World Development Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 763–782, 2002
Ó 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
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Does ‘‘Participation’’ in Common Pool
Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social
Cost–Benefit Analysis of Joint Forest Management
in Jharkhand, India
SANJAY KUMAR *
University of Cambridge, UK
Summary. — Joint Forest Management (JFM) has succeeded in halting forest degradation in India,
but its poverty reduction objective has not fully been evaluated previously. This paper compares
JFM forests and government-managed forests to assess their respective net social benefits to
different groups of local villagers. It shows that the JFM regime reflects the social preference of the
rural nonpoor, and that the poor are net losers over a 40-year time horizon. Future plans for JFM
need to include suitable compensatory mechanisms to reduce the poverty of the poorest within a
village. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — South Asia, India, forestry, participatory development, income distribution, poverty
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite initial skepticism that common pool
resources (CPRs) in poor regions could ever be
managed sustainably (Gordon, 1954; Hardin,
1968), there is now a vast literature which
suggests that suitable institutional frameworks
can be designed to secure beneficial outcomes
for stakeholders. 1 Linked to this is a growing
appreciation that sustainable resource management can go hand-in-hand with poverty alleviation (Jodha, 1986, 1992; Kumar, Saxena,
Alagh, & Mitra, 2000; World Bank, 2001) and
that the effectiveness of government as a resource manager is improved when it shares
powers with different user groups. It is fair to
say, indeed, that there has been a revolution
in the philosophy of CPR management over
the past 20 years. In the case of forestry, comanagement of government forests by a joint
body of government staff and forest fringe
villagers under various cost–benefit sharing
arrangements is becoming the standard practice. 2 It is said that co-managed systems are
more efficient since they can utilize the local maps
of poverty and ecology available with the users.
It is reasonable to argue that forest user
groups are depositories of information about
local forest stocks and agreed procedures for
763
access and use (Jewitt, 1996). But it is far from
clear that villages, at least in eastern India
(which is our area of concern here), are in any
sense ‘‘communities,’’ if by community we are
meant to understand small homogeneous groups
within which distributional conflicts are absent
or minimal. Such ‘‘communities’’ can indeed be
expected to manage a CPR in an effective and
uncontested manner, particularly where that resource is confined to a small, well-defined area
that is marked by strong de jure tenures. For the
most part, though, such communities are the exception not the rule, even though much of the
emerging literature on co-management of CPRs
assumes the opposite (Agrawal, 1999; Kiss,
1990). This is not just the academic literature: in
India there is a presumption, too, on the part of
*I
am grateful to Stuart Corbridge for stimulating
discussion and sparing considerable time and effort to go
through the earlier draft of this paper and its revisions.
My sincere thanks to Bhaskar Vira and two anonymous
referees for incisive and very useful comments on earlier
versions of this manuscript. Some of the data used in this
paper have come from a research survey funded by the
Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development,
New Delhi that I gratefully acknowledge. Final revision
accepted: 3 January 2002.
764
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
policy makers and external donors, that undifferentiated communities of forest users are the
norm because these groups are very often composed of adivasi (or members of the Scheduled
Tribes). Tribal communities are supposed not to
discriminate on the basis of gender, and are said
to be unmarked by distinctions of wealth or
status. This is far from being the case, as I shall
show in this paper, but the assumption allows
policy makers to disregard intra- and intervillage inequalities of wealth and power. 3 This
assumption in turn blinds them to the fact that
many of the products of a (public) forest are
private (excludable) goods, which, in the absence of specific mechanisms to protect the
poor, are often captured by members of a village
elite that might already have captured the decentralized village-level forest institutions
(Lawbuary, 1999; Saxena & Sarin, 1999). 4
For the most part, though, such evidence as
we have on this issue—of a possible tradeoff
between effective forest protection and the
pursuit of a pro-poor social agenda—is anecdotal: it has been difficult for the managers to
estimate the relative benefits to the poor and
nonpoor that flow from a decentralized system
of forest management. 5 Where cost–benefit
analyses have been undertaken (e.g., Hill &
Shields, 1998; Nadkarni, Ninan, & Pasha,
1994), they have generally failed to consider the
differential nature of returns to specified social
groups within a given village or group of villages. In this paper, I attempt to predict the
differential returns by means of a social cost–
benefit analysis (SCBA) of a decentralized CPR
management program, that of Joint Forest
Management (JFM) in the Indian State of
Jharkhand. JFM is meant to reduce forest degradation while at the same time offering an
equitable distribution of the benefits of forest
regeneration to households that belong to a
Village Forest Committee (VFC) in order to
reduce rural poverty. This paper considers the
robustness of this second objective, which has
been much applauded by the development
community. An income-stratified householdlevel data set collected from a cross section of
JFM and non-JFM villages in Jharkhand is
used to address two questions: (a) how much
impact has the program made on the pattern of
extraction of wood (timber and firewood) and
nonwood forest products (NWFPs) by different
groups of villagers? and (b) how consistent with
a principle of social justice are the observed
patterns of costs and benefits over different time
periods? I conclude that JFM is well suited to
the promotion of sustainable forest regeneration, but that such regeneration is currently
being achieved at the expense of the poor. In
the absence of significant levels of intergroup
mobility, and thus of reductions in the levels of
inequality between poor and nonpoor villagers
(which is not expected to be significant over the
next 40 years), it is important that actions are
taken now to put in place compensatory
mechanisms for the rural poor. Indeed there is
a possibility for intergroup mobility and reduction in inequality between poor and nonpoor over the long period of a JFM cycle (40
years), but these trends appear insignificant in
Jharkhand. 6 Compensatory mechanisms need
to be put in place to secure a proper measure of
equity.
The paper begins with a description of
India’s forest problems and policies, and a
more specific account of the assumptions about
‘‘community’’ and ‘‘rural poverty’’ that inform
the agendas of Joint Forest Management
(Section 2). Section 3 describes the patterns of
community stratification and forest use in the
study area, and in Section 4 the assumptions
that underpin the social cost–benefit model are
reviewed. Section 5 presents the main findings.
It concludes that nonpoor members of VFCs
determine the social time preference of JFM.
It also shows how the management regimes
for JFM forests that are put into place by VFCs
must discriminate against the poor, often to a
debilitating extent. Section 6 highlights the
need for a more comprehensive SCBA that
would take into account the value of local ecological services from JFM forests. These services also channel resources to the nonpoor
landholding classes, and they strengthen the
argument, made here in conclusion, for a suitable compensatory mechanism to protect poor
forest users. This mechanism will be required
not just for reasons of social justice, but also to
ensure that poorer households do not disrupt
the protective functions of JFM.
2. JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT IN
INDIA
(a) JFM and the alleviation of poverty
Joint forest management holds a particular
relevance for India, where predominantly stateowned and managed forests were subjected
to rapid decline in the decades before and
after Independence in 1947. 7 One of the main
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
reasons cited for this decline was the supposed
‘‘apathy’’ of local forest users, which allowed
many forests to be turned into de-facto open
access regimes. In an important policy shift, the
Indian National Forest Policy of 1988 underscored the need to involve local communities in
the management of forests (GoI, 1988). In a
follow-up document issued in 1990, Central
government issued guidelines to all State governments to implement ‘‘joint forest management’’ systems in order to regenerate forests
and reduce rural poverty (GoI, 1990). These
guidelines suggested that the State governments
may devolve everyday forest protection, management and development responsibilities to
local community institutions (co-operative or
committee-based) at the village or panchayat
levels, 8 and prescribe benefit-sharing arrangements following regeneration. Accordingly, 26
of the 28 Indian States (including the newly
[2000] created States of Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chattisgarh) have formally resolved to
implement JFM, making it one of the largest
such programs in the world. As on March 31,
2001 there were 44,943 official JFM groups
(VFCs) protecting over 11.63 million ha of
government-owned forests, or 15.5% of the recorded forest area of the country (Borgoyary,
2001, quoting Government of India figures).
The program is still expanding: it is expected
that tens of thousands of informal or voluntary
forest protection committees will soon be included in JFM. In addition, there is a suggestion by the government to extend JFM to
well-stocked forests too (GoI, 2000).
