Choy Yu Fong
UHB2207 Language, Cognition and Culture
A/P Peter Vail
Assignment 2: Relativity
140914
Can language shape thought? This deceptively simple question has triggered
rigorous debate over the past few decades since it was brought to attention by the
works of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf proposed that each language system enshrines
a unique way of analysing and perceiving the world. Therefore, speakers of different
languages should act and perceive differently even in situations which are objectively
similar (Whorf, 1956). Whorf’s views have since been associated with linguistic
determinism which proposes that language determines how we think. While this
strong Whorfian view has been unanimously put down by the academic community
(see Casasanto, 2008), many studies have set out to prove a weaker version of the
Whorfian hypothesis. This weak version, known as the linguistic relativity hypothesis,
proposes that language influences thought. One example is the domain of time,
where research have tried to investigate whether speakers of different languages
think differently about time (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto et. al., 2004; Santiago et.
al., 2007; Furhman & Boroditsky, 2009; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; Lynden et. al.,
2011).
In this paper, I am interested in finding out whether the orthography of a
language influences how we think about time. Time is an abstract and elusive
concept because there is no definite physical stimulus of time in which humans can
perceive through their senses (Grondin, 2001). Therefore, humans derive the
structure of time from metaphorical mappings of more concrete domains such as
space (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). These mappings have been found to be consistent
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with the orthography of the language. In a study conducted by Furhman and
Boroditsky, Hebrew and English speakers were given pictures of varying temporal
sequences and asked to lay them out in chronological order (Furhman & Boroditsky,
2009). The results showed that English speakers were more likely to lay out the
sequences from left to right, whereas Hebrew speakers were more likely to lay out
the sequences from right to left. In the same study, English and Hebrew speakers
were made to answer time-related questions on a computer screen with varying
positions of ‘past’ and ‘future’ answers keys. The results showed that English
speakers were faster to answer questions when the ‘past’ answer key was on the left
and when the ‘future’ answer key was on the right. The converse was observed for
Hebrew speakers. These results show evidence that humans think in terms of a
mental ‘timeline’ which flows in a direction consistent with their language’s writing
direction. Other studies with similar designs corroborated the results for Spanish and
German speakers (Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; Santiago et. al., 2007), showing that
they too possess a mental timeline which flows from left to right.
However, the above mentioned studies are insufficient for making claims
about linguistic relativism. This is because cross-linguistic data do not provide strong
evidence for causal effects of language. For example, showing that Hebrew and
English speakers spatialize time differently when tested separately as in Furhman’s
and Boroditsky’s study does not necessarily imply that language is the main factor
for this difference. Critics may argue that speakers of English and Hebrew think
about time differently due to other group specific confounding factors such as cultural
practices. Cross linguistic experiments are necessarily quasi experimental in nature
because we cannot randomly assign natural languages to test subjects (Casasanto,
2008, pg74). One solution to this problem is to make use of bilinguals test subjects.
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This provides control for any possible group specific confounding factors as
experiments are performed on only one group. Further, the effect of language can be
isolated through experimental intervention. By priming two groups of bilinguals in one
of their fluent languages respectively, we can then proceed to see whether language
primes have caused these two groups of bilinguals to produce different experimental
results.
Moreover, there exist limitations in the experimental methodology of the
previously mentioned studies. These studies typically involved their subjects in
linguistic tasks such as interpreting and answering temporal questions (Ulrich &
Maienborn, 2010; Santiago et. al., 2007). Such experiments required subjects to
either produce or understand language. Therefore, any cross-linguistic difference
between spatial and temporal relations may be present because subjects were
forced to process language. This limits the claims of such studies to a weak version
of linguistic relativism as proposed by Slobin, that any difference in spatial and
temporal relations are present because subjects were accessing linguistic thought
(Slobin, 1996, pg22). Would the same spatial and temporal relations be present even
when the subjects are performing a completely non-linguistic task?
In my experiment, I intend to avoid these pitfalls by adapting an experimental
methodology which tests subjects’ estimation of time for brief events (Casasanto,
2008). Firstly, it is a completely non-linguistic task. Therefore, any difference in
subject’s estimation of time for brief events provides strong evidence for linguistic
relativism. Further, testing subjects’ estimation of time is a different way of
quantifying differences in temporal thought. This introduces a new paradigm of
thought to be investigated which complements previous studies in proving for
linguistic relativity, covering another aspect of cognitive processes.
