopardize
human rights because everyone has the right to a healthy life (Caney 16). As a result, it is clear to
see why climate change is not only an environmental and economic problem, but is a moral
problem and should be treated as such. The Kyoto Protocol is the first step in addressing this
issue on a global level, which is commendable on its own. However, it is important to evaluate
whether it recognizes moral values such as fairness, compensation for historical wrongs, and the
right of poor countries to develop economically. At face value the Kyoto Protocol ideally does
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recognize these values, however, in practice it provides a balance between these values and
adapting to an economic environment.
Before evaluating the morality of the Kyoto Protocol, it is imperative to assess and
understand the ethics of climate change as a whole. As Jamieson posits in “Ethics, Public Policy,
and Global Warming,” the problem of climate change should be “confronted as a fundamental
challenge to our values and [we should] not treat it as if it were simply another technical problem
to be managed” (Jamieson 85). It is extremely difficult to do this because climate change is
caused by a large amount of people, almost everyone contributes in differing degrees to the
problem, and the harms caused by climate change are global and greatly affect future generations
(Garson Lecture 16). Therefore, it is common to express indifference towards addressing the
problem because the effect that one person can seem insignificant. This is the result of trying to
address climate change by calculating outcomes and treating it as a “technical problem”
(Jamieson 85). It is important to base our action on climate change on moral values, such as the
ones previously stated, because this is what will incite participation and responsiveness, which
will lead to positive moral progress on this detrimental global issue. Therefore, ethical questions
should be essential to formulating climate change policies (Gardiner 88).
In order to judge whether or not the Kyoto Protocol is based upon or recognizes moral
values, it is imperative to include opposing critiques that touch upon its mechanisms and analyze
the validity of each critique. In order for countries to meet their targets, the Kyoto Protocol
provides three mechanisms: Emissions Trading, The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
and Joint Implementation (JI). These mechanisms have essentially transformed CO2 (the primary
greenhouse gas emitted) emissions into a commodity that can be bought and traded. The use of a
carbon market is what the designers of the Kyoto Protocol hope will lead to a reduction in
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emissions and ultimately reduce global temperatures by at least a few degrees if free market
forces prevail. Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries are required to either limit or
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions within a set time limit. If countries are unable to meet
their emissions targets, they can “buy allowances” from another country that is doing better in
reducing CO2 emissions than required of them (Garvey 121). The Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) allows developed countries to fund sustainability projects in developing
nations in exchange for certified emission reduction credits (CERs). The Joint Implementation
program is very similar to the CDM, where an Annex B developed nation can fund a project in
another Annex B country in return for emission reduction units (EMUs).
Three Critiques of the Kyoto Protocol:
There has been major opposition to the Kyoto Protocol not just based on its functionality,
but also arguing that it falls short ethically. In regards to whether or not the Kyoto Protocol
recognizes moral values such as fairness, compensation for historical wrongs, and/or the right of
poor countries to develop economically, there are three strong critiques that the Kyoto Protocol
does not do so.
The main goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby
reduce average global temperatures. It sets restrictions on how much a country can emit and sets
emission reduction targets that they ought to meet in by the end of a given time frame.
Developing countries, like China and India, are currently not required under any binding
regulations to limit their emissions. Some countries that are currently not signed up for the Kyoto
Protocol, such as the United States and Canada, argue that this is inherently unfair and therefore
serves as basis for inaction. However, this principle of the Kyoto Protocol is fair and just in that
it is giving undeveloped countries equal opportunities to develop as current developed countries
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have already had the opportunity to do so. The argument also focuses on the present statistic that
China is currently the world’s leading emitter of CO2, yet there are no current plans to limit
China’s emissions. There is fault in this argument in that developed countries still have and most
likely will have greater emissions per person than developing nations will ever have. Therefore,
even though countries like China may be currently emitting more than developed countries,
developed countries will still be emitting more per person. This adds to the fact that developed
countries historically have emitted more than developing countries. In addition, in regards to
present capacities, developed countries have greater ability than developing countries to limit
their emissions and make gains in adapting to new sustainability projects. When considering
historical responsibility and present capacities, it is not unfair to allocate greater accountability to
developed countries. Therefore, the argument that it is unfair for developing nations to not face
as strict emissions regulations does not invalidate the benefit of reducing global emissions.