The JFM orders of various State governments recognize the special role that forests can
play in the economic life of the rural poor. This
recognition was given empirical support by
several key CPR studies in the 1980s and 1990s,
including those which established that trees are
both a source of savings and security for the
poor (Chambers & Leach, 1989), and which
showed that apparently unproductive village
wastelands are an important source of livelihoods for many rural communities (Jodha,
1986, 1992). It has also been shown, for example, that despite a large variation in the per
capita availability of forests in Udaipur District, Rajasthan (ranging from 0.087 to 4.27 ha)
the forest-related incomes of surveyed households varied over a narrow range (2.2–3.6% of
total household income), suggesting that forests
remain important across a broad range of agroecological systems (Kinhal & Narayan, 1994).
In another set of studies, the share of forest
765
income to total household income has been
found to be significantly higher for landless
poor households as compared to cultivating
nonpoor households across various Indian
States (Beck & Ghosh, 2000; Iyengar & Shukla,
1999; Pasha, 1992; Singh, Singh, & Singh,
1996). In recognition of this fact—that the rural
poor depend disproportionately upon forests—
the JFM orders of various State governments
have created right-regimes with respect to forest produce that favor participating communities. 9 Under the most liberal JFM orders, such
as in Andhra Pradesh where JFM has been
linked to the Janam Bhoomi program, 10 there
is an assignment of cent-per-cent produce of
JFM forests to VFCs. In addition, in some
States the net income from the sale of NWFPs
is shared with the VFCs. This is true for kendu
leaves (used to roll country cigarettes) in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and cashew
nuts grown in West Bengal’s forest plantations.
These directives assume that a direct benefit
sharing arrangement with VFCs will tackle the
issue of growth with equity, and thus contribute
significantly to the broader objective of rural
poverty alleviation. That policy makers see
JFM as a key tool for enhancing rural development is further evident from the fact that
many State government orders require a percentage share of the net benefits accruing to
VFCs (cent-per-cent in Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh; up to one-third or one-half in Bihar,
Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan) to be spent on
community development schemes. In recognition of the prospective role of JFM in rural
development, there has been a renewed interest
among major donor and funding agencies that
forestry projects in India, ‘‘have the potential
for alleviating poverty by building the grassroots capacity for forest protection and regeneration in the communities adjacent to forests’’
(Kumar et al., 2000; also see World Bank, 2001).
This is so because large percentage of these
(forests) communities are made up of India’s
75+ million tribal people, who are among the
most disadvantaged sections of Indian society
in terms of economic opportunities, literacy,
nutrition and healthcare, and other socioeconomic indicators.
(b) The rhetoric of ‘‘community’’
Despite these insights and commitments,
current policies for JFM in India neglect two
important field realities: first, that village
communities—even in tribal areas—are often
766
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
highly stratified in terms of assets and patterns of social inclusion/exclusion (including
forest access), and, second, that the benefits as
well as the costs of forest regeneration can vary
widely across different sites. This lack of appreciation of ground realities is partly a consequence of the way that the socio-ecological
literature frames its objects in binary terms. Far
too often, the (village) community is depicted
as homogenous, static, isolated and living (or
once living) in close harmony with nature,
while the state is conceived as the embodiment
of a technocratic modernity that disrupts the
moral economy of the countryside (CSE, 1982,
1985). 11
Such an idealization of the ‘‘undivided local
community’’ becomes all too apparent when
words such as ‘‘poor,’’ ‘‘forest dependent community’’ or ‘‘tribal’’ are used interchangeably,
as they often are in government and donor documents. 12 One effect of this, at the
operational level, is that none of the State
JFM resolutions or guidelines specifies suitable mechanisms to ensure increased access of
landless households or marginal farmers to the
forests or the forest usufruct. 13 The resultant
mismatch between JFM conception and local
realities turns JFM into an instrument of forest
control for use by the rural elite (as I show in
Section 4). Moreover, because the potential
gains from JFM fluctuate widely over time,
there is little incentive for poorer social groups
to put a high premium on future incomes, or to
mobilize themselves for secure ownership of the
scheme (as has happened in some poverty alleviation programs in India, Joshi & Moore,
2000). In West Bengal, for example, the reported quantum of income from the final harvesting of timber in JFM forests has varied
from as low as Rs. 50 per household to as high
as Rs. 13,600 (TERI, 2000). The prospect of an
income of Rs. 50 will not persuade a poor
household to commit over 20 years of protection activities. While it is true that tree cover
in JFM forests has improved appreciably, in
many cases this is the result of significant direct
investment by the Forest Department (FD): an
investment that varies, in the case of World
Bank-aided forestry projects, from USD 56.23
ha1 in West Bengal to USD 714 ha1 in Kerala
(a very high rate of investment by any standard, Kumar et al., 2000). Not surprisingly,
some foresters fear that many VFCs in these
States will be unable to sustain their activities
once a project exits or the investment funding
dries up.
3. THE STUDY AREA
(a) JFM arrangements: uniform prescription
The JFM sites that were selected for this
study are located in five villages of Ranchi
District, Jharkhand State (which was part of
the State of Bihar before November 15, 2000).
Three FD-managed forests (called NJFM forests hereafter) located nearby, and having
similar socio-ecological features, were selected
for purposes of comparison and control. In
order to ensure that the comparison of JFM
and NJFM forests is based on sound ecological
principles, extensive discussion with local villagers and foresters were held, and only such
villages were chosen that had similar initial
vegetal condition (circa 1989, when villagers
started protecting the JFM forests). The sample
JFM and NJFM forests had, in 1989, an approximate vegetation density of 0.4. JFM in
Ranchi District has been guided by a Bihar
government resolution of 1990 that established
JFM as the main institution for forest development in the State. Under this resolution,
a village forest protection and management
committee (VFPMC, but hereinafter VFC)
consisting of one adult representative from
each household of the rightholding village/s is
made responsible for implementing JFM in its
respective degrading ‘‘Protected Forest(s)’’
(PF). The executive committee of the VFC
comprises a maximum of 18 members, of which
the Secretary is the local official of the Forest
Department, while the remainder, including
the Chairperson, are villagers. Under this arrangement, the forest is managed according to
a ‘‘microplan’’ prepared by the VFC and
agreed to by the Forest Department in accordance with the broad principles of the regional
Forest Working Plan. Responsibility for the
day-to-day implementation of the microplan
rests with the VFC. In return, the VFC receives
all forest produce free of cost, except the produce of a final harvest (that is, timber and
bamboo at the end of a silvicultural rotation),
for which it is expected to pay a royalty. The
rate of royalty for timber and bamboo in the
District is presently (2001) 20% in cash or kind,
which is clearly in favor of the VFCs. From the
forest produce thus received a VFC will first
meet the bonafide domestic requirements of its
members. Any surplus will be sold in the market and the net profits will be allocated and
used by the VFC equally on forest development, village development, and a private share
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
for VFC members. The JFM resolution thus
looks impressive in terms of its bias to ‘‘the
community’’ (or the Committee). An estimated
1,874 VFCs were thought to be functioning in
Bihar in 1998, looking after 710,293 ha of forest
area, or about 25% of the total forest area in
the State (SPWD, 1998). In Ranchi District,
almost 20% of villages have VFCs and these
cover a similar percentage of the total forest
area of the District.
There are two important features of JFM in
the study area that differentiate it from some
other parts of India. First, the number of voluntary committees, as opposed to official
VFCs, is high in Ranchi District. Villagers have
been protecting forests, and extracting forest
produce under local rules, for quite some time
now—a large percentage of official VFCs are in
fact Forest Department-recognized versions of
existing voluntary committees (Jewitt, 1995).
Second, given the weakness of the Forest Department in terms of its infrastructure and silvicultural intervention due to lack of funds,
there is practically no difference between ‘‘official’’ and ‘‘voluntary’’ VFCs when it comes to
the day-to-day management and extraction of
forest produce (except in terms of the final
harvesting of timber, when the official committees will have a legal claim over the sale
proceeds of the surplus harvest). In view of the
above, JFM in the study area is more akin to
‘‘community forest management’’ (CFM). This
makes the choice of the study area especially
suitable for using social cost–benefit analysis
(CSBA) to test the claim that community control of the forests would promote ecological
sustainability and social equity (Colchester,
1994).
