African Affairs, 106/422, 95–111
doi:10.1093/afraf/adl038
© The Author [2006]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved
Advance Access Publication 9 November 2006
RESHUFFLING AN OLD DECK OF CARDS?
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
PAUL JACKSON
ABSTRACT
This article examines the relationship between chiefdom authority and decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone. The chieftaincy has been in crisis for
some time and is widely thought to be responsible for contributing to rebel
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) recruitment. However, chiefs remain an
important influence in Sierra Leone, and there is little demand for an end to
the chieftaincy system. Rather than an abolition of chieftaincy, governance at
local level requires constructive relationships between chiefdoms and local
governments and not simply a reshuffling of agrarian class relationships or old
ways of doing politics. This in turn requires a reform of the chieftaincy system
and the resolution of local political tensions arising from decentralization.
CHIEFTAINCY IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF SIERRA LEONE’S governance structure.
In rural areas, the chief is a key source of authority and frequently the only
visible element of government. Until recently, the main burden of government across most of the country rested with chiefs.1 Despite this, the chieftaincy system has been in crisis for some time. In the post-independence
period, chiefs became associated with the kleptocratic tendencies of the
Freetown elite.2 During the war, paramount chiefs along with the other
Paul Jackson ([email protected]) is Director of the Department of International
Development, University of Birmingham, and Director of the Global Facilitation Network for
Security Sector Reform. This work is based on extensive work in Sierra Leone at local government level in 2003, 2004, and 2005 for DFID and the World Bank where he worked as part
of the reform process across the country and at different levels of government.
1. R. Fanthorpe, ‘Neither citizen nor subject? ‘‘Lumpen’’ agency and the legacy of native administration in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 100 (2001), pp. 363–86. In most rural areas, the chieftaincy
is also closely related to secret societies, an impenetrable but critical element of rural social structure
that ensures a broad power base for each chief, reinforcing a predominantly male gerontocracy.
2. See P. Richards, The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone, Working Paper 21
(Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Conflict Research Unit, 2004); P. Jackson,
‘Chiefs, money and politicians: rebuilding local government in Sierra Leone’, Public
Administration and Development, 25 (2005), pp. 49–58; J. Hanlon, Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Pre-Conditions for War in Sierra Leone? (Research paper 2005/50,
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations Univ., Tokyo, 2005);
R. Fanthorpe, A. Jay and V. Kamara, A Review of the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme,
Incorporating An Analysis of Chiefdom Administration in Sierra Leone (Department for International Development DFID, London, 2002).
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symbols of government were targeted by the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF).3 As a consequence, many chiefs either fled or were killed by the
rebels, leading to a large number of vacancies in the post-war period.4
Although chiefs were re-installed in local chiefdoms after the war, there
remains a need for chieftaincy to rebuild its own legitimacy. This rebuilding is hampered, however, by a lack of consensus in many local areas.
Whilst chieftaincy as an institution is valued, large groups in the countryside also believe that the system has been corrupted and mismanaged and
that they lack a voice in chiefdom government, which tends to operate to
the benefit of a small, elderly elite. At the same time, many people clearly
do not want to abolish the chiefs; they want reform.5
Since the war, the international community has been closely involved in
reconstructing governance across the country, not least at local level. This
reconstruction reached a critical moment on 22 May 2004 when elections
were held for new District Councils. The elections were the first in local
areas for over 30 years and provided the first chance for voters to express
their verdict on the performance of President Kabbah’s second-term
government. These councils, according to the recently passed Local
Government Act, will provide services to local people and raise local taxes
to pay for them (as well as receiving central transfers). There are now three
distinct political groups within local government: politicians, chiefs, and
district administrations, and conflict between them seems inevitable.6 The
situation is further complicated by the residual power of ex-combatants
and the perpetual threat of further violence by both ex-Civil Defence Force
and RUF fighters. The outcome of conflicts between these groups will
determine the future of local governance and the chieftaincy system within
Sierra Leone.
This article looks at the current position of the chieftaincy in Sierra
Leone, taking the view that chiefs, decentralization, and local government
reform are closely linked. The article is the result of fieldwork in Sierra
Leone throughout 2003, 2004, and 2005 working on the decentralization
process, the development of the Local Government Act, and local government
finance. It begins by situating itself in the current debate on the future of
3. There are several different levels of ‘chief’, but the level that has power in Sierra Leone
is designated as ‘paramount chief’. Within the text, the word ‘chief’ refers to ‘paramount
chiefs’.
4. Around 44 percent of current chiefs were elected after 2002. See P. Richards, Fighting for
the Rain Forest (James Currey, Oxford, 1998) and P. Richards, K. Bah and J. Vincent, The
Social Assessment Study: Community-driven development and social capital in post-war Sierra
Leone (Community Driven Development Group, World Bank and National Commission for
Social Action of the Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 2003).
5. This is very clear from the large-scale consultations carried out by DFID and also the
UNDP and was reflected in fieldwork in Sierra Leone.
