s
MASTER THESIS
ERASMUS SCHOOL OF ECNOMICS
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
FRAMING AND COMMUNICATION IN
EXPERIMENTS:
IS THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL FRAMING IN THE PRISONER’S
DILEMMA DIFFERENT WHEN YOU ADD COMMUNICATION?
T
NAME: EVA VAN BUUREN
STUDENT NUMBER: 334247
DATE: JULY 2015
SUPERVISOR: YU GAO
SECOND READER:
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Abstract
The focus of this thesis is to answer the question whether communication changes the effect of
social framing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. An online survey is conducted to answer this question.
The following four treatments are in the different surveys: Wall Street game frame and Community
game frame, both frames have one treatment with and one without communication. In total 146
respondents participated in the survey. The main result of this thesis is that there is no significant
difference in the cooperation rate between the different treatments in this online survey. This
means that that communication does not change the effect of social framing in this scenario. An
interesting finding is that in the scenario of the Wall Street game frame with communication people
are more likely to change strategy compared to the no communication treatment.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2
2. Literature review
5
3. Methodology
16
4. Results
22
5. Conclusion
32
6. Discussion
34
7. References
36
8. Appendix
40
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
1. Introduction
A popular area of research in (behavioral) economics is in the field of decision making in social
dilemmas. A reason for this is that people face social dilemmas often in their personal and
professional life. Van Lange, Joireman, Parks and van Dijk (2013) define a social dilemmas as
“situations in which a non-cooperative course of action is (at times) tempting for each individual
in that it yields superior (often short-term) outcomes for self, and if all pursue this non-cooperative
course of action, all are (often in the longer-term) worse off than if all had cooperated”. This
definition is broad which means that social dilemmas are everywhere; an example of a social
dilemma is a fundraising of a local charity organization, this situation leads to a public goods
dilemma. The reason for this is that not contributing leads to the highest personal payoff, because
when you are not contributing to the good you are likely to still be able the make use of it when it
is realized. However, if nobody contributes nothing will be realized which has a negative effect on
the community. Therefore, if everyone contributes the local charity organization can be active
which has a positive effect on the local community as a whole. This means that the community is
better of when everyone is donating. However, everybody has the same personal incentive to not
contribute and free ride on the contributions of the others. This is a social dilemma, because in the
short term you may be better off by not contributing, however in the long term the community will
be better off if they had cooperated. Social dilemmas come in many different forms, examples of
social dilemmas are the dictator game, the public good game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. There
are general theories about individual decision making that are not focused on social dilemmas.
Weber, Kompelman and Messick (2004) discuss the appropriateness framework as a theory that
explains how people make decision in the case of a social dilemma. This because theories like
expected utility and prospect theory are not feasible for the explanation of the decision making
process in a social dilemma due to the fact that these theories are designed for individual decisionmaking and a social dilemma involves more than one person.
Many factors can affect the willingness to cooperate of people that are in the situation of a social
dilemma. Van Lange, Joireman, Parks and van Dijk (2013) wrote a review about the psychology
of social dilemmas. In this review, an overview is given of the literature on cooperation in social
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
dilemmas. According to this article, the factors showed in Table 1 can have effect on the
cooperation rate in the case of a social dilemma. These factors are divided into three different
categories. The first category consist of factors that have a structural effect. These structural effects
refer to the effects that the features of the decision and/or social situation have on the decision.
This is mostly covering the basic setup of the decision for example the structure of the rewards.
The second category, the psychological impact, refers to the effect of internal motives, framing,
recently primed schemas or affect of the dilemma. The focus hereby is on how the dilemma affects
the internal motives people have when making this decision. An example of this impact is the
frame of the dilemma. The last category, the dynamic effect, refers to the effect on how certain
individuals respond to a tit-for-tat strategy, whether forgiveness or retaliation will predominate
when others do not cooperate. In this category, communication is the most well-known effect.
Table 1: The factors that have an effect on the cooperation rate in social dilemmas according to van
Lange, Joireman, Parks and van Dijk (2013)
Structural effect
Psychological impact
Dynamic effects
Rewards and punishment
Social value orientation
Locomotion
Asymmetries in resources,
Consideration of future
Direct and indirect reciprocity
benefits and roles
consequences
Uncertainty
Trust
Communication
Noise
Other individual differences
Support for structuring solutions
Framing
Priming
Heuristics
Affect
As Table 1 shows there is a list of factors that can have an effect on the cooperation in social
dilemmas. However, it is not possible to test for the effects of all factors at the same time. Therefore
this thesis will focus on the effect of framing and communication in a social dilemma, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Categorizing these effects as they are in Table 1, the effect of framing is in
the psychological impact category and communication is in the dynamic effect category. The
decision to research on these two factors is made because there is much literature about the effect
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
of communication and the effect of framing, however there is not much research about whether
these effects are interacting with each other. To investigate these phenomena the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is used as the social dilemma. This is chosen because it is a well-known and researched
dilemma. The results of these researches make it clear what the effect is of both the factors.
Combing these results there can be an implication about what a possible interaction effect could
be. An example of research in the area of framing effects is the paper of Liberman et al. (2004). In
this paper the difference in cooperation rate when the name of the game is changed is investigated.
In their research they made use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma set-up and they only change the name
of the game. They found that there is a difference in the cooperation level when the name of the
game is different. Looking at communication, it is well know that communication increases the
cooperation rate. One of the first studies to find this positive effect of communication is the study
of Deutsch (1958). Multiple studies replicated the positive effect of communication on the
cooperation in social dilemmas. (Balliet 2009; Bouas and Komorita 1996; Braver and Wilson
1986; Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977; Isaac and Walker 1988; Kerr et al. 1997; Orbell van
de Kragt and Dawes 1988; Ostrom and Walker 1991; Scodel et al. 1959). However, the interaction
between these two effects in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is not well known and needs more research.
Therefore, the following research question is formulated:
Is the effect of social framing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma different when you add
communication?
To find the answer to this research question the following sub questions are formulated:
-
Is there a difference in cooperation rate between a Wall Street game frame and a
Community game frame?
-
Is there a difference in cooperation rate when communication is added to the game?
To answer the research question an online survey is conducted. There are four different version of
the survey and people are randomly assigned to one of the four treatments. In the survey two
frames are used, the Community frame game and the Wall Street game frame, and both games
have a version with and without communication. The only difference between the two frames with
the same communication regime is the name; all other text in the survey is the same.
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
The thesis starts with a literature review about decision-making theory to explain how people make
decisions and the effect of framing and communication in social dilemmas is explained and this in
linked to decision-making theory. In the next part, the methodology is explained. The following
section discusses the results. In the last section, there is a conclusion and discussion of the results.
2. Literature review
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The social dilemma used in this thesis is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This dilemma is a popular social
dilemma that is being used to investigate behavior of individuals. The original classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma involves two prisoners, who are held in a separate police cell, both accused of a crime.
They are unable to communicate with each other. When they both do not confess (CC) they can
only be punished for a minor offence, each prisoners will get a one-year sentence. If one confesses
and the other does not the one that confesses is free and the other gets a ten-year sentence (DC/CD).
If both confess (DD), they each get a three-year sentence each. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of
the potential pay-offs.
