Ref 8.16
Cognitive STYLES and learning styles: theorise or die?
Refereed Paper
Eugene Sadler-Smith,
School of Management, University of Surrey, UK
Email: [email protected]
Keywords: cognitive styles; intuition; learning styles
Abstract
In this paper it will be argued that the field of cognitive styles (including learning
styles) research is beset by a number of limitations with regard to: (1) reliability and validity
of style measurement; (2) lack of any common conceptual framework; (3) a theoretical basis
which acknowledges the integrated and interdependent nature of human thinking. In response
to these criticisms a duplex framework for cognitive style will be discussed which draws upon
dual-process theories and which consists of two complementary information processing
modes: analytical: affect-free, slow in operation, fast in formation, serial and detail-focused,
cognitively demanding, abstract/symbolic, and open to conscious awareness; intuitive: affectladen, fast in operation, slow in formation, parallel and holistic, cognitively undemanding,
imagistic/narrative based, unavailable to conscious awareness. The paper sets out some of the
implications of a duplex model of cognitive style for human resource development namely
that it: rectifies analytical bias in management; offers the opportunity for the integration of
affect and emotion into management; acknowledges the integrated (i.e. analytical and
intuitive) nature of management decisions and problems.
Introduction
One of the distinctive features of cognitive styles’ research is the proliferation of
conceptual frameworks and measurement instruments. For example, Hayes and Allinson
(1994) identified 22 different dimensions of cognitive style, more recently Coffield, Moseley,
Hall and Ecclestone (2004) identified no less than 71 models of learning styles (including
cognitive style) and categorized 13 of these as ‘major’ and worthy of critical analysis. Since
the inception of styles’ research by Witkin (1962) and his co-workers in the middle part of the
last century numerous researchers have each provided their own distinctive conceptual
frameworks, presented empirical evidence in support of the underlying conceptual bases of
their work, and offered conclusions which they claim have implications for training and
education.
Notwithstanding these achievements a number of important questions remain
unanswered, and new questions are raised. In this paper it will be argued that the field of
cognitive styles and learning styles research is beset by a number limitations (see below), and
in response to this critique a duplex model of cognitive style is offered based upon CognitiveExperiential Self-Theory (Epstein, 1994). Its relevance and implications are outlined, namely
that it: rectifies the analytical bias which pervades management; offers the opportunity for the
integration of affect and emotion into management; acknowledges the integrated (i.e.
analytical and intuitive) nature of management decisions and problems.
A critical appraisal of cognitive styles research
Amongst the principal issues to which styles researchers must provide convincing
answers are three that arise from the comprehensive and critical review of the field by
Coffield et al. (2004) and others, namely: (1) reliability and validity of style measurement
(even those models judged to be the ‘best’ exhibit a number of weaknesses in this regard); (2)
lack of any common conceptual framework and shared theoretical basis (the study of
cognitive style would benefit considerably from a unifying model or conceptual framework
underpinned by a coherent and up-to-date body of psychological theory); (3)
acknowledgement of the integrated and interdependent nature of human thinking (a number of
authors have argued that a vital learning and managerial competence is the ability to take
decisions and solve problems in cognitively versatile ways which integrate different modes of
thinking, see: Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007; Louis and Sutton, 1991).
Reliability and validity of style measurement
Styles’ assessment often relies upon the use of self-report inventories which use either
Likert or forced-choice scales (for example, Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Kolb, 1984). Many
researchers are sceptical about the results of self-report measurement (Spector, 1994), and the
weaknesses of forced-choice response formats in particular are well-documented (Saville and
Willson, 1991). In an attempt to address these issues Riding (1991) developed more direct
measure of information processing. The computer-presented Cognitive Styles Analysis
(CSA) (Riding, 1991) was designed to overcome assessment problems associated with the
various Witkin-type embedded figures tests (with respect to the WA dimension) and
drawbacks of self-report rating scales (Riding and Rayner, 1998; Riding, 2001; Witkin, 1962).
