Team Situation Assessment and
Information Distribution
HENRIK ARTMAN1
Division of Operational Studies, National Defence Collage
Sweden
[email protected]
This paper describes the cooperative work of constructing team situation awareness
within two teams of a military command and control unit. Specifically we discuss how
the distributed cognitive and cooperative work of decision-making of the two teams is
structured. The situation enabled two different ways of distributing information within
the team: one serial and one parallel. One team chose the parallel information transfer,
the other the serial one. We discuss the interaction patterns that emerge in the respective
teams and their consequences for situation assessment and situation awareness. We then
conclude by discussing the differences in terms of means of sharing information. We
also offer some hypotheses for future research.
Keywords: Dynamic Decision Making; Command and Control; Situation Awareness;
Co-operation
1. Introduction
The command and control unit under investigation is a military staff unit at battalion
level with the task of ensuring that its company units can control the enemy forces. Its
work is to plan and transmit orders to its subordinates and artillery units, and also to
construct an overall picture of the situation at the front, in order to be able to direct and
coordinate action between troops and companies. Furthermore they should be able to
forecast what the enemy will do next and how to best utilise its own forces both now
1 Most of the work has been done while affiliated with the Department of Communication Studies,
Linköping University, Sweden.
and in the near future. Thus its task is to assess the emerging situation, or in other words
produce an appropriate situation awareness of the front, and ensure that its own forces
may be able to hinder unwanted developments. The staff must gather information from
several units in order to understand and predict the situation, i.e. produce situation
awareness of the whole battle front which includes both their own forces and the enemy
forces. This paper deals with how technology arrangements enable distribution of information, and analyses how this may affect the situation assessment process.
Technology is, according to a socio-cultural theory, tightly coupled to cognitive
functioning (Hutchins, 1995; Wertsch, 1991). From this point of view it is the combined
effort of humans and their machines, or more generally artefacts, that counts. Humans
have the privilege of interpreting the meaning of information (Salomon, 1993) but their
interpretation will always be affected by how different technologies represent the information. The human-machine cooperation perspective entails many aspects ranging from
socio-historical to physical ones. Here we will discuss the physical distribution of information, which is enabled by two different forms of technology architectures, that is,
how the technology is arranged to allow information flow between agents. Thus the
team is considered the primary cognitive information-processing unit, rather than creating a division between actors, practices and technology.
Both experimental and field study research suggests that the way in which information is distributed within a team affects its performance (see Hutchins, 1995; Stammers
& Hallam, 1985). Brehmer & Svenmarck (1995) have experimentally investigated how
geographically distributed decision-makers, together considered as a team, manage to
control a dynamic system. They compared an information distribution using a hierarchical architecture and one using a so-called fully connected architecture where everybody
can communicate with everybody, and found that the hierarchical condition managed to
control the system better, but only marginally. However, in their experiment, the central,
commanding person in the hierarchical condition is alone responsible for compiling
adequate information and assessing the future of the system. This may cause a too high
workload because of the limited cognitive capacity of individuals. Many other coordination centres (see Heath & Luff, 1992; Hutchins, 1990; Suchman, 1996) have divided the
overall task of situation assessment into several more simple tasks which are distributed
among several individuals. In this military case one person is responsible for handling
the companies and their information processes and another person is assigned to fight
enemies with artillery fire. The former mainly coordinates actions that have to be performed in conjunction with several units and keeps track of where the forces are, while
the latter mainly tries to control the enemy by using the artillery forces which the battalion and the brigade have at hand. This division of simple tasks calls for distribution and
14
coordination of information at the local level of the team in order to construe appropriate
situation awareness.
2. Team Situation Assessment
In the relatively new research field of team decision-making several researchers
(Klein & Thordsen, 1989; Orasanu & Salas, 1993, Duffy 1993) argue that teams differ
from general groups in that the members explicitly have different roles and tasks, and
thus attend to different items of information in the decision process, while members of
groups in group decision-making often are fully involved in the decision process (see
also Brehmer, in prep. for a critical discussion). Furthermore, teams are more often
thought of as being in a more elaborated context with special artefacts and tools than the
generic group in experiments. In group decision research the emphasis is on how a
group reaches consensus (Brehmer, in prep). This is not as important in team decisionmaking as all the members of the team have well-defined roles and tasks and the goal is
more one of merging the information together with a common goal than of making a decision that all accept, it is argued. In the team, one member may concentrate on gathering information, another on analysing the information but they may not have to communicate about the actual decision since this is a third person's responsibility. This division
of labour has consequences for the team’s cognitive functioning and thus for both situation assessment, situation awareness and decision-making.
During the last ten years the concept of situation awareness (SA) has become more
and more important for the control of dynamic systems (see Endsley, 1995; Vidulich,
Dominguez, Vogel& McMillan, 1994), but only a few researchers deal with Team SA
(Salas, Prince, Baker, Shrestha, 1995; Wellens, 1993; Samurçay & Rogalsky, 1993).