Figure 2.1: An example of the potential pay-off of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Suspect A / Suspect B
Not confess
Confess (Defect)
(Cooperates)
Not confess (Cooperates)
1,1
10,0
Confess (Defect)
0,10
3,3
As Figure 2.1 shows the best possible outcome in the case of a Prisoner’s Dilemma for suspect A
is defecting while the other player cooperates (termed DC). The next best outcome is cooperation
from both sides (CC) followed by mutual defection (DD). The worst outcome is the case when
suspect A cooperates while the suspect B defects (CD). Thus in a Prisoner’s Dilemma looking at
the individual the best outcomes are: DC>CC>DD>CD. These outcomes give both the individuals
the incentive to defect. However, for total welfare it would be better if both play a cooperation
strategy. There are different game settings of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Sally (1995) presents an
analysis of 35 years of studies about the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this study cooperation in the
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
dilemma is defined as “the percentage of total choices made in an experiment that benefit the
overall group at the expense of the individual deciding” (Sally, 1995). Figure 2.2 shows that there
are different cooperates rates in the different research that is done about the game. Of the studies
reviewed in the paper, thirty of the studies confronted their subjects with the simple binary choice
of the Dilemma (cooperate or defect). Three experiments gave subject a third choice , which would
have benefit a subset of the total group , and the remaining four studies allowed a wider range of
choices , that involved either points harvested from a common resource pool or shares of capital
invested in a group exchange.
In total 130 treatments are pooled in Figure 2.2 which shows the distribution of the cooperation
rates of the samples in the different treatments. The mean cooperation rate for the entire sample is
47.4 percent with a standard deviation of 23.8 percent. A slight majority of the treatments occur in
the range from 20 to 50 percent, however it is clear that there are numerous experiments in which
subjects cooperated very frequently and effectively (>50 percent).
Figure 2.2: Distribution of the cooperation rate of the samples in the paper (Sally, 1995)
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Strategies
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma there are two types of games an one shot game and an iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In the case of the one shot game there is only one interaction and in the case of the
iterated game there are multiple interactions. Looking at the game the collective pay-offs are
greatest when both players cooperate, however each player gains a higher individual pay-off from
defecting irrespective of the partner’s action. An individual that cooperates when his partner
defects gets the lowest pay-off in the matrix. This means that mutual defection therefore represents
both the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) and the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, MaynardSmith, 1982) in one-shot interactions (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). However, a different situation occurs
when there are multiple interactions in the game. In this case people can adapt their strategy to the
behavior of the partner is the previous rounds. One famous strategy in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma is the tit-for-tat strategy. This starts with cooperating and thereafter respond to whatever
the partner did in the previous round (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). There are also theories related
to tit-for-tat strategy. Tit-for-tat and related strategies are similar in that behavior is typically
predictable and information about the last round is used to inform current decision-making. As
such, these strategies are referred to as ‘cost-counting’ or ‘bookkeeping’ strategies (Clutton-Brock,
2002, 2009).
Appropriateness framework
Weber, Kompelman and Messick (2004) discuss the appropriateness framework in there paper as
a theory to explain the decisions made in social dilemmas. They say that the expected utility theory
is good for explaining decision in social dilemmas when (1) the environment is less, rather than
more social, (2) when the economic structure of the situation or context is salient and (C) when
the situation or context calls for an approach with calculations. However, the main disadvantage
of this model is the lack of accounting for social factors that are often involved in social dilemmas.
Expected utility theory is designed for individual decision making without other individuals
involved, which could have an effect on the outcome and in expected utility theory only risk is
involved when making the decision.
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
The appropriateness framework is developed by March (1994). In this framework it is argued that
decisions are shaped by situational recognitions, the application of rules and someone’s identity.
When people are making a decision they form a decision based on the question "What does a
person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition)?"(cf. March , 1994; D.M.
Messick, 1999). This approach contrasts with the logic of consequences or expected utility models.
Messick (1999) suggests that the logic of appropriateness may have greater explanatory power in
social dilemmas than expected utility models.
Figure 2.3 shows a schematic overview on how the appropriateness framework explains the
decision-making process in social dilemmas. As seen in the figure the decision maker looks at the
situation through a lens that is constituted by interaction between social cues and identity.
In the situation of a social dilemma, there can be different cues. There can be objective cues for
example about who is involved, t is and what the name of the decision/social dilemma is. There
are also cues related to personal history for example history with the situation, personal traits and
your values. All these cues can have an effect on the interpretation of the situation. Idiosyncratic
motivations may also affect the situational cues (e.g., Holmes, 1991; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda,
1990; Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004). Figure 2.3 also suggest that the situational cues can
have an impact on the aspects of the identity of the individual, which then affects the situational
construal, and the accessibility of particular event prototypes. When looking at experiments a
certain group is in general more likely to be a participant in experiment. This selection can also
have an effect on the decision. This interaction between identity and objective situational factors
yields an initial definition of the situation. How the situation is defined is the heart of the
framework. The definition of the situation should inform the person about the norms, expectations,
rules, learned behaviors, skills and possible strategies that are relevant. This means that the
definition of the situation suggest a choice set. When looking at this framework the factors that are
in Table 1 can send cues and therefore have an effect on the decision people make. This theory can
explain why people behave the way they behave in social dilemmas. Two of those aspects that can
have an effect on the decision, framing and communication, are discussed in the following section
since the focus of this thesis is on these aspects of the dilemma.
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Figure 2.3: A schematic presentation of the appropriateness framework (from: Weber, Kompelman and
Messick, 2004)
Framing
Framing in experiments is done in many different ways. The Asian disease example of Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) is a famous example of framing and how it has an effect on the decisionmaking. In this scenario of a dilemma people had to decide between two treatments for 600 people
that are suffering from the Asian disease. However, there were two different frames, one positive
and one negative, of the treatments. These frames are in Table 2.2. During the experiment, one
group got the positive framing and the other group got the negative framing.
Table 2.2: The frames in the Asian disease dilemma of Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
Framing
Treatment A
Treatment B
Positive
“Saves 200 lives”
"A 33% chance of saving all 600
people, 66% possibility of
saving no one.”
Negative
“400 people will die”
"A 33% chance that no people
will die, 66% probability that all
600 will die."
The result of the experiment was that in the case that the frame was positive 72 percent of the
people chose treatment A and this is dropping to 22 percent when the negative frame is used. There
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
are multiple studies that show the effect of framing. Gächter et al (2009) finds in a natural field
experiment with PhD students that 93 percent of PhD students registered early when a penalty fee
for late registration was emphasized and only 67 percent doing so when this was presented as a
discount for earlier registration. Focusing on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Eiser and Bhavnani (1974)
find that behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is more cooperative when the situation is framed as an
“international negotiation” than when it is framed as a business transaction. Likewise, subjects
cooperate more in a “social exchange study” than in a “business transaction study” (Batson and
Moran, 1999), and substantially more in a “Community game” than in a “Wall Street game” (Kay
and Ross, 2003). The study of Liberman et al (2004) is a famous study about framing in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In their study, they reported about three different studies in total, all based on
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first study compares behavior in a seven-round Prisoners’ dilemma
under a game with the label “Wall Street game” to the corresponding behavior under a
“Community Game” label. In this study they used a selected group of 48 male college students.
The finding is that people are more willing to cooperate in the Community game frame. The second
study used 40 Israeli pilot trainees, the labels Bursa Game (Wall Street Game) and Kommuna
Game (Community game), all other factors are the same. In the second study, both the pilot trainees
and their (flight) instructors are asked to make predictions about others first-round behavior. On
average, the participants were more optimistic regarding others’ cooperation in the Kommuna
Game than in the Bursa Game, but no such difference was observed among instructors. Moreover,
participants expecting first round cooperation were relatively likely to cooperate in the Kommuna
Game, but not in the Bursa Game. In both studies, cooperation rates were significantly higher
under the Community/Kommuna Game frame. Finally, in the third study, college students who
had not participated in Study 1 were asked to predict first-round choices. Like the flight instructors
in Study 2, these subjects failed to predict the large difference in cooperation rates between the
two frames, suggesting that beliefs depend on whether one is a participant in the situation or not.
Levin, Schneider and Gaet (1998), described three different kinds of valence framing. In the case
of valence framing the frame casts the exact same critical information. The first one that is
explained is the standard risky choice framing. This is the one that is being introduced by Tversky
and Kahneman (1981). In this type of framing, the outcomes of a potential choice involving options
differing in level of risk that are described in different ways. The second one is attribute framing.
