In Pursuit of East Asian International Theory:
Focusing on the Theories of International Society and Modified Sovereignty
Wookhee Shin
Department of International Relations, Seoul National University, Korea
SOAS, University of London
1. Introduction
For decades, “the Korean theory of international relations” has been a discussion topic among
Korean scholars in this field.
However, the essential questions as to whether such a theory is
possible, or is even necessary, have not been answered in depth. This paper attempts to provide
partially positive answers to these questions and reviews the possibility of constructing a regionallevel theory of East Asian international relations based on the case of Korea. In order to bridge
the gap between a case study and theory-building, and between local theory and global theory,
this type of mediating attempt might be appropriate.
Although this study starts from the assumption of the universal nature of Western theories, it
purports to show unique aspects of East Asia.
This paper also begins with the idea that the
consideration of the applicability of Western theories to East Asia has to precede an endogenous
development of an East Asian theory.
spatial and temporal uniqueness.
The European international system itself is marked by
However, the system has acquired modern universality through
internationalisation and still possesses historical continuity. Naturally, East Asia is also manifested
by distinctive regional traits, but the unique characteristics of the East Asian international order in
its modern history have to be understood regarding its relationship with global universality.
Therefore, this study deals with the theoretical meaning of the Korean and East Asian cases in the
context of continuity and change in modern international relations.
Methodologically, this research pursues an integrative approach.
The mediation between
empirical explanation and hermeneutic understanding has been discussed in the field of
international relations, and the necessity of scholarly communication between international
relations theory and diplomatic history has also been emphasised. 1
meaning of comparative case studies for this purpose.2
This paper considers the
Snyder once pointed out the possibility
1 On these issues, see M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding in International Relations,
Oxford University Press, 1991; C. Elman and M. Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Histories, Political
Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, The MIT Press, 2001 respectively.
2 Fore this methodology, refer to J. Mahoney and D. Rueschmeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in
1
of linking case studies and theory-oriented research by arguing that it is possible to transform
detailed analyses of specific cases into theoretical propositions with deductive arguments without
harming the historical understanding of the cases.3
Both the disciplines of political science and history have continued to maintain interests in
analyses of East Asian cases using international relations theory and discussions on the theoretical
implications of the historical experiences of East Asia.4
While the works by political scientists do
not delve into a thorough assessment of the historical roots of the current conflicts, works by
historians do not provide a systematic theoretical framework for continuing research.
Based on
these existing attempts, this paper undertakes an exploration of a more effective combination of
theory and case studies.
“critically”.
This task is pursued with the goal of adopting Western theories
In other words, core concepts or ideas from Western international relations theories
such as “international society” and “sovereignty” are invoked for a comparative review of their East
Asian application in different epochs. 5
By selecting universally-used theoretical concepts and
specifically assessing the variations in their regional and local applications, it would be possible to
achieve a historical understanding and diachronic explanation of the different phases of East Asian
international order.
The theoretical part of this paper will firstly deal with the function of regional-level theory and
the meaning of international theory.
Secondly, the English School approach centering on the
theory of international society and the recent discussion on modified sovereignty will be
presented.
Focusing on the Korean case, the case part of this paper will review the process and
results of the application of international society and sovereignty --the core elements of modern
international order-- in East Asia during the periods of colonialism, the Cold War, and the postCold War.
2. Theoretical Considerations
2.1 The Function of Regional-level Theory
the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
3
J. Snyder, “Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Security, 9,
Winter 1984/1985.
An example of such a case study is J. Snyder, Myth of Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambitions, Cornell University Press, 1991.
4
Among many, J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific,
Columbia University Press, 2003 and Youngseo Baek, et. als., Dong Asia Jiyeok Jilseo: Jeguk Eul Neomeo
Gongdongchero [Regional East Asian Order: From Empire to Community], Changbi, 2005 are good examples.
5
For the impact of concepts or ideas on social reality, see R. Kosseleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of
Historical Time, The MIT Press, 1985 and J. Hall, “Ideas and Social Science,” in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane,
eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, 1993.
2
Merton has suggested the concept of “middle-range” theories in arguing for the desirability of
the integration of theory and empirical research. According to him, theories of the middle range
are “theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the
day-by-day routines of research, and the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual
scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically-observed uniformities
of social behaviour.”6
Pointing out that either to concentrate entirely on special theories or to
concentrate entirely on the master conceptual scheme offers their own risks, Merton emphasised
the necessity of searching for confirmed theories of the middle range which hold the largest
promise, provided that underlying this modest search for social uniformities, there is an enduring
and pervasive concern with consolidating the special theories into a more general set of concepts
and mutually-consistent propositions.
The “regionalist” perspective that Buzan and Waever adopted suits this attempts for middlerange theories in international relations.
As they mentioned, “there are distinct stories at several
levels with none holding the master key to a full interpretation”, and the task for international
relations scholars is, “to find coherent theoretical tools for keeping theses stories in view together,
and making sense of the way they interact with each other”.7
Regional-level theories based on
the universal frameworks of internationalisation and globalisation can be used to overcome the
gap between the specific and the general in international studies.
In his discussion of relativism
and the social sciences, Gellner argues that relativism is perfectly compatible with the existence of
any number of, so to speak, de facto or contingent human universals.
science needs one world.