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I will be looking at English and Hebrew subjects in my experiment because
the orthographies of their language are exactly the opposite of each other. This
would amplify any differences which my experimental results may show, allowing for
easier analysis. Previous studies have shown that individuals subconsciously
included unessential spatial information when producing time estimates of event
duration. Casasanto and Boroditsky had subjects view lines growing across a screen
one at a time (Casasanto & Borodtisky, 2007). Her subjects were then instructed to
estimate either the displacement of the line or the time taken for the line to
completely extend. They found that spatial displacement affected the time duration
estimates for subjects and this effect was found to be uni-directional. Casasanto also
had English and Hebrew speakers estimate the duration of videos containing
distance and amount interference separately (Casasanto, 2008). He found that the
estimations of time by English speakers were more affected by distance interference,
whereas the estimations of time by Hebrew speakers were more affected amount
interference. This corresponded to the phenomenon that English speakers use
distance metaphors to talk about time while Hebrew speakers use amount
metaphors to talk about time. Both studies exemplified that cross-dimensional
interference from space to time was observed whenever subjects tried to estimate
time duration. This pattern of interference however is not uniform across languages.
If English speakers think in terms of a mental timeline flowing from left to right,
then a video showing a line extension from left to right would pose less crossdimensional interference for their estimate of time. English speakers would therefore
be more likely to make more accurate time estimations for these videos. Conversely,
Hebrew speakers should be more likely to make more accurate time estimations for
videos showing a line extension from right to left. If however both English and
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Hebrew speakers think the same way about time, then they should not differ in their
time estimations for both videos, since both videos are of the same duration.
Part 1 of my experiment aims to show that English and Hebrew speakers
perceive time differently even when performing a completely non-linguistic task.
Experiment Part 1
Subjects: Monolingual English and Hebrew speakers will be engaged for this study.
They must have a proficiency level of at least 3 for their respective language. They
must also not have lived abroad for more than 6 months in order to control for their
exposure to other languages.
Materials: Two videos of the same duration (15s) will be played on a computer
screen. Each video will be similar in the following aspects: When the video is played,
a bolded line will extend across the screen in a two dimensional manner. The line will
extend fast enough such that it will reach the end of the screen before the end of the
video. When the line reaches the edge of the screen, there will be a frame transition
in the same direction. This is done so that subjects cannot use the end displacement
of the line to estimate the time duration of the video. The only difference in the
videos would be the direction of the line extension: Video 1 will show a line extension
from left to right while video 2 will show a line extension from right to left. In both
videos, the rate of line extension will be kept constant as the different rates of
extension may affect the subject’s temporal judgement.
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Procedure: The subjects will be split into four equal groups as shown in figure 1 and
made to watch their assigned videos. Subjects are only allowed to perform one
experimental trial each because they will be exposed to the motive of the experiment
after the first trial. This may influence them to employ other strategies to estimate the
time duration in the second trial which may bias results. After watching the videos,
each subject will be asked to estimate the duration of the video by clicking twice on
the same spot on the computer screen. The interval duration between the two clicks
will be measured and recorded.
The error margin for each subject’s estimation of the video duration will be
calculated in percentages and averaged within each group. The error margins will
then be compared across the four groups. We would expect group 1 and group 3 to
have the lowest error margin for time estimates. This is because for both groups, the
directional interference in the video are aligned to the orthography of the subject’s
language. Therefore, there would be minimal cross-dimensional interference on their
estimation of time. By the same reasoning, groups 2 and 4 would be expected to
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show higher error margins for their time estimates because there would be a greater
cross-dimensional interference effect.
If we obtain the expected results, this would mean that English and Hebrew
speakers think about time in different directions, since the same directional
interferences affect their judgement of time differently. Since the experimental task is
entirely non-linguistic, we can strongly conclude that speakers of English and
Hebrew spatialize time differently, even when they are not ‘thinking for speaking’.
This part of the experiment is crucial because it serves as the basis for
subsequent parts of the experiment which attempts to isolate causes for the
observed differences. If all four groups produce the same error margins for
estimation of the videos, then the experiment would have failed. This could be due to
two reasons. The first reason could be that the English and Hebrew speakers do not
think differently about time, which would contradict previous studies. The second,
more plausible reason would be that the spatial interferences presented by the video
are not sufficient to cause any cross-dimensional interference. In the event that the
experiment fails, other forms of spatial interference should be tried out first before we
conclude English and Hebrew speakers do not think differently about time.
Having shown that English and Hebrew speakers perceive time differently,
part 2 of my experiment aims to show that this difference in thinking is due to
language.
