A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO END
THE ‘LIGHT’ AND ‘MILD’ DECEPTION.
January 2005
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada
1226 A Wellington Street ♦ Ottawa ♦ Ontario ♦ K1Y 3A1
Tel: 233 4878 ♦ Fax: 233-7797 ♦ www.smoke-free.ca
A comprehensive plan to end the ‘light’ and
‘mild’ deception.
For over thirty years, Canadian tobacco companies have deceived smokers into thinking
that ‘light’ cigarettes are less harmful than ‘regular’ cigarettes. They have designed their
cigarettes and their cigarette packaging and marketing to perpetuate this deception.
For over twenty years, Health Canada has known that the
measurements of tar, nicotine and other compounds produced
by smoking machines do not reflect the amount of harmful
Believe That Light or Mild Cigarettes reduce the Risks
of Smoking Without Having to Give Up Smoking
Health Ministers and the department have admitted that this
deception is harming Canadians, but have done nothing to
stop change the way tobacco companies use packaging
marketing and cigarette design to deceive smokers.
For over ten years, health groups have been calling for an end
to the deception and have called on Health Canada to use its
regulatory power to ban deceptive packaging and labelling
and have called on the Competition Bureau and other
Percentage of Light/M ild Sm okers
substances inhaled by real smokers. For over six years,
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
15-19 years 20-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years
consumer protection bodies to intervene.
Many Canadians still believe that these cigarettes are less
harmful, even though governments and other health
Men
than 600,000 Canadians who smoke so-called ‘light’ and ‘mild’
cigarettes believe that the will get less tar from these cigarettes.1
To protect consumers, Health Canada must ban each of the deceptive practices used
by tobacco companies, including:
The use of misleading brand descriptors that falsely convey differences in ‘strength,’
such as ‘light,’ ’ultra-light,’ ‘mild,’ ‘ultra-mild,’ ‘smooth,’ etc.
2.
The use of misleading colours and packaging elements that falsely convey differences
in strength, such as the use of lighter colours or more white space to falsely imply
that these products are less harmful.
3.
The display of numbers on packages that falsely convey differences in the amount of
compounds inhaled between brands or sub-brands of cigarettes, and that fail to tell
consumers how much they are inhaling.
4.
The marketing and display of cigarettes in ways that falsely conveys distinctions
between types of cigarettes.
5.
The use of brand extensions (several types of one brand of cigarettes) that falsely
convey distinctions between types of cigarettes.
6.
The use of cigarette designs that falsely convey a smoking experience of ‘reducedstrength’, and that facilitate changes in smoking behaviour that are unperceived or
barely perceived by the smoker.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
Women
Health Canada surveys show that the light and
mild deception harms many smokers
authorities have cautioned that this is not the case. More
1.
45 years &
over
1
Step 1:
Ban misleading brand descriptors
Health Canada’s continued delays in banning the use of the terms ‘light’ and ‘mild’ have
become cause for wide concern. More than three years have passed since a previous
Minister of Health requested tobacco companies to voluntarily remove these labels, and
subsequently issued a notice of his intent to implement regulations requiring them to do
so.
Other countries have not been so slow to take this important first step. Since September
30, 2003 the European Union has required its (now) 25 member states to ensure that
“texts, names, trade marks and figurative or other signs suggesting that a particular
tobacco product is less harmful than others shall not be used on the packaging of tobacco
products.” 2 Brazil and Israel have introduced similar provisions.3
Canada recently ratified the global tobacco treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, which requires that parties to the treaty:
“ ensure that tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by
any means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression
about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions, including any term,
descriptor, trademark, figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates the
false impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than other tobacco
products. These may include terms such as "low
tar", "light", "ultra-light", or "mild";”4
Tobacco industry tactics in the countries which have
banned terms suggest that additional measures are
necessary.
The companies have attempted to subvert the
purpose of the European and Brazilian regulations by
introducing colour-coding to replace the newlybanned terms. Red is most often used to convey “full
strength”, blue to convey “light,” silver to convey
“extra light” and green to convey menthol.
The tobacco companies’ willingness to continue
communicating false differences in their brands
illustrates why it is necessary to ban the use of
misleading descriptors, but that doing only this is not
sufficient to end the deception.
