Sacha Journal of Environmental Studies, Volume 1 Number 2 (2011) pp. 55-80
THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGER DELTA IN NIGERIA
EDEKO Sunday E
Faculty of Law, Ambrose Alli University Ekpoma Edo State Nigeria
ABSTRACT
The objectives of this research are to diagnose the causes of the spread
of small arms and light weapons in Africa in general and the Niger
Delta in particular; to determine the effects of the proliferation of such
weapons and to determine the best ways to solve the problem. The
methodology was based on the use of secondary data. The secondary
data were collected from textbooks, journals, magazines, periodicals,
internet, etc. The research findings include: first, militant groups are
mostly responsible for the spread of small arms and light weapons in
the Niger Delta. Secondly, most of the weapons are supplied by
foreign arms dealers. Thirdly, these weapons are used by criminal
groups to commit illegal acts. To solve the problem of the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta, the
ongoing peace process should be sustained. Also, there should a better
border security policy in Nigeria.
Keywords: Small Arms, Light Weapons, Militancy, Disarmament, Reintegration
1.
INTRODUCTION
African security is aimed at protecting the national integrity of the state and at
defending the essential values that constitute African identify (Nweke, 1985: 2). African
security is conceived as projecting dynamically in the field of development or human progress.
In this sense, African security is viewed in holistic terms and appears as the integral elements of
the common good of the continent in general. Accordingly, African security goes beyond
merely safeguarding territorial boundaries. It means ensuring that the country is industrialized
rapidly and developed into a cohesive, egalitarian and technological society (Subrahmanyam,
1973: 513).
As Nweke noted, African security can be defined as the preservation of African
independence, peoples’ institutions, and identity, including the advancement of African
integrity and interests within and outside Africa through military, economic, ideological,
diplomatic, and socio-cultural instrumentalities (Nweke, 1985: 4). In this sense, he stated the
three dimensions of African security as follows:
 Ability to perceive and utilize the foundations, which provide, support and shape the
means to achieve African security.
 Ability to influence the shaping of the international system within which African
security must be achieved; and
 The actual provision of African security through rational choice of appropriate socioeconomic, political and military policies and strategies (Nweke, 1985: 4-5).
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Since human beings coexist with one another they have been bound to relate to the
pursuit of their interests. At times the resulting relationships are dictated by many needs such as
economic, social or political interests and desires. Divergent interests are not without conflicts,
which usually can be traced to differences in background, beliefs and exposures. Nader stated
that conflict results from competition between at least two parties. The parties in this regard
may be family or clan, community, ethnic groups, organizations or even nation-states (Nader,
1972: 236).
Conflict does not mean negative values. However it is its escalation of violence that
should be avoided because of the destructive effects of violent conflicts. Therefore, conflict
prevention, conflict mitigation, conflict resolution and management are very crucial. In the
view of Ochoche (2002: 1) there is the need “to have a clear picture of the dimensions and
dynamics of these conflicts, along with a more scientific understanding of the conflict
resolution efforts”.
Conflict is pervasive in all human relationships and normal in the interaction between
persons in a society, whether acting as an individual or as groups. Unugbor holds the same
view, when he maintained that the conflict is universal in human affairs and normal for
individuals or group of individuals to experience conflict in the process of their regular
interaction (Unugbro, 1998: 175). This is obvious because, when people live together, they
must of necessity interact as they try to avail themselves of the necessities of life; that is
meeting their physiological and other needs. In the process of doing so, they are bound to
disagree and have clashes of interests from time to time as individual preferences play in their
relationships and consequently lead them to pursue incompatible goals or use incompatible
means to pursue chosen goals (Imobighe, 2003: vii). McFarland cited in Unugbro, maintained
this view, when he defines conflict as a situation in which persons or groups disagree over
means or ends, and try to establish their views in preference to others (Unugbro, 1998: 175).
Globalization is becoming an ever-influential architect of the new international security
agenda. Its impact on the evolution of the relations among states is contradictory. On the one
hand, globalization contributes to accelerated development of productive forces, scientific and
technological progress and ever more intensive communication among states and people. On
the other hand, it has facilitated the easy transportation of illegal arms from one country to the
other and has transformed a domestic law and order problem to a national and international
security threat. Globalization results in the long term irreversible contraction in the domain of
state authority. Coupled with liberalization, states have in effect lost control of markets as
reflected in the development of parallel informal economics, the rise of grey and black markets
and the inability of the states to prevent the flow of illicit arms because of the porous nature of
most borders and the adoption of policies such as “free movements” of people in a particular
region.
Evidence indicates that illegal arms transfers are easier in periods of political transition
that are normally preceded by periods of violence. The state then focuses its resources in areas
of reconstruction and development only, leaving gaps for the illicit transfer of small arms by
crime syndicates. Nigeria’s fourth Republic witnesses the upsurge of communal conflicts.
Years of pent-up anger suppressed by prolonged periods of military misrule found outlets as
Nigeria joined the third democratic wave. The argument by some other scholars that Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) do not cause conflict is accepted, but its effect on conflicts
cannot be ignored. According to Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba, “While small arms and light
weapons do not of course, cause conflicts, they soon become part of the conflict equation by
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fuelling and exacerbating underlying tension, generating more insecurity and adding to the
number of casualties” (Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2004: 224).
While prolonging the conflict, SALW also hinder the chances of resolving such
conflicts; warring factions, as demonstrated in the Liberian Civil War and Sierra-Leone
conflict, have been known to concede to peace negotiations only as a strategy to buy time to
stock up arsenals in order to launch further attacks. This assertion was affirmed by Taya Weiss
when he stated that, “The mere presence of guns undermines alternative conflict resolution
strategies. The availability of small arms plays a role in perpetuating the violence and making it
more lethal at every level, from criminal activity to full-fledged war, in both developed and
developing countries (Weiss, 2003: 4). According to UN Security Council “The destabilizing
accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the
world increases the intensity and duration of armed conflict, undermines the sustainability of
peace agreements, impedes the success of peace building, frustrates efforts aimed at the
prevention of armed conflict, hinders considerably the provision of humanitarian assistance and
compromises the effectiveness of the Security Council discharging its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security” (United Nations 2002: 31).
The effects of SALW to post conflict security situation is of no less significance. The
readily availability of small arms in Africa is a major factor in sustaining and fuelling conflict
(Department for International Development, 2001: 15). Increased availability of SALW has in
the aftermath of conflicts led to an exponential increase in crime rates in the sub-region,
perpetuating a climate of insecurity. SALW are convenient and attractive to rebel groups and
dissident that characterize the African landscape because they are widely available, very cheap,
deadly, easy to use and easy to transport and smuggle, unlike heavy conventional arms, such as
artillery pieces and tanks, which are typically acquired by government forces, police, soldiers
and civil populations (Boutwell and Klare, 2000: 1). Besides, a few hours of training are
required to acquire the level of proficiency considered sufficient for the execution of rebel
warfare. These reasons account for the large number of children involved in armed conflict in
the region.
Michael Renner, a small arms commentator, reports that Africa alone has suffered
about 5,994,000 fatalities in the last 50 years due mostly to SALW (Renner, 2006). Narrowing
the estimate to West Africa, Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba indicated that, “…while there are no
official figures, an estimated 30,000 people have been killed by SALW in conflict each year
since the end of the Cold War” (Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2004: 226).
In Africa, the proliferation of small arms is increasing in proportion. These small arms
being the remnants of conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Lone
etc. as well as licensed weapons being stolen or lost, have played a major role in exacerbating
crimes and armed violence in Nigeria. The continent is a major trans-shipment point for the
international trade, as well as a major producer of local arms. This phenomenon threatens the
consolidation of democracy and security in the region, which is necessary for sustainable
development. Arms trafficking and the conflict they feed divert scarce resources away from
social services, disrupt trade, discourage tourism, and contribute to the breakdown of family
structures (www.state.gov/region/africa). The pervasiveness and persistence of the conflict also
have grave psychological consequences as children are traumatized or become accustomed to
cultural violence. Arms trafficking, has brought about organised crime which is mainly to
strengthen its illegal activities in Nigeria.
