ARTICLE
COMPARATIVE
10.1177/0010414002250678
Birch
/ TWO-ROUND
POLITICAL
ELECTORAL
STUDIES
SYSTEMS
/ April 2003
AND DEMOCRACY
TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
AND DEMOCRACY
SARAH BIRCH
University of Essex
Taking as its point of departure a little-noted recent increase in use of two-round electoral systems in parliamentary elections, this article assesses the impact of such systems on democratic
performance. It argues that the possibility of holding a second round of voting is a destabilizing
factor that inhibits democratic development and encourages the use of nonelectoral means of
exercising power. This is because the institution of the double ballot works to fragment the party
system by establishing district-specific strategic incentives and by diminishing the element of
uncertainty that is key to securing cooperation by important political actors. This proposition is
tested on a data set of all states that as of 1 January 1999 held elections to the lower houses of their
national assemblies, as well as on a smaller database of democratizing countries.
Keywords: elections, electoral systems, democratization, authoritarianism, uncertainty
S
ince the beginnings of democracy, the principle of majority rule—that
no decision should be opposed by more than support it—has been closely
associated with the achievement of fair and equitable outcomes. When it
comes to the selection of leaders, this principle has often been interpreted to
mean that each leader should have majority support in the territorial (or other)
unit from which she or he is elected. The traditional means of achieving such
a result is through multiple rounds in which voting is repeated until one candidate has more than half the votes. But though election through multiple balloting is possibly the world’s oldest electoral system, its effects are not well
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article has its origins in a rather different paper presented at a seminar
in the Department of Government, University of Essex, in autumn 1997. I am thankful to the seminar participants for their many useful comments, which helped to shape the further development
of the argument. I am also grateful to Hugh Ward and to John Bartle for their help with later versions of the text, and to two anonymous reviewers. Finally, thanks go to the Economic and Social
Research Council for grant No. L213252021, which helped to fund the research on which the
article is based.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 36 No. 3, April 2003 319-344
DOI: 10.1177/0010414002250678
© 2003 Sage Publications
319
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
understood by political scientists. The study of electoral systems has focused
mainly on the distinction between single-member district majoritarian rules
on one hand and varieties of proportional representation (PR) on the other.
There is sufficient variation among the PR laws employed in the democratic
world for these to have been an important subsidiary topic of analysis, yet few
investigators have examined in more than a cursory manner the effect of varieties of majoritarianism. The comparative study of two-round (TR) systems
in parliamentary elections had been hindered by the fact that use of this system experienced a rapid decline at the start of the 20th century, and it was,
until the 1990s, a relatively marginal electoral system type. Some theorists
such as Duverger (1959), Rae (1971), and Sartori (1994) elaborated hypotheses as to the likely effects of absolute majority as opposed to plurality laws,
but the paucity of the former in the democratic world made comparative
empirical analysis of majoritarianism difficult.
Taking as its point of departure a little-noted increase in recent years in the
number of countries that employ TR rules, this article will assess the impact
of TR legislative elections on democratic performance. It will argue that the
possibility of holding a second round of voting—whether this possibility is
exploited—is a destabilizing factor that inhibits democratic development and
encourages the use of nonelectoral means of exercising power. This is
because the institution of the second ballot works to fragment the party system by establishing district-specific strategic incentives and by diminishing
the element of uncertainty that is key to securing cooperation by important
political actors.
The article is structured as follows: The first section provides an overview
of recent experience of TR systems. Section II surveys the history of the idea
behind multiple balloting and more recent assessments of the TR system; on
this basis it develops theoretical expectations as to their likely effects. The
third section tests these expectations on a data set of all states that held elections to the lower houses of their national assemblies as of 1 January 1999, as
well as on a smaller data set of democratizing countries. More detailed investigation is also conducted on the basis of a subset of states that introduced TR
elections during the 1990s. The third and final section draws out the implications of the analysis and offers several conclusions. The main argument is
that the TR electoral system is inimical to democracy in two senses: It tends to
prevent democratization from occurring and if it does occur, destabilization is
likely to result.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
321
I. THE EXPERIENCE OF TR SYSTEMS
The principle of majoritarianism is one that dates back to the early history
of election as a means of choosing officeholders. Elections in the Roman
Catholic Church have since the Middle Ages been conducted according to an
absolute majority formula with multiple ballots (Katz, 1997, pp. 18-21;
Nohlen, 1978, pp. 50-51). Repeated balloting can prove cumbersome with
large electorates, however, and multiple-round elections to secular political
institutions have employed a number of methods to simplify the process by
restricting second-round entry and relaxing the criteria for first-round success (for an overview see Cox, 1997, pp. 65-67). The two most common contemporary procedures both require an absolute majority for election in the
first round and a relative majority in the second. They differ in that one (the
run-off system used in some U.S. primary elections) restricts second-round
entry to the two top-ranked candidates in the first round, whereas the other
(that under which most National Assembly elections in the French Fifth
Republic have been held) determines second-round entry in terms of the
number of first-round votes won.
Most commentators have conflated the requirement for an absolute
majority with the mechanism of the TR system in which a run-off election is
required between the top candidates in the first round if none receives over
50% of the first-round vote. The two institutions are not the same. The alternative vote achieves an absolute majority result by requiring voters to rank
order their preferences in one round of voting, whereas in other systems a
run-off is triggered by the failure of one candidate to win less than 50% of the
vote (as in the presidential elections in Costa Rica, where there is a 40% firstround vote requirement) or there is a supermajority requirement in the first
round (as in Sierra Leone, where the criterion for first-round success in presidential elections is 55% of the vote). In still other systems, failure to achieve
an absolute majority triggers an alternative distribution method rather than a
second vote, as in Bolivia (and Chile until 1973), where the selection of a
president is made by parliament if no candidate receives an absolute majority
in the popular vote, or in Cameroon, where all the seats in multimember districts for legislative elections go to the party that receives an absolute majority of the vote, but if there is no such party, the seats are distributed proportionally.1 A distinct category of electoral systems can therefore be identified
that have a relatively high threshold of first-round success and necessitate a
second round if this threshold is not reached.