Even though adequate SA is not itself sufficient for good decision-making (Flach, 1995)
a well-informed and well-anchored decision (planning, commands etc) has better
chances of being accepted within the team and down the hierarchy. Thus SA becomes an
important concept.
Wellens (1993:272) defined group SA as “the sharing of a common perspective between two or more individuals regarding current environmental events, their meaning
and projected future“, and Salas, Prince, Baker, Shrestha (1995:131) defined team SA as
”at least in part the shared understanding of a situation among team members at one
point in time”. Although we do not fully disagree with these definitions we would like to
stipulate a definition that puts more emphasis on the interpretative and distributed nature
of team SA; “ Two or more agents active construction of a situation model which is
partly shared and partly distributed and, from which they can anticipate important future
states in the near future.“2 This definition puts more emphasis on the process than the
state. This because the state of situation awareness is not simply the sum of individual
SA or a completely group level idea of a situation, it is an actively communicated and
coordinated accomplishment between several members. This accomplishment emerges
in a context where artefacts and information technology partly structure the possibility
of sharing and distributing information.
Team SA is related to the concept of a shared mental model (Cannon-Bowers, Salas,
Converse, 1993). Shared mental models include the team members’ models of the coordinating routines and knowledge within the team, while, SA is the conception of the
situation ‘out there’, here the battle field. Cognitive functioning of shared mental models
is vital for how the team collectively assesses the situation, as the means of sharing information is what the team coordinate their efforts by. Teams that work closely together
learn to know each other’s needs, knowledge and tasks and can adjust their information
sharing and interpretations to those needs, a situation we have called cognitive empathy
(Artman & Wærn, 1998). Cognitive empathy means that someone with a shared understanding of how to coordinate does so in an appropriate way without having a shared
history and complete understanding of the other persons situation awareness. Thus, being able to take the appropriate actions without being told to do so, or having explicit
cues for doing it. So it is more than a predictive or formal model for the coordination of
work.
3. Technology and Information Distribution
Most human-computer interaction research focuses on the internal processing of information by artefacts or humans. Here we discuss information distribution and technology
assisted communication as the arrangement of equipment within the team. In Hutchins’
words
The arrangement of equipment in a workplace might seem to be a topic for traditional, noncognitive ergonomics. However, it has an interpretation in terms of the
construction of systems of socially distributed cognition. The interaction of the
properties of the senses with the physical layout of the task environment defines
possibilities for the distribution of access to information.(Hutchins, 1995:197)
This article highlights the possible consequences of distributing information in different
ways in the social system, and how interpretations are sequentially constrained by dif2
16
This definition is informed by Hutchins (1990) and Weick & Roberts (1993). It is discussed in
more depth in Artman & Garbis (1998).
ferent transformations (Hutchins, 1995). First we want to describe how the two teams
distribute information by means of the technology. Then we want to discuss the possible
consequences of this difference in distribution. How are the teams structured in terms of
information flow and means of coordination? What difference do different information
flows imply for the team situation assessment and awareness?
First and foremost this case study is intended to be hypothesis generating. We
wanted to start from a work situation where actual practitioners used their ordinary
methods in order to be able to work out hypotheses, which we can test in an experimental situation. The research questions concern team decision-making and particularly how
practitioners organize their work, given the kind of artefacts they have at hand. Here we
will look at two organizations that emerge in two military command teams. The organizations emerged spontaneously, without our intervention, during training in a simulator,
and originate from a very small change in the technology. This minor alteration may
have major consequences.
Let us first make our acquaintance with the team roles and their responsibilities.
4. The control room
The battalion's overall goal is to delay and prevent the enemy from invading the territory. In order to do this the focused team has to coordinate its forces and the brigade artillery. The team we will focus is in the middle of a command chain, where they receive
general goals from a supervisor major situated at another place, and deal with requests
from subordinate units. The teams work is thus to mend these demands and prioritise
actions to reach the overall goal of defending the assigned territory. The team members
have quite distinct work assignments, though the outcome is dependent on the team's
collective achievement. A full battalion staff consists of two teams working in shifts.
The room where the staff is housed is a small tracked vehicle identical to the kind used
in an actual combat situation. It is about 6 metres by 2.5 metres in area, with a big table
in the centre where the staff keep all their equipment. The staff consists of four people,
two signalmen and two officers. The signalmen sit at each end, and the officers in the
centre, see Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1. The control room setting. The signalman (S1) sits at the rear, the coordinator (C)
in the middle and the artillery leader (A) up front. The other signalman (S2) sits
just under the camera.
4.1. Staff and responsibilities
The signalmen (S1 and S2) each have a small computer for which they are responsible.
They write and receive messages from hierarchically subordinated units. S2 sometimes
also communicate with supervisor units by writing acknowledgement of actions that are
of broader interest (such as brigade artillery fires). They have each a small printer on
which they print out the messages and distribute them to the officers within the team.