The CSA consists of separate sub-tests for two bi-polar dimensions of cognitive style,
wholist-analytical (WA) and verbal-imagery (VI). The CSA has been used extensively in
cognitive styles research for over a decade and a half (Riding, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003;
Riding and Al-Sanabani, 1998; Riding and Douglas, 1993; Riding, Grimley, Dahrei and
1
Banner 2003; Riding and Pearson, 1994; Riding and Sadler-Smith, 1992; Riding and Watts,
1997).
Peterson, Deary and Austin (2003) examined the CSA’s internal consistency and its
stability using parallel forms, test-retest and split half analyses. Kline (1991: 45) suggests that
the correlation (r) between scores on the same test taken on different occasions should be at
least 0.70. Regrettably, in Peterson et al.’s study of the CSA observed correlations were low
(0.07 ≤ r ≤ 0.36). This, and their other findings, led them to conclude that in its current form
the CSA “is not reliable or internally consistent”, and only by doubling the length of the WA
sub-test does this element alone become more reliable and more stable (Peterson et al., 2003:
890). Riding (2003) criticized Peterson et al.’s study on the grounds of sampling, test
conditions, test-retest interval and in particular the fact that the CSA version they used was
not a test of the published form of the CSA per se (Peterson et al. constructed their own
version of the test). Nonetheless the research by Peterson and her colleagues does raise
questions with regard to the CSA’s reliability, and in particular of the VI sub-test.
The Cognitive Styles Index (CSI) (Allinson and Hayes, 1996) uses a trichotomous (true,
uncertain, false) self-report response format. Unlike the CSA the CSI was designed
specifically to be used in organisational settings. The internal consistency and test-retest
reliability of the CSI in its original form is well-established (Allinson and Hayes, 2000;
Allinson, Chell and Hayes, 2000; Allinson, Armstrong, and Hayes, 2001; Murphy, Kelleher,
Doucette, and Young, 1998; Sadler-Smith, Spicer and Tsang, 2000). However, at a more
fundamental level the construal of the intuition-analysis dimension of cognitive style as a bipolar construct has been called into question. In essence there are two competing views:
Allinson and Hayes (1996) assert that intuition and analysis (IA) are opposite ends of a unidimensional, bi-polar continuum – referred to by Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003) as the
‘unitary’ conception of intuition-analysis cognitive style (an analysis style versus an intuition
style). An alternative position, labelled ‘complex’, asserts that intuition-analysis cognitive
style is better conceived as two separate, albeit inter-correlated, uni-polar constructs (an
analysis dimension and an intuition dimension).
Using data from over 900 participants in a series of exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003) found that a two factor (‘complex’) model
provides a better approximation of responses to the CSI than does a single factor (‘unitary’)
model. This is compelling evidence in favour of the dis-aggregation of a unitary intuitionanalysis dimension into separate, albeit correlated, intuition and analysis components, a view
with which Coffield et al. (2004: 88) concurred:
“Despite the claims of its authors [Allinson and Hayes], the CSI has been shown
to measure two related, albeit multifaceted, constructs. We believe that the basically
sound psychometric properties of the CSI would be further improved if the revised twofactor scoring system proposed by Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003) were generally
adopted.”
This conclusion is vital and difficult to underestimate in the light of the fact that
Coffield et al. (2004) reviewed 13 of the most influential style models and concluded that the
CSI had the best evidence for reliability and validity of all the models they studied (including
Herrmann’s ‘whole brain’ model and Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI), the
MBTI, Riding’s model of cognitive style and CSA, and Sternberg’s theory of Mental SelfGovernment and Thinking Styles Inventory).
2
Overall these findings suggest that a multi-faceted (‘complex’) formulation based upon
independent but complementary styles, such as intuition and analysis, which can be measured
using reliable and valid self-report scales, but ideally using or complemented by non selfreport methods, would represent a significant advance in the assessment of cognitive style and
in cognitive styles research more generally.
Commonality of conceptual framework and shared theoretical basis
One of the problems that Sternberg (1997: 149) identifies with the ‘theory’ of styles is
that there is “usually no unifying model or metaphor that integrates the various styles, not
only between theories, but even within theories”. Riding’s conceptual frame is clear and
unequivocal, consisting of two orthogonal dimensions, VI and WA, between which the
observed correlations are consistently low and non-significant (r = ± 0.10, see: Riding and
Rayner, 1998: 100), but as noted above the measure is beset by a number of problems.