1. A similar system was used to elect the Italian senate before the reforms of the 1990s; in
that case the threshold was 65%.
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
TR systems were common in parliamentary elections throughout Europe
until well into the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but they were virtually
all relinquished in favor of proportional representation at or around the time
of mass enfranchisement (Carstairs, 1980; Rokkan, 1970). France remains
the only major country to have used the TR system in fully democratic elections to the lower house of its national legislature. Nevertheless, about 40
states have employed TR systems at some point during the postwar period.
This is currently the electoral formula in use in some of the world’s least democratic states—Cuba, Chad, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Mauritania, North Korea,
Turkmenistan, and Vietnam—as well as in several that have recently made
unsuccessful attempts at democratization (see Table 1). Finally, a number of
states have employed TR systems for one or two elections before switching to
single-round voting (Algeria, 1991; Armenia, 1995; Côte d’Ivoire, 1980 and
1985; Lithuania, 1992 and 1996; Ukraine, 1994).2
A development that has almost completely escaped the notice of electoral
systems analysts has been the dramatic recent rise in the number of states that
employ TR voting. Between 1 January 1989 and 1 January 1999 the number
of independent states with TR systems for direct elections to the lower or only
houses of their national assemblies nearly doubled from 16, or 12.6% of the
total, to 29, or 20.1% (see Table 2).
This change can be accounted for largely by two factors: the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and the wave of
democratization that swept Africa during the 1990s. Virtually all of the former communist states employed electoral systems that in theory allowed the
possibility of a second round of voting. In practice most elections in the communist world were not competitive enough for a second round to be necessary, but at the end of the 1980s this began to change. At this point both the
Soviet and the Yugoslav federations fragmented into their component parts,
leaving the resulting new states to choose their own electoral regulations. The
majority opted for proportional or mixed single-round systems, whereas a
handful stuck with the original communist model (Belarus, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan), and several switched to mixed systems requiring a second
round for their single-member seats (Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Tajikistan). Other postcommunist
states used TR systems under multiparty conditions for a time before abandoning them in favor of single-ballot models (Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania,
and Ukraine). Thus by 1999 far fewer of the citizens of the ex-communist
2. The Liberian constitution of 1984 included a provision for the parliament to be elected
according to a two-round (TR) system, but the elections of 1985 were held in one round, in evident violation of the constitution (Basedau, 1999).
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
323
Table 1
a
The Distribution of Two-Round (TR) Electoral Systems on January 1, 1999
Country
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Albania
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Macedonia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville)
Gabon
Mali
Mauritania
Togo
Other
Cuba
Haiti
Egypt
France
Iran
Iraq
Kiribati
North Korea
Vietnam
Percent of
Seats Governed
b
by TR System
Single-Member (SM)
or Multimember (MM)
Districts
74
80
100
36
46
100
100
50
71
100
100
100
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
SM
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
SM
SM and MM
SM
SM
SM
MM
SM and MM
SM
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
SM & MM
SM
2-member
SM
SM & MM
MM
SM & MM
SM
MM
Sources: See appendix.
a. Lithuania has since switched to a single-ballot system for its single-member seats;
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have now adopted mixed systems but have retained TR
voting for the single-member components of those systems.
b. Percentage of the total number of directly elected members.
states were voting in TR elections, but the number of countries using such
systems had increased, as had the number of votes that actually went to a second ballot.
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
Table 2
a
Change in the Use of the Two-Round System, 1989-1999
System Type
One round
Two round
b
Not available
All
1 January 1989
106
16
5
127
%
83.5
12.6
3.9
100
1 January 1999
114
29
1
144
%
79.2
20.1
0.7
100
Sources: See appendix.
a. In cases where parliamentary democracy has been suspended, the electoral system used in the
previous election was considered to be the current system provided a direct popular election had
been held within the past 10 years. If no such election had been held in that time, the state was
omitted altogether.
b. There was insufficient reliable information available on the electoral systems in use in 1989 in
Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and North Yemen, and that in use in the Sudan in 1999.
The democratization drive of the 1990s also brought many changes in
electoral system design when virtually all the states in sub-Saharan Africa
introduced multiparty electoral competition. As in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most African countries opted for PR or mixed PR-plurality
models. But a considerable number also switched to two rounds used either
with single-member or multimember districts; these included the Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, and Togo. In very few cases did electoral system design figure prominently in contemporary debates (Nohlen, Krennerich, & Thibaut, 1999), but
electoral systems have been shown to be important in determining the fate of
democratization in Africa (Reynolds, 1999).
II. THE TR SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL STRATEGIES
Much of the comparative work on TR electoral mechanisms has been carried out with regard to their effects on presidential elections. Absolute majority elections in two rounds are common in presidential elections, and the incidence of their use has also risen substantially in recent years with the increase
in the number of countries holding competitive presidential elections. With
this rise there has been some attention devoted to the effects of plurality versus absolute majority TR rules for selecting the chief executive. This research
has found that although absolute majority formulae are commonly defended
on the grounds that they will encourage a majority to coalesce around a single
party, their effect is typically the opposite; TR presidential electoral systems
have been empirically associated with both increased fragmentation of presi-
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
325
dential support and increased division in the legislature (Jones, 1995; Shugart
& Carey, 1992). This has been attributed to the fact that the second ballot
gives outside candidates a greater chance of success should they manage to
mobilize a second-round majority against the frontrunner. This possibility is
politically divisive in that it encourages relatively minor candidates to enter
the presidential race, which evidently has a fissiparous effect on the party
system.
The competitive context of multimember legislative elections is rather different from that of presidential elections, however, and TR systems are seen
to have several specific advantages when used to elect assemblies. One perceived characteristic of the TR system is that it allows a wide range of parties
to gain representation while still maintaining the direct link between voter
and representative. According to Duverger (1959, p. 240), absolute majority
systems allow the multiplication of parties, because the psychological effect
characteristic of plurality systems does not come into play. First-round
choices are not constrained by considerations of electoral viability, giving
more parties a shot at second-round success (cf. Sartori, 1994, pp. 61-69).3
Thus the fragmenting tendency of TR systems in presidential elections may
actually be an advantage when it comes to parliamentary elections, especially
if the result is the selection of moderate candidates representing a diversity of
interests.