6. Of course, there are also several excluded groups outside local government itself, including donors and NGOs.
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
97
the chieftaincy, exemplified by two recent articles within this journal.7 It
then goes on to examine the process of public sector reform, particularly
reform of local government in the rural areas and the decentralization
process that has been central to the government of Sierra Leone’s post-war
reconstruction strategy. It then moves on to look explicitly at the reform of
the chiefdom system in the context of the decentralization process, outlining the changes to the pre-war system and threats to the ‘traditional’ role of
the chiefs. Finally, it analyses the nature of the political conflicts between
the main groups with an interest in running local government, including
the chiefs, administrators, and local councillors, drawing conclusions
about the future of the decentralization process.
The debate about chiefs in Sierra Leone
In the literature on Sierra Leone, there is currently a debate about the
role of chiefs. Paul Richards has identified abuse of chiefly powers as a key
driver of the conflict. He draws a picture of a rural agricultural elite
descended from local warlords with hegemony over slaves and dependent
populations. This historical slave structure is perpetuated by a series of
‘customs’ or ‘traditions’ including a bridal and court system structured to
extract labour. Given these structures, Richards follows Durkheim in seeing the war as a form of slave revolt.8 In evidence, he provides lengthy
examples of youths voicing their resentment over chiefs’ demands for
labour, ‘community work’, and their control over marriage.9 For Richards,
then, the reinstatement of the chiefdom system represents a reconstruction
of the historical model of forced labour in the countryside that led to the
war in the first place.10
This analysis has been broadly supported by a number of influential
reports that have driven policy within Sierra Leone, including the National
Recovery Strategy.11 The aim, according to a recent article by Richard
Fanthorpe, was explicitly to develop a ‘liberal peace’ or a fundamental
restructuring of the rural governance infrastructure. For many donors, the
chiefdoms are beyond redemption, hence the rapid drive towards elected
local government with the hope that chiefly authority will eventually wither
7. Paul Richards, ‘To fight or to farm? Agrarian dimensions of the Mano River conflicts
(Liberia and Sierra Leone)’, African Affairs, 104, 417 (2005), pp. 571–90, and Richard
Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace: chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war
Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 105, 418 (2006), pp. 27–49.
8. Richards, ‘To fight or to farm’.
9. Ibid.
10. See also Hanlon, Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Pre-Conditions for
War in Sierra Leone? and Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
11. This was also a driver of the decentralization strategy itself along with the sensitization
and training efforts carried out by the DFID/World Bank teams under the auspices of the
Decentralization Secretariat.
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away. Fanthorpe himself is sceptical of this plan, pointing to the rapidity
with which chiefs have re-inserted themselves into local power struggles
and to the fact that many rural people value them as a counterweight to a
distrusted Freetown elite.
While Richards would seem to want to strip chiefs of their powers,
Fanthorpe would seem to want to make them more downwardly
accountable. This article aims to contribute to this debate by adding an
additional level of detail to our knowledge of the reforms actually unfolding in upcountry Sierra Leone, unravelling political processes at local
level that currently affect local politics and governance. This involves
analysing the complexities of the decentralization process and some of
the practical elements of the reforms. In particular, the analysis seeks to
outline continuity between pre-war political structures and the post-war
political settlement, arguing that the rural gerontocracy is still present,
even if the new district councils offer new opportunities for these actors
to pursue old politics in new ways. Despite new political groups emerging in the countryside, particularly former combatants, the gerontocracy
remains able to exercise considerable influence over policymaking within
the triumvirate power structure of chiefs, administrators, and councillors. It is the dynamics between these groups that will ultimately decide
the fate of rural governance and the rural poor who remain excluded
from these networks.
The anatomy of chiefdom governance structures
The authority of the 149 chiefdoms combines traditional rule and
bureaucracy and relies on a social contract between paramount chief and
(mainly) rural citizens. The administrative structure is established in a
series of redundant documents dating from colonial rule. The Tribal
Authorities Ordinance 1938, the Chiefdom Treasuries Act 1938, and the
Tribal Authorities (Amendment) Act 1964 are backed up by the enshrinement of paramount chiefs in the constitution. Each chieftaincy has a
council consisting of the paramount chief, sub-chiefs, and ‘men of note
elected by the people . . .’. Each paramount chief is elected for life from
hereditary families known as ‘ruling houses’ by an electoral college of
councillors. Each councillor is elected by 20 taxpayers. The term ‘taxpayer’
of course has been an effective control over the electoral college, successfully excluding women and the poor. Each chief has a speaker, who is
effectively the chief’s deputy and main enforcer, and each council has a
chiefdom committee that acts as an executive arm. The picture in local
areas was further complicated by the power of the district officer over the
chief as the representative of the centre. This is clearly a system of indirect
rule as instigated by British colonial authorities.
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
99
Chiefdoms, as the basic unit of local government, also maintain administrative staff whose numbers vary considerably between chiefdoms.12 Each
one must have a treasury clerk, a bailiff, and court functionaries, including
chiefdom police. All administrative staff are controlled by the treasury clerk
except the local court chairman. The emphasis on chiefdom police and
courts is symptomatic of the main tasks of the chiefdoms: collecting local
taxes and maintaining security. The main problems facing the staff are a
lack of capacity, lack of income, and overstaffing.
