A house with two doors
An analysis of the effect of OSCE/ODIHR election
observation in Serbia 1997-2016
Urður Gunnarsdóttir
Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum
Félagsvísindasvið
Júní 2017
A house with two doors
An analysis of the effect of OSCE/ODIHR election observation in
Serbia 1997-2016
Urður Gunnarsdóttir
Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum
Leiðbeinandi: Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir
Stjórnmálafræðideild
Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands
Júní 2017
Ritgerð þessi er lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum og er
óheimilt að afrita ritgerðina á nokkurn hátt nema með leyfi rétthafa.
© Urður Gunnarsdóttir 2017
100567-3429
Reykjavík, Ísland 2017
Útdráttur
Með kosningaeftirliti er metið hvort kosningar uppfylli lýðræðislegar kröfur og gerðar
tillögur að umbótum þar sem það á við. Undanfarna tvo áratugi hefur Lýðræðis- og
mannréttindastofnun ÖSE, OSCE/ODIHR, haft með höndum kosningaeftirlit í aðildarríkjum
stofnunarinnar. Til að kanna hvort þessi aðferð til að mæla stöðu lýðræðis í einstökum ríkjum
bætir raunverulega úr því hvernig staðið er að kosningum, skoðaði höfundur allar lokaskýrslur
kosningaeftirlits ODIHR í einu ríki, Serbíu, 15 talsins, og lagði mat á hvaða þáttum væri bætt
úr og hverjum síður. Einnig var skoðað hvort vilji til úrbóta markaðist af tengslum Serbíu við
önnur ríki og samstarfsvilja við alþjóðastofnanir, einkum umsókn stjórnvalda um aðild að
Evrópusambandinu. Niðurstaða þessarar greiningar er sú að þrátt fyrir skýran vilja stjórnvalda
til að bæta kosningakerfi og lagaumhverfi kosninga fyrstu árin eftir fall Slobodans Milosevic
árið 2000, ekki síst vegna aðildarumsóknar að ESB, dregur úr viljanum frá árinu 2008, t.d. er
varðar að setja reglur um fjármál stjórnmálaflokka. Þá hefur staða og sjálfstæði fjölmiðla
versnað, um leið og hótanir í garð kjósenda hafa skotið upp kollinum að nýju og valdhafar
nýtt sér aðstöðumun til að fá aukna og gagnrýnislausa umfjöllun í aðdraganda kosninga. Þetta
helst í hendur við aukna áherslu stjórnvalda í Serbíu á samskipti við bandamenn í austri og
tilhneigingu stjórnvalda í allnokkrum Evrópuríkjum að slaka á ítrustu lýðræðiskröfum.
3
Abstract
Election monitoring assesses whether elections are in line with democratic standards and
makes recommendations for improvements, where needed. Over the past two decades, the
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE/ODIHR, has observed
elections in the Organization’s member states. To examine whether this method of assessing
the state of democracy improves the conduct of elections, the author analysed all final reports
of OSCE/ODHR election observation in one country, Serbia, 15 in total, and assessed which
factors have been improved and which ones less so. Furthermore, the author analysed whether
there is a correlation between the will to improve elections and governmental policy vis-à-vis
international cooperation and democratic credentials, to the extent it is measureable, looking
in particular at Serbia’s EU membership aspirations. This analysis concludes that despite a
clear will of Serbian authorities after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 to improve the
electoral and legal framework, improvements have been lagging since 2008 on issues such as
party financing. During the same period, since 2008, media independence has deteriorated,
while intimidation towards voters has re-emerged and incumbency has been taken advantage
of to get increased and uncritical coverage. This goes hand in hand with Serbian authorities
looking more towards its allies in the East and the tendency of some governments in Europe
to relax on the strictest requirements of democracy.
4
Preface
Election observation is a way to measure the ill-measureable: the state of democracy.
While the author is fully aware of the limitations of measuring democracy at all, it may be
argued that in the absence of a better or more encompassing tool, the conduct of elections
serves as an important indicator of the health and vibrancy of a democracy. The author’s
background is four years’ work for the Organization for Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in
the Balkans and over four years as a spokesperson for the OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institution’s and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), covering election observation in a majority
of the OSCE’s 57 participating states. For the last nine years, the author has worked for the
Icelandic government and hence been on the receiving end of OSCE/ODIHR’s observations.
This has raised interest in what drives government or authorities to move on improving and
strengthening democracy. In preparation for this assignment the author has drawn on
comments from fellow students and lecturer in the mandatory course ‘Masters theses:
Research plans and design - STJ302F’, particularly with regards to expounding information
on data and literature. Sound advice has also been sought with experienced election observers.
The supervisor for this dissertation is Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir, adjunct lecturer at the Faculty of
Political Science, School of Social Sciences at the University of Iceland. It accounts for 30
ECTS credits for a Master of Arts degree in International Relations at the University. The
research and the writing fully abide by the Code of Ethics, applicable at the University of
Iceland.1
1
University of Iceland Ethics Committee, "Vísindasiðareglur Háskóla Íslands,"
http://www.hi.is/sites/default/files/admin/meginmal/skjol/vshi_sidareglur_16_1_2014.pdf.
5
Index
Útdráttur ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Preface ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 8
1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 9
1.1 Purpose and research questions ...................................................................................... 10
1.2 Scope and structure ......................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Research perspective ...................................................................................................... 12
2 Theoretical background ......................................................................................................... 14
2.1 Realism – neo-realism .................................................................................................... 14
2.2 Liberalism - Liberal institutionalism .............................................................................. 16
2.3 Constructivism ................................................................................................................ 18
2.4 Democracy: a definition ................................................................................................. 22
2.5 Summary......................................................................................................................... 25
3 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 26
3.1 Methodology................................................................................................................... 26
3.2 Sources............................................................................................................................ 28
4 OSCE election observation ................................................................................................... 32
4.1 Election observation ....................................................................................................... 32
4.2 OSCE/ODIHR ................................................................................................................ 33
4.2.1 Human dimension .................................................................................................... 34
4.2.2 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 35
4.2.3 Political environment ............................................................................................... 36
5 Serbia overview ..................................................................................................................... 39
5.1 Serbia in the Cold War ................................................................................................... 39
5.2 Balkan wars - nationalism .............................................................................................. 40
6
5.3 Milosevic’s legacy .......................................................................................................... 41
5.4 Back from the cold ......................................................................................................... 42
5.5 EU ambitions .................................................................................................................. 43
5.6 A house with two doors .................................................................................................. 45
6 Election observation in Serbia 1997-2016 ............................................................................ 47
6.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................ 47
6.2 Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 50
6.2.1 Election system ........................................................................................................ 50
6.2.2 Election commissions .............................................................................................. 51
6.2.3 Election law ............................................................................................................. 53
6.2.4 Voter registration ..................................................................................................... 55
6.2.5. Political campaign ................................................................................................... 55
6.2.6. Ballots ..................................................................................................................... 57
6.2.7 Candidate Lists......................................................................................................... 57
6.2.8 Media ....................................................................................................................... 58
6.2.9 Vote 60
6.2.10 Count ...................................................................................................................... 62
6.2.11 Aggregation of results/Disputes............................................................................. 62
6.2.12 Publication of results.............................................................................................. 63
6.2.13 Observers ............................................................................................................... 64
6.2.14 Summary ................................................................................................................ 64
7 Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 68
7.1 Do election observations have an effect? ....................................................................... 68
7.2 How does election observation work? ............................................................................ 70
7.3 The effect on Serbia’s elections...................................................................................... 72
7.4 Post-wall Europe............................................................................................................. 75
8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 78
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 81
Annex I ..................................................................................................................................... 89
7
Abbreviations
ACA – Anti-corruption Agency
CoE – Council of Europe
DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia
EC – Election Commission (all levels)
FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
IR – International Relations
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ODIHR – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PB – Polling Board
PS – Polling Station
RBA – Republic Broadcast Agency
REC – Republic Election Commission
SAA – Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU
SNS – Serbian Progressive Party
SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia
VL – Voter List
8
1 Introduction
Serbia, as a young democracy on European crossroads, faces many challenges when it
comes to holding fully democratic elections. This dissertation, A house with two doors: An
analysis of the effect of OSCE/ODIHR election observation in Serbia 1997-2016, looks at
parliamentary, presidential and municipal elections in Serbia/Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia/Serbia
and
Montenegro
in
1997-2016
and
election
observation
and
recommendations based on the observation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). For ease
of reading, reference will from now on be made to Serbia, in line with the definition made by
OSCE/ODIHR and the fact that Serbia is the successor state of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006), it was the seat of the
capital, Belgrade, and holder of the national flag.
Elections are an important tool to measure the health and vibrancy of a democracy, be it
only to a limited extent. There are differing views amongst scholars, politicians and others on
whether international observation serves its purpose. The aim is to examine whether election
observation delivers on its objective, which is to improve the conduct of democratic elections
as one of the building blocks for democracy, peace and security. Furthermore, to examine
whether and to what extent there is a correlation between the will to adhere to the observers’
recommendations and governmental policy vis-à-vis international cooperation and democratic
credentials, to the extent it is measureable. This author’s research questions are exploring
whether there is a relationship between the willingness to improve elections and the interest
by government to earn respect of, and admission to, international organizations; whether this
willingness for improvement is also an indicator of the state and robustness of democracy and
possible changes in international politics, which put a question-mark to the conventional
western definition of democracy. At the same time the aim is to demonstrate how election
observation serves as an incentive or even the stick needed (vs. the carrot) for an emerging
democracy to move forward.
By analysing all election observation reports for Serbia’s elections in the timespan given,
the author intends to draw up an image of issues that a young, European democracy is facing
on its way from conflict and autocracy following the end of the Cold War and its willingness
to adhere and react to international demands and concerns. By drawing up a parallel line of
9
Serbia’s domestic politics and international politics where that applies, the author aims to
demonstrate that outside peer-pressure has a direct effect on the willingness to improve
election processes and thereby affecting the country’s democracy in a constructive but also
adverse way. During the writing of this dissertation, a Needs Assessment Report for the 2
April 2017 Presidential election was issued, confirming many of the trends emerging from the
analysis of the 1997-2016 reports.
1.1 Purpose and research questions
Election observation has been conducted for over 20 years by the OSCE. The participating
states of the OSCE have declared democratic elections as a key component of the so-termed
soft security, necessary to reduce the danger of conflict. The aim of election observation is not
only to assess to which extent elections are held in respect of fundamental freedoms, but also
to promote the improved conduct of elections.2 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate
whether and to what extent this is contributing to the improved health of democracy in the
state concerned. Such analysis is also an important contribution to the assessment of the
usefulness and the methodology of election observation.
The author hopes that by taking a microscopic look at a particular country, over a 19-year
period, she will be able to demonstrate the gradual changes taking place. By using analyses
based on the same methodology in the same country, the comparison should provide valuable
insight into the reaction of governments to constructive criticism. This dissertation should add
to growing body of research on election observation, by looking specifically at one country,
and by taking into consideration the author’s background in election observation for a
regional organization.
Research questions
• What are the main challenges facing Serbian authorities and society in the election
process?
• Which recommendations by OSCE/ODIHR, as the representative of the international
community, are accepted and implemented and which are not? Are the changes made
substantial improvements of the system, or partial, and are there particular
recommendations which are ignored?
2
OSCE/ODIHR, "Elections," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections.
10
• Is there a correlation between the will to implement changes and the political
landscape, both domestically but also internationally?
• Has the prospect of eventual European Union (EU) membership had an effect on the
will and capacity to make changes and improvements to the election process, i.e. as a
carrot and stick?
1.2 Scope and structure
In order to define the subject of this dissertation, election observation by one
internationally recognized institution in one country will be examined. OSCE/ODIHR has
been selected as it is one of the leading international election observation bodies3, applying an
internationally agreed methodology,4 to systematically assess the extent to which elections
respect fundamental freedoms and are characterized by equality, universality, political
pluralism, confidence, transparency and accountability.5
Serbia has been selected as it has been subject of a total of 15 election observation
missions in two decades6 and therefore offers a consistent view, varied mainly in time. Serbia,
as a young democracy, is of interest due to its proximity to established western democracies,
Serbia’s shifting interest in closer alliance with those states and its old allies in Eastern
Europe, and its turbulent history since the end of the Cold War. The OSCE’s election
observation methodology, which is a method of analysing the election process, prior, during
and following the election, has been applied since 1996, hence the scope of time in this
dissertation. The two decades offer a consistent view on elections in the same country over a
period of great political and policy changes, from Slobodan Milosevic’s autocratic regime
following the Bosnia war ending in 1995 and through the Kosovo war, ending in 1999, his fall
from grace in 2000 and different multi-party governments, which have generally been
motivated by EU membership.