Each officer has specific tasks connected to his rank and formal competence3. We call
them here Coordinator (C) and Artillery leader (A) respectively. The Coordinator is responsible for the coordination and communication with the distributed forces, as well as
for the accurate updating of the map. His main task is to gather and analyse, information
and then update the map and distribute relevant information (situation reports, orders
etc.) to appropriate units. The Artillery leader's task is to decide how the artillery resources are to be used and which unit should use them. This means that he has to analyse, prioritise, issue orders and inform the units about when and how much artillery
they can use, as well as to order the artillery units to fire and where and when. At the
same time he must inform the supervisory battalion major, situated in an another tracked
vehicle, about the actions. To make a decision he uses the information the Coordinator
has gathered and organized. Together the officers are responsible for the planning of and
predicting how the dynamic situation could change.
3
18
We use here the pronoun ”he” as all the team members are males.
4.2. Artefacts
In front of C and A lies a map. They also use a voice-radio system to keep in contact
with units outside of the staff. The map is the main mediating tool combined with verbal
communication, for C and A. The map looks like an ordinary map with a coordinate grid
and general signs (there might be special details for military purposes) of the area for
which the battalion is responsible. As has been noted above, C is responsible for updating the map with symbols relating to the movement of his own forces and the enemy
forces; for this he uses different standard colours and symbols. This map has two general purposes. First, it is used as an overview of the battalion and the enemy forces about
which they have information. It is from that information they decide about movements
of the forces and the use of artillery. Second, it is used as a tool for discussing and hypothesising about what the enemy is up to and what they themselves can do with their
forces to hinder them. The map is a physical representation of the team’s situation
awareness, but it does not visualise the dynamics or the processes of the battlefield or
show items of information that C has not recorded.
The team receives all new information by a voice-radio or by e-mail, and occasionally directly via other members of the battalion who visits the vehicle.
The voice-radio console includes two radiophones to contact distributed units. One
phone has loudspeakers so everyone in the room can hear what the persons at the other
end are saying. This is of course very important as it provides the members of the team
with a common ground on which to discuss and decide about further actions. This loud
speaker system is mainly used by C, to seek and receive information from the distributed
units. The other phone is a "private phone", which means that the other team members
do not hear what the other person is saying. This phone is connected to a tracked vehicle
where the supervisory battalion major is located. To keep track of what is said on the
phone they also have a logbook where all spoken messages by radio are to be entered.
Just prior to the data collection Swedish army command and control units had been
equipped with a new, complementary, tool for communicating with distributed units. It
is called DAta Reporting Terminal (DART). In simple terms it can be described as a
notebook computer designed for handling electronic mail. Each command and control
unit has two such DARTs, one for each signaller. Each DART has a printer and also has
a memory in which messages can be stored. The DART can be programmed with certain
formats to ease and standardise message writing. If a programmed formula is not wanted
messages can be typed in clear, which can be compared to an ordinary e-mail.
The printed messages are then given to the officers who take care of the written messages and then put them on pins for incoming or outgoing messages, thus providing a
chronological logbook of the messages they have received and sent. The messages are
also time-logged. This logbook can be regarded as a collective memory of what has been
done. This is useful if C has not updated the map properly or if they have to check specific messages again.
4.3. Procedures that must be accomplished
Quite schematically we will here try to describe what the team has to do.
The command and control unit receives a message from the subordinates, either via
the radio or the e-mail system. If the message is received by e-mail it is confirmed by
one of the signalmen, who then prints it out and gives it to C. If the message is received
via radio the Coordinator takes care of it directly. In both cases C evaluates the message
and transcribes the information onto the map. When the information is on the map it
constitutes, together with other information, a second time-scale with respect to when
the information was gathered.
If the message is of importance for the artillery (for example if a company or troop
calls for artillery fire) C gives A the message, else he sticks it on the incoming pin.
When A has received the message, he reads it and evaluates what, if anything, the artillery can do. Often there are several messages calling for artillery fire and then A has to
prioritise. When he has decided on artillery fire he must send a message to the artillery
(either subordinate, supervisor or both). He tells one of the signalmen to prepare for
such a message and then dictates it to the signaller, who also transmits it to the originator of the request as well as to the supervisor major.
Every now and then A and C have to confer about what the enemy is doing and how
they can plan in order to be one step ahead and delay or stop him.
As we will see, how these procedures are carried out in the teams is correlated with
the technology architecture, i.e. how the DARTs are connected. Before we can discuss
the direct work we must, therefore, have some idea of how the technology can be configurated.
5. Technology architectures
The two DARTs can be connected to other units in at least two different configurations.
One of the architectures lets one of the DARTs be connected to subordinates (hierarchically below) and the other to supervisor units, such as the unit where the battalion major
is situated or to battalion commanded fire units (hierarchically above) (see Fig. 2). The
other architecture lets both DARTs be connected to the subordinates and only one to the
supervisors (see Fig. 3). It is possible at any time to shift between the two architectures.