Levels of effectiveness vary considerably across chiefdoms and critically
depend on the capacity of the paramount chief. There are several documented instances of systematic abuse of the system by chiefs.13 The Ministry of Local Government in Freetown also receives considerable numbers
of complaints each day, the substance of which are backed up by DFID’s
own consultation exercises carried out during the reconstruction of the
chiefdom system. These frequently include abuse of women, land issues,
misappropriation of local resources, including diamonds, and corruption.
Because of the rules on the election of paramount chiefs, local people
effectively feel disenfranchised and voiceless, something that is clearly
reflected in the many consultations carried out at local level.14
The social contract between the chiefs and local population is growing
weaker again in the post-war reconstruction as chiefs increasingly appoint
councillors rather than have them elected by 20 taxpayers, as the law previously required. The new Local Government Act has also added to the
issues of election because it creates a number of new taxpayers, not least
through making many women eligible for taxation for the first time, and
removes from the chiefs some of the rights to collect tax, replacing them
with local councils. Historically, the local tax, which is really a ‘head tax’
levied on all individuals, has been under the control of the chiefs, and the
chiefdoms have collected and received all of the money collected. It is a
regressive tax levied equally but has historically been set at a low level
(around L500 in 2003 or about 20 US cents). Under the Local Government Act, chiefdoms are now entitled to a share of the local tax and must
continue to collect it, but the local council must agree the rate.15
Chiefdoms also receive income in the form of grants from the Ministry
of Local Government. In 2002, this amounted to payment of salary costs
for around one month in three. However, in 2003, the central government
12. As an example, a class A chiefdom like Gbonkolenken has 2 chiefs, 3 administrative
staff, 14 local court staff, 12 chiefdom police, and 3 health workers.
13. See A. Jay and M.T. Koroma, From ‘Crying’ and Clientelism to Rights and Responsibilities,
Study for the Government of Sierra Leone/EC on Accountability in Sierra Leone, (Freetown,
2004).
14. See, for example, Jay and Koroma, From ‘Crying’ and Clientelism, Fanthorpe, ‘Neither
citizen nor subject’, and Richards et al. ‘The social assessment study’.
15. Until recently, the rate was fixed at 500 leones per head (about 10 pence), but now,
councils set the rates and can, theoretically, set it at zero.
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informed the chiefs that local taxes were to cover all costs by the end of
2004. As a result, many chiefdom staff remain unpaid, and corruption has
reportedly increased. Even when tax is collected, the legal established
wages (around L100,000 for a class A chief) are very low, particularly
when pressures for maintaining patronage networks are taken into account.
There is therefore a strong incentive for corruption.
The potential for corruption is enhanced by the poor state of the financial
management of the chiefdoms. Audit is rarely carried out, and during the
author’s fieldwork, a considerable amount of time was taken up in gaining
access to account books, even when (or perhaps because) the author was
working on behalf of the Ministry of Local Government. On inspection, the
books themselves consist largely of rough estimates comprising round numbers. Several treasury clerks admitted that they were not really exact,
because they exercised ‘discretion’ in applying the set fines. The most common complaint with regard to finance is that of the ‘grand conspiracy of the
trio’, that is the chief, the treasury clerk, and the district officer.16
Chiefs in Sierra Leone are regarded as being custodians of the land.
This gives them significant local powers that are magnified if that land
contains valuable minerals such as diamonds. Officially, chiefs receive
one-quarter of the 3% diamond tax collected at the centre as a development fund for the chiefdom and some rent from mineral-producing
land.17 However, there is no accountability mechanism for ensuring that
this cash is used for development, and it is extremely common to hear
that local people complain of the chief’s abuse of the system in pocketing this money. Ironically, NGO and donor pressure born of fear of central government corruption led to the distribution of this money straight
to the chiefs, giving them an extremely poor reputation amongst NGOs
and other development workers.18 This is worsened by the tendency of
NGOs to work with Village Development Committees (VDCs), which
tend to be dominated by those within the patronage networks rather
than outside.19
16. The district officer role dates from colonial times where he was the representative of the
Central government at the local level, with the relevant powers and responsibilities. Effectively, this role is one of representation and oversight and is the central government’s main
political controlling mechanism over rural areas.
17. Discussions with the DFID diamond adviser were inconclusive as to actual amounts
that were paid to the chiefs, and as a recent (2005) unpublished functional review of the Ministry of Mines pointed out, the ministry was incapable of providing accurate figures.
18. R. Fanthorpe, Tax Administration and Representative Authority in Sierra Leone,
DFID, June 2004. See also R. Fanthorpe, A. Jay and V. Kamara, A Review of the Chiefdom
Governance Reform Programme (DFID, London, 2002).
19. S. Archibald and P. Richards, ‘Seeds and rights: new approaches to post-war agriculture
rehabilitation in Sierra Leone’, Disasters 26, 4 (2004), pp. 356–67. This is also reflected in
earlier DFID studies. A recent World Bank program concentrates resources in VDCs, but the
bank holds that the Local Government Act 2004 changes this relationship since approval has
to be given by the council.