According to him,
It does not need one kind of man within it. But one
kind of man did make the single world. His historical situation may have been unique,
his basic constitution was not. The single world seems to be gradually adopted by all
of them, and appears manifestly accessible to all men.8
The notion of “typological theory” by Bennett and George can also be applied to the function
of regional-level theory.
In contrast to the “covering law” conception of general theories, they
say that typological theories involve contingent generalisations that explicitly outline the differing
background conditions.
They point out that as long as historians (or regional specialists, I
believe,) contribute to the development of typological theories, and political scientists develop
theories that are sensitive to the complexities of historical cases (of specific regions), they can
6
R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press, 1967, p. 5.
7
B. Buzan and O. Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University
Press, 2003, p. 26.
8
E. Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 100.
3
fruitfully continue to go their “separate ways together.”9
According to their view, case studies can
be used inductively to develop and refine typological theories through a “building block”
approach that maps out the alternative causal paths to the outcome of interest.10
The research by Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez on the Middle East can be seen as an example of
such typological theory building.11
After explaining the theoretical elements for applying social
structural concepts such as international society or world society to the region, Buzan asks the
following questions for comparison and contingent generalisation: If such social structures do
exist, how strong are they, and how distinct from structures at the global level?; How do such
structures at the regional level interplay both with those at the global level and with other
regional level structure? 12
They argue that whatever its exceptionalism, the Middle East is
perfectly amenable to analysis using the generalised intellectual tools of the English School.13
2.2 The Meaning of International Theory
In his famous article, “Why Is There No International Theory?,” Wight made a distinction
between political theory, which deals with the state as a community and international theory,
which deals with a “community of states”.
He explained the absence of international theory
through scholars’ prejudice towards sovereignty and relative lack of faith in progress.
On the
other hand, Wight mentioned the tension between international theory and diplomatic reality, and
pointed out that the theory of international politics at the time was a theory for survival that
corresponded to historical interpretation.14
Wight’s argument illustrates his position as a realist
and also reveals his idealistic position that the community is the ultimate object of analyses by
theories. 15
9
Therefore, Wight’s notion of international theory is at the same time marked by
A. Bennett and A. George, “Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar
Strokes for Different Foci,” in Elman and Elman, 2001, p. 166.
10
Bennett and George, 2001, p. 159.
11
See B. Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., International Society and the Middle East: English School
Theory at the Regional Level, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
12
Buzan, “The Middle East through English School Theory,” in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009, p. 24.
13
Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, “Conclusions,” in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009, p. 243.
14
M. Wight, “Why Is There No International Theory?” in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic
Investigations, Allen and Unwin, 1966.
15
Such complexity can be considered as the origin of “via media,” a characteristic of the English School.
Therefore, it is argued that the school is a third way of looking at the international system that contained
elements of both realism and idealism, and is an approach that attempts to “integrate the desirable and the
practical”. B. A. Roberson, ed., International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory,
Pinter, 1998, p. 3; p. 7.
4
explanatory as well as normative theoretical orientations.16
Such a distinction is related to the distinction between “the logic of consequences” and “the
logic of appropriateness” proposed by Krasner. The logic of consequences considers all political
behaviours to be the result of rational calculation whereas the logic of appropriateness
understands them to be outputs from norms, rules and identities.17 Although it is true that the
logic of consequences is considered to be more important in relationships among given political
units, the logic of appropriateness also plays a significant part of its own.
For example, the logic
of appropriateness assumed a more important role in the traditional East Asian order, and the
political dynamics in the Korean peninsula is affected by both the logic of consequences and that
of appropriateness. 18
This paper offers the opinion that international theory possesses both
elements, and understands that the international order is constituted of a combination of both
types of logic.
The ideas of international society and sovereignty discussed below actually
correspond to the logic of appropriateness.
As mentioned above, this research emphasises the necessity of the regional theory of
international relations as a method, or as a step in exploring the Korean theory of international
relations.
An East Asian international theory --a middle-range/typological theory-- is necessary
both as an explanatory and normative theory due to the uniqueness of the East Asian system as a
“regional zone” that shares history and ideas,19 but such a theory has to be considered in its
16
Having worked on the adoption of international relations theories in Korea, Kunyoung Park and Chaesung
Chun argued that international relations theory can function as an explanatory theory that is able to find
generally-applicable hypotheses by abstraction and comparison based on inductive researches regarding
reality, or generate hypotheses that can be applied to reality by deductively using theorems from other fields
that have axiomatic status, and as a normative theory which simultaneously discusses legitimacy, norms and
values in international relations. Therefore, they point out that the development of an explanatory theory,
which can empirically explain the reality of Korean international relations and a normative theory, which can
provide help for the construction of Korea’s future, are both necessary. Chaesung Chun and Kunyoung Park,
“Gukje Gwangye Iron Ui Hanguk Jeok Suyong Gwa Daean Jeok Jeopgeun [The Korean Adoption of
International Relations Theory and Alternative Approach],” Cheolgu Woo and Kunyoung Park, eds., Hyundae
Gukje Gwangye Iron Gwa Hanguk [Modern International Relations Theory and Korea], Sahoepyeongnon,
2004.
17
S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 1999, ch. 1.
18
The logic of li (ritual propriety), which formed the normative basis of the traditional East Asian order, and
the conflict between the state-centred and nation-centred views in South-North Korean relations are good
examples.
