Nigel Newton
In search of truth, values and validity: Michael Polanyi’s theory of knowledge,
Habermas and interdisciplinary research.
Abstract
The paper explores the relevance of Polanyi’s ideas in relation to attitudes to interdisciplinary
research reflected in recent discourse concerning academic funding. Aspects of Jurgen Habermas’
theory of communicative rationality are referred to in the course of examination of Polanyi’s theory
of tacit knowledge, observing these philosophers’ attempt to redefine rationality in a way that
recognises personal perspective, while avoiding relativism. Focus is placed on epistemological
issues as they relate to questions of scientific validity. Polanyi’s “society of explorers” and
Habermas’s description of social consciousness are discussed in relation to attempts to preserve
social values and liberty. How the two philosophers understand issues of validity in relation to
community is also discussed.
The paper is exploratory in focus and written in a ‘personal voice’ as a device with which to
acknowledge the value of subsidiary knowledge. By adopting a reflexive turn, I have attempted to
illustrate how discovery, consistent with a Polanyian theory within which personal values are
included within the logic of tacit inference, includes liberty of academic discourse. Two key ideas
are referred to in relation to this concept: the fiduciary nature of all knowledge and how this is
constructed by reference to the theory of tacit knowledge. There is also consideration of possible
reasons why issues of freedom, interdisciplinary research and a commitment to anti-reductionist
epistemology can be seen to emerge from Polanyi’s writing. The aim of the paper to present some
avenues in relation to these issues which merit further work.
Personal knowing
A friend studying Patristic Studies at the University of Chicago recommended I read
Personal Knowledge (PK, 1958) by Michael Polanyi. “It makes you see why hunches work
and St. Augustine got it right”, he said. I was quickly attracted to its opening expositions on
the process of scientific discovery. Polanyi described how his own discoveries in the field of
chemistry emerged through insights for which he then had to find validating evidence. He also
provided a powerful critique of myths concerning scientific research. This discussion of the
scientific method reminded me of Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method (1988)1, and I later saw
comparisons with Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)2. However
Polanyi’s subsequent analysis of epistemological and theoretical consequences and
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implications for these early observations were complex and developed into an argument which
were theoretically distinctive.
I returned to Polanyi over a year later frustrated with the limitations of materialistic
conceptions of science, the determinism inherent in aspects of the empirical model, and with
growing suspicions that all accounts of knowledge dependent primarily on rationality
ultimately lead to a dichotomy between mind and body which I felt solipsistic3. I had, however,
sympathy for Habermas’s critique of modernism, Bhasker’s realism, and found engaging
MacIntyre’s account in After Virtue of the need for community in order understand ethical
claims. How could my own instincts for what was “out” there and “in” me be reconciled, or at
least be focused coherently, towards my own search as an educational researcher for
understanding about the relationship between personal values and learning?
I explain this personal journey to Polanyi because I see it as consistent with a
Polanyian methodology, where explication of possible subsidiary factors influencing the
researcher’s approach are valuable in terms of supporting the reliability of the heuristic
attempt within the investigation. My aim in this paper is to examine the relevance of Polanyi’s
ideas in relation to a more holistic concept of scientific discovery and how findings are
assessed as valid.
I will also consider these ideas briefly in the context of aspects of
contemporary discussion about interdisciplinary research. I make reference to features of
Jurgen Habermas’ attempt to redefine rationality in a way that recognises personal perspective,
while avoiding relativism, and Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge.
I am particularly
interested in Habermas’s concept of intuitive values, central to his argument about the
lifeworld. However, my intention is not to attempt a reconciliation of theories or fusion of
ideas. I see the value of comparison as helpful in terms of sharpening perspectives on matters
I consider germane to issues relating to interdisciplinary research referred to later. Much
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could be discussed here but I intend only to draw out epistemological issues as they relate to
questions of validity, primarily from my own background in social science research. In the
last section I will seek to find application for his theories by reference to interdisciplinary
research.