The second main advantage of PR elections is taken to be their tendency to
encourage compromise on the part of voters whose preferred choice is eliminated in the first round, and on the part of parties that may form second-round
alliances in order to prevent a common enemy from being elected (Bullock &
Johnson, 1992, p. 6; Duverger, 1984; Fisichella, 1984; Norris, 1997). It is
often pointed out that the TR system prevents the election of extreme
(“antisystem”) options that, though they command plurality support, are very
much disliked by an absolute majority.4 This type of system ought, therefore,
to produce a larger number of moderate centrist legislators, especially in
those areas where no political group has overall control.
Empirical analysis of these postulated effects in parliamentary elections
was long limited by the fact that France was the only fully established democracy in which elections for the lower house of the national legislature were
held under the TR system. This made it difficult to disentangle effects characteristic of France from those inherent in the system itself. Yet even careful
empirical studies in the French context have not entirely substantiated the
theoretical claims made for TR voting. Evaluations of elections conducted
3. See, however, Cox’s (1997, p. 124) critique of this logic.
4. See Sartori (1994, pp. 67-68) for a detailed defense of this notion.
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
under the Fifth Republic (after Duverger postulated his hypothesis) found
that the French double ballot has tended to generate parliamentary party systems of a size between those found in plurality and those in PR systems (Blais
& Carty, 1991; Lijphart, 1994, p. 96; Rae, 1971, chap. 5; Taagepera &
Shugart, 1989, chap. 8).5 Recent experience in France has also led many analysts to question the view that the TR voting promotes centrist parties; the
electoral system of that country is commonly cited as one of the causes of
party system polarization (Cole & Campbell, 1989, pp. 91-131; Criddle,
1975; Hayward & Wright, 1973). Furthermore, as Fisichella (1984) points
out, the tendency of TR elections to discriminate against antisystem parties is
dependent on the fulfillment of a number of conditions that although present
in France may not always apply in other countries. Parties must be disciplined and cohesive enough to form effective alliances and strongly enough
rooted in the electorate that voters will follow their cues in the second round.
At the same time, parties and voters alike must have the ideological flexibility
to enter into alliances in the one case and to be willing to vote tactically in the
other.
Richard Katz’s (1997, p. 147) analysis using a wider data set, including
democratizing countries, found that the TR system generated large-party systems as Duverger had predicted. By some measures, the typical size of party
systems in TR countries exceeded those of proportional systems, leading one
to question the view of the TR system as a “moderate” compromise between
plurality and PR. All in all, the characteristic effects of TR elections are
poorly understood, but it is not at all clear that the advantages claimed for it
by its proponents are actually inherent features of the system. The practical
disadvantages of the system are also well known. Holding two rounds of voting is costly both in terms of governmental resources and the effort required
of voters to go to the polls twice.
In the context of democratic transition, the TR system has a number of
additional disadvantages that have yet to be fully explored. The first of these
has to do with the direct effect of the diminution of uncertainty fostered by the
gap between rounds and the second with the strategies it encourages parties
and voters to adopt in the second round. Democratic elections are a calculated
risk based on uncertainty as to the support base of each electoral option (party
or candidate). If all actors knew for certain what the outcome would be, it
would be in the (short-term) interest of losers to opt for nonelectoral methods
of achieving their ends. It may well be the thickness of the veil of ignorance
5. Studies of American primaries that employ the TR system have also found that this institution tends to increase fractionalization within parties (Canon, 1978; Wright & Riker, 1989),
though intraparty local competition has a rather different logic from competition between parties
in a national context.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
327
surrounding elections—especially in countries with little or no recent experience of electoral competition—that prompts actors to acquiesce to the relatively fair method of popular election as a means of distributing power. The
TR system goes a substantial way toward removing this element of uncertainty by revealing the distribution of electoral strength in midcourse before
the final outcome is decided. It is a system that obliges the players to reveal
their cards halfway through the game.
This has at least two important consequences. First, it encourages
midgame defections. If democratization is about getting all major parties to
play the electoral game, to take the electoral gamble (DiPalma, 1990;
Przeworski, 1991), there is a need for institutions that encourage commitment to unconditional participation by all major players. TR systems provide
an exit option after the first round. They thus promote a wait-and-see attitude
on the part of some actors. If the results of the first round indicate that a party
is likely to perform worse than it had initially anticipated, it has an interest in
calling foul by claiming fraud or rigging. In many emerging democracies
such claims have considerable plausibility, especially if instances of malpractice have been identified by monitoring organizations or if the regime
supervising the elections has a poor record of rule of law. This has been a
common scenario in the democratizing world: The opposition perceives that
it has little chance of winning so it boycotts the second round, as transpired in
Congo (Brazzaville) in 1993, Macedonia in 1994, and Haiti in 1995. Moreover, defection may not be limited to boycotts. Losers can be encouraged to
take direct action after the first round, as was the case in Togo in 1994. Under
this system power holders also have a last option if things are clearly not
going their way. As happened in Algeria in 1991, they can abort the election
after the first round and wait for a better moment, something that is much
more difficult to do when a legislative body has actually been chosen and may
begin to meet regardless of the efforts of the regime to suppress it. The consequences of such events require no elaboration: Defection by any major player
breaks the democratic bargain and undermines the credibility of the results.
Sartori (1994, p. 64) praises the TR system for allowing voters to make an
informed choice in the second round—what he calls “intelligent choosing.”
This may make sense in the context of the established democracies that were
Sartori’s main point of reference. But in the context of democratization, there
is a danger that an “informed” choice may be an antidemocratic choice.
TR systems also reduce uncertainty by allowing powerful players to
retarget their resources between rounds, giving more power to those who
have resources to redistribute. Though this strategy is available to all actors,
government-supported parties are at a particular advantage in this regard.
Once they have decided which districts they need to target in the second
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
round, all manner of efforts can be made to induce local patrons and unsuccessful first-round candidates to declare their second-round support for the
party in question, including promises of future government patronage and
posts in the administration. The strategic deployment of patronage will generally be an important tool for any government-supported party, but such support can be more effectively concentrated once it is clear where it is most
likely to have a decisive impact.