(b) Demography, stratification and poverty
The study villages (Table 1) are located in the
northern part of Ranchi District, where it is
common to find a mix of tribal and nontribal
communities. Recorded population growth in
the District was 21.42% during 1981–91 (lower
for the Scheduled Tribes), and 25.72% during
1991–2001, during which period there was significant migration to Ranchi City (State capital) and its satellite towns. Recorded literacy in
the District is high when compared to the rest
of the State, but there is a sizeable gap between
the urban and rural parts of the District, the
former being home to major industries and
educational establishments. In the study villages, as elsewhere, a lack of marketable skills
767
means that most people are dependent on the
available natural resources in their villages,
and/or on migration to other poor States in
eastern India. 14
Notwithstanding certain features in common, there are also marked differences between
the study villages. Where a high percentage
of the village population derives its major income from nonfarming sources, as in Bisa, it
indicates a high degree of inequality in access
to farmland within the village (Table 2). This
disparity is linked to asymmetries in social
and political status within villages, including those with a predominantly tribal complexion. Throughout the eastern India plateau
region (Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa and the
southwestern parts of West Bengal) the Oriya
proverb ‘‘Jahara Chaso Nahi Tahara Baso
Nahin’’ (those who do not have farms do not
have homes) aptly describes the social value
attached to land through its claims upon village
citizenship. Even in pure tribal villages the
households of the founding lineage will own
larger quantities of land in the wet-paddy (don)
lands. Village-based rituals and festivals revolve around farming, and reinforce the balance of power in favor of larger landowners. In
theory, and in public, the fixing of wage rates
for farming and other works is done in a village-wide meeting. Despite the assumed ‘‘egalitarianism’’ of the village community, however,
village wage rates in the study area are frequently fixed at one-third to one-half of the
official minimum wage or the market rate. This
puts landless and other wage-laboring groups
at a significant disadvantage, and is testimony
to the backstage powers of landholding families. The traditional labor networks which operate in villages throughout India, are prevalent
in the study villages too. These networks provide free (e.g., voluntary labor, in exchange for
a common feast) or highly subsidized (e.g.,
group labor, in exchange for a nominal sum
and a common feast) labor to those who need
large labor inputs at a particular point in time,
such as during the transplanting of paddy or
for roof repair work. Obviously, these networks
are disproportionately favorable to medium
and large farmers. Landless laborers and marginal farmers participate in these labor networks not to secure a fair wage, but to build up
the social capital they need to cope with narrow
livelihood opportunities. 15
Linked to the issue of landownership and
inequality is the question of differentiation on
the basis of caste or tribe. The Government of
768
Table 1. Demographic features of the sample villages
Name of
village
JFM
JFM
JFM
JFM
JFM
NJFM
NJFM
NJFM
682
513
2,065
1,051
304
395
807
280
112
128
432
177
58
85
109
66
109
129
185
181
126
201
234
145
Per capita Schedule Schedule Literate Cultivator Agricultural Other Marginal NonCaste
Tribe
(%)
(%)
labor (%) worker worker worker
forest area
(%)
(%)
(ha)
(%)
(%)
(%)
0.28
0.09
0.12
0.28
0.18
0.19
0.06
0.31
1
3
12
1
15
15
16
11
99
85
52
51
65
37
60
88
16
26
18
19
28
45
25
1
Source: Census of India, 1991.
Number of households in 1996 from field-survey. Forest area calculated from the records of the Forest Department.
32
24
20
33
25
25
43
28
0
6
7
5
1
2
0
0
1
4
3
4
4
1
2
0
22
15
15
4
0
25
15
0
45
51
55
54
70
48
41
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Sarsa
Kelende
Bisa
Sadma
Banadag
Saheda
Tengariya
Bargainbanda
Forest
Population No. of housePopulation
management 1991 census holds 1996
density
type
survey
(person km1 )
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
769
Table 2. Percentage households belonging to different landholding classes
Village name
Large farmer
(>4 ha)
Medium farmer
(2–4 ha)
Small farmer
(1–2 ha)
Marginal farmer
(up to 1 ha)
Landless
(no land)
Sarsa
Kelende
Bisa
Sadma
Banadag
Saheda
Tengariya
Bargainbanda
15
9
4
–
2
7
6
–
35
27
7
15
5
15
20
3
31
24
19
49
21
21
17
18
18
36
63
34
53
51
57
77
1
3
7
1
19
6
–
2
All villages (average)
5
15
25
50
5
Average landholding
per household (ha)
5.6
2.4
1.8
0.69
0
Source: Field survey.
India and State governments in India lump
together many communities in the category of
Schedule Tribes (STs) reflecting the need to
show actions in terms of the Tribal Sub-Plan
for service delivery and positive discrimination.
But not all ST communities in a village are
viewed as ‘‘adivasi’’ or tribal. In Ranchi District, for example, it is only the Munda and the
Oraon, two large land-owning communities,
who are commonly described as adivasi (tribal).
Communities such as the Mahli (traditionally
bamboo basket-makers by trade) and the Lohra
(traditionally blacksmiths by trade), who own
little or no land, are officially listed as ST, but
are treated as if they are low-caste sadan (long
settled non-tribal) or even as ‘‘Untouchables.’’
It is then easier for the government workers to
co-opt persons from the dominant tribal communities in a participatory program and to
accept ‘‘their’’ preferences as being equivalent
to the ‘‘social preference’’ of the whole village. 16
That this practice continues at a time when the
development of local markets is opening up
new opportunities for trading in NWFPs is
further testimony to the lopsided construction
of social preferences in parts of India.
(c) Richer people, poorer people and forest
management
Although this is not the place to describe the
silviculture of the study area in detail, I will
highlight some important features that are
germane to this analysis. The usual vegetation
of the area has the features of Tropical Moist
Sal Forest type. Sal forests are the commonest
type in India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh
where they cover more than 10 Mha of area
(e.g., Tewari, 1995). The dominant species, sal
(Shorea robusta), which makes up almost 55%
of the forests in Bihar and Jharkhand States, is
valued mainly for its wood. 17 It is gregarious
and a very strong coppicer. Even in the rooted
wastes it quickly forms an almost pure patch
once the area is protected from biotic interference. Appropriate openings in the sal forest
canopy, on the other hand, leads to the appearance of myriad species important for their
NWFP value (Mitchell, Corbridge, Jewitt,
Mahapatra, & Kumar, 1999). Key products
include oil seeds, edible fruits, staple foods,
alcoholic drinks, vegetables, myrobalans, cigarette wrapper, spices, rope, leaf-plates and
medicinal plants. 18 In dry patches the overexploitation of sal forests leads to the dominance
of thorny shrubs, some of which supply fruits
even as others are used as low-grade fuelwood.
In protected regimes, in contrast, sal hinders
the growth of the understorey that is economically important for its NWFP value. The sal
forests, thus, present a paradox. With rigorous
protection, as they are under JFM or voluntary
forest protection initiatives, sal forests become
quickly ‘‘closed’’ (forest density >0.4) in which
sal trees make up over 80% of the forests
making the forests more valuable for timber
but reducing their NWFP value simultaneously. In addition, severe biotic degradation
since at least the beginning of the 20th century
has led to an ever-reduced felling cycle, and has
made some valuable non-sal species almost
disappear in many forest patches. The relative
absence of viable rootstock and mother trees,
and the dry and barren forest floor, makes
conditions hostile for coppice or seed regeneration of non-sal species. This in turn provides
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT
more room for hardy sal stems to establish
from the rooted waste. The dominance of sal
coppice is aided by a high Weck’s Climatic
Index of 142 for Ranchi District, an area that
could sustain a potential biomass growth of 314
tons ha1 .
Another factor inducing the proliferation of
sal is the distinction that local people make
between sal as kaath (good timber) and most
other species as ku-kaath (bad timber). This
notion means that villagers engaged in local
forest protection will preserve kaath, but cut
and extract ku-kaath or jhari-jhunti (shrubs of
miscellaneous species) for their day to day fuelwood and other needs. The preference for
preserving kaath species at the cost of ku-kaath
species also mirrors the preference of large
farmers and other members of the rural elite.