In both cases it is possible to send messages between the machines via the so-called local link.
20
Subordinate
S1-Dart
Local link
Supervisor
S2-Dart
Fig. 2. Shows how the technology
architecture when one computer
is connected to each of the
lower units
Subordinate
S1-Dart
Local link
Supervisor
S2-Dart
Fig. 3. Shows the technology
architecture when both computers
are connected to the lower
units
The rationale for having these two structures is that if the S1-DART breaks down all
messages can still be received by the team. This makes the means of communication
more robust.
In both structures the signalman (S2) operating S2-DART should transmit information both to the subordinate and the supervisor. In the architecture depicted in figure 2
he must then transmit via S1-DART, while the architecture in figure 3 allow direct
communication. The direct communication mode although also make that all information from subordinate units reach directly to the S2-DART, which then S2 has to deal
with. Using either architecture poses different opportunities and communication structures within the team, these communication structures in turn has consequences for how
situation awareness is distributed within the team.
6. Method
The present study has used video-audio recordings and computer logging as the main
data collection resource. We video-recorded a full battalion staff training session. The
training was divided into two parts, the first lasting from 0830 to 1930 hours, the second
from 0800 to 1100 hours, in total fourteen hours. One of the teams used nine hours of
the training session. The two teams took over each other’s combat situations every 2-3
hours, so they have worked on the same overall problem but within different temporal
phases. This means that there could be some differences in workload, but as always in
dynamic decision-making situations are not exactly comparable as a consequence of the
fact that the dynamic system changes both autonomously as well as by the control system’s actions (Brehmer, in prep.). We could not be present in the control room because
of lack of space and the possible disturbance factor. Instead we observed the sessions
from a monitor connected to the video and could ask other officers what the teams were
doing.
We have transcribed 4 hours of sampled chunks of the video recording. Many types
of messages were sent to the teams, and one type was of relevance for all team members,
i.e. they had to process it in one way or the other was an artillery request that had to be
coordinated with the supervisor battalion major. Other types of messages only address
one or two persons. As for the criteria by which chunks were analysed, we sampled
eight messages out of 71 of this specific type of message. We transcribed communications in half an hour prior to the chosen message in order to see the context in which it
was processed. This was done in order to see if there were any recurrent negotiational
processes between the team members. By this procedure we covered 28 (39.4%) of the
71 messages. One team processed 20 of this type of message and the other sent eight
messages4. This reflects the proportion of time the teams spent in the session. It was
found that the teams used the technology differently, which was not known while first
analysing the cooperation.
The transcriptions originally included both what is said, who is talking to whom (or
to ”the room”), actions such as gestures and other comments about certain matters, such
as how to use the different representations etc. In the translation from Swedish to English we have simplified the excerpts by excluding pauses, addressees, non-task relevant
actions. The analysis started by looking at how the teams differed in respect to cooperative work. It was evident that the two teams chose to work in different ways. They did
so deliberately, we did not tell them to do so. We traced the information processing and
analysed how the mediating tools and interactions made the work coordinated. The different work patterns that emerged for this analysis elicited several questions. We therefore analysed interactions in the teams’ work to show how the technology might enforce
different situation awareness between the team members within the teams, but still withholding the prescribed taskallocation. Thus the excerpts in tables (2-4), in section eight
in the article, are representative of 28 interactions with the focus on this type of message.
7. Interaction patterns
As we have seen the technology can be configured in two different architectures, one
where subordinates are connected only to one DART (Fig. 2), and the other where both
DARTs are connected in parallel to all subordinates (Fig.3). This difference gives rise to
different demands on the team and different forms of information distribution. We call
these two emerging interaction structures serial and parallel respectively, as the informa4
22
When starting to analyse this data we sought negotitional aspects of team decision-making.
We did not know that the team’s worked differently from the beginning, this became evident
as we transcribed the randomly chosen chunks. Thus, the method owes for other research purposes and therefore the chunks are unevenly distributed between the groups.
tion is processed in such ways. Under normal circumstances (e.g. when both DARTs are
in use), the teams are taught, to work by using the serial technology architecture. Despite
this, the teams chose to organize their work differently, one team worked with the serial
architecture while the second worked with the parallel one5. The interaction patterns that
emerge from the use of the technology adhere mostly to a mild form of Schmidt’s
(1991) distinction between collective and distributed cooperation. Collective cooperation is overt and conscious, while distributed cooperation is divided and semi-automous.
In this case each individual has his own tasks, thus the cooperation is distributed to some
degree, but using the serial technology architecture enables or affords more collective
cooperation, than the parallel technology architecture.
We follow the information flow within the team and highlight the stages when the
information is transformed into different representation states. Bear in mind that we are
concerned here only with information received via the e-mail system, and not when information is received via the phone.
