Comment on Hekman's "Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited": Where's
the Power?
Author(s): Patricia Hill Collins
Source: Signs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), pp. 375-381
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175278 .
Accessed: 26/03/2013 07:55
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Signs.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Commenton Hekman's"Truthand Method: Feminist
StandpointTheoryRevisited":Where'sthePower?
Patricia
Hill Collins
Y READING
OF STANDPOINT
THEORY
sees it
as aninterpretive
framework
dedicated
toexplicating
how
knowledgeremainscentralto maintainingand changing
unjustsystemsof power.While themain argumentsin Susan Hekman'sarticle(inthisissue)containsurfacevalidity,
becausestandpoint theoryneverwas designedto be argued as a theoryof truthor
method,Hekman'sarticlesimplymissesthe point of standpointtheory
overall.By decontextualizing
standpointtheoryfromitsinitialmoorings
in a knowledge/power
framework
whilesimultaneously
recontextualizing
itin an apoliticaldiscussionoffeminist
truthand method,Hekmanessentiallydepoliticizesthepotentiallyradicalcontentof standpointtheory.
First,the notion of a standpointrefersto historicallyshared,groupbased experiences.Groups have a degreeof permanenceovertimesuch
thatgrouprealitiestranscendindividualexperiences.For example,African Americansas a stigmatizedracial group existedlong beforeI was
born and will probablycontinuelong afterI die. While my individual
racismwill be unique,thetypesof opexperienceswithinstitutionalized
and
I
constraints
that
encounter
on a dailybasis will resemble
portunities
thoseconfronting
AfricanAmericansas a group.ArguingthatBlacks as
a group come into beingor disappear on the basis of my participation
seemsnarcissistic,
egocentric,and archetypally
postmodern.In contrast,
standpointtheoryplaces less emphasison individualexperienceswithin
sociallyconstructedgroupsthan on the social conditionsthatconstruct
such groups.
I stressthisdifference
betweentheindividualand thegroupas unitsof
analysisbecause usingthesetwo constructsas iftheywere interchangeable clouds understanding
of a hostoftopics,in thiscase, theverynotion
of a group-basedstandpoint.Individualismcontinuesas a taproot in
Westerntheorizing,
versions.Whetherbourgeoisliberincludingfeminist
alism positingnotionsof individualrightsor postmodernsocial theory's
celebrationof humandifferences,
market-basedchoice modelsgrounded
in individualismarguethatfreedomexistsvia the absence of constraints
of all sorts,includingthose of mandatorygroup membership.Freedom
occurs when individualshave rightsof mobilityin and out of groups,
muchas we join clubs and othervoluntaryassociations.
[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society1997,vol.22, no. 2]
? 1997 byThe University
ofChicago.Allrights
reserved.
0097-9740/97/2202-0005$01.00
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SIGNS
375
Collins
COMMENT
But the individualas proxyforthegroup becomesparticularly
probofthegroupis not synonylematicbecause standpointtheory'streatment
mous witha "familyresemblance"of individualchoice expandedto the
level of voluntarygroup association.The notionof standpointrefersto
groupshavingsharedhistoriesbased on theirsharedlocationin relations
of power-standpointsariseneitherfromcrowdsof individualsnorfrom
createdbyscholarsor bureaucrats.Take,forexample,
groupsanalytically
thecommonalityofexperiencesthatemergesfromlong-standing
patterns
of racial segregationin theUnitedStates.The degreeof racialsegregation
Blacks
underestimated.
betweenBlacksand Whitesas groupsis routinely
and Whiteslivein raciallysegregatedneighborhoods,and thisbasic featuregeneratesdistinctiveexperiencesin schools, recreationalfacilities,
shopping areas, health-caresystems,and occupational opportunities.
Moreover,middle-classBlacks have not been exemptfromtheeffectsof
diminishedopportunitiesthat accompanyracial segregationand group
It is commonlocationwithinhierarchical
discrimination.
powerrelations
that createsgroups,not the resultsof collectivedecisionmakingof the
individualswithinthe groups.Race, gender,social class, ethnicity,
age,
and sexualityare not descriptive
appliedto individcategoriesof identity
uals. Instead,these elementsof social structureemergeas fundamental
devicesthatfosterinequalityresultingin groups.