Their main requirement is for the provision of
timber for house building and repair. (The
poorer sections of the village community are
disproportionately dependent on NWFPs, both
for subsistence and extra income, due to the
low opportunity cost of their labor). 19 The
VFCs, dominated by elite as they usually are,
reinforce such practices by putting a high premium on sal pole extraction, and by reducing
opportunities for the opening of the canopy to
favor the growth of non-sal species for NWFP
production. In many places, and in three of the
five JFM sample villages, the VFCs open the
forests only for certain days in a year thereby
reinforcing the choice of the elite. The official
JFM practice is to manage the forests according to a Selection Coppice or Coppice With
Standard system, with a rotation period of 30
or 40 years that yields an average crop of 17 cm
diameter at breast height (dbh) underbark in
Quality-IV forests. This is the size of pole that
is required by villagers for house building or
agriculture (for carts, ploughs, irrigation staffs,
and so on). In the absence of any forest development investment (save for the protection
offered by villagers) the forest’s value grows
mainly in terms of timber under both official
(JFM) and voluntary protection regimes. The
social choice for a long management cycle is
thus dictated by, and benefits, the landed elite
in the village.
4. DATA AND METHODS
Thus far I have argued that even ‘‘tribal’’
villages display clear patterns of stratification
based on land, and that we can expect richer
farmers to dictate the silvicultural regime under
JFM. In the rest of the paper I will attempt to
provide a more precise evaluation of the landscape effects of these ‘‘social’’ preferences, and a
more robust assessment of the monetary value
of different forestry regimes for different groups
of villagers over specified time periods. These
assessments are derived from data collected
from the eight survey villages, and on the basis
of certain assumptions that I will outline below.
(a) Data
National surveys show that the incidence of
rural poverty in India is strongly linked to
landholding: more than 52% of the rural landless are likely to be poor, compared to just 31%
of landowners, and while more than 68% of
landless wage-earners fall below the official
poverty line, only 11% of large farmers are so
classified (World Bank, 1997 quoting NCAER,
1996 data). With these figures in mind, and
being mindful also of local conditions, all
households in the sample villages were classified
into five groups: large farmers (those owning
more than four ha of land), medium farmers
(2–4 ha), small farmers (1–2 ha), marginal
farmers (up to one ha) and landless households.
The data which are presented in Table 2 clearly
show the high degree of land inequality that
inheres even in villages with a high percentage
of STs. On the basis of this classification, and
in proportion to the total number of households falling into each category, 212 households were then randomly selected for extensive
survey work. Village-based local surveyors conducted questionnaire-based interviews with
these households throughout 1996 in order to
measure household incomes and consumption
patterns, levels of forest product collection, and
various costs involved in forest protection activities. 20 The surveyors were trained and supervised by the author who had worked as the
Divisional Forest Officer of the area during
1991–94, and had developed a good rapport
with the villagers while in the process of promoting JFM. Data on trends in forest growth,
on the local collection and sale of forest
produce, on social rules and preferences, and
on the functioning of VFCs, were periodically verified by our attendance at village-level
meetings. Trends in the prices of forest products were also verified from a regular survey of
the eight weekly markets (hats) held nearby the
study villages. Forest Department staff assisted
the surveyors in laying random sample plots in
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
the forests for vegetation enumeration. Blank
(barren) areas of more than 0.4 ha occurring
within or on the periphery of the forest, but
which were recorded as forests in the official
records, were taken into account to map the
vegetation condition more precisely. Since these
areas can be hard to distinguish from private/
public wastelands, professional surveyors were
also employed for this purpose. Detailed
knowledge of the study area allowed the team
to collect data on parameters that are sometimes missing from more orthodox appraisals,
as for example on the shadow (village) price of
forest products, 21 and on the shadow wage
rate (that fixed by the traditional village council
for all manual labor). 22
(b) Methods
After the data sets described were collected,
social appraisal of the costs and benefits of
JFM versus non-JFM forests was undertaken.
Social appraisal of projects was popularized by
Tyler’s case study of the Pakistan Tractor Import Project (Tyler, 1979). 23 By attaching different ‘‘weights’’ to the measurement of the
distribution of costs and benefits to different
income groups (large farmers, marginal farmers, wage workers), Tyler showed that the social
benefit of the Pakistan Tractor Project was
negative, even though previous financial and
economic appraisals had suggested strongly
positive gains. The logic of using different distribution weights is simple: $1 is worth more to
a poor person than to a rich person. But social
appraisal differs from economic or financial
appraisal in another key respect: it uses a social
discount rate to reflect the preference of society
for a particular product in future periods. It is
not so much concerned with individuals as with
social groups, both with respect to intragenerational equity (for which different weights are
applied to the costs and benefits of different
income groups) and intergenerational equity
(by discounting the future at a low rate).
This study, thus, faced two methodological
issues in particular: how to assign intragenerational distribution weights to different groups;
and how to determine an appropriate social
discount rate (SDR). The calculation of intragenerational distribution weights ðdÞ is a contentious issue. 24 A simple equation given by
Brent (1998, p. 46) calculates ðdÞ for different
groups based on estimates (i) of the ratio of the
consumption level of a group to the average
consumption level of all groups; and (ii) a
771
positive constant that reflects a society’s aversion to inequality ðnÞ. 25 The consumption
levels of different income groups could be assessed from the village-level data, but the setting of (n) had to be done on the basis of
received practice. Squire and van der Tak
(1975) suggest that the value of (n) will range
between 0 and 2 depending on a national government’s commitment to n. Given my knowledge of Indian social policy, my best guess was
that a value of n ¼ 1 would be not be inappropriate, and on that basis the following distribution weights were set: large farmers ¼ 0.58,
medium farmers ¼ 0.82, small farmers ¼ 0.88,
marginal farmers ¼ 1.23, and landless ¼ 1.34. 26
The choice of an appropriate SDR (r) can
also be problematic. This is the rate at which
society weighs future consumption against
present consumption, or by which it attaches a
social time preference to consumption by its
members. In the case of forestry projects that
have a long gestation period—40 years in our
case—and where the benefits are sometimes
intangible, the choice of an SDR is not
straightforward. Some recent World Bankaided forestry projects in India have been
appraised using a discount rate of 12%, in an
attempt to reflect the Opportunity Cost of
Capital (OCC) in India (e.g., Hill & Shields,
1998; World Bank, undated), and a number of
studies have used discount rates ranging between 1.5% and 6% in real terms (Ninan &
Lakshmikanthamma, 2001; Pearce, 1992). All
the respondents in this study, and in a related
survey by the author (which aimed to prepare a
social capital index for the study area), expressed a desire to extract only as much forest
produce as possible without reducing future
product flows in perpetuity. We also know
rather little about the growth parameters of
local forests with respect to wood and NWFP
production at various rates of harvesting. The
suggestion, then, is that the SDR should be on
the low side: for the present analysis a rate of
2.93% developed by Shukla (1997) for project
appraisal in India was used. 27
5. SOCIAL COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Let us now turn to a social appraisal of our
different forest regimes. We can usefully begin
with the simple costs and benefits of forest
management, before turning to an examination
of the distributional consequences of these regimes under different assumptions.
772
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
(a) The costs and benefits of forest management
The costs of forest management are of two
types: direct and indirect. Direct costs fall into
two categories: the fixed or recurrent costs of
the FD establishment and the protection cost of
the villagers, and an investment cost borne
by the FD or villagers for forest development
(for example, soil conservation, afforestation or
regeneration cleaning). In the study villages
there was no investment expenditure in JFM or
NJFM villages circa 1989, or the time when
protection started by JFM villagers. The establishment expenditure of FD was the same
for both JFM and NJFM forests. For the
present analysis, which compares the JFM
system against the NJFM system, only villagers’ protection costs incurred in the case of the
JFM system were then considered. Different
villages have different protection arrangements:
in Sadma village for example, a group of nine
people took turns patrolling the forests for
about 3 h each day; meanwhile, in Kelende
village the 128 member-households of the VFC
had appointed a guard on payment of 3 kg of
paddy per household per year. Protection costs
for JFM forests thus ranged from a low of Rs.
