Journal of Consumer Research Inc.
Choice Set Configuration as a Determinant of Preference Attribution and Strength
Author(s): Song‐Oh Yoon and Itamar Simonson
Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 324-336
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/587630 .
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Choice Set Configuration as a Determinant of
Preference Attribution and Strength
SONG-OH YOON
ITAMAR SIMONSON*
Despite the growing consensus that consumer preferences are often constructed
when decisions are made, we still know very little about the factors that determine
the strength and stability of constructed preferences. We propose that the manner
in which preferences are formed has a significant effect on their strength and
stability. In particular, we propose that option set configuration, asymmetric dominance versus compromise, drives the decision process and whether consumers
(consciously) focus on the chosen option or the context. This, in turn, affects the
resulting decision process trace, as reflected in choice stability, confidence, and
attribution. The results of five studies support this proposition. Thus, the strength
of constructed preferences is a function of choice problem characteristics and the
construction process.
T
here is a growing consensus that consumer preferences
are often constructed when decisions are made rather
than retrieved from memory (for reviews, see Bettman,
Luce, and Payne [1998] and Simonson [1993]). The manner
in which preferences are constructed makes them susceptible
to a wide range of influences. For example, the asymmetric
dominance effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) and the
compromise effect (Simonson 1989) indicate that the configuration of a choice set can significantly affect the choices
that consumers make. Similarly, the preference elicitation
task and the description or framing of options can affect the
construction of preferences (Levin and Gaeth 1988; Tversky,
Sattath, and Slovic 1988).
Despite the advances in our understanding of factors that
affect the construction of preferences, we still know very
little about the process of construction and what moderates
the strength and stability of the resulting preferences. Are
constructed preferences stable and resilient, at least in the
short term, in which case the reference to “construction” is
appropriate? Or are preferences reconstructed and possibly
revised each time a decision needs to be made? These questions are central to the concept of preference construction
and to our understanding of the susceptibility of preferences
to long-run influences. Furthermore, this subject matter has
important practical implications because marketers and marketing researchers often rely on expressed preferences at
one time to predict preferences at a later time.
Prior research has identified several indicators of the
strength of attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1995, 1998; Krosnick et al. 1993; Krosnick and Petty 1994), which can also
be applied to an analysis of the strength of preferences. In
particular, the strength of preferences can be evaluated based
on the confidence with which the preferences are held and
the stability of preferences over time.
In this research, we propose a bottom-up process of preference construction whereby problem characteristics affect
the decision process and focus of attention, which in turn
affect the decision process trace, including choice stability,
confidence, and attribution. In particular, we distinguish between choice problems that make the role of the context
transparent and problems that focus attention on the (perceived absolute) attractiveness of the options.
The asymmetric dominance and compromise effects are
particularly suitable for testing this general proposition. Specifically, prior research has established that the asymmetric
dominance effect reflects a case wherein consumers typically
do not recognize the impact of the context or set configu-
*Song-Oh Yoon is assistant professor of marketing at Korea University
Business School, Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul 136–701, Korea
([email protected]). Itamar Simonson is the Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of Marketing at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015 ([email protected]). The research is
based on the PhD dissertation of the first author, and part of the research
was conducted at Singapore Management University while the first author
was there as an assistant professor. This research was supported by the
Behavioral Research Fund from the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University and by a research grant from Lee Kong Chian School of
Business, Singapore Management University. The authors thank the editor,
the associate editor, and the reviewers for their helpful comments.
John Deighton served as editor and Stephen Nowlis served as associate
editor for this article.
Electronically published June 3, 2008
324
䉷 2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. ● Vol. 35 ● August 2008
All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2008/3502-0011$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/587630
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
ration on their preference for the dominating option, which
they usually attribute to that option’s attractive attribute values (Dhar and Simonson 2003; Novemsky et al. 2007; Simonson 1989). However, when choosing a middle option,
consumers often explicitly refer to that selection as a compromise between conflicting preferences. Dhar and Simonson (2003) labeled the former a “perceptual” effect and the
latter a “cognitive” effect. Thus, we propose that choices of
asymmetrically dominating options result in constructed
preferences that are stronger and more stable than choices
of compromise options.
Figure 1 contrasts the sequence of “events” hypothesized
to occur during and as a result of choosing asymmetrically
dominating and compromise options. This process and its
indicators are examined in a series of studies. In study 1,
we test the prediction that preferences for asymmetrically
dominating options are more stable and tend to be more
resistant to contextual changes than preferences for compromise alternatives. Study 2 uses choice and context recognition as an indicator of the focus of attention during the
process leading to selection of asymmetrically dominating
versus compromise options. In study 3, we further examine
the decision trace resulting from the process of choosing
asymmetrically dominating versus compromise options, focusing on choice confidence and the stated reasons for the
choice. In study 4, we test the hypothesized (mis)attributionbased account for each choice type and show that making
the context effect transparent decreases the asymmetric dominance effect but not the compromise effect. Finally, in study
5, we explore whether contextual influence can affect the
stability of preferences even after actual experience with the
selected product. Specifically, we test whether the perceived
experience with a given option is more favorable and
whether that option is more likely to be purchased after
being selected from a set in which it was asymmetrically
dominating. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical
and practical implications of this research.
