Perceptual Cognition: A Nyāya-Kantian Approach
Author(s): Monima Chadha
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 197-209
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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PERCEPTUAL COGNITION:
A NYAYA-KANTIANAPPROACH
MonimaChadha
ofPhilosophy,
MonashUniversity
Department
Wefindcertain
aboutseeingpuzzlingbecausewe do notfindthewholebusinessofseeingpuzzling
things
enough.
LudwigWittgenstein'
Introduction
listof the "richand
Experiencemustfinda prominent
place in the philosopher's
famous"entitiesofthismillennium.
Notjustthe moreexoticexperiencesthatthe
morefortunate
us
have
had
the privilege
to enjoy,buteven the ordinary
among
of
the
world
around
us
are
richand manysplendored.Itis
perceptual
experiences
a factthatthe humanperceptualmechanismis suchthatittransforms
themeager
of thesenses,intoa muchricheroutput.Interest
in
input,namelythestimulation
the philosophyof perceptionlies in understanding,
as W.V.O. Quine putsit,in
whatway one's theoryof naturetranscends
any availableevidence.The resultis
an epistemological
urgeto delineatetheavailableevidence-thepuregiven-from
the totalcontentof a perceptualexperiencethatis enrichedwithconcepts.This
withthe pristine
ofthegivenwas sharedby philosophers
in
preoccupation
purity
ancientIndia,and the tradition
continuesamongcontemporary
Westernphilosothenonconceptual
content
ofperceptual
phersintheirquestto identify
experiences.
Itiscommonly
believedthatthegivenconsistsofparticulars
thatarecognizedas
suchinperceptual
thispopularbelief,I shallarguethatthereis
experiences.
Against
no coherentnotionofperceptual
ofparticulars.
must
cognition
Perceptual
cognition
be restricted
to universalfeatures.If particulars-as-such
do not even qualifyas
thenthereis no possibility
ofknowingparticularsobjectsofperceptual
cognition,
as-suchinperceptual
Thus
it
seems
to
follow
that
cannotbe
experiences.
perception
a sourceofknowledgeofparticulars.
Thisclaimis hardto digest.We havealways
thatperceptionis the primary,
thought
perhapstheonly,sourceof knowledgeof
We
are
forced
to
conclude
that
cannotbe objectsofcognition
particulars.
particulars
or knowledge.Thisconclusionis counterintuitive.
I thinkthatthe conterintuitive
conclusioncan be avoidedby reconsidering
our intuitive
notionof knowledgeof
particulars.
The argument
inthisessaydrawson discussions
amongancientIndianphiloso-
contentof
phers,especially among Buddhistsand Naiyayikas,on the characteristic
the ancient
perceptualexperiences.Althoughthereare considerabledisagreements,
Indian philosophersagree on one crucial matter:perceptualexperiencesare, at the
veryleast, cognitivein character.I thinktheyare right.The contentsof perceptual
PhilosophyEast & West Volume 51, Number2 April2001 197-209
of Hawai'i Press
? 2001 by University
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197
orawareness.After
are,at leastpotentially,
all,the
experiences
objectsofcognition
wholepointofintroducing
thenotionofthecontent
ofperceptual
experiencesis to
ofperceivedobjects.Thisminimal
explaina perceiver's
capacityto gainknowledge
claimis beefedup bytheNyayaphilosophers
andthus
byaddingthatall cognition,
Thisisthefocusofthecontroversy
perceptual
requires
conceptualization.
cognition,
incontrast,
betweenBuddhists
and Naiydyikas.
The Buddhist,
insists
thatperceptual
must
be
devoid
of
is
cognition
totally
conceptualization.
Perception conception-free
Thisradicalthesisis based on a plausibleintuiawarenessofa particular-as-such.2
unlikeothercognitive
tion:perceptual
episodes,mustbe constrained
experiences,
the
sense
and
causal
interaction
between
faculty thegiven.Forthe Buddhist,
by
construction"
requires"imaginative
by the mindthatis unconconceptualization
strained
bythegiven.
offered
Inthefirst
section,we shallconsiderthecentralarguments
bytheNyaya
In
this
awareness
of
a
such
a
section,I willextend
particular.
conception-free
against
in
ofa conception-free
the
incoherence
the
idea
to
reveal
theNyayaarguments
very
that
Thisdoes notmeanthatI rejecttheplausibleintuition
awarenessofparticulars.
must
be
constrained
of
Buddhist:
the
content
the
by
experiences
perceptual
guides
betweenthe sensesand the given.WhatI do rejectis the
the causal interaction
defendson thisbasis,namelythatthecontentof
claimthatthe Buddhist
stronger
to particulars.
Thereis nothing
be restricted
must,therefore,
experiences
perceptual
ofthefamousKantiandictum:intuitions
newtothisresponse,itisjusta restatement
without
conceptsare blind.
In thisessay I shalldefendthesimpleKantianthesisaboutthe natureof perceptual cognition:perceptualexperiencesrequirecooperativeactivitybetween
comesat thecostofvagueness.In
and themind.Butthissimplicity
sense-faculties
the second section,I shall putfortha preciseclaim thatgivessubstanceto the
of recognition.
