South Asia Regional Conference on Education Quality Schooling Quality and Economic Growth Eric A. Hanushek Stanford University Importance of Human Capital Policy Focus Traditional emphasis on school attainment Development of access programs Centerpiece of Millennium Development Goals Education for All initiative Some clear successes and some continuing challenges New evidence that QUALITY is the primary issue Overview of Discussion Importance of quality (cognitive skills) Policy actions and reform Economic growth Individual earnings Distributional outcomes Resource policies Supply side incentives Demand side incentives Importance of information School Expectancy, 2001 Total Male Female World 10.3 10.7 9.8 Countries in transition 12.5 12.2 12.6 Developed countries 15.9 15.2 16.4 Developing countries 9.5 10.1 8.9 Arab States 10.0 10.6 9.4 Central and Eastern Europe 12.7 12.7 12.7 Central Asia 11.4 11.5 11.3 East Asia and the Pacific 10.9 11.3 10.5 Latin America and the Caribbean 13.0 12.7 13.2 North America and Western Europe 16.3 15.4 16.8 South and West Asia 8.6 9.5 7.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 7.1 7.6 6.4 Cognitive Skills: International Student Achievement Tests Measuring knowledge, not sitting in the classroom International agencies have conducted many international tests of students’ performance in cognitive skills since mid-1960s 12 testing occasions 36 separate test observations (age levels, subjects) Require rescaling to obtain combined measure Adjust mean and variance of separate International Achievement Source: Hanushek and Wößmann (2007). International Achievement International Achievement Education Quality and Economic Growth Quantity of Schooling With quality control Without quality control Education Quality and Openness Effect of test score on growth 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 Openness 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Estimated effect of test scores on average annual rate of growth of real GDP per capita in 1960-2000, depending on degree of openness to international trade of a country. Source: Hanushek and Wößmann (2007). Implications of Reform Speed of reform 10, 20, 30 years Magnitude of reform ½ standard deviation Half distance of Mexico, Indonesia, Chile to OECD U.S., Germany to East Asian Full impact felt 35 years after completion of reform Improved GDP with Moderately Strong Knowledge Improvement (0.5 s.d.) 30% 20% 10% year 20-year reform 30-year reform typical education spending 80 20 75 20 70 20 65 20 60 20 55 20 50 20 45 20 40 20 35 20 30 20 25 20 20 20 15 20 10 20 05 0% 20 percent additions to GDP 40% Other Benefits of Improved Cognitive Skills Individual earnings Developed countries Developing countries Estimated Returns to Cognitive Skills Country Ghana Study Glewwe (1996) Ghana Jolliffe (1998) Estimated effecta 0.21**-0.3** (government) 0.14-0.17 (priv.) 0.05-0.07* Ghana Vijverberg (1999) ? Kenya Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985); Knight and Sabot (1990) Angrist and Lavy (1997) 0.19**-0.22** Alderman, Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (1996) Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (forthcoming) 0.12-0.28* Moll (1998) 0.34**-0.48** Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985); Knight and Sabot (1990) 0.07-0.13* Morocco Pakistan Pakistan South Africa Tanzania ? 0.25 Notes Alternative estimation approaches yield some differences; math effects shown generally more important than reading effects, and all hold even with Raven’s test for ability. Household income related to average math score with relatively small variation by estimation approach; effect is only observed with offfarm income, and on-farm income is not significantly related to cognitive skills. Income estimates for math and reading with nonfarm selfemployment; highly variable estimates (including both positive and negative effects) but effects not generally statistically significant. Total sample estimates: small variation by primary and secondary school leavers. Cannot convert to standardized scores because use indexes of performance; French writing skills appear most important for earnings, but results depend on estimation approach. Variation by alternative approaches and by controls for ability and health; larger and more significant without ability and health controls. Estimates of structural model with combined scores for cognitive skill; significant effects of combined math and reading scores which are instrumented by school inputs Depending on estimation method, varying impact of computation; comprehension (not shown) generally insignificant. Total sample estimates: smaller for primary than secondary school leavers. *significant at 0.05 level; **significant at 0.01 level. a. Proportional increase in wages from a one standard deviation increase in measured test scores. Other Benefits of Improved Cognitive Skills Individual earnings Developed countries Developing countries Income distribution Inequality of Educational Quality and of Earnings Earnings inequality 4.5 USA CAN 4.0 3.5 IRE UK 3.0 AUS SWI NET 2.5 FIN GER SWE DEN 2.0 BEL NOR 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 Test score inequality Conclusions on Economic Impacts Powerful effects of cognitive skills on individual earnings, on the distribution of income, and on economic growth Support for causal interpretation The current situation in developing countries is much worse than generally pictured on the basis just of school enrollment and attainment Basic Skills Ghana never enroll dropout gr 1-5 dropout gr 5-9 finish gr 9 w/o basic skill finish gr 9 w/ basic skill Grade 9 37 % Fully literate 5% Basic Skills Brazil never enroll dropout gr 1-5 dropout gr 5-9 finish gr 9 w/o basic skill finish gr 9 w/ basic skill Grade 9 22% Fully literate 8% Basic Skills Morroco never enroll dropout gr 1-5 dropout gr 5-9 finish gr 9 w/o basic skill finish gr 9 w/ basic skill Grade 9 28% Fully literate 13% Distribution of Education Quality 2.7% Estonia Taiwan 21.9% 8.2% USA 7.3% Brazil 66.2% Source: Hanushek and Wößmann (2007). 81.8% Peru Cognitive Skill Production Families Peers Community and neighborhood Schools Policy largely around schools but other interventions such as health programs Resource Policies Little evidence of success Cross country evidence Expenditure per Student and Student Performance across Countries Math performance in PISA 2003 550 Finland Korea 2 Czech Rep. R = 0.01 Ireland Slovak Rep. 500 Poland Hungary R 2 = 0.15 Japan Netherlands Belgium Canada Switzerland Australia Iceland Denmark Sweden France Austria Germany Norway Spain USA Portugal 450 Italy Greece 400 Mexico 350 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 Cumulative educational expenditure per student Resource Policies Little evidence of success Cross country evidence Within country – developed Within country – developing Resource Policies Little evidence of success Cross country evidence Within country – developed Within country – developing Does not say “resources never have effect” Does not say “resources cannot have effect” No expectation within current incentive structure Teacher Quality Strongest evidence on systematic effects Not related to common measures Observability Supply Side Incentives Changing Institutions Application in both developed and developing countries Interpretation – work largely through changing teacher quality Institutional Reforms Supported by Evidence Centralized exams Accountability Autonomy/decentralization Choice Direct performance incentives Autonomy and Central Exams or Accountability 76.2 80 Math performance in T IMSS/T IMSS-R test scores (relative to lowest category) 70 55.5 60 50 40 30 20 10 Yes 23.7 0 0.0 No School autonomy over teacher salaries Yes No Central exams Demand Side Incentives Application mainly in developing countries Motivated by access/attainment issues Work through changing student and family behavior Programs carefully evaluated Range of programs Conditional cash transfers Fee reduction Mexico, Brazil, Columbia, Nicaragua Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, Kenya* Food and nutrition supplements Bangladesh, India, Kenya Results of Demand Side Incentives Aimed generally at encouraging attendance/completion Rewards linked to being in school Supports Education for All Each has positive (and significant) impact on attendance and attainment But, with exception of Kenyan merit scholarship, little or no apparent impact on achievement Conclusions on Demand Side Incentives Incentives have impact on behavior Requires care in structuring incentives May be perverse effects Ensure that goals are correct Do not assume other outcomes Access and quality trade-offs Access viewed as “equity” Equity not supported by low quality Information and Feedback Assessments very bad Limited national assessments International assessments problematic No regular evaluation function Local variation in effectiveness No simple solutions Conclusions School quality is not easily changed Focus on Incentives but be careful Information shortage critical Student performance Program feedback
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