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
In this case, some characteristic of an object or event serves as the focus of the framing
manipulation. The third case is the goal framing. In this case, the goal of an action or behavior is
being framed. Table 2.3 gives a summary about the features of the different frames.
Table 2.3: Summary of Methodological Differences in Risky Choice, Attribute, and
Goal Framing (From: Levin, Schneider and Gaet, 1998)
Frame type
What is framed
What is affected
How the effect is
measured
Risky choice
Set of options with
Risk preferences
different risk levels
Attribute
Object/event attributes
Comparison of choices
for risky options
Item evaluation
or characteristics
Comparison of
attractiveness ratings
for the single item
Goal
Consequence or
Impact of persuasion
Comparison of rate of
implied goal of a
adaption of the
behavior
behavior.
Based on the results about the effect of framing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Ellingsen et al (2012)
performed a study to explain the behavior of the people and how the framing affects this behavior.
In their study, they split the previous research about the framing effect in experiments into three
different hypothesis:
1. The variable sociality hypothesis
2. Social image hypothesis
3. Coordination hypothesis.
The first hypothesis, the variable social hypothesis, posits that frames affect internalized social
norms or, alternatively, social preferences. This would mean that the Community label triggers a
stronger desire or compulsion to cooperate (Montgomery, 1998; Weber et al., 2004). The second
hypothesis is the social image hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that people respond to social
frames because the frame affects how others interpret their behavior, which in turn determines
their social esteem. Even a person who has not internalized norms, and who holds strictly selfish
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
preferences, may want to appear to be pro social. The third and last is the coordination hypothesis.
The main idea is that the frame affects the expectations that people have about each other’s
behavior, and these expectations in turn affect the own behavior.
They performed three experiments to test the different hypotheses and they found evidence for the
existence of the coordination hypothesis and evidence that contradicts the variable social
hypothesis and the social image hypothesis. They did this by making different models and
performed experiments based on these models. The overall conclusion was that social framing
effects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma works through beliefs and not preferences. Linking this to the
appropriateness framework. These hypotheses also fit in the appropriateness framework. This
because the coordination hypothesis assumes that people respond to social frames because the
frame affects how others interpret their behavior, which in turn determines their social esteem. In
the appropriateness framework people answer the question “What does a person like me (identity)
do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition)?"(cf. March, 1994; D.M. Messick, 1999). This
question is linked to the coordination hypothesis because in both cases the respondent is asking
his of herself how are other people think I would respond in a certain situation and act upon that
scenario.
Dreber et al. (2013) performed research about framing effects on preferences in dictator games.
The main conclusion is that preferences are largely immune to mere labeling of the games and
strategies. This contradict the results about the framing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Looking at the ultimatum game Leliveld et al. (2008) found that the proposals are more generous
in the “taking” treatment (the opponent has the entitlement) than in the “giving” treatment in (the
proposer has the entitlement). At first sight, one reason can be that the responder can reject in the
ultimatum game, and that proposers anticipates more aggressive rejections under the taking frame.
However Leliveld et al. (2008) rejects this explanation based on a “generalized ultimatum game”
control treatment in which they vary the impact of rejection on the proposer’s payoff. After that
control the findings are in line with the findings of Dreber et al (2013).
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Summarizing this literature review on framing it shows that there is evidence that the frames have
an effect on the decisions people make in the case of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Therefore the
following hypothesis is formulated:
-
There is a difference in cooperation rate between the Wall Street Game and the
Community Game frame
Communication and social dilemmas
It is generally known that communication leads to higher cooperation rates is social dilemmas like
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Baillet 2009; Bouas and Komorita 1996; Braver and Wilson 1986;
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977; Isaac and Walker 1988; Kerr et al.1997; Orbell, van de Kragt
and Dawes 1988; Ostrom and Walker 1991; Scodel et al.1959). Most of the experiments use
uncontrolled face-to-face communication (FtF), in either a discussion set-up or just a face-to-face
chat. However, a new stream of literature is focusing on the effect of computer-mediated
communication (CMC). This because communication is done more and more with computers.
Face to face communication (FtF)
The most common form of communication in experiments is face to face to communication (FtF).
For FtF communication the results are clear that it increases cooperation in iterated social
dilemmas. Bicchieri and Lev-on (2007) give a summary of the main findings in the literature so
far. The four main points in this summary are that in the first place that as long as communication
persists, cooperation rates are high and stable. The second conclusion is that a regular finding in
iterated social dilemma experiments is that without communication cooperation gradually declines
and that cooperation rates peak after communication, even when it takes place after a few rounds
of declining cooperation. The third conclusion is that communication not only improves
cooperation in the round immediately following it, but its effect carries over to a number of
subsequent iterations. The fourth conclusion is that when there are two separate groups, the
carryover effect extends to the out-group. The final point is that the communication effect lasts
even when agents are aware of incentives to defect.
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Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Computer-mediated communication (CMC)
Nowadays communication is done more and more with the mediation of computerized
technologies like video conferences. Jensen, Farnham, Drucker, and Kollock (2000) compare four
forms of computer-mediated communication: no communication, text-chat, text-to-speech, and
voice. As a result statistically significant differences between the various forms of communication
and the level of cooperation voice condition resulted in the highest levels of cooperation and the
text forms had the lower levels of cooperation. However, they were still higher than without
communication. Bicchieri and Lev-on (2007) gives a summary of the main findings in the literature
so far for the CMC. The first finding is that the communication effect is still present in computermediated environments. CMC produces higher cooperation rates than equivalent environments in
which communication is not allowed. The second finding is that the communication effect varies
in degree according to the richness of the communication channel. Videoconferencing sees
cooperation rates very close to FtF communication, whereas text-based communication produces
substantially less cooperation. In general, the CMC effect approximates the FtF communication
effect the closer the communication channel comes to reproducing the features of face-to-face
communication. Another important finding is that when using CMC to communicate in social
dilemmas, communication is normatively charged, this means that people receive and use it the
same way as other forms of communication, and even more forceful than FtF communication. This
could be explained by the need to ‘compensate’ for the lack of contextual cues in computermediated environments. The fourth finding is that compared to FtF communication, it takes more
time to establish cooperation, especially when using ‘poorer’ CMC channels. As in FtF
communication, cooperation deteriorates over time in the absence of continuing communication.
After communication resumes, cooperation rates improve again (which also occurs in FtF
communication). The last finding is that especially with asynchronous communication, it is more
difficult to establish ‘social contracts’ in CMC, and even when such agreements are reached, they
are violated more frequently than agreements reached using FtF communication
When comparing the strengths of the different types of CMC, videoconferencing is the strongest
form and the use of pure text is the weakest form. CMC has several difficulties when it is compared
to FtF communication. The first difficulty is the coordination. In the case of CMC it is harder to
14
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
coordinate because in the first place the familiar conversational structure is altered. In the second
place, the absence of FtF communication may lead to the absence of leadership. The second issue
is the credibility. In the case of FtF communication it is easier to give credible visual, verbal and
social cues. In the case of CMC these cues are restricted or absent. The third problem is making
promises public knowledge. It the case of CMC it is harder to communicate expectations and this
makes it harder to make promises public knowledge.
In Summary the results for effects of FtF communication and CMC on the cooperation there is
evidence that a communication effect exist for FtF communication and CMC. In the case of CMC
it depends on the type of communication how strong the effect is.