In Europe and Brazil, tobacco companies replaced
words like ‘light’ with colour coding.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
2
Step 2:
Remove misleading numbers from cigarette packages
In 1976, Canada’s tobacco companies adopted a voluntary code to display ratings for tar
and nicotine content of their cigarettes. The same year, the first ‘light’ brand (Players’
Light) was introduced. It quickly became
the best-selling brand. In 1989, the first
Machine tar readings for 25 most popular Canadian
brands - ISO & 'Intense' Methods
federal laws on cigarette labelling came
into effect, and the formerly voluntary
listing on packages of tar, nicotine and
0.0
carbon monoxide became mandatory. In
2000 the government imposed new
requirements that other compounds also
be disclosed, and that a second machine
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
du Maurier Ultra Light Regular Filter
du Maurier Ultra Light King Size Filter
du Maurier Extra Light Regular Filter
du Maurier Extra Light King Size Filter
measurement also be used.5 The first
Players Extra Light King Size Filter
Players Extra Light Regular Filter
method (ISO or FTC) was developed by
tobacco companies, the second was
5.0
Matinee Extra Mild King Size Filter
du Maurier Special Mild 100
du Maurier Special MildKing Size Filter
adapted from the first by Health Canada
and intended to show a more ‘realistic’
measurement of smoker exposure.
du Maurier Light Regular Filter
du Maurier Light King Size Filter
Matinee King Size Filter
Players Light Smooth Regular
Rothmans Special Mild King Size
It is now well established that the
machine readings shown on cigarette
packages (both the historic and recent
measurements) have little relationship to
how much an individual actually smokes.
Yet many smokers believe that the
numbers on the side of the package can
provide a guide to how much smoke they
Export 'A' Light Regular
Players Light King Size Filter
Players Light Regular Filter
Craven Menthol King Size Filter
Craven A King Size
du Maurier Regular Filter
Export 'A' Medium Regular
Rothmans King Size Filter
intense
du Maurier King Size Filter
ISO standard
Export 'A' Regular
Players Regular Filter
will inhale.6
The development by Health Canada of a
second test method was helpful in
illustrating that the apparent differences
between brands under one system had little
relationship to the differences under a
Canadian cigarette packages must now display readings from
two machine tests. The dark bars are the standard test
developed by tobacco companies, the light bars are the
‘intense’ method developed by Health Canada.
Neither of these values do not help smokers understand how
much they are inhaling and help continue the deception that
some cigarettes are less harmful than others.
second system. By requiring the results of
both tests to be shown on each cigarette package, they have provided smokers with more
information, but there is no evidence that this information has been helped smokers
understand that there is no relationship between those values and their own smoke
exposure.
While smokers are likely to inhale toxic substances in amounts somewhere between the
lowest number and the highest number on the side of the package, there is about a
threefold difference between these numbers and there is no way of knowing how much a
given smoker will inhale. The information is thus, at best, useless and, at worst,
dangerously deceptive to individual consumers.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
3
Step 3:
Ban deceptive package imagery
Tobacco companies have developed package imagery to reinforce the deception
that leads smokers to think that some brands are less harmful than others.
As the industry’s own studies put it:
“a pack not only generates powerful independent images, but also provides
important and predictable cues or suggestions about the type of smoke which may
be expected from a cigarette contained in such a pack, and even the type of person
who might typically smoke such cigarettes.”7
Canada’s largest tobacco company, Imperial Tobacco/BAT researched how
package design affected the perceived strength of their products, that is to say
they measured how the package reinforced the deception that there were
differences in the strength/harmfulness of their products.
“Brand name does have connotations which may shift product perception.
However the more important influences appear to be the product itself and the
pack in which it is presented.
Subjective evaluation can be manipulated by imagery variables.”"8
We have learnt that tar level isn't the only determinant of strength. Other main
contributors would be the qualifier (strong, medium light), packaging and other
elements that contribute to the trademark image. A good illustration of this is
Player's Medium versus Player's Light; the tar level of these two brands is
practically identical (14 vs 13) - yet in image terms, they are perceived to be
significantly different on strength (6.4 versus 5.1)."
When we position our brands, we use all the tools to place the brands at the
desired position in relation to the parent and the competition."9
The current package of Player’s cigarette brand family shows how imagery in
the form of:
•
different styles of boats
•
different intensities of the chevron
•
different amount of white on the package
•
different descriptors, and
•
different intensities of blue
are combined to convey deceptive differences within the brand.
Imperial Tobacco says it does this to help smokers “navigate the tar spectrum” 10
That is to say, they admit that they intend smokers to believe that there is a
difference between brands.