Riding’s theoretical basis is a systems model (the ‘cognitive control model’) consisting of: (1)
primary sources (knowledge and cognitive history; reasoning ability; personality sources; and
gender); (2) cognitive control (cognitive style); cognitive input (working memory); (3)
cognitive output (learning and coping strategies); (4) external; world (experiences and
observed behaviours). Within this model cognitive style provides a “representational
interface” between the internal sources and the external environment.
Notwithstanding the logic of the model in itself, precisely how the hypothesized
function of ‘cognitive control’ via style (Riding, 2001: 68) relates explicitly to other relevant
theories , for example of working memory (see: Baddeley, 1997), long-term working memory
(Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995), non-conscious processing of information (Reber, 1993) or
personality (given that relationships with neuroticism are suggested – see Riding, 2001: 66) is
unclear. The extent to which Riding’s more recent work (Riding, Grimley, Dahrei and
Banner, 2003) which incorporates a measure of working memory capacity (the Information
Processing Index, IPI) addresses these issues remains to be seen.
When taken in isolation the various models of style often possess the virtues of elegance
(for example, the orthogonality of VI and WA dimensions), conceptual simplicity (for
example, the unitary nature of IA), and face validity (for example, the metaphor of
‘government’ used by Sternberg (1997) in his model of thinking styles). However, this
conceptual clarity becomes somewhat obfuscated when the models are scrutinized
collectively. As has already been noted, the concepts of ‘local’ and ‘global’ as used by
Sternberg (1997) in the MSG theory share many of the features of the whole/part distinction
embodied in Riding’s WA dimension. When one adds to this the definition and
operationalization of the notion of ‘analysis’ in the CSI model (Allinson and Hayes, 1996) the
difficulties are, to say the least, compounded. If ‘analysis’ (Allinson and Hayes, 1996) and
‘analytical’ (Riding, 2001) refer to similar psychological constructs we might expect there to
be a statistically significant positive correlation between Allinson and Hayes’ CSI scores and
Riding’s CSA WA scores (high scores indicate an analytic style on the CSA and the CSI)
(assuming, of course, that both tests are reliable). Empirical data suggest otherwise: SadlerSmith, Spicer and Tsang (2000) observed a near zero correlation (r = +0.05) between CSI
scores and CSA WA scores. As Coffield et al. (2004: 42) noted the reliability questions
raised by Peterson et al. (2003) in relation to the CSA may be one of the reasons why
correlations of WA with other measures have often been close to zero.
3
The integrated and interdependent nature of human thinking
Polarization of cognitive functioning is inherent in the Riding model (verbal-versusvisual style, and wholist-versus-analytical style) and the Allinson and Hayes’ model
(intuition-versus-analysis) of cognitive style. An analogy which can be used is that of a
child’s see-saw – it is impossible to be ‘up’ or ‘down’ at both ends simultaneously, hence for
example more of analysis means less of intuition and one can therefore, only exercise a high
level of intuition at the expense of a reduction in analytical reasoning – the processes contest
and oppose rather than integrate and harmonize.
Following this line of reasoning, Coffield et al (2004: 42) argue with regard to the CSA
that there are conceptual problems with VI in that most tasks make demands on verbal and
non-verbal processing, and that in reality these are interdependent or integrated aspects of
thinking. Coffield et al. (2004) also drew a comparison between the WA dimension and
Bloom’s (1956) elements of analysis and synthesis in the taxonomy of educational objectives
for the cognitive domain (knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and
evaluation). They argue that the wholist style shares some of the features of synthesis which
in Bloom’s terms is a less simple (i.e. higher level) process than analysis but nonetheless
inter-dependent with it. Moreover “we simply do not know enough about the interaction and
interdependence of analytic and holistic thinking in different contexts to claim that they are
opposites” (Coffield et al., 2004: 42).
At a more general level some psychologists have called into question the simplistic
dichotomization and polarization of human information processing. Reber (1993) argued that
it is important to have an appreciation of the differences between implicit and explicit
learning, but it is quite another thing to “allow ourselves to be seduced by what we can call,
for want of a better name, ‘the polarity fallacy’” and thereby treat different modes of
cognition as completely separate and independent rather than interactive components in a
“cooperative process” (Reber, 1993: 23).