19
Yonghee Rhee defines a “regional zone” as “a zone of meaning where the meanings of political
behaviours are universally accepted”.
According to Rhee, political consideration of a zone of meaning is
important because “politics can be studied only by understanding the overall structure of the specific time
and place that conceptualise certain social phenomena as political”. Younghee Rhee, Ilban Gukjejeongchihak
(Sang) [General Theory of International Politics Vol: 1], Bakyeoungsa, 1962, pp. 48-49.
5
relationship to the Western theoretical framework.20
Then the discussion that follows should be
about the relevance and limits of existing Western theories in explaining and understanding the
regional order in East Asia.21
Except for critical theories, international relations theories in the United States are mainly
divided into three paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
The paradigms respectively
emphasise power and interest, norms and institutions, and ideas and identity as explanatory
variables. All of these variables are important in analysing the past, the present, and the future of
regional order in East Asia, and each of the perspectives can be selectively applied.22
However,
such analytical eclecticism does not provide a coherent conceptual framework, and easily leads to
relativism.
This paper proposes to adopt the theory of international society of the English School
and the recent discussion on modified sovereignty in order to construct an East Asian
international theory.
The two theories are chosen because they are relatively free from existing
categorisation of paradigms and because they are adequate frameworks for revealing the spatiotemporal universality of modern international relations as well as unique regional and local
attributes.
In addition, the two perspectives are marked by comparative and historical
approaches, unlike the contemporary debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the
United States.23
2.3 International Society
The theory of international society is characterised by multi-dimensional attributes that can
overcome the theoretical dichotomy between realism and liberalism and the methodological
dichotomy between historicism and structuralism. As is well known, the English School takes the
20
Insung Jang points out that “it is necessary to methodologically reconstruct the historical existence of the
East Asian civilisation and deliberate on its transformation in order to avoid the external orientation that
understands it in comparison with the Western civilisation.” Insung Chang, “Dong Asia Ui Munmyeong Gwa
Gukje Sahoe: Guseong Wolli Wa Jonje Bangsik [East Asian Civilisation and International Society:
Organisational Principles and the Method of Existence,” Hanguk Jeongchi Oegyosa Nonchong [Korean
Journal of Political and Diplomatic History], 24, 2, 2002. However, an understanding of the principles and
characteristics of modern Western civilisation is required in order to discuss the reorganisation and
transformation of the modern East Asian civilisation because Western civilisation has provided momentum
for the changes in East Asia.
21
An example of such academic attempts is Wookhee Shin, “Dajajuui Ui Dongasia Jeokyong Ui Munje
[Problems in Applying Multilateralism to East Asia],” Hanguk Gwa Gukjejeongchi [Korea and World Politics],
13, 1, 1997.
22
An example is J. J. Suh, et. al., eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, Stanford
University Press, 2004.
23
The essentially reflective nature of the rationalist tradition of the English School makes the school distinct
from the rationalism of the United States.
6
Grotian tradition that contrasts with the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions, and the basic
arguments of the school focus on the characteristics of international society vis-à-vis international
system and world society.
However, not all discussions of the English School centre on
international society, and it has been pointed out that the utility of the international society
perspective consists of analysing the extent of the influence of international society on
international system and world society as the three engage in a continued coexistence and
interaction.24
It is generally noted that the theory of international society is divided into two positions:
pluralism, which assumes the existence of common interests as a formative element of society,
and solidarism, which assumes the existence of common values as a formative element of society.
It is also argued that pluralism emphasising the dimension of order and sovereignty opposes
humanitarian intervention whereas solidarism emphasising the dimension of justice and individual
rights supports it.25
However, the distinction was not clear, just as in the Wight’s case above, and
Bull himself saw that “through international society some states could pursue the creation of a
consensus towards the universal goals”. 26
The theory of international society additionally has
some common elements with American theories.
Buzan emphasised the commonality that exists
between structural realism/regime theory and the English School.27
More recently, many scholars
have discovered similarities between constructivism and the theory of international society and
the possibility of engaging communication between the two.28
Essentially, the theory of international society describes the constitution of world politics
centering on Europe.
In other words, the international society of Europe underwent evolution
and expansion, and constructed a universal international society based on the European standard
24
B. Buzan and L. Little, “Why International Relations Has Failed as An Intellectual Project and What to Do
about It,” Millennium, 30, 1, 2001, p. 37.
25
For the issue, see A. Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society,
Oxford University Press, ch. 3.
26
Roberson, 1998, p. 9.
For this type of synthesising efforts in normative international relations theory,
refer to M. Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
27
B. Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet
the English School,” International Organization, 47, 3, 1993.
28
For instance, Reus-Smit thinks that both groups share common traits: the cultural foundation of national
identity, governance by rules as the nature of international society, and diverse types of existence among
states under anarchy.
C. Reus-Smit, “Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School,” British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4, 3, 2002.
Moreover, Adler points out that cooperation
between constructivism and the English School should seek the comprehensive synthesis of the analytical
and normative international relations theories. E. Adler, “Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct
the English School: ’Not All the Way Down,’” Millennium, 34, 1, 2005.