This dissertation will draw up a theoretical definition of key aspects of the subject: of
democracy and democratic elections, international cooperation, and the development of norms
3
Election Observation and Democratic Support. EODS, Handbook for European Union Election Observation,
ed. EODS, Third edition ed. (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2016). 9
4
UNEAD/NDI, "Declaration of Principles for International Election Observervation and Code of Conduct for
International Election Observers," United Nations Electoral Assistance Division/National Democratic Institute,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/16935.
5
OSCE/ODIHR. “Elections”.
6
OSCE/ODIHR "Elections in Serbia," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia.
11
that govern the interactions between states within international institutions. It will draw up an
outline of Serbia’s complex history since the Second World War before describing
international election observation and the background for OSCE/ODIHR’s observation in
particular, including the challenges it faces. An analysis of the main topics in the observations
then forms a basis for a summary of the main conclusions, which will be discussed in the
context of scholarly work on election observation and democratic developments.
1.3 Research perspective
As stated in the introduction, the author has first-hand knowledge and experience of
election observation, as well as working experience in Serbia and neighbouring countries.
While the aim of this dissertation is to keep the research perspective neutral towards the
event, it does not mean that the approach chosen is entirely positivist or value-free.7 It is in
fact difficult, if not impossible, to foresee a political study which isn’t value-laden to at least
some extent. By anchoring the research in a methodology subscribed to by over 20
international and domestic election observation groups from around the world,8 the author
hopes to minimize western value-laden assessments and views which are difficult for a
researcher from an established western democracy to avoid.
The theoretical perspective of the thesis focuses on testing existing theories9 by applying
an approach rooted in liberalism, constructivism and realism. This subject may at first
instance be a clear-cut example of liberal theory, defining states as pluralistic, not unitary
actors who see value in tying their interests with other states by cooperating internationally
which is arguably the motivation and one of the building blocks of the methodology of
election observation. However, liberal theory does not fully explain the motivations of states,
it does not clarify why and how states act in relation to outside pressure from an international
organization. Of interest here is to examine the democratic motivations of a state from the
point of view of realism/neo-realism, which stipulates that states act out of self-interest and
where the role of international organizations is seen as a tool in a power-struggle, able only to
keep the aspirations for power within tolerable bounds.10 Or to paraphrase Mearsheimer:
7
Gabe T Wang, and Keumjae Park, Student Research and Report Writing: From Topic Seleciton to the
Complete Paper (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016). 5
8
UNEAD/NDI.
99
Dimiter Toshkov, Research Design in Political Science (London: Palgrave, 2016). 290
10
Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1948). 220
12
Institutions are merely arenas to pursue power relationships.11 Approaching this from another
direction calls for a constructivist point of view, focussing on norms and identities.
Constructivists agree that behaviour by states as well as individuals is shaped by shared
beliefs and socially constructed rules and practices, and that by cooperating they can change
the meaning of norms. Krook and True support this, stating that the diffusion of international
norms and their effects on policy and political behaviour is a central research question in
constructivist theory.12 Or to quote Toshkov: “The researcher seeks information about
particular variables previously identified by theories but also pursues promising leads
suggested by the case itself.”13
11
John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3
(1994).
12
Mona Lena Krook, and Jacqui True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations
and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality," European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012).
103
13
Toshkov. 292
13
2 Theoretical background
Developments in international cooperation, relations between states and the existence and
of international organizations can be explained with international relations theories, a disciple
which has evolved extensively since its emergence as a theoretical scholarship in 1919.14 In
this dissertation, election observation and Serbia’s reaction to it, is viewed through three of
the main strands of international relations theory; realism, which views states in constant
struggle for power and security; liberalism, which sees international organisations as key
instruments in realizing ideas of a peaceful coexistence of states; and constructivism, which
claims that the world is socially constructed and that states’ behaviour, and that of
international organizations, can be explained by norms. As election observation looks at
whether elections are conducted in line with democratic standards; this chapter looks at
democracy through the lens of the three main IR theories.
2.1 Realism – neo-realism
The world, according to realists, is a grim place, where states seek to take advantage of
each other and see little benefit in cooperation. The struggle for power is characterized by the
need to gain and hold power, and, importantly, prevent others from empowerment.
Morgenthau sees the fundamental drive for power based on human nature, not universal moral
principles, and that those who seek power to stave off a revolt, will employ normative
ideologies to conceal their true aims.15 He argues that despite the human element, moral
principles cannot be applied to states. Neither the form nor the nature of power is fixed; it
varies, depending on the environment in which power is exercised.
Drawing on a range of historical ideas, from Thucydides to Machiavelli, realists believe
that the balance of power between states determines their will to cooperate and the extent of
their cooperation. While realism is not a description of a world at war at all times, it portrays
continuous security competition, where states seek maximum relative power.16 Realists look at
the world from a rational point of view, they see structural factors as the main determinants of
state behaviour, not ideas or discourse.17 The characterizing external behaviour is one that can
14
Stephanie Lawson, International Relations, Second edition ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 63
Morgenthau. 4-6
16
Mearsheimer. 9/48
17
Ibid. 40
15
14
be “adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation.”18 In classical realism,
power is what drives states, whereas the founding father of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, sees
the world as anarchic, where states are driven by their need for survival19 and operate in a selfhelp system, which does not deter them from allying themselves with others, as it is a matter
of convenience in the relentless aspiration to survive.
In a realist world, peace is unlikely to last and institutions are weak and difficult to sustain.
Cooperation between states is based on their perceived gain from it; Mearsheimer’s theory is
that they are not only preoccupied with their absolute gains, but also, the relative gains of
others, which is a powerful deterrent from cooperating. He maintains international institutions
merely reflect the world’s power distribution but have no great or lasting effect on
international stability. Their effect is only marginal, as they reflect the power calculations of
great powers without having a direct effect on how states behave. 20 Mearsheimer points to a
string of failures of the United Nations, for instance in peacekeeping, which he states has no
role to play in disputes between great powers. He also points to the failures of concerts which
do not last as the power balance between states changes.21
Realism does not see that institutions influence stability but that they simply reflect the
power distribution in the world. Therefore, the “self-interested calculations of the great
powers”22 have, at best, a marginal effect. Realist theory dictates that states would never give
international organizations the power to enforce sufficiently to overcome anarchy, they reflect
national interest and do not constrain powerful states. An international organization is, to
quote Mearsheimer, a “set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate
and compete with each other.”23 States then agree upon their behaviour within the boundaries
of the institutions, how they cooperate and what is unacceptable. Institutions are not a world
government; they call for cooperation in a given field but do not hold the power to penalize.
In neo-realism, possibilities for international cooperation are slim and neo-realists generally
see the importance of international regimes and institutions as exaggerated. In rational theory,
derived from realism, international institutions facilitate self-interested cooperation: states
18
Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," American
Political Science Review 79, no. 2 (1985). 294
19
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1979).
20
Mearsheimer. 7
21
Ibid. 36
22
Ibid. 7
23
Ibid. 8
15
participate in international cooperation out of fear of being left behind, even when it is not in
their best interest,24 but also to further their national goals.
2.2 Liberalism - Liberal institutionalism
An answer to realism is liberal theory, which links economic, political and social change,
and state behaviour in world politics. Moravcsik states that international order is increasingly
linked to three variants of liberal theory: national self-determination and social citizenship, the
increasing complexity of economic integration, and liberal democratic governance.25 Moral
and ethical principles drive and change States’ policies, as well as power bargaining and
changing international conditions. States vary in their goals and national interests but focus
primarily on their individual absolute gains and not the gains of others.26 Moravcsik
summarizes the core assumptions of liberal theory as threefold: individuals and groups are
fundamental actors in international politics in a rational and risk-averse manner; the state is
merely a representative institution of social actors, constantly affected by their changing
coalitions; and each state seeks to realize its preferences under constraints imposed by the
preferences of other states.27 He sees inter-connectivity between domestic politics within
states—ideas, interests and institutions—and how states behave in world politics. These statesociety relations shape state preferences, which, he argues, matter most in world politics. For
liberals, he argues, the configuration of state preferences is of greatest importance in world
politics—not, the configuration of capabilities.28 State preferences vary, and their
interdependence is a systemic outcome; states are not using all their capabilities pursuing one
goal in foreign policy.
Generally, peace operations and other international programmes to promote democracy
and human rights, are the legitimate offspring of the theory of liberalism, focusing on transnational relations and the important role international organizations and non-governmental
organizations play in promoting a world where values of freedom, equality and rationality are
24
Lloyd Gruber, "Power Politics and the Free Trade Bandwagon," Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 7
(2001). 706
25
Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International
Organization 51, no. 4. 535
26
Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," in Neorealism and
Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate, ed. Daniel A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993). 209
27
Moravcsik. 516-520
28
Ibid. 513
16
building blocks of liberal institutions.29 The theory of democratic peace, derived from liberal
ideas, rests on the assumption that democracies are unlikely to attack each other, and less
likely to wage wars. Liberalists see international organizations and international laws and
standards as key to promoting and protecting these fundamental principles. This is evident in
the OSCE’s Copenhagen commitments,30 extensive politically binding commitments on
democracy and human rights as a part of what the OSCE terms the ‘human dimension’ of
security.
A challenge to the realist lack of enthusiasm for international cooperation is liberal
institutionalism, based on the belief that international institutions are a powerful force for
stability, affecting state preferences and changing their behaviour. 31 While the nature of
various organizations and institutions is different, neoliberal theorist Keohane states that “all
efforts at international cooperation take place within an institutional context of some kind”. 32
He states it is in fact impossible for a liberal institutionalist to envisage “contemporary
international life” without organizations of some kind. It is within institutions that states
interact, act responsibly instead of based on their narrow self-interest, and trust other states,
although he reminds us that international cooperation is not always benign. 33 Changing
behaviour is entrenched in cooperating, but it also depends on others changing their
behaviour. In the liberalist view the international system is a forum where various actors learn
from their interactions, opposite to the realist view of a power-distribution system.
For liberal institutionalists, the norms are embedded within international institutions and
generated along with them, because of the demand for cooperation between states. They use
international organizations to manage their interaction, be it in peace, trade or war, including
post-conflict situations and security efforts.34 According to Abbott and Snidal, the main
motivations for states are centralization and independence,35 i.e. the established structure that
offers support but also the ability to act autonomously and neutrally within defined areas,
such as creating norms and promoting and observing elections. International organizations
29
J. Mark Halstead, "Liberal Values and Liberal Education," in Values in Education and Education in Values,
ed. J. Mark Halstead and Monica J. Taylor (London: The Falmer Press, 1996). 24
30
OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2005),
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/16363.
31
Mearsheimer. 7
32
Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4
(1988). 380
33
Ibid. 393
34
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998). 3
35
Ibid. 5
17
mostly begin as a normative and consultative arrangement which takes on a more formal
structure, although liberal institutionalism does not have a definite answer to why cooperation
and problem solving has taken on this form and not some other.36 These institutions are made
for stability and don’t generally adapt well to changes, although they, grudgingly, do. Critics
argue that the motivation for international programmes and operations is less righteous;
Keohane, indeed admits that some organizations are designed as means for prevailing in
conflict.37
2.3 Constructivism
Constructivists, in a challenge to realism and liberalism, as well as neo-realism and neoliberalism, claim that the world, or significant parts of it, is socially constructed, rather than
given by nature.38 Constructivists see international norms as a way to govern international
interaction39 and the pursuit for benefits by states may indeed generate new norms.
Constructivism is a valuable tool to analyse how norms within international institutions are
generated and how they evolve through interaction within institutions but also between states.
Katzenstein describes norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors
with a given identity.”40 Norms are human practice; people with principled commitments that
have made significant changes to the political reality. They are a dynamic change to the way
we look at things, what we tolerate and what our basic values are. We notice them when they
are challenged, perhaps because by then the change may already be underway, and they may
change surprisingly fast.41 Individuals follow social norms partly because not doing so would
indicate what kind of a person you are, therefore, reputation is a strong incentive to adhering
to norms. In politics, civil rights and civil liberties are as much protected by informal norms
for what is acceptable as they are by the powers of the formal legal system.42 Leadership is
subject to norms, as leaders who violate political norms, may encounter. The power of the
36
Ibid. 11
Keohane. 380
38
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,"
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). 391-393
39
Susan D. Hyde, "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion," American
Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011). 357
40
Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspective on International Security," in The Culture of
National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996). 5
41
Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986).