The concept of a carbon market, in making greenhouse gas reduction credits a commodity,
appears on the surface a distancing from moral values that will possibly leave developing
countries vulnerable to being taken advantage of by wealthy developed countries. The developed
countries have the ability to purchase the most reduction credits. The fear is that the leaders of
these nations will look upon developing countries as just a means to their ends, which will in turn
lead to the disrespect of the economic and environmental well-being of developing nations.
Another part of this argument focuses on the possibility that with programs like the Clean
Development Mechanism, the smaller developing nations that don’t have as many credits to offer
will be left “on the side-lines of the global carbon market” (Najam et al 225). Therefore, as a
result of making emission reduction credits a commodity, there will be an unethical and unequal
distribution of “help” given by developed countries amongst the world’s developing nations.
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This fear of corruption is not a sufficient argument for invalidating the carbon market. The
only results from using carbon emissions credits as a commodity are morally positive and just.
Developed nations get the flexibility in obtaining more emissions reduction credits if they need
it, while developing nations get sustainability projects, which will in the long term help them
lower their emissions and contribute to action on climate change. It would be impractical to
demand developed nations to decrease their emissions by a great amount without room to adjust.
While creating this concept of a carbon market, the Kyoto Protocol will be able to function in a
world run by economic interest. It establishes motivation for directly and indirectly reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. A country can directly reduce their emissions by meeting the goal
allotted to them by the Kyoto Protocol, or a country can reduce emissions indirectly by trading in
emissions with countries that have extra emissions credits (Joint Implementation), or through
funding sustainability projects in other countries (Clean Development Mechanism). This is a
principle based on “justice or utility,” in that it allows for developed countries, which without the
concept of emissions trading would be required to reduce unrealistic amounts of greenhouse
gasses, some flexibility in meeting their targets (Singer 196). This is an ideal and effective
mentality to have in regards to climate change since it is a global issue.
Another critique of the Kyoto Protocol is that developing countries are hit with the worst of
climate change disasters, yet they are not involved in making the major decisions regarding
climate change mitigation. The argument focuses on the fact that in the drafting of the Kyoto
Protocol, the voices and interests of developing nations are not heard and that this is unethical
and unjust. Even though ideally it would be necessary to include the developing nations in major
decision-making, practically this will not work. The developing nations under the Kyoto Protocol
are not given any limitations on their emissions and are given the opportunity to develop their
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economies. Therefore since developed nations are currently restricted in their carbon emissions,
they should have a majority say in these decisions made in the Protocol. Once developing nations
make significant progress in their economies and are included in the emission restrictions, then
they should have a more equal say in the decision-making process. In this instance, even though
there is inequality in representation during the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, it is justified since
developing nations are given the unequal advantage to emit greenhouse gasses without
limitation. Another argument closely linked to this advantage is that the Kyoto Protocol does not
compensate developing nations for historical wrongs. It is true that the Protocol does not respect
this moral value; however, it is politically infeasible to do so. The Protocol focuses on fixing the
present to make a better future. It compensates for not recognizing this specific value by
providing developing countries with the opportunity to develop economically, which is an
important moral right for a treaty to respect.
After evaluating these three major criticisms, it is clear to see that the Kyoto Protocol
does recognize certain moral values. It does not do so ideally; however, it creates an effective
and fair balance between recognizing moral values and functioning in an economic environment.
The Kyoto protocols, so far, have not been a successful as the international community
has hoped. The refusal of countries such as America, Australia, and the revocation of Canada’s
signature was unkind to the ambitions of the Kyoto commission. The foremost alternative to the
Kyoto protocols is the Contraction and Convergence model. America and Australia had both
indicated an interest in this model, should the international community look to change the
structure of climate change regulations. The Global Commons Initiative proposed the C&C
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Model in 1989. The main distinction between the C&C Model and the Kyoto Protocol is in the
C&C’s refusal to consider vengeance.