7
of civilisation.
arguments,
and
However, Buzan and Little have relatively criticised Euro-centrism of such
they
revealed
the
existence
of
multiple
international
systems/societies
characterised by different sizes, structural attributes, and the frequency and pattern of interactions.
At the same time, they expressed the wish of transforming the theory of the English School into a
grand theory of international relations by adding a comparative world history perspective to its
discussions on international systems. 29
However, the reduction of the European case to such
specificity may cause problems as well as excessive generalisation of the case.
It is necessary for
East Asian scholars to discuss both the contextual generality and the specificity of modern East
Asian international relations through the observation of globalization of the Western model and
its regional application, and the resulting amalgamation and transformation of the East Asian
order.
2.4 Modified Sovereignty
Discussions on sovereignty and international society are closely related as a sovereign state is
the component unit of international society.
by
establishing
the
concept
of
internal
From Bodin, who tried to maintain domestic order
sovereignty,
to
Hinsley,
who
dealt
with
the
institutionalisation process of the state --a specific political unit-- in the name of external
sovereignty, sovereignty has for a long time aroused scholarly debates.30
In his book, Krasner
argues that (state) sovereignty is an “organised hypocrisy” that exists, but with limited power.
This is because sovereignty, which is described by the principle of non-intervention, has been
constantly violated.
According to Krasner, there are four types of sovereignty: domestic
sovereignty (the organisation of public authority within a state and effective control by the
organisation); interdependent sovereignty (the ability of public authorities to control trans-border
movements); international legal sovereignty (the mutual recognition of states or other entities);
Westphalian sovereignty (the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations).
Krasner points out that international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty are easily
compromised, and he enumerates convention, contract, coercion, and imposition as methods of
compromise.
According to Krasner, recognition among states is not an absolute condition of international
behaviours and the existence of international legal sovereignty does not guarantee a country’s
territorial integrity or survival.
The principles of non-intervention by Westphalian sovereignty can
also be often violated in the international system.
29
From a weak states’ view, sovereignty might
B. Buzan and L. Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International
Relations, Oxford University Press, 2000.
They stated that the Wightian tradition can clearly achieve a
synergistic effect in methodology and research agendas when the tradition is linked to historical sociology
and world history. Buzan and Little, 2001, p. 36.
30
J. Bodin, On Sovereignty, Cambridge University Press, 1992; F. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Basic Books, 1966.
8
be an absolute value that needs to be protected, but the principle is actually damaged both by
intervention and invitation. 31
Krasner points out that international legal sovereignty and
Westphalian sovereignty are good examples of “organised hypocrisy”, and he argues that
sovereignty is one of the political behaviours through which rulers realise national goals and
interests in international relations in accordance with the “logic of consequences”.
This line of Krasner’s argument is related to the debate between pluralism and solidarism in
the English School.
Krasner compares his ideas on sovereignty with arguments of neo-realism,
neo-liberalism, constructivism, the English School, and world culture theory, and he concludes that
the sovereign institution is marked by a low concordance between norms and behaviours and a
continuity of norms amid changing environments.
He points out that none of the existing
theories succeeded in appropriately conceptualising the function and nature of international legal
sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty in the real world.
He argues that emphasising the role
and importance of institutions beyond actor-specific theories is meaningful, but such an emphasis
necessitates caution. This is because none of the institutional devices including sovereignty can
be taken as granted in the international system, which is characterized by multiple norms, an
asymmetry of power, and the absence of an authority structure.32
Moreover, when analysing international relations in the post-Cold War period, Krasner tries to
find political possibilities in the instances of “problematic sovereignty”.
Based on the notion that
“new rules can be defined under new circumstances”, he discusses the possibility of the
transformation of the idea of sovereignty and points to the meaning of exploring alternative
institutions by voluntary initiatives rather than through coercion or imposition.
According to
Krasner, a partial concession of sovereignty in the case of the European Union, and the application
of “one-country, two-systems” principles in Hong Kong after its return, illustrate the flexible
dealings of the principles of sovereignty in accordance with changes in the power distribution, a
realistic calculation of interests, and the goals and intentions of specific actors.33
From the Korean perspective, it is necessary to simultaneously consider the relativity of
sovereignty caused by the logic of consequences as described by Krasner, the formal/normative
aspects of sovereignty as the logic of appropriateness, and the flexible coexistence of the two.
In
other words, both explanatory and normative theories must be provided, and this requires
analyses of both the material and social aspects of international relations.
In this respect, the
theory of international society of the English School and Krasner’s discussion of modified
31
For a different interpretation of this matter, see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International
Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
32
33
Krasner, 1999, ch. 2.
S. Krasner, “Explaining Variation: Defaults, Coercion, Commitment,” in S. Krasner, ed., Problematic
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, Columbia University Press, 2001.
Badie uses the
concept of “creative deviation” for a similar explanation. B. Badie, The Imported State: The Westernization of
the Political Order, Stanford University Press, 2000.
9
sovereignty can be used as frameworks of reference that enable a diverse theoretical
consideration in dealing with the regional East Asian order and Korean cases.
3. International Society and Sovereignty: the Korean Case
3.1 Colonialism: Dualistic International Society and the Limits of Formal Sovereignty
This section analyses changes in the East Asian regional order by dividing the region’s modern
history into three periods and exploring the evolving characteristics of international society and
sovereignty in each of the periods.
The analysis centres on cases of Korea.