This study attempts to examine the effect of SALW on African conflicts and
recommends workable solutions to avert such effects, especially as they affect Nigeria.
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The sources of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation in Africa are many
and varied. They include the manufacture and supply of new weapons both inside and outside
the continent to the remnants of weapons shipped into Africa in the 1970s and 1980s by the
former Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies to facilitate different interstate and
intra-state proxy wars. Intra-state armed conflicts, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria’s
Niger Delta region, has however expanded the frontiers of the gun trade in Africa by creating
considerable demand for these weapons of war.
The conflicts that take place in the Niger Delta region emerged in the early 1990s, the
result of unresolved tensions between local communities, the Nigerian state, and oil-extracting
multinational corporations over the allocation of oil revenues. Community resistance to the
extraction of oil from the Niger Delta region includes social movements, youth groups,
women’s groups, community development associations, and insurgent groups. Oil companies
often meddle in local politics by providing financial support to certain local leaders, elites and
youth factions. As a result, the groups in conflict often engage in complex alliances. The
proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta is within the context of the interplay between the
internal governance process and external forces. Global Changes have contributed to an erosion
of state power and sovereignty and also accounted for unprecedented political, economic, social
and cultural changes within Nigeria.
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and groups misusing them, are dangerously
out of control in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Incidentally, the Niger Delta is the hub of
oil and gas production in the country. Crude oil from the belt accounts for over 90% of revenue
accruing to the government. In spite of the oil wealth, the Niger Delta region like other parts of
Nigeria is riddled with abject poverty, high unemployment rate, social deprivation and injustice,
pollution and under-development. Synergy between the aforesaid has created a breeding ground
for non-state armed groups, organized crime and illicit arms trafficking and proliferation in the
zone.
The Niger Delta is one of the world’s richest areas in terms of natural resources. Apart
from its substantial oil and gas deposits, there are extensive rainforests, abundant wildlife and
fertile agricultural land where rice, sugarcane, plantain, beans, palm oil, yams, cassava and
timber are cultivated. The delta is also famous for having the largest expanse of mangrove in
Africa, and rich fish resources. It has more fresh water fish species than other coastal systems in
West Africa (Okonta and Douglas, 2001).
Each of Nigeria’s 370 identifiable ethnic group perceives itself to be linguistically,
culturally, and historically distinct, although four tribes – the Hausa and Fulani in the north, the
Yoruba in the south–west, and the Igbo in the Southeast – constitute a larger share of the
population (Otite, 2005). Tensions among these four are well documented, as are hostilities
among other lesser-known groups who have grievances against both the major ethnic groups,
the Nigerian state (which they perceive as insensitive to their interest), and one another. Beside
the major ethnic groups above, in the southernmost section of Nigeria lies the Niger Delta, and
like the larger country with its heterogeneous ethnic cluster, the Niger Delta region has diverse
ethnic accumulated. The groups that inhabit the area are the Ijaw, Ogoni, Ogba, Ikwerre,
Itsekiri, Urohobo, Ibibio, Efik, Ndokwa, etc. But the Ijaw is the largest group in the Niger Delta
belt.
The Anglo-Royal Dutch Shell first discovered high-quality oil in Nigeria in 1956 at
Oloibiri, Bayelsa state. Additional discoveries quickly followed across the region. The promise
of lucrative exports raised hopes that this newly found source of wealth would lead to
improvements in the living and economic conditions of the region and the country. Such hopes
did not turn into realities (Hazen and Homer, 2007). Instead, the population remains
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impoverished, despite large revenues accrued from oil, and the environment has been severely
damaged by the reckless practice of the oil companies. Discontent over limited economic
opportunities and poor environmental practices led to organized protest against poor practices
(Hazen and Homer, 2007).
The resistance movement has existed in the region since the 1960s, but oil is not the
only contributor to violence and the rise of armed groups. There have long been and continue to
be clashes between communities over land and security concerns, as well as a number of
criminal gangs and cult groups who contribute to the atmosphere of insecurity and violence.
Yet oil has become both a curse to rally around and a source of necessary funding for
perpetuating the fight (Hazen and Homer, 2007).
2.
METHOD AND MATERIALS
The data used are secondary. The secondary data were collected from textbooks,
journals, magazines and periodicals. In the course of the research, the researcher consulted the
internet, Ambrose Alli University Main Library, Law Library of the Faculty of Law of
Ambrose Alli University Ekpoma, University of Benin Law Library, The University of Benin
Main Library, and the Library of the Centre for Strategic and Development Studies, Ambrose
Alli University, Ekpoma.
The research design of this study is informed by the very nature of the study. Therefore
the study used focus group discussion and content analysis. The effort to acquire primary
materials involved discussing questions in a focus group to obtain the views of participants.
The process of content analysis involved investigating, recording and analyzing past events
with a view to discovering generalizations that were significant in understanding of the past and
the present in order to predict and deal with the issue under consideration. To this end
documented literature was relied on. Documented literature was the major instrument of
research, which are deemed to be able to stand alone if the need arises.
3.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
3.1
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
The United Nations General Assembly defines “small arms and light weapons” as any
portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily
converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive (Heinrich,
2006). United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research highlighted small arms to include:
revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine-guns; assault riffles; light
machine-gun; heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;
portable anti-craft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless riffles; portable launchers of antitank missiles and rockets system; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missiles systems; and
mortars of calibers less than 100mm (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR), 2006: 1).
According to Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi
Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, small arms are weapons
designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, including machine pistols,
fully automatic rifles and assault rifles and semi-automatic rifles (Best Practice Guidelines,
2005).
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Firearms include any portable barreled and lethal weapon that expels, is designed to
expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of burning
propellant, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall
be defined in accordance with domestic law:
 Any device which may be readily converted to a weapon as referred to above or
destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb,
grenade, rocket launcher, missiles, missile system or mine.
Ammunition:
 The complete round or its components, parts or replacement parts of a small arm or
light weapon, provided that those components are themselves subject to
authorization of the respective State party; and
Other related materials:
 Any components, part or spare parts of a small arm or light weapon, that are essential
to its operation (Ibid).
Generally, “small arms” refer to weapons meant for individual use, including revolvers
and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine
guns. Light weapons are portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a
crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100mm caliber,
grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder fired rockets,
anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defence weapons (SADC Firearms Protocol, 2003:
Article 1.2).
When compared to other major weapon systems, small arms are cheap, easily
accessible, simple to operate, portable and easy to repair or replace. In addition, they are easily
acquired and used in armed conflict by both state and non-state actors. Above all they are
highly lethal. According to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (2006: 1),
around 640 million such weapons are estimated to be in circulation around the world, many of
which are not government controlled. Although they are used for legitimate national defence
and security needs, they are also used by rebels, irregular armed groups, terrorist and criminal
gangs. Equally, to say that small arms are also used for personal protection, hunting and
sporting activities will amount to restating the obvious.
3.2
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
In Africa, the sources of SALW proliferation are many and varied (Abdel-Fatau, 2011).
While the thrust of international efforts to curb proliferation tend to concentrate on the
manufacture and supply of new weapons, a major pipeline of SALW remains the stockpiles that
were pumped into Africa in the 1970s, 1980s and early 90s by the ex-Soviet Union, the USA
and their allies to fan proxy intra-state and interstate wars. These leftover weapons have found
their way through clandestine networks involving rogue arms brokers, private military
companies, shady airline companies and local smugglers to exacerbate on-going conflicts and
facilitate the commencement of new ones in the continent (ibid).
