TR A6860
Renewable energy policy making in
the EU: What has been the role of
Norwegian stakeholders?
Audun Ruud and Jørgen K. Knudsen
SINTEF Energy Research
October 2009
TECHNICAL REPORT
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SINTEF Energy Research
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Renewable energy policy making in the EU:
What has been the role of Norwegian stakeholders?
CONTRIBUTOR(S)
Audun Ruud and Jørgen K. Knudsen
CLIENT(S)
SINTEF Energy Research
TR NO.
DATE
CLIENT’S REF.
PROJECT NO.
TR A6860
2009-09-21
Sverre Aam
12E08601
EL. FILE CODE
REPORT TYPE
RESPONSIBLE (NAME, SIGN.)
CLASSIFICATION
090921GJA143436
William M Lafferty
Open
ISBN N0.
RESEARCH DIRECTOR (NAME, SIGN)
COPIES
PAGES
42
978-82-594-3416-6
Petter Støa
10
DIVISION
LOCATION
LOCAL FAX
Energy Systems
Forskningsveien 3b
+47 22 96 59 80
RESULT (summary)
In December 2008 the EU finally agreed upon a Directive to promote an increased share of energy
consumption from renewable sources (the RES Directive). The present report assesses Norwegian
stakeholders’ mobilisation as to the formulation of the RES Directive.
Although the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement provides Norway with opportunities for
influence during early phases of EU decision-making, this was not considered as feasible by the Ministry
in charge. The controversial nature of both the future energy policies in balancing renewables versus
petroleum interests, and Norway’s relationship with the EU, contributes to explain the lack of clear,
public Norwegian position vis-à-vis the formulation of the RES-Directive.
Despite the lack of a clear, public position, some of Norway’s major industrial companies have aimed to
influence certain aspects of the EU RES Directive.
The report also assesses an emerging political and technological cooperation on off-shore wind power
between Norway and the EU, with the potential of engaging both public and non-public actors. The case
of off-shore wind can be an arena for improved cooperation. The report ends with recommendations on
improved strategies for the promotion of Norwegian RES interests vis-à-vis the EU.
KEYWORDS
Renewable energy
Norway
EU Directive on renewable energy
interests
SELECTED BY AUTHOR(S)
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 4
2
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES AND FRAMEWORK........................................................ 6
2.1 PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING ..................................................................................7
2.2 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS .......................................................................... 7
2.3 TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCES............................................9
2.4 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 10
3
EU RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES AND NORWAY................................................ 12
3.1 NORWAY AND THE EEA AGREEMENT ............................................................. 13
3.2 NORWAY’S DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE FOR EEA-RELEVANT
ISSUES....................................................................................................................... 14
3.3 NORWEGIAN RES INTERESTS IN AN EU PERSPECTIVE................................15
3.3.1 The context: Norwegian energy policy priorities and interests ...................... 16
3.3.2 Norwegian positions towards the EU RES policies ....................................... 18
4
NORWEGIAN ACTORS’ APPROACHES TO THE EU RES DIRECTIVE .....................20
4.1 THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY (MOPE) AND THE
PUBLIC ACTORS ..................................................................................................... 20
4.2 INDUSTRIAL ACTORS ........................................................................................... 21
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS......................................................................................23
4.4 REGIONAL INTERESTS.......................................................................................... 24
4.5 DOES OFF-SHORE WIND POWER COOPERATION PROVIDE NEW
OPPORTUNITIES? ................................................................................................... 25
4.6 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 26
5
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTEXTUALISING NORWEGIAN ACTORS’
APPROACHES ..................................................................................................................... 28
5.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING....................................... 28
5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS ..............................30
5.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPERIENCES ......................................................................................................... 32
6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 34
7
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 38
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1
INTRODUCTION
The main objectives for the EU’s future energy and climate change policies were endorsed by the
European Council in March 2007. On this background, in January 2008, the EU Commission
presented a number of proposals aiming at a triple 20 % target for Green-House Gas (GHG)
emission reductions, increased use of energy from renewable sources (RES), and increased energy
efficiency by 2020. Included in this ‘package’, there was a proposal for a revised Directive on
renewable energies, covering electricity, heating/cooling as well as biofuels (CEC 2008b). The
new RES Directive was adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in December 2008,
and is replacing a former directive promoting renewable electricity (RES-E) (CEC 2001, 2009).
Due to its relevance for the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway is
committed by the new RES Directive despite being a non-member state. Norway is, moreover,
considered to be an important partner for the EU in the energy field – particularly by its supply of
natural gas. However, the country’s hydropower resources and off-shore wind power potential
also make the country an interesting energy partner for the EU.
In other studies we have assessed whether and how the EU RES-E Directive of 2001 has affected
national political efforts of promoting renewable electricity consumption (Lafferty & Ruud 2008).
In the present report we rather seek to explore and assess Norwegian actors’ approaches towards
the decision-making processes with relevance for the formulation of the EU RES-Directive, which
is also implying a broader perspective compared to the focus on electricity only in the former
directive. We ask the following main question: To what extent and how do governmental and nongovernmental Norwegian actors try to influence this process? This study limits its focus up to the
final agreement of December 2008, but we will follow-up with subsequent studies both on the
ongoing negotiation as well as the final implementation in Norway.
The present report will depict to what extent there prevails a ‘Norwegian RES strategy’ vis-à-vis
the EU, and to what degree this strategy is influenced by non-governmental actors. Alternatively,
do industrial interests and environmental groups seek to influence EU processes through other
means?
In order to identify the strategies and tactics undertaken by the different actors, we will assess the
framework and arenas for the relevant interest representation. Due to the EEA Agreement, there is
a formalised, institutional framework to manage contact and negotiations with the EU institutions.
By not being a Member State Norway lacks, however, the formal opportunity to influence
decisions during the decisive final phases of the decision-making process. The potential influence
for the Norwegian government is primarily related to the more technical-administrative
preparatory phases. Non-governmental actors, on the other hand, are less bound by such
formalized frameworks.
A second aim of the report is thus to identify some critical junctures for Norwegian interestrepresentation, and – based on the case of renewable energy policy making – recommend possible
amendments in order to strengthen Norwegian actors’ capacity for outreach and influence vis-à12E08601
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vis the EU. In this regard, we have made a specific assessment of a recently initiated cooperation
on off-shore wind power, and ask the question as to what potential this can imply for the further
cooperation on RES policies between the EU and Norway.
The following section provides an overview of the analytical approaches employed in the report.
Section 3 outlines the political background for the relationship between Norway and the EU on
renewable energies, whereas section 4 provides a mapping of the actual interaction between
Norwegian stakeholders and actors at the EU-level. Section 5 gives a summarising discussion in
light of the analytical perspectives, and – finally – concluding remarks as well as
recommendations are given in the sixth section.
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2
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES AND FRAMEWORK
In order to study to what extent and how Norwegian interests have sought to influence the
relevant decision-making processes, it is necessary to take into account both the specific
framework regulating the Norwegian relationship with the EU (mainly the EEA Agreement) – as
will be outlined in section 3.2, as well as the multi-layered structure and function of the EU itself.
Whereas the supra-national level has achieved increased importance, the EU is still substantially
characterized by its different Member States. The notion of subsidiarity is an important concept in
EU politics, constituting a principle for determining how goals transcending the nation state
should be best pursued, by whom and at what level of governance (Bomberg 2004: 81). Albeit a
goal not easily achieved, a major aim of the principle is to balance the two ideas of effectiveness
and closeness to the citizens. There are various underlying tensions of this principle also activated
in matters pertaining to EU energy policies (Collier 2002). This is further illustrated by the RES
Directive which will set mandatory national targets on renewable shares in national energy
consumption and simultaneously realising the ambitions of an integrated EU energy market. The
national RES-targets must be implemented by member states (MS) characterised by different
policy interactions with regional-local levels.
There are generally few up-dated studies dealing with the consequences of the EEA agreement on
Norwegian governance and policies, both in general terms – and in relation to more specific
sectors. An exception is provided by an ongoing project coordinated by the Fridtjof Nansen
Institute in Norway, focusing how the Nordic energy market and infrastructure are influenced by
current and coming EU energy and climate policies.1 In addition, some earlier studies have
focused on the impact of the EEA Agreement on specific policy areas, such as gas and electricity
(Claes & Tranøy 1999; Claes & Eikeland 1999). Furthermore, several studies have investigated
the impact of the EEA affiliation on Norwegian administrators and political-administrative
structures (se for example Lægreid et al. 2004; Trondal 2006; Egeberg & Trondal 2007).
The lack of analyses of more sector-specific cases is interesting given the observation by leading
scientists that EU policies probably impact the content of national policies more substantially than
the organisation and institutional framework (Olsen 2006). There is, moreover – with certain
exceptions (Dyrdal et al. 2006) – a general lack of studies on how non-public Norwegian actors
relate to the EU level in the preparatory phases and during the decision-making process.