325
THE CONTEXT OF CONSTRUCTION AS A
DETERMINANT OF PREFERENCE
STRENGTH
Although there has not been much research regarding the
strength and stability of constructed preferences (except for
Amir and Levav 2008; Hoeffler and Ariely 1999), there has
been a great deal of research in social psychology on the
meaning and moderators of attitude strength (Eagly and
Chaiken 1995, 1998; Krosnick et al. 1993; Krosnick and
Petty 1994). In particular, strong attitudes are characterized
by high levels of confidence and stability (Chaiken and Baldwin 1981; Fazio and Zanna 1978; Judd and Johnson 1981;
Schuman and Presser 1981). Attitude confidence has been
defined as the degree to which an individual is certain that
his or her attitude is correct (Budd 1986; Krosnick and
Schuman 1988). Beyond confidence, strongly held attitudes
are more likely to remain unchanged over time, to persist
across different contexts, and to resist persuasion attempts
(Eagly and Chaiken 1998; Krosnick et al. 1993; Petrocelli,
Tormala, and Rucker 2007). Consistent with past research
on attitude strength, we define strong preferences as those
that are held with greater confidence, are more stable, and
are resistant to change. In particular, strong preferences are
less likely to change over time, even when the context that
influenced the original choice has changed.
An important question that has received little attention in
both the attitude and decision literatures refers to contextual
factors that affect the strength of constructed attitudes/preferences. In the present research, we argue that the context
within which preferences are constructed and, in particular,
the choice processes triggered by the set configuration can
affect the strength of constructed preferences and the attributions consumers make regarding the causes of their decisions. We expect preferences that are formed under the
influence of nontransparent effects (such as the asymmetric
dominance effect) to be stronger and more stable than those
FIGURE 1
A BOTTOM-UP (MIS)ATTRIBUTION PROCESS MODEL AND RESULTING DECISION TRACE
326
produced under the influence of transparent context effects
(such as the compromise effect).
Figure 1 outlines a bottom-up process underlying the impact of choice set configuration on the decision processes
and the resulting decision trace. We propose that the set
configuration, asymmetric dominance or compromise, affects the focus of attention—the focal option versus the
choice context—and the manner in which the problem is
resolved. These differences, in turn, determine both the resulting choice attribution, confidence, and stability. A set
configuration with asymmetric dominance produces a (perceived) choice between two options, one of which seems
particularly attractive. Conversely, a compromise configuration calls attention to the context—three options with a
middle option that “combines” both attributes.
The different attention focus triggered by the problem
configuration is expected to affect the resulting decision
trace, including the consumer’s attribution regarding the reason for choice, the confidence about the choice, and the
stability of the preference for the selected alternative. Regarding choice attribution, preferences for compromise options are likely to be seen as suitable for, and the outcome
of, a particular choice problem; that is, it is a context-specific
solution. Conversely, preferences for asymmetrically dominating options, which are assumed to reflect the consumer’s
underlying preference for an attractive option and not merely
the outcome of a particular choice context, are expected to
be held more strongly and to be more stable.
Consistent with this analysis, prior research has shown
that asymmetric dominance and compromise effects differ
in their underlying processes and their transparency. Asymmetric dominance is more of a “perceptual effect” (Dhar
and Simonson 2003; Simonson 1989), whereby consumers
typically fail to recognize the impact of the dominated option
on the perceived attractiveness of the dominating option.
For example, those choosing the dominating option rarely
mention the dominated option in their think-aloud protocols
(Simonson 1989). Instead, they tend to explain their choices
in terms of their underlying preference for the dominating
option (e.g., attribute importance or preference for the option’s absolute attribute values). Furthermore, consistent
with the notion that consumers perceive their preference for
asymmetrically dominating options to be based on the option’s attractive (absolute) features rather than as a way to
resolve difficult choices, Dhar and Simonson (2003) showed
that adding the option not to choose any of the alternatives
has little (or even a positive) effect on the choice share of
dominating options.
Conversely, consumers often recognize and explicitly refer to compromise as the reason for their choice of a middle
option (e.g., “I’ll take the middle one”; “B is a good compromise”; Simonson 1989), whereas relatively few consumers explain it based on the option’s attractive attribute values.
Also, consistent with the notion that choices of compromise
(middle) options are often seen as a way to avoid difficult
trade-offs (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999), the introduction of a “no choice” option significantly diminishes the
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
choice share of compromise options (Dhar and Simonson
2003). Furthermore, Novemsky et al. (2007) demonstrate
that consumers are more likely to select a compromise option when they have difficulty generating reasons for preferring any particular alternative in the set. This evidence
suggests that compromise alternatives are often consciously
selected as a means to resolve the conflict arising from the
need to make difficult trade-offs.
In addition to choice attribution, as shown in figure 1, the
tendency to focus on the asymmetrically dominating option
or on the context is expected to influence the resulting preference strength. In particular, when the context’s influence
on preference construction is transparent, the resulting preferences for the chosen options are expected to be weaker,
that is, less stable and associated with lower confidence.
Thus, the choice stability, confidence, and attribution are
simultaneously determined by the process triggered by the
set configuration. The discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H1: Preferences for asymmetrically dominating options are more stable than preferences for compromise options.
H2: Compared to compromise option choosers,
choosers of asymmetrically dominating options
have a better long-term recognition for the option
they chose but a poorer recognition for the options they did not choose.
H3: Preferences for asymmetrically dominating options are held with greater confidence than preferences for compromise options.
H4: Preferences for asymmetrically dominating options tend to be attributed to the option’s (absolute) attractiveness whereas the role of the
choice set context is transparent in the case of
compromise choices.