1096
42
Ibid. 1095
37
18
membership, be it contracts, treaties or alliances, supports and strengthens norms, Axelrod
argues. It makes going against a voluntarily accepted commitment unattractive; interacting
with those who are of the same views strengthens the resolve to implement the stated reasons
and by establishing a group helps define the purpose of the group.43 The firmer the norm
becomes, the likelier it is to be enshrined in the law, like freedoms and civil liberties.44
How does the state adopt and develop norms? The heart of the matter is the socially
constructed identity of a state; it does not arrive with a fully created set of norms or
“stateness”.45 The neo-realist anarchy, where all states focus on self-help, may be reality, but
this anarchy may also be a collective system of norms; anarchy is what states make of it, to
quote constructivism’s best known theoretical statement, by Alexander Wendt. He believes
that intersubjective systemic structure between states rests on collective understanding,
expectations and social knowledge, folded into international organizations. The identities of
states and the social structures they create are constantly evolving.46 Interaction at the
systemic level changes state identities and interests, Wendt says, and state egoism should not
be taken as given. Collective identity among states could emerge endogenously at the
systemic level, generate cooperation and transform systemic anarchy into an “international
state” – a transnational structure of political authority that he sees might undermine territorial
democracy.47
In the absence of a global government, states react to changes and seek benefits of
cooperating, creating norms, intentionally or unintentionally.48 Finnemore and Sikkink point
towards the reaction of state leaders to changes on the international fora, which, again,
develops and creates new norms.49 Finnemore, who has explored how states’ identity changes,
says states are “reorganized, redirected, and expanded at least in part according to shared
normative understandings about what ‘the state’ as a political form is supposed to do.”50 Hyde
and other scholars speak of norm creation by those institutions or others who are motivated by
principled ideas, such as the ideas thriving once the Cold War thawed, and whose efforts
43
Ibid.1105
Ibid. 1106
45
Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," The American Political Science
Review 88, no. 2 (1994). 387
46
Ibid. 389
47
Ibid. 384
48
Hyde. 357
49
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 892
50
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell Studies in
Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 35
44
19
bring about not only desired changes in state behaviour, but also develop norms by facilitating
cooperation between international institutions.51 By joining these norms, states are able to
project themselves as modern states.52
A model by Finnemore and Sikkink, often referred to, is that norms evolve through a “life
cycle”, beginning with “norm emergence”, then broad norm acceptance which reaches a
tipping point in a “norm cascade” and ends with “internalization”.53 Krook and True suggest
that we look at norms as ‘processes’, rather than as ‘things’, if we want to understand how
they develop and diffuse. Norms diffuse because they have different meanings, fit in with a
variety of contexts and are framed by different actors. However, their boundaries are largely
understood as fixed: norms are taught, advocated and internalized.54 Theories of norm
diffusion abound, but here three mentioned by Krook and True are of interest: norm
cascading, boomerang effect and spiral pattern. “Norm cascades”, is a linear process, also
referred to as “bandwagoning” among states as increasing numbers of states adopt a new
norm. According to this theory, international norms evolve in a patterned life cycle: norms
emerge, gain the acceptance of a critical mass of states, and diffuse across the international
community, with states converging around a common set of principles. Once conformity is
widespread, the norm life cycle moves into a period of internalization, during which the norm
becomes a taken-for-granted feature of domestic and international politics.55 The “boomerang
effect” describes cases where the state resists civil society demands, but domestic groups
connect to transnational allies, who then lobby their own states and international institutions
to pressure the state in question on a set of ideas and norms. This effect may initiate dramatic
changes in the scope and recognition of international norms. Related to the boomerang
approach is the possibility of a “spiral pattern” of transnational influence, with states
contesting and adapting norms, which Risse et al. have described as a five-stage process of
socialization of norms: domestic repression, state denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive
status and rule-consistent behaviour. Movement through these stages is not necessarily linear
and norm implementation may therefore halt or reverse at any time.56
51
Hyde. 357
Krook. 107
53
Finnemore and Sikkink. 895
54
Krook.
55
Ibid. 107
56
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic
Practices: Introduction," in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed.
Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 32-34
52
20
Structures are of interest to constructivists. Wendt, taking issue with neo-realists, who
believe structures are made from a distribution of material capabilities, points out that
structures are made of social relationships as well: shared knowledge, material resources and
practices. Demonstrating the last point: “The Cold War was a structure of shared knowledge
that governed great power relations for forty years, but once they stopped acting on this basis,
it was ‘over’.”57 Wendt explains that the social construction of international politics is an
analysis of how processes of interaction “produce and reproduce” social structures, in
cooperation and conflict, shaping identities.58
Constructivism sees the role of international organizations as norm entrepreneurs and norm
diffusers as key. Constructivists seek to uncover the social content of those organizations by
decrypting how dominant norms influence their behaviour as well as that of states. Many
constructivists see international organizations as agents of social construction, which may
teach or develop norms, convincing states to accept new values, changing what states want or
creating a want. As Finnemore points out, states do not always know what they want, their
“preferences are malleable”.59 In this sense, international organizations are powerful.
Finnemore together with Barnett, argues that they build the social world where cooperation
takes place, defining the interests that states come to hold. Their strength lies in the ability to
present themselves as neutral; not exercising power, but serving the states, whether or not that
is a correct rendition of reality.60 Abbot and Snidal, in examining how international
organizations facilitate cooperation, describe the process as laundering, and not only in
financial, negative terms; by their existence, organizations prevent states from directly
intervening in other states’ affairs, but allow them to contribute to conflict resolution and
democracy and human rights promotion, all in the name of neutrality. Here the independence
of the staff of international organizations plays a key role as their loyalties must be seen as
resting with the organization or institution not the states, “Eurocrats” being an example of
persons whose loyalties are beyond their states.61
Constructivists are concerned with how international institutions socialize states, members
and potential members. As Finnemore has pointed out, states may not always know what they
want, or change their preferences, due to pressure from international organizations. Their
57
Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995). 73-74
Ibid. 81
59
Finnemore. 5-11
60
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 162
61
Abbott and Snidal. 19
58
21
reaction may, in other words, be to a particular problem that they believe needs solving, or
react to a problem and a solution supplied by the international organization.62 This may
include strategic calculations, role-playing, normative suasion, but also looking at how deeply
rooted norms of institutions become internalized and how they affect identities and interests
of the states. At the global level, Barnett and Finnemore argue, international organizations
have a certain tendency to use undemocratic procedures in promoting liberal values,
something, they argue, has not particularly concerned scholars.63 Börsel and Risse, exploring
the different diffusion mechanisms of institutional change, describe how the European Union,
using different methods, influences EU member states and accession states. They have
identified them as coercion, using force or legal imposition; manipulating utility calculations,
by providing negative and positive incentives; socialisation, persuading actors to define and
redefine their interests and identities; and persuasion by promoting ideas as legitimate or true
through reason-giving, particularly used in dealing with accession candidates, neighbouring
countries, and in its external relations with third countries.64
2.4 Democracy: a definition
From the time of Greek historian Herodotus, democracy has meant the rule of the people.
Democracy may in the simplest terms be described as a decision-making procedure in any
group, where all its members have an equal right to have a say and have their opinions count.
Democracy, or any other form of government, is not of particular interest in realism;65 its
focus is on how states ensure their security, not how they are governed. For liberalists on the
other hand, democracy is the chosen form of government, ensuring the rights and the
freedoms of citizens. Democracy in the late 20th century and now in the 21st has evolved
significantly from the 19th century with its very limited suffrage, excluding women and lower
ranking males. Russett’s classic description of democratic governance relies on a voting
franchise for a substantial part of society, with a government brought to power in contested in
fair, honest and periodic elections and that the executive is elected by popular vote or
responsible to an elected legislature.66 The western definition of democracy has evolved to
62
Finnemore. 11-12
Barnett and Finnemore. 172
64
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction," West European
Politics 35, no. 1 (2012). 6-8
65
Stephen D. Krasner, "Realism, Imperialism and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert," Political Theory 20, no.
1 (1992). 45
66
Bruce M. Russett, with the collaboration of William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, Zeev Maoz,
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (New Jersey: Princeton, 1993). 14
63
22
include liberal values such as civil rights and economic liberty; and free elections are seen as
a critical point in the democratic process.67 Economic development increases the viability of
democratic governance, as with its implicit pacifism, liberal democratic governments tend to
support commerce, which promotes economic development.68 Thus, democratic peace theory
states that democracies do not wage wars with each other, although scholars have increasingly
painted a more complex picture which indicates that democracies are not that peaceful after
all, particularly against states they see as undemocratic. Furthermore, democratizing states
may have aggressive consequences, if this process is disrupted, for instance with the rise of
nationalism or increasing economic inequality.69
Samuel Huntington’s well known theory of democracy’s third wave, taking place in over
50 states since the 1974 revolution in Portugal, explores the reasons for the democratic
transition that occurred in a number of countries in a relatively short period of time. Three of
the factors he believes have contributed to the third wave, and which are of interest in the
context of this dissertation are: less legitimacy due to popular expectation for competitive
elections; the snowball effect of democratic success from one neighbouring country to the
next; and changes in policies of external factors, mainly international efforts by institutions or
states to affect the form of government.70 While Huntington saw the third wave as a positive
development, he warned already in 1991 that there could be what he termed a “third reverse
wave”, backsliding from democracy to authoritarianism, caused by e.g. weakening democratic
values, economic setbacks, social and political polarization, breakdown of law and order or a
reverse snowballing effect in other countries.71 This reinvigoration of authoritarianism, he
stated, could have unsettling effects in Eastern-Europe, including in what was at the time
Yugoslavia.72
Constructivism’s interest in democracy depends in large part on development and diffusion
of norms, where democracy is either the origin, creating the conditions, or a goal in itself.
From a constructivist’s point of view, democracies build on rule of law, the constraints of
checks and balances and participatory rule of citizens, with domestic structures consisting of
norms, rules and procedures. Krook and True take the gradual acceptance of election
67
Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press., 1993). 9
68
Moravcsik. 534
69
Ibid. 532
70
Huntington. 13
71
Ibid. 17-18
72
Ibid. 19
23
monitoring as an example of how sovereignty-based objections give in for the view that
democracy and human rights are a basic entitlement.73 In their interaction, democracies
emphasize “social diversity, shifting coalitions and consent of the governed and publicity of
the political process” shaping their practices and motivations in liberal systems.74 Risse states
that democratic systems are supposed to externalize their internal decisions-making norms
and rules in their foreign policy behaviour.75 In taking issue with the liberal democratic peace
theory, he sees democracies as two-faced; while not fighting each other, they are frequently
involved in disputes and wars with authoritarian regimes.76
Barnett and Finnemore recall that scholars studying democratization, particularly in the
developing world, worry that the use of democratic procedures may exceed the spread of
liberal values, and by that giving space for what has been termed as “illiberal democracies”.77
Fareed Zakaria, who coined the term in 1997, described it as “democratically elected regimes,
often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring
constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and
freedoms.”78 Historian Timothy Garton Ash likewise describes illiberal democracies as what
takes place when a government elected in free and fair elections is “demolishing the
foundations of a liberal democracy” without necessarily intending to erect a dictatorship.79
When the term was coined in 1997, over half of the world’s states were termed democratic,
but Zakaria’s estimate in 1997 was that 35 per cent of the world’s democracies counted as
illiberal, with the numbers steadily rising. Zakaria makes the point that the spread of
democracy coincided with the rise of liberal values, in what he terms constitutional liberalism.
but that now, “the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political
fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing; constitutional
liberalism is not.”80 In 2017 Garton Ash has termed the highpoint of constitutional, or liberal
democracy following the fall of the Berlin-wall as the post-wall period,81 claiming that it saw
its end with the economic crisis of 2008 which brought on a democratic and European identity
crisis as well.82
73
Krook. 111
Thomas Risse - Kappen, "Democratic Peace — Warlike Democracies?," ibid.1, no. 4 (1995). 500
75
Ibid. 500
76
Ibid. 491
77
Barnett and Finnemore. 172
78
Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. November/December (1997).
79
Timothy Garton Ash, "Is Europe Disintegrating?," The New York Review of Books, 19 January 2017.
80
Zakaria.
81
Garton Ash.
82
Ibid.
74
24
2.5 Summary
Armed with these contradicting theories of how states interact and view international
institutions, this dissertation attempts to explain the driving forces behind election observation
and Serbia’s reaction to it. Starting with the international institution, the OSCE, the author
will use liberal theory to explain its human dimension, where election observation belongs.