Kantianthesisabove: perceptualcognitionrequiresthepossibility
fortheclaimthatperceptual
thesiswillprovidetheargument
The substantial
cognithenotion
We willbeginbyunpacking
to universal
features.
tionmustbe restricted
as involvedin perceptual
construction"
or "imaginative
of "conceptualization"
the
remarks
on
some
by
Naiyayika
philosophers
suggestive
bybuilding
experiences
is a necessary
construction
or imaginative
and Kant.Forthem,conceptualization
unconstrained
butitis nottotally
ofperceptual
bythegiven.
experience,
ingredient
Thustheplausibleintuintuitions
are empty.
As Kantwouldsay: conceptswithout
mustbe
can be saved.Theclaimthatperceptual
theBuddhist
itionguiding
cognition
of
foritseemsto ruleoutthepossibility
is surprising,
features
to universal
restricted
Inthethirdand finalsection,I shallshowthatthiscounknowledgeofparticulars.
notionof
aboutour intuitive
terintuitive
consequencecan be avoidedbythinking
ofparticulars.
theknowledge
PerceptualCognitionof Particulars
We begin withthe radical position,defendedby Buddhistphilosophers,according
to which the contentof perceptualexperiencesis totallydevoid of any proliferation
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Philosophy
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school hold that
in the Dinndga-DharmakTrti
of concepts.Buddhistphilosophers
construction
or
is
free
from
(kalpana).No seeing
imaginative
perception seeing-truly
the
intervention
of conceptual
since
the
latter
involves
is seeing-as,
necessarily
of
or a verbalization
claimsthata perceptual
The Buddhist
construction.
judgment
verbalizaFor
such a conception-free
is,
speaking,impossible.3
experience strictly
and thatbringsin morethanwhat is
tion invariably
requiresconceptualization,
consistsof distinct,
givenin perceptualawareness.The given,forthe Buddhist,
self-characterized
particulars
unique,momentary,
(svalak9anas).
in
The Buddhist
argument supportof thisradicalthesisis based on a simple
is cognitiveawarenessarisingfromsense-object
intuition.
contact,and
Perception
since an objectdoes notcarrya conceptor a label on itsbody,thesensefaculty
cannotbecome aware of a conceptas a resultof such causal contact.A sensory
awarenessthatarisesfroma colorcan represent
onlythecolor.Itcannotrepresent
forexampletaste,texture,
thatcoloras accompaniedbyanothersensoryparticular,
thatthe awarenessof an object in one's
The Buddhistis suggesting
and so forth.
visualfield-as a mango-cannotbe calleda properperception.
Seeing-asrequires
We havediscretevisualawarenessesofcolorand
mentalconstruction.
imaginative
fromsense-object
results
conshape,butthereis no mangoto be seen. Perception
Wordsand
tactand thusmustdependsolelyon thecausal powersof particulars.
can onlyresultin
and thusperception
conceptsare not ingrainedin particulars,
If
restriction
awareness
of
is
this
particulars.
ignoreditwill lead to
conception-free
awarenesscan represent
absurdconsequences.Forthenperceptual
thatare in
things
mindcan
no way connectedwiththe perceptualoccasion,and the imaginative
and
represent
anything everything.
The Naiydyika
awarenessinvolving
rejectstheclaimthatconstructive
concepts
since it is merelya figment
of our imagination.
is a
is notperceptual,
Perception
causal
interaction
between
sense
and
This
by
cognitiveepisodetriggered
object.
awarenessofan unstructured
whole.The nirinteraction
givesriseto a preliminary
thatis,conception-free
awareness,is a necessary
stageintheprocessof
vikalpaka,
is
a
But
this
awareness
first
folunstructured
step;it is invariably
perception.
only
in
awarenessas a necessary
the
lowedbya structured
same
consequence
sequential
awarenessdoes notdestroy
theperceptual
ofthesecond;
series.The first
character
itfacilitates
orthesensory
it.The nirvikalpaka
awarenessintheimmediately
rather,
an
forthe generation
moment
is
causal
factor
of a saviindispensable
preceding
or
and
constructive
awareness,althoughmemory,
kalpaka
conception, collateral
information
are also required.A cognitionthatis independent
of the preliminary
in
For
awareness
cannot
result
a
sensory
perceptual
judgment. example,thejudgment"Thisis a collectionofleptonsand quarks"thatis madeon seeinga tablemay
be legitimate
is suppliedby physics),
butitcannotbe a
(thecollateralinformation
since the necessarydependenceon an appropriate
perceptualjudgment,
sensory
awareness is missing.
Buddhists reject this analysis of the perceptual process. They argue that
the sequential process of perceptionas described by the Naiyayika,that is, senseobject contact resultingin unstructured,
conception-freeawareness, followed by
MonimaChadha
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199
thestructured
transfer
oftheproperty
of
conceptualawareness,involvesa mistaken
fromthefirst
awarenessto thesecond.Udayana,one ofthemost
perception-hood
makesa
famousNavya-Nyaya
(thatis,thenewor laterNyayaschool)philosophers,
in
is
counterclaim
to
this
Buddhist
response
argument.