7.1. Serial work organization; Team 1
This team is less stressed than the other team. They work calmly and methodologically
through all incoming information. This group seems to be quite socially oriented, i.e.,
they talk quite a lot with one other and try to resolve most problems collaboratively.
They use the technology as depicted in figure 2, where each DART is connected to the
subordinate and supervisor respectively. If we follow an average message the serial organization works as follows:
5
There is, for us, no possible way to tell why they chose different procedures. It can be that one
team had better understanding of the technology and what could be done with it. In any case
we have found in laboratory experiments that people are creative in this way, and do not always act as they are supposed to.
Subordinate
Supervisor
6 to supervisor
to subordinate
1
6
S1-Dart
S2-Dart
S2
Sends
2
Gives
Gives
S1
3
C
4
Dictates
A
5
Says
7
FIGURE 4. Shows the serial interaction pattern when using the normal technology structure.
The numbers denote the stages of the information processes.
S1 monitors his DART to see when an incoming message is received. When the DART
tells him that a new message is received he prints this message on a small printer (Fig 4:
stage 2). When the message is transformed into a paper strip it is more easily handled
within the team, and can constitute a buffer of information as S1 lays it in front of C,
who then can deal with it as soon as he has time (Fig. 4: stage 3). S1 is repeatedly also
told to tell C when the message seems to be an urgent one, and he also sends an acknowledgement to the originator of the message.
C then picks up the strip of paper and evaluates it. Often this is done aloud, as if he is
talking to himself. Sometimes A is then able to hear what the message is about and then
promptly helps him out and prepares his own task with respect to this message. C transforms the message to symbols and colours on the map. When the information is on the
map it is potentially accessible to all members and constitutes a second-order time-scale,
in respect of where the information originated. From this map the team members can
read out possible ways of reacting to the situation. Coordination between C and A, who
have different aims with the same information, is mediated both verbally and by paper
strip and by map. As A is dependent upon information that C distributes he is constantly
monitoring C’s work and information, which helps at all times to update his mental
situation awareness in concert with C’s. This monitoring and eavesdropping is a very
important coordination mechanism (see Heath & Luff, 1992). Much of the Team SA is
represented, and thus distributed by means of the map.
After C has noted the information on the paper strip he puts it down or promptly
gives it to A, who evaluates the message in accordance with what he can read from the
positions and symbols on the map (fig 4:stage 4). This evaluation is often done silently.
24
If there are several messages he also has to prioritise the order in which they should be
handled. C and A could start to discuss the meaning of the messages and thus interrupt
the fluent information flow. We will look at such discussions later.
Whatever the content of the message, he has to send an acknowledgement to the
originator, so he dictates a message for S2, who converts it into electronic form (Fig 4:
Stage 5). When this is done S2 sends the message via the local link to S1 and to the supervisors (Fig 4:stage 6). In order for S1 to know what to do with it (and not just print it
out automatically) A tells him to re-send (or let it through) to the subordinate originator,
as S2 does not have access to the subordinates (Fig4:stage 7). Then the decision sequence for this particular message is covered, and several sequences have started.
C is central as regards information gathering, but A is central for getting the information through. In this serial processing procedure, A becomes quite central as he relies on
information from C and S1 on his left, and must also tell S1 to re-send the message going back to the originator. "A" thus has to monitor outgoing messages to ensure they are
forwarded. The information is redundant at several levels but cannot be dealt with in
parallel as the communication is sequentially organized. It would not happen, except by
mistake, that A would get information before C and that he then would make a decision
on information (e.g. the map) that is not properly updated. C will always update the map
before A gets this particular information. In that way this organization is dependent
upon C’s interpretations. But the information processing also takes time; and time is essential in controlling dynamic systems.
7.2. Parallel work organization ; Team 2
If the other team was working calmly, this team is working hastily. They seem to try to
process the information as quickly as they can and use the technology as efficiently as
possible. Instead of writing a new message to send to the supervisor and subordinates,
this team re-uses the information in the electronic message they received, and so save
some minutes per decision made. In the beginning they switched between the two technology architectures described above. Their information processing procedure started as
it did in the other team, but when A had made a decision he told S1 to send the message
received via the local link to S2 (Fig. 5: stages 5-6). A and S2 could then elaborate the
message on their side of the room (Fig.5: stage 7). When they are ready A switches over
to the parallel technology architecture (Fig5:stage 8-9), which enables them to send the
message directly to the originator, without sending it via S1. Thus the team makes use of
the opportunity to modify at any stage the electronically held information. The procedure is depicted in Fig. 5.
Subordinate
to
s u b or d i n a t e
1
S1-Dart
Supervisor
to
s u p e r vi s or
S2-Dart
2
S2
8
6
Op e n
7
Dictates
3
4
S1
C
9
A
Sends
Gi ve s
Gi ve s
Sa ys
5
FIGURE 5. Shows the interaction pattern when alternating between the two technology architectures. The numbers denote the stages of information processing.