To ignorepower relationsis simplyto misreadstandpointtheoryits raison d'etre,its continuingsalience,and its abilityto explain social
ofgroupsas an accumulationofindividuinequality.Hekman'streatment
own realityallows her to do just this.
their
with
als and not as entities
and groupstandpointinthefollowindividual
between
Note theslippage
of feministstandpointsto its
the
"If
take
we
multiplicity
ing passage:
becomes
coherent
impossiblebecausewe have
analysis
logicalconclusion,
is unique; ifwe anawoman
too manyaxes of analysis.Ultimately,
every
So is feminist
is
obviated.
in
her
each
uniqueness,systemicanalysis
lyze
certain
for
even
to
the
lose
we
categoriesofwomen"
speak
ability
politics:
of
construct
the
identifies
Hekman
standpointwiththe
very
(359).
clearly
idea of individualperspectiveor point of view.This assumptionallows
herto collapse theindividualand groupas unitsof analysisand proceed
to reason that individualsand collectivitiesundergosimilarprocesses.
Butbecause sheremainsfocusedon theindividualas proxyforthegroup,
to constructthegroupfromsuch "unique" individuit becomesdifficult
of systemicanalysisthat
als. Arrivingat thedead end of theimpossibility
leads to systemicchange appears as the result.By omittinga discussion
of group-basedrealitiesgroundedin an equallycentralnotionof groupbased oppression,we moveintothesterilegroundof a discussionof how
of truth.
effectively
standpointtheoryservesas an epistemology
fostersinto
attention
that
view
In contrastto Hekman's
multiplicity
376
SIGNS
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENT
Collins
situated
coherence,currentattentionto the theme of intersectionality
withinassumptionsofgroup-basedpowerrelationsrevealsa growingungroups
derstandingof thecomplexityof theprocessesbothof generating
and accompanyingstandpoints.Initiallyexaminingonly one dimension
of powerrelations,namely,thatof social class, Marx positedthat,howeverunarticulatedand inchoate,oppressedgroupspossesseda particular
versions,inequalityhas
standpointon inequality.In morecontemporary
been revisedto reflecta greaterdegreeof complexity,
especiallythat of
race and gender.What we now have is increasingsophisticationabout
how to discussgrouplocation,not in thesingularsocial class framework
frameworks
proposedbyMarx, nor in theearlyfeminist
arguingthepriof
within
of
but
constructs
macy gender,
multiplicity
residingin social
structuresthemselvesand not in individualwomen. Fluiditydoes not
mean thatgroupsthemselvesdisappear,to be replacedby an accumulationof decontexualized,uniquewomenwhose complexityerasespolitics.
of boundariesoperatesas a new lensthatpotentially
Instead,thefluidity
deepens understandingof how the actual mechanismsof institutional
power can change dramaticallywhile continuingto reproducelongstandinginequalitiesof race,gender,and class thatresultin groupstability.In thissense,grouphistoryand locationcan be seen as pointsof convergencewithinhierarchical,multiple,and changingstructuralpower
relations.
A second featureof standpointtheoryconcernsthe commonalityof
thatemergeforgroupsdifferentially
experiencesand perspectives
arrayed
withinhierarchicalpower relations.Keep in mindthat if the group has
been theorizedaway,therecan be no common experiencesor perspectives.Standpointtheoryargues that groupswho share common placementin hierarchicalpower relationsalso sharecommon experiencesin
such power relations.Such sharedangles of vision lead those in similar
social locationsto be predisposedto interpret
theseexperiencesin a comfashion.
The
existence
of
the
as
parable
group theunitof analysisneither
meansthatall individualswithinthegrouphavethesame experiencesnor
that theyinterpretthemin the same way.Using the group as the focal
point providesspace for individualagency.While these themesremain
meritorious,
theysimplydo not lie at thecenterof standpointtheoryas
a theoryof group power and the knowledgesthat group location and
powergenerate.
the much-deservedattentionto issues of individual
Unfortunately,
the continuedsaagency and diversityoftenovershadowinvestigating
lienceofgroup-basedexperiences.Butgroup-basedexperience,especially
thatofraceand/orsocial class,continuesto matter.Forexample,AfricanAmerican male rates of incarcerationin Americanjails and prisons
remainthe highestin the world,exceedingeven those of South Africa.
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SIGNS
377
Collins
COMMENT
Transcendingsocial class, regionof residence,commandof English,ethnic background,or othermarkersof difference,
all Black men mustin
some way grapplewiththe actual or potentialtreatment
bythecriminal
as
justice system.Moreover, mothers,daughters,wives, and loversof
Black men, Black women also participatein this common experience.
childrenfrompoor communitiesand homelessfamiliesare unSimilarly,
attend
to
likely
college, not because theylack talent,but because they
lack opportunity.