In writing about these topics, I will be drawing from my subsidiary knowledge, this
includes all the things I have read, the experiences I have had and the practice of writing itself.
Polanyi distinguishes subsidiary and focal awareness. The latter refers to the thing under
consideration, for him this is never known without the use of subsidiary knowledge. For
example, in reading this paper the focus is on the meaning of the words but we rely on
subsidiary knowledge of the significance of marks on the paper, an awareness of the English
lexicon and syntax. Nevertheless, if we were to focus on these we would lose sense of the
meaning. The subsidiary elements resist codification, largely remaining unconscious, yet they
are indispensable to successfully knowing.
I see how the practice of reflexivity, often
encouraged in qualitative research, can be enhanced by consideration of Polanyi’s argument
that discovery is an art4. If this discussion of Polanyi leads to any new knowledge, I hope that
one way will be by stimulating readers’ to consider his ideas in relation to the philosophical
presuppositions that influence discourse about discovery and the dangers of neglecting to
consider these.
My ‘Focal’ Aims
I have begun this essay by saying why Polanyi interests me and how I came to
appreciate his relevance. I refer above to topics which will be discussed. However, it would
be disingenuous of me to suggest the transferral of information about these were the focus of
my writing. In truth, the discussion draws from Polanyi’s defence of the fiduciary nature of all
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knowledge and explores how this can be understood in relation to his theory of tacit
knowledge. Other issues are discussed in the text as lenses through which the significance of
his philosophy can be seen. For example, in the next section I describe the context within
which his ideas emerged, in order to draw attention to both Polanyi’s credentials as a scientist
and to illustrate how important his ideals of freedom were in relation to the development of his
theory. It was this aspect of my reading of Polanyi which caused me to see a connection to
Habermas’s social criticism.
In turn, my concerns about trends in the discourse about
interdisciplinary research towards an instrumental view of discovery were brought into clearer
perception by my engagement with Habermas’s ideas.
I have written this paper with a personal voice consistent with the qualitative traditions
that inform my practice as an educational researcher. Polanyi seems to me a much needed
voice in wider discussion about interdisciplinary research and initiating consideration about
how his ideas may be introduced to debate about the value of this kind of research is my wider
objective. What prompted this thought was my friend’s suggestion of reading Polanyi. He
came from a research background in theology and textual studies, yet thought that I as a social
scientist would find something relevant in Polanyi. What is it about Polanyi’s heuristic
philosophy which makes it valid across disciplinary domains?
Polanyi’s journey to philosophy of science
Michael Polanyi’s was not a professionally trained academic philosopher. He was well into
his 50s when he recognised this was his “life’s work” and 62 when his major philosophical
text was published. His intellectual journey is instructive but complex. No less so are his ideas.
They range from theories of knowledge and ontology to arguments about economics, art and
the place of faith in scientific discovery.
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As a scientist Polanyi had made significant discoveries in the field of chemistry, the late
Prof. John Ziman believed his work was worthy of the Noble Prize5. But Polanyi’s intellectual
commitments were deeper and broader than the mono-academic pursuit typically associated
with those who receive the highest honours in academic endeavours. Regardless of the limited
public recognition he received in his life, Polanyi’s experience twice of the descent of Europe
into war and the family hardships, migrations and changes this caused gave him deep concerns
for the value of liberty and structure of society.
As a young scientist he had visited the Soviet Union (1928, 1931 and 1932), witnessing
first hand the Communist experiment at fulfilling human potential and satisfying universal
needs. There he conversed with scientists and the theorist Nikolai Ivanovich Burkharin (Scott
& Moleski, 2005, p.154). In 1935 he published his first work on economics, “USSR
Economics – Fundamental Data, System and Spirit”, and in 1936 he published a review of a
two volume work on Soviet Communism (Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 1935 cited in Scott &
Moleski, 2005, p.155) which he titled “The Struggle between Truth and Propaganda”. Here
he began to outline his concerns that scientific research divorced from the freedom to pursue
“truth” would be powerless to resist top down manipulation from political elites. Entering into
debates reminiscent of contemporary ones6, Polanyi argued that blue-skies research, “pure
science”, alone was capable of making discoveries which were truly beneficial to society.