STUDY 1
In study 1, we test the prediction that choices of asymmetrically dominating options are more stable than choices
of compromise options (hypothesis 1). Specifically, we examine whether preferences for asymmetrically dominating
options are more likely to persist even when the same option
is evaluated at a later period in a set in which it is not
asymmetrically dominating. Thus, in the first experimental
session (T1), participants chose from a set with either an
asymmetrically dominating or a compromise option (the
“target option”). A week later, in the second experimental
session (T2), they chose from a set containing just two of
the original three options from T1 (i.e., a set containing only
the target and the competing option). The likelihood of participants choosing the same target option at T1 and T2 allows
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
us to contrast the durability of the asymmetric dominance
and compromise choice.
Method
Two hundred and ten undergraduate respondents at Stanford University participated in both sessions and received
$10.00 upon completion of the second session. In both week
1 (T1) and week 2 (T2), respondents were asked to choose
one option from a provided choice set in three product categories. Two of the three options in both the asymmetric
dominance and the compromise choice sets were identical.
For example, as shown in figure 2, the attribute values of
Phone A (target option) and Phone C (competing option) in
the asymmetric dominance choice set were the same as those
of Phone B (target option) and Phone C (competing option)
in the compromise choice set. Only the third option differed
between the two sets so as to create either an asymmetric
dominance or a compromise configuration.
Respondents made choices in three product categories, including microwave ovens, cordless phones, and automobiles.
The choice sets were similar to those used in prior studies of
the asymmetric dominance and compromise effects (Dhar and
Simonson 2003; Simonson 1989), with options described on
327
two attributes. The market range of each attribute value was
explicitly presented in the questionnaire.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions that differed only with respect to the choice set
at T1: (a) asymmetric dominance, (b) compromise, or (c)
control. The control choice set contained only the “core”
two-option set consisting of the target and the competing
options. At T2, all respondents evaluated the same twooption choice sets, with those in the control group again
evaluating the same set they considered in the previous
week. In both T1 and T2, the order of the product categories
and the order of the options within each product category
were randomized and the market range for each attribute
value was provided in the questionnaire. Also, to minimize
the potential effect of participants’ desire to appear consistent in their choices over time, they were asked to create
an ID number at T1, and this was used in both experimental
sessions.
Results and Discussion
We tested hypothesis 1 by comparing the proportions of
respondents in each condition who chose the same target
option at both T1 and T2 (pooling across the three prod-
FIGURE 2
STUDY 1: AN EXAMPLE OF THE THREE VERSIONS OF A PROBLEM
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
328
ucts).1 The results show that there was a significant main
effect of the choice set on the consistent choice (x 2 (2) p
7.27, p ! .05). As expected, the proportion of respondents
who selected the asymmetrically dominating option at T1
(from a three-option set) and again at T2 (from a two-option
set in which it was not dominating) was greater than the
corresponding proportion of consistent compromise option
choosers (M p 83% vs. M p 60%; z p 3.84, p ! .01). The
choice consistency level was similar in the control and the
asymmetric dominance groups (M p 90% vs. M p 83%,
respectively; z p 1.50, p 1 .10), whereas the consistency
level in the compromise group was significantly lower than
in the control group (M p 60% vs. M p 90%; z p 5.05,
p ! .01). It is noteworthy that the finding of similar (or
slightly higher) consistency in the control (two-option set)
condition is not surprising considering the lower likelihood
of choosing the same option twice from a three-option set
as compared to a two-option set.
An alternative way to analyze the results is to examine
the asymmetric dominance and compromise effects at T1
and separately at T2 by comparing the shares of the target
options with the shares of the same options in the control
group. At T1, both the asymmetric dominance (M p 66%
vs. M p 49%; z p 3.34, p ! .01) and the compromise
(M p 67% vs. M p 49%; z p 3.53, p ! .01) effects were
statistically significant. However, at T2, the enhanced share
of the previously asymmetrically dominating option was still
(marginally) evident (M p 62% vs. M p 52% in the control; z p 1.96, p ! .10), whereas the previous compromise
option was no longer different from the corresponding control option (M p 48% vs. M p 52%; z p .78, p 1 .10). The
time by choice set interaction effect was marginally significant (Wald(2) p 4.85, p ! .10).
Again, these findings are consistent with hypothesis 1.
However, a potential rival explanation is that the greater stability of asymmetric dominance choice was due to its “extreme” position in the set. That is, the asymmetrically dominating option was always the extreme option at both T1 and
T2, whereas the compromise option was necessarily positioned in the middle of the set. Thus, the greater consistency
of preferences for asymmetrically dominating options might
have reflected a stronger preference for the highest (or lowest)
quality/price option rather than a more stable preference for
asymmetrically dominating options in general.
To test the “extreme position” rival account, we conducted
a follow-up study, which, in addition to the existing three
choice set conditions, included a condition in which the
asymmetrically dominating option was not an extreme option at T1. In this new condition (hereafter referred to as
the “non–extreme asymmetric dominance condition”), the
target option still asymmetrically dominated another alternative (i.e., the “decoy”), but it was no longer in the “extreme” position (e.g., the highest quality alternative). If preferences for the dominating options in this condition are still
1
We do not find any significant interaction effects involving product
category in the analyses reported in this and all other studies (all p’s 1
.10). Thus, we only show the results pooled across product types.
more stable than preferences for these (same) options when
they are first selected as compromise alternatives, then the
rival account based on the extreme position of the dominating option can be rejected. In this follow-up study (n
p 160), we observed a similar pattern in the non–extreme
group as in the (extreme) asymmetric dominance condition.
As expected, the proportion of those selecting the same
option at T2 was significantly smaller among the compromise option choosers (M p 56%) than among the extreme
(M p 78%; z p 3.34, p ! .01) and non–extreme dominating option (M p 71%; z p 2.00, p ! .05) choosers. Although the consistency rate for the non–extreme dominating
option was lower than for the extreme dominating option,
this difference was not statistically significant (M p 71%
vs. M p 78%; z p 1.06, p 1 .10).