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
101
Political patronage and accountability: Political patronage surrounding chieftaincy has been a defining feature of Sierra Leone over the last 20
years, in that exclusion from patronage networks created the raw material
for the violence of the 1990s. Within the chieftaincy system, the ruling
houses seek the moral and political support of local citizens to win periodic
chiefs’ elections.20 It is therefore taken as completely normal that these
support groups benefit after the election. This can range from beneficial
results in the chieftaincy courts, appointment to key positions of power, or
access to land or resources. This also extends to appointment of the chief’s
advisors. Preferential treatment may also be given to youth who are related
to the ruling houses in some way, although effectively rural government is
in the hands of a male gerontocracy.
Political patronage works upwards as well as downwards. The Ministry
of Local Government states categorically that chiefs should be loyal to the
government whichever party is in power. In practice, however, chiefs are
rarely so apolitical, and many are members of either the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) or All Peoples Congress (APC). This means that many
chiefs have political patrons at the national level and are part of wider
patronage networks, including those extracting diamonds.21 It also affects the
national accountability system of parliament taking oversight in that many
MPs are reliant on chiefs for the mobilization of political support, whereas
chiefs rely on MPs for resources to maintain patronage networks.22
The result of this is that there are large groups of excluded citizens and
some groups that effectively have no hope of advancement within such a
closed feudal approach to local governance. The World Bank notes that
rule by the chiefs has led to widespread mismanagement, abuse of power,
and a failure to deliver basic services.23 Fithin and Richards add that the
high fines imposed arbitrarily on youth in the countryside by chiefdom
courts face a decision between indentured labour to a chief to pay the fine,
or taking an exit strategy involving diamond mining or joining the RUF.24
Given the issues facing the huge reintegration programme within Sierra
Leone following the war, there is clearly a risk that a fragile security situation could be exacerbated by the reinstatement of patrimonial rule at a local
level by the chiefs and widespread social exclusion of former combatants
who are returning to local regional centres with very few prospects of
20. Chiefs are elected for life, but the hereditary line is complicated by chiefs coming from
more than one family in any one chiefdom. Once a chief dies, therefore, there is frequently
competition between the different families eligible to provide chiefs.
21. See Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
22. DFID, Identifying Options for Improving chiefdom and Community Governance in
Sierra Leone (DFID, Sierra Leone, October 2004).
23. World Bank, Sierra Leone: Strategic options for public sector reform (Report no. 25110,
Washington, DC, 2003). See also DFID, Identifying Options.
24. C. Fithin and P. Richards, ‘Making war, crafting peace’, Richards, P. (ed.), No Peace, No
War: An anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts (James Currey, Oxford, 2004), pp. 117–36.
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economic betterment and no access to patronage networks. In the absence
of alternatives, one has to agree with Fithin and Richards’s rather depressing
conclusion that violence may be the only avenue open to them, either in
Sierra Leone or more broadly in the region.25
Decentralization and chiefdom authorities
Since independence from Britain in 1961, the main feature of Sierra
Leone’s political system has been increasing centralization of power and
resources in Freetown. An integral part of this was Siaka Stevens’s abolition of local government in 1972. A key policy decision of the current
SLPP government was to decentralize power from Freetown to a rejuvenated local government structure. This process has been ongoing since
2000, culminating in a new Local Government Act, passed in March 2004,
and local government elections held in May 2004.
Most donor agencies agreed that the highly centralized system of government was a major contributing factor to the war during the 1990s, and the
World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and
DFID in particular placed a strong emphasis on decentralization as part of
their post-war reconstruction efforts. This was also mirrored by the Sierra
Leone government itself and was documented by a number of contemporary reports.26 However, given the internal politics of the Sierra Leone
government in Freetown, it is difficult to say categorically that all officials
were in favour of decentralization. Officials certainly knew that this was a
route to obtain external funding. There may, therefore, have been an
incentive for officials to ‘say the right things’ to external donors, particularly the World Bank and UNDP.27
Hanlon, amongst others, sees the delay in local government elections
from April 2003 to May 2004 as being part of a deliberate policy of the
government of Sierra Leone designed to avoid devolution of power, backed
up by a British choice to rebuild a discredited feudal system of chieftaincy
rather than constructing a working democracy.28 However, what is also
25. Fithin and Richards, ‘Making war’. See also A. Sawyer, ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River Basin area’, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 42, 3 (2004), pp. 37–63.
26. See, for example, World Bank, Sierra Leone — Strategic options for public sector reform.
27. This type of discussion is virtually impossible to corroborate accurately, but certainly
one interpretation of the later changes to the new Local Government Act in retaining central
powers could be that the Ministry of Local Government wanted to say that it was decentralizing without actually going very far down the road of divesting powers, which would not be an
uncommon reaction from a central ministry.
28. See Hanlon, International Community. Whilst I have some sympathy with this view, it is
somewhat harsh on the decisions open to DFID at the time where virtually the whole of society had broken down. What is more difficult, however, is why DFID persisted with a
programme that was clearly not working (and was criticized by DFID staff), was open to
corruption and was clearly shown to be unpopular by DFID’s own consultations at local level.