Conclusion
In the light of these observations, limitations and criticisms it may be concluded that if
the concept of cognitive style is to achieve its potential to make a more meaningful
contribution to management and educational research and practice it must have valid and
reliable methods of assessment, be based on a unifying conceptual model and be attuned to
the integrated and versatile nature of the cognitive competencies required in educational and
occupational settings. The current position is that a number of the available methods of
cognitive style assessment are beset by problems of reliability, validity and lack of
convergence, moreover no common or related conceptual frameworks appear to be drawn
upon which acknowledge recent advances in cognitive and social psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. Styles researchers have yet to take advantage of the new generation of imaging
techniques such as PET and fMRI which may help shed light upon the biological nature of
stylistic differences1. Moreover, the notion of bipolarity is often employed in a way which
fails to acknowledge and accommodate the integrated nature of human cognition and problem
1
There were promising moves in this direction when in the 1990s Riding and his colleagues conducted research
using electro-encephalograph (EEG) techniques in an attempt to identify the neural correlates of various styles of
processing (see: Riding, Glass, Butler & Pleydell-Pearce, 1997).
4
solving, all-to-often dominates both the conceptualization and the operationalization of
cognitive style.
A Duplex Model of Cognitive Style
Epstein (1994) in the Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) distinguishes between
two information-processing systems, an experiential system and a rational system. (1) The
experiential system is a learning system which operates automatically, pre-consciously,
nonverbally, rapidly, effortlessly, and concretely. It is holistic2 and is associated with affect
and operates on the basis of schemas acquired from lived experiences. Intuition is the
operation of the experiential system; (2) The rational system is an inferential logical system
which operates consciously, primarily verbally, slowly, and effortfully. The rational system is
abstract, analytic, and affect-free and evolutionarily the more recent of the two systems
(Epstein, 1994; 2004). CEST is but one of a number of dual process theories and falls within
the broad System 1 and System 2 cognitive architecture outlined by Stanovich and West
(2000). The degree to which either system dominates thought and behaviour is a function of:
(1) the extent to which the situation is associated with a customary way of responding; (2) the
degree of emotional involvement; (3) experiential dominance based on repeated amounts of
relevant experience; (4) “individual differences in preference for relying on one system more
than the other” (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier, 1996: 391, italics added). The specific
properties of the rational and experiential systems (Epstein, 1994) are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: A dual process framework for cognitive style
EPSTEIN COGNITIVE EXPERIENTIAL SELF THEORY
Experiential system
Rational system
Holistic; automatic, effortless;
Analytic; intentional, effortful;
affective; associationistic; mediated
logical; mediated by conscious
by ‘vibes’ from past events; concrete appraisal of events; abstract
images, metaphors, narratives; more symbols, words, numbers;
rapid, immediate action; slower
slower, delayed action; changes
more resistant to change; changes
more rapidly; changes with
with repetitive/intense experience
strength of argument, new
evidence.
DUPLEX MODEL OF COGNITIVE STYLE
Intuitive system
Analytical system
Affect-laden; comparatively fast in
Affect free; comparatively slow
operation, slow in formation; parallel in operation, fast in formation;
and holistic; involuntary; cognitively serial and detail-focused;
undemanding; imagistic/narrativeintentional; cognitively
based; unavailable to conscious
demanding; abstract/symbolicawareness
based; open to conscious
awareness
Source
Epstein et al
(1996)
Sources
Epstein (1994);
Lieberman
(2007); Sloman
(2002); Smith and
DeCoster (1999);
Stanovich and
West (2000)
2
The experiential/intuitive system does not have a monopoly on holistic, non-analytical thinking; it is feasible to
engage in non-linear thinking in ways that are under conscious control (for example, creative and divergent
thinking, the deliberate use of imagery, etc.).