Two factors helped make it easier for these groups to act: the first one is that borders
inherited by Africans are badly demarcated; hence, they are easily crossed. These boundaries
inherited by African states, were arbitrarily drawn by European imperialists who colonized
almost the entire continent (Imobighe, 1989: 16). A tour of the Nigerian borders in September
1984 by Nigerian immigration officials in Sokoto revealed that there were over 1,500 illegal
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entry points along Nigeria’s border with Benin and Niger (Imobighe, 2003: 36). In the fourth
Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms which took place at the UN Headquarters in New
York, on June 14 and ended on June 18, 2010, Liberia’s Permanent Representative of the
Kingdom of Belgium and the European Union Ambassador Company B. Wesseh told the
gathering that “Liberia and its neighbors do not produce arms, but the major entry points of
illicit arms and drugs, were more than 170 border points with Guinea, Sierra Leone and the
Ivory Coast (http://africa.com/stories/201006250494.html. Retrieved 18-7-2010). Thus, there
need only be unrest in one state for the repercussion-particularly through the influx of refugeesto be felt in other states, especially neighbouring states” (ibid). In other words, unregulated
movement of people facilitates the circulation of weapons (Diarra, 2005: 35).
Secondly, these arms are precisely ‘small’. They circulate easily because they are small
arms, easy to buy, easy to use, easy to transport and easy to conceal. Their proliferation
exacerbates conflicts, sparks refugee flows, undermines the rule of law and spawns a culture of
violence and impunity. From the above point of view, one can confidently say that conflict
prevention and resolution is not a question of regulating arms in general, but only a specific
category of them (those that are liable to fuel civil wars or acts of banditry).
Equally, the break-up and deregulation of arms industries in eastern and central
Europe have also led to the mushrooming of mini industries whose aggressive search for new
markets in the developing world have made nonsense of existing export regimes. Africa itself
boasts of countries that are arms manufacturers – South Africa, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Morocco
and Nigeria among others, and countries that are dotted with growing small arms cottage
industries (Abdel-Fatau, 2011).
Finally, small arms have found their way into civilian hands from official sources due
to a combination of factors, including the breakdown of state structures, lax controls over
national armouries and poor service conditions for security personnel (Ibid). According to
Langumba (2010), “the widespread availability of small arms to abusive actors poses a threat of
unprecedented magnitude to West Africa, far greater than that of HIV/AIDS in terms of its
socio-economic and human consequences”.
Where wars have officially come to an end, the presence of small arms makes sure
that physical insecurity persists through banditry and violent settlement of scores (Abdel-Fatau,
2011). In the context of Africa, many countries could be described as nominally at peace. But
even in these societies – South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana – armed robbery is rampant and coercive
protection and vigilante justice is replacing the incapacitated state security rackets. As long as
the small arms pipelines remain open, the prospects for peaceful conflict management, reigning
in crime and promoting human rights will be greatly undermined, and this has dire
consequences for the process of democratization and fostering secure livelihoods (ibid).
3.3
MODES OF ACQUISITION
The obvious thing is that the means of acquiring weapons today are much greater and
different from those of the Cold War period. The reason is that the Cold War arms trading
system was more strictly controlled than the one that exists today, especially in the case of
small arms and light weapons (Laurence, 2010). It is not a false argument to say that Cold War
arms trading system which have non-state actors as its dominant feature (i.e. as the superpowers
and their allies supplied their clients in pursuit of political and ideological goals), did not
receive 100% government control. The truth is that during the era, the control of these weapons
was not perfect, especially for weapons sent to non-state actors. But at least in the case of the
initial production and transfer of these weapons to states and non-state actors, government
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controlled the production and export (ibid). Weapons are also acquired legitimately. It is on
record that much of the supply and acquisition of small arms and light weapons is through
legitimate trade that occurs among governments or among legal entities authorized by
governments. As countries that manufacture small arms and light weapons continue to export
them legitimately, along with their surplus of use weapons, they continue to be imported legally
by counties in regions of conflict, -- legal being defined as any transfer that is not “contrary to
the laws of states and/or international law” (Laurence, 2010). This takes place as granted (aid),
particularly when a large army is decreasing in size and wishes to export its surplus weapons.
Government to government sales can take place as well, but the dominant mode of legitimate
transfer is the commercial sale. The transfer is normally controlled under national procedures in
both the supplier and recipient state, through export licenses and end-user certificates.
Equally, a government that want to bolster its own security and political power, arms
sub-national groups that support its political or social policies and act as a supplement to
government security forces. This often takes the form of arming “self-defense” force or
liberalizing arms acquisition procedures for individual citizens. Both types of holders can end
up retaining weapons when the need for such forces or possession diminishes, especially at the
end of a peace process. This has occurred in many places, including South Africa,
Mozambique, Colombia, and Guatemala. Attempts to register surplus weapons in a post
conflict phase can be complicated by such transfers and distribution (ibid).
Several major changes have taken place since the Cold War ended that resulted in
much of the trade in small arms and light weapons not conforming to the above definitions of
legal trade.
The first one is that trade in SALW has shifted from old to newly produced weapons
(Ibid). The second one is that many countries are now capable of producing light weaponry.
This is made possible due to the diffusion of arms producing technology during the Cold War.
The third aspect has to do with the fact that the overall manufacturing of small arms and light
weapons has reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War. The major reason for this is
that much of the SALW supplied during the Cold War has remained in the regions where these
conflicts were fought, thus creating a surplus pool to be re-circulated and diffused into society.
According to the United Nations Disarmament Commission Report one factor bearing on the
availability, circulation, and accumulation of these weapons in many areas of conflict is their
earlier supply by Cold War opponents (United Nations Disarmament Commission Report,
1995: 15).
Four, arms manufacturing countries outside the regions of intrastate conflict have less
need for the weapons in their arsenals, and haven down-sized their armed forces, economic
necessity forces them to export the surplus, not new production. In determining that a majority
of the small arms and light weapons being used in conflicts dealt with by the United Nations are
not newly produced, the UN Small Arms Panel cited the case of the production of assault rifles
for the years between 1945 and 1990 (ibid, 14).
Five, another major change in the post-Cold War arms trading system is the relative
rise in illicit or illegal trade. This is mainly due to the characteristics of the class of weapon now
dominating the world’s armed conflicts, that is, light, portable, inexpensive, easily concealed,
and transported, etc (Laurence, 2010). Illicit acquisition is usually perpetrated through a covert
or secret transfer of arms to a government or non-state actor from another government.
Although this mode is not common in the post-Cold War period, it has continued to be an
option for those states supporting separatist forces outside their borders. This poses a serious
setback in the many attempts to prevent conflict through the control of arms.
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Six, another variant of illicit transfer is the black market. As United Nations arms
embargoes have increased, and more and more conflicts involve non-state groups, black market
suppliers have become the only source of arms for countries under embargo. Equally,
underground political organizations, and criminal organizations such as drug cartels, are also
forced to rely on this means of acquisition. The portability, low cost, and concealment ability of
small arms and light weapons make this mode of acquisition and transfer particularly effective
(ibid).
A seventh variant is illicit in-country circulation, a situation where a significant amount
of the supply is already in the region and sometimes in the country where it is in the greatest
demand. It is more feasible, (economically, militarily, and politically), to obtain the needed
weapons without complicated export and import procedures. In many cases cross-border
acquisitions are not required. The first such type of acquisition is theft from government
arsenals. As one example, a recent South African government study revealed that more than
10,000 weapons had been stolen from the police, army, and legal self-defense forces since 1990
(ibid). The second type of in-country acquisition arises from the tactics of laying ambushes for
the purpose of seizing weapons from opponents (ibid). Third, it is now common for subnational groups to conduct mutual arms deals. This was widespread in the case of the conflict in
Liberia, where several groups were armed by those already participating in the conflict (ibid).
Equally, arms can be acquired through an arms deal between sub-national groups and criminal
organizations, especially when the criminals are used by the sub-national groups to protect their
illegal activities. It is important to note that large quantity of weapons is siphoned off by either
government officials or sub-national groups, when one or more of the above modes of
acquisition are being employed.
A review of available literature shows that people have done extensive work on the
proliferation of SALW; but not much has been done as they affect Nigeria. This is a
fundamental gap which we intend to use our research to fill.
4.