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
103
true is that the government wished to build on its election victory by holding
local elections early, even if the institutions were not yet in place.
The local government system itself has been operating under a highly
centralized framework. The pre-2004 system consisted of five town councils,
twelve district councils, and one city council (Freetown), all of which have
been managed by centrally appointed management committees, including
a district officer structure. The history of this management has not been a
happy one. Even before the war destroyed most of the government infrastructure, service delivery in most areas was extremely poor, and the RUF
deliberately targeted local government offices during the civil war.
As part of the plans to re-establish local government, UNDP financed a
nationwide consultation by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) in March 2003 to canvass public opinion
on the future structure of local government. The consultation process
included a wide-ranging debate about the limitation of paramount chief
representation, special representation of previously excluded groups, and
even elections on a non-party basis. However, the consultation process
itself did not produce uniform agreement on all of these issues, and also
the impracticality of, for example, having non-party elections in a state
with national parties led to few radical changes. Its only significant addition was the creation of a new district council, the Western Area Rural District, adjacent to Freetown. In addition, a proviso was included, giving
strong supervisory powers over local government to the three Resident
Ministers who head the Provincial Administration.29 The centre will thus
retain significant control over the new councils.
With regard to the chiefs, no district voted for no representation of chiefs
and many districts wanted more representation (up to half of the paramount chiefs). In many ways, however, this was hardly surprising given the
nature of those participating in the voting process within the districts —
predominantly males, chiefs, and government officials.30
The new act does provide a democratic system of local governance. The
new local councils will have responsibility for a wide range of services and
powers, including tax raising and planning. However, devolution of
responsibility is likely to be slow, given the extreme shortage of qualified
staff, buildings, and equipment at the local level. A Local Government
Service Commission (LGSC) will be established, and senior administrators
have been seconded to fill the posts of Local Council Chief Administrators
(LCCAs) for one year. After that, elected councillors will recruit people for
29. These have headquarters in Bo, Makeni, and Kenema, respectively.
30. This was reported by several donor officials and was a cause of heated discussion during
the process between the ministry officials and international and local officials involved in the
process.
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these posts, with technical support from the LGSC to guarantee a transparent selection process.
The structure of the district councils is such that the position of the
LCCA is critical. This position effectively controls the entire bureaucracy
of the council and also acts as secretary and main contact for the councillors.
The appointment of competent individuals is therefore extremely important in the early stages of decentralization. Certainly, the competence of
staff more generally, particularly in some of the more remote districts, and
along the volatile border with Guinea, for example, will be problematic,
not because of the competence of those already there but because of the
difficulties faced in recruiting sufficient good staff in remote areas. In a
recent workshop held in Bo with representatives of the new administrations, one of the most heated discussions was on the Freetown/interior split
and within the interior, the urban/rural split, and the chief issue was the
recruitment and retention of staff in difficult rural areas with no facilities,
office buildings, or living quarters in some cases. Furthermore, if good staff
are to be recruited to the districts, then there has to be some form of career
progression, and this is hampered by distance from Freetown.
The change of roles within the chiefdoms, instigated by the Local
Government Act, has the potential to cause significant friction with the
new local councils. The government is keen that chiefs and councils work
closely together and the provision in the Act by which councils set tax rates
and chiefs collect and revenue share is designed to encourage this. The
problem, however, is really that the Act is not clear about the relationship
between chiefs and councils in a number of key areas, including development funding, ward committees and chiefdom committees, local taxes,
and the nature of responsibility with regard to land and natural resources.
There are also conflicts of interest with regard to reporting and responsibilities
vis-a-vis the Ministry of Local Government.
Some of the ambiguity comes from a desire for flexibility within the Act
itself. Development activity, for example, is the responsibility of the district, but chiefdoms are required to co-operate with districts, and districts
may even delegate authority to chiefdoms, something that could be valuable in carrying out the key activity of mobilizing the human and material
resources necessary. However, there are no guidelines on exactly how to do
this and there is potential for conflict with, for example, access to the key
resource of land. In practice, chiefs, as guardians of the land, can severely
hinder the access of councils to agricultural and other land. This is likely to
be worse in relation to land with rich natural resources, particularly diamonds and plantation agriculture, because chiefs will also have access to
significant human resources.
The main issue of conflict, however, is likely to be finance. The Act
transfers several sources of revenue previously enjoyed by the chief to the
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN SIERRA LEONE
105
local council, including precepts from local taxes, fees, and licences. Local
councils have the authority to determine the rate of local tax and the level
of precepts. All revenues have to be paid into local authority accounts and
will be subject to audit. At the same time, the collection of the tax will
remain in the hands of the chiefdoms, which will have to declare the
amount of tax collected. Local councils can also disburse monies directly
to chiefdoms for development purposes. If the level of precept is insufficient or the chiefdom revenue capability is not improved, then the local
council will suffer financially through reduced revenues. The chiefdoms
require sufficient incentive to collect the tax in the first place. In the first
few months of local government, this has been the single most problematic
area of operation. In several local councils, there have been reports of local
councillors collecting their own taxes, that is printing their own tickets,
whilst in at least one council (now with the LGSC and the courts),
the council sacked the LCCA and divided up the tax money amongst
themselves.