Explanations
For the positive effect of communication in social dilemmas, there are two main explanations. The
first explanation focusses on a change in norms due to communication. (Kerr, 1997 and Bailliet,
2009). They suggests that communication engenders a personal norm of cooperation that
enduringly increases individuals’ propensity to contribute, thereby affecting behavior even when
there is no possibility of future reproaches. The second focuses on a change in preferences. This
theory says that the communicator is able to make a permanent change in the agent preferences
and beliefs. (Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Weisser, Johannes, 2012)
Looking at the literature discussed in the previous section it shows that there is evidence for an
effect of communication in the case of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Based on this literature the following
hypotheses are stated
-
Communication increases the cooperation rate in the Community game
-
Communication increases the cooperation rate in the Wall Street game
Combining the evidence about the effect on communication and framing the following hypothesis
is formulated:
-
There is a difference in the effect of social framing when you add communication
15
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
3. Methodology
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether communication and framing have an
effect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and if there is an interaction effect between the two effects. An
online survey is used to investigate the possible effects of framing and communication in this
scenario. In total, there are four different version of the survey. For the sample size the rule of
thumb is that the minimum amount of subjects for each treatment is 30, however the more the
better. The decision to use an online survey is that due to the four treatments of the survey a lot of
respondent are needed (minimum of 120) to be able to draw conclusion. Since many respondent
are needed an online survey is done because it is easier to recruit respondents with an online survey
compared to a field or lab experiment. This is because people can participate when they want and
not at fixed times. Making it easier to convince people to fill in an online survey than to ask if they
want to participate in an experiment. In addition, it would take a lot of time to conduct the
experiment in a lab setting. There are also some negative side effects one of them being having
less control on the situation and therefore the environment in which people do the survey.. Another
point of discussion is that it is online, however as discussed in the literature about CMC there is
evidence that the effect of commutation can also be found when it is in an online environment.
This mix of pro and cons of both options made me decide to do an online survey, with the main
reason being the access to and recruitment of respondents. More of the pro and cons and possible
effects of an online survey and possible implications are discussed in the final section.
Survey
The main purpose of the survey is to find whether there is an effect of framing and communication
and if there is an interaction between these effects. In total there are four different surveys, two
different names and for both frames one with and one without communication. The names of the
games used in the analysis are based on the article of Liberman et al. (2004). Therefore the Wall
Street frame and the Community game frame are used. Combining this with communication the
following frames and communication setups are in one of the four surveys as a treatment: Wall
Street game without communication (WSN), Wall Street game with communication (WSC),
Community game without communication (CGN) and Community game with communication
(CGC). The two versions of the Wall Street frames are in appendix, the Community Game frame
is the same version and the only difference is that Wall Street is replaced with Community. The
16
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
survey is conducted in an online environment and most participants are recruited through the
internet. The survey is made on the website of Thesis Tools1. When inviting the respondents for
the survey everyone gets the same link and are then randomly assigned to one of the four
treatments.
Survey questions
The survey starts with a short introduction mentioning the possibility of winning a gift card of ten
euro when participating in the survey. In the recruitment ad the value was not mentioned only that
there was a chance to win a gift card. The winner is chosen at the end of the survey period with
using a website that randomly selects a winner2. Participants were given the possibility to leave
their e-mail address at the end of the survey if they like to have the possibility of winning the gift
card. The email addresses are only used for this purpose and deleted afterwards.
After the introduction the game starts. The game consists of ten rounds. The two different
treatments the frames are the same except for the name of the game that is either the Wall Street
game or the Community game. In the case of no communication it is only mentioned that there is
a different opponent each round. In the case of communication, the opponent is introduced with a
name and in the first five round there is only cheap talk. This cheap talk is based on funny facts
that are found on the internet. In round six to ten, information about the game is added to the cheap
talk. This information is based on results of research. Table 3 shows the sentences that are used.
To control for gender effects in the case of communication, 50 percent of the respondents has a
male (round two, four .six .eight and ten) name and the other half a female name. During all the
rounds of the game the pay-off matrix, that is in Figure 3, is visible and is it the same in all the
rounds.
1
2
http://www.thesistools.com/ (visited May 2015)
http://www.naamloten.com/?trekking=941320
17
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Table 3: Overview of the sentences used in the communication treatment
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6
Round 7
Round 8
Round 9
Round 10
This round you are playing against Linda.
She says: My name is Linda and did you know that ketchup was sold in the 1830s as
medicine.
This round you are playing against Michael.
He says: My name is Michael and did you know that a raisin dropped in a glass of fresh
champagne will bounce up and down continuously from the bottom of the glass to the top.
This round you are playing against Barbara.
She says: My name is Barbara and did you know that there are more than fifty different
kinds of kangaroos.
This round you are playing against William.
He says: My name is William and did you know that there are no words in the dictionary
that rhyme with: orange, purple, and silver!
This round you are playing against Elizabeth.
She says: My name is Elizabeth and did you know that of all the words in the English
language, the word ‘set’ has the most definitions.
This round you are playing against James.
He says: My name is James. Did you that a crocodile can't stick it's tongue out. In this
game most people are likely to play a tit for that strategy.
This round you are playing against Mary.
She says: My name is Mary. Did you know that like fingerprints, everyone's tongue print
is different. In this game the dilemma is that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome
than mutual defection but it is not the rational outcome because the choice to cooperate, at
the individual level, is not rational from a self-interested point of view.
This round you are playing against John.
He says: My name is John. Did you know that the average person laughs 10 times a day.
In this version of the game it is not possible to be punished or rewarded for previous
decision, since there is a different opponent every round.
This round you are playing against Patricia.
She says: My name Patricia and did you know that chewing gum while peeling onions
will keep you from crying. In this game mutual defection is the only strong Nash
equilibrium in the game (i.e., the only outcome from which each player could only do
worse by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma then is that mutual cooperation
yields a better outcome than mutual defection but it is not the rational outcome because
the choice to cooperate, at the individual level, is not rational from a self-interested point
of view.
This round you are playing against Robert.
He says: My name is Robert and did you know that it's possible to lead a cow upstairs but
not downstairs. In the final period of this game most people are likely to defect.
18
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Figure 3: Pay off matrix of the game
Strategy
Opponent
Opponent
cooperates
defects
You
You: +5
You: 0
cooperate
Opponent : +5
Opponent: +7
You defect
You: +7
You: +2
Opponent: 0
Opponent:+2
After the ten rounds of the game, in the second part of the survey, question are posed to get
information about the risk-attitude and the willingness to cooperation of the respondents. The risk
attitude questions are based on an article of Ding, Hartog and Sun (2010). In this article, they find
that these questions are a good indicator for risk attitude in experiments, however there is noise.
These questions are asked because Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) have results indicate
that, indeed, a player’s attitude towards an uncertain situation is related with his/her behavior in a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, players who have previously demonstrated a more
conservative attitude towards risk (in a control experiment preceding the main experimental
session) tend to cooperate less. Furthermore, this phenomenon is enhanced when risk averse
subjects are exposed to an end game probability. Meaning that there is a known probability when
the game will end. Another section of the questions in the survey is about the willingness to pay
(WTP) of a lottery and about the willingness to accept (WTA). The WTA is the amount of money
that а person is willing to accept to abandon a good or to put up with something negative, such
as pollution. It is the minimum monetary amount required for sale of a good or acquisition of
something undesirable to be accepted by an individual. Conversely, the WTP is the maximum
amount an individual is willing to sacrifice to procure a good or avoid something undesirable. Both
these measures are used to analyze the risk attitude of people.
The question to determine the WTP is: Suppose you are in a lottery game, the possibility to win
1,000 euro is 10%, how much would you pay at most to buy a lottery ticket?