I think that the
Korean case aptly represents the East Asian characteristics, because it has been a microcosm of
the regional politics in the modern era.
The cases of the Korean-UK amity treaty in the Colonial
period, the Korean War in the Cold War period, and the North Korean nuclear problem in the
post-Cold War period effectively show the symbiotic relationships among East Asian countries;
mainly China, Japan and Korea.34
The regional system of modern East Asia is more than a mere dependent variable of the global
international system.
The expansion and diffusion of the European international system and the
adoption of, and response to, the system has generated the specificity of the East Asian system.
While the first period was the period of colonialism, the characteristic of the international society
which assumes importance in the analysis of this period is its duality.
Wight made a distinction
between the broad boundary of global international society as a human community dominated by
natural law, and the narrow boundary of international society among Western Christian nations
governed by empirical rules based on agreement.
Bull relatively emphasised the substantial
importance of the narrow boundary in his discussion on international society.
The expansion of
the Western international system gave rise to conflicts between the two boundaries.
It has been
mentioned that Western nations initially tried to recognize equal status for non-Western countries
as members of the universal international society.
However, these Western nations gradually
resorted to discriminatory concepts such as “divisible sovereignty” or “semi-sovereignty” in
accordance with the standard of civilization.35
Application of the concepts was legitimised by the flexibility of the Grotian concepts of
34
For example, Lord Curzon tried to understand the Far Eastern problems by comparing the situations of
China, Japan and Korea in the late-19th century. See George Curzon, Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea,
China, 1886.
35
In explaining the diffusion of the rules and standards of international society by the West, Watson points
out the limits of expansion by mutual agreement to non-Western areas. A. Watson, “European International
Society and its Expansion,” in H. Bull and A. Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society, Clarendon
Press, 1984.
10
sovereignty.
Keene argues that there were two types of international political legal order --
European international society and the colonial international society-- during the colonial period.
According to him, toleration was the standard for European international society whereas
civilisation was the standard for the colonial international society.
Keene points out that the
concept of divisible sovereignty was drawn from the distinction between public sovereign rights
and private property rights in the international law theory of Grotius, and that the concept of
semi-sovereignty was applied to many cases including American federalism and the relationships
between Western countries and non-Western countries such as the British rule in India.36
Under the dualistic environment of international society, the three countries of East Asia
followed different trajectories.
became a colony.
China became a semi-colony, Japan became an empire and Korea
The book by Gong is the most representative work from the English School on
the case of East Asia.
His analysis adopted the typical logic of the theory of international society:
the expansion and diffusion of the standards of civilization.37
process from the recipients’ points of view.
Later, other scholars interpreted the
Zhang states that China’s entry into international
society was made in the early-20th century through resistance to colonialism rather than in the
mid-19th century.
Zhang emphasises China’s autonomous initiatives in the entry. He argues that
this was enabled by the domestic reform in China that transformed the country into a Westernstyle polity, the cooperative atmosphere in the new international order after World War I, and
China’s active participation in the post-war international society. 38
According to Suzuki, Japan
attained the status of a civilised country and became a member of international society by
adopting the standards of civilization.
On the other hand, he argues that Japan also learned
another aspect of Western identity and behaviour: a coercive policy towards “barbarians”.
While
Suzuki refutes the argument that the model of Western international society is more progressive
than others, he provides the relative excuse of the imperialistic postures of Japan, which learned
the West’s discrimination and violence towards the non-West.39
In addition to the dualistic environment of international society, China’s embedded condition in
the traditional order and Japan’s characteristics as a new colonial power played important roles in
Korea’s experiences in the region. As mentioned above, the two treaties between Korea and the
United Kingdom in 1882 and 1883 and the Geomundo incident in 1885 showed these features
very well.
36
While the conclusion of the first treaty was mainly managed by China trying to
See E. Keene, Beyond Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
37
G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society, Clarendon Press, 1984.
38
Y. Zhang, “China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilisation’,” Review of
International Studies, 17, 1991.
39
S. Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European International society,” European Journal of
International Relations, 11, 1, 2005.
However, other scholars also criticise Japan for using more coercive
policies on its regional neighbours compared to Western nations.
11
maintain its influence over Korea, that of the second treaty was supported by Japan trying to
compete with the influence of China. The British government demonstrated the limits of Korea’s
formal sovereignty by occupying a Korean island one year after the validation of the mutual treaty.
The introduction of the modern concept of sovereignty to Korea was related to a series of
historical events: the first amity treaty of Korea with Japan, Sino-Japanese War, and the
establishment of the “Korean Empire”.
Some Korean intellectuals emphasised the principle of
external sovereignty in accordance with the law of nations, and some proposed neutrality or
pointed out the role of faith on the part of great powers for the maintenance of legal sovereignty.
On the other hand, they emphasised the importance of self-strengthening as they realised the
necessity of the realistic conditions of sovereignty and the dynamics of the balance of power.
In his article on East Asia in the 19th century, Krasner argues that the logic of appropriateness
overwhelmed the logic of consequences in the Korean case as moral justification and domestic
political motivations were predominant in Korea. 40
In contrast with Krasner’s view, however,
Korean intellectuals were aware of the anarchical and imperialistic nature of the modern
international system, and they strived to preserve sovereignty and to build the capacities
necessary for Korea as a modern nation-state in diverse ways.