Whereas what has been coined “applied science”, research aimed at solving predetermined
problems, he viewed as prone to being corrupted by the political powers which direct it.
In his preface (1963) to Science, Faith and Society (1943) he described Baukharin’s belief
that “all research was to be regarded merely as a conscious confirmation of pre-existing
harmony between scientific and social aims”. This, he went on to evaluate, had led to “havoc
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among chemists and paralysed whole branches of biology” (p.8). Polanyi was not naïve about
the ability of intellectual pursuits to produce knowledge gains, even under Soviet conditions.
However, he believed “a general respect for truth is all that is needed for a society to be free.”
But clearly, it was the nature of “truth” which required a rigorous definition and defence. In
Britain during this pre-war period there were many advocates of Marxist theories of science,
yet Polanyi felt deeply uneasy. He believed the Marxist materialistic beliefs were errant, and
if so, the adoption of even reformed Marxist ideas influencing science in the West would be
detrimental to liberty. He argued:
“…materialistic (or romantic) philosophies, denying any universal claims to the
standards of truth, justice or morality may deprive citizens of any grounds for appealing
to these standards and thus endow the government with absolute power.” (SFS, p.16-17)
In 1940 he was invited to join a newly formed group, the Society for Freedom in Science,
founded by John Baker, an Oxford zoologist. It was this which he later described as the
decisive moment in his turning away from chemistry to philosophy (Scott & Moleski, 2005,
p.184). By the spring of 1943 he had written fifty papers in defence of liberty. Through the
encouragement of Baker and the Vice Chancellor of Manchester University, Sir John Stopford,
Polanyi moved in 1948 from Professor of Chemistry to a newly created Chair in Social
Sciences. From then until his death in 1976 he wrote on a wide range of subjects, many
developing insights drawn from his seminal work Personal Knowledge (1958).
There are a number of points which emerge from this overview of Polanyi’s career. First,
Polanyi’s interest in philosophy was closely bound up with his concerns for ideals of freedom.
Second, his work is consciously directed to the practical implications of ideas. Third, he
approaches philosophical problems as someone who feels free to draw from several diverse
traditions, bringing them to bear with coherence on the issues addressed.
Polanyi was
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convinced, fourth, that there were overarching rules which if discovered would allow any
philosophy of science to have application to every other field of investigation. Finally, he was
not apologetic for his non-materialistic convictions and also possessed a strong sense of the
importance of art. These themes infuse his philosophy and shaped his own pursuit of truth.
Polanyi and Habermas – community values and the search for social sustainability
“The popular conception of the scientist patiently collecting observations, unprejudiced
by any theory, until finally he succeeds in establishing a great new generalisation, is quite
false.” (SFS, p.28) In the critical analysis of misconceptions about the nature of scientific
discovery which follows this quotation, Polanyi sets out his ideas concerning the emergence of
discovery. Scientific statements describe “something real which may manifest itself in many
indefinite ways”, no rules or methods can determine whether the scientist’s initial sense of
discovery is true or false, processes of verification form “clues to future observations”
ultimately rely on “mental powers” and “intuition” (SFS, p.29).
So, we may ask, how can we know for sure something is true or real? For Polanyi the
community of scientists with whom the research is shared provide a primary source of
validation. They decide whether to pursue the insights further, confirming belief in the reality
of those things described, or abandoning them as false, “deceptive beauty”. However, the
initial attempt can be allowed to stand and perhaps someone later will return to it and take up
again the search in this area with new insights. The way criminal investigation is conducted
provides a helpful analogy. Police detectives are renowned for working on hunches, as well as
applying reason, to follow lines of investigation and evaluate evidence. At times they may
conclude they would not be able to convince a court with their interpretation of the data.