THE NIGER DELTA
The Niger Delta is an unstable area of Nigeria, and inter-ethnic clashes are common often access to oil revenue is the trigger for the violence. Pipelines are regularly vandalized by
impoverished residents, who risk their lives to siphon off fuel. Vandalism is estimated to result
in thousands of barrels of crude oil wastage every day - a loss to the Nigerian economy of
millions of dollars each year. Nigeria is the world's sixth largest oil-producing nation. However,
mismanagement and successive military governments have left the country poverty-stricken
(Olufemi Ayodele, 2010: 10). Although many observers of the South South think primarily of
youths invading oil company properties when they think of conflict there, in fact the roots of
South-South conflicts lie deeper in history and in the contemporary social circumstances of the
area.
Contemporary history of the Delta can be summarized as economic decline and broken
promises. Historically, Delta communities prospered as middlemen controlling trade with the
interior, particularly palm oil products and slaves. But with the development of the colonial
state and independence, the region experienced a steady decline and stagnation, for no new
sources of wealth developed there to replace these activities. More recently, the failure of the
early independent Nigerian government to follow through on a promise to treat the Delta as a
special development area, the steady reduction in the share of oil royalties that states in the
Delta have received, and, finally, the habitual disregard of state needs by non-indigenous
military state governors, continued and worsened Delta problems. The government’s neglect of
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the Delta's development (roads, schools, electricity, and health services all ended well inland
before reaching coastal communities), Nigeria's overall economic decline since the mid-1980s,
and the tendency of educated Delta youths to leave the area, have confirmed its status as an
economic backwater. The people who remained behind simply lacked prospects elsewhere
(Olufemi Ayodele, 2010: 17).
The Niger Delta region comprising of present day Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River,
Delta, Edo, and Rivers States of Nigeria and with an estimated population of over 30 million
Nigerians has been the foremost economic resource generator for the Nigerian state since when
crude oil was first struck at Oloibiri in Bayelsa State. Billions have accrued the Federal
Republic of Nigeria from sales of crude oil over forty years of exploration. The history of
protests and conflicts of acrimony by the Niger Delta peoples against forced union and
exploitation dates back to 1957 when testimonies were made in respect thereof before the
Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears. Subsequently, several protests and clamors
for justice have been registered to no avail (Alimi Idrisu, 2011: 76). Characteristically, both
military and civilian governments have ignored claims for equitable remedy and forcibly
smothered protests through the use of overwhelming military might and other documented acts
of state sanction political violence.
There is an inevitable and serious conflict of interest between Delta communities that
bear the environmental damage of oil extraction and the rest of the nation for which oil money
is essentially a free good. Delta populations, clearly a minority, regularly lose these struggles.
Had they some authority over environmental issues, many current problems might be more
manageable. Lacking this, and given the federal government's control over all subsurface
resources as well as ownership of all land, all Delta issues inevitably become national issues.
The national government has failed to resolve these. In its campaign to "buy off" Delta
discontent on the cheap side, earlier administrations frequently corrupted Delta community
leaders. There is a deep distrust in the Delta concerns the federal government and a feeling
among local populations that most other Nigerians care little for their problems, so long as the
oil flows. Delta populations constantly campaign for a larger share of the federal cake, most of
which originates in their homelands (Alimi Idrisu, 2011: 96-97).
A continuing environmental degradation of the region poses another major threat of
devastation to local indigenous communities. Oil corporations deposit wastes of varying toxic
levels with impunity and are unchecked by an indolent environmental protection agency.
Corporations have adopted the pile exploration methods that consistently threaten bio-diversity
and ecological stabilization. These translated into a continuing decline in indigenous farming
industries and frustration of peoples whose livelihood directly dependent on riverine land
farming.
As a result of these factors, and because oil companies did and do make tempting
targets, many aggrieved youths in the Delta resort to direct action to extract compensation for
their perceived losses. They invade oil company properties, take employees hostage, and shut
down facilities. Oil companies typically negotiate release of captured personnel and properties
with relative ease by paying the youth’s modest ransoms (Alimi Idrisu, 2011: 86). This oil
company strategy creates a moral hazard: the willingness of companies to pay ransoms
stimulates imitators of this lucrative business, leading to sustained disruptions, at times to
compete among youths, and to a general sense of anarchy in the Delta.
Another conflict closely linked to federal control over Delta oil and the economy in
general is the intense competition for political office. For politicians, and for their communities,
control of federal office opens the high road to resources that can be diverted from public to
private or community control. Competition is naturally intense for federal political offices and
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has historically turned violent in the second election in each of Nigeria's two previous
republics. In summary, federal control over oil and much of the rest of the economy tends to
federalize many economic problems, particularly in the Delta, and stimulates intense efforts to
gain and hold office throughout Nigeria (Olufemi Ayodele, 2010: 34).
5.
ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS IN THE NIGER DELTA
Until early 2003 illegal small arms available in the Niger Delta were sourced from
conflict zones in West African countries such as Liberia and Chad. The weapons were of
poor quality. Weapons from Chad and Niger entering Nigeria through northern land borders
include Maigatari, Nguru, and Mallam Falori tend to be used to supply weapons to northern
clients (Adejo, 2005: 93). Some Nigerian military used their military role in Liberia to collect
weapons and ship them to Nigeria where they are sold directly to militants or through local
arms dealers. Some craft weapons were available from the Nigerian military and police
sources but, until recent evidence emerged about the illegal supply from the military's
Kaduna armoury, there was little hard evidence that these sources provided any substantial
volume of weapons. In 2005 President Obasanjo suspected an illegal supply network from the
Nigerian military and set investigations in process. These investigations gathered pace in
2007. In the lead up to the 2003 elections supplies of illegal weapons expanded. Political
patrons supplied weapons to groups in the Niger Delta who were contracted to deliver election
results. Closer to the 2003 elections Nigerian networks accessed international supplies of
automatic weapons. There is some anecdotal evidence that various groups were supplied
with some weapons and ammunition indirectly by the major oil companies as part of
contracts to supply the security services along oil pipelines (Adejo, 2005).
Illegal small arms sources (Lewis et al, 2005: 2) include: (a) weapons captured from
confrontations with the Nigerian military and police; (b) weapons sold to militia and illegal
arms dealers by the Nigerian military; (c) weapons provided by political parties for electoral
violence/intimidation purposes; (d) weapons provided in exchange for stolen oil by tankers
off-shore; (e) weapons bought from ex-military stationed in Bakassi and other places, and
foreign/local arms dealers; (f) weapons captured or bought from Cameroonian soldiers; and
(g) weapons bought with funds from members of Niger Delta communities living outside
Nigeria or directly supplied by them.
5.1
SOURCES OF FINANCE
Weapons are available through illegal oil bunkering either directly as part payment or
indirectly by paying for security services to protect oil theft operations. Oil companies have
also provided payments direct to communities to ensure oil operations are permitted to
continue without disturbance. Such payments are often used by disaffected youth as a means
to improve their arsenals (www.crisigroup.org). It is not only oil companies that provide
payment for security services. Arms are purchased with funds provided in return for
security services to various organizations operating in the Niger Delta such as construction
companies.
5.2
SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
The sources of SALW in the Niger Delta are international, regional and sub-regional.
After the conclusion of the Cold War, the deregulation of former state arms industries in
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Eastern and Central Europe led to an aggressive search for new arms markets in the developing
world. Through the activities of states, arms brokers and mercenaries thousands of weapons
have been transferred into the Niger Delta region and used by state security forces, the security
factions of oil companies and insurgent groups (Onuoha, 2006). Those weapons that are traded
include semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine-guns, and shoulder-fired rockets (known as
‘bazookas’). These weapons are readily available for purchase in Warri at prices that range
from around US$570 for a shotgun, or US$850 for a Kalashnikov rifle, to US$2, 150 for a
‘bazooka’. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service reportedly intercepted small arms and
ammunition worth more than N4.3 billion (US$30 million) at border posts during the first six
months of the year (Onuoha, 2006).
Insurgents have been known to steal or purchase small arms from government soldiers.