Liberalist thinking, and the belief that moral and ethical principles are an important part of
shaping states’ interests, together with power relations and bargaining, springs to life in the
commitments set by member states. It also sheds a light on how the definition of what
democracy entails has evolved, and may be evolving still. Liberal institutionalism addresses,
as the name implies, how international institutions act as a forum where states seek to solve
problems by cooperating, negotiating and developing coalitions, based on their varying goals
and interests, employing international law, treaties and political commitments. Liberalism,
however, does not fully explain the complex interactions between states and particularly,
states and institutions. The constructivist viewpoint, seeing these relations as a social
construct and cultural practices where international relations are governed by norms, helps to
explain how states react to institutions and indeed, to each other. Constructivist thinking helps
explain how a state chooses where to cooperate and how, and how international demands
change as norms develop. Constructivism also sheds a light on the multi-layered relationship
between a state and institutions which aim to change behaviours and norms of states. Realist
thinking is helpful, both as a counter-theory to liberalist and constructivist ideas, but also to
explain the recent challenges to liberal democratic ideas, which affect state interactions and
their relations with the very institutions they are part of or seek to join.
25
3 Methodology
A number of scholarly articles exist on Serbia’s history and generally on the background
and effects of election observation, focussing on the observers. This author is however not
aware of many analyses of how national authorities respond to election observation and the
related recommendations. An extensive amount of election observation reports on the country
in question, with thorough analyses of each election, presented in a comparable manner, are
the basis for this dissertation. This chapter describes the methodology selected for the analysis
and the sources available.
3.1 Methodology
This is an international relations thesis that does not avail itself of the tools of interviews or
surveys. It aims to analyse a set of observations that are based on a standardized monitoring
methodology, identifying changes by comparing 15 reports on the same state, and attempting
to associate those with actions and motivations of the state in question. The challenge facing
the author is to demonstrate that the research and the observed patterns reflect a causal
relationship.83 The author will examine written sources, recovering as much information as
needed for connecting the data from observations to historical and political facts relating to
government policy. Mindful of the dangers of bringing too much context into the explanatory
account and constructing narratives where there is no evidential basis, the researcher will seek
to consider alternative explanations84 by applying different theories to conclusions emerging
from the research.
This is a qualitative,85 single case study, keeping in mind Gerring’s assumption that all
single-case studies are qualitative in nature.86 As with all types of research, a single case study
has both strengths and weaknesses and is not without its critics who argue that one cannot
generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific
development and that a case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other
83
Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," Conflict Management and Peace
Science 25, no. 1 (2008).11
84
Toshkov. 295
85
Wang. 86
86
Toshkov. 295
26
methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building.87 But as Toshkov
explains, this method is commonly used in political sciences, and is helpful in contributing to
the understanding of processes and decision-making within various kinds of organizational
and political structures,88 in this case an organization and one of its member states. Yin points
out several rationales for choosing a single case design.89 Those applying to this case study
include that it describes a case that is representative and therefore should have an informative
value. In other words, it should confirm the theory that election observation does have an
effect on election processes in a given country and that links may be drawn between the
willingness to improve processes and interest in increased international cooperation. The aim
is to look at a case as an instance for a theoretically defined class of events,90 analysing the
motivation behind the actions of a given government by doing an in-depth study in order to
draw wider conclusions about the effects of election observation on the will of governments
to improve election processes. The question of “what is it a case of”91 is central here. The
author’s intention is to conclude from the case given, about other cases, or countries, and the
forces driving or forcing change, applying the theories of international relations of
constructivism, realism and liberalism.
This study does not aim to explain an individual historical episode, but rather to the point
possible, to generalize beyond the data, by examining one case to demonstrate a more general
theoretical proposition. In what has been termed a hypothesis-generating case study,92 the
author will look and analyse the Serbian elections in order to theorize on the larger effect of
election observation on a state in transition from the de facto autocracy of Slobodan Milosevic
to a democracy, and an applicant country to the EU. While there is a certain element of
theorizing on the larger event, observations of one country are not fully comparable to another
country or quantifiable,93 thus confirming its single case study component.
While election observation can be seen as more than just an isolated programme, this study
is also evaluative,94 exploring whether this programme, or international intervention, works,
and reaches its overall goals of improving the conduct of elections, thereby strengthening the
87
Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006).
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Designs and Methods, Fifth edition ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014).4
89
Ibid. 27-45
90
Levy. 2
91
Ibid. 2
92
Ibid. 5
93
Toshkov. 295
94
Wang. 85
88
27
pillars of democracy. Furthermore, it has elements of a historical study95 exploring how things
have changed over a period of two decades but also seeking the motivation for it. This
research is operationalized by analysing the 15 election reports and identifying changes from
election to election, where that applies, and assessing how they conform to changes in
governmental policy throughout the period. Three different theories, help to provide opposing
views and validate the robustness of the work.
3.2 Sources
This dissertation will largely be built on existing literature: OSCE/ODIHR observation
reports; scholarly sources; discourse in statements by government, opposition and
international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), OSCE and the EU; and
discourse in the media. The author relies on OSCE/ODIHR observation reports; legal
analyses from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe; Serbian law as accessible
through Legislationline,96 but must rely on the analyses of the ODIHR/CoE experts when it
comes to by-laws, regulations and sets of instructions by the Republican Election
Commission. Evaluations by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Transparency International and
Freedom House have a comparative element, which could be useful for this dissertation but
due to incoherency in the Freedom House data, between the often unchanging numeric
grades97 given and accompanying text, the author will rely on its analyses rather than the
grades.
Elections have a key role in any democracy, where people rule, as the power to govern is
embedded in their results. If the citizens are to trust the results of elections, the conduct of
elections is key: that the voters have trust in the system that will ensure that their will is
expressed correctly. This could be termed as self-enforcing98 democracy where incumbents
choose to hold free elections and the electorate chooses to observe the results. The western
definition of democracy has evolved to include liberal values such as civil rights and
economic liberty, with free elections as a critical point in the democratic process.99 Liberalists
engage themselves with democracy, expanding on its definition, including democratic peace
95
Ibid. 92
An online legislative database for OSCE States to assist them in bringing their legislation into line with
international human-rights standards.
97
Milos Damnjanovic, "Serbia," in Nations in Transit (Washington: Freedom House, 2016).
98
James D. Fearon, "Self-Enforcing Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, no. 4 (2011). 1
99
Huntington. 9
96
28
theory, which states that democracies do not go to war against each other. Hence, they see
democracy as a way to ensure peace in this world, whereas realists do not focus on the form
of government, but rather power relations between states and their pursuit for power and
security. Constructivists look at democracy from the point of view of development and
diffusion of norms. Democracy establishes the conditions for this development but may also
be the goal in itself. From a constructivist’s point of view, democracies build on rule of law,
the constraints of checks and balances and participatory rule of citizens, with domestic
structures consisting of norms, rules and procedures.
Election observation has become the most prominent method to assess that elections are
conducted in such a way that the electorate can express its will freely and have faith that its
will be implemented fully and correctly.100 Observation reports are public and the
consequences of election observations are important, as they are seen by many as legitimising
or de-legitimising governments, but still incumbent leaders invite observers to monitor
elections. This dissertation will look at the complex interaction between international
organizations and states, mainly through the lens of constructivism. In the theories of
Europeanization, norm development and diffusion is intertwined with positive and negative
incentives and normative pressure101 on both member states and aspiring members. The author
will also make use of liberal institutionalism when attempting to describe the complex
incentives and inhibitors for states to participate in international cooperation, including
accepting election observers. Realism serves as a tool to look at shifting power balances
between states and how they assess their interests.
A number of scholarly articles exist on the effects on election observation, both empirical
and analytical, a majority pointing out that observation does have an effect but differing in the
view of whether it is positive and of the motivation of the observers. Kelley argues, for
example, that observers may be constrained by donors or member states, and that observers
are more likely to endorse transitional elections and elections showing improvement from
earlier elections.102 Simpser and Donno state that even the likelihood of a presence of highquality election observers can harm governance, as authorities will move from more obvious
100
OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook, 6th edition ed. (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2010). 13
Börzel and Risse. 6
102
Judith Kelley, "D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation,"
International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009). 782
101
29
forms of election manipulation, such as ballot-stuffing, to more damaging methods.103 Fawn,
on the other hand, points out that while governments indeed adapt to criticism, some by
covertly influencing the outcome, observers also improve, by adding to the competence of the
missions and its experts.104 A majority of scholarly articles on election observation focuses on
the former Soviet Union, Africa and South-America, but less so on emerging democracies
seeking to join European democratic institutions, such as the South-East European states,
where the motivation for adhering to the will and recommendation of the observers may be
different, due to the possibility of joining influential regional organizations.
This dissertation looks at Serbia over a turbulent 20-years period, characterized by war,
aftermath of war, autocratic rule, popular revolt and moves towards membership of European
regional, democratic organizations, such as the European Union as well as resumed OSCE
membership. Extensive scholarly literature exists on the particularly turbulent era during
Milosevic’s autocratic rule, running what some scholars have termed pseudo-democratic
elections.105 Media coverage of Serbia’s gradual change over the last decade focuses mainly on
Serbia’s strive to become a member of the European Union, and more recently through what
has been termed a ‘democratic roll-back’, with less attraction towards liberal democracy and
with new forms of authoritarianism emerging,106 related among other things to frustrations
with the very international organizations they wish to join and the evolving relations between
European states following Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
The basis for the report are 15 final election observation reports for Serbia, which include
recommendations for improvement of the election conduct and process. 107 Almost all other
international observers of Serbia’s elections have cooperated with OSCE/ODIHR and issued
joint reports with the Office (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe). The observations of the main domestic observation group, Centre
103
Alberto Simpser and Daniela Donno, "Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?," The
Journal of Politics 74, no. 2 (2012). 501
104
Rick Fawn, "Battle over the Box: International Election Observation Missions, Political Competition and
Retrenchment in the Post-Soviet Space," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82,
no. 6 (2006). 1136
105
M. R. Thompson, & Kuntz, P., "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbia October," Journal of Democracy
15, no. 4 (2004). 163
106
Cengiz Günay and Vedran Dzihic, "Decoding the Authoritarian Code: Exercising ‘Legitimate’ Power Politics
through the Ruling Parties in Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no.
4 (2016).
107
OSCE/ODIHR, "Elections in Serbia".
30
for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID)108 have not been available electronically for the
timespan of this dissertation and therefore cannot be taken into consideration.
108
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, "The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, Cesid," Balkan
Investigative Reporting Network, http://birn.eu.com/en/donors-and-partners/the-centre-for-free-elections-anddemocracy-cesid.
31
4 OSCE election observation
Election observation has in the last few decades become an integral part of elections in
emerging democracies and to a certain extent, established democracies as well. By allowing
election observation, carried out by international and domestic observer groups, authorities
indicate their will to hold democratic elections. This chapter will look at the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which, through its Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, is the main international actor in election observation in
Europe.109 Together with a number of international actors, it has developed a methodology,
widely used in long-term observation of elections. With increased attention to the outcome of
observations, criticisms by states subject to extensive observation efforts, have pushed for
changes to the observation methodology.
4.1 Election observation
International influence on democratization are gradually being accepted as an important
and relevant factor in international relations theories of political transition, rejecting the idea
that institutional change is entirely domestically driven and not affected by regional and
international events.110 As a barometer of democratic health, election observation has emerged
as an international norm.111 It is a tool for democracy promotion, providing a certain
legitimacy to elections, particularly in developing countries,112 but can prove a risky
endeavour as it exposes the states to the danger of crippling criticism which may bring on the
exact opposite effect intended and lead to regime change. Here, Western states, with their
advanced liberal definition of democracy, have been a driving force in elaborating election
norms. While election observation has evolved rapidly to become an integral part of the
elections’ process in newer and developing democracies, such a high-profile democracy
instrument is also bound to attract both praise and criticism, not only from countries who feel
they have been wronged, but also from scholars. Election observation has drawn criticism for
involving as much show as substance,113 being prone to misunderstanding, leniency, partiality,
109
EODS. 18
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Michael D. Ward., "Diffusion and the International Context of
Democratization.," International Organization 60, no. Fall 2006 (2006). 930
111
Margaret P. Karns, and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global
Governance, Second edtion ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010). 473
112
Susan D. Hyde, "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," World
Politics 60, no. 1 (2007). 38
113
Thomas Carothers, "The Observers Observed," Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997). 22
110
32
receptive to outside and domestic influence, and having by its presence an undue influence on
the election. In other words, a completely neutral and undisputed observation is a myth. 114
While observers stress that they go about their work objectively, total and absolute neutrality
cannot be a norm for any organization predisposed to promoting democracy and human
rights, which, in itself, is a perspective, a stance.