For the WTA the proposition is: Now we change the conditions of the choice. Suppose you are
offered 100 euro in cash. Instead, however, you may choose a lottery ticket. The lottery has a prize
of 2000 euro, but the probability to win has not yet been determined. We want you to think about
19
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
different probabilities to win the prize of 2000 euro. How high should this probability be at least
for you to take the lottery ticket rather than the 100 euro in cash? For further risk attitude
measurement question are copied asked in the German SOEP survey, and analyzed in Dohmen et
al. (2005). Following a common practice, individuals are asked to grade themselves, on an eleven‐
point scale: How do you see yourself: Are you in general a person who takes risk or do you try to
evade risks? Please self‐grade your choice (ranging between 0‐10 ) The grades run from 0: “not
at all prepared to take risk” to 10: “very much prepared to take risk”. This question is asked for
following five domains:
A. finances
B. leisure
C. career
D. health
E. education
The questions to gather information about the willingness to cooperate and/or trust in people are
based on survey of Gächter et al. (2004). These questions are showed in Table 4. They use a trust
questionnaire that adopts standardized trust questions that have been frequently used by other
researchers. The questions GSS trust, GSS help, and GSS fair are taken from the National Opinion
Research Center’s General Social Survey. Versions of the GSS trust questionnaire are widely used
to measure group-level social capital (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).
These questions are based on the seven measures of trust. After this section, there are some general
question about the respondents. This to get information about the demographics of the respondents
(age , gender and education level). This is to get information about the subject pool, which could
possibly have an effect on the outcomes of the experiment. At the end of the survey people are
asked if they want to participate in the lottery to win the gift card and if they want that they can
fill in their email. This is all on a voluntary basis and people do not have to fill in their email
address.
For the sample size the rule of thumb is that the minimum amount of subjects for each treatment
is 30, however the more the better. After 3 weeks of recruiting subjects through email and
Facebook, in total 166 subjects opened the link to the survey. However, 20 people did not finish
20
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
the survey and are therefore removed from the sample that is used in the analysis. This means that
in total 146 subjects completed the survey and are in the analysis
Table 4: The seven measures of trust (from: of Gächter et al. (2004)
Statistical methods
In the survey, participants are assigned one treatment. This means that the experiment has a
between subject design and that different subjects are compared witch each other to see if they are
significant different from each other. The Mann-Whitney U test is used to test whether there is a
significant difference between the subjects that are in the different framing treatment or in the
communication / no communication with the same frame. When looking for significant difference
between different rounds in the same treatment the Wilcoxon test is done because this is a within
subject test. A Friedman test is used to check whether there is any significant difference between
the four treatments when looking at the personality question. To control whether one treatment is
different from the other three treatment a t-test is used.
21
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
4. Results
Summary statistics
Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the total sample and the subsamples of the different
treatments. From this table it can been seen that every treatment has at least the 30 participants that
are necessary according to the rule of thumb. The differences between the numbers can be
explained with the fact that there were some participants that did not finish the survey and are
therefore dropped from the analysis and the sample. Looking at the demographics of this sample
the table shows that the average age of the respondents is 23.52 years. An explanation for this
relatively young age is the fact that most of the respondents are students. This is due to the way
the respondents are recruited. The recruitment of participants was done through with Facebook
and email. Since I am a student myself, my network and social circle consists of mostly students.
However, as discussed in Druckman and Kam (2009) this should not lead to problems for external
validity of the study. Looking at the gender the table shows that the larger part of the participants
is a female. In total 108 respondents, are female and 38 respondents are male. The average level
of education is relatively high in this sample. This can again be explained with the fact that sample
mostly consist of students with a high education degree.
Table 5: Summary statistics of the demographics of the respondents with the mean and standard
deviation (in parentheses) from the different samples.
Summary statistics
Total sample
WSN
WSC
CGN
CGC
Number of
146
45
32
38
31
Age
23.52 (2.131)
23.33 (2.326)
23.56 (2.129)
23.61 (2.150)
23.67 (1.833)
Gender (0=female ,
0.26 (0.440)
0.40 (0.495)
0.219 (0.420)
0.158 (0.370)
0.226 (0.425)
4.62 (0.911)
4.60 (1.096)
4.656 (0.745)
4.66 (0.847)
4.58 (0.886)
observations
1=male)
Education (1= High
school, 2= MBO , 3=
HBO ,4= Bachelor
, 5 = Master ,6= PhD d
, 7 = other)
22
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Performing a t-test to check if there is a significant difference between the gender distributions, it
shows that there is a significant difference in the gender between the WSN and the other three
samples. Looking at the hypothesis of the t-test, Ha!=0 is accepted with a p-value of 0.01. This
outcome shows that the group means are significantly different as the p-value in the Pr(|T| > |t|)
row (under Ha: diff!= 0) is less than 0.05 (i.e., based on a 2-tailed significance level). This means
that in the WSN group the ratio of males is significantly higher compared to the other three groups.
In the results, there are no significant differences between groups that can be related to gender
specific behavior and therefore there is no further check for this.
Table 6.1 shows the results of the trust measures that are in the survey. In this table the [−] sign
behind the variable names indicates the variables for which higher scores reflect less trust and the
[+] sings behind the variable indicates variables for which higher scores reflect more trust. In case
of the GSS measures (trust, fair and help) the answer range was that the value 1 corresponds to the
lowest level of trust in-between is 1.5, it depends on the situation or they do not know the answer
and the value 2 indicates the highest level of trust. All the GSS measures (trust, fair and help) are
around the value of 1.5. This means that respondents answered that it depends on the situation or
that they do not know when they can trust people. The interpretation is that people have trust in
others most of the time depending on the situation they are in.
Looking at the variable on the trust in strangers the value 0 is that they more or less agree and the
value 1 is that more or less disagree. The value is 0.6 and this means that they the more disagree
with the proposition that you cannot count on strangers. This means that more people say that you
can count on strangers. For the variable of leaving the door unlocked, the question was: how often
do you leave your door unlocked? The answer range is 1: very often; 2: often; 3: sometimes: 4:
rarely and 5: never. The average answer is 4.027 this means that people rarely leave the door open.
This high score indicates a low level of trust. The next variable is the lend money variable. In this
case, a question is asking participants how often they lend money to your friends. The possible
answers range from 1-4 the value 1 is more than once a week, 2 is once a week, 3 is one a month
and 4 is once a year of less. The value of this sample is 3.199. This means that on average they
lend money to friends once in a month. This implies a mediocre level of trust in their friends or
having friends that seldom ask for money. The next variable indicates how often they lend personal
23
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
possessions to a friend. The range is the same as the lend money variable. The value of this variable
is 3.00. This means that on average they lend personal possessions to a friend once a month. This
means they trust their friends with personal possessions, however it is not known how often people
ask to borrow their belongings. The last variable is corresponding to the trustworthiness in this
variable people rate how trustworthy they are. The answer ranges from 1-6. From disagree strongly
to agree strongly. The rate is the sample is 5.075. This means that people agree somewhat that they
are trustworthy. This means that they think they are trustworthy most of the time. Looking at the
results of this measure, it shows that people have more trust in friends than in strangers a Friedman
test was performed to see whether there are significant differences between the measures among
the different treatments and no significant result was found.
Table 6.1: Comparison of trust measures in the study with the value of the variable and the standard
deviation (in parentheses)
Variable (Sign
Total
WSN
WSC
CGN
CGC
Observations
145
45
32
38
31
GSS trust (-)
1.517
1.489
1.547
1.524
1.516
(0.329)
(0.345)
(0.320)
(0.367)
(0.273)
1.527
1.578
1.547
1.434
1.548
(0.351)
(0.319)
(0.345)
(0.352)
(0.395)
1.592
1.556
1.641
1.605
1.581
(0.381)
(0.402)
(0.386)
(0.370)
(0.367)
0.610
0.667
0.531
0.632
0.581
(0.489)
(0.477)
(0.507)
(0.4889)
(0.501)
4.027
4.133
3.75
4.026
4.161
(1.242)
(1.078)
(16.459)
(1.284)
(1.86)
3.199
3.156
3.281
3.211
3.161
(0.884)
(0.928)
(0.851)
(0.874)
(0.898)
3.000
2.978
2.875
3.052
3.097
(0.879)
(0.965)
(0.868)
(0.868)
(0.746)
5.075
5.089
4.969
5.158
5.065
(1.024)
(1.125)
(1.21)
(0.886)
(0.964)
indicated the direction
of higher trust)
GSS fair (+)
GSS help (-)
Trust strangers (+)
Door unlocked (-)
Lend money (-)
Lend possession (-)
Trustworthiness (+)
24
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Gächter at al. (2009) compares the scores on these measures to two references studies. This is
shown in the Table 6.2. Comparing this table to the scores that are found in this thesis study it
seems that there are no large difference between the average scores of this study, the study of
Gächter et al. (2009) and the comparing studies of Glaeser et al. (2000) and Ashraf et al (2003) I
am not able to test it since I do not have the data of the other articles to perform a test. However,
having looked at the scores, there it does not look that one of the variables is extremely different
compared to the values reported in previous articles. Since there is no large different between the
groups which could have a possible effect on the result no further tests are performed with this
measures.