Whatevertheirracial/ethnic
classification,
poor people
as a group confrontsimilarbarriersforissues of basic survival.In this
sense, standpointtheoryseems especiallysuitedto explainingrelations
of race and/orsocial class because thesesystemsof power sharesimilar
Giventhehighdegreeof residentialand occupainstitutional
structures.
tional segregationseparatingBlack and/orworking-classgroups from
Whitemiddle-classrealities,it becomesplausibleto generatearguments
and/orBlackculturethatemergefromlong-standing
about working-class
shared experiences.For both class and race, a much clearercase of a
Whetherindividualsfromor associgroupstandpointcan be constructed.
ated withthesegroupsacceptor rejectthesehistories,theyrecognizethe
saliencyof thenotionof groupstandpoint.
But genderraises different
issues, for women are distributedacross
theseothergroups.In contrastto standpointsthatmustlearnto accommodate differenceswithin,feministstandpointsmust be constructed
difa distinctly
such as these.Thus, genderrepresents
across differences
How
efwithin
ferentintellectualand politicalproject
standpointtheory.
to
that
was
can a standpointtheory
originallydeveloped explifectively
of European,
cate thewage exploitationand subsequentimpoverishment
the
to
be
extremelyheterogeneous
applied
working-classpopulations
UnitedStates,let alone globpopulationof womenin thecontemporary
ally?For example,Black womenand Whitewomendo notlivein racially
integratedwomen'scommunities,separatedfrommen and childrenby
experiencebank
processessuchas gendersteeringintosuchcommunities,
to
women's
to
lend
in
refusal
results
that
communities,
money
redlining
attendinferiorschools as a resultof men movingto all-malesuburban
areas,and thelike.Instead,Black and Whitewomenlivein raciallysegreand theexperiencestheygarnerin suchcommunities
gatedcommunities,
in physitheracial politicsoperatingoverall.Moreover,proximity
reflect
cal space is not necessarilythe same as occupyinga commonlocationin
thespace of hierarchical
powerrelations.For example,Blackwomenand
women of color routinelyshareacademic officespace withmiddle-class
and/orWhitewomenacademics.It is quitecommonforwomenof color
to clean the officeof the feministacademicwritingthe latesttreatiseon
standpointtheory.Whilethesewomenoccupythesame physicalspaceshouldnot be confusedwithgroupsolidarity-they
thisis whyproximity
378
SIGNS
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENT
Collins
locationsin hierarchicalpowerrelations.
different
occupyfundamentally
These womendid not justenterthisspace in a randomfashion.An entire
createdpaths in whichthe indiarsenalof social institutions
collectively
vidualsassignedto one groupreceivedbetterhousing,healthcare,education,and recreationalfacilities,while thoserelegatedto the othergroup
did withworse or did without.The accumulationof thesedifferent
exof
women
to
that
same
academic
The
the
two
led
space.
groups
periences
actual individualsmatterless than the accumulationof social structures
that lead to theseoutcomes.In this sense,developinga politicaltheory
a different
and morecomplex set of isforwomen involvesconfronting
sues thanthatfacingrace theoriesor class-basedtheoriesbecause women'sinequalityis structured
differently.
Thereis a thirdthemeof standpointtheoryin whichpoweris erased,
ofgroupconsciousness,groupself-definition,
and
namely,thesignificance
"voice" withinthisentirestructureof power and experience.Collapsing
individualand groupidentity
because applying
emergeshereas significant
standpointtheoryto the individualas proxyforthe groupbecomesparticularlyproblematicin comparingindividualvoice withgroupvoice or
thisprocessoperatesvia imagininghow individuals
standpoint.Typically,
and thenclaiminga "familyresemblance"posnegotiateself-definitions
itingthat collectivitiesundergoa similarprocess. Because collectivities
thisapproach apcertainlydo constructstoriesin framingtheiridentity,
pears plausible.But can the individualstand as proxyforthegroupand
thegroupfortheindividual?Moreover,can thisparticularversionof the
individualserveas theexemplarforcollectivegroupidentity?
If an individualreasons fromhis or her own personalexperiencesby
what
imaginingthatsince "we are all thesame underthe skin,therefore,
I experiencemustbe thesame as what everybodyelse experiences,"then
a certainperceptionof groupnarrativestructure
emerges.Ifan individual
believesthathis or herpersonalexperiencesin comingto voice,especially
the innervoices withinhis or her own individualconsciousnesshidden
fromhierarchalpowerrelations,not onlyreflect
a commonhumanexperiencebut, more to the point,also serveas an exemplarforhow group
consciousnessand decision makingoperate,thenindividualexperience
becomes the model forcomprehending
group processes.This approach
minimizesthe significance
of conflictwithingroupsin generatinggroup
narratives.In themodel in whichan individualconductsinnerdialogues
among various partsof his or her "self,"the process of mediatingconflictingidentitiesoccurs withineach individual.The individualalways
holds completepower or agencyover the consciousnessthat he or she
constructsin his or her own mind and the voice that she or he uses to
expressthatconsciousness.