34.62 ha1 yr1 in Kelende village to a high of
Rs. 91.80 ha1 yr1 in Bisa village, which is low
when compared to the FD schedule of rates.
Indirect costs might include, for example, the
opportunity costs of grazing cattle and of VFC
meetings, or forest product removal foregone.
Since cattle grazed freely in both JFM and
NJFM forests grazing costs were not taken into
account, yet it may be that mostly large farmers, who traditionally keep large herds of cattle
for various purposes, benefit in this manner.
Calculation of the opportunity cost of time
spent on VFC meetings, etc. was difficult as
meetings are mostly held during leisure periods.
Foregone removal of forest products in JFM
systems was not taken into account as these
products add to the growing stock included in
the assessment of benefits.
Conventionally, benefits from forests are
classified as tangible (for example, directly
quantifiable products) and intangible (such as
values of bio-diversity conservation, control of
environmental pollution, and aesthetic and
cultural values). Tangible benefits fall into two
categories: forest products and local ecological
services (LES ). 28 The forest product flow in
this analysis is entirely due to natural regeneration by protection, since no plantation was
undertaken in the sample forests. The flow of
timber products has been estimated using the
Yield Table of Quality-IV sal forests, and the
current extraction rates of the forest products is
based on our survey of the sample households. 29 Because of obvious measurement
problems, I have only taken the value of forest
products in the estimates of benefits from the
forests, although I appreciate that the value of
LES and of global environmental benefits can
be significant. 30 The harvesting of forest
products—timber (poles), firewood and
NWFPs—is mostly uncontrolled in NJFM
forests, whereas the VFCs devise and enforce
common rules for the selective harvesting of
these products from JFM forests on the basis of
bonafide domestic needs. Unofficially, many
VFCs charge a fixed user fee, usually Rs. 3 per
pole, and impose fines for the violation of
agreed rules by insiders or outsiders. This introduces a new rights-regime that is not consistent with traditional de-jure or de-facto
rights. The monies of the user-fee go into a
village fund that is used once or twice a year for
cultural or religious purposes. These new arrangements reduced the extraction of poles
from JFM forests to an average rate of 6.9
poles per household per year, as against 21.1 in
non-JFM forests (Table 3).
A randomly laid 1% sample plot enumeration revealed that the differential extraction of
poles and other materials in JFM and NJFM
forests had made significant impacts on the
growing stock of the two forests: whereas JFM
forests had an average of 1491 stems ha1 ,
NJFM forests had only 809. Assuming that
current rates of extraction continue into the
future, NJFM forests would not only have no
surplus available for thinning in years 10, 20
and 30, but there would only be 50 stems ha1
in the rotation year (40), far below the stipulated 501 stems ha1 required for a healthy
Quality-IV (Q-IV) sal forest. The JFM forests, on the other hand, in addition to supporting the regular removal of 6.9 poles
household1 yr1 , should give a thinning yield
of 338 stems in year 10 (corresponding to a pole
of average 8 cm dbh), 253 stems in year 20 (11
cm dbh), 87 stems in year 30 (14 cm dbh), and
61 stems as final yield in year 40 (17 cm dbh),
besides leaving the stipulated 501 stems ha1 as
Standards (Table 3). As per present JFM arrangements, all thinning yields until year 40
accrue to the VFCs free of charge, whereas the
final yield in year 40 is shared between the FD
and the VFC in the ratio 20:80. Here, then, is
the very substantial good news about jointly
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
773
Table 3. Number of trees in sample JFM and NJFM forests (Stems ha1 )
Yr-8a to 10
Yr-11 to 20
Yr-21 to 30
Yr-31 to 40
1,136
(8 cm)
805
(11 cm)
640
(14 cm)
501
(17 cm)
JFM
No. of standing stems at the start of the decade
No. of stems left after annual extraction by the villagersc
No. of stems silviculturally available for harvest
Balance of stems at the end of the decade
1,491
1,475
339
1,136
1,136
1,058
253
805
805
727
87
640
640
562
61
501
NJFM
No. of standing stems at the start of the decade
No. of stems left after annual extraction by the villagersd
No. of stems silviculturally available for harvest
Balance of stems at the end of the decade
809
762
0
762
762
525
0
525
525
287
0
287
287
50
0
50
No. of stems to be retained at the end of the decade
according to the Yield Tableb
Source: Sample plot enumeration and author’s calculation.
a
Assuming that protection in JFM forests started eight years ago.
b
Standard Yield Table of Q-IV Sal forests used. Corresponding average stem diameter (underbark) within brackets
(Maslekar, 1977).
c
Average annual extraction per household from JFM forests ¼ 6.9 stems.
d
Average annual extraction per household from NJFM forests ¼ 21.1 stems.
managed forests—there is a guaranteed flow of
large-size timber into the future, while the forests remain healthy in perpetuity, supplying
local ecological and global environmental services.
This is, however, only part of the story. A
domestic need principle also guides the extraction of firewood from those JFM forests where
the VFCs allow member-households to take
only jhari-jhunti (shrubs of inferior species) or
dry fallen wood free of charge. The survey figures show that the extraction of firewood averages Rs. 1,690 yr1 hh1 in value in NJFM
forests, compared to Rs. 1,041 in JFM forests
(at current village prices). Similarly the value of
NWFP extraction averages Rs. 945 yr1 hh1
in non-JFM forests compared to Rs. 417 in
JFM forests. This finding contradicts the popular belief that forest regeneration through
JFM, or by community protection, will always
increase the value of NWFPs extracted. 31
Why should this be so? Three probable explanations suggest themselves. First, villagers
in the study area seldom go to the forests to
collect NWFPs alone. The women of the
household usually go to the forests to collect
firewood and small timber, and it is on their
return journey that they collect NWFPs. 32
Since the frequency of forest visits for the
purpose of firewood and timber collection has
declined considerably in JFM forests, the col-
lection of NWFPs has declined proportionately. Second, the largest collectors of NWFPs
are the landless households. Some of these
people are shifting to nonforest livelihood
sources away from their home village. Because
of the closure of forests near JFM villages,
villagers have less time to go to the forests.
Third, it is likely that the availability of
NWFPs (productivity) has declined in real
terms due to closure of the canopy and the increased purity of the sal crop in JFM forests. 33
The effects of such closure will be especially
pronounced in the case of the kendu bush.
In income terms, this might not have much
effect in the study area, but it will be a major
problem in major Kendu leaf producing
areas, such as Chatra, Palamau, Gumla and
West Singhbhum Districts in Jharkhand, and
a number of Districts in Orissa and Chattisgarh.
(b) The distribution of costs and benefits
I turn now to the distributional consequences
of JFM. Table 4 shows how the costs and
benefits of forest management under JFM and
non-JFM systems accrue to different groups of
villagers at current (1996) prices over 40 years
across all household classes. These are based
on the assumption that the current rates of
774
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 4. Costs and benefits of management of forests to different groups under JFM and NJFM regimes
at current (1996) price (Rs. hh1 )
Product/parameter
Benefits
Firewood
Small timbera
NWFP
Managed yieldb
Total benefits
Costs
Protection cost
User-fee cost
Total costs
Net benefits
(benefits–costs)
Forest
regime
Landless
Marginal
farmer
Small
farmer
Medium
farmer
Large
farmer
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
39,116
54,468
4,184
15,300
15,874
45,453
13,459
0
72,633
1,15,221
37,992
70,436
3,916
15,500
15,709
43,215
13,459
0
71,076
1,29,151
49,240
83,100
4,548
8,840
18,573
39,914
13,459
0
85,820
1,31,854
42,032
66,376
6,204
17,424
19,784
32,468
13,459
0
81,479
1,16,268
38,252
40,624
7,820
14,392
9,568
14,690
13,459
0
69,099
69,706
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
2,712
0
740
0
3,452
0
69,181
1,15,221
2,712
0
692
0
3,404
0
67,672
1,29,151
2,712
0
804
0
3,516
0
82,304
1,31,854
2,712
0
1,096
0
3,808
0
77,671
1,16,268
2,712
0
1,380
0
4,092
0
65,007
69,706
Source: Field survey and author’s calculation.
