LECTURE
GEOG 270
Fall 2007
November 30, 2007
Joe Hannah, PhD
Department of Geography
University of Washington
GMOs and Hunger
Food Security and Food Aid
Last Time
Reviewed “Permissive” vs. ”Precautionary”
approaches
► A little history of GMO adoption
►
 US, Canada, Argentina first users (rich, large farms)
 “Mad Cow” and European adoption of Precautionary
Principle
 Third World policy dilemmas
 Is “privatized development” a good thing for Third World
countries?
► Some
policy examples
 Kenya, Brazil, China
(from Paarlberg)
Today
►
►
GMOs and Food Security
Famine, Food Aid, and GMOs: Southern
African Food Emergency 2002
The Food Security Debate
►
What is “Food Security?”
 Over 200 definitions
 Different scales:
(Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith, 1992)
►e.g.,
amount of food available world-wide
►e.g., access to food by all people at all times
►my experience in early 1990s: seasonal security
 Different focus
►Production,
sustainability, nutrition, trade/markets,
access (e.g., famines)
Food Security and GMOs
► Proponents
of GMOs
 Future “food gap”
►population
-- +73 million per year thru 2010
►Urbanization
 “productivity gap”
►can’t
leave the poor behind
►Must use available land to its utmost potential
Food Security and GMOs
► Opponents
to GMOs
 Technology not the answer: Green Revolution
did not end hunger
 GMO technology is driven by commercial (not
humanitarian) interests
 Real challenges are social/political: foremost is
access to food, poverty alleviation, land reform
 Ecologically sustainable agriculture will give
cheaper, longer-lasting increases in productivity
Food Security and GMOs
The debate over whether GMOs can help
reduce hunger reflects, in large part, actors’
ideas of the causes of hunger (i.e., their
definition of “food security”):
• production,
• sustainability,
• nutrition,
• trade/markets,
• access (e.g., famines)
• etc.
GMOs and US Food Aid:
Southern Africa 2002
Six countries, over 14 million people “rapidly
slipping into a food crisis”
► Estimated food requirements: over 1 million metric
tons of grain
► “Trigger” for crisis: weather (floods, drought)
► “Causes” more complicated (poor governance,
land redistribution, sale of surpluses to pay debt,
etc.)
► Access to food (no alternative sources) – not lack
of food
►
US Donates GMO Grain
► US
took the lead in donating food to
alleviate crises: ½ required additional food
► Some of the unmilled grain aid was GMO
► Each country had to respond:
 Swaziland, Lesotho accepted aid (Lesotho
initially asked that it be milled first)
 Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
challenged: grain did not have regulatory
approval in US
Concerns about GMO Aid
► Potential
health impacts on food recipients
► Impact on local agricultural biodiversity
(genetic pollution)
► Impact of possible GMO pollution on abilities
to export grain n the future
Recipients’ Policy Responses
► Malawi,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe asked that the
grain be milled first (to prevent replanting by
farmers and crossing with local varieties)
► Zambia: refused aid until Zambian scientists could
study potential health impacts; concluded:




Health effects unclear
High risk of eroding biodiversity
High risk of impacting exports (e.g., honey, corn) to EU
Rejected Aid
Official US Response
► Initially
simply dismissed critics’ concerns:
“ignorant and uninformed”
► As opposition grew, US sought to “educate”
recipients on safety of GMOs
► Refused to replace food aid with cash aid
(to by regionally available grain)
► Refused to mill the grain first (too
expensive)
Official US Response
“Washington, however, failed to to both
understand the nature of the concern of the
governments of the region and to take them
seriously. For Washington, the choice was
simple: either accept US food aid
unconditionally, or allow your population to
starve” (Zerbe, 2004)
Recipients’ Policy Dilemma
“For the governments of the region, however,
the matter was far more complex. For them,
the decision to accept US assistance in the
form of GM food aid represented a trade off,
not just between the potential short and
long term health of their populations, but
between the short and long term health of
their economies.” (Zerbe, 2004)
Short-term resolution
► South
Africa intervened: milled US donated
grain.
► Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe
accepted distribution
Zambia Still Refused US Aid
►
“Framed” as sovereignty – Zambian
President Levy Mwanawasa:
“we may be poor and experiencing food
shortages but are not ready to expose
people to ill-defined risks. . . I am not
prepared to accept that we should use our
people as guinea pigs” (Zerbe, 2004)
US vs. EU
► US blames the EU:
“This dangerous effect of the EUs moratorium became
painfully evident last fall when some famine-stricken
African countries refused US food aid because of fabricated
fears stoked by irresponsible rhetoric about food safety.”
(US Trade representative)
► The EU responds:
“Food aid to starving populations should be about meeting
the urgent humanitarian needs of those who are in need.
It should not be about trying to advance the case for GM
food abroad, or planting GM crops for export, or indeed
finding outlets for domestic surplus…” (EU policy response)
Policy Situation, 2005
Will GMOs Reduce Hunger?
► The
debate seems to have come to an impasse –
entrenched positions divided along lines of
“theory” and “world view”
 Causes of hunger, importance of markets, safety
► Each
► Each
side claims “moral high ground”
stakeholder has (potentially) a great deal to
gain or lose
► Policy approaches are developed inthis ambiguos
environment, relying on best science, local
knowledge and understandings, and personal
beliefs
Next time…
► Wrap
up GMO Topic
► Re-visit “Sustainability” and “Development”
► Talk about ”Participatory Development”
approaches