Shiftingthismode of comingto voice to the level of the small group
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SIGNS
379
Collins
COMMENT
providesspace to thinkof groupsas collectionsof individualsengaged
theconcernlies in
in dialogue withone another.As equal and different,
has
most
rules
to
decide
whose
voice
validity.By asking,"If we
finding
how do we discrimacknowledgemultiplerealities,multiplestandpoints,
inate among them?" (359), Hekman continuesthe searchforrulesthat
everyonecan followin orderto come to a collective"voice."Withinthe
thisseemsreainteraction,
scope of individualsengagedin face-to-face
ofgroupthatundersonable. Butdoes thisworkwiththeunderstanding
lies standpointtheory?
Hekman quite rightlyrecognizesthatmultiplerealitiesyieldmultiple
perspectiveson reality.But again, herconcernwiththe questionof who
has the best,"truest,"or privilegedstandpointremainsgroundedin amand how hierarbiguousnotionsofgroupthatomitgroup-basedconflicts
in groupvoice or standpoint.
chical powerrelationsgeneratedifferences
argumentsolelyto the
Bracketingthe questionof power and restricting
of usingepistemological
revealsthelimitations
questionoftruthcertainly
criteriain defenseofprivilegedstandpoints.Butwithintherealityofhierarchicalpower relations,the standpointsof some groupsare most certainlyprivilegedoverothers.The amountof privilegegrantedto a partictheterrain
ular standpointlies less in itsinternalcriteriain beingtruthful,
in which Hekman situatesher discussion,and more in the power of a
group in makingits standpointprevailoverotherequallyplausibleperspectives.Withinhierarchicalpower relations,it seems reasonablethat
in soligroupsdisadvantagedbysystemsofpowermightsee theirstrength
and
location
common
their
to
subjugadarityand collectiveresponses
tion.In contrast,it seemsequallyplausiblethatthoseprivilegedbythese
typesof group placementsmightwant to do away with notionsof the
in effectobscuringthe privilegestheygain fromgroup
groupaltogether,
membership.
Again, genderraises some particularchallengesin using standpoint
contributhestandpointofwomen.One fundamental
theoryto represent
tion of feministmovementgroundedin standpointtheorywas that it
aimed to bringwomen'sgroupconsciousnessinto being.Earlyemphasis
and
on women'scomingto voice via theprocessof consciousness-raising
the
for
foundation
laid
the
"voice"
individual
type
inadvertently
claiming
of conceptualambiguitybetweenindividualand group as categoriesof
analysis.Contemporaryfeministtheorizing,especiallythe emergenceof
the subject,aggrapostmodernsocial theory'sthemeof deconstructing
to bringingindividualwomen to
vates this long-standingcommitment
voice as emblematicof thecollectivestruggleof womenfor"voice." Collapsingtheprocessesof individualand groupvoice and usingtheprocess
of individualwomencomingto voiceas emblematicofwomen'scollective
thisnotionthatindividualand collectivevoice
comingto voicereinforces
380
SIGNS
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMMENT
Collins
or standpointare the same. For manycontemporaryfeminists,
voicing
theirdiscontentwithoppressionis sufficient-actually
changinginstitutional powerrelationsseemsless important.Gainingvoice onlyto lose it
again to a standpointtheorythat replaces the freedomof individually
or sisterhoodwith the obligationsof race, class,
negotiatedfriendships
and gender "families"seems unacceptableto those with the means to
escape.
Standpointtheoryarguesthatideas matterin systemsof power.In this
sense,standpointsmaybe judgednotonlybytheirepistemologicalcontributionsbut also bythetermsof theirparticipationin hierarchicalpower
relations.Do theyinherently
explain and condone injustice,or do they
challengeit? Do theyparticipatein relationsof rule via creatingknowledge,or do theyrejectsuch rulebygeneratingculturesof resistance?Extractingany claims about knowledgefromthe power relationsin which
theyare embeddedviolates the basic premiseof standpointtheorybecause such theoryexists primarilyto explicate these power relations.
Thus, attemptsto take the knowledgewhile leavingthe power behind
inadvertently
operatewithintheterrainof privilegedknowledge.While I
in deconstructing
respectpostmoderncontributions
languagesof power,
standpointtheoryencompassesmuchmorethanchangingthe "language
game of politics" (363). Oppressionis not a game,nor is it solelyabout
real.
language-for manyof us, it stillremainsprofoundly
Studies
Departmentof African-American
University
of Cincinnati
Winter 1997
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.130 on Tue, 26 Mar 2013 07:55:02 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SIGNS
381