For example, Yu Giljun, a liberal
Korean intellectual, used the concept of the “dual system” to explore the transition to modern
order in the context of traditional order and its restrictions. He also tried to exploit the relative
role of norms by emphasising national rights in the power-political situation. 41
However, the
geopolitical condition in East Asia, in which Japanese hegemony was strengthening, was not
favourable to Korea’s “war against time”, and it led to Korea’s adherence to modern sovereignty
and its failure to maintain it.
3.2 The Cold War: Hierarchical International Society and “Perforated” Sovereignty
The second period is the Cold War era.
The causes of the Cold War as an ideational conflict
had been latent since the Russian Revolution, but the substantial intensification of the conflict
began in the late 1940s.
The transition from the traditional balance of power to the “balance of
fear”, based on the existence of nuclear weapons, created a unique international system
dominated by bipolarity during the Cold War period.
40
The system was marked by a differentiation
Comparing China, Japan and Korea, Krasner points out that China abandoned its own logic of
appropriateness to a considerable extent in order to cope with the power of the West, and it tried to adapt
itself to the new logic of consequences. In both ideational and material respects, Japan actively introduced
the logic of consequences demanded by the new order and attempted to build institutions that were
harmonious with the logic.
S. Krasner, “Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-century East Asia,” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1, 2001.
41
Wookhee Shin, “Geundae Hanguk Ui Jugwon Gaenyeom [The Concept of Sovereignty in Modern Korea],”
Segye Jeongchi [The Journal of World Politics], 25, 2, 2004.
12
of the two dynamics: military rivalry and economic competition, and, politics between the camps
and politics within the camps.
The Cold War system was also subject to its own rules of the
game, 42 but it is hard to say that the bipolar structure was characterised by a societal nature
based on specific common interests or values.
At the global level, the Cold War system meant the coexistence of two superpowers seeking
stability through instruments of abnormality, such as the division of Germany and Korea and the
peace constitution of Japan. Lewkowicz explains the treatment of the German problem along the
line of the English School.
According to him, the process was carried out by the “practical
association” that consisted in the search for the stable coexistence of superpowers, the
recognition of each superpower’s pursuit of individual goals, and the establishment of procedural
legitimacy. 43
On the one hand, these characteristics of inter-camp politics generated two
divergent systems shaped by substantive “social” characters respectively.44
On the other hand,
the United States and the Soviet Union assumed the burden of patronage in intra-camp politics in
exchange for the maintenance of hierarchical order and policy compliance of subordinating
countries.
45
World politics during the Cold War, therefore, deviated from the general
characteristics of a multilateral modern international system, and was marked by rather unique
attributes: relative anarchy between the two camps and the hierarchy within each camp.46
While the Cold War in East Asia was a result of the global Cold War, it apparently had its own
dynamics.
Until the late 1940s, East Asia was subject to power-political chaos, which was caused
by the defeat of Japan and the civil war in China, rather than ideological conflict. Even after the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the United States was considering strategic use of
Mao Ze-dong.
42
However, the flexible situation was replaced by a confrontation between the
Gaddis enumerates the following characteristics of the relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the so-called “long peace”: 1) respect for the other’s spheres of influences; 2) avoidance
of direct military confrontation; 3) the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort; 4) preference for
predictable abnormality rather than unpredictable rationality; 5) the absence of attempts to harm the other
side’s leadership. J. L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, Oxford University
Press, 1987, ch. 8.
43
N. Lewkowicz, “The German Question and the International Order (1943-1948): An English School
Approach,” WISC, Istanbul, Turkey, August 2005.
44
Westad defines these two as “the empire of liberty” and “empire of justice”. See O. A. Westad, The Global
Cold War, Cambridge University Press, 2003, ch. 1.
45
Wendt and Friedheim provide an example of such characteristics in their study of the relationship
between the Soviet Union and East Germany.
A. Wendt and D. Friedheim, “Hierarchy under Anarchy:
Informal Empire and the East German State,” in T. Biersteker and C. Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social
Construct, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
46
On the discussion of authority and hierarchy in world politics which differs from the neo-realist
assumption of anarchy, see D. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Anarchy in World
Politics,” International Security, 32, 1, 2007.
13
United States and China and the search for a new cooperation between the United States and
Japan under the impact of the “reverse course” policy towards Japan, the outbreak of the Korean
War, and the military encounter between the United States and China.47
The regionalisation of the Cold War in East Asia was closely related with the issues of
sovereignty.
After reviewing the so-called “lost chance”, Christensen concludes that the United
States could have avoided the encounter with China in the Korean War and the consequent
conflicts if it had refrained from intervening in the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party
and Kuomintang and had formally recognised Mao’s government.
He explains this through the
restriction imposed by domestic politics under the Cold War environment rather than a strategic
miscalculation by the United States.48
Gijeong Nam analyses the US-Japanese relationship in the
early phase of the Cold War and the process by which Japan became a “base-state” under the
impact of the formation of the Cold War order in East Asia and through the Korean War more
specifically.
A “base-state” is defined as a sovereign country that organises its territory as a
potential zone for military operations.49
The historical path of Korea, which was shaped by the succession of liberation, division, and
war, strongly influenced the process by which the state formation of Korea and its foreign policy
choices were structured in the Cold War period.