Sometimes, state security personnel double-up as arms dealers. However, other reasons that
account for the leakages from official sources include: the breakdown of state structures, lax
controls over national armouries, and poor service conditions of security personnel. The
industrial zones in the southeast of Nigeria, like Aba and Awka, are also home to the
manufacture of arms (Onuoha, 2006).
5.3
WHAT TYPE OF WEAPONS?
The most common weapons used by militants in the Niger Delta are assault rifles,
machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and explosives. In 2002 and 2003, weapons were
often sourced from civil wars in neighbouring countries, previous communal conflicts and some
captured during clashes with police and military. Leading up to the 2003 elections newer
weapons were supplied primarily through political patrons. After the 2003 election, new
weapons were procured through illegal crude oil bunkering where vessels brought weapons in
and took stolen oil out. As international arms sources were accessed through illegal arms
dealers in 2006 and 2007 the quality of weapons improved. The range of weapons in the hands
of non-state forces in the Niger Delta includes AK-47s, General Purpose Machine Guns
(GPMG), Light Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), German G3 assault rifles,
explosives (nitropil, dynamite, plastic), and electronic remote detonation devices. More
sophisticated weapons acquired by militia have not yet been deployed. Weapons being acquired
by non-state forces include features of night vision and increased targeting accuracy (Coventry
Cathedral, 2009).
5.4
V O L U M E O F I L L E G A L S M A L L A R M S A N D L I G H T WE A P O N S
There are an estimated seven to ten million illicit small arms and light weapons in
West Africa (Hazen et al, 2007: 8). There are an estimated one million (Ebo, 2006: 1) to three
million (Nnamdi, 2002: 69) small arms and light weapons in circulation in Nigeria. But,
whereas illegal small arms are most commonly associated with militia activity in the Niger
Delta, it is the civilians in the villages that possess the major ity of weapons in the
countr y. These weapons pose a significant challenge to law and order and a high risk to
personal security” (Hazen et al, 2007: 25).
As militia groups fractured in 2005 and former commanders formed new groups the
demand for weapons steadily grew. The formation of MEND and its emergence in a dramatic
fashion with several high profile kidnappings early in 2005 saw a rapid expansion in demand
which was met by access to the international arms market.
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5.5
THE CHANNELS OF SUPPLY OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS
Several transit countries are often mentioned include countries with whom Nigeria
shares a common border (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) are known as countries that
transit illegal weapons into Nigeria. Weapons are illegally procured through Cameroon,
often as part of a shipment of machinery parts or smuggled inside petrol tankers. Other
countries such as Gabon and Guinea-Bissau are also known to be countries through which
illegal weapons transit to Nigeria (Ojudu, 2007: 228). Other reported countries from which
illegal weapons and ammunition are sourced include Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, South Africa,
Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia (Davis et al, 2005: 3). While
source countries are often named, the flows of small arms from source and transit countries
are not well documented.
5.6
PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS IN THE STREETS AND CREEKS
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation dramatically escalated in the
Niger Delta over the past twelve years. The availability of these weapons of an unregulated
international market has enabled militant groups, criminal groups and political aspirants to
further destabilize the fragile region (IANSA and Oxfam, 2006). The SALW proliferation has
been driven by political ambition combining with a cross cutting illegal economy, fed by oil
bunkering, creating both direct and indirect drivers of violence in the Niger Delta region. The
international trade in SALW in the Niger Delta trade is thought to be dominated by ruthless
Ukrainian and Russian dealers who over the past few years have swapped thousands of
automatic weapons for illegal bunkered oil. It is also believed that weapons from Turkey,
Indonesia and South Africa play a crucial role in the arms flow in the Niger Delta (IANSA and
Oxfam, 2006).
The domination of violence both as political and economic drivers undermines the
incentives for economic diversification and medium term investment into the region. There are
devastating impacts on communities and small businesses, as well as losses at the federal level.
In the region, these dramatic social and economic impacts in turn create a vast number of idle
youth, ready to take up arms in a deadly cross cutting mix of short term ideology, status and
wealth (IANSA and Oxfam, 2006).
This deadly international trade can only be addressed through international regulation.
So far, the international community has failed to take the necessary measures to control the
international arms trade. At regional level, ECOWAS moratorium should be strengthened into
the convention, and at international level, government must agree a new international Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) (IANSA and Oxfam, 2006). There is the need for the Nigerian
government, to pursue a true and genuine agenda of democratization, justice, stabilize its
economy and create opportunities for its citizens, in order to divert the attention of its
population from gangsterism and violence. If the problems of proliferation in the Niger Delta
region and other parts of Nigeria are not addressed, the non-state armed and warlords operating
in the region will undermine the region and plunge it into a dangerous conflict zone where the
gangs will rule at the expense of legitimate authority, development, security and progress of all.
The situation looks hopeless, and, again, if not checked, the scenario in Somalia and other
conflict zone around the world will be a child’s play.
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5.7
THE CAUSES OF CONFLICTS AND ILLEGAL WEAPONS
Marginalisation of minorities and inequitable oil extraction is one of the causes. Nigeria
is a former British colonial territory. Prior to the advent of colonialism, Nigeria was comprised
of various kingdoms, empires and ethnic groups. These groups had developed their own
indigenous systems of administration, as well as their own political arrangements and
formations. The modern Nigerian state emerged in 1914, the consequence of the forced merger
of the Northern and Southern British protectorates due to economic and administrative
motivations. The colonial state subsequently became arbitrary, all-powerful and absolute. The
creation of the Nigerian state resulted in the economic and political marginalisation of many
minority ethnic groups, which was the case in the Niger Delta region. This was achieved by
means of a rationalisation exercise set out in the Richards Constitution of 1946, which divided
Nigeria into three unequal administrative units (Onuoha, 2006). Nigeria achieved independence
from Britain in 1960 and adopted the Westminster parliamentary system of government and a
federal approach to governance.
The former proved to be problematic in Nigeria as well as other multi-ethnic societies
that adopted it, as it tends to over-amplify the role and influence of the major political parties,
allows for elites to exploit ethnicity as a modality for mobilising mass support in the pursuit of
political power, and contributes to the marginalisation (and eventual militarisation) of minority
groups. In Nigeria, there were campaigns for the creation of states for minorities, for example a
cross-ethnic coalition, the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers Movement, in the Southeast and Delta areas of
Nigeria (Onuoha, 2006)
The marginalisation of minority groups in the Niger Delta was particularly severe
during the 1960s, and was exacerbated by the hostile approach of Nigeria’s ruling party (federal
government), the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), with opposition political groups, the
global collapse of the price of cash crops particular to Nigeria, and the rising significance of
petroleum exports from the Niger Delta. In February 1966 a small group of Ijaw activists (the
Niger Delta Volunteer Force) led by Isaac Adaka Boro, Sam Owonara and Nottingham Dick
attempted to secede the Niger Delta region from Nigeria through the force of arms and
proclaimed the Niger Delta a republic. However, their insurgency was short-lived as it was
crushed by federal troops after 12 days (Onuoha, 2006)
Minorities in the oil-rich regions of Nigeria became further estranged from the Nigerian
state after the Nigerian civil war (1967-1969). Derivation, the system of government’s regional
allocation of revenue, which had been pursued under colonial rule, was rapidly phased out after
the civil war. This system of resource allocation was based on the principle that funds and other
resources would be disbursed and employed in those regions from which they were derived. In
March 1978 the Land Use Decree was passed by the federal government, which had the aim of
establishing a standardised land tenure system in Nigeria, where Nigerians required certificates
of occupancy from the government for land held under customary and statutory rights, and had
to pay rent to the government. In addition, this decree sought to make land available for
development by corporations, institutions, and governmental authorities. The decree gave the
government the authority to acquire and assign undeveloped land. Occupancy or possession of
undeveloped land by individuals was restricted. In the Niger Delta region, indigenous people
were alienated from the land, while corporations, particularly multinational oil conglomerates,
were empowered. This led to the degradation of the fragile delta environment, with a direct
adverse impact on biodiversity and the livelihoods of the people (Onuoha, 2006).