Eliminating only the descriptors (i.e. ‘light’, ‘smooth,’ and ‘silver’) would not
eliminate the deception. The use of colours, imagery and other devices that
contribute to the deception must also be banned.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
4
Step 3:
Ban brand extensions
In the tobacco market, a ‘brand extension’ is a model of
cigarettes that is sold under the same brand name but which
produces a different reading on smoking machines.
Imperial Tobacco, for example, markets six brand extensions in
its du Maurier family, eight brand extensions in its Player’s
family and eight versions of Matinee.
BAT/Imperial Tobacco Canada’s
three major brand families
du MAURIER
du MAURIER Light
du MAURIER Extra Light
Tobacco companies began to introduce ‘brand extensions’ in the
du MAURIER Ultra Light
1970s to allow them to promote ‘light’ cigarettes to smokers who
du MAURIER Special Mild
felt they should quit, but who could be encouraged to keep
du MAURIER Edition
smoking if there was a ‘healthier’ cigarette available. 11 By
using the same brand name, the companies found they could
Player's Plain
capitalize on the imagery they had already developed for that
Player's Filter
trademark.12
Player's Medium
If smokers are faced with multiple types of cigarettes under one
brand name they can be expected to look for and find differences
in those brands, and to ascribe a meaning to those differences.
Because these cigarettes were marketed to convey a hierarchy of
‘strength’/harmfulness, this will be the meaning that smokers
Player's Light
Player's Light Smooth
Player's Extra Light
Player's Silver
Player's Special Blend)
ascribe to any within-brand distinctions.
Tobacco companies recently showed in Europe how quickly
brand extensions allow them to use new descriptors (like
colours) to convey deceptive health information.
As the pictures of currently available Player’s brands shows,
Canadian cigarette brand families are already colour-coded.
Removal of the misleading words only and not the associated
imagery would not sufficiently reduce the deception.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
Matinée
Matinée Extra Mild
Matinée Menthol
Matinée Select
Matinée Silver
Matinée Slims
Matinée Slims Menthol
Matinée Ultra Mild
5
Step 5:
Ban deceptive cigarette designs
It is not only by marketing their cigarettes with terms like ‘light,’ deceptive machine
readings and package designs and brand extensions that tobacco companies have
deceived smokers into thinking that some cigarettes are less harmful than others. The
cigarettes themselves have been designed to
create and sustain this deception.
Modern cigarettes are made with highly
Researchers are now calling for an end to filter-ventilation
(see Kozlowski, reference 13
ventilated paper and filters. Originally, this
was thought to dilute the smoke with air, and
thus reduce the amount of smoke inhaled. In
fact, it merely allowed smokers to control the
dilution, and to easily adjust the amount of
smoke they inhaled so that they received the
right dose of nicotine at the right puff (smokers
will try to get more nicotine out of the first
puffs of a cigarette than out of the last ones).
Because smokers have to inhale more deeply to
get the dose of nicotine they crave, the
cigarette gives the impression of being ‘lighter.’
The smoke from a ventilated cigarette is less
dense, but smokers forget that because they
inhale more of it they are actually getting the
same amount of toxic substances. The smoking
sensation perpetuates the impression. 13 The
adjustment of smoking is called ‘compensation,’
and these cigarettes are designed to be
‘compensatible.’
This is, by way of analogy, similar to the drinkers’ experience: a one-ounce shot of scotch
tastes ‘stronger’ than a one-ounce shot of rum mixed with fruit juice, but they both have
equal alcohol effects).
Recent research suggests that the modern cigarette is a defective design, in the same way
that a car that explodes is a defective design.
Health Canada can use its existing powers in section 5 of the Tobacco Act to demand that
tobacco companies stop using deceptive cigarette designs and that they start making
cigarettes less compensatible.
There are dozens of ways that cigarette design can be manipulated to make cigarettes
compensatible. Attempts to regulate one or more design features may result in
companies subverting the intent of the regulation by devising alternate ways to make
cigarettes compensatible.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
6
A better strategy would be to require by regulation of overall performance standards that
achieve the desired effect.
One example of a performance-based regulation to reduce compensatability would be to
require that that there be no more than a 50% difference between the two types of
current machine readings (the ISO method and Health Canada’s intense method) for each
brand.