There is also a range of potential conflicts surrounding political legitimacy. In many places, chiefs are regarded as legitimate traditional rulers,
with broader political power bases than the council chairperson or the chief
administrator. Moreover, the majority of the population were born after
1972, that is they have only known chiefdom administration.31 An additional consideration is the relationship between chieftaincy and the secret
societies. The subtleties of most secret societies are a closed door to most
researchers, but their influence is a constant in Sierra Leonean politics.32
To stand as paramount chief, one has to be a member, and in the Temne,
Loko, Limba, Susu, Koranko, and Yalunka tribes, the paramount chief is
both the spiritual and the political authority in the chiefdom.33 It is also
commonly asserted that critical governance issues have been decided by
the secret societies rather than in the chiefdom councils. The net effect of
this is that transparency and accountability are reduced, along with an
increase in power of the rural elite.34
It is also true to say that the war was at least partly caused by a crisis of
political legitimacy within the chieftaincy system.35 Furthermore, the reassertion of chiefs’ legitimacy was problematic following a war during which
31. DFID, Identifying Options.
32. Even to the point where the krios as non-indigenous Sierra Leoneans imported Freemasonry
as their own secret society to counteract the rural societies such as poro. See S. Ellis, The Mask
of Anarchy: The destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war (New
York University Press, New York, 1999) for an excellent survey of Liberian secret societies.
For a historical view of Sierra Leonean secret societies, see F.W.H. Migeod, A View of Sierra
Leone (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, London, 1926).
33. Jay and Momoh, ‘From crying and clientelism’.
34. Note that there are some female paramount chiefs, but political matters are more likely
to be resolved in male secret societies; thus, the chief has to resort to proxies and emissaries.
35. Richards, Political Economy.
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several of them fled and after which over one-third of chiefdoms required
new elections. Given that the chiefs were amongst the first targets of RUF
fighters in the countryside, it cannot be automatically assumed that all
chiefs have regained their positions as legitimate traditional rulers.36 In
fact, even within the chieftaincy itself, there are calls for reform led by the
newly elected chiefs, most of whom are relatively young, well travelled, and
educated. The government is certainly confident that the chiefdom administrations can be modernized.
Sources of political conflict at the local level
Despite the clarity of most of the Local Government Act, there are a
number of grey areas that require further definition. The confusion of the
first year of implementation has not been helped by the rather sluggish
reaction of the central government in implementing the provisions of the
Act that are designed to aid the councils. In particular, the Act has had a
transitional year where the new local authorities have been established.
Elections were held following a partial sensitization campaign, and councillors entered their posts.37 However, the administrative staff of the new
councils were posted by the central government for the transitional year
rather than appointed by the councils themselves as stated in the Act.
Councils are to make their own appointments after June 2005 with the
guidance of a LGSC.38 However, the Secretary Establishments (the official
in charge of the civil service) only actually posted three members of staff
from the centre to the local authorities, the rest being made up of the staff
that existed in urban areas and the transfer of district officers, including in
many cases the transfer of the district officer to the post of LCCA.39 Over
the course of the first year, this has therefore established a pattern of political rivalry between three main groups: the new councillors, the chiefs, and
the former district officers.
These changes have produced a series of areas of potential political conflict. First, there are a number of straightforward conflicts between the
chiefs and the chairmen of the councils. Effectively, the chairman is the
most powerful political individual in a district, with power over the LCCA
36. There were extensive consultations at village level carried out as part of DFID’s chiefdom Governance Reform Project in 2000/2001 that provided perspectives on why the RUF
fighters destroyed the court barris, why paramount chiefs were targeted, and why rural youth
took up arms to destroy their own communities.
37. See Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’ for further notes on the sensitization
process and issues affecting the establishment of local government.
38. The story of the LGSC is an article in itself. Suffice to say that, although partially established, it has received very little support from the central government and is not in any
position to make any real recommendations to local government on recruitment.
39. The figure of three transfers was discussed in a meeting with the Establishments
Secretary in early 2005 in Freetown.
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and also over all subordinate bodies. This has caused considerable friction
where the paramount chief regards himself as highest political authority
and also has the means to maintain his administration, that is where there
is access to land and resources. In this respect, local disputes have not been
helped by ambiguous legislation regarding exactly what constitutes ‘artisanal’ production of diamonds and what constitutes ‘industrial’ production;
the former being subject to local regulation whilst the latter is subject to
the Ministry of Mines, which itself is ineffective.40 There have already been
a number of disputes in this area, particularly regarding income from mineral rights, but also revenue-sharing arrangements for the local tax.