In summary, the results of both study 1 and the followup study demonstrate that preferences for asymmetrically
dominating options are more stable and more resistant to
contextual change than are preferences for compromise options. Specifically, those who chose the dominating option
were significantly more likely to choose the same option a
week later from a two-option set than those who first selected
that option from a set where it was a compromise alternative.
In the follow-up study, we also ruled out the rival account
based on the extreme position of the dominating option by
showing a similar pattern in the choice sets in which the
asymmetrically dominating option was not the extreme alternative in terms of its attribute values.
STUDY 2
As summarized in figure 1, our analysis indicates that
choice sets with asymmetric dominance trigger a focus on
the dominating often-selected option, whereas the role of
the context (i.e., including the nonchosen options) is more
transparent in compromise sets. Accordingly, we expect that,
compared to compromise option choosers, choosers of
asymmetrically dominating options will have a better longterm recognition for the option they chose but a poorer
recognition for the options they did not choose (hypothesis
2). Study 2 tests this prediction.
Method
Eighty student respondents at Stanford University each
received $10.00 after completing two experimental sessions.
They made choices in the first week (T1) and were given
an option recognition task a week later (T2). This study
employed the same within-subject design as study 1, and it
also used a similar procedure. Subjects made choices in four
product categories: food processors, lawn mowers, portable
grills, and binoculars. These four products were chosen because undergraduate subjects are less familiar with these
products than they are with the products used in the previous
study, and therefore this provides a stronger test of option
recognition. About half of the respondents received the
asymmetric dominance version, and the other half received
the compromise version (with the same two core options).
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
329
In each of these product categories, moderately familiar
brand names were selected (e.g., KitchenAid, Black and
Decker, and Cuisinart for food processors). These brand
names were associated with comparable evaluations, based
on information provided by the Consumer Reports Buying
Guide. The order of the product categories was randomized. To assess recognition level at T2, subjects were given
six brand names in each category, including three names
that had not been evaluated at T1. They were asked to (a)
identify the brand names evaluated in the previous week
and (b) identify the brand they had chosen in each category.
The presentation order of the six categories and the order
of the brand names in each product category were randomized.
Results and Discussion
We first compared the percentage of people who correctly
recognized their previously chosen option when it was an
asymmetrically dominating option versus a compromise alternative in the first week. As shown in table 1, consistent
with hypothesis 2, pooling across the four products, choosers
of asymmetrically dominating options were marginally significantly more likely to correctly identify their earlier choice
than were choosers of compromise options (M p 47% vs.
M p 34%; z p 1.77, p ! .10). A within-condition comparison shows that the dominating option choosers were able to
recognize their previous choices better as compared to those
who did not select the dominating options in the asymmetric
dominance condition (M p 47% vs. M p 32%; z p 2.00,
p ! .05). However, the recognition of the previous choice did
not differ significantly among those who selected the compromise versus the noncompromise options in the compromise condition (34% vs. 29%; z p .63, p 1 .10).
In contrast to the superior recognition of their previous
choice, the mean number of previously unchosen alternatives correctly recognized was actually smaller among those
who had chosen the dominating options than among those
who had chosen the compromise options (M p 1.31 vs.
M p 1.55; t(178) p 2.55, p ! .01). This finding supports
hypothesis 2. Comparing the recognition performance of
those who selected the focal option versus the nonfocal
option within the asymmetric dominance condition, choosing the dominating option was associated with a poorer
recognition of unchosen options than was choosing the nondominating option (M p 1.31 vs. M p 1.56; t(158) p
2.52, p ! .05). Conversely, the corresponding difference between the focal option and nonfocal option choosers in the
compromise condition was not significant (M p 1.54 vs.
M p 1.58; t(146) p .32, p 1 .10).
Overall, these recognition patterns are consistent with the
disproportional focus on, and the enhanced attractiveness
of, the asymmetrically dominating option as compared to
preferences for compromise options that tend to be explicitly
based on the position of the selected options within the
available choice set. In addition, these results are consistent
with choice explanations offered by choosers of dominating
versus compromise options (Simonson 1989; see also the
analysis of reasons in study 3). That is, on the one hand,
choosers of asymmetrically dominating options tend to explain their decisions based on the attribute values of their
chosen options and are less likely to refer to these options’
relative position in the set. On the other hand, compromise
option choosers often consciously and explicitly consider
the position of their chosen options in the set.
STUDY 3
In study 3 we tested two indicators of the impact of the
choice process triggered by each set configuration on the
decision process trace: choice confidence and the stated reasons for choice (hypotheses 3 and 4). We again used two
choice set configurations, with the focal option asymmetrically dominating another option in one version and a compromise option in the other version. In both conditions, subjects first chose an option and then rated the confidence in
their decision. In addition, although the issue has been examined in prior research (Dhar and Simonson 2003; Simonson
1989), we asked respondents to explain each decision, which
allowed us to test the hypothesis that individuals who select
TABLE 1
STUDY 2: RECOGNITION OF OPTIONS BY ASYMMETICALLY DOMINATION VERSUS COMPROMISE OPTION CHOOSERS
Average percentage of correct
recognition of their own choice
Food processor
Lawn mower
Grill
Binocular
Mean
Average number of unchosen
alternatives correctly recognized
Dominating option
choosers (n p 87)
Compromise option
choosers (n p 93)
Dominating option
choosers (n p 87)
Compromise option
choosers (n p 93)
54
24
50
53
47
38
10
35
48
34
1.30
1.35
1.31
1.30
1.31
1.62
1.57
1.55
1.48
1.55
NOTE.—The n-size represents the target option choosers in each condition pooled across the four products.