In order to highlight both public and non-public actors, as well as different dimensions of their
strategies, we will base our analysis on three complementary analytical perspectives, with a
particular focus on:
1. Public decision-making
1
The project is entitled ’Climate change altering Nordic Energy Systems’ (CANES): www.fni.no/canes/ The CANES
project has, however, mostly focused the processes at the EU level per se, as well as the effect of EU regulations on
national policies – and not as the present report – on how national stakeholders seek to influences processes at the EU
level.
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2. Non-governmental actors
3. Transfer of knowledge and experiences
These perspectives refer to different ways of depicting the relationship between national, transnational and supranational structures and actors within the EU polity. The perspectives can,
however, also be combined to contribute to a more eclectic and multi-faceted analysis as shown in
the subsequent assessment.
2.1
Public decision-making
The first analytical perspective is building on theoretical approaches that emphasise the
formalised, but complex structures that are geared towards rule-making and common regulation of
the EU policy area. According to this perspective we should focus on the procedures dominating
the official contacts between the Norwegian government and the EU system. In the present
context, this implies a focus on the actors’ use of the EEA framework, and the national procedures
preparing national positions vis-à-vis EU regulatory acts.
A related question is, therefore, the institutional capacity to deal with EEA-related matters. In this
regard, one should specifically note that there are few specific organisational entities within the
Norwegian government dealing specifically and explicitly with EEA-related issues
(Riksrevisjonen 2005). These issues are mostly managed within the mainstream framework of
formal structures, procedures and institutional practice. In addition, several researchers have
pointed to the country- and sector-specific institutional filters which modify the impulses received
through participation in expert groups and other forums at the EU level (c.f. Veggeland 1999).
In Norway, an important feature of this ‘institutional filter’ is the interaction between the ministry
and the subordinate agencies. In this regard, Egeberg and Trondal (2007: 16) document that the
Norwegian ministries execute a relatively strong control of their sub-ordinate agencies, although
the agencies also operate with a considerable degree of professional autonomy. The ministry’s
role partly depends both on its organisational capacity in the field and the extent to which the EUrelevant area is politically contested.
Building on this perspective, we assume that the interaction between the EU and Norway is
substantially influenced by the characteristics of the public, formalised framework regulating
Norway’s access to the formal decision-making bodies within the EU.
2.2
Non-governmental actors
The second perspective employed is building on theoretical approaches emphasising the
pluralistic and open-ended features of the different EU policy areas, and the many different
interests that are influencing both the EU institutions directly, and indirectly – through national
decision-makers. This perspective resonates with the governance mode identified by Knill and
Lenschow (2005) as competitive. The basic focus is here the effects of regulation vis-à-vis the
competitive position of the national industry within the common market which are judged to be
instrumental for national, political and bureaucratic representatives at the EU-level (ibid.).
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The present approach stresses the strength, and related resources, mobilised by interests affected
by EU policy processes. Given the potentially complex consequences of EU policy proposals,
there is a potential for mobilisation and politicisation in favour of and/or opposing the various
components of the proposals. According to this perspective, therefore, the outcome of EU policy
processes is less dependent on the formal rules of decision-making, but more on the aggregated
impact of different interests relating to a specific issue and context. Various interests are thus
assumed to compete to imprint their positions and views in future policies and legislation.
Interest groups are key actors in contemporary forms of governance throughout the western world.
Civil servants increasingly seek inputs from stakeholders, because they may have expertise, assist
with implementation or they add democratic legitimacy to the outcome (Greenwood & Halpin
2007: 190). Analysts have, however, also observed certain dis-benefits (ibid.). Organised interests
can constitute rent-seeking cartels interfering with the wealth creation process (Olson, 1982),
whereas other analysts consider interest groups as monopolising elites that can undermine public
governance (Greenwood & Halpin 2007). Anyhow, interest groups’ key features may vary along
several dimensions: Groups may lack resources and expertise or advocacy; they may be based on
faulty, biased or contrived thinking and/or research (hence undermining their contribution to
output legitimacy); and they may lack authority and democratic legitimacy with those they
purport to advocate for (Greenwood & Halpin 2007: 190).
A crucial observation is, moreover, related to which interests seek to which parts of the decisionmaking system. In the literature on lobbying, two conflicting hypotheses have emerged (Gullberg
2008). One claims that interest groups lobby their ‘friends; that is, decision-makers with positions
similar to their own, whereas the alternative hypothesis claims that interest groups lobby their
‘foes’; decision-makers with positions opposed to their own (ibid.). Gullberg (2008) documents,
however, that in the field of EU climate policy, interest groups lobby both friends and foes –
albeit conditioned by their resources and capacity.
Others have pointed to the way the open-ended and competitive governance structure of the EU,
with shared competences between ‘federal’ and multilateral institutions, in itself creates multiple
and mutually-reinforcing opportunities for diverse groups of interests (Schreurs and Tiberghien
2007: 24). Multi-level dynamics can also provide mutual reinforcements between different
interests. Interests and ideas promoted by various actors – not least the Member States themselves,
eventually in cooperation with the EU Commission – have in climate-change policies contributed
to more dynamic changes and more ambitious polices than would have been the case without this
mobilisation (ibid.).
Building on this perspective, we assume the role of interests to be a prominent feature in the
national strategies, expressed by non-public actors aiming at influencing EU policy formulation.
In particular, the interests most directly affected by the proposed EU policies are assumed to
mobilise at both the national- and EU-levels. Related to RES policy formation at the EU level we
can thus assume that concerned interest groups mobilise to promote their interests, either towards
the national level and national authorities, and/or directly towards the EU institutions.
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2.3
Transfer of knowledge and experiences
The third analytical perspective employed in this report is related to theories on the transfer of
ideas and knowledge, and processes of policy learning (Rose 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).
According to this approach policy outcomes will also depend on how different actors are
conveying their knowledge, ideas and experiences. This perspective is further linked to
perspectives that emphasise the multi-tiered and increasingly networked structure of the EU
decision-making system. This is manifested by the way different economic and other interests are
gathering and interacting in various network formations which simultaneously stimulate increased
mutual policy learning across sectors and levels. This perspective is fruitful in the present context
since Norwegian actors increasingly are engaged in various organisations and forums at the EU
level.
In general, there is a clear tendency of increased use of more bottom-up, voluntary, governance
strategies, instead of traditional top-down, regulatory approaches within the EU (Jordan & Shout
2008). Furthermore, the Commission increasingly engage in direct partnerships with stakeholders
– including national, regulatory agencies – in order to improve EU policy formulation and
implementation (Eberlein and Newman 2008). This development is also related to the emergence
of so-called ‘incorporated trans-governmental networks’, which characterise the way national
regulators are formally incorporated into the supranational policymaking process, bypassing the
governmental level (ibid.).
We can also refer to a recent analysis undertaken by Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008) assessing the
importance of the expert groups within EU decision-making. The authors identify three categories
of information providers; the scientific community, societal actors and governmental officials.
Building on a quantitative analysis of a new data set on the expert groups, they conclude that
informational basis is strongly biased towards the national administrations (ibid.). An important
consequence of this pattern is the increased ability of the Commission to anticipate reactions to its
proposals and initiatives. Expert groups are established by the Commission. It may be created
either by a Decision or other legal act (formal group), or by a specific Directorate-General (DG)
in agreement with the Secretariat-General (informal group). The data demonstrate that
governmental officials are the principal actors in the expert group system. Scientific experts are
primarily involved in combination with other actors, in parallel to the representation of societal
groups.
A relevant example in the present context is the European Regulators Group for Electricity and
Gas (ERGEG), within which the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE)
takes part. Network formations such as the ERGEG serve to advise the Commission, draft
implementing legislation, coordinate national enforcement, promote information exchange among
national regulators, and make recommendations. The ERGEG has been particularly important
since it assembles the regulatory authorities with the mandate of managing and surveying this
integration process. Similar constellations and networks exist for non-public actors as well. For
the electricity producing industry Eurelectric is the European-wide branch organisation. In
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addition, there are EU-level interest organisations for renewable energies, in addition to branch
organisations for each renewable technology.
Building on this perspective, we assume that the exchange of ideas and learning through policy
and other non-public networks substantially influence national stakeholders’ positions vis-à-vis
the EU policies, and that policy ideas and concepts stemming form discussions within these
networks influence related strategies – as well as the way they are carried out.
2.4
Summary
In order to analyse the various ways and degrees by which Norwegian actors seek to influence
decision-making at the EU-level, we will be informed by the three analytical perspectives outlined
above. In order to provide a broad analysis of the national actors’ positions and strategies towards
the EU RES policies these perspectives are considered to be supplementary. Furthermore, the
different interests that emerge through this analysis will have different characteristics, and will to
differing degrees be representative for individual actors or groups of actors. These interests must,
furthermore, be observed and understood in relation to the actual actor constellations they are
based on and enacted through; that is, the arena and institutional framework in question, as well as
the broader political and economic context. On this background, positions and strategies may also
appear as more or less planned and well structured.
In section 4 we turn to the Norwegian positions and strategies that have been formulated and
executed by public and non-public actors. Subsequently we will, in section five, analyse the
documented positions and strategies in light of the three perspectives outlined above. First,
however, we will in the following section outline the background for the EU RES Directive, as
well as the main features of Norway’s interaction with the EU in this area.