Table 6.2: comparison of the several trust measures in the study of Gächter at al. (2009) and two reference studies
(from: Gächter at al. (2009)
Table 7 shows the summary statistics of the risk attitude questions. This table shows that the
expected value in the lottery in case of the WTP is 100 euro (0.10*1000). On average the
respondents are willing to pay 23.10 to cooperate is this lottery. This is 23.10 percent of the
expected value of the lottery. For the WTA you have 100 euro in cash and you need to give the
probability you want to have to win 2000. The average probability that people want to have to
accept the lottery instead of the 100 euro is 42.83 percent. This means that they want to have an
expected value of 856.60 (expected value = 0.4283 *2000) instead of the 100 euro is cash. In this
case, the WTA is relatively higher than the WTP. These values are in line with the endowment
effect found and explained by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990). The endowment effect is
the hypothesis that people ascribe more value to things merely because they own them. This effect
is that the WTA is larger than the WTP. This is because in the case of the WTA, question people
25
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
own the 100 dollar. In the question of the WTP, they do not own anything and therefore people
ascribe more value in the case of the WTA due to the endowment effect. Another part of Table 7
shows the questions about the risk behavior in five categories: finances, leisure, career, health and
education. From this table it can been seen that people are least willing to take risk when it concerns
there health and finances. A Friedman test shows that in the domain of leisure, people are
significantly more willing to take more risk compared to the domain of finances (p=0.048), career
(p=0.013) and education (p=0.066). The highest score in the willingness to take risk is for the total
sample 6.103 and this is in the leisure domain. Looking at the different subsamples there is no
significant difference between the scores within the samples when looking at the same framing.
This means that there is not further testing on this value to control is as a possible factor for
behavior during the game.
Table 7: summary statistics of the risk attitude questions (standard deviation is in the parentheses)
Total
WSN
WSC
CGN
CGC
23.11
25.28
24.034
18.56
24.89
(26.96)
(27.31)
(28.87)
(21.802)
(30.851)
WTA
42.83
44.77
46.59
38.66
42.62
(probability)
(34.02)
(47.721)
(34.654)
(27.313)
(24.173)
Finances
3.965
4.533
4.281
3.210
3.742
(2.321)
(2.424)
(2.303)
(2.183)
(2.435)
6.103
6.432
6.375
5.553
6.032
(2.156)
(1.958)
(1.962)
(2.165)
(2.614)
5.979
6.133
6.438
5.447
5.935
(2.032)
(1.829)
(1.84)
(2.114)
(2.323)
3.993
4.222
3.844
3.500
4.419
(2.606)
(2.679)
(2.784)
(2.491)
(2.460)
5.472
5.756
5.563
5.079
5.451
(2.260)
(2.091)
(2.409)
(2.409)
(2.188)
Sample
WTP
Leisure
Career
Health
Education
26
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Analysis
The focus of the analysis is on the cooperation rate in the different games to explain the possible
effects on framing and communication. Table 8 shows the numbers of observations and the
percentages (in parentheses) that play a cooperation strategy and the one that defect in the different
treatments and Figure 4 shows the percentage of cooperation in the different treatments This table
shows that in the Wall Street game with no communication the average percentage that cooperates
is 40.84 percent, when there is communication in the game with the same name the average rate
of cooperation is 41.80 percent. For the Community Game, the average cooperation rate without
communication is 41.98 percent and when there is communication, the rate is 41.59 percent. These
rates are close to each other and to test if they are significant different the Mann-Whitney u test is
performed. The results show that the average rates of the cooperation in all rounds are not
significant different from each other. However, a point to note is that the average cooperation rate
is in line with the result of lab experiment of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This could mean that the
framing and communication did not have an effect and the score is equal to a “regular” Prisoner’s
Dilemma setting. Possible reasons for this are in the discussion section.
When looking at different rates between the no communication and communication treatment in
the games with the same frame in each round the Mann-Whitney u test is done to test whether
there is a significant difference between the two treatments in each round. The test for the Wall
Street game shows that there is only a significant difference in round one (p=0.081) and round
five (p=0.047) between Wall Street with communication and Wall Street without communication.
For the Community game there is no significant result for the Mann Whitney u test, this means
that there is no significant difference between the two treatments with the same name in this game
in each round. Doing the Mann-Whitney u test comparing one treatment to the other three
treatments for the individual rounds the results in a significant (p=0.061) difference for round five
in the WSC treatment compared to the other three treatments. For the WSN treatment a significant
(p=0.0944) difference is found in round three. This means that in round three the WSN treatment
significantly differs at the ten percent level from the other three treatments. No significant
difference is found for the Community game label
27
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Game
Round
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
WSN
Defect
19
26
32
27
30
26
25
26
28
29
(42.22)
(57.78)
(71.11)
(60.00)
(66.67)
(57.78)
(55.56)
(57.78)
(62.22)
(64.44)
26
19
13
18
15
19
20
19
17
16
(57.58)
(42.22)
(28.89)
(40.00)
(33.33)
(42.22)
(44.44)
(42.22)
(37.78)
(35.56)
20
18
18
21
14
20
18
17
23
19
(62.50)
(56.25)
(56.24)
(65.63)
(43.75)
(62.50)
(56.25)
(53.13)
(71.88)
(59.38)
12
14
14
11
18
12
14
15
9
13
(37.50)
(43.75)
(43.75)
(34.38)
(56.25)
(37.50)
(43.75)
(46.88)
(28.13)
(40.63)
19
19
21
24
22
20
18
27
21
28
(50.00)
(50.00)
(55.26)
(63.16)
(57.89)
(52.63)
(47.37)
(71.05)
(55.26)
(73.68)
19
19
17
14
16
18
20
11
17
10
(50.00)
(50.00)
(44.74)
(36.84)
(42.11)
(47.37)
(52.63)
(28.95)
(44.74)
(26.32)
17
18
18
18
19
16
16
19
20
20
(54.84)
(58.06)
(58.06)
(58.06)
(61.29)
(51.61)
(51.61)
(61.29)
(64.52)
(64.52)
14
13
13
13
12
15
15
12
11
11
(45.16)
(41.94)
(41.94)
(41.94)
(38.71)
(48.39)
(48.39)
(38.71)
(35.48)
(35.48)
Cooperate
WSC
Defect
Cooperate
CGN
Defect
Cooperate
CGC
Defect
Cooperate
Table 8: the numbers of observations and the percentages (in parentheses) that play the different strategies
28
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Figure.4: The cooperation rate (in percentages) in the different treatments
Table 9 shows the cooperation level of the individual in different games. (Cooperation level =
number of rounds cooperated /10). From this table it can been seen that in the total sample 33
people (22.60 percent) played a strategy were they defect in all the rounds and 13 people (8.90
percent) cooperates in all the rounds. This means that 68.50 percent of the participants play both
strategies in the game. Performing a Mann-Whitney u test shows there is no significant difference
in cooperation level between the communication and no communication treatment with the same
name. There is also no significant difference between the different frames.