330
compromise options are more likely to rely on contextual
factors than are choosers of asymmetrically dominating alternatives.
Method
Study participants were 120 students at Stanford University; each received $2.00 for participation. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions that
differed only with respect to the choice set: asymmetric
dominance or compromise set. Similar to the sets tested in
the earlier studies, two of the three options in both the asymmetric dominance and compromise choice sets were identical. Respondents made choices in three product categories:
microwave ovens, cordless phones, and automobiles (with
provided attribute value range).
After indicating each choice, respondents rated on a 7-point
scale the degree to which they were confident that the option
they selected was the best option among the alternatives in
the set (1 p not at all confident, 7 p very confident; Budd
1986; Krosnick et al. 1993). Finally, respondents were asked
to write down the most important reason for their choice.
Results and Discussion
The confidence scores for the choice of the target options
(i.e., the asymmetrically dominating options in the asymmetric dominance condition and the compromise options in
the compromise condition) were aggregated across the three
products. The mean choice confidence rating was significantly higher when respondents chose the asymmetrically
dominating alternatives as compared to the compromise alternatives (M p 5.86, SD p 1.04 vs. M p 4.76, SD p
1.25; t(198) p 5.73, p ! .01). Thus, consistent with hypothesis 3, choices of asymmetrically dominating options
were associated with greater confidence than choices of
compromise options (holding the target options constant).
Next, the thought protocols of choice explanations were
analyzed by two independent judges who were blind to the
hypotheses. Provided explanations were classified as referring to (a) attribute importance, (b) specific attribute values
of the chosen options, (c) other alternatives in the set, (d)
the chosen option’s relative position in the set, or (e) “other.”
Also, to investigate a potential difference in the attribute on
which choosers of the dominating and compromise options
focused, responses were further coded based on the attribute
highlighted in the choice explanation. The average interjudge reliability was 76%, and disagreements were resolved
by a third independent judge.
A greater number of reasons were listed on average by
dominating option choosers as compared to compromise
option choosers (M p 1.46 vs. M p 1.24; t(153) p 2.60,
p ! .05). However, there was no significant difference in the
number of reasons referring to the specific dimensions (e.g.,
quality vs. price). More important, while the average frequency of explanations based on attribute importance did
not differ significantly between the two groups (e.g., “I don’t
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
care about price; quality is the most important factor,”
Mdominating p .41 vs. Mcompromise p .45; z p .50, p 1 .10),
dominating option choosers were more likely to mention
their chosen option’s specific attribute values than were
compromise option choosers (e.g., “150 ft. range is a reasonable distance,” M p .67 vs. M p .45; z p 2.74, p !
.01). We observed this effect regardless of whether the chosen option’s superior dimension was price or quality. Furthermore, consistent with prior research, the frequency of
references to the chosen option’s position (e.g., “It is a compromise option”) was significantly higher among the compromise option choosers than among the dominating option
choosers (M p .24 vs. M p .10; z p 2.28, p ! .05). Although it did not reach statistical significance, compromise
option choosers also tended to mention other options in the
set more frequently than did the dominating option choosers
(e.g., “I chose option A because it is a better deal compared
to B,” M p .36 vs. M p .28; z p 1.06, p 1 .10).
Consistent with prior evidence (Dhar and Simonson 2003;
Simonson 1989), these results suggest that choices of the
dominating options are misattributed to the overall attractiveness of the option, whereas compromise choices are often correctly attributed to the option’s intermediate position
in the set. Also, in line with our analysis, we found that the
average confidence score was significantly greater among
respondents who mentioned specific attribute values as their
reasons for the choice than among those who did not
(M p 5.42, SD p 1.22 vs. M p 4.97, SD p 1.48;
t(354) p 3.12, p ! .01). This finding further supports the
notion that preferences that are presumed to be based on
noncontextual reasons tend to be associated with a higher
level of preference confidence.
In the next study, we further examine the impact of the
decision processes triggered by asymmetric dominance and
compromise problems on choice attribution. Specifically, as
an additional test of hypothesis 4, we investigate whether a
procedure that makes the context effect more transparent
has a greater effect on the propensity to select dominating
versus compromise options.
STUDY 4
Our analysis indicates that preferences constructed under
the influence of asymmetric dominance often fail to recognize the effect of the particular choice set context on their
preferences, which are attributed instead to the attractive
(absolute) attribute values of the options. Conversely, the
context dependency of preferences for compromise options
is often transparent.
This analysis suggests that, if the (absolute) attribute values of the dominating options can be separated from the
relative position of that option in the set, the asymmetric
dominance effect will be attenuated. Thus, once both the
asymmetric dominance and compromise positions are attributed to the manner in which the set was constructed, the
attributions and the corresponding impact of the set configuration should be symmetric. In particular, if consumers
know that the asymmetric dominance relation in the set was
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
331
created by adding a dominated option, the impact of asymmetric dominance becomes transparent and the tendency to
select the asymmetrically dominating option should be diminished. By contrast, the popularity of the compromise
option should not decrease and might even increase when
the manner in which the set was constructed is transparent
because this information will further enhance the perception
of the middle option as an intermediate option that represents
a compromise whereas the “extreme” (noncompromise) options may appear to be even more extreme.
We are planning to conduct a study of consumer decision
making and we need your assistance in preparing the choice
problems that will be given to participants in that study.