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3
EU RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES AND NORWAY
The RES Directive’s major objective is to ensure that 20 % of all energy used by 2020 is
renewable. This includes a specific target on 10 % renewable fuels for transport. Whereas the
Member States are differently committed to the overall 20 % target, and are free to stimulate
electricity and heating, respectively, all Member States must achieve a 10 % share of renewable
fuels for transport. The new RES Directive replaces and extends the former Directive on the
promotion of electricity from renewable sources (RES-E, adopted in 2001). The RES-E Directive
aimed at obtaining 21 % RES-E of total electricity consumption in EU-27 by 2010 (CEC 2001).
The RES-E directive was evaluated in 2005 and 2006, whereby the Commission concluded that
the overall indicative target would not be fulfilled as a consequence of insufficient national
follow-up measures. Furthermore, the Commission concluded that it was not conceivable with a
common EU-wide promotional scheme for RES-E, as initially proposed (CEC 2005; CEC 2007;
Rowlands 2005; Lafferty & Ruud 2008).
The new RES Directive will contain more ambitious national targets which are, moreover,
binding, whereas the former targets of the RES-E directive were only indicative. However, the
compromise reads that there will be interim national targets in the run-up to 2020, and that
governments missing their binding 2020 target will not automatically face financial sanctions
(CEC 2009). The Directive will be reviewed in 2014. Whereas the wording makes clear that no
changes should be made to the national targets, this condition is somewhat symbolic, since the
Commission has the power to review any EU legislation and propose changes at any time (ENDS
Europe Daily 2008).
Stronger requirements concerning the phase-in of new RES production – not least through
facilitating grid access is also underlined by the new RES Directive. The Member States are
required more forcefully to take the necessary steps to develop and adopt transmission and
distribution infrastructure (‘shall’ in stead of ‘should’ as in the RES-E directive) (CEC 2009). The
Member States must also adopt national action plans before 30 June 2010, in order to clarify how
they will fulfill these requirements. The national action plans must be accepted by the
Commission.
A key difference compared to the RES-E Directive, is the regulation of transfers of renewable
energy production between the Member States. Guarantees of Origin (GO) are still a major way to
certify RES production. The RES Directive introduces, however, a new practice: Those Member
States that are presumed to over-fulfill their national targets have the opportunity to transfer some
of their RES production to Member States facing problems with their fulfillment, by bilateral
agreements. Such transfers must be certified by GO’s and accepted by the Commission.
The Member States are also encouraged to cooperate on joint RES projects as well as engaging in
common support schemes – as, for example, common schemes of tradable RES certificates. There
are, however, still no plans of a common EU RES support scheme.
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Apart from the more committing and stricter national targets, the new RES Directive mainly
consolidates the principle of national sovereignty in questions pertaining to what technology to
stimulate, as well as on the selection of related incentives to promote increased use of renewables.
Given the more ambitious and committing national targets, however, the new RES Directive will
also represent a more demanding challenge for Norwegian policy objectives and strategies.
3.1
Norway and the EEA Agreement
Along with its EFTA partners, Iceland and Liechtenstein, Norway’s participation in the EU
internal market, as well as involvement in related EU policy areas, has since 1994 been regulated
by the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement). Through the EEA
Agreement Norway is obligated to follow the regulations related to the internal energy market. An
integral part of the process is consultations and negotiations between the three EFTA-EEA
countries and the EU Commission as to the eventual adoption of EU legal acts within the EEA
framework. The EEA Joint Committee – where the EFTA countries meet with EU Commission
representatives – takes the final decision on whether the legal act in question is to be integrated as
part of the EEA Agreement, on the basis of decisions taken by the national parliaments. If
accepted by the EEA Joint Committee, the legal act is then transposed to national legislation.
As part of the EEA institutional set-up there are also EFTA Working Groups on different policy
matters. The EFTA Working Group on Energy Matters meets approximately six times a year and
deals with all issues related to energy. The Working Group is monitoring new proposals from the
Commission as well as assessing the eventual incorporation into the EEA Agreement of relevant
legal acts. The Working Group also meets with the Commission in order to consult on the
implications for the EEA countries of the relevant directives. The Energy Working Group has met
with the Commission to discuss the RES Directive on several occasions, and is currently
undertaking a dialogue on the implementation of the Directive within the framework of the EEA
Agreement.
Finally – but not the least, there is the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). ESA is to ensure that
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway respect their obligations under the EEA Agreement. It also
ensures that enterprises in these countries abide by the rules relating to effective competition. The
Authority can investigate possible infringements of EEA provisions, either on its own initiative,
or on the basis of complaints.
The rationale behind the ESA mandate is that the successful operation of the EEA Agreement
depends upon uniform implementation and application of the common rules in all the 27 EU
Member States, in addition to the three EFTA countries taking part in the EEA (Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway). A two-pillar system of supervision has thus been devised: the EC
Member States are supervised by the European Commission; Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
by ESA. There is therefore close contact and co-operation between the Commission and ESA.
Several energy policy measures in Norway have been scrutinized by the ESA, and both existing
and proposed national policies have been rejected as being in conflict with the EEA Agreement.
This is particularly the case if the policy measures are considered as public financial support of
industries.
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The role of the ESA can be illustrated with a recent ruling whereby Norway was obliged to
change its regulations of ownership limitations for hydroelectricity. This issue has been regulated
by the Industrial Concession Act of 1917, which was formulated to ensure a continued national
ownership of Norway’s important hydropower resources. The Act prescribes to ‘whom’ and for
‘how much’ the power plants can sell their resources. According to this Act the Norwegian State
takes over any waterfall or hydropower installation managed by private interests, free of charge
when a licence expires. This regulation does not, however, restrict the power producers’ ability to
invest in and improve the plants. The conformity of the Act with the EEA Agreement (as to the
principle guaranteeing reversion of ownership to the state) was heavily questioned by the ESA,
and the case was taken to the EFTA Court. In June 2007 it was decided that Norwegian authorities
had to amend the principles in the Act to treat public and private owners equally. The Norwegian
Parliament was therefore obliged to amend the act in a way that avoids different treatment of
public and non-public owners.
As an important add-on, the EEA Agreement also provides Norway and Norwegian governmental
actors with access to the Commission during the preparatory phases of EU policy formulation and
law-making through technical-administrative working groups. This access into the EU system has
been considered as representing a sectoral logic, as opposed to the horizontally coordinated logic
reflected by the operations of the EU Council and Parliament – within which Norway is not
represented (Trondal 2006). Norwegian actors’ sector- and issue-specific contacts with the EU
are, therefore, considered to be less hierarchical and politicised than would have been the case in
the event of a full membership status. It has, in this regard, also been stressed that the Norwegian
central administration’s reinforced integration within a multilevel bureaucratic web oriented
towards the European Commission represents a substantial challenge for the traditional,
hierarchical control exercised by the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office in
international processes (Trondal 2005).
3.2
Norway’s decision-making structure for EEA-relevant issues
For the formulation of national positions vis-à-vis the EU, and as a preparation of the actual
national adoption and implementation, Norway has established an EEA-specific decison-making
structure and procedures, mainly managed by each sectoral ministry. Issue- and sector-specific
committees are dealing with EU law proposals, policy plans and programs with a regulatory aim,
as well as the EEA-relevant legal acts already adopted by the EU. The committees provide arenas
for mediating between different interests, as well as to clarify how EU legal acts can be
transposed into Norwegian legislation.
There is a specific ministerial committee for energy policy issues, in which several ministries
participate and co-ordinate the Norwegian positions. The ministry responsible for the issue at
stake, in this case the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE), prepares so-called ‘framework
memos’ which refer to the main content of the EU legal act, the main challenges vis-à-vis the
transposition and implementation in Norway, as well as incorporating comments from the
stakeholders in the event of a preparatory consultation.
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Since Norwegian governmental actors are not operating within the more cross-sectoral,
coordinating structure of the Council of Ministers, analysts have pointed to a sectoral
fragmentation (Trondal 2005: 251). There are several formalised procedures as to how to
coordinate EEA-related issues within the different sectoral, ministerial realms, but few or no
procedures on the inter-ministerial coordination (ibid: 257). Sectoral ministries and related
agencies are thus involved in the EU Commission’s activities with limited coordination vis-à-vis
other ministries and agencies in Norway (Riksrevisjonen 2005).
Last but not the least - and in line with empirical observations from the EU Member States, the
Norwegian Parliament is relatively de-coupled from the formulation of policy strategies vis-à-vis
the EEA and EU, and mostly leaves this thinking to the central bureaucracy (ministries and
agencies) that are the core actors in the national EEA-related work (Trondal 2003).
The Norwegian Office of the General Auditor has evaluated the EEA-related cases passing
through the national, ministerial structures – with a specific view to the MoPE and energy cases
(Rikrevisjonen 2005). A general observation is that the energy special committee rarely deals with
issues at the same time as they are being prepared by the EU Commission. That is, the EEA
Special Committee are seldom provided with documents enabling discussion, consultation and
inter-ministerial co-ordination during the preparatory phases of the EU decision-making – despite
the fact that Norway has a formalised access at this stage (Riksrevisjonen 2005).