Finally, although the proposition is more difficult to test directly, TR systems may tend to destabilize the representative process in democratizing
countries by encouraging candidate and voter strategies that fragment and
weaken the party system. The supposed tendency of two-round elections to
produce compromise outcomes and to marginalize extreme parties may, if it
is operative, further increase the propensity of extremists to defect from
democracy and employ other means of achieving their ends. Yet under many
circumstances typical of democratizing states, TR laws cannot be expected to
generate moderate outcomes. Their ability to do so is largely dependent on
the incentives provided by the system for the formation of alliances between
parties. In a state with a relatively established and restricted party system in
which parties have extended histories of coexistence in the legislature, strategic bargaining will be highly credible, and patterns of cooperation can be
expected to be regular. But for this mechanism to function, parties across the
political spectrum have to be both willing and able to form alliances. In a
young party system such agreements may be hindered by a number of factors.
First, lack of trust among parties and fears of defection may limit the extent to
which alliances are entered into. Furthermore, even if parties are able to make
credible commitments, these are likely to be characterized by a great degree
of geographical diversity, especially in single-member districts and especially in new party systems in which political organizations have geographically restricted support bases. This diversity of electoral alignments will, in
all likelihood, have the effect of destabilizing the legislative process in that
legislators from different parts of the country will have an incentive to build
ties with different parties in the legislature in anticipation of future electoral
agreements. Such a situation can put considerable strain on the internal
coherence of parliamentary parties in their ability to function as effective
coalition partners. Campbell (1958, p. 24) identifies this as one of the principal problems with the TR system as it operated in France during the early
phase of democratization; the diversity of electoral alliances entered into by
candidates led to parliamentary parties with divided loyalties. And even in
recent times, French candidates have not always been consistently willing to
follow the central party leadership in forging agreements at the district level
(Converse & Pierce, 1986, pp. 395-396; Criddle, 1975, p. 177).
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
329
Second, vote choice in the definitive round is ultimately up to the voters,
and there are reasons for believing that voters in young democracies may not
always follow the recommendations of their favored candidates when the latter have been eliminated in the first round of voting. Such compliant voter
behavior is predicated on the existence of relatively strong party identification and tight party discipline, which are not necessarily present in emerging
democracies. Even recent French experience shows that such alliances have
not always been feasible in practice, because a party’s supporters in the electorate are not necessarily willing to follow the lead of “their” candidates in
making second-round vote choices (Bartolini, 1984; Converse & Pierce,
1986, p. 391; Cole & Campbell, 1989, pp. 27-28, 91-131; Criddle, 1975). In
reality, the TR system is more likely to encourage abstention or negative voting in the second round.6 For those voters who do go to the polls a second
time, choice of candidate will be, to a great extent, arbitrary with respect to
party identification, as their main concern may well be to prevent the election
of a least-liked alternative (Duverger, 1960, p. 266). Such arbitrariness will
tend to fragment the parliamentary party system even further by allowing the
entry of small parties and obscure independents.
This discussion suggests that the institution of the TR system increases the
likelihood that elections in transitional countries will prompt authoritarian
intervention. Even if this does not occur, the result will often be nondemocratic political action and/or considerable party system instability, which will
tend to undermine any incipient democratization process. Moreover, the
nature of the “typical” effects such a system will have in any given state will
depend to a great extent on the structure of the party system, its relationship to
the electorate, and the willingness of politicians to cooperate. As the French
example has shown, all these factors can vary significantly from one region to
another, from one end of the party spectrum to another, and from one election
to the next. In short, the institution of the TR electoral system is one whose
effects are highly unpredictable and strongly contingent on conjunctural
factors.
III. ANALYSIS
It has been argued that the reduction of uncertainty following the first
round of a TR election can destabilize balloting in midcourse and may in
6. This tendency may be exacerbated by what Converse and Pierce (1986, pp. 385-387)
term the “unfriendly neighbors” phenomenon—the reluctance of voters to support ideologically
adjacent parties in making second-round vote choices, even when such a choice is encouraged by
the leadership of their favored party.
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
some cases undermine it. The party system may also be fragmented in the
process. Where TR systems are found we can predict that competitors will
exit prematurely from the electoral process, or that the result will be a fragmented legislature and/or one with a single large party dominating. All of
these possible outcomes—exit by one group or another, extreme fragmentation, and the domination of one party over all others—will make the consolidation of democracy difficult, if not impossible. It is therefore probable that if
a polity adopts a TR system democratic success will be jeopardized, and that
this is more likely to be the case in transition states or states whose regimes
are already fragile.
We should expect to observe these effects especially in states where two
rounds of voting are regularly required. Surprisingly, this turns out to be the
norm among most of the authoritarian systems that employ absolute majority
laws. Of all the states that currently have formal TR systems, only North
Korea and Turkmenistan do not make use of the provision for a second ballot.
Yet even where it is not used, the option of a second round has practical significance, for the high threshold it represents poses a formidable hurdle for any
would-be opposition contestant. Furthermore, in the event of a successful
first-round challenge, the opportunity of delaying the final result would give
the authorities valuable time in which to launch a counterstrategy prior to the
decisive vote. In nondemocratic states, the TR system may be used as a mechanism for controlling the electoral process by weeding out potential troublemakers and ensuring that substantial support is required for victory. In this
sense the TR system is the “dictator’s friend,” a characteristic that has not
been lost on certain reluctant democratizers. Conversely, as countries with
TR systems have undergone democratic transition, many of them have
switched to single-round voting.
The poor track record of this electoral system type is evident in the fact
that most of the states that have undergone transition under the TR system
have subsequently abandoned it, and those that have successfully retained it
are hardly exemplars of democracy. Table 3 compares the level of democracy
in states with one-round and two-round voting provisions using two wellknown measures of democracy, the Polity IV score and the Freedom House
Political Rights (FHPR) score. The Polity IV score ranges from –10 to 10,
where –10 is most authoritarian and 10 is most democratic.7 The FHPR score
ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most democratic and 7 the least democratic.