Looking at the cooperation level, it shows that many people are changing their strategy. This is
because a ratio that is not equal to zero or one means that people are not playing the same strategy
in all the rounds. Therefore, it is interesting to further investigate how many times people change
their strategy during the game. The definition of a change in strategy is that it is a change when
people play a different strategy compared to the round before. Table 10 gives an overview on how
29
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
many times people change their strategy during the game. In line with Table 9 it shows that 46
people (13+33) are not switching. There is one person that changes his or/ her strategy each round.
In the total sample the average number of a change in strategy is 2.829 (std. =2.555).
Table 9: The cooperation level of the individual is the different games. (Cooperation level is number of
rounds cooperated /10)
Total sample
WSN
WSC
CGN
CGC
0
33 (22.60)
14 (31.11)
5 (15.63)
7 (18.42)
7 (22.58)
0.1
8 (5.48)
2 (4.44)
1 (3.13)
3 (7.89)
2 (6.45)
0.2
8 (5.48)
1 (2.22)
4 (12.50)
1 (2.63)
2 (6.45)
0.3
8 (5.48)
3 (6.67)
1 (3.13)
2 (5.26)
2 (6.45)
0.4
20 (13.70)
5 (11.11)
7 (21.88)
5 (13.16)
3 (9.68)
0.5
22 (15.07)
6 (13.33)
6 (18.75)
8 (21.05)
2 (6.45)
0.6
15 (10.27)
2 (4.44)
1 (3.13)
5 (13.16)
7 (22.58)
0.7
11 (7.53)
4 (8.89)
4 (12.50)
1 (2.63)
2 (6.45)
0.8
3 (2.05)
0 (0.00)
1 (3.13)
2 (5.36)
0 (0.00)
0.9
5 (3.42)
1 (2.22)
0 (0.00)
3 (7.89)
1 (3.23)
1
13 (8.90)
7 (15.56)
1 (3.13)
1 (2.63)
3 (9.68)
#rounds
cooperated /10
Table 10 shows that there are some differences between the treatments in percentages the time
people change their strategy. To test whether there is difference between the groups are significant
a Mann-Whitney u test is done. Results show a significant difference at the 5 percent level between
the times people change their strategy in case of the Wall Street label (p=0.0403). The average
number of changes in the strategy in the Wall Street game without communication is 2.133 (std. =
2.464) times and in the game with communication it is 3.28 (std. = 2.556) times. This means that
in the case of the Wall Street game with communication people are more likely to switch.
Comparing the cooperation level of one game to the other three games the Mann-Whitney u test
shows that there are no difference between one treatments compared to the three others. Looking
at the average number of changes in strategy in the Community game the one with communication
has an average of 3.065 (std. =2.670) and the one without communication is 3.079 (std. =2.497).
Performing the Mann-Whitney u test is shows that they are not significant different from each
30
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
other (p=0.985). So the conclusion when looking at the change in strategy is that with the
communication treatment in the Wall Street game people are more likely to change the strategy
during the game compared to people that are in the non-communication treatment with the Wall
Street label. For the Community game no significant result is found.
Table 10: overview of the number of times respondents change their strategy during the game.
# of times
Total
respondent
sample
WSN
WSC
CGN
CGC
change strategy
during the game
0
46 (31.51)
21 (46.67)
7 (21.88)
8 (21.05)
10 (32.26)
1
12 (8.22)
4 (8.89)
3 (9.38)
4 (10.53)
1 (3.23)
2
14 (9.59)
2 (4.44)
3 (9.38)
5 (13.16)
4 (12.90)
3
15 (10.27)
3 (6.67)
5 (15.63)
5 (13.16)
2 (6.45)
4
15 (10.27)
5 (11.11)
2 (6.25)
6 (15.79)
2 (6.45)
5
13 (8.90)
3 (6.67)
4 (12.50)
3 (7.89)
3 (9.68)
6
18 (12.33)
5 (11.11)
4 (12.50)
3 (7.89)
6 (19.35)
7
10 (6.85)
2 (4.44)
3 (9.38)
2 (5.26)
3 (9.68)
8
2 (1.37)
0 (0.00)
1 (9.38)
1 (2.63)
0 (0.00)
9
1 (0.68)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (2.63)
0 (0.00)
In the first five rounds there is only cheap talk in the game and in round six to ten there is cheap
talk and communication that is game related. To test if there is an effect of the type of
communication the Mann-Whitney u test is performed to look if there is a difference between
communication and no communication treatment within the same framing and the number of times
people switch strategy. In the Wall Street game, the p value for round one to five is equal to 0.0725
and for round six to ten, the p value is equal to 0.0839. This means that in both treatments of
communication (cheap talk and game related talk) there is a significant difference at the ten percent
level between the communications and the no communication treatment in the Wall Street labeled
game. Performing a Wilcoxon test to test if there is a difference between the two forms of
communication within the Wall Street communication treatment results in a p-value of 0.055. In
31
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
the case of cheap talk the average rate of changing strategy is 1.568 times that people switch and
for the game related talk it is 1.260 times in case of the Wall Street label. This means that in the
cheap talk people are more likely to switch and this is a significant difference at the ten percent
level. However, it is a small difference. Comparing it to the other three treatments it shows that
the WSN significant (p=0.028) differs from the other three treatments. There is no significant result
for the other treatments.
Hypotheses
To sum up the result section the hypotheses are rejected or accepted. The first hypothesis states
that there is a difference in cooperation rate between the Wall Street game and the Community
game frame. The result show that there is no significant difference between the cooperation rates
between the treatments therefore this hypothesis is rejected. The second hypothesis states that
communication increases the cooperation rate in the Community game. The result of the analysis
show that there is no significant differences between the communication and no communication
treatment in the Community game. This means that this hypothesis is also rejected. There is no
significant difference between the treatments with and without the communication. The third
hypothesis is that communication increases the cooperation rate in the Wall Street game. Looking
at the result there is a significant difference in the cooperation rates in round one (p=0.081) and
round five (p=0.047), however looking at the overall rate there is no significant difference and
therefore this hypothesis is rejected too. The final hypothesis is that there is a difference in the
effect of social framing when you add communication. Since all the previous hypotheses are
rejected there is no evidence that communication has an effect on the social framing. This leads to
the conclusion that this hypothesis is rejected. To draw a conclusion in this section the four
hypothesis stated in this thesis are rejected.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, research is done on the effect of social framing, communication and the association
between these two. The research question is:
Is the effect of social framing in the Prisoners Dilemma different when you add
communication?
32
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
To answer this question he following sub-question are answered:
-
Is there a difference in cooperation rate between a Wall Street game frame and a
Community game frame?
-
Is there a difference in cooperation rate when communication is added to the game?
Answering these (sub)-questions is done by conducting an online survey. In total, there were four
different treatments in the survey: Wall Street game without communication (WSN), Wall Street
game with communication (WSC), Community game without communication (CGN) and
Community game with communication (CGC). Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the
four treatments. In total 146 respondents participated in the survey. To test whether there are
significant differences between the treatments a Mann-Whitney u test is used.
The first sub-question is whether there is a difference in cooperation rate between a Wall Street
game frame and a Community game frame. The answer is that there is no difference between the
cooperation rates in the Wall Street game frame and the Community game. This is not in line with
the findings in the study of Liberman et al. (2004) who did find a framing effect with the same
labels. Possible explanations for this are discussed in the next section. The average rates that are
found in the different frames are equal to the rates in the “regular” Prisoner’s Dilemma. The second
sub-question is whether there is a difference in cooperation rate when communication is added to
the game. The answer to this sub-question is that there is no difference between the cooperation
rates in the different communication treatments. However, in the Wall Street game frame people
are more likely to change their strategy when they are in the communication treatment.