Specifically, we have already decided on the product categories in which we will ask participants in that study to make
choices, and we also selected two options in each choice
category. However, we want to add a third option to each
choice set, so that participants in that study can choose among
three options instead of just two. In each case, we already
identified two candidates for the “third option” that might be
added. Your job is to select which of these two options you
think would be better as the third option to be added to the
choice set. To indicate which option we should add, simply
cross out the one option you believe we should NOT add.
Method
The respondents in study 4 were 313 students at Singapore
Management University, each of whom received S$5.00 for
participation. These respondents made choices in four product categories: microwave ovens, digital camcorders, laser
printers, and automobiles. The study employed a 2 (third
option inclusion: respondent-selected vs. given) # 2 (choice
set: asymmetric dominance vs. compromise set) # 2 (location of the third option) between-subjects design.
The first factor indicates whether the third option was
added to the choice set by respondents (“respondent-selected”) or by the experimenter beforehand (“given”). That
is, in the respondent-selected groups, the construction of
each set was made transparent by first asking respondents
to choose a third option to add to a set of two preselected
(core) options; as explained below, we later asked respondents to choose from the set of three options that they helped
construct. We first gave these respondents the following instructions:
As illustrated in figure 3, respondents in the respondentselected conditions were asked to choose between options
3a and 3b to add to a core set, with the two candidate
additions being on opposite sides of the core set (designed
to make the selection task more meaningful). After completing the third-option addition task in all four problems,
respondents were asked to assume that the third option they
had selected for each set was indeed added to the set and
to indicate the choice they would make from the complete
three-option set. In the “given” condition, respondents were
not asked to participate in the construction of the set. They
received a complete three alternatives set (either option 1,
option 2, and option 3a or option 1, option 2, and option
3b; see fig. 4) and indicated the choices they would make
in each category.
FIGURE 3
STUDY 4: AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMPROMISE CHOICE SET IN THE “RESPONDENT-SELECTED” CONDITION
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
332
FIGURE 4
STUDY 4: THE GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF EACH CHOICE
SET CONFIGURATION
As indicated, we predicted that self-selection (vs. given)
would have a different impact on the choice share of the
core option for each choice set. Specifically, self-selecting
the clearly inferior option was expected to decrease the share
of the dominating option, whereas self-selecting the straight
trade-off extension was expected to have no effect or to
increase the share of the compromise (adjacent core) option.
We made no predictions regarding the effect of self-selecting
the mildly inferior third options, which were somewhat inferior to the adjacent core option while also making it appear
more like a compromise.
Results and Discussion
We first performed an overall test, using a logistic regression with participants’ choice of the relevant core option
as a dependent variable. The following variables were included as independent variables: (a) choice set (0 p compromise, 1 p asymmetric dominance set); (b) third-option
inclusion (0 p given, 1 p respondent-selected); (c) thirdoption location (0 p 3a, 1 p 3b); (d) two-way and higher
order interaction terms.
The results (see table 2 and fig. 5) show a pattern consistent with our expectations: pooling across the four products, we observed a marginally significant three-way interaction effect (Wald(1) p 2.82, p ! .10). Further analyses
reveal different outcome patterns for each choice set configuration. Specifically, in the asymmetric dominance set,
NOTE.—Options 3a and 3b in the compromise set indicate compromise extensions. Options 3a and 3b in the asymmetric dominance set represent clearly
inferior and mildly inferior options, respectively.
The second and third design factors referred to the location of the third option (fig. 4). Specifically, the third
option was either inferior relative to the adjacent core option
(asymmetric dominance set) or it extended the set in a way
that made the adjacent core option a compromise (compromise set). In addition, in the case of the inferior third options
(relating to the asymmetric dominance test), the option was
either clearly inferior (3a) or mildly inferior (3b) relative to
the adjacent core option. Third options that extended the set
along the same trade-off slope (relating to the compromise
test) were on either side of the core set. Thus, the third
option was in one of four positions (see fig. 4): clearly
inferior, mildly inferior, or a straight extension on either side
of the core set.
To make certain that the various third-option positions
were perceived as intended, we ran a pilot study with 58
respondents from the same student population. Respondents
rated the relevant core option and adjacent third option in
terms of overall attractiveness. The results of the pilot study
confirmed that the attractiveness of the core option relative
to the third option was significantly greater in the case where
the third option was designed to be clearly inferior as compared to the third option that was designed to be mildly
inferior (in all cases, the differences were significant at
p ! .05, or, in one case, p ! .10).
FIGURE 5
STUDY 4: THE CHOICE SHARE OF THE TARGET OPTION IN
EACH CHOICE SET CONDITION
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
TABLE 2
STUDY 4: THE CHOICE SHARE OF THE OPTIONS
IN EACH CONDITION
Choice share (%)
Choice set
Attraction:
Third-option 3a inclusion:
Given (n p 34)
Respondent-select (n p 51)
Third-option 3b inclusion:
Given (n p 34)
Respondent-select (n p 38)
Compromise:
Third-option 3a inclusion:
Given (n p 35)
Respondent-select (n p 41)
Third-option 3b inclusion:
Given (n p 35)
Respondent-select (n p 46)
Option Option Option Option
3a
1
2
3b
17
25
25
24
62
51
20
24
45
24
39
55
57
61
18
15
45
23
33
44
333
the share of the core option was higher in the self-selected
third-option group than in the given third-option group was
when the third option was clearly inferior. In other words,
when respondents participate in and recognize the manner
in which the asymmetric dominance relation was formed
(i.e., the fact that they added the dominated option), the
effect is eliminated, consistent with our misattribution-based
analysis. Conversely, the self-addition of a third option that
extends the trade-off line and makes the compromise position of the adjacent core option more salient tends to enhance that option’s choice share.