3.3
Norwegian RES interests in an EU perspective
Through the EEA Agreement, Norway has already been committed by the former EU RES-E
Directive that aimed at 20 per cent renewable electricity of total EU electricity consumption by
2010. The Directive was considered to be in accordance with Norwegian interests by both the
Government and the Parliament, and it was welcomed by Norwegian energy companies (Knudsen
et al. 2008: 252). The Directive was also considered to serve ‘offensive interests’ for Norway,
since one of its premises was to promote international physical and financial markets for
renewable electricity (ibid.). However, there was very little political debate on the national
implementation of the RES-E Directive and it never entailed any substantial amendments of the
national polices nor the regulatory framework (ibid.). Nonetheless, 5 years passed before the
Directive was formally implemented into Norwegian law in 2006, one year after the formal
adoption by the Norwegian Parliament – mainly due to a belated ratification by EEA-partner
Iceland.
Despite having a capacity for 100 per cent self-sufficiency in electricity from RES in a year with
average amount of precipitation, Norway’s indicative target according to the RES-E Directive was
set at only 90 per cent by 2010; a level which is just barely above the lowest level ever recorded
for RES-based electricity consumption in Norway (89.5 percent) (Knudsen et al. 2008: 252). The
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE) nonetheless considered the target to be ‘ambitious’,
given projected increases in both consumption and additional production (6-7 TWh for the period
1997-2010) (ibid.). Analysts expect, however, that the EU Commission will require a more
ambitious and demanding national target for Norway under the new RES directive, also given the
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extended scope of the RES directive as compared to the former RES-E directive (Point Carbon
2008).
3.3.1
The context: Norwegian energy policy priorities and interests
In general, the political debate in Norway on energy policy issues reflects the relative abundance
of domestic energy resources – hydropower and petroleum - which traditionally also constitute
strong, separate technological and institutional segments (Knudsen et al. 2008). Nevertheless,
since the mid-1990’s and mirroring the emergence of climate-change as a political issue, the
questions of alternative renewable energy production (wind power and bio energy), and energy
efficiency have been increasingly addressed. In January 2008, all but one of the political parties
represented in the Norwegian Parliament signed an agreement on medium- and long-term GHG
reduction targets with the declared ambition of becoming a ‘carbon-neutral society’ by 2030, but
this agreement is vague on the promotion of renewable energies. Whereas up to one third of the
2030 target is expected to be obtained by international off-set’s (i.e. Kyoto-like flexible
mechanisms), a substantial part must be realized domestically. This could eventually trigger a
more substantial priority of non-hydro, renewable energy in coming years.
In an average year, more than 95 % of Norway’s electricity consumption stems from domestically
produced hydropower, by which approximately 6 TWh are produced by small hydropower plants
(installed capacity below 10 MW). Although electricity consumption is increasing, the Parliament
has decided that, in principle, construction of new large-scale hydropower is no longer an option
(Knudsen et al. 2008). A further 9 TWh new hydropower production is still projected, however,
with at least 4 TWh stemming from smaller hydropower plants (NVE 2009). Furthermore, there is
potential for substantial increases of production by refurbishment and upgrade of existing
hydropower facilities in non-protected water courses (MoPE 2008a: 27).
Biomass in Norway is primarily employed in relation to heating purposes, and only to a limited
degree for electricity. A major energy policy objective in Norway is to stimulate the substitution
of hydropower for heating with biomass-based district heating.
Norway’s wind power potential is considered to be the best in Europe. Wind power, along with
small-scale hydropower and refurbishment of existing hydropower plants, thus appear to be the
main alternatives for new, renewable electricity production.
A source of controversy relating to non-hydro RES in Norway, are the questions of economic
support and licensing procedures. A public Energy Fund has been allotted substantial and
increasing amounts of money in order to support projects. The investment subsidies for wind
power has, however, been considered to be insufficient. Alternative financial support schemes
have been assessed. In particular, in 2006 - after prolonged negotiations, a common SwedishNorwegian certificate scheme for RES-E was cancelled by the Norwegian Government because
electricity prices for household consumers could increase.2 The idea has been revived, however,
and by 2009, new negotiations with the Swedish authorities are taking place.
2
The failure of these efforts was also related to a fear among Norwegian energy producers that a majority of the
incomes from the certificates would be gained by Swedish (bioenergy) producers (MoPE 2006).
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In addition, the energy industry has emphasised the challenges related to the administrative
framework and the licensing processes for new RES production. In particular, wind-power
projects suffer from complex and time-consuming licensing processes, where it can take until 6
years to get a license. This is also due to resistance from various regional and local stakeholders.
Increased local resistance combined by an economic support scheme considered to be insufficient
by the potential producers, have weakened an initially strong industrial interest for wind power.
Another, relevant factor in understanding the Norwegian RES situation is the controversial issue
of constructing gas fired power plants.3 Four projects have obtained licenses since 2000, but only
two are currently on line. An underlying motivation is regional industrial development and
employment via domestic, low-cost electricity – as well as gas power’s presumed replacement of
the more GHG-emitting coal-based, imported electricity. The resources employed for the gas fired
power plants, and – not the least – public financing of related facilities for carbon capture and
storage (CCS), have negatively influenced the political and financial priority of renewables, not
the least with respect to funding of research and innovation (Larsen 2005; Klitkou et al. 2008).
As an underlying dimension beneath the moderate public and non-public engagement for the EU
RES Directive in a Norwegian setting, key decision-makers – not least related to the Ministry of
Finance – can be assumed to judge the value added of the directive as limited. Norway’s energy
production for domestic usage is predominantly renewable, and Norwegian electricity producers
have already substantial incomes from export via the Nordic electricity market (NordPool); why
then accelerate existing incentives, and eventually provide more expensive public subsidies?
As the international attention towards climate-change is increasing, a renewed interest for the
development of alternative renewable energies has emerged in Norway, however. ‘Green-minded’
industrialists, researchers and politicians have proposed comprehensive schemes for the
development and installation of large-scale off-shore wind power plants.
In 2007, the Norwegian agency for the promotion of renewables and energy efficiency, Enova,
granted a pilot project financial support in order to develop full-scale off-shore wind power, and
from 2009 Enova disposes of a specific program for stimulating research and demonstration of off
shore wind power. In 2008 the MoPE adopted a research and innovation strategy for the nonpetroleum energy sector in Norway (Energy 21), formulated by the research institutions (Norges
Forskningsråd 2008). Building on this strategy, several centers for strategic research on
environmentally friendly energy have recently been established with grants from the Norwegian
Research Council. Among these there will be two centers on off-shore wind power (NOWITECH
and NORCOWE) and one centre focusing on environmental design of renewable energy
(CEDREN). An important policy perspective in this regard, which was also profiled by Energy
21, is the potential of using Norwegian renewable energy resources - hydro and off shore wind, as
3
This political conflict even resulted in the resigning of the Centre Government led by PM K.M. Bondevik, in early
2000. The Bondevik cabinet, in direct conflict with the parliamentarian majority, refused to grant licenses to three
gas-fired power plant projects. Eventually, the incoming Labour Government (led by PM J. Stoltenberg) did issue
these licenses later the same year.
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substantial suppliers for the European market. Norwegian research actors are also increasingly
participating in EU-funded research projects.
There is ample precedence for Norway’s position as a net exporter of electricity towards other
European countries. Norway has been exporting surplus hydropower for the Nordic market for
more than a decade, and a new cable enabling direct exchange of electric power between Norway
and the Netherlands was inaugurated in 2008. Norwegian hydropower is assumed to provide a
flexible, but reliable supply of renewable electricity to Europe. Norwegian industrial interests are
also focusing on how to increase their market shares within the European market. In particular,
the publicly owned company Statkraft has been substantially expanding its engagement in other
European countries during recent years.
3.3.2
Norwegian positions towards the EU RES policies
The Norwegian position vis-à-vis the EU in the negotiations on the RES Directive, must be
formulated and developed in accordance with the other EEA-partners on the EFTA side, Iceland
and Liecthenstein. This process is currently ongoing (as of September 2009), in parallel with
analyses undertaken by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on the different consequences for
existing Norwegian policy objectives and measures.
The actual time span before the Directive will become operational in Norway is, however, more
open. If substantial amendments in existing national legislation must be undertaken, the process
can take as much as 5-6 years (Point Carbon 2008). It is, however, not likely that substantial legal
amendments will be necessary. What is more critical is the extent to which and how Norwegian
interests are assumed to be affected, and whether the Norwegian government will demand
adaptations adjusting the Commission’s proposal for a national target. However, it is not yet
publicly known what target the Commission expects from Norway, neither what is considered as
acceptable by the Norwegian government.
The MoPE has, nevertheless, signalled an ambition of implementing the RES Directive faster than
was the case with the former RES-E Directive. The Minister of petroleum and energy, Mr. T.
