13 July, 2013 (15th International Conference on Social Dilemmas)
E‐mail: [email protected]
Psychological processes of linkage between social dilemmas and social exchange
Misato Inaba 1,2
2
Nobuyuki Takahashi
*1 JSPS Research Fellow , Japan
*2 Hokkaido University, Japan
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Overview
• Linkage
– Giving resources only to social dilemma’s cooperators while not giving to SD defectors in a social exchange. • Research question: What is the psychological mechanism of linkage?
• Experiment 1
– People engage in linkage behavior.
Experiment 2
– Internal attribution is necessary for linkage.
• Discussion: Does engaging in linkage behavior promote self‐interest?
C
D
2
Linkage
• Making two or more types of situations interdependent (Aoki, 2001).
– EX.) Activity among local community members and helping behavior.
link
You would rather help those who positively participate in the local community.
• This is sometimes called reputational mechanism.
– People won’t be nice to someone who has bad reputation.
3
Linkage between
social dilemmas and social exchanges
• Social exchange
– Non‐economic exchange. Obligation involved in the exchange is unspecified, at least initially.
– “One person does another a favor and while there is an expectation of some future return (Blau, 1964)”.
– Prisoner’s dilemma games and indirect reciprocity games can be regarded as types of social exchange.
• How could linkage with social exchange solve social dilemma?
– Those who have bad reputation in SD are excluded from the social exchange, which means they lose the benefit of social exchange.
– Linkage will work as a selective incentive for cooperating in SD.
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Linkage as a solution to social dilemma
• Previous laboratory experiments showed linkage between SD and several types of social exchange.
• Consequently, mutual cooperation in SD was facilitated.
(e.g., Milinski et al., 2002; Vyrastekova & van Soest, 2007; Sylwester & Roberts, 2013).
Vyrastekova & van Soest (2007)
– Participants played an SD game and a PD game alternately.
– Linked condition and unlinked condition.
• The cooperation rate in SD was higher in the linked condition than in the unlinked condition.
• In the linked condition, the more participants contributed in SD, the more they were given resources in PD game.
‐>SD and PD were linked.
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What kind of psychological mechanism
exists to explain linkage?
• Past studies showed that people engage in linkage behavior.
• Why do people engage in linkage?
Experiment 1
• Do people engage in linkage behavior?
• We also explored possible psychological mechanisms underlying linkage.
Experiment2
• We examined the psychological mechanism suggested in Exp.1.
• Is internal attribution necessary for linkage?
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Exp. 1 : Do people engage in linkage behavior? And, why?
• Social exchange: Repeated PD • Participants: 41 students (M=28, F=13)
• Each group consisted of 5 members.
The 1st stage
SD game
The 2nd stage
Repeated PD game
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Exp. 1
Condition and dependent variable
• Condition: partner’s SD history
– SD cooperator condition: the PD partner was an SD cooperator.
– SD defector condition: the PD partner was an SD defector.
• Dependent variable
– Giving rate in the 1st PD
– If the giving rate is higher in the cooperator condition than in the defector condition, linkage occurred.
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Exp. 1
Result
Giving rate in PD game
80.5%
41.5%
SD cooperator
SD defector
(χ2 (1) =13.12, p<.001)
• Participants gave more to an SD cooperator than to a defector.
• They engaged in linkage behavior.
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Exp. 1
Result: Psychological mechanism
• People engaged in linkage behavior.
‐>What is the psychological mechanism behind linkage?
Post‐experimental questionnaire
• People perceived SD cooperators as good‐
natured.
• People expected good‐natured people to give at a higher rate.
• People gave their resources when they expected partner’s giving behavior.
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Exp. 2
• Do impression formation and expectation cause linkage behavior?
• We manipulated the possibility of internal attribution.
– Attribution of behaviors to internal traits is necessary for impression formation.
Hypothesis Internal attribution of partner’s behaviors is
possible ‐> linkage would occur impossible ‐> linkage would not occur 11
Exp. 2
Is internal attribution necessary for linkage?