Health Canada should concurrently set performance-based regulations to reduce the
elasticity of cigarette brands (elasticity is a specific dimension of compensatibility, which
allows smokers to get proportionately more nicotine from a cigarette when they increase
the amount they inhale).
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
7
Step 6:
Support regulatory requirements with good health
programming
In addition to banning these deceptive practices of the tobacco industry, Health Canada
can help ensure that Canadians are no longer deceived by:
•
integrating messages about product design and marketing into its
communication activities.
•
making public which tobacco products are ‘identical’ (the government is provided
with a list of identical products currently sold under different brand names, but
has made the decision to keep this information secret.
Du Maurier light, for example, is identical to Matinee, but the different
packaging and marketing results in some smokers thinking that it is “stronger”.
•
Banning retail displays. Tobacco companies display packages in ways which
communicate false distinctions.
•
Using consumer protection law to hold tobacco companies accountable for
deceptive marketing.
A staged approach to implementation of this comprehensive
plan to end the deception
Some parts of this plan have already benefited from more reflection and research than
others. In particular, steps 4 and 5 have not received much attention to date, and could
well benefit from being more carefully researched, as part of the preparation for the
introduction of effective regulation.
Accordingly, the following schedule is suggested for the adoption of regulations to
implement the six steps in this comprehensive plan.
2005
•
Step 1: Ban misleading brand descriptors
•
Step 2: Remove misleading numbers from cigarette packages
•
Step 3: Ban deceptive package imagery
•
Step 6: Support regulatory requirements with good health programming
2006
•
Step 4: Ban brand extensions
2007
•
Step 5: Ban deceptive cigarette designs
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
8
Background:
Chronology of court and government actions on ‘Light and Mild’
cigarettes since 2000.
January 24, 2001: The government of British Columbia (under Premier Ujjal Dosanjh)
re-filed a lawsuit against the tobacco industry. The lawsuit includes claims that the
industry “sold ‘light’ cigarettes as an alternative to give false reassurance to smokers who
were concerned about their health – even though these cigarettes deliver about the same
amount of tar and nicotine as regular cigarettes.” (B.C. statement of claim)
May 31, 2001: World No Tobacco Day. Hon. Allan Rock asks tobacco companies to
voluntarily remove "light" and "mild" terms from cigarette packages within 100 days, and
asks the Ministerial Advisory Council on Tobacco Control to recommend actions in the
event the companies do not comply. (Health Canada press release)
21 August 2001: Environics reports that two-thirds of Canadian support ending the use
of "light" on cigarette labels. (Environics news release)
8 September 2001: 100 days pass without the cigarette companies removing misleading
descriptors from their packages. (Imperial Tobacco's response)
1 November 2001 – The Health Minister Allan Rock releases the findings of the Expert
Panel, which advises that regulations under the Tobacco Act be passed to ban the use of
the descriptors. (Health Canada press release)
27 November 2001: United States' National Cancer Institute scientific report concludes
no benefit from lower tar cigarettes. (Press release)
1 December 2001: Notice of Intent published in Canada Gazette proposing ban on the
terms “light” and “mild”. (Gazette) Deadline for public responses to notice of intent is
January 15, 2002..
January 2002: Brazil bans use of "any type of descriptor, on the packaging or in
advertising material, such as: classes (s), ultra low tar, low tar, smooth, light, soft, leve,
moderate tar, high or any others that could induce consumers to an erroneous
interpretation as to the tar contained in cigarettes.” (Brazilian regulation)
November 2002: The World Health Organization Scientific Advisory Committee on
Tobacco Product Regulation recommended a ban on all misleading health and exposure
claims and related packaging. (SACTOB recommendations)
December 2002: Health Canada research shows that 2 of every 3 smokers of 'light'
cigarettes switched to light based on the belief that there would be fewer health risks.
(Health Canada overview of 2001 CTUMS findings)
December 10, 2002: The European Court of Justice rejected a tobacco industry challenge
to the EU directive banning the terms 'light' and 'mild', 'low-tar', etc. (Court ruling)
December 13, 2002: The Quebec Superior Court upheld the federal Tobacco Act against
an industry claim of unconstitutionality. The law allows the federal government to
regulate how cigarettes are labelled. (Justice Denis' ruling)
March 21, 2003: Illinois judge Nicholas Byron rules in favour of a class action suit
against Philip Morris for the sale of ‘light’ cigarettes (the “Price” suit). He ordered the
company to pay US$10 billion in damages and said that "the course of conduct by Philip
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
9
Morris related to its fraud in this case is outrageous, both because Philip Morris' motive
was evil and the acts showed a reckless disregard for the consumers' rights."