5
Epstein et al. (1996) constructed two separate self-report scales to assess preferences for
experiential and rational processing with the aim of empirically resolving whether such
preferences are uni-modal (“I believe in trusting my hunches” and “I would prefer a task that
is intellectual, difficult and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require
much thought”) rather than an a priori assumption, as in the CSI and the MBTI, of bimodality
(“I am more of a thinking-type person than a feeling-type person”). Epstein and his
colleagues developed and tested the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) by combining a
reliable and valid measure of rational processing (Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) ‘Need for
Cognition’ (NFC) scale) with a new scale which they called ‘Faith in Intuition’ (FII). The
verbal-visual distinction which is to be found in dual coding theory ( “images and verbal
processes are viewed as alternative coding systems or modes of representation”, Paivio, 1971:
8) which Riding drew upon as a theoretical basis for the VI dimension is also recognized as
antecedent to dual processing theory (Epstein et al., 1996: 390). The representational mode of
visualization is encapsulated in the REI by a number of items, for example: “I often have clear
visual images of things” and “I am good at visualizing things”.
As well as being potentially helpful in the understanding, diagnosis and treatment of
various psychopathologies, Epstein et al. (1996) speculate that CEST and the REI may also be
helpful in understanding a person’s receptivity to different kinds of communication, for
example:
“Appeals to emotions, personal experience and the use of concrete examples
could be more effective for people who process information primarily in the intuitive
mode, whereas presenting facts and logical arguments could be more effective for
individuals who process information primarily in the analytic mode” (Epstein et al.,
1996: 390)
This in effect re-states the cognitive styles ‘matching hypothesis’ (see: Hayes and
Allinson, 1996) from the perspective of CEST. In relation to other models of cognitive style,
the evidence in favour of the match is far from unequivocal and significant effects are often a
result of complex two-way and three-way interactions. As a result it is far from clear whether
matching mode of presentation to the requirements of the different information processing
systems is more effective than mis-matching. This question is one which requires further
theoretical elaboration (‘why should matching to be more effective than mis-matching?’) and
empirical investigation (‘is matching more effective than mis-matching?) (see: Massa and
Mayer, 2006). Moreover, in the same way that rational processing can be disaggregated into
various sub-components (such as mathematical and verbal) Epstein et al. (1996: 403)
speculated that there may also be a number of experiential (intuitive) sub-components (for
example, visualization, imagination and aesthetic sensibility).
CEST and related dual process theories (for example, Sloman, 2002) provide a simple
and compelling conceptual framework for a duplex model of cognitive style based upon the
parallel workings of an intuitive system and an analytical system which contribute jointly to a
cooperative process. The two modes of thought are qualitatively different in terms of the
kinds of data upon which they draw, their operating principles, and their outcomes (Smith and
DeCoster, 1999). Moreover, there is accumulating evidence that different brain structures
appear to be activated when these different modes of thought are engaged (see: Kruglanski
and Orehek, 2007).
6
The analytical3 system (affect free, comparatively slow in operation, comparatively fast
in formation, serial and detail-focused, intentional, cognitively demanding, abstract/symbolicbased, and accessible to conscious awareness) and the intuitive system (affect-laden,
comparatively fast in operation, comparatively slow in formation, parallel and holistic,
involuntary, cognitively undemanding, imagistic/narrative-based, and unavailable to
conscious awareness) interact. For example, intuition (sometimes manifested as ‘analyses
frozen into habit’) draws upon implicit and explicit learning experiences compressed into
expertise which reveals itself as the involuntary, affectively-charged, holistic informed
intuitive judgments which experts are able to exercise in complex, time-pressured and
judgmental situations (Dane and Pratt, 2007; Sadler-Smith, 2008).
Measurement of dual-processing
With regard to the self-reported assessment of individual differences in preferences for
the analytical mode or the intuitive mode there are at least two candidate instruments which
have exhibited acceptable levels of reliability. As noted above the CSI consists of 38
trichotomous (true/uncertain/false) items which are scored to derive a single index (0 through
76; lower scores are more intuitive, higher scores more analytic). As discussed earlier, there
are number of problems that have been identified with this instrument: firstly, factor analyses
suggest that a unifactoral model is not tenable (Backhaus and Liff, 2007; Hodgkinson and
Sadler-Smith, 2003); secondly, when scored as recommended by Coffield et al. (2004) as two
separate scales, in spite of the acceptable levels of reliability, the intuition and analysis
components are not independent (reported correlations are moderate and statistically
significant). The other strong candidate for the assessment of cognitive style within a duplex
framework is the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) (Epstein et al. 1996) which exists in
both longer (31 item) and short (ten item) forms. The REI appears to be a reliable and valid
instrument for the assessment of two independent constructs reflecting the operation of the
intuitive and analytical systems.