Appreciations of global oil prices significantly boosted the value of Nigeria’s total
exports in the 1970s, but also distorted the national economy. In 1970 oil constituted 26 per
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cent of government revenue, but by 1973 it had risen above 60 per cent. The result was the
over-valuation of the Nigerian currency, which undermined agricultural exports. Both the
Nigerian government and the economy struggled to adapt to this rapid growth, and corruption
and economic mismanagement were by-products. Major decreases in the global oil price in
1977, and again in 1981, sent shockwaves through the Nigerian economy, with massive public
debt and a dysfunctional economy being the result. The economic crisis sets the tone for a
fundamental change in the outlook of the minority movements of the Niger Delta. Polarisation
occurred within these movements, which occurred at two levels: those who benefited from and
supported the extractive state-corporate oil alliance and those who were critical of the inequities
embedded in that alliance, and the consequent exploitation.
In 1989, the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida adopted structural
adjustment economic reforms in 1986. These reforms brought an end to price-fixing in the
agricultural sector, a reduction in fuel subsidies, the deregulation of the banking sector and
limited liberalisation of the exchange rate. However, the adjustment package failed to reverse
the economic decline. The theoretical underpinnings were faulty and this engendered an
inappropriate approach to economic reform in Nigeria. More so, this economic strategy
contributed to misery, insecurity, tension and conflict within the country. This trend was
noticeable in most parts of Nigeria, but it was overwhelmingly concentrated and sustained in
the Niger Delta.
5.8
LOCAL ILLEGAL ARMS MARKETS
Weapons drifted into Nigeria through porous borders from conflicts in other African
countries and came with the Nigerian military forces force returning from peace-keeling
missions to such places as Liberia and Sierra Leone. Supply significantly increased to meet
demand which increased significantly when youth in the Niger Delta were mobilised to
secure elections. The need to secure elections meant that powerful political patrons were able
to open the way for supplies of illegal weapons to reach their required destinations. Weapons
were being landed on the docks in Lagos and quickly cleared by customs. Clearly there was
complicity on the docks. The illegal weapons were then transported by road both to the Niger
Delta and to illegal arms markets in the middle belt. Militias have expressed their confidence
at the ease with which they could transport weapons from Lagos to the Niger Delta. Illegal
small arms are readily available from Aba, Onitsha or Enugu arms markets. Aba plays a
central role in the supply of used weapons to the local Rivers State market. In one case a
Local Government Chairman retained a large, unofficial security force which he armed by
purchase of weapons from the Aba market. In April 2006 the spot price at the Aba market for
an AK-47 was N200,000. Other towns renowned for the availability of weapons include
Asaba, Benin City, Warri, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt (Hazen et al, 2007). Leading up
to the 2003 elections there were three prominent areas known for the ease of entry for illegal
weapons. In the south-west there are Idi-lroko in Ogun State and Seme in Lagos State; in the
south there is Warri in Delta State; and in the north-east at the border with Niger and
Cameroon (Agboton-Johnson et al, 2004: 21). However by 2003 militia spoke more of
shipments through Lagos and the ease of distribution to arms markets in the south and the
middle belt. In 2004 consignments of small arms were being transshipped from Liberia
bound vessels standing off the Niger Delta coast to small fast speed boats used by the
militia.
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5.9
THOSE INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
The identity of persons involved in the supply of illegal weapons either directly
or indirectly includes former federal ministers, state commissioners, local government
chairmen, state security officers, Nigerian military officers, and senior officers of federal
government statutory authorities (Coventry Cathedral, 2009). Weapons have been landed at
ports in the Niger Delta with the knowledge and complicity of senior state security
officers. Local Nigerian illegal arms dealers use Niger Delta ports to import illegal
weapons through import-export businesses and distribute the weapons through their state
networks particularly in Akwa lbom and Anambra states. Military personnel have been
involved in supplying weapons from the Nigerian military's armouries. Training camps
led by ex-military officers were functioning in strategic locations throughout the Niger
Delta in 2006. Some non-state forces have been sponsored by senior government officials by
way of regular payments akin to salaries (Coventry Cathedral, 2009).
5.10
SHORT T ERM RENT AL OF WEAPONS
Day hire of weapons from military and police officers has become a feature of the
illegal use of small arms in the Niger Delta. Hire of automatic weapons in 2006 ranged
from N5, 000 to N20, 000 per day depending on the job they were to be used for and
success of the operation. At that time it was also possible to hire a "trigger finger" with
weapon for additional N10,000 - N20,000. President Obasanjo raised the subject of illegal
supply of weapons from Nigeria's state security agencies as early as December 2002 when
he stated that “the majority of small arms and light weapons circulating in Nigeria were
either sold or rented out by, or stolen from, the country's security agencies” (Ginifer et al,
2007: 6-7).
5.11
CONFISCATION OF ILLEGAL WEAPONS
The number of illegal small arms seized by Nigeria's customs is ridiculously small.
Weapons seizures at border points known to be key ports of entry for shipments of illegal
arms such as Lagos and Port Harcourt are almost unknown. Similarly, recovery of illegal
arms by the Nigerian military and police is negligible (Coventry Cathedral, 2009).
6.
THE CONTROL OF ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
Following a period of violent conflict, such as has occurred in some Niger Delta
states, no cessation of the conflict could return the social and political setting to its
former pre-conflict situation. Thus all parties accepted there would be a new reality but
more importantly that they could help to construct the new social, political and economic
dimensions of the new reality (Coventry Cathedral, 2009). The concept of conversion
relates to the transition from violent conflict to peace and the consequent change of use
of economic and social resources and change of vocation of former combatants
(Gormally, 2001: 2). The creation of a peaceful society is predicated on finding solutions
to the issues that lay at the root of conflict. A solution imposed by one party is unlikely to
form the basis of an enduring peace with sustained improvement in the quality of life of
all participants. A sustained peace with justice requires an agreed process in which all
stakeholders are willing participants.
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There were four broad parts to the peace process. First there was the
demobilization of the militia. Second there was the disarmament. Third was the weapons
destruction which was conducted to international standards. Fourth is the ongoing
reintegration of former non-state combatants which involves counselling for the former
nonstop combatants and building the community capacity to receive the former nonstop
combatants back into mainstream society.
6.1
THE STRATEGY OF DEMOBILISATION
In the first stage combatants were registered, interviewed and received counseling. The
second stage involved the determination of those without a livelihood who should be absorbed
in the amnesty activities. Amnesty activities involved work and training projects to ensure
productive engagement in the post-conflict situation. The demobilisation reintegration scheme
was compounded by certain problems.
 Economic problems hampered the ability of facilitators to demobilise combatants
effectively. Political difficulties in the demobilisation process compounded uncertainties
caused by the paucity of resources and logistic problems both of which resulted in serious
challenges to demobilisation.
 The number of weapons in private hands led to insecurity and fear.
 Suspicion and distrust among factional leaders hampered efforts at demobilisation.
Throughout the demobilisation stages of the agreements, faction groups were unwilling to
demobilise until their opponents had taken a verifiable first lead. Again, the existence of
open hostility between and among various groups delayed the demobilisation and
reintegration of troops.
In Nigeria the term "demobilisation" has been used most often to refer simply to
disarming former non-state combatants and providing them with a modest payment and some
skills retraining. It focuses on reducing the immediate threat under international pressure.
Inevitably this version of demobilisation has had little enduring success. Demobilization in the
Niger Delta required a detailed program that specified education, job training, employment and
small business opportunities for the former non-state combatants.
Without successful demobilisation former non-state combatants are highly likely to
return to combat roles. The militia chain of command needed to be severed in a formal process
that would release former non-state combatants to reintegration programmes and thus dispel
suspicions that the former non-state combatants have not totally relinquished their militia
activities and therein hindering full reintegration.
There was the need to have former non-state combatants formally and publicly renounce their
associations with a group or cause. Further, having not only the principal militia leaders but
also their next tier of command make public and written renouncement of association helped in
reducing the potential of reviving conflict during the demobilization and reintegration of former
non-state combatants. "The development of veteran's organizations with open membership can
be one way to acknowledge the effort of soldiering and promoting return to civilian life"
(Buchanan, 2008: 26).