Looking at the research question, the main result is that there is no difference between the levels
of cooperation in the different treatments (framing and communication). In all the games, the
cooperation rates are just above the 40 percent. This is in line with findings in lab experiments
(Sally, 1995). So answering the research question no difference is found between the effects of
social framing when there is communication. However, an interesting finding is that in the Wall
Street label the subjects are more likely to change their strategy in the case when communication
is added to the game. This is an effect of the communication and not on the social framing. The
possible reasons for this result are discussed in the next session.
33
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
6. Discussion
As said in the conclusion there is no significant difference in the cooperation level between the
four treatments. There are different reasons that can explain this result. One reason to explain this
is the fact that it is on online survey. The main disadvantage of this set-up is the fact that it is a
survey and that there is no real time interaction. As mentioned in the literature the communication
effect with text has less power compared to a real life communication in experiments (Bicchieri
and Lev-on, 2007; Farnham, Drucker, and Kollock, 2000). This means that the lack of real life
communication reduces the possible effect. Literature about this effect shows that computer
mediated communication with only text has the lowest effect (Bicchieri and Lev-on, 2007). This
weaker communication could in this case lead to no communication effect in combination with
other factors. One of the other factors is that it was a survey in an online environment and this
means that people participate at different uncontrolled locations and this makes it possible that
people are not fully focused on the text and read it quickly. Due to the lack of concentration, the
subjects may not be aware of the names of the game and the information that the communication
is giving. It could also be the case that the name of the game was not emphasized enough because
it was there just every round. However, this was the best possible approach looking at the factors
involved. One of the main factors that was involved for making the decision to do a survey was
the lack of time. This because if it would be a lab experiment there must be at least 120 respondents
and this would take a lot of time to recruit subjects and perform a lab experiment and this would
not be possible in the given time limits. In addition, it is hard to get 120 people for a lab experiment
if you do not have access to a pool of subjects. Looking at the recruitment of the respondents, the
focus is on individuals in my personal and online network. Since I am an economic and business
student, some of the respondents may have prior knowledge of the game and may be aware of the
strategies they can use in playing the game. However, there is evidence that being a student is not
a problem for the external validity of the experiment (Druckman and Kam, 2009). Although it can
be a danger that people have prior knowledge of the game and possible strategies. To conclude
there are some weak points of the set-up of this study, this is due to the constraints when doing
this thesis. However, I hope it gives other researchers ideas for further research with a similar setup in a different environment.
34
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
The limitations of this study give implication for further research. An implication for further
research is to do the same set-up with the four different treatments in a lab environment were the
instructions are first read in front of the group and then they get a sheet with the instructions and
communication is face to face. This to make sure that people read the instruction and are aware of
the name of the game. The use of face-to-face communication is important. As Bicchieri and Levon (2007) mention this is the strongest form of communication and therefore the one by which it
is most likely find the effect when it is there. In addition, the pool of respondents is from the people
in my network and since I am an economic and business student, a part of the respondent may have
prior knowledge of the game and may be aware of the strategies they can use in playing the game.
Therefore, for further research it would be good to have a subject pool with people that are more
different.
The most interesting finding of the study is that people are more likely to change strategy when
communication is in the game in the case of the Wall Street game. A possible explanation for this
that is the communication makes people think more about their strategy and that they are therefore
more likely to switch strategy. For further research, it would be interesting to do more research
about the effect of communication on the decision to change the strategy. Another finding was
that in the Wall Street game frame there is a significant difference in the cooperation rate between
round one and round five when there is communication and no communication. I think this are
possible false positive result because looking at the average rate in all round there is no significant
difference.
Looking at the results in this thesis, the significant results that are found are in the Wall Street
game frame. These results give implications for further results to see whether these effects are also
there when the frame is different. It would also be interesting to perform more of this type of
experiments in different setting to see if the environment also affects the behavior of people.
35
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
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Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
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Behavioral Economics
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Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
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Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
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39
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
8. Appendix
Survey 3
Welcome to the game! In total there are 10 rounds. In each round you are playing against a different
opponent. If you participate in this survey you can win a 10-euro gift card.
Start
3
In case of the Community game the word Wall-Street game is replaced by Community game , Ceteris paribus
40
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Round 1 Wall Street frame without communication
1.
Wall Street game round 1.
In each round there is a different opponent.
Please imagine the following situation: When you and your opponent both cooperate, you get 5 each. If
you defect and your opponent cooperates, you get 7 and your opponent gets 0. If you cooperate and your
opponent defects you get 0 and your opponent gets 7. If you both defect, you get 2 each. In total there will
be 10 rounds.
What is your strategy? *
Cooperate
Defect
Next round
After this, there are nine other rounds and only the round number changes.
Round 1 Wall Street frame with communication
1.
Wall Street game round 1.
This round you are playing against Linda.
She says: My name is Linda and did you know that ketchup was sold in the 1830s as medicine.
When you and Linda both cooperate, you get 5 each. If you defect and Linda cooperates, you get 7 and
41
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Linda gets 0. If you cooperate and Linda defects you get 0 and Linda gets 7. If you both defect, you get 2
each. In total there will be 10 rounds. In each round there is a different opponent.
What is your strategy? *
Cooperate
Defect
Next round
The communication used in the other nine rounds is in Table 3.
This section is identical for both surveys
This is the end of the game.
Now some question are asked.
11.
Suppose you are in a lottery game, the possibility to win 1,000 euro is 10%, how much would you
pay at most to buy a lottery ticket? *
42
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
12.
Now we change the conditions of the choice. Suppose you are offered 100 euro in cash. Instead,
however, you may choose a lottery ticket. The lottery has a prize of 2000 euro, but the probability
to win has not yet been determined. We want you to think about different probabilities to win the
prize of 2000 euro. How high should this probability be at least for you to take the lottery ticket
rather than the 100 euro in cash? *
13.
How do you see yourself: Are you in general a person who takes risks or do you try to evade risks?
Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0-10) asked (0 not at all prepare to take risks, 10
very much prepared to take risks).
For the following 5 domains:
Finances
Leisure
Career
Health
Education
14.
43
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?
1: “most people can be trusted”; 2: “can’t be too careful”; 1.5: “depends” *
1
1.5
2
15.
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try
to be fair?
1: “would take advantage”; 2: “would try to be fair”; 1.5: “depends” *
1
1.5
2
44
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
16.
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking
out for themselves?
1: “try to be helpful”; 2: “just look out for themselves”; 1.5: “depends” *
1
1.5
2
17.
Approval or disapproval to the statement “You can’t count on strangers anymore".
Answer range is 0: more or less agree; 1: more or less disagree *
0
1
18.
45
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
How often do you leave your door unlocked?
1: Very often; 2: often; 3: sometimes; 4: rarely; 5: never *
1
2
3
4
5
19.
How often do you lend money to friends?
1: More than once a week; 2: once a week; 3: once a month; 4: once a year or less *
1
2
3
4
20.
46
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
How often do you lend personal possessions to friends?
1: More than once a week; 2: once a week; 3: once a month; 4: once a year or less *
1
2
3
4
21.
Approval or disapproval to the statement “I am trustworthy.
Answer range from 1: “disagree strongly” up to 6: “agree strongly” *
1
2
3
4
5
6
22.
What is your gender? *
47
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
Male
Female
23.
How old are you? *
24.
What is your highest level of education? (Finished or currently studying) *
High school
MBO
Higher education (HBO)
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Ph.D.
Other degree (please specify)
25.
If you leave you email address here you have the possibility to win a gift card with the value of 10
euro from a store of your choose. (The survey is anonymous)
48
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics
Framing and communication in experiments:
Is the effect of social framing in the prisoner’s dilemma different when you add communication?
End of the survey
Thank you for participating in the survey.
49
Master Thesis Eva van Buuren
Behavioral Economics