Perception-hood
surprising
transof the second,structured,
awareness;it is mistakenly
reallya characteristic
to thefirst,
awareness.Thisbringsus to thecruxofthematter.
ferred
unstructured,
character
ofconception-free
awarenesstheNaiyayikais
In denyingtheperceptual
the
term
"awareness"inthisconitscognitive
aspect.The use of
reallyquestioning
the
relation.
To frame
a cognitive
theissue,forawarenessis necessarily
textconfuses
thatis not
a neutral
relation
theterm"grasp"to signify
issueclearly,I willintroduce
necessarily
cognitivein character.FollowingMatilal,we can say thatthedispute
of
is notabouttheoccurrence
and theBuddhist
betweentheNaiyayika
philosopher
concomiabout
the
nor
is
the
of
a
a puresensory
physical
dispute
particular,
grasp
theconception-free
tantofsucha sensory
sensory
grasp.The issueis:can we regard
as
a
of
particular cognitive?
grasp
as a cognitive
as wellas theNaiyayika
The Buddhist
episode.
perception
regards
is
not
a
a
of
of
a
character
the
problem
particular
sensorygrasp
Rejecting cognitive
of
an intermediate
sinceitis merely
fortheNaiyayika,
stepintheprocesstheresult
intercausal
awareness.The Naiyayikaholdsthat
whichis a structured
perceptual
thatis
and an objectresultsin a sensoryimpression
actionbetweensense-faculties
arises
the
awareness
of
The
no morethana merephysiological
impression
change.
second
and
this
of
of
the
as
a
atthesubsequent
infiltrationconcepts, only
result
stage
must
awarenessis, strictly
speaking,a perceptualcognition.However,Buddhists
the
for
them
in
since
is
showthatthepreliminary
character,
sensory
grasp cognitive
a
criterion
needs
That
the
Buddhist
this
at
terminates
of
is,
stage.
process perception
froma merephysioa concept-free
fordistinguishing
sensorygraspofa particular
an essentialmarkof awarenesshas a criterion:
logicalchange.Andthe Buddhist
of
self-aware
We are reflexively
self-awareness.
hood is the presenceof reflexive
that
a
idea
is
not
intuitive
The
a conception-free
sensorygrasp
only
sensorygrasp.
resultsin the occurrenceof a physiological
change,but in additionthatsuch a
thatthe
is suggesting
in some partofthe mind.The Buddhist
changeis registered
thatis,
virtue
of
this
event
is
a
of
registration,
by
sensorygrasp particulars cognitive
ofthesensory
self-awareness
reflexive
grasp.
the mark.Buddhists
The responsesoundsplausible,butitfallsshortof hitting
as a reanswerto thequestion:whatis itthatwe register
a satisfactory
cannotoffer
a senof
such
character
the
To
ensure
a
of
such
sult
cognitive
episode?4
perceptual
of
the
on theawarenessaspect
sensory
theyfocusentirely
sorygraspofa particular
the
that
its
intentional
of
the
cost
at
is,
objectaspect,
completely
ignoring
grasp,
of
Buttheydo notdenytheintentional
directedness.
experiences,
aspect perceptual
forperceptualcognitionresultsin an awarenessof distinct,
uinque,momentary,
particulars(svalakinas).
The real problemforthe Buddhistis: in what sense are we aware of a unique,
distinctparticularin a perceptualepisode? The Buddhistdisallows any differentiationor characterizationof particularsas a resultof perceptualcognition.We cannot
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Philosophy
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theparticular
characterize
characterization
using"this"or"it,"foreventhisminimal
The Buddhist
has a reasonfordenyinganykindofdifcountsas misidentification.
or identification,
since it necessarily
ferentiation
bringsin concepts.Conceptsare
notonlyforkind-identity
but also forobject-identity.
requiredas a precondition
If
ina sensory
the
is absentina
Thereis no identification
grasp.
object-identification
in
it
cannot
arise
the
reflexive
self-awareness
of
thesensory
magically
sensory
grasp,
how
does
the
Buddhist
for
the
one
account
intentional
mayask,
grasp.But,then,
ofperceptual
episodes?
aspect,thatis,theobject-directedness,
does notdenytheobject-directedness
As we said above,the Buddhist
of perIn
order
to
account
for
the
intentional
of
ceptualepisodes.
aspect perceptualepisodes we cannotdemandthatthecognizermustbe in a positionto offer
necessary
criteria
and sufficient
foridentification
of distinct,
uniqueparticulars
givenin such
is
for
much.
The
That
too
intentional
experiences.
asking
aspect of perceptual
in
can
be
accounted
for
of
the
terms
experiences
cognizer'sacquisitionof some
betweendistinct
forthatprovidesus witha miniabilityto differentiate
particulars,
mal basisforregarding
thegivenin suchexperiencesas consisting
ofdistinct
and
it
is
to
make
sense
of
talk
about
disOtherwise, impossible
uniqueparticulars.
any
tinctand unique particulars.
thereis no conceptual
Accordingto the Buddhist,
in perceptual
As
a
the
intervention
result
cognition.
cognizerlosesout notonlyon
theability
to identify
a particular
datum(thegiven)as belonging
to a certainkind(or
a
or
but
also
on
the
to identify
itas a
concept class-characteristic)
instantiating
ability
The Buddhist
distinct,
uniqueparticular
altogether.
analysisofperceptual
cognition
failsto meetthe intuitive
that
accounts
for
the
intentional
requirement
aspectof
To
save
the
character
of
a
perceptualcognition.
cognitive
perceptualepisodethe
Buddhistdelinksthe awarenessaspectfromits intentional
aspectof the sensory
cannotaccountfortheintentional
grasp.Butthiscomesat a cost,fortheBuddhist
withitsreflexive
selfaspectof perceptualcognition.The sensorygrasptogether
awarenessvacuouslyresultsin an awareness,butitcannotresultin an awareness
of a particular.