7. The indicator used here is the standard combined “Polity” score, calculated by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score. See the “Polity IV Variable List” at www.bsos.
umd.edu/cidcm/polity.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
331
Table 3
Levels of Democracy in One-Round and Two-Round Systems, 1999
System Type
One round
Two round
All
Average Polity IV Score
Average FHPR Score (Inverted)
4.860
–.759
3.371
4.912
3.000
4.385
Sources: See appendix.
Note: FHPR = Freedom House Political Rights. Both differences of means are significant at the
.001 level.
The latter scale has been inverted for the purposes of presentation in this
table, so that a higher score indicates a more democratic regime.8
The difference between the two groups of states is striking; the average
Polity IV score for single-round systems is, at 4.860, comfortably above the
midpoint of the –10-to-10 scale, whereas the average for the states with tworound systems is –.759, dipping into the less-than-democratic half of the
range. The average scores on the (inverted) FHPR scale paint a similar picture: Single-round systems are, with a mean score of 4.912, well above middle of the 1-to-7 range, whereas states with two-round systems average only
3.000. In both cases, the difference between the two groups is about a quarter
of the entire range of the respective scales, and in both cases the difference of
means is significant at the .001 level. Our predictions are thus confirmed; use
of a second round of voting in parliamentary elections is clearly and strongly
linked to poor democratic performance.
It might, however, be that this link is a function of other aspects that tend—
for historical, geographical, or other reasons—to be associated with TR systems. It is therefore desirable to control for possible confounding factors
through the use of multivariate regression. Ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression was employed to estimate both Polity IV democracy data and
FHPR data. The latter include six cases not included in the former because no
Polity IV scores were allocated to the states in question in 1999 (GuineaBissau, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Lebanon, and Croatia). Controls
were, in both cases, introduced for a variety of other variables that have been
found in past studies to be associated with levels of democracy: the presidential electoral system type, per capita gross domestic product (GDP),9 popula8. See the appendix for notes on data sources. The two scales have been shown to be highly
correlated (Bollen, 1991).
9. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was defined in thousands of U.S. dollars (see
the appendix for full details). A logarithmic transformation was employed to mitigate the effects
of skew.
332
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
tion, state formation in the post-Second World War period, previous experience of French and British colonial rule, and dummy variables designating
region (an “other” category comprising North America and Oceania serves as
a reference category).10
The overall shape of the two models is similar, despite some variations in
the behavior of the control variables (see Table 4).11 Both models provide
strong evidence that the use of TR electoral systems for parliamentary elections has a negative impact on democratic performance, even controlling for
other factors. As I have shown elsewhere (Birch, n.d.), single-member
districting exerts a similar effect, but the significance and magnitude of the
two variables indicate that the effects are distinct. Moreover, there was not
found to be any interaction between them.
Many of the theoretical explanations advanced in Section II above are
likely to be most relevant in states that are on the path to democratization.
Regimes so repressive as to stifle all genuine electoral competition are not
likely to be greatly affected by electoral system design; likewise, the effects
discussed above will probably not be as marked in fully democratized countries. It therefore makes sense to check that the findings of the regression
analysis hold also for states between full autocracy and full democracy. To
this end, a second set of regressions was conducted on a case set excluding the
extremes of the FHPR scale (states scoring 1 and 7) and a similar proportion
of the extreme values on the Polity scale (values less than –7 and greater than
7). The resulting models, presented in the final two columns of Table 4, indicate that the hypothesized relationship between TR systems and democracy
is found in this reduced case set also. The significant reduction in N translates
into lower significance levels for some variables, and the role of the regional
dummies varies somewhat (sub-Saharan Africa is significantly negatively
associated with level of democracy in this case set and not Asia), but as far as
10. The states in this category include Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand,
Fiji, and Papua New Guinea.
11. The most notable difference is the strong negative impact of postwar state formation on
the Polity IV score and its insignificance in the model based on Freedom House data. This difference is linked to variations in coding methodologies rather than differences in case selection, as
the variable was also insignificant in a model of Freedom House employing the same case set as
those used in the model of Polity scores. Per capita GDP has a significant positive impact on the
Freedom House Political Rights score, though it was insignificant in the model based on Polity
data. By contrast, the variable designating population had an extremely slight but significant
impact on the Polity score, but none on the Freedom House data. Tests on the reduced case set
indicate that these differences are also effects of variable construction rather than case selection.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
333
Table 4
Ordinary Least Squares Estimations of Level of Democracy, 1999
(standard errors in parentheses)
All Countries
Variable
Two-round system in 1999
Polity
Score
–3.411**
(1.158)
Single-member districts in 1999
–2.815*
(1.134)
President directly elected by
–1.206
TR system in concurrent elections (1.369)
Per capita GDP (logged) in 1999
0.597
(0.409)
Population in 1999 (thousands)
0.00001*
(0.000)
Postwar state formation
–3.196**
(1.231)
Former British colony
1.625
(1.342)
Former French colony
–0.004
(1.369)
Middle East and North Africa
–9.367***
(2.515)
Asia
–5.310*
(2.414)
Sub-Saharan Africa
–3.642
(2.417)
Central and Eastern Europe and
–1.227
the former Soviet Union
(2.576)
Western Europe
–1.241
(2.348)
Latin America
–2.236
(2.308)
Constant
5.406
(4.459)
n
134
2
.489
Adjusted R
FHPR Rating
(Inverted)
–1.141**
(0.371)
–0.859*
(0.360)
0.083
(0.433)
0.418**
(0.129)
0.000003
(0.000)
–0.581
(0.394)
0.589
(0.419)
0.001
(0.434)
–2.958***
(0.808)
–1.988***
(0.781)
–1.176
(0.780)
–0.306
(0.826)
–0.250
(0.760)
–0.942
(0.745)
3.125
(1.422)
140
.524
Democratizing
Countries Only
Polity
Score
–2.665*
(1.362)
–3.293*
(1.456)
–0.404
(1.511)
–1.089*
(0.548)
0.00001
(0.000)
–4.416*
(1.868)
0.802
(1.950)
0.441
(1.615)
–11.745**
(4.654)
–8.511
(4.634)
–9.189*
(4.540)
–6.968
(4.752)
—
–6.950
(4.767)
21.565
(6.731)
81
.287
FHPR Rating
(Inverted)
–1.034**
(0.395)
–0.133
(0.402)
0.575
(0.413)
0.097
(0.142)
0.0000001
(0.000)
–0.505
(0.447)
0.326
(0.483)
0.216
(0.429)
–3.225**
(1.024)
–1.584
(1.016)
–2.300*
(0.973)
–1.461
(1.012)
—
–1.638
(1.048)
5.744
(1.546)
90
.287
Sources: See appendix.