May 8, 2003: Lawyers from the Klein Lyons firm file a class action lawsuit in the name of
Kenneth Knight against Imperial Tobacco for damages associated with the deceptive
trade practice of 'light' labels on cigarette packages. (Statement of Claim)
May 20, 2003: World Health Organization adopts text for a global tobacco treaty, the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The treaty calls for an end to all misleading
descriptors, including the use of such terms as "low-tar" and "light." (WHO press release)
June 16, 2003: Complaint filed by the Non Smokers Rights Association with federal
Competition Bureau regarding the deceptive trade practice of labelling cigarettes as
"light" or "mild. " (NSRA Press Release)
July 15, 2003: Canada signs the framework Convention on Tobacco Control - but doesn't
say when it will ratify the treaty, or whether it will implement the requirement to ban
the terms "light" and "mild" (Health Canada Press Release)
September 30, 2003: "Low-tar" and similar misleading terms are banned on all
cigarettes sold in the European Union. (EU directive)
February 2004: The Australian government announces that it will abandon the use of
machine tests as they “bear no relation to what smokers actually ingest.” (Press release)
April 30, 2004: Imperial Tobacco files its response to the Knight case filed in British
Columbia, arguing that it never represented that “light” or “mild” products reduced the
risk of disease and that it was the federal government that directed Imperial Tobacco
toward “developing and marketing lower delivery products.”
Imperial Tobacco files a “Third Party Notice,” deflecting responsibility for liability in the
Knight case to the federal Government. If consumers were misrepresented about “light”
and “mild,” cigarettes, ITL states “then the Federal Government breached the standard of
care in the operation of its health programmes,” and should pay any damages awarded in
this case.
August 16, 2004: Massachusetts court certifies a class action suit (“Aspinall” suit). "We
conclude that a class action is not only an appropriate method to resolve the plaintiff's
allegations, but, pragmatically, the only method whereby purchasers of Marlboro Lights
in Massachusetts can seek redress for the alleged deception," Justice John M. Greaney
wrote in the majority opinion.
September 14, 2004: Missouri court certifies ‘light’ class action suit against Philip
Morris (“Craft” suit). (news report)
October 14, 2004: The Federal government replies to Imperial Tobacco’s Third Party
Notice by recommending that the court throw-out the class action suit.
December 2, 2004. Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh announces that Canada is among the
first 40 countries to ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The treaty is
scheduled to come into effect on February 27, 2004. (press release)
January 10, 2005. Non-Smoker’s Rights Association seeks an application for judicial
review to compel the Competition Bureau to rule on its complaint regarding the ‘light’
deception. (press release)
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
10
References
1
2
Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey, (CTUMS), 2003.
European Union Directive on the Manufacture, Presentation and Sale of Tobacco
Products. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_194/l_19420010718
en00260034.pdf
3
Brazil Resolution - RDC n. 46, of March 28, 2001 http://www.anvisa.gov.br
/eng/tobacco/rdc_46.htm
4
World Health Organization. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Article
11. http://www.who.int/tobacco/fctc/text/en/fctc_en.pdf accessed January 2005.
5
Health Canada. Tobacco Products Information Regulations, June 2000.
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hecs-sesc/tobacco/legislation/prop_may_13.html#toxic
6
need to find reference
7
The Influence of Brand Identification and Imagery on Subjective Evaluation of
Cigarettes. Report No. RD 1752-C R.P. Ferris. Guildford via HC 202, beginning
page 102227170
8
Imperial Tobacco Canada. A summary of Brand imagery studies on Canadian
products. Research Report No. 183. 402374210
9
Letter from Don Brown to Ulrich Herter (BAT industry head), 1993 page
202200796
10
Imperial Tobacco’s response to Health Canada’s regulatory notice of December 1,
2001.
11
Bob Bexon, “Post Lights”
http://www.hlth.gov.bc.ca/guildford/pdf/013/00001365.pdf
12
Imperial Tobacco. Switching Analysis, 1991.
13
L T Kozlowski and R J O'Connor. Cigarette filter ventilation is a defective
design because of misleading taste, bigger puffs, and blocked vents. Tob.
Control, Mar 2002; 11: 40 - 50.
A comprehensive plan to end the light and mild deception
11