STUDY 5
16
21
22
33
NOTE.—The target options for the 3a and 3b third-option conditions are option
1 and option 2, respectively.
there is a significant third-option inclusion by third-option
location interaction effect (Wald(1) p 10.84, p ! .01),
which indicates that the impact of self-selection on the subsequent choice of the target option depends on the characteristic of the third option. As predicted, the choice share
of the dominating target option (option 1) decreased substantially when the clearly dominated third option (option
3a) was selected by the respondents as compared to when
it was given by the experimenter (M p 51% vs. M p
62%; z p 2.00, p ! .05). Conversely, such an effect of selfselecting the third option was not observed for the added/
given third option (option 3b) that was only mildly dominated by the adjacent core option (option 2). In fact, the
choice share of the target option increased when the third
option was self-selected versus given (M p 55% vs.
M p 39%; z p 2.71, p ! .01). That is, while the self-selection of the clearly inferior third option had a negative
impact on the choice of the adjacent target option, selfselection of only mildly inferior third options actually
helped to increase the choice share of the adjacent core
option. This result might be due to the fact that the mildly
inferior third option made the adjacent core option appear
to be a compromise alternative.
For the compromise choice sets, there was a (marginally)
significant third-option inclusion main effect (Wald(1) p
3.10, p ! .10), reflecting an increase in the share of the core
option (in the self-selection group), and no significant thirdoption inclusion by location interaction effect (Wald(1) p
.84, p 1 .10). On average, the share of the core (compromise)
option was only 7% higher in the “self-selected” (M p
52%) as compared to the “given” (M p 45%) group. This
result is consistent with our prediction, considering that selfselecting the extreme option was likely to make the compromise position of the adjacent core more salient.
In sum, the above findings show that the only case where
A key conclusion from the above studies is that context
effects in which the resulting preferences are attributed to
the selected option’s absolute attribute values (e.g., asymmetric dominance) tend to be stronger than preferences that
are known to have been influenced by the context (e.g.,
compromise). However, putting the comparison to preferences for compromise options aside, how can we assess the
impact, if any, of the strong preferences for options that
were selected from sets in which they were asymmetrically
dominating? We examine this question in study 5 by testing
whether the mere fact that a selected option was asymmetrically dominating can also affect the perceived actual experience with that option.
Prior research has shown that prior beliefs can influence
the perceived experience with a product (Levin and Gaeth
1988; Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely 2005). However, we are
not aware of any existing evidence that choice context effects, such as asymmetric dominance, can affect perceived
product efficacy. In particular, showing that asymmetric
dominance enhances the perceived efficacy of a product
even after actual usage will be an indicator of the strength
of preferences constructed under the influence of such an
effect. As described next, after making a choice, respondents
in this study used and then evaluated the product they chose.
In addition, they were given the option to pay $2.00 in order
to keep that product.
Method
Participants were 176 students at Stanford University,
each of whom received $10.00 for participation. Participants
were told that they would also have the option of purchasing
a small gift at a discounted price. They were then presented
with a set of either two or three candidate gifts. The control
group evaluated two products: a target pen (Pilot Pen: retail
price p $2.75) and a plastic folder (retail price p $2.50).
Participants assigned to the asymmetric dominance group
saw an additional (decoy) pen (BIC: retail price p $.95).
We pretested the option set with 45 students who did not
participate in the main study. The attractiveness ratings
showed that the Pilot Pen and the folder were perceived as
equally attractive (M p 5.73, SD p .96 vs. M p 5.66,
SD p .72; t(28) p .22, p 1 .10) and as having a similar
store price (M p $3.07, SD p .60 vs. M p $2.97, SD p
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
334
.52; t(28) p .53, p 1 .10). By contrast, the BIC pen was
perceived as less attractive (M p 2.10, SD p .92) and as
less expensive (M p $1.00, SD p .29) than both the Pilot
Pen and the folder (all p’s ! .01).
After participants indicated their choice from the set, those
who selected a pen received it and were asked to scribble
with it on a piece of paper for 2 minutes. They then evaluated
the pen on three items: (a) overall quality of the pen (1 p
very bad, 7 p very good), (b) smoothness of the pen (1 p
not at all smooth, 7 p very smooth), and (c) overall satisfaction with the pen (1 p not at all satisfied, 7 p very
satisfied). Those who chose the folder completed a similar
evaluation task. Next, participants completed an unrelated
questionnaire for about 10 minutes and were then asked if
they wanted to purchase the pen in exchange for $2.00 (out
of their compensation).
Results
The asymmetric dominance effect was marginally statistically significant, with 75% choosing the Pilot Pen when it
was dominating as compared to 63% choosing it when it was
not (z p 1.72, p ! .10). More important, compared to those
who chose that pen from the two-option set, participants who
used that pen after selecting it from the set in which it was
dominating evaluated its overall quality as higher (M p
5.76, SD p .80 vs. M p 5.25, SD p 1.13; t(120) p
2.86, p ! .01) and were more satisfied with it (M p 5.63,
SD p 1.00 vs. M p 5.14, SD p 1.44; t(120) p 2.23, p !
.05). The difference in terms of writing smoothness, though
not statistically significant, was in the expected direction
(M p 5.75, SD p .84 vs. M p 5.46, SD p 1.04;
t(120) p 1.41, p p .16). The smaller effect on ratings of
writing smoothness might be due to the relatively more
concrete and objectively verifiable nature of this attribute
as compared to the overall quality and satisfaction judgments.