Demobilization is not an ad hoc process that should be permitted to occur in a form that
varies from state to state. The terms must be uniform across all states in the Niger Delta. The
mechanics of demobilization required former non-state combatants and prisoners belonging to
the militia groups to register and thus allow them to fully participate in programmes.
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Demobilization camps were required and that entailed well equipped camps with
medical assistance, good food, and security. The camps provided for the dependants of the
former non-state combatants to join them and participate in orientation programmes.
Orientation is an important step in establishing the value of the demobilization and a future
in which the former non-state combatants are active and valued participants. The
demobilization camps offered an opportunity for former non-state combatants and their
families to understand the demobilization process, the process of reintegration into
community life, health, education, employment, training and business opportunities
available to the former non-state combatants. It is also an opportunity to explore the future
and map out a path that will assist former non-state combatants establish a firm and
positive direction.
6.2
THE ROLE OF DISARMAMENT
Disarmament includes disarming of combatants and irregular forces, weapons buyback
programmes and arms embargoes and control. In the Niger Delta disarmament was related to
the search for stability and implemented under the supervision of government representatives.
Federal forces undertook disarmament processes and the verification and monitoring of faction
compliance.
The lack of clear confidence-building measures was an obstacle to the
disarmament. There is a close correlation between the level of insecurity and distrust
among faction groups and the quantity and quality of weapons surrendered. Mutual
suspicion among faction groups contributed to non-compliance with disarmament
components amid acrimonious reciprocal accusations of violations during the harvest of
weapons in October 2004 (Lewis et al, 2005). The issue of disarmament has been addressed
in a range of situations throughout the world in recent years: Uganda (1992), Mozambique
(1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1997), Northern Ireland (1998), and Kosovo (1999).
Recent disarmament efforts in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia suffered from inadequate
funding and lack of trust between government and rebels, issues which must be addressed
in the Niger Delta situation if disarmament is to be successful.
Weapons by-back programme was an economic incentive scheme to encourage faction
participation in the disarmament programme. As a result, a cash-for-arms programme, whereby
the militants were given cash rewards, small-scale business loan and job training schemes to
provide alternative possibilities for post-combat activities was introduced. The critical factor
was the reintegration of combatants who had been living a life of violence and crime to
productive ventures and alternative modes of useful contribution to social development.
However, weapons buy-back programmes have had limited medium-term impact on reducing
the number of weapons circulating in countries which have porous borders with countries with
active weapons market; lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying of weapons
and apolitical, economic or security climate which promotes the security and economic value of
owning and using a weapon.
Fusato's (www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization) list of the five
conditions to help to guarantee the success of a program for the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former non-state combatants are:
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6.2.1
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
In the Niger Delta, disarmament has been seen as an end in itself with the view that when the
non-state forces are disarmed the threat will subside and peace will flow as a natural result. Thus
disarmament is often pushed too quickly, some components are disregarded, the non-state combatants
become nervous, trust breaks down and the process stalls or collapses. Disarmament is the first
component cited in the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration). Disarmament must be
seen as an integral part of the overall peace making process. In the Niger Delta 2004 Peace Accord
disarmament occurred quickly after the principle points of the ensuing Peace Accord were agreed on
01 October 2004 in the Cabinet Room at a meeting between President Obasanjo and militia leaders.
The funds for demobilization had evaporated by early 2005 and by March former combatants were
being recruited as mercenaries for operations in other countries. The militias depended on their
arms for survival. The force of arms was their strength and their bargaining power. Thus they
were unwilling to relinquish their weapons until they had clear and credible evidence that all
matters agreed with the government would be implemented and there was a credible high
profile international third party who would oversee and publicly report on the process at the
frequent internals (Coventry Cathedral, 2009).
DDR programs must have sufficient funding to complete their implementation, and to
provide for contingencies in a flexible way. Failure to complete a DDR program can jeopardize the
entire peace process and obstruct economic recovery. Former non-state combatants who are not
successfully demobilized and reintegrated can easily fuel new violence, and may return to conflict as
the only possible way to make a living. A new escalation in violence can then destroy the results of
piecemeal interventions and partial implementation of DDR. The Niger Delta has seen a variety of
conflict situations. Various remedies have been applied ranging from security solutions,
disarmament and demobilization to conflict resolution. In many cases solutions have been
instituted with the full intent of procuring a temporary peace in order to satisfy and external,
often international audience (Coventry Cathedral, 2009).
6.2.2
PROBLEM-SOLVING PEACE SETTLEMENT
The conditions of security and inclusion must be integrated into a political agreement defining
the end of hostilities and the implementation of DDR. Experience has shown that DDR programs
cannot drive a peace process. DDR can only be implemented in the context of a negotiated settlement,
a ceasefire, or a peace agreement. It can reinforce the agreement, as a form of security guarantee and a
confidence-building measure, but it cannot precede the agreement (ibid).
6.2.3
PROVISION OF ADEQUATE SECURITY
A safe environment is required in order for parties to give up their weapons, and for DDR
institutions to operate. Only trust can break the cycle of violence, allowing warring individuals and
parties to disarm and resume civilian life. Third parties play an important role in guaranteeing
compliance with a ceasefire, respect for public order, the safety of individuals, and equitable
implementation of disarmament programs. Peacekeeping forces cannot be expected to end hostilities,
but a credible deterring force is necessary to prevent unilateral violations of agreements, which could
jeopardize an entire DDR program (ibid).
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6.2.4
COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION
DDR programs cannot succeed without careful coordination of the phases of DDR by the
different actors at the local and national levels. Disarmament without reintegration, and demobilization
without prior disarmament and planned economic and social reintegration, are short-lived efforts.
Necessary ingredients include, a credible and authoritative national institution to plan, implement, and
oversee the program at the national level; peacekeeping forces and military personnel implement
disarmament; civilian organizations and institutions to provide food, education, and health care to
demobilized ex-combatants; local communities which are sensitized and directly involved in the social
and economic integration of demobilized former non-state combatants (Ibid).
6.2.5
INVOLVEMENT OF ALL COMBATANTS
In order to establish a safe environment and break the security dilemma, it is necessary that all
parties be included in the DDR program and disarmed simultaneously. Otherwise it is easy for one
party to resume fighting, taking advantage of its opponents' disarmament. It is important that all parties
develop ownership of the process and do not feel discriminated against, that different parties feel that
they are being treated equitably, and that they are given the same opportunities to reintegrate into
society. Institutions implementing DDR should communicate regularly and frequently with each party
at the political and military commander level. External observers and peacekeepers should be
perceived by all sides to be impartial, neutral, and credible (ibid).
6.3
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMME
Weapons destruction is an aspect of the disarmament programmes. Most of the
weapons delivered for destruction were serviceable under the modalities for monitoring the
implementation an end to militant activities. After the serviceable weapons delivered by
factions were registered most of them were destroyed. Depending on the quality of the weapon
presented, some were not recognized as weapons at all but were simply destroyed and there
were many cases.
6.4
REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS
The rationale for implementing reintegration programmes for ex-combatants during a
peace support operation is that such a programme can reduce tensions between parties thereby
helping to achieve the effective disarming of warring parties and reducing the possibility of
factional parties trying to use military means for political purposes
Beyond the mechanics of the training, jobs and weapons there is the care of the former
non-state combatants, their families and their communities. There is a constant danger in the
peace process that reintegration will be treated as optional. When weapons have been
recovered and the threat of violent conflict has faded there is the tendency for government
and other stakeholders to turn their attention elsewhere. Shortcomings and delays in
reintegration support have jeopardized a number of past DDR efforts, including the
demobilization processes in Mozambique, Angola and Liberia in the 1990s.
In the Niger Delta there is already one major network established that could foster the
former non-state combatants in their reintegration, provide counselling and work with families
and communities to accept the former non-state, combatants back into mainstream community
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life. The churches could be coordinated to form a co-operative group that will specifically work
towards reintegrating the former non-state combatants.