Riis-Johansen has, moreover, signalled the ambition of completing the negotiations with the EU
Commission by early 2010, in order to present a Norwegian action plan by 30 June 2010, in line
with the EU Member States’ deadline (Riis-Johansen 2009). Formal negotiations with the EU has
not yet been initiated. On September 9, however, the MoPE invited a selected number of
stakeholders to comment upon the template for National Renewable Energy Action Plans agreed
upon in accordance with the RES Dirtective.4
4
Further details on: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/hoeringer/hoeringsdok/2009/eueos-energi-horing-avkommisjonsvedtak-/horingsbrev.html?id=576633#
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4
NORWEGIAN ACTORS’ APPROACHES TO THE EU RES
DIRECTIVE
4.1
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE) and the public actors
Since 2006, there is a Norwegian-EU energy policy dialogue with regular meetings twice a year,
gathering the EU Commissioner for energy and the Norwegian Minister for Petroleum and
Energy. The three last Norwegian Ministers of Petroleum and Energy have discussed the RES
Directive in their meetings with the EU Energy Commissioner. However, the energy policy
dialogue has tended to gravitate around the petroleum sector and particularly the issue of CCS.
Nevertheless, during the meeting between the EU Commissioner and the Norwegian Minister in
May 2008, Norway and the EU signed an agreement on joint exploration of off shore wind power
potentials. This cooperation has been followed up by mutual orientations and meetings of
representatives from the MoPE and the EU Commission’s Directorate General for Transport and
Energy (DG TREN). The cooperation is also related to ongoing research projects, and Norwegian
institutions’ participation in EU-funded research. We will return to this issue below, and assess its
potential for a reinforced RES cooperation between the EU and Norway (see section 4.5).
On the administrative level, the MoPE has followed the standard routine-based approach to the
process of assessing the RES Directive during the preparatory phases: Consultation with their
contacts in the Commission and gathering information through their participation in the EFTA
Energy Group. These consultations have to a large extent been executed by the MoPE’s
representative at Norway’s Mission to the EU in Brussels.
Sources within the MoPE contend that it has become more difficult to obtain information directly
from the Commission. Moreover, according to the Ministry, the Directive was not prepared by
any relevant expert group at the EU-level within which Norwegian authorities could have
promoted Norwegian interests in early phases of the decision-making process.
The Directive was, nevertheless, described and assessed in a memo to the Special Committee for
Energy before the final adoption of the EU institutions (the first version dated 14 April 2008), and
the directive and its preparation has been discussed at meetings in the Special Committee on
energy on several occasions in both 2007 and 2008 (MoPE 2008b).
Furthermore, there was an earlier consultation with stakeholders than was the case with the former
RES-E directive, in April 2008. This process was, however, conducted ‘in the spirit’ of the former
RES-E Directive, with an emphasis of the electricity industrial actors rather than of RES in the
wider sense. In particular, the branch organizations for new RES-E; the Norwegian Wind Energy
Association (NORWEA) and the Norwegian Bioenergy Association (NOBIO), were not consulted
at this point.5
5
These organisations were, however, included in a second consultation undertaken, after the EU’s final adoption of
the Directive, in March-April 2009.
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In addition, the MoPE convenes a consultative forum for the energy companies, meeting
approximately twice a year, where the Ministry inform about current and coming relevant EU
policy processes. The EU RES Directive was on the agenda of this forum in 2008.
There are also regular consultations on ministerial level with the other Nordic countries – that is,
EU Member States (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). MoPE representatives emphasise that RES
has been a crucial issue in the Nordic discussions, not least related to the common policy
frameworks stemming from NordPool. In particular, there is a Nordic expert working group on
RES with representatives from the Nordic countries’ ministries and agencies.
Norwegian representatives also discuss RES policies with a more explicit EU reference with their
Nordic colleagues. An interesting case here is the Nordic EU Member States’ preparatory
meetings before the EU Energy Council. In spite of not taking part in the very EU Council
meetings, the Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy has access to this Nordic pre-session.
There are, however, no indications of a substantial Nordic influence in the actual Norwegian
preparations for the follow-up of the RES Directive.
4.2
Industrial actors
The Federation of Norwegian Industries (NHO) holds an office in Brussels, and is actively using
its network of contacts through its European branch organisation, BusinessEurope, in addition to
other national industrial federations, particularly its Nordic counterparts. In particular, NHO
cooperated with its Nordic counterparts in formulating a position paper towards future climate
policies, nationally and in within the EU (Confederation of Finnish Industries et al. 2007).
Furthermore, representatives of NHO are generally very outspoken proponents for a Norwegian
membership within the European Union. The Federation has also been critical towards the alleged
low priority of EU affairs by both Norwegian politicians and the civil service. A recent report
commissioned by NHO, emphasises the need for employing the EEA framework more actively
by; (1) the formulation of stronger, earlier and more explicit mandates for Norwegian positions
towards the EU, and (2) by a more effective promotion and communication of Norwegian
positions vis-à-vis the EU decision-making bodies (Econ 2009).
One of the member associations of NHO, the Norwegian Electricity Industry Association (EBL) is
the major branch organisation representing Norwegian electricity producers. EBL is following the
EU policy processes closely, in particular through its activities within its European branch
organization, Eurelectric.6 There is also a close cooperation with the EBL equivalents in the other
Nordic countries. EBL is generally linking its work on RES to the wider EU energy policy
development where the efforts of further deregulation and market developments represent crucial
questions for the organisation. The Association has also argued for a more pro-active Norwegian
response to the new RES ambitions of the EU, as expressed by the RES Directive. This view was
communicated to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy during the consultation on the Directive
in 2008 (EBL 2008).
6
Eventually see Eurelectric’s web pages for a description of its organisation and work vis-à-vis the EU institutions:
http://www2.eurelectric.org/Content/Default.asp?
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The Norwegian Wind Energy Association (NORWEA) is cooperating closely with its European
branch organisation – the European Wind Energy Association, EWEA. Although NORWEA is
small organisation with limited resources, it is involved in the recently established EU technology
platform for wind power.7
Whereas the above-mentioned branch organisations are well informed and follow the EU
processes closely, a few major Norwegian energy and industrial companies have pursued more
goal-oriented and issue-specific activities. We will, therefore, in the subsequent paragraphs focus
on two of these; Statkraft and Norsk Hydro. There are also other Norwegian companies with
representation in Brussels, even active in forums at the EU-level. We have, however, not observed
other companies with a similar level of activity.
Based on its position as dominant hydropower producer Statkraft is the major Norwegian
company on renewable electricity, and is profiled as Europe’s largest producer of renewable
energy from 2008. This is due to Statkraft’s agreement with the German energy company E.ON
AG from 2008 of transferring Statkraft’s 44.6 % share in E.ON Sweden in return for flexible
power production assets and share in E.ON AG. In addition, the company has increased its shares
of the Swedish market through an agreement with the Swedish company SCA, which includes the
ownership of several wind power projects.
It is thus not surprising to observe Stakraft’s reinforced focus on the EU during recent years.
Although the company only recently established a permanent representation in Brussels, it has
actively tried to influence the outcome of the EU Commission’s preparation of the RES Directive
proposal of January 2008.
Statkraft’s activities have both been directed towards the Commission itself (DG TREN), as well
as towards national authorities in countries important for the company’s current and future market
position and industrial activities.
In particular, the company has successfully lobbied – with the assistance from the Confederation
of Norwegian Industry (NHO) – in order to include osmosis as an eligible technology of the RES
Directive. Statkraft initiated a test facility for osmosis-based power generation in Norway in 2007.
The lobbying was conducted vis-à-vis the Commission, the Parliament and national
representatives from the other Nordic countries.
Furthermore, Statkraft has been renowned as a quite active proponent of a common EU green
certificate scheme, in line with the positions of the majority of member companies in the
European branch organisation, Eurelectric (Eurelectric 2008). Statkraft prepared a report,
published in September 2007, in order to document the perceived advantages of a common
support system based on green certificates (Statkraft 2007). This report was actively promoted and
distributed by the company. In particular, Statkraft made specific presentations for representatives
7
See the web site of the EU Technology Platform for Wind Power for further information:
http://www.windplatform.eu/
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from DG TREN, in the autumn of 2007 and during a hearing for stakeholders in December 2007.
These meetings were co-scheduled with the Commission’s run-up for the final draft of the RES
Directive presented in January 2008. On this background, the company has expressed its
disappointment with the Commission’s final proposal which did not contain any proposal of a
common EU support system (Statkraft 2008).
The company is also participating in the Sustainable Energy Forum (also called the Amsterdam
Forum) which originally was a joint initiative by the EU Commission and the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs. Currently it assembles representatives of the Commission, national authorities
and the European energy industry in order to discuss matters pertaining to renewable energy and
energy efficiency. In addition, representatives of Statkraft are participating actively in 8-9
thematic working groups within Eurelectric’s framework.
Although Statkraft has not had a specific focus on Norwegian authorities (the MoPE), the
company has publicly emphasised the EEA relevance of the RES Directive, and has requested a
more active follow-up by Norwegian politicians, as expressed in the public consultation organised
by MoPE in 2008 (Statkraft 2008).