a
Small timber includes small and large diameter poles; no large size timber will be available in a 40-year old forests.
b
Managed yield includes thinning and final yield according to the standard silvicultural plan.
extraction of forest products and sharing of
costs of JFM by household of different classes
(as revealed in the field survey) will not change
during this period. The table shows that the net
benefits of JFM forests are lower than for
NJFM forests over this period. The decrease is
appreciable across all types of forest products:
timber (small timber and pole), firewood and
NWFPs. One might suppose, as many villagers
and JFM enthusiasts surely also suppose, that
this observed ‘‘loss’’ from JFM forests will be
offset by the expected sizeable increase in the
quantity of timber potentially available at the
end of rotation period (Year 40)—timber that
will also command a high unit price on account
of its large diameter. But this proves not to be
the case if our survey gives an accurate picture
of current rates of extraction and tree growth in
a moderately stocked forest. 34 More important, the decrease in net benefits from JFM
forests is most pronounced in the case of
landless and marginal farmers: they suffer a loss
of up to 45–50%, compared to a mere 6% decrease for the large farmer category. This is as I
predicted, given VFC rules that timber and
firewood will be harvested only for bonafide
domestic needs. Large farmers need bigger
quantities of timber and firewood, respectively,
for their house building/repairs and hearths,
even though they have access to other sources
of fuel, including from privately grown trees
and cow dung. The greater loss in the case of
landless and marginal farmers is also to be explained by the introduction of new rules that
have reduced their access to the forests, as, for
example, with the introduction of a user fee for
pole extraction or higher fines for the violation
of local rules. As mentioned earlier, the income
generated from the user fee is deposited in a
common village fund managed by the VFC
leaders. Very often these funds are used for
purposes—such as temple building or community feasting—that offer little by way of compensatory benefit to the poor, but which help to
reproduce the cultural and political capital of
more influential households.
Several mechanisms are thus in place to discourage poorer households from participating
in JFM. As these groups make fewer visits to
the forest, or seek other livelihood options, we
would expect to find a reduction in the NWFP
harvest (see Tables 4 and 5). But does this bleak
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
775
Table 5. Present value of social costs and benefits of management of forests under JFM and NJFM regimes
over a period of 40 years (Rs. hh1 )
Products/parameters
Benefits
Firewood
Small timber
NWFP
Managed yield
Total benefits
Costs
Protection cost
User-fee cost
Total costs
Net benefits
(benefits–costs)
Forest
regime
Landless
Marginal
farmer
Small
farmer
Medium
farmer
Large
farmer
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
30,199
42,051
3,230.2
11,812.2
12,255.4
35,091.5
7,874
0
53,559
88,955
26,924
49,916
2,775.1
10,984.3
11,132.6
30,625.1
7,228
0
48,059
91,525
24,965
42,133
2,305.9
4,482
9,417
20,237.1
5,171
0
41,859
66,852
19,858
31,359
2,931
8,231.9
9,347
15,339.1
4,818
0
36,954
54,930
12,783
13,575
2,613.2
4,809.3
3,197.3
4,908.9
3,408
0
22,001
23,293
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
JFM
NJFM
2,095
0
571
0
2,666
0
50,893
88,955
1,924
0
490
0
2,415
0
45,645
91,525
1,376
0
408
0
1,783
0
40,076
66,852
1,281
0
518
0
1,799
0
35,155
54,930
908
0
461
0
1,369
0
20,632
23,293
Source: Field survey and author’s calculation.
finding change with the possibility of capital
sums accruing to the poor (as to other groups)
from the harvest of JFM timbers in Year 40?
Table 5 presents the present value (PV) of social costs and benefits accruing to different income categories from forests under JFM and
non-JFM regimes. The current (1996) values of
costs and benefits were adjusted on the basis of
the distribution weights described in Section 4,
and discounted at an SDR of 2.93% over a
period of 40 years. The analysis revealed that
not only is the PV of protection costs of JFM
borne disproportionately by the poor (Rs.
2,095 per landless household against Rs. 908
for a large farmer household), but that the
disparity becomes more acute when the user fee
charged under JFM is taken into account. This
asymmetry would be even more evident, it
should be noted, were the value of grazing and
local ecological services were taken into account. Richer farming families gain most from
leaf nutrient and moisture flow from the forests
to the don paddies, just as they gain from the
disease and storm protection functions of the
forests in relation to nearby farms (Kumar,
2001). 35
If these results are unexpected this is mainly
because other appraisals of JFM have dealt
with the village as a whole, or with a larger
ecosystem (we must also recall that the NPV of
forests under NJFM will tend to be negative
after the end of the 40-year rotation period).
But does this analysis suggest that JFM can in
no circumstances benefit the poor over the
short to medium term time horizons? Table 6
presents the results of a sensitivity analysis to
consider this question. The analysis also begins
to suggest why richer farmers might favor a
JFM (or CFM) regime even though when it
threatens to reduce their offtake in the short
and medium term. We see, then, that in a situation when the current annual extraction rate
of timber (poles) and NWFP in NJFM forests
reduces at a rate of 5% yr1 ; the discounted
values of net social benefits to the larger
farmers become positive even as all other
groups are faced with a net loss. For all groups
to benefit from JFM in net terms we have to
suppose that the current extraction rates of
timber and NWFP will reduce at 5% yr1 in
NJFM forests, while simultaneously the rates
increase by 5% yr1 up to Year 10 in the case of
JFM forests; the firewood extraction rate in
NJFM forests must also become equal to that
in JFM forests. 36
In practice, this situation appears unlikely to
be met. A perception of comparative advantage
on the part of large farmers should prompt
776
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis—percentage change in monetary value of net benefits to households from forests
under JFM regime over forests under NJFM regime
Landless
Marginal
farmer
Small
farmer
Medium
farmer
At current price and at current levels of extraction
)40
)48
)38
)33
)7
At Social PV at current levels of annual extraction
)43
)50
)40
)36
)11
At social PV, if the annual extraction of NWFP in
NJFM forests decreases by 5% per year until Yr-40
)29
)40
)29
)25
)1
At social PV, if the annual extraction of timber pole
and NWFP in NJFM forests decreases by 5% per year
until Yr-40
)22
)35
)26
)18
+12
At social PV if the annual extraction of pole and
NWFP inw NJFM forests decreases by 5% per year
until Yr-40, and firewood extraction becomes equal to
rate in JFM forests
)5
)4
+8
+12
+17
At social PV if current annual extraction of NWFP
increases by 5% per year in JFM forests until Yr-10,
and decreases by 5% per year in NJFM forests until
Yr-40
)21
)33
)22
)16
+6
At social PV if current annual extraction of pole and
NWFP increases by 5% per year in JFM forests until
Yr-10, and decreases by 5% per year in NJFM forests
until Yr-40
)11
)26
)16
)5
+27
At social PV if current annual extraction of NWFP
increases by 5% per year in JFM forests until Yr-10,
decreases by 5% per year in NJFM forests until Yr-40,
and firewood extraction level decreases to that of JFM
forests
+9
+10
+23
+30
+33
them to take a lead in JFM/ CFM. But this still
leaves one question unanswered. Why should
the poor participate in JFM, as some evidence
suggests they do? The answer is to be found less
in terms of economic theory than in terms of
the social realities of village life (as indeed it is
when landless and marginal farmers are expected to participate in labor-sharing networks
for farm work). The fact is that the poor have
few options. They could have made some gains
had their been some investment by the Forest
Department in wage work for plantation,
thinning, cleaning, etc., but there was no such
in the study villages. Moreover, the provision
of wage work is not in itself a guarantee that all
the benefits of wage income will flow to the
landless poor. It is often the case that nonpoor
households corner most of the wage work opportunities within their home village, especially
when this work is provided by government
agencies at an official wage rate that is two to
three times the traditional village rate (Kumar,
2002). The poor can exit, perhaps (migrate),
but if they raise their voices it is mainly to
Large
farmer
state their loyalty to the village leadership. By
participating in JFM the poor ensure that
they can partake of at least some village institutions, and they build up their stocks of social
capital.