However, this does not falsify the research and their work is kept on record. At a later date
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new methods of analysis or evidence collection emerge, such as DNA, and the convictions
which the detective had, but knew would not satisfy a court, are then shown to be valid.
What Polanyi vigorously rejects is the idea that a methodology or specific process of
validation can determine whether a discovery is true or not. This would be to elevate manmade constructs above human insight and divorce science from personal convictions about
experience and the community values which are needed to maintain a free society. Who
would decide what was valid? How would rules governing investigation be amended, if
scientific rationality was supreme? And was there no solution to this other than in expressions
of nihilism and dissent in relativism? From Polanyi’s historically minded perspective, it was
over confidence in enlightenment rationality, cut loose from religious conscience, that created
the environment in which totalitarian power sought mastery alone. The evidence of two World
Wars and the loss of much of the heritage of European culture seemed to him to verify his
thesis.
There is an interesting similarity with Polanyi’s attempt to avoid modernity’s
philosophical traps and Volume 2 of Jugen Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action7
(1987). Habermas describes the ‘lifeworld’, the informal domain in which our social lives
exist, where “shared meanings” and understandings are refined and developed. This occurs
through the possibilities the lifeworld gives for new horizons – places on the boundary, places
of changing perspectives. Here there are gradual revisions and the possibilities for new
insights, unlimited through the operation of communicative action. Along with the lifeworld,
Habermas describes the ‘system’, which refers to the structures and patterns of instrumental
rationality, means-ends reasoning. This is most clearly experienced in the institutions of
power and money. Although necessary for the production and distribution of goods and
services, the system does not lead to consensus or provide for human autonomy, it acts more
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like a “block of quasi-natural reality” (TCR, 1987) with its own self-sustaining logic which
ultimately escapes human control. The problem is the system tends to exert a colonizing
influence over the lifeworld, creating in Habermas’s terms “social pathologies”.
Polanyi’s “society of explorers” (TD) and Habermas’s description of communicative
action both seek to preserve social moral consciousness and liberty, or emancipation where
necessary. Both speak of validity in terms of community acceptance of reality. Polanyi
believes in an ultimate moral reality; Habermas, despite describing a pragmatic realism to be
an essential element of the lifeworld, introduces a discursive truth predicate which limits his
realism to material existence (Seemann, 2004).
Kant and the fiduciary nature of knowledge
Polanyi and Habermas both provide critiques of Kant’s moral philosophy, for Habermas
there is a refining and extending Kant’s account of rational behaviour.
“Habermas shifts the focus of the critique of reason from forms of transcendental
subjectivity to forms of communication. Kant, moving within the horizon of individual
consciousness, understood objective validity in terms of structures of Bewusstsein
ueberhaupt, consciousness as such or in general. For Habermas, validity is tied to
reasoned agreement concerning defeasible claims.” (McCarthy, 1994).
Polanyi instead focuses on aspects of rational thought Kant chose to pass over as “a skill so
deeply hidden in the human soul that we shall hardly guess the secret trick that Nature here
employs”8. For Polanyi it was unnecessary and inadequate to leave the account of the
relationship between sense experience and reason at this point. He believed we have an
intuitive knowledge of super-sensible reality and it is this which provides us with “an ever
deeper understanding of reality” (PK, p.6)9.
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It is here the distinctiveness of Polanyi is most profound, for him all knowledge is
fiduciary and cannot be divorced from personal commitment to values. These values
ultimately relate to higher order principles which provide the integrating element to all the
explicit experiences operating at lower levels. These include both material and sensual
elements as well as semantic and conceptual.
“Hence no description of a comprehensive entity in the light of its lower
principles can ever reveal the operation of its higher principles. The higher
principles which characterize a comprehensive entity cannot be defined in terms
of the laws that apply to its parts in themselves.” (KB, p.217)
Polanyi applies this theory in Knowing and Being (1969) to both physics and chemistry before
considering social knowledge.