CEST and cognitive style
One assumption of the duplex model is that individual managers will exhibit a
preference (a set level) for relying on the intuitive or the analytical system (see: Epstein et al.,
1996). An implication of this is that managers may be classified as one of the four types
identified by Hodgkinson and Clarke (2007): (1) high analytic/low intuitive managers may be
characterized as ‘detail conscious’ and are driven by a compulsion to pore over minutiae and
analyze, sometimes to the point of ‘analysis paralysis’. Whilst to focus on detail has
undoubted strengths in many situations, in taking it to extremes one may overlook the bigger
picture and ignore intuition; (2) low analytic/high intuitive managers are ‘big picture
conscious’ and may be pre-occupied with ‘seeing the wood rather than the trees’; (3) low
analytic/low intuitive managers are ‘non-discerning’ to the extent that they deploy “minimal
cognitive resources” and rely upon received wisdom or the opinions of others (Hodgkinson
and Clarke, 2007: 247); (4) high analytic/high intuitive managers are cognitively versatile,
able to ‘see the wood’ and ‘see the trees’ and deploy rational and analytical processing with
equal facility. If analysis and intuition are well-developed preferences then it is likely that the
majority of managers are likely to fall into the ‘detail conscious’ or ‘big picture conscious’
categories; therefore one of the aims of management education and training should be to
3
The term ‘analytical’ is preferred over ‘rational’ because there are strong elements of rationality in both
systems (Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2004). The term ‘intuitive’ is preferred over ‘experiential’ for
three reasons: the term intuition has greater currency in management research; intuition subsumes
experientiality; intuition is the operation of the experiential system (Epstein, 2004).
7
endow managers with a cognitive versatility whereby they are able to deploy strategies in
ways that go beyond their ‘set’ level of intuition or analysis and are commensurate with the
task.
Implications for human resource development, management and education
The duplex model has a number of implications both for the teaching strategies used by
trainers, management educators, and the strategies employed by learners themselves.
Rectifies analytical bias in management education: traditionally human resource
development and management education, as practiced in most business schools, emphasizes
the development of logical, ‘rational’ and analytical skills, and it could even be argued that
these curricula are biased in favour of the analytical system and the analytic cognitive style.
However an important and indeed long-standing challenge for management education
(Taggart and Robey, 1981; Taggart and Valenzi, 1990) is to recognize and accept the
importance of the intuitive system, and to devise ways of integrating knowledge of it into the
curriculum in order to develop managers’ intuitive awareness and enhance their intuitive
capabilities (Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004). Various researchers have made suggestions for
how this might be achieved (Hogarth, 2001; Klein, 1998, 2003; Robinson, 2006). SadlerSmith and Burke (2008) and Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004; 2007) suggest a number of
activities which could be successfully incorporated into the management education
curriculum, including: dispelling myths about intuition as a sixth sense, journaling intuitions
and developing cognitive maps, scrutinizing intuitions and giving good feedback, being aware
of biases in heuristics and intuitive judgment, and ‘giving the rational mind a reprieve’.
The context of management and learning: managers in the 21st century face frequent and
unexpected changes in their internal and external environments, they therefore need to be able
to adapt, flex and change. Meta-cognition provides a basis for personal adaptation to new and
changing environments, a corollary of this is that too great an emphasis upon the development
of a single mode of thinking (and traditionally the accent has been put upon analysis) may
instil cognitive rigidity and inertia and constrain the personal adaptability that the business
environment demands of managers. Managers call upon intuitive judgments in those
situations which require people-oriented decisions, quick decisions, unexpected decisions,
uncertain or novel situations, and situations where there is a lack of explicit clues (Burke and
Miller, 1999). Where there is an absence of an informed or educated intuition, such
judgments may be practiced covertly and without the constructive feedback which is essential
for the development of informed intuition (Hogarth, 2001). Without a honing of the expertise
through focused and deliberate practice which is the bedrock of good intuitive judgment
(Ericsson and Charness, 1994) intuitions may be misinformed and potentially perilous, and of
no more value than guesses.