6. CONCLUSIONS
I have tried to measure the effects of JFM on
various social groups among the participating
communities. The analysis is timely because
there is now an increased willingness on the
part of the Government of India to place a
higher emphasis on the poverty reduction aspects of the National Forest Policy of 1988. 37
This analysis, based on actual rates of extraction of forest products by different classes of
households in 1996, and making the assumptions that these rates and the protection
mechanisms of JFM forests will not change
substantially in the next four decades, shows
that the gains to various sections of the participating communities cannot be assumed to
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
be uniform, and that in the sal forest regions of
South Asia the nonpoor are likely to gain at the
expense of the poor under present JFM arrangements. The analysis also suggests that the
Government of India should move away from
countrywide prescriptions for JFM. JFM in
pure sal or teak forests is likely to be focused on
the long-term accumulation of timber and local
ecological services values in order to meet the
needs of rural elite, whereas opportunities for
the poor might be relatively higher in miscellaneous forest vegetation. Second, a highly
protective silvicultural regime, of the sort that
is practiced in most JFM areas, is more likely to
lead to the early closing of forests, and this
potentially reduces the harvest of NWFPs both
by making the harvest cumbersome and (possibly) by reducing the basal area of NWFP
species. Third, the initial condition of the forest
vegetation is also important: everyone stands to
gain if the forest has been totally degraded to a
rooted waste stage, but might not do so if the
vegetation is appropriately open, having a
proper density of dominant species. Silvicultural research in JFM has been a neglected
topic in India, as elsewhere. The country still
practices traditional silvicultural systems, most
commonly Coppice with Standard in the sal
forest zone, and this tends to disadvantage the
poor both in the short and medium terms. In
the absence of robust data, however, one cannot be sure that short felling cycles (10 years or
less) will bring significant incremental benefits
to the poor.
Given these findings, there is a need for
changes to the institutional design of JFM
systems if they are not to discriminate against
the very groups they are meant to benefit. In
part, of course, these changes might emerge
from within the JFM system. The most pessimistic findings presented here are made on the
basis of extrapolations from existing conditions, and without regard for adaptive behavior
on the part of different groups of villagers. This
analysis assumes for good reasons, that there
will not be much intergroup mobility during the
period of study (see Note 6). There is reason to
believe, however, that the rate of formation of
VFCs in Jharkhand is slowing down, and that
this slowdown has been prompted as much by
villager distrust of the FD as by FD inefficiency
or mistrust of JFM. Even some richer villagers
are skeptical of FD claims that they will get
80% of the final sale of timbers (in Year 40)—
‘‘why would the FD be so generous?’’ is a
common refrain—and poorer villagers have
777
little faith in either the FD or in village elite.
Poorer villagers may be inclined to disregard
the forest protection rules set in place by the
VFC, even though the consequences of being
caught are quite substantial.
If the assumption is that a version of JFM
will and should remain intact (and let us be
clear that I am not arguing for a return to a
prior system of estate management of forests),
how might it be reshaped to benefit the rural
poor? In principle, of course, the idea would be
to create a set of synergies such that richer and
poorer villagers gain from a broader system of
forest (or even rural) development. Bamboo,
for example, is both a short rotation crop, and
is highly preferred for its leaf nutrient value. Its
short rotation feature is particularly suited to
the needs of the poor, while its leaf litter is
highly valued by farmers for its fertilizer value.
It is possible that fast-growing species might
also be promoted (notwithstanding the bad
press that some species of eucalyptus has received). Similarly, the drinking water supply for
urban communities is dependent on the maintenance of catchment forests in rural areas. The
government might hope to create a system
whereby urban dwellers pay a user-fee for this
ecological service, with the rural poor being the
beneficiaries of the funds thus raised. But while
such a scheme has been tried in New York
State, it is unlikely to succeed in the Indian
context. This will be true both for technical
reasons—not all villages are within the catchment areas of ‘‘urban’’ reservoirs—and for
political reasons: urban dwellers will resist the
imposition of such a tax. Here, sadly, is the
major problem facing any redesign of JFM
institutions. While it is not difficult to think of
mechanisms to improve the lot of the rural
poor—from a system of compensatory financing to government interventions in the market
for timber (in favor of small diameter pieces)—
it also requires little foresight to see that such
proposals will be blocked by current taxpayers (the better off) or defeated by trends in
world timber prices (where Malaysian timber in
Jharkhand is beginning to drive down local
prices). However, much the rural populists
might wish it was otherwise, all systems of
forest management in India are bound up with
a political context which is not advantageous to
the rural poor, and which takes its cue from
exiting structures of inequality in the distribution of land and rights to local citizenship. This,
finally, has been the major argument, and lesson, of this paper.
778
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
[Notations used: ha—hectare; Mha—million
hectare; cum—cubic meter; cm—centimeter;
hh—household, yr—year; Rs.—Indian Rupees;
USD—US Dollar].
NOTES
1. For a review see Baland and Platteau (1996).
2. For a review of various forms of collaboration
between forest owners and users see Carter (1999).
3. Gender and other differences in tribal communities
may be less than in some caste Hindu communities, even
if they are marked nonetheless. See, for example, Jewitt
(2000) and Jewitt and Kumar (2000) for a discussion on
gender and ecology in Jharkhand.
4. Discussion on ‘‘rich men and women’’ versus ‘‘poor
men and women’’ in JFM began in the meetings of the
Gender and Equity Sub-group of the National Support
Group for JFM in India, a joint body of NGOs and
Forest Department staff, set up in 1996 by the Society
for Promotion of Wastelands Development, New Delhi.
See Sarin (1998) on the Sub-group’s work.
5. For a fine review on the use of the economics of
participatory forest management (PFM) see Davies and
Richards who observe: ‘‘Mainstream neo-classical economic theory is built on a number of assumptions which
do not sit comfortably with PFM, and there has been a
bias in applied research and literature to more sophisticated methods of limited relevance to PFM. These
difficulties are perceived by donors who remain skeptical
of economic methods, preferring to use noneconomic
stakeholder analysis and the logical framework as the
main project cycle tool’’ (Davies & Richards, 1999, p. 38).
6. Several studies indicate that the high Gini coefficient
of income inequality in rural India changed little
throughout the 1957–88 to 1997–98 period (see Lal,
Mohan, & Natarajan, 2001). A study of agricultural
land holdings also showed that there was negligible
mobility of landless households into farming households
in Bihar (including Jharkhand) during the period from
1970–71 to 1990–91 (AERC, 1998). Moreover, the
restrictions imposed on the transfer of lands from
Schedule communities by the Chotanagpur Tenancy
Act of 1908 have also limited the scope of intergroup
mobility based on land transfers in the study area. In the
personal experience of the author, also, there has been
not much intergroup mobility of late, particularly from
the group of landless or Marginal Farmers to the higher
categories named in the study villages. (I am grateful to
the two anonymous referees for their comments on the
drafts of this paper, and on this point in particular.)
7. The decline was both in terms of area (deforestation)
and quality (degradation). According to one estimate,
the country lost ‘‘dense’’ forest area at a rate of 1.3
million ha yr1 between the period 1972–75 and 1980–82
(Planning Commission, 2001b, p. 491), but gained about
one million ha during 1997–99 Assessment Years (FSI,
1999) mainly due to successful natural regeneration.
8. Panchayats are the institutions of local governance
in rural areas mandated by the Indian Constitution. Its
lowermost unit is the Gram Sabha of which all adults of
a village are members.
9. These are in addition to the traditional forest use
rights of tenant villagers that are well recorded in Bihar
and Jharkhand. The traditional rights are extensive, and
allow collection of timber, fuelwood and NWFPs, and
graze cattle free of cost in most Protected Forests (PFs).
In fact, the forest working plans recognize that meeting
the local bonafide demands of the right holders is the
first charge on management of the PFs. In Reserve
Forests (RF) the rights are not as extensive as in the PFs,
however, significant variations occur across different
areas of both states.
10. An ambitious rural development program, which
insists that the participating communities first make
voluntary inputs (labor, material or cash) before the
government releases money to any scheme.
11. Though some social differentiation within a community is assumed in these writings, it is still kept outside
the ‘‘local community.’’ For a critique, see Corbridge
and Jewitt (1997).