Running through his account is an appreciation of the
teleological import of discussion about meaning and knowledge, “supposedly objective terms
still do not refer to purposeless facts but well functioning things” (PK, p.371-72)10. Within this
concept of reality all forms of reductionism are resisted because they lead scientists to
construct accounts of purposefulness from particulars and encourage scepticism concerning
higher order purposes. Polanyi sees this not least in philosophy’s colonisation by materialistic
concepts. In a passage which analyses reductionism in relation to the natural sciences, he
moves to apply the argument to linguistics in order to illustrate the folly:
“You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannot derive grammar
from vocabulary; a correct use of grammar does not account for good style; and
good style does not provide the content of a piece of prose.” (KB, p.154-55)
Polanyi searched for a new epistemology which includes recognition of teleology. He
accepts there appears to be patterns of things in the worlds which seem integrated and
purposeful. These, as mentioned, resist any form of reductionism and consequently no
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scientific knowledge should limit the possibilities of new ways of discovery. He concludes
there must be universal realities that cannot be codified:
“All meaning lies in higher levels of reality that are not reducible to the laws by
which the ultimate particulars of the universe are controlled…What is most
tangible has the least meaning and it is perverse then to identify the tangible with
the real. For to regard a meaningless substratum as the ultimate reality of all
things must lead to the conclusion that all things are meaningless. And we can
avoid this conclusion only if we acknowledge instead that the deepest reality is
possessed by higher things that are least tangible.” (Polanyi, 1965, p. 15, italics as
in original)
It is this aspect of his epistemology which allowed him to develop a theory of personal
knowledge which avoids subjectivist traps (PK, p.316). It is the shared values which support
and maintain the community which provide the integrating element to discovery, and it is the
community which will verify the discovery11. Miller (2008) in an article on rationality and
knowledge, describes Polanyi’s line of reasoning, also seeing the connection with Habermas:
“Progress in knowledge requires a mutually supportive relationship between the
scientist and society (Polanyi, 1946). The personal nature of progress in knowing
implies that the monitoring of scientists by society is necessarily incomplete, and
scientists must take it on themselves to self-monitor (Polanyi 1969: ch.5). Such
commitments to collective scientific progress cannot arise from a stance of objectivity
(Polanyi 1969: ch.3). Rather, the ethical commitments associated with advancing
knowledge grow out of one’s identification with a larger community (see MacIntyre,
1984). The affirmation of any truth claim — empirical or ethical — requires a
community that upholds a set of shared beliefs (Polanyi 1946; Habermas 2003).”
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Habermas’s “linguistic turn”, it is worth noting, sees social morality and values arising
from rational communicative discourse but he cannot account for them as universals, they are
at best quasi-transcendental. This limits his concept of the value of truth within cultural
assumptions about rationality and discourse, because it assumes social groups always seek
consensus but provides no route to recognising truth if the desire for consensus is abandoned.
If he is right, it is just this that civil society must prevent by defending the lifeworld from
colonisation by the system. Polanyi’s account is appealing because he is able to demonstrate
the operation of “intellectual passions”, orientated by personal values, across both natural and
theoretical disciplines, and show how these function within the logic of tacit knowing in all
aspects of life.
The ‘tacit dimension’ and its application
Therefore central to Polanyi’s response to modernist scientific reductionism is his
exposition of tacit knowledge. It is to this aspect of his work that I turn through consideration
of ‘discovery’ as the goal of scientific research. In describing this as a key aim of research, I
recognise similarities between knowledge arrived at within the ‘sciences’12 and the knowledge
generated in other disciplines, particularly history within a hermeneutical tradition. Here there
is often a clearer view of the researcher as a narrator of an experience of discovery or
investigation. According to Ricoeur (1984) how historians write significantly determines the
extent to which knowledge is increased. Also, as with historical study, reliability13 of source
material, or data, is important in giving credibility to the analytical and interpretative accounts
which form the outcomes of investigation. However, data credibility depends firstly on the
trustworthiness of the researcher. Secondly, by using data as ‘evidence’, credibility will also
depend on the reasonableness of the interpretations to the addressee’s own experience14 (first
hand or through secondary reading).