Note: FHPR = Freedom House Political Rights; TR = two-round; GDP = gross domestic
product.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
334
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
the institutional variables are concerned, the models are largely similar to
those based on the full range of states.12
One of the most interesting aspects of these models is the nonsignificance
of the variable for presidential electoral system type. A number of different
variables related to presidential elections were experimented with prior to the
construction of the model reported: directly elected presidential systems versus nonpresidential systems, two-round versus one-round systems, presidential elections held concurrently with parliamentary elections and those that
were nonconcurrent, and various combinations of these variables. The variable entered in the models presented here—concurrent presidential elections
using a TR system—is that which achieved the highest level of significance.
Even so, it came nowhere near the .05 cutoff level, and there is no evidence
that the inclusion or noninclusion of this and other variables relating to presidential elections has any significant impact on the parliamentary electoral
system indicators.
It is also of interest that once postwar state formation and geographical
region are controlled for, colonial heritage (British and French) does not have
a significant effect. This suggests that the oft-noted relationships between
colonial legacies and democratic achievement may be the consequence of
intervening variables such as size, region, or indeed, the institutional factors
examined here (Blais & Dion, 1991; Bohrer, 1997; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Weiner, 1987).
Finally, it is worth mentioning the impact of three of the five regional controls introduced into the equations: those for the Middle East and North
Africa, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. The poor democratic credentials of
many of the states in these regions appear to be related to cultural, physical, or
other attributes of states not included in these models and do not seem to be a
function of institutional design or colonial legacy. Clearly, the features of a
country’s electoral institutions are not the only determinants of propensity to
establish and maintain democracy, but they are strongly and consistently
related to levels of democracy in those states in which elections are a part of
the political regime.
The question remains as to the precise nature of this observed relationship.
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated a strong empirical link between TR
12. One noteworthy difference is the negative impact of GDP in the reduced model based on
Polity scores. The relationship between democratization and economic growth is complex, as
the voluminous literature on this subject attests, and it is doubtful that any firm conclusions could
be drawn on the basis of these findings except to say that the role of the economy does not appear
to interact with electoral system design in these models, and the changing direction and significance of the GDP variable does not appear greatly to affect the impact of the institutional
variables.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
335
electoral systems and difficulty in establishing or maintaining democracy.
Yet it has not provided clear evidence of the causal flows that underlie this
link, and it might be that the causal relationship is more complex than that
posited in the models presented. Authoritarian rulers may anticipate the
potential benefits of TR systems and introduce them in order to thwart
democratization, that is, lack of democracy may “cause” TR, which may, in
turn, “cause” authoritarianism, creating a feedback loop. Although it is not
plausible that the relationship would be the opposite of that posited here—
there is no reason to think that authoritarianism would “cause” a TR electoral
system independent of any anticipated effects of that system—the relationship might be a reciprocal one. It is reasonable to suppose that feedback will
be a matter of degree; some but not all authoritarian rulers will realize that the
TR system is helping them to maintain their regime. The relevant question is
then whether a minority of such rulers are in a position to anticipate the workings of the system (in which case it is therefore realistic to assume that the
causal relationship is predominantly a one-way effect of electoral institutions
on political outcomes), or whether most authoritarian rulers do correctly
anticipate the effects of TR (and a one-way model is inadequate).
It is not possible to gather accurate data on the intentions of all authoritarian rulers; it is especially difficult to ascertain whether an authoritarian
regime’s retention of a TR electoral system is linked in any way to a perception of the effects of that system. But given that most of the TR systems in use
at the turn of the century were adopted relatively recently, light can be shed on
the question of causality by the subset of states that adopted TR systems at
some point during the 1990s. (It can be assumed that the new leaders in
postcommunist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union all made
explicit choices about their election systems at the time of the first
posttransition elections.13 The choices made at this point will thus be counted
as “introductions” of the TR system in cases where this system was retained
in some form.) The subset so defined comprises only 24 cases, precluding the
use of nonrecursive causal modeling.14 It thus makes most sense to examine
the political circumstances under which the choice of electoral system was
made. In the majority of cases the conditions were not, in fact, met under
13. These states were all obliged to rewrite their electoral laws to accommodate multiparty
politics, and this assumption can be further justified with reference to studies of the process of
electoral institution design in Eastern Europe, which show that electoral systems were widely
debated throughout the region and that their choice was a conscious one (Birch, Millard, Williams, & Popescu, 2002; Elster, 1996; Elster, Offe, & Preuss, 1998, pp. 112-120; Kitschelt,
Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999, pp. 31-35, 105-10; Lijphart, 1992).
14. Techniques of this kind have, in any case, received considerable criticism in recent years
(Bartels, 1991; Miller & Shanks, 1996, appendix D).
336
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
which imposition of an electoral law by authoritarian rulers would have been
possible. In 7 cases (Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Gabon,
Hungary, and Bulgaria) TR electoral systems were agreed on during predominantly consensus-based rounds tables between government or opposition or
national (constituent) assemblies that included broad sectors of political
society. In a further 4 cases (Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Macedonia)
the democratic opposition was already in power when the first elections were
held in the newly independent states.15 In Haiti the introduction of TR elections was brought about by a broad-based provisional electoral council
selected by the transitional Trouillot government that took power after military leader General Avril fled the country. Thus in 13 out of 24 cases, it was
not even in the power of authoritarian leaders to impose TR systems in order
to bolster their rule.