12. See, for example, the Indian National Forest Policy
(GoI, 1988), and the World Bank Country Report on
Indian forestry (Kumar et al., 2000).
13. But caste and class-based stratification of the
Indian society is well documented in the literature of
Indian political economy (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000).
Similarly, capture of common pool benefits by the local
rural elite is well known (Sarin, 1998).
14. The Expert Group Calculations from the 50th
Round of NSS Survey (1993–94) put Bihar (of which
Jharkhand was a part then) as the State with highest
poverty incidence, with its neighbors Orissa, Assam,
COMMON POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
779
Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh,
respectively, as second to sixth most poor states of
India in that order (Srinivasan, 1997 quoted in World
Bank, 1997, p. 8).
inefficiency of FD and other market imperfections.
Village price, at which exchange takes place within local
village, therefore, gives a more reliable and appropriate
estimate of the shadow price.
15. As one Marginal Farmer respondent puts it to the
author: ‘‘Indeed it [taking part in traditional labor
network] is a financial loss to me because I don’t need a
large labor-group for my farm work, but this is a village
tradition which should be respected. Moreover, it gives
us an opportunity to dine together [in the common feast
hosted by the employer of the day] which gives me a
sense of social inclusion.’’
22. The shadow wage rate (SWR) used in the present
analysis was the average of traditional village wage rates
in the eight sample villages. The traditional council in
each village in the study area fixes the wage rate for the
year on an appointed day in June or July. Although this
rate is lower than the official minimum wage, or even the
market wage rate, it is respected for all work on private
farms and sites within the village, so much so that wage
payment for work on government projects is also guided
by this type of wage arrangement. In 1996, the average
wage rate was Rs. 20 per day for men.
16. In none of the study villages, for example, did the
respective JFM committee makes bamboo regeneration
a priority, even though green bamboo is the main source
of livelihood for the basket making community, viz.,
Mahli in these villages. Instead, as Section 4 below
shows, the production of timber or poles dominates the
management of forests in the study area, very much at
the bidding of the locally dominant large landowning
groups who require more timber and poles for farming
and house building.
17. Sal yields a number of NWFPs as well, e.g., leaf (for
plates), twigs (for chew stick), and seeds (for oil, food and
medicine). Its leaves and twigs are easily harvestable
when the crop is in a bushy stage. Sacred groves of sal are
common in the area, and sal tree occupies one of the
highest places in the adivasi cosmovision.
18. For detailed discussion on NWFPs of the area see
Mitchell et al. (1999).
19. For example, sal seed collection returned an
income of only Rs. 10.15 for a day’s work as opposed
to the village wage rate of Rs. 20 for farm labor. See
Mitchell et al. (1999) for details.
20. By 1996 the sample JFM-forests had received
protection for almost eight years, so the distinctions
between JFM and NJFM villages were easily discernible.
21. Shadow price of forest products for project appraisal purpose is usually a product of market price and
standard conversion factor (SCF). Use of market price is
not appropriate for calculating benefits in our case as
the products are consumed mostly locally. In India, the
market price of timber is determined mainly by the
Forest Department, which is both a trader and a trade
regulator. The department fixes the price keeping urban
consumers in mind. In addition, the department has sole
logging rights within the government forests. The
market price of wood thus reflects the administrative
23. Tyler’s work followed the seminal works of Little
and Mirrlees (1974), UNIDO (1972) and Squire and van
der Tak (1975) which shared a common approach,
namely, the valuation of costs and benefits using shadow
prices for project appraisal in developing countries. See a
short review by Kirkpatrick (1994) for a historical
account of decline and then rise of these methods.
24. The World Bank, where social appraisal techniques
were a popular topic for discussion during the 1970s,
seldom appraised its projects using intragenerational
distribution weights. The political difficulty associated
with imputing the value of n was perhaps one of the
reasons. While making a case for revival of project
appraisal in the World Bank, its Public Economics
Division suggested dropping distribution weights since
distributional objectives could be pursued more effectively using other instruments such as allocation of
public expenditure and tax policy (Devarajan, Squire, &
Suthiwart-Narueput, 1995). Others, however, controvert
this argument saying that these instruments are never
fully efficient in the developing countries, and challenge
World Bank’s intervention in tax reform processes in
developing countries on the same grounds (see Brent,
1998, Chapter 3, for details). We follow Brent, as the
Government of India admits that the administrative cost
of reaching benefits to the poor is very high (Planning
Commission, 2001b).
n
25. The equation given by Brent is: d ¼ ðc =cÞ , where
c ¼ existing consumption level of a group, c ¼ average
consumption level of all groups, n ¼ positive constant
that reflects society’s aversion to inequality.
26. Looking at India, we can assume that the government is concerned about inequality, but perhaps not
acutely so. In the rural areas, especially, the government
allows agricultural incomes to be free of income-tax;
780
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
promises but often fails to provide education and health
free to all, irrespective of wealth; and permits poverty
reduction schemes that have little in the way of selfselection features to eliminate the nonpoor.
27. In Shukla’s equation, r is given by: r ¼ ð1 þ gÞe 1,
where e ¼ elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,
the value of which was calculated to be 1.47 for India;
g ¼ growth rate of per capita consumption, the value of
which was calculated to be 1.9867% for India. This gives,
r ¼ ½ð1 þ 0:019867Þ1:47 1, or 0.02934 or 2.93%.
28. By Local Ecological Services (LES) we mean
services available to the immediately local community
and attributable to the local forests, e.g., drinking and
irrigation water and moisture, leaf-litter fertilizer flowing
to farms, maintenance of local aquatic bodies and
availability of food items therein, etc. See Kumar (2001)
for details and crude estimates of LES in the region.
Also see Costanza, d’Agre, de Groot, Farber, Grasso,
and Hannon et al. (1998) for discussion of LES on a
global scale.
29. These estimates are based on the Yield Table of QIV Shorea robusta (sal) forests given in Maslekar (1977).
The study area, with its high Weck Climatic Index, has
better yield potentials than are reflected in this Yield
Table, but we used the more conservative figures of the
Yield Table to allow for future uncertainties.
30. Here again the central argument of this paper is
supported especially as the benefits of LES disproportionately flow and are utilized by large landowners.
31. See a collection of field study reports by the
Ecological and Economics Research Network of the
National Support Group of JFM in India (Ravindranath, Murali, & Malhotra, 2000).
32. Except for some high yielding items, e.g., flowers of
Mahua (Madhuca indica) that have a lucrative market.
33. See Mitchell et al. (1999) who found positive
correlation between productivity of major fruit yielding
NWFPs and crown diameter of the fruiting trees. Most
JFM forests have high-density sal crop, which gives little
opportunity for the NWFP trees to expand their crown
diameter. On the other hand, slightly open sal forests
provides less competition to other species in this respect.
34. These results are in line with the Staff Appraisal
Report of the Uttar Pradesh Forestry Project which
notes that the overall Economic Rate of Return to JFM
based on estimated production benefits alone is 10%, less
than the 12% Opportunity Cost of Capital used in India
(World Bank, undated). On the other hand, there would
be a net gain if JFM is assumed to start only in forests
that are degraded to such an extent that they are
presently yielding no significant amount of timber,
firewood or NWFPs.
35. See Ninan and Lakshmikanthamma (2001) who,
for example, report that gross crop income in a
Karnataka watershed has increased by USD 85 ha1
while the costs have declined by USD 62 ha1 between
the period 1989–90 and 1996–97 due to watershed
development, mainly afforestation.
36. The upper limit of 10 years in case of JFM forests
is based on field experience. If a completely degraded sal
forest starts receiving protection, its rate of growth in
terms of annual NWFP, firewood and small pole
production will most likely peak in the 10th year of
protection.
37. In order to strengthen JFM, the Government of
India has suggested that the State governments should
extend it to Reserve Forests and other well stocked
forests (GoI, 2000). A special cell within the Ministry to
monitor progress of JFM in the country has since been
created. Also see the Draft Approach Paper for India’s
Xth Five Year-Plan 2002–2007 which places added
emphasis on the role of JFM in poverty reduction
(Planning Commission, 2001a).
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