International election observation was first recorded in 1857 when French, British,
Prussian, Russian, Austrian and Turkish representatives were present during a plebiscite in
Moldavia and Wallachia.115 Modern time observation goes back to 1962, and for the first 25
years it was mainly performed by international non-governmental organizations. Through
rapid evolvement and entering of international organizations, such as the UN, EU and OSCE,
by 2004 about 80 per cent of elections were observed in what Hyde refers to as
“unconsolidated democracies”116 and it can be assumed that this number has only increased
since then. In the words of an experienced international elections expert, Gerald Mitchell:
The speed at which international election observation has become a pillar of democracy promotion
initiatives – and in fact a feature in international relations – during the past two decades is indeed
impressive. This development was of course spurred on by profound political transition as a result of
the end of the Cold War, and the growing global consensus on the value of democratic governance. 117
Inviting observers has indeed become a norm for governments seeking to “attain
democratic maturity”118 but in the same rein not doing so, is seen internationally as declaring
the intention to cheat. Hence the phenomenal growth in observation since the 1990s.119
4.2 OSCE/ODIHR
The OSCE’s human dimension spells out the parameters for the organization’s election
observation. The OSCE/ODIHR has developed an observation methodology, based on the
commitments made by the OSCE’s participating states to hold democratic elections. This
chapter describes the background and implementation of this methodology as well as some of
the disputes arising from it.
114
Judith Kelley, "Election Observers and Their Biases," ibid. 21 (2010). 168
Gerald Mitchell, "History and Mandate of Election Observation: The OSCE/ODIHR Experience," in
International election observation and assessment of elections, ed. Hans Schmeets (Maastricht: Statistics
Netherlands, 2011). 34
116
Hyde, "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." 38
117
Mitchell. 72-73
118
Judith Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring,"
International Organization 62, no. 2 (2008). 223
119
Ibid. 221/251
115
33
4.2.1 Human dimension
In the extensive group of election observers, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), is recognized for its observation work 120 and
contribution to the development of the observation methodology most international
organizations base their work on.121 OSCE/ODIHR’s election observation is a stable reference
point for the European Union in its assessments on democracy,122 as the two institutions share
the same basic human rights, democracy and rule of law criteria for their member states.
OSCE/ODIHR’s methodology defines democratic election as key component in building and
ensuring democracy, which together with human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of
law constitute what OSCE terms the human dimension of security. It is set out in politically
binding commitments stemming back to the early, optimistic 1990s, where in the landmark
1990 Copenhagen Document, the member states declared that “the will of the people, freely
and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and
legitimacy of all government.” In the following years, the states agreed on a number of
commitments specifying in unprecedented detail what constitutes a democratic election:
•
Hold free elections at reasonable intervals;
•
Permit all seats in at least one chamber of the legislature to elected by popular
vote;
•
Guarantee universal and equal suffrage;
•
Respect the right of citizens to seek office;
•
Respect the right to establish political parties and ensure that parties can compete
equally.
•
Ensure that political campaign can be conducted openly, free of violence and fear;
•
Ensure unimpeded and equal media access;
•
Ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot, counted and reported honestly, with the
results made public;
•
Ensure that elected candidates are duly installed in office.123
Inherent in the OSCE commitments to hold democratic elections, is that the participating
states commit themselves to invite each other to observe elections. Similar to many other
120
Guttorm Vik, "Statement in Response on the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the Russian
Duma Elections," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/pc/29163. See also Carothers. 21-22
121
UNEAD/NDI.
122
European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Document: Serbia 2015 Report," in EU Enlargement
Strategy, ed. European Commission (Brussels 2015). 6
123
OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook. 18
34
organizations, OSCE/ODIHR acts as a pooling arrangement124 for member states, due to cost
and resource sharing, and as a vehicle to administer this observation. The mandate for
OSCE/ODIHR observers focuses on the OSCE member states, which includes all states in
Europe, hence other organizations, such as the EU, observe outside Europe.125
4.2.2 Methodology
By developing and adhering to a detailed methodology, OSCE/ODIHR strives to ensure
that observation is performed in the same manner, irrespective of the state or election in
question, and by the same standard. However, OSCE/ODIHR reports spanning two decades,
show that both methodology and standards evolve over a longer period of time, due to
experience, changes in election technology, value judgement and norms, as discussed later in
this thesis. The institution also aims to diversify its observer base by enlisting as many OSCE
nationalities in its observations as possible, only allowing a maximum of 10 per cent of
observers from one state for an election.126
The observation is done through long-term observation of the preparation of elections;
election legislation, electoral systems, election commissions, campaign, ability to stand and
campaign freely and reporting in media. Short term observation on election day is conducted
through systematically looking at the voting and counting, with statistical processing of the
observations of, often, hundreds of observers. The long-term observation follows up on
aggregation and publishing of final results. The long-term nature of the OSCE/ODIHR
missions builds on the recognition that elections are more than a one-day event,127 the election
begins no later than when it is called, as work on the election process is ongoing within states
both system-wise and, importantly, politically, long before the election. This is further evident
in OSCE/ODIHR’s follow up with the states in question on recommendations, and support to
authorities willing to improve electoral processes, including by reviewing election-related
legislation and providing technical expertise.
OSCE/ODIHR election observation took off in mid-1990s, with the earliest reference of
observations from 1992.128 It was, however, only in 1996 that OSCE/ODIHR established its
124
Abbott and Snidal. 13
EODS. 18
126
OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook. 32
127
OSCE/ODIHR "Elections".
128
US Congress on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Serbian Democracy, 10 December 1998.
125
35
comprehensive election observation methodology, fielding five observations that year, and
five in 1997. In the first decade, OSCE/ODIHR focused on new democracies which emerged
following the end of the Cold War, all of which were faced with great democratic challenges,
including the holding of genuinely democratic elections. The missions were generally with a
substantial number of short-term observers on election day. For the last decade, due partly to
pressure from Russia and other former Soviet states,129 OSCE/ODIHR has also begun to focus
the attention on electoral challenges in established democracies, including the use of new
voting technologies, absentee-, early-, and postal voting, to name some. Those missions tend
to be smaller, consisting of a group of experts who look mainly at the administrative and legal
framework, but not deploying short-term observers for voting and counting on election day.
Altogether, OSCE/ODIHR has deployed over 300 observation missions in the last two
decades130 to all but one of its 57 member states, publishing over 700 reports. The missions
vary in size and length; a fully-fledged election observation mission is usually deployed for 68 weeks and includes short-term observers for election day. A limited election observation
mission is similar in length but without short-term observers, if the OSCE considers that
serious problems during voting and counting are unlikely.131 Decisions on where, when and
how to observe are taken on the basis of a needs assessment which is conducted a few months
ahead of the elections. OSCE/ODIHR election observation focuses mainly on parliamentary
and presidential elections, the Office also observes some municipal elections and only
occasionally referenda.132 The number of observers, in particular whether short-term observers
are deployed, are an indicator of OSCE/ODIHR experts’ expectations for the conduct of an
election a few months ahead, e.g. whether irregularities are seen as likely during the counting.
4.2.3 Political environment
As Abbott and Snidal argue, no international organization or institution is fully
independent as they are guided and directed by the member states, who, as in the case of the
OSCE, sit in regular, decision-making sessions deciding on substantial matters as well as
financing of the institutions. The member states grant some authority to their institutions but
Nikolay Afanasievsky, Vladimir Shustov, Hans van den Broek, Wilhelm Höynck, Kuanysh Sultano, Knut
Vollebaek, Richard Williamson, Miomir Žužul, "Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE," (Vienna:
OSCE Chairmanship, 2005). 5
130
OSCE/ODIHR, "300 ODIHR Election Observation Missions," OSCE/ODIHR,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/193741.
131
Election Observation Handbook. 30
132
Ibid. 15
129
36
supervise through structure,133 which can cause friction and OSCE/ODIHR’s election
observation is no exception. With all its observation findings made public and having
observed some of the most contended elections in the region, which have led to mass protests,
even revolutions, OSCE/ODIHR has been described as a “public archive of election-season
abuses in the [former Soviet] region”134 making Russia, formerly a strong supporter of the
OSCE, express the view that the OSCE has been turned into a vehicle to counteract Russian
interests in post-Soviet states.135 While the observation methodology is recognized and lauded
by western countries and opposition and civil society in the former Eastern Europe bloc,
OSCE/ODIHR has for the last decade received repeated criticism by Russia and eight other
former Soviet-states136 who have been subject to a number of observations. They have
criticised the observers for their application of its methodology, accusing OSCE/ODIHR of
double standards and political hypocrisy, claiming e.g. that it makes “politically motivated
and biased assessments and approaches to particular countries and regions and the use of
human-rights issues for exerting political pressure.”137 They argue that identical violations
during election campaigns and voting are assessed differently depending on the “political
leanings of countries” and for a few years these states took to fielding their own observation
organization138 and methodology, which, although bearing a strong resemblance to
OSCE/ODIHR’s
methodology,
inevitably
led
them
to
opposite
conclusion139
to
OSCE/ODIHR when observing the same elections.
OSCE/ODIHR has enjoyed strong support of the majority of OSCE states, led by the
United States, and EU-members,140 which as a rule, support OSCE/ODIHR election
observation findings in public statements, encouraging states to follow up on OSCE/ODIHR
recommendations.141 The argument between the factions of OSCE’s member states has at
times threatened to paralyze the work of the Office, including a halt in invitations to
133
Abbott and Snidal. 5
C.J. Chivers, "Russia Working to Limit Election Observers," New York Times, 24 October.
135
Fawn. 1148
136
Ibid. 1141
137
Alexey N. Borodavkin, "Statement by Mr. Alexey N. Borodavkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation, at the Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/pc/39864.
138
CIS, "CIS- Europe Monitoring Organisation " http://www.cis-emo.net/en/page/about-us.
139
Fawn. 1142
140
European Union, "EU Statement in Response to the Report by the Director of ODIHR, Mr Michael Link,"
OSCE, http://www.osce.org/pc/234606.
141
EEAS, "Statement by the Spokesperson on the Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan," news release, 2
November 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3098/statement-spokespersonparliamentary-elections-azerbaijan_en.
134
37
observe,142 and the organization as a whole. It has put OSCE/ODIHR into a difficult situation,
where its political employers, to coin a phrase, exert pressure on an institution whose
independence they have pledged to guard, and criticize it for how it performs the duties the
states have tasked it with. By this, powerful states and groups of states have to thread a
delicate balance, between protecting the independence and effectiveness of an organization
they have established, while not relinquishing the possibility to affect its work and elaboration
of norms.143 This is a part of a larger impasse within the OSCE between a group of states led
by Russia, and other members of the organization, which has made decision-making within
the organization difficult,144 due to the OSCE’s consensus-based policy. OSCE/ODHR has
steered through with its election methodology largely unscathed, although it may be argued
that the criticism has accelerated the inevitable evolvement of methodology. It has
undoubtedly made OSCE/ODIHR broaden its geographical focus, acknowledging that no
state, including established democracies, is above scrutiny. To date it has now deployed
election observation missions, albeit very different in size and scope, to all but one of its 57
member states, leaving its critics far from content,145 but enabling it to continue observing.
142
OSCE/ODIHR, "ODIHR Unable to Observe Russian Duma Elections," news release, 16 November, 2007,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/49175.
143
Abbott and Snidal. 15
144
Vladimir Socor, "Vice President Biden Envisions New Tasks for the OSCE " Jamestown Foundation,
https://jamestown.org/program/vice-president-biden-envisions-new-tasks-for-the-osce/.
145
Andrey Rudenko, "On the Observation by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of
the Parliamentary Elections in Canada," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/pc/197601.
38
5 Serbia overview
Serbia’s tumultuous modern history is a necessary background for any analysis of the
responsiveness of Serbian authorities to OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations regarding
improvement of the electoral, political and media systems. This chapter provides a short
overview of Serbia’s, and before that Yugoslavia’s, political history since the Second World
War. Following the end of the Cold War, Serbia has been party to many of the wars and
conflicts in Europe. Foreign powers have intervened in Serbia’s affairs, as it has in others’,
and Serbia has taken a remarkable turn in its attitude towards international and regional
organizations. Only a decade and a half after being bombed by NATO planes, Serbia has
entered a partnership programme with the very same organization, as well as seeking to join
the European Union, which took part in bringing economic and military sanctions on Serbia
during the Balkan wars.
5.1 Serbia in the Cold War
Following the Second World War, Europe faced a new reality in the Cold War. As the
Soviet Union and the US asserted their control over the continent, an Iron Curtain was drawn
through Europe. The popular leader of the anti-Nazi resistance in Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito,
came to power in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, dominated by Serbia, after the
war, which became a part of Stalin’s Eastern Bloc. Tito, unlike other leaders in the Soviet
sphere of influence, was not in need of the Soviet military power and rejected Stalin’s
supremacy, resulting in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Information Bureau of the
Communist and Workers’ Parties, Cominform, as early as 1948. Yugoslavia remained only
partly bound to its Eastern European allies, who saw “Titoist” as paraphrase for those who
wanted their national communist party to maintain some independence from the Soviet one.146
Still, very dedicated to communist ideology, mixed with populist dictatorship, Tito governed
Yugoslavia as an independent member of the socialist camp147 until his death in 1980.