The Global Commons Institute, based in England, proposed the Contraction and
Convergence model in 1989. It was proposed during the discussions of the Kyoto Protocol as an
alternative to either adopt in whole or in part. The tagline for the project was “Climate Justice
Without Vengeance”, which summarizes the ideology behind the proposal.
The Contraction portion of the system is the idea that over time, we will utterly reduce
the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. The example given by the Global Commons institute is
that of 450 ppm by 2100. The benefit of this is that each country is given an individual rate to
reach the goal at. Some countries will have very sudden imposition of very rigid requirement,
like America. Other countries will actually receive a bubble of time by which they are
encouraged to increase carbon emissions and develop, to increase the standard of living of their
lower classes.
The Convergence focuses on the end goal of each country’s emissions level. Ultimately,
the Convergence model wants to achieve equal per capita emissions. This is the simplest version
of fairness that is operable. By the end of 2030 in the current example, the entire world will be
emitting equal per capita emissions. The Global Commons Institute also illustrates a hope that
eventually, technology and society will develop to the point that we can achieve a zero level of
carbon emissions, though that is much further down the line.
The main point of the Contraction and Convergence model is the idea of “Climate Justice
without Vengeance”. The Global Commons institute saw in the Kyoto Protocols a moral issue
that discouraged its adoption. The Kyoto Protocols works to redress historical wrongs. They take
into consideration the idea that much of the developed world had utterly unregulated ability to
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grow and pollute as it needed. Therefore, the Kyoto Protocols put more weight upon those
countries to cut back their emissions, and do not put similar restrictions on countries that are still
developing such as China or India. They feel that the burden of work, or of expense, or of
limitation, belongs on those who have the longest time to reap the benefits of an industrial
society. The ideology boils down to a mother’s admonishment – you made the mess, so you’re
going to clean it up.
The Contraction and Convergence model does not take any of this into consideration. It
saw how many of the developed countries refused to sign on the Kyoto Protocols, and realized
that exacting “vengeance” for development opportunities was not the way to coerce the world
into saving the environment. So instead, they focused on a system that would not take into
consideration the responsibilities of the past. The Contraction and Convergence model does not
put heavier burdens based on historic emissions. They only consider the level of development in
relation to how quickly a country will need to cut down its emissions levels. In the end, all
countries will cut the same amount of emissions and be subject to the same strict rules. The only
difference is that some countries will do it in 10 years while others will do it in 20 or possibly 30.
Each country is expected to contribute equally to the overall goal of an emissions-free earth.
That is not to say that the Contraction and Convergence system doesn’t have moral flaws.
Some believe that we should take historic wrongs into consideration. The developed world
exploited the carbon sinks of the undeveloped world, and are not giving them any recompense
for it. One of the moral arguments made by Garvey is that you must address historic wrongs, and
if you hold to Garvey’s ideals, this is an issue. Some would point out that attempting to redress
historic wrongs is less important than saving the environment. If you can get everyone to
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cooperate, is the continued existence of the human race not enough? Must we really draw more
issues into the discussions of climate change?
Another issue to be taken with the Contraction and convergence model is the goal of
“equal per capita emissions”. This system means that each person in the world has an equal
allowance of carbon emissions. However, you cannot allocate carbon emissions directly to each
person. So, the population of a country determines its total carbon emission allowance. However,
this does not take into consideration the varying needs of different communities. People who live
far north of the equator are going to need to use a considerable amount more energy in order to
heat their homes during the winter than those who live further south. One could argue that it
simply puts pressure on northern territories to come up with more ingenious ways of avoiding
creating carbon, but it still is discordant with the toted idea of fairness.