Further opportunity for the integration of affect and emotion into management
education: affect is a principal feature of the experiential system. The acknowledgement of
the role that affect plays in learning may be addressed by reference to intuition per se (see
above) but also via the incorporation of emotional intelligence (EI) into management
education and training. The subject of EI is hotly debated, however, Ashkanasy and Daus
(2002) argue that it is safe to work on the assumptions that EI involves the ability to identify
and perceive emotions in the self and others and the skills to understand and manage them, is
an individual difference which is distinct from, but positively related to, other ‘intelligences’
and develops over the life span and is ‘trainable’ via specific affective domain practices
8
(Ashkanasy and Dasborough, 2003; Boyatzis, Stubbs and Taylor, 2002). Further work is
required to explore the relationships between affect as it manifests itself in intuitive judgment
and emotions and the relationship between being ‘emotionally intelligent’ and ‘intuitively
intelligent’.
Integrated nature of management decisions and problems: analytic and intuitive
cognitive styles are qualitatively different, each has its own strengths and weaknesses, and the
problems and decisions which confront managers are likely to require a synthesis of the
processes of the intuitive and the analytical systems (Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007). There
are few tasks which require analytical solutions or intuitive judgments exclusively. More
often than not intuition can alert an experienced practitioner to anomalies in a computation,
whilst an analytical check may be used to moderate levels of confidence in intuitively-derived
judgments. The polarization favoured by some cognitive styles researchers of a ‘unitary’
persuasion logically precludes the union of opposites. A more complex, flexible and
theoretically parsimonious view allows for the union of intuition and analysis and the
development of learning strategies to augment individuals’ habitual and preferred ways of
representing, organizing and processing information.
Conclusion
Over three decades ago Mintzberg (1976) argued that one of the keys to organizational
effectiveness lies in a synthesis of clear-headed logic and powerful intuition. If we accept the
view that business schools have a long and distinguished tradition of educating managers in
analytical thinking, the question is raised how might the balance be re-dressed so that the
curriculum of the business school develops managers’ abilities to understand intuitive
thinking and use intuitive thinking in more effective ways? Cognitive styles research and the
duplex model in particular offer one possible way in which the business school curriculum
might engage other cognitive faculties which go beyond the verbal, sequential and analytical
and into imagistic, holistic and intuitive realms.
Management education’s theory and method has embraced experiential learning theory
(Kolb, 1984) and the related notion of learning style (Honey and Mumford, 1986; Kolb,
1984), it may however be underplaying the significance of dual process theories at a time
when: (1) neurological research and a new generation of brain-imaging techniques are rapidly
expanding scientists’ understanding of the neural circuitry which underpins decision making,
problem solving and learning (Bechara, 2004; Bechara, Tranel and Damasio, 2000; Damasio,
1994; Jung-Beeman, Bowden, Haberman, Frymiare, Arambei-Liu and Greenblatt, 2004;
Lieberman, 2007; Springer and Deutsch, 1998); (2) perspectives from evolutionary
psychology, whilst controversial in some quarters (Rose and Rose, 2000), are adding new
insights to the understanding of cognition, emotion and learning (Dunbar, 2004; Nicholson,
2001; Reber, 1993; Slovic et al., 2004); (3) dual process theories provide a parsimonious
conceptual framework in which to place a pedagogy based upon managerial cognition
(Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 2002; Smith and DeCoster, 1999; Stanovich and West, 2000); (4) the
training and development profession is increasingly being expected to be explicit about the
theoretical bases of its work (Armstrong and Sadler-Smith, 2008), and depth and breadth of
theorising is becoming a priority for human resource development research (Garavan,
O’Donnell, McGuire and Watson, 2007). By failing to acknowledge these issues cognitive
styles researchers, trainers and management educators run the risk of overlooking some of the
most important developments in the current body of scientific knowledge relating to human
cognition.
9
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Acknowledgement: The author is grateful to Dr. Eva Cools of the Vlerick Leuven Gent
Management School, Gent, Belgium for her constructive comments on an earlier and more
extensive draft of this work.
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