Yugoslavia had a special relationship with both East and West, and its citizens enjoyed more
freedom to travel without visa than any country in the world. Western allies, willing to assist
and to do business with Yugoslavia, turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, and Tito kept
146
Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956 (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
270-71
147
Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Penguin,
1999). 570
39
a lid on the powder keg of nations148 that had fought for centuries and exploded when the Iron
Curtain fell.
5.2 Balkan wars - nationalism
In the years following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Serbia emerged as the villain of the
Balkans,149 a central player in most of the wars ravaging the states of former Yugoslavia. A
leading state in Yugoslavia, it attempted to halt its breakup by sending Yugoslav armed forces
into Slovenia, which had declared independence in June 1991. Serbia thereby became part of
the first of the Balkan wars, one that only lasted ten days. More wars, far more devastating,
were to engulf Yugoslavia: the war between Croatia and Yugoslavia 1991-1995, beginning
with a Serb uprising in Krajina, the Bosnia war between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in
Bosnia, 1992-1995, the Kosovo war between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians 1998-1999 and
Albanian insurgency in Presevo valley in Serbia 1999-2001. The established historical view is
that nationalism played a central role in the wars; Serbs are, after all, thought to have coined
the term “ethnic cleansing”150 to describe the brutal treatment and expulsions of ethnicities
other than Serb. But not all agree on whether the wars were entirely rooted in the ideology
and psychology of expansionist nationalism151 or whether the blame lay with a corrupt
Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, and his elite:
It was very simple and straightforward. There was a war in former Yugoslavia because a
criminalised elite in Belgrade, that had jumped from the sinking ship of communism onto the life raft of
nationalism had chosen to have one.152
Only in the brief war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001 did Serbs not
play a key role in fighting those seeking independence. Despite their attempts to prevent it,
the final breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, became a reality in 2003; by
then only Serbia and Montenegro were left. The Federation between the two states was then
renamed Serbia and Montenegro but was short-lived, as Montenegro declared independence
three years later, in 2006.
148
Ibid. 574
Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1997). xii
150
"Ethnic Cleansing," Encyclopædia Brittanica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing.
151
William W Hagen, "The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999).
152
Alan Little, "Finally: The Truth," The Guardian, 6 January 2003.
149
40
5.3 Milosevic’s legacy
A key figure in Serbia’s turbulent modern history is Slobodan Milosevic, leader of
Yugoslavia and Serbia in the period from 1989-2000. Milosevic rose to power through the
Communist Party153 and managed to consolidate power through the breakup of Yugoslavia by
arousing nationalism. The most symbolical example of this was in Kosovo in 1987 where he
gave an impromptu speech to local Serbs, promising that Kosovo was theirs and would never
be given up.154 The echoes of this speech reverberated in Serbia’s politics for years to come,
and have not yet disappeared, as Serbia still does not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
Serbia’s involvement in the Bosnia war, prompted the international community to put a total
economic blockade on Serbia and Montenegro in 1992, ruining the economy, but not bringing
the state to its knees.155 The same year, Yugoslavia was suspended from the OSCE, in one of
the most difficult decisions the organization has had to make156 and is to date the only
suspension of a participating State by the organization. However, OSCE and Yugoslavia did
not sever all ties, with OSCE Missions established within Yugoslavia’s boundaries in Kosovo,
Vojvodina and Sandjak in 1992, and election and verifications missions deployed in 1997 and
1998 respectively.
Milosevic ruled Yugoslavia and Serbia as an autocrat, relentlessly persecuting his
enemies,157 who were jailed, beaten and killed. One of his victims was his political mentor and
friend, Ivan Stambolic, former president of Serbia, who was killed on Milosevic’s order in
2000.158 Despite sanctions, economic hardship and oppression of dissent, Milosevic enjoyed
general, public support, managing to convince the nation this was the price to pay for
“supporting the Serbs outside Serbia”.159 Inevitably, this support eroded with the continuing
grave economic situation where at one point inflation was measured by the hour, and in 1997
Milosevic was forced to accept opposition victories in some local election after almost 100
days of protests. A skilful tactician, he still managed to manipulate the political situation,
153
Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, Third edition ed. (London: Penguin, 1996). 41
Judah. 29
155
Ibid. 261-262
156
Valery Perry, "The OSCE Suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ from the Helsinki Monitor,"
(2012), http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/11/7/3766bd03-0e5c-4541-b4d65412e1489a76/publishable_en.pdf.
157
New York Times, "Topics of the Times; Pressure Works in Belgrade," New York Times 15 July 1998.
158
Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Death Squad Leader Guilty of Killing Serbian President," The Independent, 18 July
2005.
159
Judah. 261
154
41
helped by a splintered opposition, and receive what may be termed as procedural
legitimacy,160 while accentuating the weakness of his opponents.
He turned his focus on hardening the grip on Kosovo, seen by Serbs as an indivisible part
of the state. The Kosovo-Albanian majority yearned for independence and by 1998 it had
managed to get covert promises of US support and eventually, independence.161 International
efforts, including the OSCE’s, to halt the fighting which broke out in 1998, came to naught. In
early 1999, renewed fighting between Milosevic’s forces and Kosovo-Albanians drove
hundreds of thousands of Albanians to neighbouring states. NATO’s response was
bombardment of targets in Serbia March-June 1999, which made Serbs initially rally around
Milosevic again,162 allowing him to crack down on the independent media that had existed.
This crackdown, combined with corruption, economic hardship due partly to EU sanctions
and no confidence in public institutions soon turned the public against him. In late September
2000, he lost the federal and local elections to the opposition which had at long last joined
forces in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, led by Zoran Djindjic and Vojslav
Kostunica. The latter became President of FRY, following mass protests in October 2000
against Milosevic who had attempted to cling to power by manipulating the results of the
elections.
5.4 Back from the cold
FRY was formally admitted back to the OSCE a month after Milosevic’s fall in November
2000. It also joined the UN, which had not accepted it as successor state of Yugoslavia, and
entered into accession discussions with the Council of Europe.163 Milosevic’s party, the
Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS, lost the parliamentary election in December 2000, and he was
eventually arrested in April 2001. His last years were spent in a prison cell in The Hague, on
trial for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY,
until he was found dead in his cell in 2006.164
160
Thompson. 164
Little.
162
Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. 658
163
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December
2000. Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000). 3
164
John O'Neil, "Report on Milosevic's Death Finds No Foul Play," New York Times 31 May 2006.
161
42
The ecstatic atmosphere of the days and weeks following Milosevic’s fall soon gave in for
the harsh reality of an economy in ruins and public institutions deprived of trust. The proWestern Zoran Djindjic, who had taken over as Prime Minister in January 2001, was
assassinated in 2003 by the same group of former paramilitary members found guilty of the
murder of Milosevic’s predecessor.165 DOS, a coalition of 18 parties, kept the Prime
Minister’s post, but tensions soon became apparent over the pace of reform, different
ideological orientations and personal and political rivalries, combined with economic
insecurity.166 DOS split, was eventually disbanded and a new election called in December
2003. This election was by many seen as the first election where the public had a real
choice,167 as public confidence in institutions and the integrity of the elections was
strengthening. Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, who had stayed on as
Yugoslav president until the Federation was disbanded in 2003, became Prime Minister. He
sat until 2008, when his government collapsed due to internal disagreements over the status of
Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008, and relations with the European
Union, both of which Kostunica opposed. The emotionally charged and difficult issue of
Kosovo’s independence caused Serbia to withdraw its ambassador to the US temporarily from
February to October 2008, due to the US’s support to it.168 Another complicating issue in
Serbia’s politics was the imperfect election law combined with low turnout, which caused
repeated failed presidential elections. Hence a number of acting presidents served until 2004
but only two have been elected in a popular vote: Boris Tadic of the Democratic Party, 20042012 and Tomislav Nikulic from the Serbia Progressive Party, SPS, since 2012.
5.5 EU ambitions
Shortly before the parliamentary elections in 2008, Serbia signed a Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) and an Interim Agreement on trade-related measures, with the
European Union, one of the main organizations behind the economic and military sanctions
against Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. A coalition of pro EU parties and the SPS formed a
government, led by Mirko Cvetkovic, an independent, until 2012. In December 2009, Serbia
165
Peric Zimonjic.
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Presidential Elections 29 September
and 13 October 2002 and Repeat Presidential Election 8 December 2002. Final Report," (Warsaw:
OSCE/ODIHR, 2002). 3
167
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Parliamentary Election 28 December 2003. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2003). 4
168
US State Department, "US Relations with Serbia," US State Department,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm.
166
43
applied for EU membership and the EU confirmed Serbia as a candidate country in March
2012, preceded by two high-profile arrests of indicted war criminals and the 2011 opening of
EU-led talks with Kosovo. Still, several setbacks have been in the relationship between Serbia
and Kosovo, the improvement of which is one of Serbia’s main accession tickets to the
European Union.169
Two months after the confirmation of Serbia’s candidacy, Milosevic’s old party, the SPS,
came to power in a coalition with the new Serb Progressive Party (SNS), which splintered off
from the extreme nationalist Serb Radical Party (SRS)170 over EU affairs in 2008, and other
smaller parties. In an ironic twist of fate, Milosevic’s former spokesman, Ivica Dacic, took
over as Prime Minister, twelve years after the spectacular downfall of Milosevic, in an
alliance with former party members of ultra-nationalist and convicted war criminal, Vojislav
Seselj, founder of the SRS. As the previous government, Dacic’s government had its eyes
firmly on EU membership, despite the underlying ties to nationalistic policies of both parties.
The EU, making it clear that a prerequisite for any success was improved relations with
Kosovo, presided over a round of meetings beginning in October 2012. They led to a first
agreement on normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in April 2013 and in
January 2014, formal accession talks with the EU commenced. Premier Dacic called an early
election in April 2014 with the justification that a renewed mandate was needed to complete
reforms ahead of EU accession.171 He lost to his coalition partner, the SNS, led by Aleksandar
Vucic, who won absolute majority in 2014 and again in 2016, running on a pro-EU, anticorruption, liberal ticket.172 Vucic seemingly has a strong grip on power, with some voices in
Serbia fearing a return to a not-so-distant authoritarian past.173 When the OSCE’s
Representative on Freedom of the Media raised concerns in 2014 about “worrying trend of
online censorship” in Serbia, Vucic reacted harshly, demanding an apology,174 but mended ties
with the OSCE a few months later. During Vucic’s tenure, four chapters have been opened in
accession negotiations with the EU. In 2015, Serbia chaired the very organization it is
169
Tim Judah to Eastern Approaches, 5 August, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/08/kosovo-and-serbia.
170
"Vucic's Victory," The Economist, 17 March 2014.
171
Maja Poznatov, "Early Elections in Serbia in March " EurActiv, http://www.euractiv.rs/english/6801-earlyelections-in-serbia-in-march.
172
The Economist, "A Pro-Europe Prime Minister Wins a Second Term in Serbia," The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21697568-what-about-democratic-values-pro-europe-prime-ministerwins-second-term-serbia.
173
Aleksandar Vasovic, "Serbian PM Demands OSCE Apology over Allegations of Censorship," Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-censorship-osce-idUSKBN0ED17320140602.
174
Ibid.
44
observed by, the OSCE, attempting to build bridges between East and West on the conflict in
Ukraine and other pressing issues of rebuilding trust in stalling European cooperation.175 And
although not aspiring to join NATO, Serbia agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO
through an Individual Partnership Action Plan in January 2015, sixteen years after enduring
heavy bombardment by NATO forces during the Kosovo war.
Serbia’s economy is slowly reviving after a collapse after the 2008 economic crisis, when
the country’s GDP was at its absolute high of over 49 billion USD down to 37 billion USD in
2015. Compared with a GDP of only 6 billion USD in 2000,176 the country has nevertheless
made remarkable progress. Corruption is a major problem in many emerging democracies and
Serbia is no exception, ranking no. 72 out of 168 on Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index,177 slightly regressing for the last few years, following a global trend,
according to TI. Support of EU accession is dwindling, having dropped by 32 per cent since
2009, to around 41 per cent. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of Serbs favour maintaining close ties
with Russia.178
5.6 A house with two doors
Foreign involvement in Serbian politics is well known. In 2016 OSCE/ODIHR noted that
foreign dignitaries, Hungarian and Russian, lent a supporting hand to two parties 179 during the
election campaign, not previously mentioned in observation reports. This is not the first time
foreign states were seen as interfering in Serbian politics; one of the most debated examples is
the US and European support of the protests, particularly the Otpor (Resistance) civic protest
movement,180181 which eventually brought down Milosevic. Hungary’s support in the 2016
elections was to the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina-region, but Russia’s support relates
directly to foreign policy, with the deputy speaker of the Russian Duma addressing a rally of
175
OSCE Chairmanship, "Serbia Reveals Chairmanship Priorities Pledging to Rebuild Trust and Confidence in
OSCE Region," news release, 15 January, 2015, http://www.osce.org/cio/134821.