The other Norwegian company we have observed to have a distinct activity at the EU level is
Norsk Hydro, albeit more succinctly demonstrating an orientation towards the EU’s climatechange mitigation regulations, than towards the RES Directive. The company is today the
remaining non-petroleum producing part after the merger with Statoil in 2007. After the merger
only the electricity production serving the company’s aluminium production in Norway
(hydropower), in addition to some limited investment in solar energy equipment industries,
remain in the company’s energy portfolio. In essence, Norsk Hydro is currently, therefore, mainly
a metallurgic company with aluminium production as the main activity, although with production
facilities in a number of EU countries. Hence, the RES Directive is primarily relevant for the
company through its eventual impact on energy prices that will affect costs of the industrial
production.
Given its more direct relevance, the main focus of Norsk Hydro has, therefore, been to influence
the revision of the EU emission trading scheme for greenhouse gases (ETS). This work has been
focused both on the actual (direct) costs of the ETS itself, as well as the indirect costs related to
energy - assumed to increase as a consequence of the ETS. This position is also reflected in the
company’s statement in the MoPE consultation in 2008 (Hydro 2008). Hydro does here
emphasise, however, the importance of providing a sufficient capacity for distribution in the case
of increased Norwegian RES production as implied by a more demanding target through the RES
Directive (Hydro 2008). In this regard, the company calls for a stronger harmonisation of
incentives across countries in the EEA area, in order to avoid hurdles for the industry’s
competitiveness (ibid.).
4.3
Environmental NGOs
The environmental NGO, foundation and think-tank, Bellona, has become a very distinct and
profiled player both nationally and at the EU level, particularly as a provider of competence and
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political arguments for the priority of CCS and enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Bellona has been a
very active participator in the EU technology platform for CCS, the Zero Emissions Platform
(ZEP)8.
On this background, Bellona actively lobbied the EU Commission and Parliament prior to the
presentation of the climate and energy package in January 2008, in order to ensure a regulatory
framework enabling CCS as a GHG emission abatement option, as well as to ensure economic
incentives to establish and manage CCS facilities in EU Member States. Bellona was a key actor
in arranging a special hearing in the EU Parliament in March 2008, in order to convince EU
stakeholders of the value of CCS. The Norwegian Minister for PE participated and promoted the
Norwegian approach to CCS.
Bellona has had a more limited focus on RES in an EU context. The last year, however, this has
changed somewhat. Bellona has been cooperating with the EBL in assessing and profiling RES as
a viable solution for GHG emission reductions in Norway, and thereby emphasised the
importance of implementing the RES Directive in Norway. This was also a main message in the
foundation’s statement in the MoPE public consultation on the draft RES Directive in 2008
(Bellona 2008).
In sum, Bellona’s activities at an EU level demonstrate the potential for other Norwegian
stakeholders of being heard at the EU level, as long as the arguments are well prepared and
performed. Other Norwegian environmental NGO’s do not seem to have been active vis-à-vis the
RES Directive.
The Norwegian section of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has not itself devoted resources to follow
the processes at the EU level, and has not prioritized to employ the Directive as an argument in a
Norwegian debate. WWF Norway has mainly left to its European organization to follow and
influence the EU policies. In 2007, WWF Norway published, however, a report that pointed to the
discrepancy between Norwegian and EU policies for biodiversity, indicating the EU as having a
better policy performance compared to Norway (Reinvang 2006). Apart from this, WWF Norway
has thus far not participated actively in a debate on EU policies in Norway. WWF Europe in
Brussels follows the climate- and energy package very closely and actively, seeking to influence
all the EU institutions when necessary. WWF Europe has been very positive towards the
ambitions expressed through the RES Directive.
4.4
Regional interests
Since the 1990’s, with an increased EU focus on the regions as providers and arenas for economic
development, welfare creation and innovation, sub-national regions themselves have been
increasingly represented at the EU level. On this background, all the Norwegian regions – that is,
the cooperation of neighbouring counties – have established permanent delegations in Brussels.
8
See the ZET Technology Platform’s website for furhter information: http://www.zero-emissionplatform.eu/website/
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The first Norwegian regional office to appear in the early 1990’s was the Brussels Office of the
Stavanger Region. This mission has been a facilitator of regional initiatives vis-à-vis the EU
institutions, both in industrial and cultural matters. The Office often bypasses national authorities,
including the official Norwegian Mission in Brussels, and offers direct access to the EU organs
for its regional clients. In particular, the Office convened a conference in Brussels in April 2008
with representatives from the European Parliament, the EU Energy Commissioner (Andris
Piebalgs), as well as Norwegian parliamentarians who were discussing Norwegian energy policies
in a European perspective (Norway’s Mission to the EU 2008).
In January 2009, another regional delegation, the Western Norway’s Brussels Office also
convened a seminar on the EU climate and energy policies, and the related opportunities for
regionally based industrial actors (Norway’s Mission to the EU 2009b).
4.5
Does off-shore wind power cooperation provide new opportunities?
Wind energy is assumed to play a vital role in meeting the objectives of the RES Directive (CEC
2008a). Crucial challenges addressed by the Commission is the lack of adequate funding, lack of
integrated strategic planning and cross-border coordination, as well as lack of adequate access
points to the electricity grid at sea (ibid.). The Commission also emphasises the importance of an
improved development and sharing of information and knowledge (ibid.). The challenge is to
ensure that various processes are linked up and at the same time to exploit their specific
advantages, resources and expertise. To this end, the Commission is developing a road map for
off-shore wind power as a framework for balancing and arbitrating between different sectoral
interests and to set stable conditions for investments (ibid.). A specific European coordinator for
offshore wind energy was nominated by the Commission in 2007, Mr. Georg Wilhelm
Adamowitsch. His role is to facilitate the implementation of the project ‘Connections to offshore
wind power in Northern Europe’. This work includes to facilitate the integration of the offshore
wind energy produced in the Baltic Sea and North Sea into the continental grid.
As indicated above, Norway and the EU have agreed to cooperate more closely in RES issues,
with a specific focus on off-shore wind power. Building on this, Norway in July 2008 entered the
so-called ‘Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Research on Offshore Wind Energy
Development’ – which is a cooperation established in 2007 by Denmark, Sweden and Germany
(Joint Declaration 2007). The cooperation programmes is to facilitate exchange of knowledge at
the governmental level, as well as provide insights in technical and legal issues, in addition to the
challenges of formulating a more robust R&D strategy (ibid.). The programme also intends to
support joint projects (ibid.).
Furthermore, bilateral contacts are established between the MoPE on the Norwegian side and the
EU Commission’s Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DG TREN), and has thus far
resulted in two meetings at the administrative level with the main purpose of exchanging
information on current projects and policy development. In January 2009, Norway’s Mission to
the EU convened a workshop on offshore wind power in Brussels, with participation from a whole
range of Norwegian actors, as well as representatives from the EU Commission and the European
Parliament (Norway’s Mission to the EU 2009a). Finally, the EU offshore wind energy
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coordinator, Mr. Adamowitsch, has expressed substantial interest for policy developments in
Norway (MoPE 2009a).
At the national level, the MoPE has recently in June 2009 also put forward a law proposal for the
regulation of off-shore energy production in Norway (MoPE 2009b), albeit not yet adopted by the
Parliament. It remains an open question as to what extent the new Norwegian law can be
harmonised with other national regulations, as well as how the EU Commission will coordinate
the different national frameworks. It seems, however, to be a growing interest in Norway for the
RES off-shore wind power as a potential for export and as a possible new industry.
In sum, therefore, the parallel offshore wind power focus in the EU and Norway could provide
Norwegian authorities, and Norwegian research and industrial actors, with a potential for a closer
and mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU on RES development.
4.6
Summary
No coherent or coordinated national strategy vis-à-vis the EU RES policies emerge when
assessing the different Norwegian actors’ positions and activities.
MoPE and the governmental side mostly seem to have responded to the ongoing process and the
final outcome, whereas few efforts were employed in influencing the preparation of the Directive
in the initial phases. This reflects the few formal access points for Norwegian authorities at these
stages.
A few major industrial actors have bypassed the governmental channels (including Norway’s
Mission to the EU), and have engaged themselves through alternative arenas; not least through the
European branch organizations. This has also been the case with the branch organisations EBL
and NHO. The industrial interests’ access and eventual positive responses from EU-level
institutions do, furthermore, to a high extent depend on the framing, and whether the case can be
profiled as a common benefit in a European perspective. The underlying motivation from the
industrial side is, nevertheless, related to current and future market positions in other EU
countries.
The environmental NGO’s seem mostly to have been absent – both in Brussels and in the political
debate in Norway, with the partial exception of Bellona. Bellona has a strong credibility at the
EU-level in terms of their CCS engagement, and is currently reinforcing its EU RES perspective.
It remains to be seen, however, whether Bellona’s advantageous CCS position could be
transferable to the RES field – and to what extent this could serve as an additional incentive for
increased Norwegian activity at the EU-level.
Lastly, the establishment of an offshore wind power cooperation between Norway and the EU
represents a potential for a more substantial political, regulatory and economic cooperation on
RES.