A similar pattern was observed with respect to the likelihood of purchasing the pen for $2.00. In the group that
selected the asymmetrically dominating Pilot Pen, 24.2% of
the respondents chose to exchange the pen for $2.00 as
compared to 10.7% of those who had selected it from the
two-option set (z p 2.03, p ! .05). These results demonstrate that choices of asymmetrically dominating options are
associated with strong, far-reaching preferences, as reflected
in the subsequent effect on (perceived) actual experience
with the product as well as on the willingness to pay $2.00
for that product.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our view of preferences has evolved over the past decades, moving from the dominant economic assumption that
people generally have well-established tastes and preferences captured by their indifference curves (Stigler and
Becker 1977) to the current view of preferences that are
often constructed on the fly for a particular decision. The
growing consensus that preferences are constructed for a
particular decision has relied primarily on various context
and task effects (Bettman et al. 1998; Huber et al. 1982;
Nowlis and Simonson 1997), such as the attraction and compromise effects. At the same time, there are many situations
in which preferences and habits are well established and
stable and, if anything, appear overly resistant to change
and reconsideration. So, the relevant question is not whether
consumer preferences are stable and fixed or merely constructed for a particular task but what factors moderate the
strength of preferences and consumers’ understanding of the
impact of context on their preferences.
In the present research, we examined a key moderator of
preference attribution and strength, namely, the characteristics of the problem and of the associated decision process.
In particular, building on prior research (Dhar and Simonson
2003), we contrasted an asymmetric dominance set configuration with a compromise configuration, representing situations in which the decision process focuses on the selected
choice option or the context, respectively. As we proposed,
the results indicate that the decision processes triggered by
these problems generate different choice processes and decision traces. Specifically, under the influence of the asymmetric dominance configuration, the decision process focuses on the chosen option that is perceived to be attractive
regardless of the context. As a result, the preference is attributed to the selected option’s attractive absolute, contextindependent attribute values, and that option is better recognized subsequently. Furthermore, as a reflection of the
(attractive) option-centered decision process, the resulting
option preference is stronger—it is associated with higher
confidence and stability. Conversely, when the role of the
context is salient and transparent, the resulting option preference is weaker—it is associated with lower confidence,
stability, and subsequent recognition.
Thus, because of the context-based attribution and weaker
preference trace, consumers are less likely to repeat making
choices that were originally attributed to the context (e.g.,
“I’ll take the compromise option”) when considering that
option again in a different context. Conversely, an option
that was presumably selected for its inherent attractiveness
and that is now associated with a stronger preference is likely
to be selected again even if it is evaluated at a later time in
a different context. In fact, as shown in study 5, an asymmetrically dominating option tends to be perceived as providing better performance even after the participant has had
actual experience with that product (e.g., after writing with
a pen). This is also reflected in a higher willingness to buy
that product. This finding is consistent with the notion that
higher perceived option attractiveness at the time the choice
is made generates higher expectations, which consumers
tend to confirm. Relatedly, enhanced preference fluency associated with the selection of an asymmetrically dominating
option (Novemsky et al. 2007) might affect the subsequent
perceived experience with that option.
The present research was limited to a situation in which
two choices were made 1 week apart, and it is likely that
even the more stable preferences constructed under the in-
SET CONFIGURATION AND PREFERENCE STRENGTH
fluence of the asymmetric dominance effect will not endure
for an extended period. However, to the extent that similar
options are encountered periodically, a preference constructed on a particular occasion may generate strong
change-resistant preferences. Indeed, repeated choices tend
to be less vulnerable to contextual influence and to build
more on past evaluation of the option (Cox and Grether
1996; Hoeffler and Ariely 1999; Wright 1975).
Future research could examine other moderators of the
strength and stability of constructed preferences. For example,
Yoon and Simonson (forthcoming) find that individuals who
express their preferences through a joint, as compared to a
separate, evaluation mode (e.g., choice between options vs.
separate ratings of each option), tend to perceive the task as
easier and to hold their expressed preference with greater
confidence. Also, individuals whose preferences were elicited
by a joint, as opposed to a separate, response mode, were
more consistent in choosing the same options again at a later
time. The difference in preference stability was observed both
when the response mode remained the same in both periods
and when the response mode was changed in the second
period. These findings are consistent with the notion that joint
evaluations rely on more comparable and easy-to-justify dimensions (Hsee 1996; Nowlis and Simonson 1997).
One of the benefits of gaining a better understanding of
the moderators of the strength of constructed preferences is
the enhancement of our ability to predict consumer choices
based on measured preferences. Models of consumer choice
have begun to incorporate context effects, relaxing the assumption of value maximization (Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan 2004; Tversky and Simonson 1993). However, the
validity of any measure or model designed to predict consumer choices depends on the stability of the preferences
being measured. The current research suggests that the predictive validity of models that incorporate context effects is
moderated by the type of effect influencing the measured
preferences. Specifically, our findings suggest that accounting for asymmetric dominance effects in measures of consumer preferences may make a particularly pronounced contribution to their ability to predict accurately future choices.
In addition, the current findings suggest that the effectiveness of attempts to influence consumer choices through
context effects depends on the particular set configuration
used. Prior research indicates that, under certain conditions,
people can intuitively recognize the ability of using asymmetric dominance or compromise relations in the offered
set to influence others’ choices (Hamilton 2003). However,
as was shown in this research, although both asymmetric
dominance and compromise effects might be equally influential in constructing momentary preferences, the former
effect is likely to produce a more durable change in preferences and might even affect consumers’ subsequent product satisfaction.
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