This is exacerbated by the position of district councillors who chair ward
meetings assuming that they are responsible for development planning,
whilst the chief has traditionally fulfilled that function. There are also
widespread reports of councillors informing chiefs that they are the ‘highest political authority’ (not the council as a whole, as in the Act). This
largely comes out of a misunderstanding, but it serves to illustrate the confusion in parts of the countryside.41
There are also a number of conflicts between the administrators and the
chiefs. Several LCCAs in the districts assumed that they would be responsible for chiefdom staffing as well as district staffing and effectively took control of chiefdom administration. At the same time, many politicians in the
rural areas see the LCCA as a threat, especially when he has formerly been
a district officer.42 There have also, however, been reports of LCCAs being
fired by the chairperson for less political reasons. In one case, yet to go
before the LGSC, it is reported that the entire council signed a note to support sacking the chief administrator. Once replaced by his deputy, the council then persuaded the new LCCA to sign a cheque for 18 million leones,
which was then divided up between the councillors.43 Whilst there are frequent reports of this type, it is certainly clear that being a councillor in rural
Sierra Leone is now regarded as being lucrative; a situation that endangers
the whole basis of decentralization — getting services to the rural poor.
One central problem with the escalation of political conflict in the countryside is the absence of an effective oversight mechanism. Notionally, the
40. This was confirmed recently by a functional review of the Ministry of Mines that concluded that the situation had become so confused that what was required was a completely
‘fresh start’ in terms of redrafting all of the current legislation and regulatory guidelines.
‘Review of Ministry of Mineral Resources’ (Unpublished DFID review, Freetown, 2005).
41. And is probably the result of a relatively weak senstitization campaign by the Ministry of
Local Government.
42. One chairperson told me that he had sacked his Chief administrator because he had
been conspiring with the local paramount chief against the council. This is not surprising
given the history of district officers, chiefs and taxes.
43. This certainly happened, but the exact reasons given for the LCCA’s demise are different according to the chairperson. In another often-cited case, the chairperson printed his own
local tax tickets and collected the revenue himself.
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Ministry of Local Government oversees disputes relating to chiefdom disputes, crime, gambling, bye laws, and land. With the abolition of District
Offices, this workload has increased exponentially, and the Ministry was
unprepared. There is little record keeping, few staff, and no clear procedures. In effect, there is little or no oversight from the centre.44
The potential for reform: The picture is not entirely negative. Positives
include the fact that there are now elected local councils across Sierra
Leone and that they are more or less functioning. The chiefs do, clearly,
have a role. The question is how to determine that role clearly and support
the chiefs in enacting this new set of roles. For a start, the chiefs have clear
roles established by the Office of National Security (ONS) within the
country’s security apparatus, namely identifying threats in their own localities. However, the ONS has also clearly stated that it feels that chiefs
should be depoliticized.45 This could be a valuable starting point for the
development of chiefs as a valuable element of civil society — outside formal politics but acting as opinion formers and mobilizers. In this role,
chiefs could also take on the role of advocate, providing a voice for those
who feel excluded by the councils. The main issue here is of course that the
chiefs have historically been very exclusive and it requires substantial
reform to encourage greater inclusion and break the power of the rural,
male gerontocracy.
The government’s position on reform: The government sees chieftaincy reform, at least officially, as a critical issue. In particular, President
Kabbah stated that he wanted the chiefs to become more ‘effective, relevant
and democratic’.46 Within the Ministry of Local Government, officials talk
about returning ‘the glory’ to the chieftaincy through depoliticizing it.
Part of this modernization was the establishment, in January 2003, of the
Council of Paramount Chiefs as a means of providing guidance to the
president on matters relating to chieftaincy, reviewing the institution of
chieftaincy, fostering good relations between chiefs and their people, and
to review electoral procedures for chiefs. Chiefs are further expected to
hold regular consultations with their people. This organization has potential as a means to drive through modernization, but to date it has achieved
very little largely because of lack of resources.
Clearly, the strategic vision of the government is one of the chiefs
becoming more ceremonial and less political. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has
received a mixed reception from the chiefs themselves, who see councillors
44. See J. Cutting, ‘Overview of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development capacity needs in relation to the decentralization and local government reform
programme (Government of Sierra Leone)’, DFID, Sierra Leone, May 2004.
45. DFID, Identifying Options.
46. Speech by His Excellency the President at the ceremony for the recognition of newlyelected paramount chiefs and the establishment of a council of chiefs at Kenema, Bo, Makeni
and Port Loko, 26–30 January 2003.
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as rivals and their ‘traditional’ role diminishing. Discussion in the Council
of Chiefs really surrounded two arguments. First, the fear that modernization would reduce their standing in their communities and compromise
their own prestige. This further developed into a discussion about reducing
‘opportunities’, that is access to resources and the resulting income
streams. The second area of discussion surrounds a more positive view that
if they modernized, they may not be ignored by central government. This
is a clear opportunity for central government to provide funding to allay
the fears of many chiefs and to provide comprehensive sensitization to
explain that the reform process is aimed at restoring their prestige and
status in the local community.47
The new chiefs: One group within the chieftaincy system with real power
is the large group of new chiefs elected since the war. Around 44% of all
paramount chiefs were elected after December 2002.48 In general, the new
chiefs have a higher level of education and many have travelled extensively.
The optimistic view is that these chiefs will use their education and networks to protect chiefdoms against exploitative business ventures and to
build constructive relationships with local councils.