Following the conflicts between the People’s
Republic and the Provisional Government and the rivalry between Syngman Rhee and Kim Gu, the
Republic of Korea was established in accordance with Rhee’s policy line that aimed at the
construction of a separate regime in South Korea.
During the Korean War, President Rhee
transferred South Korea’s strategic command to the United States for the war operation. After
the failure of the Geneva Peace Conference in 1954, the division of the Korean peninsula became
a fait-accompli, and the hierarchical military alliance between South Korea and the United States,
marked by a security division of labour, was established.50
47
The conclusion of the Mutual Defence
Kim interprets this as the resurrection of the Japan-centered “Greater East Asian” economic structure and
colonial order in the region. Myoungseop Kim, “Dong Asia Naengjeon Jilseo Ui Tansaeng [The Birth of the
Cold War Order in East Asia]”, Youngseo Baek, et. al., 2005.
48
T. Christensen, Useful Adversary: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and the Sino-American Conflict,
1947-1958, Princeton University Press, 1996.
49
Gijeong Nam, “Hanguk Jeonjaeng Gwa Ilbon: ‘Giji Gukka’ Ui Jeonjaeng Gwa Pyeonghwa [The Korean War
and Japan: The War and Peace of a ‘Base-State’,]” Gukje Gwangye Yeonguhoe [International Relations
Research Group], ed., Dong Asia Gukje Gwangye Wa Hanguk [East Asian International Relations and Korea],
Eulyumunhwasa, 2003.
50
These institutional or social characteristics created a unique sovereign identity in Korea. For instance, the
relationship between South and North Korea is not governed by a single fixed identity. The relationship is
shaped by multiple identities because the identity of a sovereign state or the identities of a divided nation,
based on different ideological foundation, exert influences depending upon the circumstances.
South
Korean-US relations can also be defined as a relationship between an imperfect sovereign state and a supra-
14
Treaty between South Korea and the United States after the ceasefire, and the normalization of
diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan in 1965, created the foundation for a
triangular relationship in the southern part of East Asia, which had been the pillar of Korea’s
external relations.
Therefore, regional order in East Asia during the Cold War period was
operated by inter-camp conflict between the southern and northern triangular relationships, which
was even more severe than that at the global level, and the existence of a hierarchical
international society within the US-led camp --“informal empire”-- where “perforated sovereignty”
was accepted.51
3.3 The Post-Cold War: Diversified International Society and Reconstruction of Sovereignty
The last period to be considered is the post-Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War brought
great changes in both the reality and theory of international relations.
Some scholars viewed the
breakdown of the bipolar system as a “back to the future” and predicted that multi-polar system
would be more unstable.52 Others understood the breakdown of the Soviet camp to be the “end
of history” and optimistically predicted that the transition of Socialist countries in the post-Cold
War period would usher in a stable system based on a single global economy.53
However, the
deepening of globalisation and the strengthening of uni-polarity dominated by the United States
led some theorists to predict the emergence of an empire or a new mediaeval age that would
replace the modern interstate system. 54
The September 11 attack triggered debates on new
global security after “the end of the post-Cold War”.55
Discussions on the changes were not confined to the system level, and society and unit level
considerations were also carried out.
Buzan pointed to the limits of the pluralistic theory of
international society and reignited discussions on the world society and global institutions.
According to him, it is necessary to consider a diversified cooperation model that encompasses
interactions across various levels.
Instead of the categorisation of three traditions in the English
School since Wight, Buzan suggests a new framework of analysis that consists of three domains --
territorial sovereign state affected by power relations rather than a relationship between formal sovereign
states. Geun Lee and Chaesung Chun, “Anboron E Isseoseo Guseongjuui Wa Hyensiljuui Ui Mannam [The
Encountef of Constructivism and Realism in Security Stueis],” Hanguk Gwa Gukje Jeongchi [Korea and World
Politics], 17, 1, 2001, p. 19.
51
These concepts were borrowed from Wendt and Friedheim, 1996.
52
J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War,” International Security, 15, 1, 1990.
53
F. Hukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 1992.
54
A. Tanaka (Yongheon Lee, tr,) Saeroun Jungse: 21 Segi Ui Segye Siseutem [New Mediaeval Ages: The
World System in the 21st Century], Jijeong, 2000.
55
S. Talbot and N. Chanda, eds., The Age of Terror: The United States and the World after September 11,
Basic Books, 2001.
15
inter-human, inter-state, and transnational--, and analyses the social structure of globalisation in
the context of the interplay among the three domains. Furthermore, he tries to espouse a subglobal diversity in addition to global liberal trends.56
In contrast with Buzan’s works which deal with the macro processes of complex system
changes, Krasner worked on micro-level unit reconstruction.
As mentioned above, Krasner
explained the emergence of the modified patterns of sovereignty and mentioned the possibility of
voluntary selection of polity types.
He argues as follows:
The rules of sovereignty, like the rules that have existed in any international
environment, do matter, especially if political leaders cannot agree, or use coercion, to
create alternatives.
others.
Prevailing rules make it easier to do some things and harder to do
But they are not determinative.
New rules can be invented.
And new rules
can work, especially if they are the product of an equilibrium outcome arrived through
voluntary decisions rather than coercion, which inevitably involves governance costs.