Another failure of the equal per capita emissions system is that it does not take industry
into consideration. If the nations are responsible for doling out credits to corporations, which
could negatively impact the citizens of that nation. There could be a cut back of people’s
allowances for energy and transportation needs if the government found itself in need of
placating large industries. In addition, there would need to be a discussion as to who would pay
for possible overages. If the payments go to a United Nations group, the payments would have to
come through the national government. If a country’s major export requires emitting a large
amount of carbon into the atmosphere, who will be blamed for any overages? This system
creates a complicated moral issue. What is more important: the people’s ability to heat their
home, or the ability of a corporation to provide jobs for these people? Corporations would be
encouraged to find innovative ways to stay within the national allowance, but they would also be
encouraged to take their businesses elsewhere. It is analogous now to the exportation of labor
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from areas with high labor cost to areas where minimum wages is not that high. You would see a
movement of highly pollutive industry to areas where the carbon emissions regulations were less
strict and the population higher. The resulting economic stimulation would aid developing
countries in the short run. However, having a large industrial sector based in work that requires a
great deal of emissions would make it more challenging for these nations to meet the global
requirements. It could also cause them to put their citizens in a place of secondary importance, as
an expendable resource. Carbon trading markets have been put in place in the Contraction and
Convergence model, however these alone may not be enough to prevent an abuse of the human
labor markets by corporations. This is on top of the current encouragement to outsource labor to
developing countries since “Why pollute America when you can pollute China?” There is much
potential for corporate and government abuse of the per capita emission system.
The Global Commons Initiative also never explains how to determine the “population”
used for a per capita analysis. One fear is that a per person allowance will encourage countries to
falsify census data. They could also encourage increased population growth to gain a greater
allowance. This would directly counteract the attempt that the Contraction and Convergence
model makes to improve the life of the lower classes, by giving rewards to those who have larger
families, which contributes to the continuation of the cycles of poverty. The only remedy to that
is to use a projected population size. By projecting the population, you reduce the opportunity to
encourage increased reproduction. However, the projected population size doesn’t take into
consideration any actual growth of countries that naturally occurs. For example, should China lift
its one-child laws, and experiences a boom of second children, how will their transportation
needs be taken into consideration, when they were not included in the projected population
growth? The impact of mass emigrations and immigrations, due to natural disasters, political
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turmoil, or even climate change cannot be taken into consideration. Horrific acts of genocide
under unstable political regimes would also skew any projected population growth as well.
The Contraction and Convergence model is just as flawed as any other proposed solution
to climate change. There are parts that will likely be helpful and beneficial, and there are parts
that will create a great deal of difficulty. The advantage to the Contraction and Convergence
model is its appeal. During talks about the Kyoto Protocols, several world superpowers indicated
an interest in the Contraction and Convergence model, should discussions ever be held on it.
Getting the approval of countries such as America, Australia, and Canada would increase the
global reduction, since at this time; none of those countries are under pressure to reduce their
emissions.
Among the possible solutions to mitigating climate change, the use of carbon markets is
perhaps the most encouraging prospect. As greenhouse gas emissions continue to climb, more
and more nations are deciding to implement carbon markets in an attempt to combat carbon
dioxide levels. Although carbon markets have existed for years, their effectiveness remains
disputed. Many argue that carbon markets provide strong incentive to minimize emissions while
others argue that carbon markets are not a useful tool in mitigating climate change because they
are volatile and easily exploited.
The use of carbon markets to mitigate climate change is a market-based approach
intended to lower the amount carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Carbon markets
operate on a cap and trade basis. In other words, a governing authority does research and sets a
reasonable limit on the amount of carbon dioxide that may be produced. Depending on the
design of the market, the central authority will distribute carbon dioxide emissions permits
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among nations or business firms. A single emissions permit is typically equivalent to one metric
ton of carbon dioxide. The overseeing authority may auction off these emission permits to
participating firms or simply allocate them as it sees fit. Firms are not allowed to produce
emissions that exceed the value of their permits. However, firms may purchase more emission
allowances from other firms that are below their emissions quota. This commodification of
carbon dioxide emissions penalizes those who pollute by indirectly charging them for excessive
emissions. Alternatively, those firms that are able to minimize their emissions and maintain
unused permits may profit by trading with firms that require more emissions allowance.