However, there is a caveat here. Extensive consultations at local level
also showed a mistrust of several chiefs.49 Particularly in remote areas, it
was felt that chiefs might have a monopoly of knowledge that would allow
them to take advantage of the situation for personal benefit. This is partly
born of widespread experience of previous, educated chiefs who have failed
to deliver local improvements and were able to support expensive Western
lifestyles, frequently in Freetown.50
Many of the new chiefs have already had an impact. Particularly in urban
areas where chiefs and local councils have built good relationships and where
there are resources, chiefs have been able to increase income and to raise
development funding that people did not feel was reaching them before.
There is a lot to be gained by using the energy and ideas of the new generation of chiefs, but the danger is allowing them to grow into a system where
the old, more corrupt practices are encouraged. The harnessing of this positive group requires urgent reform of the whole chieftaincy system, but also,
more broadly, the Ministry of Local Government, which, to date, has failed
in its task to provide a workable framework or an oversight system that could
provide a positive framework for making progress in the countryside.
47. Certainly, DFID staff believed that this would lead to more widespread support for
modernization.
48. DFID, Identifying Options.
49. The original DFID consultation documents show this clearly. See DFID ‘Summary of
Reports on Consultation Workshops’ (Chiefdom Government Reform Programme, Freetown,
December 2001).
50. This is an issue that is frequently brought up in several analyses of chiefs, including
DFID, Identifying Options, Fanthorpe, Jay and Kamara, ‘A Review of the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme’, and Jay and Momoh, ‘From crying and clientalism’.
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Conclusions: back to the future?
It has been argued elsewhere that there is a danger of excess nostalgia in
Sierra Leone.51 The use of the prefix ‘re’ is particularly worrying in the
context of recreating a situation in which poor governance contributes to
renewed outbreaks of violence.52 It is also true that the establishment of a
new local government system has been partly hampered by the government’s
position on getting ‘experienced’ people into position. This effectively
means that civil servants (or former civil servants) with experience of the
pre-1972 local government system have been placed in powerful positions.53 This was also used by the Establishment Secretariat to just move
existing district staff over the local government during the transitional year,
where a major criterion was ‘experience of local government’, thus immediately cutting out anyone who had not been a district officer or deputy.54 This
has caused a number of problems related to political position, responsibility, and conflict.
In the countryside, there are a number of political battles being carried
out by groups who regard themselves as either ‘losers’ or ‘winners’ in the
decentralization process. The primary groups in these political conflicts are
the chiefs, the local councillors, and the former district administrators, particularly the former district officers. The outcome of these power struggles
will determine the future of local government in Sierra Leone. In particular, one interpretation of the reform process is to view decentralization as a
means of breaking down the damaging sociopolitical relationships that
supported a rural gerontocracy. Advocating democracy and political representation and then allowing local authorities to deliver services, local populations may feel more included in rural social processes as a whole and be
less inclined to take an exit option involving violence or insurgency. This
does, however, place an inordinate amount of responsibility on the fledgling
councils, particularly given the inadequate support, oversight, and policy
guidance from the centre. The danger must be that the core-periphery politics of Sierra Leone will return in the form of neglect of local government,
thus forcing local councillors to join the historic elite running the countryside. Instead of overturning rural gerontocracies, councillors will then
become co-opted in them and the situation will either remain the same or
worsen from the point of view of those who have been excluded.
Returning to the debate about the future of chieftaincy, this article has
uncovered plenty of evidence that Fanthorpe’s fears about recreating
‘. . .new platforms for the old politics, and [that] the rural poor will be
51. Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
52. Ibid; Hanlon, International community.
53. For example, the Chairman of the Local Government Service Commission.
54. The author discussed this with the Establishments Secretary in person, who was assuming
that this would be the case anyway.
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locked, as before, into a desperate scramble for elite patronage’ are justified.55 The article has attempted to map the changes in power caused by
decentralization. The institutional arrangements in the countryside were
designed to facilitate greed amongst the rural elites. Historically, this has been
the triumvirate of the district officer, the treasury clerk, and the paramount
chief. This situation has been changed by decentralization both officially
and in reality. In practice, the way that decentralization has been implemented has led to a situation where the district officers have stepped across
to become LCCAs, the paramount chiefs are still there and wield significant informal and formal influence over council decisions, access to land,
etc., and the local councillors are in danger of being captured by the elite.56
So what of the chiefs? Not all chiefs are a negative influence, but the
administrative powers given to the chiefs by the British system of indirect
rule have, in some cases, been abused since independence. This leads one
down the path of either abolishing them (which no one wishes to do) or
reforming their powers. The second avenue is clearly the route currently
being followed by the government of Sierra Leone, but reform usually
means some form of political pain and that pain comes in the shape of
reduced potential for income and less influence on what is happening
within chiefdoms. Furthermore, the Local Government Act removes autocratic rule in the countryside and replaces it with a system of compromise,
partnership, and representation, but only if the system is made to work.
Currently, the old ways of politics are involved in a reshuffle and the outcome of this political conflict is by no means clear. Making the liberal
peace work may be the only way to end the dependency of the rural poor
on unsympathetic feudal elites.
55. Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace’, p. 47.
56. One of my colleagues in Sierra Leone refers to the position of councillors as the ‘Animal
Farm Option’, where councillors just act as a new part of the elite.