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Consequently, as a social science researcher, often presenting interpretations of texts,
interviews and observations, I need to question how I can increase the credibility of my
insights. New perceptual discoveries require the unique combination of explicit and implicit
skill, insight, knowledge and judgement which is only achieved in the act of investigation as
an individual pursues their gifts with conviction (PK, p.106). Researchers choose a field of
investigation from a world of possibilities, drawn by motives which are rarely explicit. They
use their judgement in deciding on the methods of data collection best suited to the phenomena
under consideration, taking into account practical issues relating to cost and time, ethical
concerns and their own aptitudes. Whether interviewing, or note-taking as part of an
ethnographic study, the researcher relies on many skills which are hard to codify: interpersonal
rapport in interviewing, observational senses, qualities of inquisitiveness. Many decisions are
required at the stage of analysis and evaluation. Is it appropriate to quantify references to a
specific topic in an open-ended series of interviews? What comments recorded in pages and
pages of notes will be included in the journal article published as a result of the research? And
finally, there are the choices of register and medium in the communication of the
investigation: personal and idiosyncratic or detached and formal; published first on-line as a
video or as text in an established journal.
Running through all these choices and their
subsidiary effects on discovery are the values and convictions of the researcher. It may be
hoped similar values will be held by those to whom the research findings are addressed and
that the new perspectives or insights gained are accorded value.
Much formal discussion of research methodology seeks clarification of how the focal aspects
are to be observed or studied. Even when context, subjectivity and theoretical considerations
are discussed it is often with a view to including these within the objective definitions of the
focal knowing. At times I have employed this strategy within reflexive description, drawing
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from Bourdieu. The danger here is that the desire to create objective distance between
researcher and phenomena causes amnesia towards the persistence of the subsidiary, tacit
dimension of knowing. This dimension is part of all acts of knowing and is always providing
pathways to new insights, if the researcher is open to them.
But openness in this respect includes recognition of the values, beliefs and convictions
which have guided or motivated my decision-making throughout the process of investigation,
drawing from a commitment to what can be known.
“We can voice our ultimate convictions only from within our convictions.” (PK, p.267)
This in turn depends on a recognition of the fiduciary element to knowledge (PK, p.266).
Whatever phenomena is being explored, the researcher is committed to the belief in discovery
of insights which can be evaluated as significant. But significance is not value-neutral and
acceptance of it ultimately requires shared beliefs about the meaning, value and purpose of
new knowledge.
Reading Polanyi, I understand that if I assume the small piece of reality I plan to
examine through a pre-planned method will yield insights, I am probably mistaken. “Deepest
reality” manifests itself in the complexity of forms. In order to accurately describe this I must
stay alert to my own perspective, to the possibility of meaning emerging from unusual sources.
Polanyi suggests that the potential worth of investigation will be revealed in its effectiveness
to create dialogue and debate within the community of scientists15. This is both because others
are needed to verify personal interpretations of phenomena and because exploring others’
perspectives on data often reveals to the researcher new ways of seeing the “least tangible”
realities16. If this is the case, then credibility of data interpretation, particularly aiming to find
consensus across research traditions and disciplines will require agreement concerning what
values direct the activities of discovery and how these help constitute significance.
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Interdisciplinary Research
At a time when the advantages of interdisciplinary research are being reconsidered,
Polanyi’s academic disposition towards the pursuit of knowledge is instructive. He began his
academic career as a physical chemist and although lost interest in it, his philosophy and
theoretical understanding remained informed by practical, empirical science. In his
philosophical discourses he frequently draws from his experience of scientific discovery and
uses physical analogies to illustrate theoretical concepts.