Experiment part 2
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Subjects: Bilingual English and Hebrew speakers will be engaged for this study.
They must have a proficiency level of at least 2 for both languages. They must also
not have learnt a third language.
Materials: In addition to the materials presented in part 1, additional materials make
up the primes used in this experiment. Primes will consist of a televised news report
in either English or Hebrew, lasting around 10 minutes. A set of simple and
descriptive questions pertaining to aspects of the news report will also be devised.
Procedure: The bilingual subjects will be split into two equal groups as shown in
figure 2. Each group will be primed in either English or Hebrew. For the priming
procedure, each subject will be made to watch the news report video. They will then
be instructed to complete a questionnaire which requires written answers. This
ensures that the individuals are thinking and processing in their respective
languages, which makes language the variable to be tested between the two groups.
The bilingual subjects will then be made to watch their assigned videos, following the
same procedures in part 1. The time estimation result for each subject will be
recorded and analysed.
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As per the analysis in part 1, the error margins of time estimates for both
groups will be calculated and compared. We would expect to see a significant
difference in time estimates for both groups of bilinguals. More importantly, English
primed bilinguals should show error margins similar to the English speakers in part 1
while Hebrew primed bilinguals should show error margins similar to the Hebrew
speakers in part 1. This would identify language as the main casual factor for
causing the same group of bilinguals to think differently about time.
A major assumption made in this part posits bilingual speakers to share the
same group traits. Therefore an experimental intervention using language priming
would necessarily isolate language as the causal factor. As it turns out, the case may
not be so simple. For example, Boroditsky showed that factors such as first language
and age of acquisition for second language necessarily impute differences in how
bilinguals spatialize time (Boroditsky, 2001). There may be huge variability within the
bilingual group, which may erase any differences in the expected experimental
results. One solution will be to conduct pre-experimental surveys to select bilinguals
based on a standard set of criteria to minimize in group differences.
Part 2 of the experiment shows whether language is the main causal factor for
how English and Hebrew speakers think differently about time. Part 3 of aims to find
out whether this differences remains when we reverse the orthography of the
language.
Experiment part 3
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Subjects: Same as in part 2.
Materials: In addition to the materials presented in part 1, additional materials make
up the primes used in this experiment. In this experiment, subjects will be taught to
read and right in the opposite direction of their language. Primes will consist of a text
which mirrors the orthography of the type of primes. For example, an English prime
will show an English text written from right to left. A short questionnaire containing
simple questions in the same style related to the text will also be used.
Procedure: The bilingual subjects will be split into two equal groups as per
experiment part 2. Each group will be primed in either English or Hebrew. For the
priming procedure, each subject will be made to read the respective mirrored text.
They will then be instructed to complete a questionnaire, writing their written answers
in a mirrored direction. The priming procedure aims to ‘train’ subjects to process and
write in a completely mirrored style, introducing an orthography which is opposite to
the conventional one. The bilingual subjects will then be made to watch their
assigned videos, following the same procedures in part 1. The time estimation result
for each subject will be recorded and analysed.
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As per the analysis in part 1 and 2, the error margins of time estimates for
both groups will be calculated and compared. We would expect to see a significant
difference in time estimates for both groups of bilinguals. More importantly, we would
expect to observe results opposite to those obtained in part 2. That is, bilinguals
primed in mirrored English should show a lower error margin when watching right-left
videos and vice versa for bilinguals primed in mirrored Hebrew. This would show that
the orthography of a language, not other attributes of language, are causing the
English and Hebrew speakers to perceive time differently.
To conclude, my experiment intends to tease out whether the orthography of
language causes English and Hebrew speakers to perceive time differently. This is
done in three parts. Part 1 attempts to show that English and Hebrew speakers give
different estimates of the same event duration with different spatial interferences.
This establishes that English and Hebrew speakers think differently about time. Part
2 shows that this differences can be induced by language priming in English-Hebrew
bilinguals, showing that the difference in thinking is due to language. Part 3 shows
that the orthography of language is the main factor by mixing new writing directions
into the language primes to try and reverse the experimental results.
2716 words
Works Cited:
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Boroditsky, Lera. "Does Language Shape Thought? Mandarin and English Speakers'
Conceptions of Time." Cognitive Psychology 43.1 (2001): 1-22. Print.
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Casasanto, Daniel, et al. "How deep are effects of language on thought? Time
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the 26th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. 2004. Print.
Santiago, Julia et. al. "Time (also) flies from left to right." Psychonomic Bulletin &
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