Thusthe Buddhist
cannotclaimthatthesensorygraspresultsin a
for
perceptualcognition, perceptualawareness,by his own lights,is essentially
an awarenessof distinct,
Thisshowsthattheverynotionof a
uniqueparticulars.
of
a
is
"conception-free
cognition particular" incoherent.
Beforewe close thissection,letus pause to notethestatusofconception-free
awarenessin Navya-Nyaya
unlikethe earlierNaiyayikas,
the
philosophy.Firstly,
laterNaiydyikas
allowedconception-loaded
awarenesseven inthefirst
moment
of
and themindcooperateimmediately,
contact,wherethesensefaculty
sense-object
as inthecase ofhabituated
and recurring
Forexample,on thewaytomy
perception.
officeeverymorning,
I am usedto lookingintomymailbox.I do notfirst
graspsenlike
I
and
so
a
see mailboxin
forth; instantaneously
soryparticulars color,shape,
the veryfirstmomentof sense-objectcontact. In some cases a conception-loaded
awareness may be mediated by a conception-freegrasp of a particular,but this
intermediategrasp is not logically requiredfor perceptual awareness, since it is
causally impotent.And thisbringsus to the second point:the Navya-Nyya position
on the statusofthe conception-free
graspof particularsis thatsuch a graspis or may
MonimaChadha
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201
be factually
butitis notan indispensable
elementinperceptual
awareness.
present,
ofsucha conception-free
thenecessity
as
a
Byrejecting
preliminary
grasp
stepinthe
of
the
secures
its
the
process perception Navya-Nyaya
positionagainst dangerof
which
is
in
the
notion
of
the
incoherence,
lurking
conception-free
graspof particulars.Thefirst
because itdrawsourattention
backto theKantian
pointis important
the
mind
and sense-faculties
thesis,whichis preempted
byNaiyayika
philosophers:
in
the
act
of
In
the
next
section,I hopeto give
cooperate(immediately)
perception.
substance
to
this
notion
of
the
some
between mindand sense-faculties.
cooperation
savestheplausibleintuition
thatguidestheBuddhist;
thatis,perceptual
This,inturn,
must
be
constrained
causal
interaction
sense-faculties
and
between
by
experiences
realparticulars.
ofUniversal
Awareness
Features
Perceptual
contrast
Thereseemsto be an intuitive
betweenseeingand seeingas. Thinkofthe
familiar
ofmeeting
an old acquaintance,
someoneyouhavenotseenfor
experience
You
see
the
but
fail
to
personclearly,
youremember
years.
recognizehim.Suddenly
him.You see theoldfaceinthealteredone. First
have
the
ofseeing,
you
experience
ofseeingas. The number
and thentheexperience
ofexamplesofthisare numerous,
willbe thrilled
withthem.Thefirst
and theBuddhist
as
experiencecan be regarded
whereasthesecondis adulterated
withrecognitional
in
thatofseeingtruly,
abilities,
in
whicha realparticular
is identified
as someone,and thisinvariably
conbrings
innocent?
Can we
experiencereallyconceptually
cepts.Butone mayask:is thefirst
this
a
of
No!
To
contrast
case
with
another
it
as
case
see
pureseeing?
why,
regard
familiar
visualexperience.Supposeyou are takinga walkin a desertat dusk.You
are lookingat a solitary
palmtreeinthedistance,butyousee itas a pole. As you
walktowardit,yousee itas younormally
would,as a tree.Inthisexample,too,as in
in a new aspect.Unlike
there
is
of
thefirst
the
one,
experience seeinga particular
is
no
of
an
rather
thereis onlya gradual
thefirst
there
sudden
case,
dawning
aspect;
ofseeingit
youhavetheexperience
changeinaspectas youapproachthetree.First
as a pole,and thentheexperienceofseeingitas a tree.The secondcase bringsto
can present
different
theuncontroversial
aspects;a
pointthatvisualexperiences
light
objectcan be seen nowas one thing,nowas another.Butsetagainstthe
particular
first
case, thisshowsthatthesuddendawningofan aspectofa visuallypresented
thatis presentin perception
dramatizes
forus a feature
merely
particular
generally,
In
the
intuitive
contrast
betweenseeingand seeingas
as.
other
words,
namelyseeing
is in starkcontrast
to the
is a falseone. All seeingis seeingas. Thisgeneralization
claim:no seeingis seeingas.