176
World Bank, "Serbia," (Washington: World Bank, 2016).
177
Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," (Berlin: Transparency International 2016).
178
Harriet Salem to Ukrainealert, 7 December, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/bewareof-the-russian-bear-in-the-balkans.
179
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2016). 10
180
Ivan Marovic, "In Defence of Otpor," Open Democracy,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/civilresistance/ivan-marovic/in-defense-of-otpor.
181
Fawn. 1151
45
the ruling SNS in a campaign where one of the dividing lines was between those who
supported EU accession and those speaking for closer cooperation with Russia.182
Serbia and Russia have a strong bond, often referring to their orthodox brotherhood. Russia
was a stalwart supporter of Serbia during the Kosovo war and vehemently opposes Kosovo’s
independence, although more may lie behind that than concern for Serbia’s interest, namely
the danger of precedent.183 Russia has twice used its veto power in the Security Council for
Serbia, in 1994184 and 2015.185 Since the 2008 economic crisis, which wreaked havoc on
Serbia’s economy, Russia has increased its investment and economic support, although not
unreservedly.186 Mindful that it needs Serbia as much as an ally in Europe as Serbia needs its
support187, Russia has also made more symbolic gestures, such as sending a convoy of lorries
to assist Kosovo-Serbs at the end of 2011.188 Military cooperation has increased, including a
“Slavic Brotherhood” drill in late 2016,189 and security analysts claim that a war of ideas
between Russia and the West is currently being fought in Serbia.190 Serbia’s President Nikolic
formulates this differently; referring to Serbia’s interests East and West, he says his country
should “be a house with two doors”.191
182
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report." 10
183
Oksana Antonenko, "Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo," Survival 49, no. 3 (2007).
184
UN Security Council, "Meetings Records," United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/1994.shtml.
185
"Meetings Records," United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2015.shtml.
186
The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Serbia," (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).
187
Ibid.
188
Tim Judah to Eastern Approaches, 28 January, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/serbias-eu-bid.
189
"Russia Appears to Cause Trouble in the Balkans," The Economist, 4 November 2016.
190
Ibid.
191
The Economist Intelligence Unit. “Serbia”.
46
6 Election observation in Serbia 1997-2016
Every final election observation report by OSCE/ODIHR lists recommendations regarding
the entire election process; including legislation, campaign, voting and counting, aggregation
of results and complaints. The following analysis examines these recommendations to get an
overview of whether there is visible trend in implementation regarding time or subject-areas.
6.1 Overview
Serbia has held numerous elections in the timespan observed, 1997-2016, due to repeat
presidential elections and early parliamentary elections. OSCE/ODIHR has observed 15 times
in Serbia: nine parliamentary elections, eight presidential and two municipal elections, some
coinciding. OSCE/ODIHR has not observed all elections in Serbia during the period, as it
focuses mainly on parliamentary and presidential elections. Only in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and in Montenegro has OSCE/ODIHR observed as often, 15 times.
OSCE/ODIHR has also provided election support to Serbian authorities between elections for
almost two decades, including with legal reviews of draft legislation.192
Table 1. OSCE/ODIHR observation missions in Serbia
Date
Presidential
1997 Sep/Oct
x
1997 Dec
x
2000 Sep
x
2000 Dec
Parliamentary
Municipal
x
Core team/LTOs
30
STOs
156/25
30
x
x
Not invited
x
2002 Jul
x
36
320
4
110
2002 Sep-Dec
x
28
230/121
2003 Nov
x
19
159
24
178
2003 Dec
2004 Jun
x
x
2007 Jan
2008 Jan/Feb
18
x
28
x
2008 May
21
x
34
x
22
2014 Mar
x
22
2016 Apr
x
22
2012 May
x
308
192
See for instance Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, "Joint Opinion on Draft Laws on Electoral
Legislation of Serbia," (Strasbourg/Warsaw: Council of Europe and OSCE 2009).
47
The observer missions vary in size, the largest one being for the parliamentary election in
December 2000, with 356 observers, following a tumultuous period of power transfer from
Slobodan Milosevic’s party, the SPS, to the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. At the time,
public confidence in state institutions, including the state media, the judiciary and the election
administration, was very low,193 and it may be assumed that deployment of a substantial group
of observers on election day was to address this lack of trust by systematically and objectively
describing the voting and counting. The number of observers then went down until 2007,
when OSCE/ODIHR deployed over 300 short-term observers for the 2007 parliamentary
elections, while no short-term observers had been deployed for the previous vote two years
earlier. In a needs assessment report issued in November 2006, the reason is cited as
“violations during the recent 28-29 October Constitutional Referendum.”194 The referendum
was not observed by OSCE/ODIHR. The 2007 observation found the vote and count to be
peaceful and orderly and enjoying high confidence amongst voters 195 and since then no shortterm observers have been deployed, as no significant concerns have been expressed regarding
the conduct of election day proceedings in needs assessments prior to the election.196
The first OSCE/ODIHR observation in Serbia in 1997 was conceived out of conflict. It
was deployed following the annulled municipal elections in 1996, which led the OSCE
Chairman-in-office to appoint former Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzales, to gather
information on the situation in Serbia. That report served as an important basis for the first
observation, which was undertaken a year later.197 From the outset OSCE/ODIHR observation
missions have been conducted in adherence with their methodology, barring one;
OSCE/ODIHR was not invited to observe the federal and municipal elections in 2000 and was
unable to conduct either short- or long-term observation in country. The report was based on
information compiled from what OSCE/ODIHR termed “reliable sources”.198
193
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December
2000. Final Report."
194
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission
Report 21-24 November 2006," ed. OSCE/ODIHR (Warsaw2006).
195
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2007).
196
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 2012. OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 8-10
February 2012," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2012).
197
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997," ed. OSCE/ODIHR (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 1997). 3
198
"Elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 24 September 2000: Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000).
48
All reports include analyses and recommendations, which have been compiled and
analysed, divided into 13 chapters, generally reflecting the reports. The main conclusions of
the 15 reports199 can be summarized as follows:
Parliamentary & Presidential September/October 1997
• Fundamentally flawed, neither transparent nor uniformly administered. Procedures
mostly adequate, limited attempt to address shortcomings. Election law ambiguous,
unclear election commissions’ guidelines, state TV biased.
Presidential December 1997
• Fundamentally flawed. Limited attempts to improve process insufficient, leaving
integrity of the election process seriously compromised.
Federal (presidential and parliamentary) and municipal September 2000
• Access denied, report based on “reliable sources” and public information. Significant
deterioration.
Parliamentary December 2000
• Considerable progress, many flaws addressed but a number remain. Multi-party
administration transparent, impartial. Respect for fundamental freedoms, absence of
intimidation. Improved media environment.
Municipal (limited) July 2002
• Generally in accordance with international standards. New election law made progress
but shortcomings remain. Participation of all ethnicities.
Presidential September, October, December 2002
• Conduct in line with international commitments but did not meet criteria for domestic
law due to political impasse and defective legislation. Failed to elect a president.
Presidential November 2003
• In line with international commitments, but failed to elect president due to political
impasse, defective legislation and requirement for over 50% turnout.
Parliamentary December 2003
• Generally in line with OSCE commitments but challenges in relation to legislation
unchanged since October 2000.
Presidential June 2004
• Essentially in line with OSCE standards for democratic elections. Welcome changes to
election law, although some hurdles remain.
Parliamentary January 2007
• Conducted in line with OSCE standards for democratic elections. Offered genuine
opportunity to freely choose from a range of platforms. Some legal provisions
continue to cause concern.
199
"Elections in Serbia".
49
Presidential January/February 2008
• Mostly in line with OSCE commitments. Transparent process, genuine choice for
voters but incumbent president enjoyed an advantage and law could be improved.
Early parliamentary May 2008
• Overall conducted in line with OSCE commitments but partly overshadowed by
negative campaign, with death threats to officials. Long-standing OSCE
recommendations still not addressed.
Parliamentary and early presidential May 2012
• Election offered voters large degree of choice and was characterized by respect for
fundamental rights but media scrutiny was lacking, allegations of fraud marred the
process which needs enhancing.
Early Parliamentary March 2014
• Gave voters genuine choice, respect for fundamental rights but credible reports of
intimidation raise concern. Legal framework sound basis, administration efficient and
collegial. Lack of analysis and scrutiny in media.
Early Parliamentary April 2016
• Efficiently run elections but handling of complaints raise concern. Fundamental
freedoms respected but biased media coverage and unlevelled playing field; advantage
of incumbent and blurred distinction between state and party activity.
6.2 Analysis
The findings and recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR in the final reports have been
summarized in a table in Annex I. They concern the following issues: election system,
election commissions, election law, voter registration, political campaign, ballots, candidate
lists, media, voting, counting, aggregation of results, disputes, publication of results and
access of observers. For the ease of reading, some issues related to the election legislation are
addressed in respective sub-chapters.
6.2.1 Election system
Shortly before the first OSCE/ODIHR observation in 1997, changes were made to the
election system, dividing the state into 29 constituencies. In its first reports OSCE/ODIHR
called for a re-assessment of this change, which should be conducted in a more transparent
and inclusive process.200 The election system was consequently changed to a single
constituency prior to the December 2000 elections, which were held in the wake of
200
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997." 17
50
Milosevic’s downfall. Another change to the election system in 2002, the introduction of
proportional and direct election for mayors, enjoyed wide support.201 The provision
demanding that the president should be elected in a vote where over 50 per cent of the
electorate participated, caused three failed attempts in 2002, one in 2003 and significantly
lowered public confidence in electoral reforms. At the strong recommendation of
OSCE/ODIHR, this provision was removed and a president duly elected in June 2004.202
6.2.2 Election commissions
Ever since the first election following Milosevic’s downfall, OSCE/ODIHR has reported
on a generally efficient election administration. It has nevertheless been faced with difficulties
implementing unclear and conflicting provisions in the legislation, many of which have been
slowly removed. Still OSCE/ODIHR, as late as in 2016, recommended a comprehensive
review of the electoral legislation, including to address these provisions. This included that
the law should prescribe a detailed counting, drafting and tabulation process. 203 One of
OSCE/ODIHR’s main recommendations still stands, that in parliamentary elections, an
intermediate level of election administration is established, between the overarching Republic
Election Commission (REC) and Polling Boards (PBs), which control each polling station. 204
To date, this level remains to be formally established although regulation exists on an acting
municipal administration.
In the first elections in 1997, the REC was criticized for failing to issue clear guidelines for
a uniform and transparent process and OSCE/ODHIR called for all parties to be represented
on election commissions.205 This recommendation was heeded following Milosevic’s fall in
late 2000, where OSCE/ODIHR commended the authorities on multi-party commissions and
a transparent and impartial process. However, OSCE/ODIHR continued to stress the need to
ensure gender representation on election commissions, which was rectified prior to the 2004
201
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Early Municipal Elections for Mayors and Councillors
in Bujanovac, Medvedja and Presevo, 28 July 2002. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report,"
(Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2002). 1
202
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004). 1
203
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 23
204
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections 16 March 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). 5
205
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997."
51
elections, with good representation of women on the commissions.206 A recurring theme in
OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations is a continued call for standardized training for polling
boards; although some improvement in training occurs as of 2012, its uniformity and
availability to all members of the polling boards remains an issue. 207 Other recurring and
partly outstanding concerns are a recommendation to provide the REC with authority to
overturn decisions of polling boards and to annul elections in case of irregularities; and a call
for increased transparency and harmonization of the work of the REC, including publicizing
its agenda.208 Recommendation for reducing the number of members on polling boards from
2008 and 2012 were heeded but a 2014 call for additional safeguards for political
representation on the boards to prevent parties from exchanging seats on the commissions 209 is
not addressed in the 2016 report. From late 2000 until 2007 OSCE/ODIHR praised the work
of the REC as open, transparent, inclusive and stating that it enjoyed confidence by parties in
the process210 but during the 2008 presidential election in January and February,
OSCE/ODIHR saw some regression as the REC appeared at times influenced by politics,
ignoring rulings of the Supreme Court211 Further concerns were raised during the 2016
election on its processing of results and post-election complaints, including the REC using its
discretionary powers in an “inconsistent and arbitrary manner”212 to address inaccuracies of
counting protocols.