It is not merely as an example of a good interdisciplinary researcher that Polanyi is
valuable but through the way this practice was grounded in the theory of knowledge outlined
above. Underlying this theory is a belief in the reality of truth and that all knowledge is
interconnected through the influence of higher order principles. This kind of belief spurred his
interest in a several academic fields and led to collaborations with academics working in
economics, theology and theory of art, as well as chemistry. For him, the defensiveness and
entrenched partisan attitudes which characterised much scholarly work limited discovery and
problem solving. However, in terms of interdisciplinary research these concerns also manifest
themselves in relation to broader questions concerning what is valued as ‘significant’
outcomes of research.
A report to the UK HE funding bodies and Medical Research Council by Elsevier in
July 2015 highlights the way research in perceived from the perspective of the UK
Government.
Research is valued in relation to its “potential to contribute to research
breakthroughs, address societal problems, and foster innovation”. Interdisciplinary research
(IDR) papers, it is acknowledged, struggle to receive high citation numbers but, “Despite their
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lower overall citation impact, IDR publications are cited more frequently in patent applications
for many of the comparator countries.” Or, in other words, this is research which is capable of
producing commercially valuable discoveries. There is nothing wrong with research leading
to innovations which help address societal problems and improve the lives of individuals.
However, what is consistently absent from the much civic orientated discussion about this
kind of research is its value in terms of discovery which challenges accepted wisdom. These
concerns are elaborated and illustrated, through interviews with scientists, by Linden (2008).
She highlights the constraints placed on researchers working within a culture of accountability
which focuses on probable outcomes, writing:
“There is a vital need for prominent scientists and for universities to help the media, the
public, and policy makers to understand the importance of innovative thought along with
the need for scientists to have the freedom to challenge accepted thinking.”
Polanyi’s philosophical work emerged in part out of concerns for scientific freedom.
These concerns led to his discovery of an epistemology of tacit knowledge, his major
contribution to the philosophy of science. Central to this theory are the role of personal and
community values, and an ontological framework within which these exist independently. If
scientists are going to resist the undermining of their freedom to explore and investigate and
benefit from new opportunities for interdisciplinary research, they may need to be clearer
about what values shape their recognition of significance. In other words, what counts as
‘truth’. This in turn may require a re-evaluation of attitudes towards methodology, the forms
of discourse considered appropriate for reporting research, and processes used to confer
credibility on interpretations. The influence of both the state and the market are strong in
relation to shaping perceptions of research significance and the need for a rigorous
epistemological defence of scientific freedom, such as we find in Polanyi’s work, seems
highly pertinent:
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“For if truth is not real and absolute, then it may seem proper that public authorities
should decide what should be called the truth.” (Polanyi, 1947)
Final reflections
There appears considerable value in comparing the development of Habermas’s ideas
with the evolution of Polanyi’s philosophy. It is interesting, for example, that later in his
career Habermas has engaged more fully with the place of religion in society. Equally, much
more could be said about interdisciplinary research, not least in relation to attempts to
reconcile different epistemologies and the advocacy for epistemological pluralism. The paper
also could have presented more of an argument for the relevance of Polanyi’s work to these
developments.
However, the discussion is both a product of knowledge and the means to create new
ways of seeing. My intention was to ‘open up’ the possibility of further work in these areas by
providing a ‘voiced’, personal discussion of how I have come to see the importance of
Polanyi’s heuristic philosophy in the context of my research in the social sciences.
I
acknowledge the ‘mixed’ signals the paper may appear to give but hope this can be seen as an
attempt to explore, to follow some clues, guided by a conviction that freedom to discover also
requires liberty to communicate in diverse ways.
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Endnotes
1
“For is it not possible that science as we know it today, or a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of
traditional philosophy, will create a monster? Is it not possible that an objective approach that frowns
upon personal connections between the entities examined will harm people…?” Feyerabend (1993, p.
154)
2
See below, and also Kuhn’s use of the concept of tacit knowledge.