Buddhist
In the previoussection,we saw thatsuch a conception-free
sensorygrasp(or
awareness) of a particularcannot be regardedas a perceptualcognitionof a particforthereis no
ular. Pureseeing does notresultin perceptualcognitionof particulars,
coherentnotionof a conception-freesensorygrasp of a particular.The following
question becomes pressingat this point: what exactly do we need to add to the
sensorygraspso thatitcountsas a perceptualcognitionofa particular?No doubtthe
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is triggered
between
by a causal interaction
perceptualexperienceof particulars
and particulars,
butwe needtogo beyondwhatis immediately
sense-faculties
given,
thatis,fleeting
Thus,we invokethemind,as Humewouldsay,
sensoryimpressions.
thanwhatis immediately
"forthe mindlooksfurther
givento it."The necessary
forces
us to compromise
on the
ofthemindforperceptual
intervention
experience
loaded
notion
of
it
with
the
of
and
conceptually
seeing
replace
pristine
purity seeing
ofsense-faculties
theco-activity
and
as. Thatisto say,perceptual
requires
cognition
themind.
In
cannotbe regardedas perceptions.
Discrete,fleeting
sensoryimpressions
as
of them[fleeting
such
Kant'sterms,"A combination
they
sensoryimpressions],
is demanded[forperceptualcognition]"(A 120; emcannothave in sense itself,
ofthemindbringsin conceptsthatare vehiclesfor
phasismine).The intervention
the
forperceptualcognition.Kantintroduces
the
demanded
providing synthesis
forunifying
or synthesizing
discretesensoryimnotionofa conceptas a principle
Conceptshave applicationin experiencebecause theyserveto linkor
pr~essions.
of thesame
combinedistinct
as different
sensoryimpressions
fleeting
perceptions
to
The
is
that
some
for
Kant
wants
are
point
emphasize
object.
concepts necessary
This
theverypossibility
ofperceptual
for
cognition.5 idea ofconceptsas a principle
ofthe Kantianthesisthatwe
containsthegermfora preciseformulation
synthesis
ofrecognishallexploreintherestofthissection:cognition
requiresthepossibility
of recognition.
tion.The Kantiannotionofa conceptbringsin thepossibility
This
fortheclaimthatperceptual
awarenessmustbe
thesis,inturn,
providesan argument
restricted
to universal
features.
willbe rejectedoutright
Thiskindofreasoning
fortworeasons.
bytheBuddhist
the
thethesisthatcognition
ofrecognition
is metaphysically
First,
requires possibility
consistsofpersisting
loaded,since itassumesthatreality
objectsthatendureover
time.Thismetaphysical
isquestionedbytheBuddhist,
andthisforms
the
assumption
of
the
basisfortheoutright
thesis.
to
the
Budrejection
epistemological
According
consistsofsvalak?anas,
whichare unique,discrete,
dhist,reality
particmomentary
ulars.I don'tthinkwe needto getintoa metaphysical
for
the
thesis
above
quibble,
does notrequireany debatablemetaphysical
The
we
as
shall
assumption. thesis,
makeclear at the end of thissection,is merelyan epistemological
thesisthatis
neutralregarding
And second,the Buddhistdoes
commitment.
any metaphysical
notwantto allow minimal-mostotherswouldsay inevitable-intervention
from
the mindbecause once conceptsand wordsare allowed,thereis a tendencyfor
theobsessiveproliferation
ofunnecessary
concepts.The pointis thatas soon as we
allow themindto intervene,
ithas thetendency
to takeoverto theextentofcomthe
from
the
we are forcedintoa position
and
then
senses,
pletelyignoring input
wherewe can perceiveanything
and everything
ofwhichthemindcan conceive.
The Buddhistis rightin warningus about thisdanger,but goes too farin restricting
the contentof perceptualexperiencesto the pristinepurityof the given: real particulars. As a result,the Buddhistfails to offera satisfactory
account of perceptual
cognitionof particulars.
In an attemptto offera satisfactory
account of perceptualcognition,I begin here
MonimaChadha
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203
withenigmaticinsights
of the Navya-Nyjyaphilosophers.
As we said above, in
the
causal
of
intheproawareness
of
denying
necessity conception-free
particulars
cess of perception,
the Navya-Nyaya
offer
a
novel
aboutthe
philosophers
insight
natureof some perceptualexperiences:thereare instanceswheresense-faculties
andthemindcooperateimmediately
inthefirst
ina
moment
ofperception,
resulting
in
awareness
as
the
case
of
rehabituated
and
conception-loaded
instantaneously,
for
is
in
There
offered
another
the
context
of
curring
perception, example.
example,
thedirectperception
ofsimpleuniversals,
thatis interesting
and usefulforourpurhere.6
actual
has
been
modified
poses
Gangesa's
example
byMatilal;I willstickto
Matilal'smodification
without
his
(Matilal,Perception,
pp. 347using terminology
I
I
am
a
that
is
color.