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5
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTEXTUALISING NORWEGIAN
ACTORS’ APPROACHES
Based on the previous section’s assessment of the various Norwegian interests and positions, the
present section will aim at understanding and contextualising the different actors’ approaches to
the EU RES policies in light of the analytical perspectives outlined in section 3, namely:
1. Public decision-making
2. Non-governmental actors
3. Transfer of knowledge and experiences
5.1
The importance of public decision-making
Former analyses of the Norwegian official apparatus’ management of the EEA Agreement and the
relations with the EU have pointed to the lack of inclusion of non-public actors and stakeholders
(Riksrevisjonen 2005). This hampers the process of considering relevance of the EU regulations
and related modes of implementation. In addition, the public apparatus is rarely engaged in early
phases of EU decision-making. In general, the ministries wait to clarify and promote eventual
national interests until after the formal adoption of the EU legislation by the EU institutions have
been executed (ibid.). Both of these general features seem to be confirmed by the present case.
An interesting question to ask is whether the public administration’s limited efforts dedicated to
participating in and influencing EU policies is a product of lacking political priority and interest,
or whether the formal approach is just reflecting well-established procedures – a ‘routine-based
approach’.
The lack of activity in the case of RES is probably connected to the overall lack of political
motivation in Norway for influencing the EU. In addition, the approach to EU RES policies are
also hampered by the lack of overall, coherent national priorities, as well as the lack of
participation in relevant formal and informal arenas at the EU-level by Norwegian authorities.
Whereas the objective of limiting GHG emissions is a crucial dimension of the RES Directive, the
role of the RES sector within the Norwegian climate-change policy perspective is far from
definitely settled. This is substantially reflected by the most recent parliamentary agreement on
the future directions of the climate policy in Norway (Innst. S. nr. 145, 2007-08). The former
Minister for P&E (Ms. Åslaug Haga) in late 2007 signalled the preparation of a white paper on the
overall direction of Norwegian energy policy. Her successor as PE minister has later modified
this, and no such white paper is currently being prepared. Thus, it is still not specified whether and
how Norwegian RES production is to contribute to reductions of Norwegian GHG emissions, or
to reduce European emissions by exporting surplus electricity. It is further not clarified how RES
could be promoted as an alternative to other climate policy options, such as electrifying the offshore petroleum activities or the transport sector, thereby inducing a need of stronger RES
supplies.
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This situation is in this specific case reinforced by the controversial nature of EU-related issues in
the Norwegian political debate. Hence, few EEA-relevant EU legal acts are debated in the
Norwegian Parliament. Neither the former RES-E Directive (c.f. Knudsen et al. 2008), nor the
current RES Directive has thus far undergone a substantial, plenary debate in the Parliament. This
impression is further reinforced by a recent report that documents the Norwegian political parties’
low priority of EU-relevant competence (MandagMorgen 2009). This stands out as a contrast to
the more diversified approach of some of the non-public actors, as documented in section 4.
There has, however, also been a relatively limited industrial attention towards the possible
national consequences in Norway after the Commission’s first signals of a coming RES Directive
in 2006/2007. This can be seen as a contrast to the proposals for a directive on carbon capture and
storage (CCS), which was eventually presented along with the RES directive as part of the EU
energy and climate package in early 2008. The latter directive is considered to be vital to
Norwegian interests; both in terms of the future of the Norwegian petroleum industry, as well as
in relation to the climate-change policy of Norway and the highly profiled international promotion
of CCS as a viable solution to climate-change mitigation.
The proposal for an RES Directive was, however, placed on the table of the EEA Special
Committee for energy in April 2008, eight months before the final adoption by the EU. During
this initial period, a main concern for Norwegian authorities was to scope the potential
consequences of the Directive and prepare the basis for more detailed, clarifying consultations
with the EU Commission. These consultations were mainly conducted together with the other
EEA-EFTA partners (Iceland and Liecthenstein), thus following the formalised routines.
There are clearly limited access points for Norway, particularly during the final stages of the
decision-making, when the EU Council and the Parliament are negotiating a final decision. It is,
therefore, important to actively pursue the possibilities represented by the various expert groups
and networks at the EU level. In contrast, there seems to have been more activity from Norwegian
authorities in the case of the EU ETS – where Norwegian bureaucrats have been participating in
expert groups at the EU level.
In the case of the RES Directive there has, however, not been any adequate arena within which to
seek influence at an early stage, according to MoPE representatives. This is also claimed to be the
case with the MoPE’s subordinate organs, as the Norwegian Directorate for energy and water
resources (NVE), which participates in other expert groups at the EU level (mostly related to the
internal energy market). Despite this situation, it is, however, possible to imagine the use of
alternative contacts and networks, as well as engaging in a more active dialogue with other
Norwegian, non-public actors that take part in relevant arenas at the EU-level.
From a general perspective, Egeberg and Trondal (2007) document that Norwegian regulatory
agencies are firmly supervised in EU-relevant cases by their ‘parent ministries’ although they
enjoy professional autonomy to a considerable extent (ibid: 16). They conclude that the
importance of the ‘parent ministry’ partly depends on its organisational capacity in the field and
the extent to which the EU-relevant area is politically contested. In total, the ‘parent ministry’ and
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the Commission (in tandem with ESA in the Norwegian case) are assumed to be the most
important interlocutors as far as national agencies’ practising of EU legislation is concerned
(ibid). This observation confirms the assessment by the Office of the General Audtior in 2005
which demonstrated the relatively stronger position of the ministries – compared to the agencies
and subordinate organs – vis-à-vis participation in the EEA-related decision-making structure
(Riksrevisjonen 2005).
In light of these observations, and the experiences with the preparation of the RES Directive, one
can question the role of the sub-ordinate agencies. In particular, it stands out as important to
activate the sub-ordinate agencies and related expertise more substantially at an earlier stage.
As will be elaborated in the subsequent section, representatives of the industrial branch
organizations have called for a stronger political engagement and swifter national processes in
order to implement the RES directive. It is, therefore, possible that Norwegian industrial actors,
with increasingly stronger European interests, can stimulate the public authorities to undertake a
more active approach in the future, including both a more coherent and focused national process,
as well as earlier efforts to influence the EU decision-making process.
5.2
The importance of non-governmental actors
As indicated in section 4, several non-public actors have voiced critique against a too restrained
Norwegian official approach to the ambitious EU RES targets, and a lack of clarity vis-à-vis
Norwegian positions towards the RES Directive. This was particularly maintained by EBL,
Statkraft and Hydro during the MoPE’s public consultation on the RES Directive in 2008.9
Bellona, as an environmental NGO, was critical to the Norwegian climate-change policy efforts as
well, emphasizing that a presumably more ambitious EU strategy should entail more ambitious
Norwegian RES targets (Bellona 2008). On this background, the question here is whether the nonpublic actors’ activities and arguments have spilled over to the political arena as an incentive to a
strengthened Norwegian interest and activity vis-à-vis the formulation of the renewable energy
policy of the EU. This may be an important factor behind the issue of the EEA-relevance of the
Directive, at least.
Despite criticising the government of being too passive, industrial actors have, however, been
only moderately active in order to actually influence the government’s engagement for EU RES
policies. There also seems to have been a moderate focus on the potential for industrial
development provided by the RES Directive, and Norwegian interests in this regard. Despite some
critique – particularly voiced by Bellona – there has also been a relatively moderate pressure from
the environmental side. In general, there has thus been a limited ‘demand’ and pressure from
domestic non-public interests towards the Government for a more active promotion at an earlier
stage of domestic interests vis-à-vis the EU RES policies.
9
During this consultation, written submissions were communicated from six stakeholders outside the public organs;
from Bellona, the Norwegian Electricity Industry Association (EBL), Hydro, the Norwegian Petroleum Industry
Association (NP), the Norwegian Association for small-scale hydropower developers and Statkraft.
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On the other hand, Bellona and EBL have more recently convened common seminars and jointly
called for a stronger Norwegian engagement in the EU RES policies. This new ‘alliance’ between
the energy industry and Norway’s most profiled environmental organisation indicates a potential
for new actor constellations and possibly new, reinforced inputs to a national debate on RES
policies and the EU.
Statkraft, on the other hand, has been actively pursuing a policy strategy at the EU level, arguing
for certain policy options within a European perspective. It is, however, unclear to what extent
and how Norwegian non-governmental actors will take this engagement back to a national setting
and thereby influencing the national policy framework for new, Norwegian RES production.
Given the increased national political attention and the increasing market power of Norwegian
energy companies, and particularly Statkraft – one could have assumed an even more active
stance towards the national follow-up of the RES Directive and the further development of
Norwegian RES policies in an EU perspective. It seems, however, that the industrial actors focus
more actively on the EU level itself in order to impact upon the future framework for their transnational industrial activities.
As indicated in section 4.2, Norsk Hydro has also been focusing on the EU climate and energy
package in the broader sense, but concentrating its attention towards the regulations pertaining to
GHG emissions. In this endeavour, however, the company’s activities can further illustrate the
potential for a Norwegian industrial actor at the EU level. Norsk Hydro has actively cooperated
with its European counterparts through BusinessEurope’s branch organisation for metal industries
(and further, its working group for aluminium). The company has also identified common
interests with some of the Member States – within which they have production facilities
(Germany and Slovakia) – and has thereby had access and insight into the processes of the
Council, as well as the Parliament.