In order for this cycle to continue, the team has to switch between the two technology
architectures every time a message is sent. In fact, on almost every occasion they forgot
to change the technology architecture to serial, which made incoming messages reach S2
directly. It is also interesting to note that A seldom or never tells the others that he
switches between architectures. This initiated a new form of interaction structure, which
the team adopted after a while. We therefore abandon the above structure and move to
the more extreme structure that the team adopted.
When the technology architecture which connects both computers to the subordinates is used transmission via the local link is unnecessary, as all information received
from a lower hierarchy is directly duplicated to both DART-computers.
Subordinate
1
to
1
Supervisor
t o s u p e r vi s or
2
s u b or d i n a t e
S1-Dart
S2-Dart
S1
3
Gi ve s
26
S2
3 Gi ve s
2
C
A
4
Di c t a t e s
FIGURE 6. Shows the parallel interaction pattern when using the parallel technology architecture. The numbers denote the stages of information processing.
The team chose to organize their work as depicted in Fig. 6. As there are fewer information processing stages for each message, and as they can re-use the information contained in the received message, and thus do not have to manually coordinate as much,
this team processes information more quickly than the other team. In this interaction
structure S1 and S2 mirror each other to a great extent; both print out messages and give
them to C and A respectively (Fig. 6 stages 3). C transforms the information onto the
map, but instead of forwarding the message to A, as in the serial team, he sticks it directly on a pin, as a kind of logbook.
A who receives all incoming messages from S2, then consults the map and sometimes C, evaluates and prioritises on his own between the messages concerning his task.
Then A tells S2 what to change in the incoming message and lets him send it to the
originator (Fig.6:stage4). Thus, using this technology architecture A does not have to
receive any paper strip from C, nor do they have to talk in order to attend to specific information (or paper strips). The interaction between A and C’s information requirements
are mainly managed via the map they have in front of them, thus the interaction between
A and C is reduced to almost nil for their routine work, and A’s need to monitor C’s
work is nil as he receives all information from S2. A must concentrate on filtering the
information himself. The process of gathering and organizing the information is distributed to two subteams. The map becomes an even more important physical representation
of SA, as A is using the information on his own without consulting C most of the time.
This procedure may, as we will see, mean that C’s and A’s mental models can come out
of synchronisation as the updating of the map (C’s work) and the use of the information
contained in the map (A’s work) is not sequentially constrained.
The only time they have to interact is when they want to discuss more strategic problems or hypotheses. As we will see next, such discontinuity in cooperation may be a
problem.
8. Assessing the Situation
These two forms of work organization, we propose, have implications concerning how
the teams coordinate and construct a situation awareness model of the front6. The task is
6
Please observe that we here are considering the negotiational phase of situation assessment.
The assessment is mainly done by the commanders C and A. The full procedures to actually
send out the commands is accomplished as depicted above i.e. by sending a message to con-
naturally time constrained and there is a trade-off between making decisions upon information which is as complete or adequate as possible and making a quick decision.
We have seen how the two teams cope with this in different ways. The team members of
team 1 continuously talk more with one another, while team 2 work steadily with individually assigned tasks and choose the technology that supports such an organization.
We suggest that these differences may show differences in the participants’ shared representations of the battle situation (see also Grusenmeyer, 1995 for a similar discussion).
The information distribution, enabled by either serial or parallel connected DARTs may
explain the dramatic differences in hypotheses about future development generated by
the two teams (see table 1).
TABLE 1. Shows the absolute number of analyzed messages and generated hypothesis in the
two teams.
Number of analysed messages
Number of hypothesis
Team 1 (serial)
8
8
Team 2 (parallel)
20
1
Consider the following illustrative examples of interaction in the assessments of the
situation in tables 2-4. Both examples occur at the beginning of the training and both are
interactions between A and C arising after a period of low workload and when a new
message asking for artillery fire arrives.
TABLE 2. TEAM 1 (SERIAL). (simplified transcription)7
Who Message
C
A
C
S1
C
7
28
Where did we have the support platoon? Was it about
here?
Yes
Because, we have now here a smaller troop with about
80% losses. RN [a company] assess this enemy to be
destroyed, but there is a lone army cabin , firearms and
they open fire from here, and they could have had a
firetroop around here, huh
But the best is that there is ammunition about here
Yeah, with destroyed food and clothes, or what ever...
Action
Points on the map
Nods
Points on the map
C and S1 nods
Points on the map
firm or disconfirm a request, or by sending a command to a specific unit. S1 and S2 are involved in the full procedure (receiving to sending messages) .
The excerpts here are simplified which means that we have excluded pauses, intonation and
addressee. Clarification by us is within [].
A
C
S1
C
Yes, The question is, could we put, ehh, It’s too early to Points on the map
put this here... The question is what happens when SN
[a company] gives a report, because he must have e
some knowledge about that
Yeah, that means for X that
It was from RN, was it?