While
am
at
disc
348).7Suppose
looking
changing
lookingat
thedisc,ithasjustchangedto blue. Further
bluetint,
supposethatitis a particular
bluetintas therelethelikeofwhichI have neverseen before.I see theparticular
ofthedisc.Thepointisthateventhougha particularvantqualifier
ortheproperty
in
to therelevant
theawareness
thecolor thisexample-is presented
sense-faculty,
as an instanceofa
as a property-instance,
forI see theparticular
is ofa particular
ofme.
certaincolorproperty
ofthedisc infront
Intheveryfirst
moment
ofperception
thereis immediate
between
cooperation
abstraction
ofstructure:
thesensesand themind,whichresultsin an instantaneous
instanceofa simpleuniversal
as a prototypical
theawarenessis thatofa particular
The immediate
or property.
cooperationof the mindis essentialsince whatone
present.Thusthe same
perceivesor is aware of is beyondwhat is immediately
thatexemplify
model can be extendedto explainour perceptionof particulars
mind
relates
theparticular
which
The
with
we
have
prioracquaintance.
properties
future
to
other
and
on
a
certain
occasion
and,in
sensoryimpressions,
past
presented
These
to the possibility
of future
thecase of new properties,
sensoryimpressions.
are
not
senon
the
are
not
occasion;
therefore,
they
present
perceptual
impressions
in
are
real
fictitious.
These
Neither
are
these
possibilities the
totally
soryimpressions.
the
at
sensethattheymayhave been actualizedin history
or,
veryleast,havethe
to be actual.Letus call themimages.Images,inthissense,are notpurely
potential
ofthistermbringsus to explainthenotion
orfictitious.8
The introduction
imaginary
construction
as involvedin perceptualcognition.Forthiswe shall
of imaginative
nowturnto Kant.9
To setthestagefordiscussion,letus beginwitha quotefromKant:"Psycholoof
is a necessaryingredient
failedto realizethatimagination
gistshave hitherto
notion
of
introduces
the
itself"
Kant
(A 120).
"imagination"
specifically
perception
intocoherent
sense impressions
thedistinct
and fleeting
forthejob ofsynthesizing
Thissynthesis
servesa dual purposeforKant,sinceitalso showsthat
perceptions.
and
in
have
application experience.As we havealreadysaid,a transient
concepts
Foritto countas a
as a perception.
cannotbe regarded
sensoryimpression
fleeting
perceptionit mustbe relatedto otherpast and futuresensoryimpressionsof other
particularsof the same kind(or of the same particular).10 Kantinvokesthefacultyof
imaginationexactlyat thispoint.The cognition(or recognition)of an immediately
presentparticularon a perceptualoccasion requiresthatotherpast and/orfuture
204
East& West
Philosophy
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of the same kindare represented,
or brought
alive in one's
imagesof particulars
InKantian
the
of
imagination.
terminology, faculty imagination
providesa "schema"
fortheconceptso thatitcan be appliedinexperience.
Theactivity
ofinvoking
other
real imagesand combining
or linkingsuch imageswiththe immediately
present
is essentialforperceptualcognition.Thisis whatis meantby
sensoryimpression
whichinvolvesconceptsas vehiclesforbringing
alive
construction,"
"imaginative
otherimagesofthesamekind,someofwhichmayevenbe ofthesameparticular,
if
theparticular
enduresovertime.The thought
hereis justanotherexpression
ofthe
idea floatedby Gangesa:"seeinga particular
as a property-instance."
Thereis no
notionof cognizinga particular-as-such;
one can onlycognize universalfeatures
thatare exemplified
Thesefeatures
are cognizedbya subjectinthe
by particulars.
sensethatthesubjectacquirestheabilityto recognizethesefeatures
on otherperoccasions.
On
a
occasion
we
are
confronted
with
a particular
ceptual
perceptual
but
what
we
is
the
of
other
data
of
thesame
datum,
register
possibility recognizing
kind.
restricts
thisclaimto someperceptual
occaThoughtheNaiyayika
philosopher
I
that
we
can
extend
this
idea
to
all
instances
of
sions, think,
Kant,
following
perThisviewisforcedbythenegativeconclusionofthelastsection:
ceptualcognition.
thereis no coherentnotionofcognizinga particular-as-such.
No doubt,perceptual
is
it
is
an
awareness
of
The
intentional;
cognition
something. awarenessis notofa
rather
it
is
an
awareness
of
a particular
as a property-instance.
particular-as-such;
The verynotionofexperienceor perceptual
cognitionis thatofcognizing(or recthe
datum
as
an
instantiation
of a property
or a universal.In
ognizing) particular
otherwords,cognition
the
of
Thus,we can conclude
requires possibility recognition.
thatperceptualcognitionmustbe restricted
to universal
features.
The argument
in
thissectionmakesitobviousthattheplausibleintuition
the
Buddhist
can
be
guiding
saved. Perception
is constrained
betweensense-faculties
by thecausal interaction
and realparticulars,
sincethedirectperception
ofproperty-instances
is,at thevery
of a particular
the
least,occasionedby thepresentation
datum,whichinstantiates
or
the
universal.
property
Some of myreadersmayobjectthatin discussingKantand Naiydyikas
in the
same vein I have conflated
thedistinction
betweenproperties
and concepts.This
Itis important
to notethattheNaiyayika
talk
objectionis notjustified.
philosophers'
of cognitionof particulars
as property-instances
on perceptualoccasions is just
anotherway of describing
the processof ascription
of properties
to particulars.