A further three cases are ambiguous. In Algeria, the TR system was introduced with the explicit aim of preventing the election of the opposition
Islamic Salvation Front, but other opposition parties were included in discussions about changes in the law (Axtmann, 1999; Sutton & Aghrout, 1992). In
Albania, a mixed electoral law including a TR component was adopted during the end of the period of communist party hegemony, but it was in fact the
democratic opposition that supported the majoritarian system, whereas the
ex-communist Socialist Party favored proportional representation (Loloci,
1994). Finally, the Ukrainian electoral law was adopted by a parliament in
which no single political group could claim a majority. The law was widely
held at the time to favor the old guard (Arel & Wilson, 1994), but Ukraine
was, by this point, no longer an authoritarian regime; it’s FHPR rating was 4
and its Polity score was 6.
TR systems were introduced by authoritarian regimes in 8 of the 24 countries examined here (Central African Republic, Mauritania, Togo,16
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).17 But this
does not necessarily mean that these choices were in all cases motivated by
selfish ends. In most cases the leaders in question had little experience of
competitive elections, and there is little reason to suppose that they would
15. In Kyrgyzstan reformist president Akaev managed to push the electoral law through a
recalcitrant and less reformist parliament (Anderson, 1996).
16. Following a national conference in 1992, the “Accord de Ouagadougou III” stipulated a
TR electoral law, but the TR system had already been introduced by the ancien régime of
Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 1990.
17. The skeptical reader may suspect that these eight cases could be driving the regression
equations. But two of the eight—Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—are not included in the case set
of democratizing countries, and the difference between the average Freedom House/Polity
scores of the remaining six cases and the average for all TR systems is not significant.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
337
have had a clear idea of how electoral system design would affect this process. That said, conscious power-preserving choices are more likely to have
taken place in the five ex-Soviet countries, whose first elections in the mid1990s were relatively late by regional standards (allowing the incumbent rulers of these states more time to observe electoral system effects elsewhere).
The three African cases all adopted their TR laws between 1990 and 1992,
early on in the African wave of democratization, and when opposition forces
did come to power in the Central African Republic and Togo they did not
change the electoral system, suggesting that it was not a major bone of contention. It therefore appears likely that a reciprocal causal model would be
appropriate in only a small minority of cases, and it is safe to say that the
causal relationship under investigation is predominantly unidirectional.
In light of this rather broad-brush assessment of overall trends, it makes
sense to turn once again to individual experiences of double-ballot elections
in order to gain explanatory leverage on the nature of their effects. This section will therefore conclude with a closer examination of two cases—
Kyrgyzstan and Congo (Brazzaville)—where the fact of holding a second
round of voting had a significant negative influence on the course of political
events. These examples show the potential impact of TR elections at its most
clearcut, enabling more in-depth analysis of the mechanics of the effects
observed in the wider case sets examined above.
The 2000 parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan provides an example of
the potential for state manipulation under TR voting. This Central Asian state
retained its Soviet-era TR system until 1999, when it introduced PR for 15 of
the 60 seats in the lower house of parliament in an effort to strengthen the
country’s fledgling political parties. During the preelectoral period, however,
the central election commission prohibited the three main non-Communist
opposition parties from contesting the party list seats, and following the first
round of the subsequent legislative elections, held on 20 February 2000, nine
prominent opposition candidates in eight districts were “deregistered” on
allegations of financial or other impropriety. A clause in the election law stipulated that in the event that one of the two candidates in the runoff withdrew
prior to the second round, the remaining candidate would be declared elected.
The consequence of this rule was that a number of government-supported
candidates in key seats were elected on the basis of less than 20% of the popular vote, and in some cases less than 10%. The unexplained length of the firstround vote count also aroused suspicion, especially as full first-round results
were never released. The first round was strongly criticized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other monitoring
groups, but the second round proved even more fraught with suspected irregularities (Inter-Parliamentary Union [IPU] Parline database at www.ipu.org;
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
OSCE, 2000; Pannier, 2000). The final results sparked popular demonstrations lasting several months and resulting in a heavy-handed crackdown by
the authorities, which, in turn, provoked international criticism and led to a
view among the international community that Kyrgyzstan was becoming
increasingly undemocratic.18 The first-round results gave the government
information that allowed it to shape the outcome to its advantage. It is also
noteworthy that this occurred in a relatively small number of seats in a mixed
electoral system, suggesting that such shaping strategies can have important
impacts on electoral outcomes when targeted at a few key seats contested by
opposition figures.
A good example of opposition-interrupted TR elections can be found in
1990s Congo (Brazzaville). Despite the fact that TR elections have generated
a relatively compact party system (Mozaffar, 1997, p. 151), Congolese politics have been characterized by extreme instability in recent years. In May
1993 the country conducted its second parliamentary elections under a TR
system, the first having been completed barely 10 months previously.
Shifting coalitions in the resulting parliament had led President Lissouba to
dissolve the chamber and call for new elections. Unlike the Kyrgyz case, it
was the prospect of a government landslide that disrupted the electoral process. The first round of the elections indicated that the government was set to
sweep the board, whereupon the opposition announced a boycott, several
parties formed their own militias, and the second round was accompanied by
significant violence. The results of the second round were eventually
annulled by a supreme court decision and repeated in October following
international mediation. Despite a “peace pact” signed between the parties in
1995, civil war again broke out in 1997 between the party-based militias. The
result this time was a military takeover by Denis Sassou Nguesso (IPU
Parline database at www.ipu.org; Fleischhacker, 1999).19
In both cases, the information conveyed in the first-round results had a disruptive effect on the completion of the electoral cycle. In Kyrgyzstan the firstround results allowed the authorities to manipulate the final results in their
favor, marking an increasing authoritarianism in Kyrgyz politics that lasted
well beyond the electoral period. In Congo the elections were effectively
aborted due to action by opposition forces, which triggered civil war. These
examples demonstrate the variety of pathways through which destabilizing
18. See, for example, Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, at www.hrw.org.
19. Other examples of TR elections that were interrupted or severely disrupted between
rounds include Gabon, 1990; Central African Republic, 1992, 1993; Comoros, 1993; Chad,
1997; Mali, 1997; Togo, 1994, Kazakhstan, 1995; Haiti, 2000.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
339
outcomes can be generated by TR systems but also the common effect of
declaring partial results midway through the electoral cycle.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has provided evidence that the institution of the second ballot
hampers the development and consolidation of democracy by encouraging
only conditional commitment on the part of certain actors and by enhancing
the ability of powerholders to manipulate the electoral process to their advantage. Although the countries in which the TR system is employed vary widely
both in social and political terms, the same pattern is evident across these
divides. It must, however, be admitted that the TR system does seem to have
worked relatively effectively in France, and it has also been accompanied by
a solid democratic tradition in the tiny Pacific island republic of Kiribati.