The company has established many relevant contact points within different parts of the
Commission (several DG’s), during several years, mainly as a function of its European
importance as aluminium producer. Thereby the company has obtained first-hand information of
the coming EU regulations, whereas the Commission has achieved insights and assessments from
an industrial point of view. Norsk Hydro has, on the other hand, only limited contact with the
Norwegian Mission to the EU in Brussels, as well as with the Oslo-based Norwegian authorities
in matters pertaining to the EU policies.
As far as the role of the regional offices in Brussels are concerned the major industrial interests
are not focusing on the regional delegations, whereas smaller energy companies with a regionallocal basis in Norway are not focused on the EU at all.
In sum, non-public interests have access to the public apparatus represented by MoPE (‘gothrough’), but at the same time they ‘by-pass’ this ‘filter’, aiming directly at the EU level (c.f.
Dyrdal et al. 2006: 25). An important development to emerge is, however, that industrial actors
can substantially benefit from influencing EU policies by being actively engaged in forums and
arenas at the EU-level.
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5.3
The importance of transfer of knowledge and experiences
As emphasised above, non-public Norwegian actors have aimed at influencing the EU RES
policies through more specialised arenas at the EU-level. The success of these strategies seems to
depend on their ability to present their interests within a European perspective – which, in turn,
also reflect the international focus of the operations of the relevant industries.
The European arenas in which these actors take part also constitute forums of policy learning,
exchange of experiences – including the provision of more inside information from decisionmaking processes within the EU.
There is certainly a learning effect related to the participation for the involved actors. It is,
however, less evident that the insights gained by this participation has provided any incentives at
the national level, vis-à-vis the public decision-making structure. This also reflects the lack of
adequate arenas for exchange of information and policy perspectives between governmental and
non-governmental actors in EEA- and energy-related issues, at the national level. It is
undoubtedly a potential for a stronger exchange of information and experiences between the nonpublic actors taking part in forums and activities at the EU-level, and representatives of the formal
decision-making structure nationally.
There are, however, indications of emerging new arenas with participators from environmental
NGOs and the industries, as demonstrated by the cooperation between Bellona and the EBL,
aimed at influencing national policy decisions on RES – including an ambitious national target
according to the RES Directive. Such new arenas can possibly also provide forums for a more
substantial exchange of information and experiences related to the EU level and thereby facilitate
future national policy processes.
Building on observations of the increasing importance of expert groups and trans-national, nonpublic forums, political scientists have pointed to an increased leverage of the EU Commission. In
this perspective, the Commission seems to emerge as a distinct level beyond the intergovernmental locus (Curtin and Egeberg 2008). In particular, the Commission has as an explicit
strategy to establish direct partnerships with national (regulatory) authorities in order to improve
policy formulation and implementation. This can in turn provide new incentives for European
integration (ibid.). Given Norway’s dependence on influencing the preparatory stages, in which
the Commission constitutes the nucleus, this development demands new strategies and efforts
from Norwegian actors in order to identify and participate in relevant, influential forums at the EU
level.
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6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Norway’s indicative target under the former RES-E Directive has not triggered any revision of
existing energy policy measures. In contrast to the period prior to the adoption of the RES-E
Directive, however, there has in recent years emerged a stronger political focus on climate/energy,
with a related ‘political competition’ of promoting the most ambitious targets and measures. In
this context, one could expect a stronger interest for a broader perspective, as implied by the
extended scope of the RES Directive.
In general, however, we have thus far not observed any substantial Norwegian debate on the RES
Directive, nor any reinforced EU perspective in the general climate and energy debate. No explicit
positions vis-à-vis the EU, nor any related strategy, seems to emerge in a short-term perspective.
Norwegian politicians are not using the EU RES policies actively in a national political context.
This general picture is currently confirmed through the debates related to the parliamentary
elections in Norway on 14 September 2009. As far as the internationally oriented Norwegian
energy and industry enterprises are concerned, they rather pursue their interests by using
international networks – more or less outside the public-formal framework coordinated by the
MoPE.
As indicated above, the present report confirms key observations from former analyses of the
Norway’s interaction with the EU within the framework of the EEA Agreement. In this regard, we
have here pointed to the lack of inclusion of non-public actors and stakeholders in the process of
considering relevance and modes of implementation, as well as the lack of engagement in early
phases of EU decision-making. In general, the ministries normally wait to clarify and promote
eventual national interests until the formal adoption of the EU legislation by the EU institutions.
On a general level, this reflects the limited engagement in EU-related issues in Norway, and, more
particularly, an even more limited interest in EEA-relevant issues and legislative proposals. On
September 9 2009, however, the MoPE invited a selected number of stakeholders to submit
comments on the proposed template for National Renewable Energy Action Plans under the RES
Directive. It remains to be seen if this will trigger more engagement? A subsequent study will
follow-up this invitation as well as the actual implementation of the RES Directive in Norway.
There is, in short, relatively little public engagement from the Norwegian side towards the EU. In
this context, non-public Norwegian actors have aimed at influencing the EU RES policies more
directly, by-passing the formal channels between Norwegian authorities and the EU, and seeking
influence through networks and arenas in Brussels. Such activities have been framed within a
European perspective – reflecting the international scope of the operations of the relevant actors.
Furthermore, actors taking part in relevant arenas at the EU-level, both profile their own
performance, as well as exchanging experiences with other industrial and public actors. Hence,
these arenas constitute forums for policy learning, and provide Norwegian non-public actors with
inside information from decision-making processes within the EU.
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Whereas there are few indications of a proactive approach from Norwegian authorities vis-à-vis
the EU in the case of the RES Directive, the growing cooperation on off-shore wind power
represents an area with a clear potential for reinforcing RES-cooperation between Norway and the
EU. This will, however, depend on the attribution of an appropriate level of political priority and
resources in Norway – the development of “critical mass” related to energy policy that can
stimulate a more issue-specific and multi-stakeholder approach.
In sum, although a stipulation of a demanding national target by 2020 would most probably affect
both national policy objectives and specific regulations, it remains at present an open question as
to the extent and form of how the actual implementation of the RES Directive will influence
Norwegian RES policies.
On the background of the assessment concerning Norwegian stakeholders’ mobilisation as to
the formulation of the RES-Directive, we propose the following recommendations, for improved
strategies for influence at the EU-level:

The Norwegian government should anticipate EU policy processes and clarify national
positions at an earlier stage, and thereby enabling a more active interest promotion in the
preparatory phases where Norway has access. In this regard the invitation by the MoPE to
comment upon the RES action plan template is promising.

Despite the controversial nature of EU-related matters in Norway, as well as the lack of a
coherent framing of Norwegian RES policies, the government should strive for a more
comprehensive renewable energy policy – particularly given the renewable economic
interests at stake.

Stronger coordination of RES policy positions with the national climate-change strategy,
in terms of policy measures and actual implementation. This is particularly important
given the fact that Norway is included in the EU ETS and – directly and indirectly – is
committed by all of the EU’s 20/20/20 objectives.

A more comprehensive inclusion of a broader range of stakeholders, and not only the ones
associated with hydropower and the petroleum sector. A stronger and earlier engagement
from and inclusion of the innovation and RTD sectors is also required in order to provide a
stronger scientific and innovative edge of the RES policies. In this context it is striking
that the MoPE has not learned after the consultation on the RES Directive in April 2008.
The new consultation on the template for National Renewable Energy Action Plans were
sent to a total of 32 addressees. However, still neither NORWEA nor NOBIO were on the
list.10
10
Further details on: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/hoeringer/hoeringsdok/2009/eueos-energi-horing-avkommisjonsvedtak-/horingsbrev.html?id=576633#
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
Better inclusion of the government’s expert organs and regulatory agencies – i.e. NVE and
Enova, with reinforced stimulation of the agencies’ participation and engagement in
relevant EU-level expert groups and networks.

Improved procedures for interaction and coordination in EU-RES matters between the
MoPE and its sub-ordinate agencies, as well as between the MoPE and other relevant,
sectoral ministries (i.e. Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Trade and Industry).

Early tackling of the challenge of integrating approaches to biofuels with those of
stationary RES, as implied by the Directive with better cooperation between Enova and
Transnova11.

The Norwegian government should seek to learn from non-public actors’ experiences with
participation in EU-based networks (i.e. Statkraft and Bellona). Norwegian public
decision-makers should actively search advice from these actors, and thereby create
stronger joint national arenas for mutual learning. This could be done through an
upgrading of the MoPE-led consultative forum for EEA-related energy issues.

Employ the case of off-shore wind power cooperation as a possible way of reforming the
bilateral contacts between Norway and the EU in RES issues. Stimulate a stronger political
interest and leverage, and provide sufficient resources and adequate competencies;
including those of the NVE, Enova, Statnett, Norwegian Research Council, and
Norwegian research actors (i.e. the new FME’s).

An EU-oriented off-shore wind power strategy should, therefore, be substantially
integrated into the overall national strategy for off-shore wind power and the promotion of
renewable energy at large. This will very much be in line with the Norwegian
implementation of the RES Directive.
11
Transnova was established as a project organisation by the Government in 2009, primarily to provide public
support and funding for alternative fuels in Norway. See http://www.transnova.no/ for a further description in
Norwegian.
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7
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