Furthermore, in addition to selling permits, firms that have extra emissions allowance may also
save their permits for use in future cycles of the market. This system provides strong economic
incentive for participants to not only maintain emissions that are consistent with the carbon
dioxide cap that was previously set, but to reduce emissions to a level that is well below that cap.
Advocates of emission trading argue that carbon markets are the best option to mitigating
climate change because of their flexibility. The International Emissions Trading Association
claims that unlike a regulatory carbon tax, carbon markets are effective because they place an
actual limit on the amount of emissions in the form of a cap. Furthermore, carbon markets enable
participating nations to fund carbon projects in nations outside the market. Projects involving
forestation and energy inefficiency will help these nations develop practices that are in
accordance with lower carbon emissions.
Although many carbon markets exist in the world today, the oldest and largest ongoing
market is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. The European Union Emission
Trading Scheme operates in a fashion typical of carbon markets. Member states of the union
come together and collectively decide on the national emission caps for countries with the
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approval of the European Union Commission. In turn, countries divide the cap and allocate
emission allowances among its companies and other industrial firms. Participating firms may
trade privately or choose to buy and sell internationally. Emission allowance trading works in a
way similar to a stock market; brokers may be employed and the price per allowance fluctuates.
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme operates independently from the Kyoto Protocol,
but was designed to incorporate similar mechanisms. For example, an EU allowance unit (EUA)
is equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide emissions and is also equivalent to a certified
emissions reduction (CER) under the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, EUAs and CERs may be
traded within the same system.
As of late, more and more carbon markets are beginning to take shape around the globe.
China, which was exempted from reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, recently
launched a carbon market campaign in an attempt to reduce emissions. In June, China launched
its first of many trading schemes in the city of Shenzhen (Qiu). Since then, six other similar
markets have sprouted in major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Jiang Zhaoli, head
of climate change at the National Development and Reform Commission of China, notes that
carbon markets are proving to be valuable tools in reducing emissions (Carr). Indonesia, one of
the world’s the biggest emission culprits, has begun planning an emission trading scheme that
could possibly reach across national boundaries if successful (Reklev). China and Indonesia are
not alone. In fact, South Korea and Thailand plan to develop their own markets by 2015
(Reklev). There are an increasing number of countries that are turning to carbon markets as a
form of climate change mitigation.
Although carbon markets appear to be popular mechanisms for mitigating climate
change, they face vigorous criticisms concerning their effectiveness. Perhaps the most
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fundamental criticism of carbon markets is that the emission caps are simply too high to result in
meaningful reductions. As was the case in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU
ETS), emission caps are typically decided by identifying how much is already being emitted. In
turn, large portions of the permits are distrubuted to the biggest emitters. In other words, the cap
for the EU ETS was not set to a level that is consistent with the avoidance of the catastrophic rise
temperature (Naughten 11). Rather, the cap was set according what emissions have historically
been.
Another flaw inherent to carbon markets is that caps are “leaky” and easy to circumvent.
Naturally, emission caps can only apply in nations participating in carbon markets. What if
industries in capped nations move their carbon emitting operations to areas outside the cap? In
this way, firms appear to have reduced their emissions, but in reality they merely exported them
to nations that are not limited by a cap (Naughten 12). Thus, the amount of global emissions
remains unchanged. This issue is compounded by the fact that accurately measuring emissions is
costly.
Opponents of carbon markets also contend that markets are ineffective because of the use
of offset credits. In all existing carbon markets, participating firms can use offset credits to allow
emissions that exceed the cap. These credits are obtained by paying a party in another country to
reduce their emissions. The funds received from offsetting are intended to be used for carbon
reducing projects. Essentially, firms are allowed to produce excess emissions if they pay
someone in a developing country to decrease their emissions instead (Naughten 7). Again, this
results in little to no net decrease in global emissions.