• Participants: 57 students (M=45, F=12)
• In each session, two groups participated. • Each group consisted of 4 members.
The 1st
stage
Group A SD game
The 2nd stage
Repeated PD game
Group A
Group A did not exist.
Group B Individual task
Group B
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Exp. 2
The 1st stage
Group A: SD
• Endowment: 500 yen
• Given a card: Two behavioral
choices to use the endowment
were written.
• Each member chose his behavior from the choices written on his card.
Example of card
Choice
X: Cooperate
Y: Defect
Choice
X: Cooperate
Y: Cooperate
Group B: Individual task
• Members of Group B engaged in an individual task which is completely different from SD. 13
nd
The 2
stage
Exp. 2
• Participants played a repeated PD game with each of the 4 members of the different group.
– Endowment: 50 yen per partner
Note: Group A did not exist. Participants belonged to Group B.
Group B
• PD partners: members of Group A.
• They knew their partners’ history on the 1st stage SD game.
Conditions were manipulated by the choices written on the card and which behavior each partner chose (within‐subject factors).
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Exp. 2
Conditions
Intention condition
No intention condition
Two choices
Only one choice
cooperate
cooperate
cooperate
defect
defect
defect
cooperate
defect
Linkage: participants gave more to an SD cooperator than to an SD defector.
Prediction: linkage would occur only in the intention 15
condition. Result: Giving rate in PD
***
Exp. 2
cooperator
defector
73.7%
56.1% 57.9%
26.3%
intention
no intention
Logistic regression, interaction is significant. (β＝2.13, p<.001)
Only in the intention condition, participants gave more to an SD cooperator than to a defector = linkage occurred 16
Exp. 2
Positive impression
(7‐point scale)
***
5.21
cooperator
defector
Expectation of partner’s giving in PD
***
78.9%
cooperator
defector
66.7%
52.6%
4.29 4.10 3.28
14.0%
intention no intention
GLM, interaction is significant.
(F(1,56)=85.01, p<.001)
intention
no intention
Logistic regression, interaction is significant. (β=3.72, p<.001)
These items show the same pattern.
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Exp. 2
Mediation analysis Psychological process of linkage behavior
Impression
1.74***
Condition
3.72***
1.04**
2.13***
‐0.58 (2.13***)
Expectation of partner’s giving in PD
Giving in PD
1.90***
Impression formation and expectation of partner’s giving are the psychological processes of linkage behavior.
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Summary of results • What kind of psychological mechanism explains linkage?
– People form a good impression toward an SD cooperator and expect his giving behavior, – while they form a bad impression toward an SD defector and therefore expect non‐giving behavior.
– This is why people engage in linkage behavior.
• Thus, impression formation and expectation of partner’s behaviors cause linkage.
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Does engaging in linkage behavior promote self‐interest?
*Since it depends on the structure of social exchange, here we limit our discussion to a case of repeated PD.
• If people choose their behavior in social exchange independently of SD, linkage behavior would not be profitable for an actor.
– Those who engage in linkage would lose the opportunity to attain mutual cooperation with SD defectors. – A certain type of person may defect in SD but cooperate in a social exchange.
– Those who engage in linkage would not be able to form good exchange relationships with them.
‐>Thus, linkage might even be a maladaptive strategy.
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Future direction
• The results of current study suggested that people have a belief that human behaviors are consistent across situations.
‐>Linkage may be a mechanism which takes advantage of behavioral consistency.
• If there is actually a correlation between behaviors in social exchange and SD, linkage could be adaptive.
‐>In the future studies, we need to examine when correlation emerges so that linkage behavior promotes self‐interest.
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Thank you!
Psychological processes of linkage between social dilemmas and social exchange
Misato Inaba
Nobuyuki Takahashi
E‐mail: [email protected]
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Game theoretic explanation of linkage
Aoki(2001)
• To assume that people have a shared belief that “people would not give resources to SD defectors in another social exchange.”
• Since behaviors in SD would become a shared knowledge, SD defectors expect not giving from others in another social exchange.