Yes, it was from RN, but that means for X that it is not
safe for him to drive there
Points on the map
In excerpt 1 C, A and S1 are discussing equally elaborated ideas about the future state of
the situation, which is a rare occasion in the other team. They form a hypothesis about
what might happen and what the enemy will do next, by using the map as a conversation
piece. The map contains more information than one person can actively hold in their
short term memory, and they point emphatically at the map to stress possible developments of events. We can see how they actively try to construct the development by
forming a hypothesis and anchoring these on the map. C, who is the one who has the responsibility to update the map, even asks C about the state of things. They try collectively to assess the situation. Below, in excerpt 2, we see the only situation in Team 2,
which includes a hypothesis. Instead of being collective, the dialogue between A and C
is concerned with getting A enough information in order to be able to do the job.
TABLE 3. TEAM 2 (Parallel). (simplified transcription)
Who Message
C
[C gives a message to A]
A
No, what the hell should I say? WHAT THE HELL
SHALL I SAY? It must be these (pointing at the map)
who have moved or
C
Hmm, yeah, it must be yes, they are dividing now yeah
and trying it way up here
A
What does that mean? It means like, like it looks like
C
I think the enemy’s simply trying a way where he does
not meet resistance, huh
A
And as here it is quite a big front here
C
C
Action
Points
map
on
the
Points
map
Points
map
Yeah he has sent [inaudible] He goes here with different Points
battalions and companies and tries to move forward and map
seek resistance. He should meet one hell of a lot of resistance because here is actually a battalion (hmm) SO he
will probably not get through here (hmm) There is a battalion [the same] and here there was a brigade or battalion
or? [no answer]
This 49 I think I can delete like
(another person enters and the conversation ends)
on
the
on
the
on
the
A asks C questions but does not, as A in the other team, give his interpretation about the
current situation. These questions could at first glance be seen as critical but informed
inquires, but is articulated in a more desperate voice. Also note how uncertain A is about
how to interpret the situation from the map. Instead the thread is developed by C in order to inform A about the status of the map. This is the only observed hypothesis about
the future state of the system that this team makes together in contrast to 8 in team 1.
They have supposedly constructed different models of the situation, and must resolve
this difference. It is C who communicates the most developed model. A mainly questions C to get an situation report.
In Team 1, which uses the serial work organization, the map is always updated before the decision about artillery is made, whereas in the Team 2 parallel organization it
is quite possible that A could receive and decide about a certain message before the map
is updated, and thus make a decision on older information. Thus, the information flow
gets out of synchronisation. Still they work as if C has got the latest information. In the
above transcription from team 2 we can see that A does not know exactly what to do. A
does not have, mentally, the information from which he could start to assess the situa-
30
tion properly. A contributes by giving questions to C and by that are able to adopt C’s
situational model. A is trying to gain the uttermost from C’s situation awareness but
does not contribute to the collective situational model himself.
This sharp task distribution and difference in situational assessment in team 2 is even
clearer in the next episode where A has not noticed a message of concern to him. C
promptly makes him attend to this message, but A does not understand in what context
this message comes, i.e. what is meant by it.
TABLE 4. Team 2. (simplified transcription)
Who
Message
C
A
C
A
C
A
C
A
C
A
C
Have you seen this? He wants to shoot at 225,59
Does he want to shoot now? Uh Huh, What happens?
But wait, you have to tell me what happens! Quick
orientation!
Yes, they want to cut this way here by the bridge
”I will send values [coordinates]” What does he
mean? Where does he want to shoot? Why?
He will send the coordinates
Uh Huh, he will send the coordinates
I hope
I suppose he has not said that... he should He has not
said something about firing there now?
No, he did not
You’ll take care of that won’t you?
Yes
Action
Points on the map
A reads the message
aloud
Points on the map
We can see that A does not understand the message and what it signifies, and C who
does understand, has a problem in updating him as the message must be put in a long
chain of messages in order to make sense, and A has not followed or heard of this because he has been concentrating solely on his own tasks and only selectively picked up
information from his DART-computer. By not attending to C’s work A has lost the
overall awareness of the situation and therefore must ask C about a ”quick orientation”.
Again we can see that A does not contribute with own interpretations, but only questions
C about his situational model. Taking this case as illustrating the different forms of cooperation, we interpret it as the teams using the parallel technology architecture after a
prolonged period lose contact with each other and therefore also shape different situation awareness of the front. Furthermore, as they get out of synchronisation as to their
respective situation awareness, the shared mental model of teamwork is no longer ap-
propriate and they have to restore the collective situation assessment. The map, which is
constantly updated and materializes the situation at the front, is not of much help to A as
the information here also must be understood in its historical context.