6.5
POLICIES, MEASURE AND CONTROL OPTIONS
In the Niger Delta, SALW have been used to exacerbate conflicts, to engage in criminal
activities such as banditry, theft of crude oil (known as ‘oil-bunkering’) and kidnapping, and to
intimidate opposition groupings. Given the availability of SALW in the Niger Delta region,
sustainable peace is difficult to achieve in this poverty-stricken and densely populated area.
Concerted efforts should be made to reduce the proliferation and misuse of SALW in the Niger
Delta region. Such an approach should address both the demand and supply aspects of the
SALW problem. In terms of supply, a multi-tiered approach is required, from targeting the
major global arms manufacturers and suppliers in order to encourage them to show greater
restraint in the sale of weapons to African countries that are experiencing armed conflict, to
establishing stiffer internal arms transfer controls, to regulating the activities of arms brokers
and private security companies.
In practical terms, it is impossible to place a ban on the production and transfer of
SALW in the country. According to Musah, apart from the fact that they perform some
legitimate functions in the governance process, they are widely used in hunting to supplement
the predominantly starch-based diet in the rural communities of the country (Onuoha, 2006). In
addition, SALW are sturdy, durable and reusable, and hence are difficult to eliminate.
Government must consequently improve and strengthen national SALW laws and regulations,
impose licensing requirements, and carefully restrict their manufacture and transfer. Addressing
the demand side of the SALW problem can only be achieved if local conditions are taken into
account. In the case of the Niger Delta region, the manner by which Nigeria is governed is one
of the major root causes of violence as it distributes resources inequitably, which directly
contributes to underdevelopment. This is particularly stark in the case of the Niger Delta region,
which is one of the poorest in Nigeria, but is the largest generator of foreign exchange earnings
in the country. Possible solutions can be found in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, Addendum to the
Ogoni Bill of Rights and Kaiama Declaration, which articulate the core needs of minority
ethnic groups in the region, such as greater regional autonomy and equitable access to oil
revenue and land for the communities of the Niger Delta (Onuoha, 2006).
There have been some positive developments in terms of arms control and disarmament
in Nigeria. For example, in October 1998 the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) established a moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of SALW. One of
its aims was to institute a voluntary freeze on arms trade and eliminate existing illegal stocks
from society. The agreement also calls for the creation of a national commission drawn from
the state and civil society structures to supervise disarmament within each individual state. In
May 2001 the Nigerian government inaugurated a national committee on the ECOWAS
moratorium on SALW. The Nigerian government has also established a national committee to
investigate and report on the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW within as well as in
the country. Its members include representatives of the Army, Navy, State Security Services,
Nigerian Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency and Ministry of
Defence. In September 2003 the federal government announced an ‘arms surrender’ policy to
recover weapons being used by ethnic militias in the Niger Delta. Although it recorded a
modest success, no real long-term strategy for recovering SALW seems to be in place.
Conversely, on the civil society platform, a coalition of non-governmental organisations in the
Niger Delta launched a ‘mop-up the arms’ campaign in June 2003 (Onuoha, 2006).
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In spite of these developments, practical action remains limited. First, the moratorium
is voluntary and is not legally binding. To this extent, only a demonstration of confidencebuilding measures and political will by the government can tackle the instability caused by
SALW in the region. Second, there is a growing tendency for these agencies and commissions
to be incorporated into the corrupt and inept state bureaucracies, hence, rendering them
ineffective.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Attempts to totally disband the militia, without providing credible and sustained
demobilization will likely fail and either the militia will be drawn back into conflict activity to
support political power brokers, oil theft operations or other boys will step up to replace
those that have relinquished the space.
There is an argument for maintaining the militia structure and territorial association
and, in the first step, seek only to change the militia activity from unlawful activity to
lawful activity. This involves moving from hostage taking and infrastructure destruction to
commercial activities that operate over an exclusive area (the militia territory) similar to a
franchise. These activities would initially include river transport and road transport, where
militia skills excel and the local knowledge base could be used to give early warning of any
illegal activities. A local fuel franchise could similarly be provided with appropriate
business support. Each militia commander could partner with a business mentor for each
activity.
The militia structure could also be used as the basis for forming agriculture cooperatives where
former non-state combatants provide labour for large scale rice farming projects and also hold a
stake in the project through membership of a cooperative. Thereby they not only receive a wage
for their labour but also share in the profit of the respective projects. There is some merit in the
above suggestion and this must be weighed against experience in other situations where
maintenance of the militia command structure has led to a re-establishment of militia activity.
The Nigeria Government and the oil companies share common characteristics of
handling violence in the administration of the Niger Delta region as it affects the oil producing
communities. The government should initiate a credible, sustained dialogue on control of
resources with Niger Delta civil society groups, including ex-militants, activist leaders,
religious leaders, women and youth drawn from nominees submitted by councils of ethnic
groups in the Niger Delta states. Moreover, it should institute a derivation formula of between
25 and 50 per cent of mineral resources, including oil and gas, to all Nigerian states, and phase
this in over five years in order to avoid budgetary shock to non-oil producing states and to
encourage exploration and production of other mineral resources throughout Nigeria.
The problem of the Niger Delta can only be resolved by the collaborative efforts of the
community, local, state and Federal Government as well as the multinational companies
coming together to sincerely dialogue on genuine issues and also honour decisions reached.
While the Federal Government at various times created avenues for dialogue and negotiations,
the strategy adopted mostly does not lay emphasis on redressing the injustices to the people of
the Niger Delta through political and constitutional solution. The emphasis here is that the
political interest of these people must be taken into consideration while their welfare must not
be undermined and when resolutions are taken it should be made constitutional and binding on
both sides. It is evident that the Niger Delta region suffers from a flagrant dearth of
infrastructure development. It has been advocated severally that government should embark
upon a meaningful, people –oriented projects that will avert the pending doom for good. The
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Niger Delta region should be developed as the capital city Abuja is being developed. Thus, the
only panacea for the enthronement of lasting peace in the Niger Delta is massive economic and
infrastructure development, justice, equity and fair play in line with the tenets of true
federalism, which Nigeria professes.
The prevalence of poverty, unequal access to resources, large youth populations with
limited access to education or jobs, and other socio-political factors contribute to conflict and
instability in the Niger Delta region, as well as other parts of Nigeria. Nevertheless, it is the
presence of SALW that escalates conflicts from situations of tension to high levels of violence,
as is currently taking place in the Niger Delta. Thus, this scenario results in an internal arms
race, hinders development and stifle conflict resolution efforts. This crisis cannot be addressed
in isolation. It must take into cognisance the developments at the global, regional and national
levels. The state in Nigeria must critically address the welfare and development needs of its
people. The proper articulation of state policies to address these issues will ward-off unrest and
resolve conflicts in the region. If the Nigerian state is to be guaranteed a meaningful future in
the 21st century, it must critically address the problems of governance, oil revenue distribution
and identity and class. Anything short of democracy, development and meaningful federalism is
the only cosmetic approach and will further intensify the conflicts in Nigeria.
A sustained peace in the Niger Delta will not be attained without serious and constructive
attention to the weapons through which violence is perpetrated. Neither will the local community, the
national population nor the international community believe that there is any integrity of a peace
process that does not address disarmament. The disarmament program and subsequent weapons
destruction had the full backing and integral involvement of the Federal Government. The
disarmament process will be seriously compromised if the government fails to guarantee security and
demonstrate that it has transformed security from a private necessity which individuals and groups
have to provide for themselves through various means to a public good provided by the state.
Corruption within the legal system means that criminals often escape justice. A particularly
alarming dimension is the involvement of law enforcement agents in the proliferation of illegal small
arms. Given that situation, many citizens have simply decided to provide security for themselves,
arming themselves with illegal small arms. In order to convince people to disarm Nigeria has to
provide and maintain an adequate level of public safety. This may include measures to improve law
enforcement through training and capacity building, an increased presence of security forces in remote
areas and reinforcement of the rule of law and respect for international human rights. The
government has obligations to respect, protect and fulfill all human rights.
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