• Then, SD defectors should defect in the social exchange. • This expectation, defection by SD defectors causes people to defect toward SD defectors in the social exchange from the beginning.
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SD
Coop
Defect
Coop
Coop
Shared belief
“People would not give resources to SD defectors.”
Defect
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SD
Coop
Defect
Shared belief
“People would not give resources to SD defectors.”
PD
Coop
Coop
IfDefect
heI defected
gives me,
I would
in the
SD, so give him.
But people
if he would
does not
notgive
give me, I
menot
resources
in the PD,
would
give him.
then
Whether will he give meNot-give
or not?
He would think like
this, then
I defected in the
SD, so people
would not give
me resources in
the PD, then
Not-give
Not-give
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Knowledge manipulation
Exp. 1
• For preventing shared belief from working, we manipulated participants’ belief about what the other people know.
Participants were told ...
 Nobody knows the other people’s behaviors in SD.
 But ONLY YOU know what your partner did in SD.
 Your partner believes that you does not know what he/she did in SD.
Note: We used deception for this manipulation.
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Although you know whether your partner is a Exp. 1
SD cooperator or not, your partner believed that
you does not know what he/she did in SD.
2nd stage PD
I defected in the SD,
so people would not
give me resources in
the PD, then
Not-give
I wonder what he thinks.
He would think
like
this, then
?
My partner does I defected in the
SD, so people
not know that I would not give
defected in SD.
me resources in
Not-give
the PD, then
Not-give
Don’t know
Know
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Giving rate in PD game
90.91
Exp. 1
SD cooperator
SD defector
• Participants who cooperated in the 68.42
59.09
SD gave more in the PD game.
• Both participants who cooperated in 21.05
the SD and defected in the SD engaged on linkage cooperated
defected
behavior.
Participants’ SD behavior
(cooperated: N=22, defected: N=19)
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Exp. 2
Mediation analysis Psychological process of linkage behavior
Impression
1.74***
Condition
3.72***
1.04**
(2.13***)
‐0.58 Expectation of partner’s giving in PD
Giving in PD
1.90***
Impression formation and expectation of partner’s giving are the psychological processes of linkage behavior.
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Exp. 2
Positive impression scale
•
•
•
•
1 Ill‐natured ‐ 7 Good‐natured
1 Disagreeable ‐ 7 Agreeable
1 Unapproachable ‐ 7 Approachable
1 Untrustworthy ‐ 7 Trustworthy
conditions
Alpha
Intention‐ SD cooperator
0.85
Intention ‐ SD defector
0.76
No intention ‐ SD cooperator
0.91
No intention ‐ SD defector
0.39
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Exp. 2
Mediation analysis
Independent Model 1
Model 2
variables
Intercept
1.03 *** ‐3.84 **
Intention
** ‐0.51 ‐0.78 (0=Intention)
SD behavior *** ‐0.03 ‐2.06 (0=cooperator)
Interaction 2.13 *** 0.74 Impression
Expectation of partner’s giving in PD
‐
‐
0.99 ***
‐
Model 3 Model 4
1.60 *** ‐3.54 *
‐0.97 *
0.50 ‐0.31 0.41 0.71 ‐0.58 ‐
1.04 **
‐2.03 *** ‐1.90 ***
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Exp. 2
Positive impression and expectation
DV: Expectation of partner’s giving in PD
Independent variables
Model 1
Model 2
1.32 ***
Intercept
‐2.38 *
Intention (0=Intention)
‐3.13 **
‐1.88 ***
SD behavior (0=cooperator)
‐1.22 ***
‐0.60 Interaction Impression
3.72 ***
‐
2.58 ***
0.74 ***
Impression
Condition
Expectation
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Types of social exchange
• Conditions under which linkage becomes a rational behavior may depend on the type of social exchange.
• Current study: Repeated PD
– Direct exchange and Forced play
• In some types, correlation may not be needed.
– Selective play
• Competitive altruism will work.
– Indirect exchange
• Milinski et al.(2002), Sylwester & Roberts (2013)
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