3
“Thus the programme of comprehensive doubt collapses and reveals by its failure the fiduciary
rootedness of all rationality.” Polanyi (PK, 297)
4 The philosopher who did most to introduce the importance of reflexivity to research practice was
Pierre Bourdieu. He discusses Polanyi’s work in “Science of Science and Reflexivity” (p.38ff), in a
section entitled “The ‘craft’ of the scientist”.
5
“Michael Polanyi was one of the finest minds of his time. As a scientist, I have always maintained that
he ought to have won a Nobel Prize for his work on crystal dislocations. As a metascientist, I have
always recognized him, along with Robert Merton, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, as one of the four
great teachers in that then emerging field.” (Ziman, 2000).
6
Compare David Willetts, former Minister for Science, speech offering protection for “blue skies
research” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10123821, with discussion about the importance of the emphasis
on “applied science” leading to practical outcomes,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/today/tomfeilden/2008/10/blue_skies_versus_applied_rese.html. More
recently, a new £26m research centre was opened at the University of Cambridge, the Maxwell Centre.
The centre will be led by physics professor Sir Richard Friend, who is reported saying: "The centre will
translate 'blue skies' research into products vital for industry.” (http://www.cambridgenews.co.uk/Cambridge-University-opens-newest-science-centre/story-29064392detail/story.html#ixzz49afO4sob)
7
Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol.2), referred to as TCR hereafter.
8 Kant, Emmanuel (1781), Critique of Pure Reason. Quoted in Knowing and Being, Polanyi (1969), p.
105.
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9
More could be elaborated comparing Polanyi and Habermas at this point, particularly in relation to
their understanding of how a common human commitment to values, operating within communities,
protects human endeavour from instrumental colonisation. Habermas conjectures concerning the
origins of these values in pre-linguistic symbols. Each transcends attempts at mechanical reductionism
to create the possibility of ‘solidarity’, ‘collective consciousness’ (TCA, p.60). He is careful in how he
constructs an approach to research based on this evolutionary model, writing that a theory derived from
these insights, “Must orient itself to the range of learning progresses that is opened at a given time by a
historically attained level of learning” (TCA, p.383). The indeterminate element here is particularly
worth exploring in relation to Polanyi’s thought.
10
It is interesting to note that Kuhn (1996) makes reference to the loss of teleology following Darwin’s
the Origin of Species towards the end of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions but he is able to
believe that all the progresses of science are due to the operation of similar evolutionary principles
outlined by Darwin: “And the entire process may have occurred, as we now suppose biological
evolution did, without the benefit of a set goal, permanent fixed scientific truth…” (P.172-73)
11
As Jha (2002) writes, “For Polanyi, tradition and authority form a living, continuous, and open-ended
process…Even though scientific insight, judgement, and knowing are grounded in tacit processes, they
are not subjective – they are open to scrutiny and testing by the scientific community.” (p.67)
12
“Science” derives from the Latin “scientia” which was used during the Middle-Ages to mean “to
know through study”. The earlier root “scire” simply meant to know, probably implying knowing
something as distinct from something else. Our understanding of “science” as denoting the kind of
knowledge arrived at through empirical investigation is a fairly recent concept (C18th). Even here it is
easy to forget that during the late C17th and early C18th “empirical” still held something of its own
root meaning, deriving from the Greek “empeirikos” meaning "experienced”, which had the sense of
the experiential knowledge someone acquires through their skills being tested. Interestingly, this
concept of knowledge is closer to Aristotle’s idea of phronesis than to episteme (Aristotle, Ethics, book
vi and Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics).
13
Reliability of historical primary sources is tested by application of the time/place and bias rules.
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14
Here, I will not discuss fully the communal aspects of shared experience, as I focus on the
relationship of addresser (author) to addressee (reader). But epistemologically it is important to
acknowledge that collective understanding (through peer review) is an important component in
recognising new knowledge.
15
See PK, pages 163-4
16
“Knowledge is not a matter of interaction with a nonhuman reality, but of communication between
persons; as argued by Rorty (1979), the conversation becomes the ultimate context within which
knowledge is to be understood.” (Kvale, 1995)
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