9. Conclusions
The teams share operative information by at least three means; artefacts, attentive monitoring and negotiation. The different uses of the technology, we propose, enables or affords different degrees of the coordination means. We suggest that the arrangement and
use of the technology makes the means of information sharing differently weighted in
the two teams. Each arrangement pose different valuable trade-offs, i.e. between speed
of decision process and well-synchronised anchoring of the decisions within the team.
Using the technology to support serial information processing as team 1 did, C will
always receive any information before A and A will always be dependent upon the fact
that C is passing information to him. The tasks and information flow are sequentially
constrained. This dependence allows A to continuously monitor C at any ”free” moments and follow the propagation of the information, and in turn prepare his individual
tasks. When A receive information he has already seen the changes in the context and
the decision environment has been documented. In team 2 the cooperation is more discontinuous. C is working by updating the map, and A is fully occupied in filtering information from his parallel-connected DART in order to find the information that is
relevant to him. There is simply very little time for A to attend and monitor C’s work.
When A then runs into a problem that must be resolved by earlier information, A could
either try to interpret the map, where such information should be documented, or directly ask C about the problem and start a negotiation phase instead. Interpreting a
documented map is a very time consuming and cognitively difficult task, so it is no surprise that A instead asks C about the current state.
In team 1 cooperation and sharing of information becomes a consequence of the sequential constraints, as A is dependent on C’s work and information and therefore continuously monitor C for any information. In team 2 cooperation is triggered by a problem for A. Of course, both teams use both attentive monitoring and negotiation to a high
degree, but in different ways. In team 1, attentive monitoring is at the heart of the cooperation. Team members in team 1 mostly share much information because A is monitoring C. In team 2 the team members might not share an understanding of the current state
because they process the information themselves and consequently may develop individual situation awareness. When a problem appears they will have to synchronise their
32
representations about the current state first, before discussing future states of the situation.
Our study suggest that the serial team generates a hypothesis of the future state of the
enemy vs. their units for every message, while the parallel team only generates 1 hypothesis of the 20 messages we have analysed. This dramatic difference may be a consequence of how these two teams share their information. As A in the serial team is being updated continuously by attentive monitoring, they can focus their negotiation time
to discuss future and hypothetical states. In the parallel team one member has an elaborated awareness of the situation at the front, and the other does not. Negotiation deals
with smoothing out this difference and getting a collective, or symmetrical, awareness of
the situation. We propose that the arrangement of information and the accompanying
degree of continuous or problem focused cooperation may explain the dramatic differences in hypothesis generation. What we can suggest from the empirical data, is the hypothesis, that a parallel organisation may create more breakdowns between team members, due to different degrees of situation awareness, and that time has to be taken to repair and resolve such differences. Which cooperative arrangement is most successful for
military purposes in general is hard to say as it may depend on the pace of the task and
the goal. We could not measure any absolute and objective variables of effectiveness in
this study due to that the situations the different teams worked with, was dependent and
the situations fluctuated. Obviously it is important for any artillery leader to have authorized and well informed decision ground in order to not fire on its own forces or civilians. For this reason a sequentially constrained arrangement may be the best solution.
From the theoretical analysis and observations from the empirical data we have generated some hypotheses for future research:
• The serial work organization ensures that the participants attend to more of the
same information and as a consequence are able to use a common ground or
common interpretation as a basis for cooperation, while the parallel organization requires more negotiation and cooperation.
• Teams organized for parallel work will formulate fewer collective hypotheses
about developments because they share too little information, that is situation
awareness, and must concentrate on resolve this difference first.
Users of new technology find ways of using the technology that differ from those originally intended by the designers. In this study we have shown that one team uses the
technology in an innovative way which makes it possible to speed up the decision process. The effect of the technology in this specific case is related to two conflicting goals;
the speed of information flow and the quality of situational awareness of the team and
individuals. We form the following hypotheses:
• Serial processing is better for high reliability when workload is low due to the
availability of physical representation of collective and physical situation
awareness.
• Parallel processing is better when workload is high and quicker decisions are
called for.
The field study cannot tell us why the two groups chose different ways organizing the
information flow, neither if these different ways of organizing caused their ways of
working, communicating or their results. This is the drawback of field studies. However, the field study generated some hypotheses, some of which we investigate in a more
controlled study were we compare effectiveness and information sharing practices in
serial and parallel organised teams dealing with a dynamic task (see Artman, 1997),
other hypotheses may be followed up by other researchers. One issue still unresolved is
related to trade-offs. The teams for example have to trade off shared situation assessment against decisions, and they have to trade off filtered information intake versus nonfiltered information. The first may lead to slowness, the second may lead to information
overload.
Acknowledgements
Financial support for this study has been received from the Swedish Work Environment
Fund and The Swedish National Defence Establishment. I am grateful to Professor
Yvonne Wærn for support in planning the study, help with analysing the data and sorting out the discussion. I would also like to thank E. Hollnagel and (anonymous) reviewers for constructive comments on an earlier draft. Furthermore, I would like to thank all
the personnel of the military battalions.
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