Carbon markets are often celebrated as an alternative to the less popular notion of a
carbon tax. Supporters of carbon markets claim a tax would only discourage emissions, not
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actually limit them. A carbon tax would not be choice because like all taxes, it would be difficult
to politically advocate. However, given their current state, I would argue that carbon markets are
not an ideal solution to climate change. Cap and trade schemes are celebrated for their flexibility,
but this flexibility inevitably leads to exploitation. The use of offset credits in the system seems
to undermine the goal of carbon markets. The world’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide choose
to offset their emissions rather than restructure their operations to produce lower emissions. This
is because offset credits are vastly cheaper than the restructuring their carbon emitting processes.
Furthermore, offset credits function on the unrealistic basis that the hypothetical emissions
prevented in another country are equal to the excess emissions released by the credit buyer. If
carbon markets are to be truly effective, stricter regulations must be put on offset credits or
offsetting must be abandoned completely.
Carbon markets give an illusion that the emission caps they implement are concrete
mechanisms to limiting the amount of greenhouse gases. However, industries may just move
their polluting operations to areas that are not restricted by the cap. Caps are only effective in the
nations they encompass. Perhaps this would not be the case if a single, unified carbon market
existed to span across all nations, but no such global market has begun to take shape. Carbon
markets must be drastically redesigned if they are to be used as our primary tool for climate
change mitigation.
CONCLUSION
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Works Cited
1
Adaptation, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php
Adaptation Fund,
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3
659.php
Clean Development Mechanism,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718
.php
Compliance, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php
Doha Amendment, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2012/12/20121217%201140%20AM/CN.718.2012.pdf
Emissions Trading,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php
Joint Implementation,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php
Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
Massai, Leonardo, The Kyoto Protocol in the EU, "The EC and the Member States in the Kyoto
Protocol", http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-90-6704-571-1_4/fulltext.html
Mechanisms, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php
Registry System, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/items/2723.php
Reporting, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/reporting/items/3879.php
Group B 21
2
3
Dale Jamieson’s “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming”
Stephen M. Gardiner’s “A Perfect Moral Storm”
Simon Caney’s “Global Justice and Future Generations”
Peter Singer’s “One Atmosphere”
Adil Najam, Saleemul Huq, and Youba Sokona’s “Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto:
developing countries concerns and interests”; http://climate-talks.net/2006ENVRE130/PDF/Najam-CliPol%20Climate%20and%20SD.pdf
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
4
Contraction and Convergence. The Global Commons Institute, n.d. Accessed Friday November
15th 2013. www.gci.org.uk
Garvey, James The Ethic of Climate Change New York, Continuum International Publishing
Group, 2009. Book.
5
Carrington, Damian. "Carbon Emissions Trading System 'seriously Flawed'" Theguardian.com.
Guardian News, 19 June 2009. Web. 13 Nov. 2013.
Naughten, Austen. "Designed to Fail? The Concepts, Practices and Controversies behind Carbon
Trading." Fern.org. FERN, n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.
Group B 22
Qiu, Jane. "China Gets Tough on Carbon." Nature.com. Nature Publishing Group, 12 June 2013.
Web. 11 Nov. 2013.
Reklev, Stian. "Indonesia to Launch Voluntary Carbon Market." Thejakartaglobe.com. Berita
Satu Media Holdings, 13 Nov. 2013. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.
Wadhams, Nicholas, and Mathew Carr. "China Tests CO2 Emissions Markets Before Tax,
NDRC Official Says." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg L.P., 17 Oct. 2013. Web. 13 Nov.
2013.
"What Is Carbon Credit | Carbon Trade Exchange." What Is Carbon Credit? Carbon Trade
Exchange Ltd., n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2013.
"Why Emissions Trading Is More Effective Than a Carbon Tax." IETA.org. International
Emissions Trading Association, n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.