In
Kantianterms,suchascription
of properties
is no morethantheunifying
and synofdatabyapplying
In
thesizing
conceptstogenerate
perceptual
experience. fact,the
account
of
new
on perceptual
occaNaiydyika
philosophers'
cognizing
properties
sionsprovidesa novelaccountofacquiringand simultaneously
theposdisplaying
sessionoftheconceptin itsapplication
to perceptual
Inthissense,the
experiences.
Nyaya-Kantianthesisis only an epistemologicalclaim. The argumentin the followThis will also help in clarifying
ing paragraphwill reveal itsmetaphysicalneutrality.
the thesisfurther.
It may seem thatthe Buddhistworldview,accordingto which realityconsistsof
MonimaChadha
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205
withthesubstantial
conflicts
thesis,thatis,
momentary
particulars,
unique,distinct,
exists
If
the
of
the
thatcognition
onlyfora
particular
recognition.
possibility
requires
does
thesis
The
substantial
on
future
occasion.
a
it
be
cannot
moment,
recognized
is
mustendureovera periodoftime.The requirement
notrequirethatparticulars
thecognizer
withmomentary
met,even ifcognizeris onlyconfronted
particulars:
The
some
the
of
as
an
instantiation
seesthemomentary
property. Buddhist
particular
on a perceptual
of universal
features
willobjectto such a cognition
occasion,for
one of
is a self-characterized
each distinct
uniqueparticular,
particular
(svalak?ana),
thereis no
consistsofdistinct,
itskind.Sincereality
unique,momentary
particulars,
withan identicalsensoryimoccasionon whichthecognizeris presented
future
thesisbecause itseemsthatthepossibilThisconflicts
withthesubstantial
pression.
arisesbecauseoftheambiguity
is ruledout.The seemingconflict
ityofrecognition
thesis.The thesis
thatinfectsthe substantial
in the use of the term"possibility"
the parthatcharacterize
to universalfeatures
claimsthatcognitionis restricted
the
basis
in
that
constitute
ticularsgivenin perceptual
they
experiences, thesense
As a resultofperceptual
fordistinguishing
(or
cognition
particulars.
amongdistinct
a
or
differentiate
to
an
the
particular
knowledge), cognizeracquires ability identify
thepossioccasion.The acquisitionofthisabilitymanifests
givenon a perceptual
of
view is the truedescription
Ifthe Buddhistmetaphysical
bilityof recognition.
with
an
is
which
the
future
occasion
on
there
is
no
then
cognizer presented
reality,
Butthatjustmeansthattheabilityacquiredby cogidenticalsensoryimpression.
nizersin perceptual
experiencesis notexercised.The pointremainsthattherecan
as an instanceof
is ofa particular
ofa particular-as-such;
be no cognition
cognition
a property.
KnowledgeofParticulars
mustbe restricted
In theprevioussection,we concludedthatperceptualcognition
counterintuitive
seems
to
have
Thisconclusion
features.
to universal
consequences.
thereis no poscannotevenqualifyas objectsofperceptual
Ifparticulars
cognition,
in perceptualexperiences.Thus it seemsto follow
of knowingparticulars
sibility
On theotherhand,
ofparticulars.
cannotbe a sourceofknowledge
thatperception
is theprimary,
however,itseemsplausiblethatperception
perhapstheonly,source
This consequence is unacceptableand will force
of knowledgeof particulars.
theconclusionoftheprevious
someof myreadersto reject,or at leastreconsider,
the
counterintuitive
I
will
show
that
In
this
section.
section,
consequencecan be
notionof the knowledge
to our commonsense
avoided,ifwe pay some attention
ofa particular.
ofa particular-as-such
Inthefirst
section,we saw thatthenotionofa cognition
worldview.
totheBuddhist
ina deeperproblemaccording
Thisresults
is incoherent.
itdoes not make sense to talk
or differentiation,
In the absence of any identification
about the particulardatum. The Buddhisthas no basis forthe uniqueness or distinctnessof real particulars,and is thusforcedto give up the idea thatdistinct,real
particularsare given in perceptualcognition.The given in perceptualawareness is
206
East& West
Philosophy
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whoseconstituents
cannotbe
reducedtoan indistinguishable
heapormassofreality
sounds
at
the
notion
of
The
Buddhist
veryleast.
mystical
distinguished.
svalaksina
cannotbe thatof a unique,
notionof a particular
Thissuggeststhatour ordinary
self-characterized
distinct,
particular-as-such.
momentary,
is a commonsense
thatcan
The uniquenessof distinct
assumption
particulars
I
of
We
we
cannotarticle
faith.
do
not-in
be
as
an
fact, believe,
only accepted
itis thataccountsfortheuniqueness
ofwhatever
havea comprehensive
knowledge
are
of distinct
However,as we saw in the lastsection,theparticulars
particulars.
the
for
which
constitute
basis
universal
characterized
features,
by
distinguishing
Incognizinga particular
as an instantiation
ofsomespeparticulars.
amongdistinct
we have some holdon features
thatcan be
cificproperty
(orgroupof properties),
inquestion.Butthesefeatures
fordistinguishing
theparticular
can
offered
as grounds
to
sufficient
the
neverconstitute
(that
and/or
necessary
grounds identify particular is,
itfromeverything
our intuitive
notionofthe knowlelse). Fortunately,
distinguish
does notdemanda comprehensive
thatcharedge of particulars
graspoffeatures
in whichitsuffices
acterizeituniquely.We settleformuchweakercriteria
to disin
in
the
from
other
a
situation.