Conventional rules do not necessarily make the resolution of unconventional situations
more problematic.57
Discussions on the diversified international society and the reconstruction of sovereignty, which
overlap with aspects of world society, involve specific policy issues related to the expansion of the
zone of democracy, human rights and the rights of minorities, human security and humanitarian
intervention, and the resulting problems of constructing new states.
Despite global level changes that necessitate consideration of world societal factors and the
coming of the post-sovereign age, anarchy is still sustained in East Asia, where maintenance and
the completion of ideas and institutions based on modern sovereignty is an ongoing process.
In
all aspects of structure, process and unit, East Asia as a sub-system is noticeably characterised by
conflict rather than cooperation in regional politics.
A substantive societal arrangement between
hegemonic America and rising China has not been made, 58 and multilateralism remains in a
primitive stage in East Asia. The limits of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific stem form the
differences in the level of nation building, the consideration of political legitimacy needed, and
56
B. Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of
Globalisation, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
57
Krasner, 2001, p. 342.
58
Attempts to analyse US-China relations in the post-Cold War period from the perspective of the theory of
international society include Y. Nagao, et. al., “Post-Cold War International Society and U.S.-China
Relationship,” NIDS Security Reports, 1, 2000. They predict that international society in the post-Cold War
period will be based on the heterogeneity found between the United States and China rather than the
homogeneity that marks international society in Europe.
They also point out the problems in the US
intervention strategy towards China, which espouses a universalistic view.
16
the resulting sensitivity to exclusive sovereignty. 59
The “one-China principle”, a constitutional
revision in Japan, and Korean unification, may illustrate the dynamism in each country as it
undergoes “normalisation” in modern standards.
However, these issues are perceived as security
threats and causes of regional instabilities from the point of view of other countries.
Therefore,
we need to simultaneously recognize the limits of the status quo and the necessity of transition in
East Asia, and devise ways to solve the security dilemma that may accompany the transition.
In order to do so, it is necessary to expand a solidarity-based inter-subjectivity that transcends
the pluralistic reciprocity between the United States and China, and explore the possibility of
creating complex units through an understanding of the processes through which the
idiosyncratic aspects of sovereignty in East Asian countries were formulated.
In other words, the
democratisation of given polities or cooperation among democratised countries alone cannot
solve the regional problems, and the idea of a “concentric multilateralism” based on the United
States and Japan cannot be fully applied to East Asia. 60
Therefore, it is needed to carry out
discussions on modified sovereignty in East Asia --the “one-country, two-system” proposal in
China, the “peace state” alternative in Japan, and the conception of a “peace system” in the
Korean peninsula-- to find the possibilities for the creative reconstruction of sovereignty.61
This
means that unit-level efforts must precede or accompany the building of a regional-level
governance structure. From such a perspective, sovereignty in East Asia is a pharmaconic entity
that can be either curative or poisonous. In the case of Korea, this problem can enter the realm
of practise through debates on the revision of the Korean-US alliance or strategies for Korean
unification.
4. Conclusion
Instead of presenting specific theoretical issues or historical cases, this paper put forward a
typological framework for the construction of East Asian international theory.
Theories of
international society and modified sovereignty can be a good basis for unfolding regional level
theories and combining explanatory and normative theories.
As seen above, the regional East
Asian system is simultaneously a part of the global system and a system with its own autonomous
dynamics.
In many respects, including power distribution, anarchy/society characteristics, and
regional identity, the East Asian system differs from the European system.
59
Therefore, a reflection
S. Narine, “State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific,” The
Pacific Review, 17, 3, 2004.
60
For the attempt, see H. Nau, At Home and Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy, Cornell
University Press, 2002, ch. 6.
61
However, current regional and domestic environments are not evolving in a direction that supports these
efforts, and it should be mentioned that a gap exists between prescription and reality.
17
of the construction of modern East Asian international order/disorder cannot be done by a simple
introduction of the Western model.
It is in this sense that the discussions of the particularistic
transformation of universal ideas such as international society and sovereignty are meaningful.
In his foreword to the third edition of Bull’s The Anarchical Society, Hurrell summarises Bull’s
theoretical concerns as follows:
We are still left with Bull’s concern with two fundamental tensions in the
constitution of international society: first between those rules and institutions that seek
to mediate amongst different values and conceptions of the good, and those that seek
to promote, and perhaps enforce, a single set of universal values; and second, between
the vaulting normative ambitions of contemporary international society and its still
precarious power-political, institutional and cultural foundations. Although sometimes
seen as optimistic, complacent, or even nostalgic, Bull was constantly worried what he
called premature global solidarism-- that too many hopes, too many demands, and too
many moral claims were being placed on the still thin fabric of international society.62
The new version of international society theory proposed by Buzan and the modification of the
logic of appropriateness considering the logic of consequences argued by Krasner, should pursue
a path of moderation and restraint.
It is through such efforts that the universal theory will
achieve its relevance as an explanatory and normative theory.
Moreover, it is only when such a
theory can communicate with region-based middle-range theory that it will be possible to
positively revise the answer to Wight’s question on the existence of international theory.
62
A. Hurrell, “Foreword to the Third Edition: The Anarchical Society 25 Years On,” in H. Bull, The Anarchical
Society: The Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed., Columbia University Press, 2002, p. xxii.
18