What makes these states different? In the case of France, a close analysis suggests that the answer is not a lot. Though France has been a pioneer in the
development of democratic electoral institutions, it has also experienced an
extremely turbulent political history. Since the introduction of manhood suffrage in 1848 it has employed the TR system for approximately four fifths of
elections to the National Assembly (Cole & Campbell, 1989); in that time it
has experienced five republics and several other less democratic forms of
government. As late as the 1970s, textbooks on comparative politics still gave
France as a classic example of an “unstable” democracy (e.g., Finer, 1970).
Kiribati represents another extreme. With a population of only 80,000 and a
weakly developed party system, this island community has remained politically calm largely due to the influence of traditional personalistic leadership
patterns (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996). Hungary and Lithuania are the
other two countries with TR electoral institutions that received top scores in
1999 on both the Polity and Freedom House scales. But in neither case have
TR elections dominated the transition process; Hungary uses TR voting for
only 176 of its 386 seats, and Lithuania adopted plurality elections in 2000
for the 71 single-member seats in its 141-seat parliament.
This raises the question of whether the analysis undertaken here might be
extended to TR’s cousin, the alternative vote (AV). There are far fewer examples of “third wave” countries that have adopted AV for legislative elections
(the Pacific island states of Nauru; Papua New Guinea, 1964-1975; and Fiji,
1999, are the only extant cases), making detailed comparative analysis of this
system type difficult. Careful consideration of the two systems indicates that
AV is not likely to suffer many of the nefarious effects associated with TR, for
340
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2003
most of them pertain to holding separate rounds of voting at two different
points in time. Yet there is one feature shared by the two systems that has been
linked to success in the context of democratization. Donald Horowitz (1985,
pp. 639-641; 1991, pp. 163-203; 1997) has praised AV for encouraging preference swapping among parties and thereby providing incentives for accommodative behavior in divided societies (cf. Reilly, 2001). This argument is
similar to that which lauds TR voting on the grounds that it encourages alliances among moderate parties. Whatever the merits of this claim with reference to AV,20 Section II above argues that the conditions under which moderate centrist results would be generated are often absent in TR systems, and
that such outcomes could simply have the effect of alienating the adherents of
more extreme views, who may then seek to sabotage the democratic process.
All in all, the analysis presented here suggests that aspiring democracies
should be discouraged from adopting TR electoral systems. As mentioned
above, TR systems are not typically defended in and of themselves but as
means of delivering absolute majority results. Though such systems are often
advocated with reference to the intuitive fairness of selecting an absolute
majority winner (Blais & Massicotte, 1996, pp. 75-76), in practice most do
not embody pure majoritarian precepts even at the district level (not to mention the national level). If absolute majority outcomes are desired, then the
focus should be on generating such majorities where it really counts, at the
level of the country as a whole. Electoral districting typically generates geographical units that have little meaning for ordinary constituents. This undermines the theoretical justification behind employing a system that emphasizes majorities in these units but provides no guarantee that any party will
hold an absolute majority in the assembly as a whole. If it is thought vital to
elect members in individual member districts, the AV may provide a more
efficient way of doing so, but electoral engineers would be wise to avoid the
use of multiple ballots. One of the primary reasons why the European countries of the “first wave” of democratization abandoned two-round
majoritarianism in favor of PR was the unpredictability of the results that the
TR voting model yielded under conditions of multiparty competition
(Carstairs, 1980); the evidence presented in this analysis indicates that the
track record of this electoral system type in the third wave is equally poor, and
those countries that have not switched to a different system have by and large
experienced stalled transitions. Like many vestiges of the past, TR voting has
the appeal of rich historical associations and an impressive pedigree, but it is
ill-suited to the conditions of contemporary democratization.
20. For critiques of this argument, see Reilly and Reynolds, 1999, pages 35-36; Reynolds,
1999, pages 101-103.
Birch / TWO-ROUND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY
341
APPENDIX
Data Sources
I. Election Results
Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments and Inter-Parliamentary
Union Parline database at http://www.ipu.org; Derksen’s Elections around the World
at http://www.agora.stm.it/elections; Journal of Democracy; Elections Today; Electoral Studies; Keesings Record of World Events; Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996;
Nohlen, Kennerich, & Thibaut, 1999; database on Central and Eastern European
Elections at www.essex.ac.uk/elections.
II. Electoral and Political Systems
Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments and Inter-Parliamentary
Union Parline database at http://www.ipu.org; database on Central and Eastern European Elections at www.essex.ac.uk/elections; Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996;
Gorvin, 1989; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1998; Nohlen et al.,
1999; Reynolds & Reilly, 1997. The Polity IV data are taken from the Polity IV Project, 2000. The Polity IV data set [Computer file; version p4v2000] is constructed by
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of
Maryland, and can be accessed at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/. Freedom House
data are taken from the Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings, 1972-73 to 199900 available at www.freedomhouse.org.
III. Economic and Population Data
Gross domestic product (GDP): International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook database (available at www.imf.org). Per capita GDP is in current
prices (U.S. dollars per person). IMF data are missing for Afghanistan, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Iraq, North Korea, and Somalia. For these countries data for 1997 were taken
from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics online version at
www.esa.un.org/unsd. Population: World Bank World Development Indicators database, available at www.worldbank.org. For Taiwan, population data from Freedom
House were used.
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Sarah Birch is a lecturer in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
U.K. She has published several articles on the effects of electoral systems in the context of
democratization. She is also coauthor of a monograph on the process of electoral system
design in Eastern Europe entitled Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in
Post-Communist Europe (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002).