What
objects
given
tinguish particular question
in
on
the
contextthatis determined
works a givensituation
bycognizers'
depends
and thusknowledge
interests,
attitudes,
needs,and so on. Theperceptual
cognition,
in thisweakersense, is possiblein the Nyaya-Kantian
of particulars
framework.
I
we
the
counterintuitive
that
can
have
no
Therefore,think,
consequence
knowledge
ofparticulars
can be avoided.
Notes
1 - LudwigWittgenstein,
p. 212.
Philosophical
Investigations,
ofa "concept,"I shallbe working
2 - Intheabsenceofan explicitdefinition
witha
minimalist
claimaboutconceptsthatis uncontroversial.
Whateverelse they
theinputfrom
maybe, conceptsare,at least,vehiclesto structure
sense-object
is neutralon the realist/nominalist
contact.Thisworkingdefinition
debate,
whichis centralto thedisagreement
betweenBuddhists
and Naiydyikas.
So I
shalltakethe liberty
to use the notionsof "conception-free
awareness"and
inthisessay.
awareness"interchangeably
"unstructured
3 - It mustbe notedthatthe Indianphilosophers
wereworking
witha theoryof
betweenwordsand conceptsis veryfine,if
languagewherethedemarcation
notpractically
nonexistent
(Matilal,Perception,
p. 310). Thiscan be attributed
oftheIndiangrammarians,
to theinfluence
notablyBhartrhari.
4 My positiveaccount in the nextsectionwill proposean answerto this
question.
5 - Kantregardedsuchconceptsas transcendental
and hopedto have identified
them.I don'tagreewiththe Kantianthesisbecause it restson a distinction
Monima
Chadha
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207
betweentranscendental
concepts,pure concepts,and empiricalconcepts.
Sucha distinction
is untenable
and can be questionedon variousgrounds.For
thepurposesofthisessay,I willavoidthatdebate.I thinkwe can endorsethe
broadKantianclaimthatsome conceptsor otherare necessaryforthevery
ofexperience,
without
suchconcepts
possibility
claimingthatwe can identify
at thisstage.
6 - The Nyayaphilosophers
betweensimpleand
upholdtheobviousdistinction
in
universals
the
that
this
offers
us
a
criterion
betweenrealunicomplex
hope
versalsand mind-dependent
ones. I am skepticalofthetenability
ofanysuch
betweentranscendental
and
claim,in the same veinas in Kant'sdistinction
I
don't
think
useful
distinction
can
be
made
between
empiricalconcepts.
any
or universals
kindsofproperties
and concepts.
7 - Gangesa,Tattvacintamani,
vol. 1, p. 87.
Pratyaksa,
8- It is important
to notethatthe term"image" as introduced
here is not in
the sense of fanciful
whichis usuallyassociatedwithfalsebeliefs,
imagery,
mistaken
The term
dreams,delusions,and creativeoriginalinsight.
memory,
in
has
another
use
the
sense
of
a
mental
or
also,
"image"
image picturein
ourselvesto thelatter
use.
one's mind.Forourpurposeshere,we willrestrict
9 - It is important
to notethatKanttreatsunderstanding
and imagination
as two
distinct
faculties.Butthe distinction
is not important
forour purposeshere.
ifany,
Bothofthemcan be treated
as mentalfaculties
and thusthedistinction,
is irrelevant
here.
is important
to be fairto Kant,butitwill be
10 - Thisparenthetical
qualification
of the same
Kantinsistson othersensoryimpressions
droppedhenceforth.
because
he
is
to
defend
the
commonsense
that
particular
trying
assumption
the
as
distinct
and
As
perception
represents particulars
enduring
objects. we
havealreadynoted,thiswillbeg theissueagainsttheBuddhist
philosophers.
So we willcircumvent
thismetaphysical
debatebyfocusing
on particulars
as
of
kinds.
exemplifiers
References
Edited,with Didhitiand jagadisi of Jagadisa,by S.
Gangesa. Tattvacintamani.
1906-1908.
Varanasi:Chowkambha,
Nyayaopadhyaya.
Kant,Immanuel.TheCritiqueofPureReason.Translated
by NormanKempSmith.
London:Macmillan,1958.
ofKnowlAn Essayon ClassicalIndianTheories
Matilal,BimalKrishna.
Perception:
Oxford:
Clarendon
1986.
Press,
edge.
208
East& West
Philosophy
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
of LogicalAtomism."
In Bertrand
"The Philosophy
Russell,Logic
Russell,Bertrand.
and Knowledge:Essays1901-1950,editedby RobertCharlesMarsh.London:
GeorgeAllenand Unwin,1956.
P. F. "Imagination
and Perception."
In P. F. Strawson,
Freedomand ReStrawson,
Other
London:
1974.
and
sentment,
Methuen,
Essays.
Translated
Ludwig.Philosophical
Investigations.
byG.E.M.Anscombe.
Wittgenstein,
Oxford:Blackwell,1953.
Monima
Chadha
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
209