In most cases, recommendations regard the technical and sometimes quite detailed aspects
of administration of election commissions, such as the need to adopt and define rules on
issues such as repeat voting, the appointment or change of members of commissions,
clarification of rights of members, or whether the REC has a formal role during municipal
elections.213 It is not always possible to elicit whether or to which extent these
recommendations have been heeded when they are not addressed in the following report,
206
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 10
207
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 6
208
Ibid. 5
209
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections 16 March 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 7
210
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report." 1
211
"Republic of Serbia: Presidential Election, 20 January and 3 February 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2008). 1
212
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 20
213
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Early Municipal Elections for Mayors and Councillors
in Bujanovac, Medvedja and Presevo, 28 July 2002. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report." 6
52
although it may be assumed that in some cases at least, the recommendation has been
implemented partially or fully and therefore has not come up during the next observation.
6.2.3 Election law
Prior to the parliamentary elections in December 2000, OSCE/ODIHR considered the
election law vague, not permitting a uniform, transparent process and that it caused problems
on composition of election commissions, on production of ballots, military and postal voting
and on aggregation/publication of results,214 to name some of the issues. OSCE/ODIHR called
for rulings for uniform interpretation of the law to no avail for the first years. In fact, prior to
the 2000 federal and municipal elections, last minute changes were made to legislation,
changing the term of office. In addition to criticizing this approach, OSCE/ODIHR pointed
out that the law lacked safeguards to prevent fraud.
A substantive change was seen in both the law and its application in the immediate
aftermath of Milosevic’s fall in 2000. Within two months, a hastily changed legislation
addressed numerous concerns, including some of the above. OSCE/ODIHR concluded
nevertheless that the law needed further improvement, including on ensuring the
representation of national minorities in parliament, clarification of rules on campaign
expenditure, penalties set, that minor breaches would not result in repeat voting and
importantly, that independent candidates may stand in elections and that the mandates belong
to independent councillors, not parties, in case elected individuals change parties.215 The last
two recommendations have not been taken into account, but others have to a certain degree.
Steps have been taken to facilitate national minority representation, such as abolishing the 5
per cent threshold for those parties in 2007216 and a provision to ensure that only those who
indeed represent national minorities can register as such, in order to prevent lists from abusing
the benefits relating to such registration.217 In a 2007 review, a recommendation for a longer
timeframe between calling and holding an election was followed.218
214
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997." 7
215
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December 2000. Final
Report." 17-19
216
See chapter on candidate registration
217
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report."
218
"Law on Election of the President of the Republic of Serbia," in Legislationline (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR,
2007).
53
In 2004 a long-awaited law on financing of political activities took effect but difficulties in
interpreting and implementing the new law arose immediately. Although some were rectified
in 2011 and 2014, including reducing public funding for party activities and campaigning, 219 a
number of concerns have not been addressed, such as insufficient measures against misuse of
administrative resources, inadequate finance regulation, and absence of sanctions for some
violations. In its 2016 report, OSCE/ODIHR called for regulating the election campaign,
including abuse of administrative resources and that limits would be set for campaign
expenditure and sanctions set. OSCE/ODIHR also reiterated a joint 2011 opinion by the
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and legal experts of OSCE/ODIHR, calling for
establishing an expenditure ceiling, lowering limits of donations, submitting reports before
election day, shortening the deadlines for submission of financial reports, and introducing a
short deadline for their publication as well as proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. 220 In
2016, twelve years after the legislation was introduced, OSCE/ODIHR’s conclusion raises a
warning flag: “Overall, the regulatory system does not ensure transparency, integrity and
accountability of campaign finances. The significantly greater financial capabilities of the
ruling parties compared to other contestants undermined the equality of opportunity.”221
To summarize: repeated calls for comprehensive review of the election law were partly
followed with reviews in 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2011.222 The amendments in 2004 were
significant as they addressed the demand for 50 per cent turnout in presidential elections, and
allowed for voting outside Serbia223 in addition to the law on campaign finance. Amendments
were also made to other relevant legislation (media, criminal code, financing political
activities, political parties) in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013224 and 2014.225 Due to these changes,
OSCE/ODIHR has since 2004 concluded that the electoral framework provides a sound basis
219
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 2
220
James Hamilton, OSCE/ODIHR experts, "Joint Opinion on the Revised Draft Law on Financing Political
Activities of the Republic of Serbia," (Strasbourg: Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2011).
221
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report." 2
222
"Law on the Election of Members of the Parliament (2000, as Amended 2011)," in Legislationline (Warsaw:
OSCE/ODIHR, 2011).
223
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 5
224
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections 16 March 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 4
225
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 11
54
for holding democratic elections, notwithstanding a concurrent call for a comprehensive
review to close loopholes and abolish unclear provisions,226 which remains in place.
6.2.4 Voter registration
From the outset in 1997, OSCE/ODIHR’s main recommendation was the establishment of
a central voter register. With two parallel registers, quality was very varied, cross-checking
was not done regularly and many errors remained in the registries.227 Following the fall of
Milosevic, the authorities reacted to one of OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations, deciding to
computerize the national registry, and a provision was included in the election law for a
central register. For the next years, however, no significant changes were made to the voter
lists and OSCE/ODIHR continued to call for actions to improve the transparency, quality and
accuracy of the list and that the law be implemented with single, civil database.228
A unified voter registry was finally set up in 2011 and used for the first time in 2012.
Although welcoming the registry, OSCE/ODIHR pointed out the need to enhance its accuracy
and transparency. This included Cyrillic spelling of Latin-spelled names of national minorities
and a display for public scrutiny,229 in order for the general public, media and others to be able
to inspect the lists for inaccuracies, instead of limiting this possibility to voters for their own
registration. Entry of names in different languages and style of script was partially improved
in 2014 but the call for transparency is reiterated in the 2016 report. A new recommendation
was also added for mentally incompetent persons to be allowed to register on voter lists, as
denying them the right to vote counters a number of international conventions and
commitments.230
6.2.5. Political campaign
Prior to the problematic 2000 federal elections, OSCE/ODIHR did not comment on the
political campaign but quoting sources for the 2000 federal elections, OSCE/ODIHR states
that the pre-election environment in the 2000 federal elections was characterized by severe
226
Ibid. 5
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997," (Warsaw:
OSCE/ODIHR, 1997). 8
228
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Presidential Elections 29 September and 13 October
2002 and Repeat Presidential Election 8 December 2002. Final Report." 23
229
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2012). 9
230
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 6
227
55
restrictions, intimidation and fear.231 This changed considerably following Milosevic’s fall,
and in the parliamentary elections held in December 2000, OSCE/ODIHR noted a general
absence of intimidation, parties were able to register candidates and campaign fairly and
equally. Subsequent election campaigns were described as calm and constructive and the
parliamentary elections in December 2003 were characterized as the first elections where the
public could vote for a preferred option rather than the party least disliked, due to a wide
choice and changes to the political situation in Serbia.232
The tone of the observation of the political campaign continued positively; in the 2008
January/February presidential election the campaign was described as pluralistic, competitive
and calm, with civil and political rights respected,233 and OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendation
only concerned clarification of provisions for pre-election silence. A sudden change occurs
ahead of the parliamentary elections in May of the same year, where the campaign was indeed
described as vigorous and open but OSCE/ODIHR saw it going too far when death threats
were directed against officials.234 In consecutive elections, this negative trend continued. In
2012 allegations of fraud, intimidation and misuse of public funds caused concern and
OSCE/ODIHR called for investigations into the allegations.235 In 2014 there were incidents of
violence and credible reports of intimidation of voters, including state employees. In the 2016
report, OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the ruling party took undue advantage of its
incumbency, blurring the distinction between state and party. Widespread reports of the ruling
parties pressuring voters, including employees in the public sector, and promises of welfare
benefits undermined an otherwise competitive and pluralistic campaign.236 OSCE/ODIHR
concluded in 2016 that the absence of comprehensive campaign regulations and a competent
campaign-monitoring body, for which OSCE/ODIHR had repeatedly called, potentially left
irregularities unaddressed.
231
"Elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 24 September 2000: Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions." 1
232
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Parliamentary Election 28 December 2003. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 4
233
"Republic of Serbia: Presidential Election, 20 January and 3 February 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 1
234
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2008). 1
235
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report." 22
236
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 1
56
6.2.6. Ballots
In 1997 OSCE/ODIHR expressed serious concerns regarding all security aspects of the
ballots: printing, paper and distribution. It recommended accountability in the production of
ballots, amending the law to require stamping of each ballot, a public tender for ballot
paper/printing and improved security of storage.237 This was addressed in a 2000 revision of
the law, with improved legislation on printing ballots, a provision that political parties witness
printing of ballots, and for election materials to be in both Serbian and Albanian. The issue
then disappears from OSCE/ODIHR reports until 2007 when observers noted that the ballot
paper was too thin to protect secrecy of vote. They recommended printing ballots on a betterquality paper to enhance secrecy. The recommendation was repeated once but not since the
2011 amended law which states that ballots should be printed on watermarked paper and
stamped.238
6.2.7 Candidate Lists
One of OSCE/ODIHR’s principal, long-standing recommendation for elections in Serbia,
that the order of candidates on lists is set before the elections so that voters know which
individuals they are voting for, was only resolved in a 2011 amendment to the election law.239
This had also prevented the implementation of a provision in Serbian law that at least onethird of the less-represented gender was present on candidate lists. OSCE/ODIHR repeatedly
pointed out that not deciding on the lists beforehand made it difficult to enforce this provision
as the quota only applied to the candidate lists, not the final mandates. 240 Since the 2011
amendment, women have been one third of the candidates but their visibility has been limited
in campaigns and party programmes.241
In 1997 OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations concerned the need to clarify the registration
process, following rulings by the REC where a majority of candidates was rejected in a
process lacking transparency regarding registration and signature checks.242 In the first
elections following the fall of Milosevic, the REC registered candidate lists impartially but
237
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 17
"Law on the Election of Members of the Parliament (2000, as Amended 2011)."
239
Ibid.
240
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 20
241
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections 16 March 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 2
242
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 7
238
57
OSCE/ODIHR noted difficulties for regional parties to overcome a five per cent threshold.
This requirement was removed in a 2004 revision of the law.243 In order to enable national
minorities to register, OSCE/ODIHR has since 2007 recommended that the requirement for
10,000 signatures for lists, particularly for minorities, is reassessed. The requirement for
10,000 signatures is still in place but other provisions in the legislation have facilitated
registration of national minority parties and in 2008 registered national minority parties were
up to ten.244 This has brought on a new complication, as in 2014 and 2016, OSCE/ODIHR saw
the need to call for codifying provisions for minorities to prevent abuse, as parties were
unjustifiably claiming to be minority parties.245 In 2002 OSCE/ODIHR recommended revision
of the nomination and registration process to make it practical, enforceable and allowing for
signature verification. The process was already rectified by the following election. 246 Since
2000 OSCE/ODIHR has recommended that individual candidates are allowed and this
recommendation still stands. Another standing recommendation, since 2008, is to allow voters
to sign support for more than one list in the run-up to elections.
6.2.8 Media
The main problems faced by media in 1997 were identified as strong bias by state media,
particularly TV and radio, in favour of the ruling party and/or incumbent and obstacles for
independent media coverage. OSCE/ODIHR called for the de-politicization of state media,
that biased TV news content be addressed and obstacles for independent media, in particular
on obtaining frequencies, be lifted.247 In 1998 the situation deteriorated with a law on public
information, including strict regulation on “publicizing the truth” and harassment of
journalists.248 Immediately following Milosevic’s fall in 2000, OSCE/ODIHR observed
significant improvement on media but noted that state media, although not overtly biased, was
still unbalanced, but now in favour of the leaders of the opposition against Milosevic, DOS,
243
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report." 1
244
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 8
245
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 16
246
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election 16 November 2003. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2003). 7
247
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997." 17
248
"Elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 24 September 2000: Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions." 3-4
58
who consequently won the election. A Supervisory Board for media was set up for the
elections, but with an unclear mandate.249
OSCE/ODIHR recommended in 2002 that the state TV and radio should be developed into
a public broadcaster, which was implemented ahead of the 2007 elections. Furthermore, the
observers called for provisions for equal media coverage and access for candidates, which
was implemented by binding instructions in 2003.250 They also recommended that a
permanent regulatory body be set up instead of a Supervisory Board, which has only been
established once,251 despite legal requirements for it to be set up for every election.
OSCE/ODIHR also recommended setting penalties for breaking the silence period, 252 a
recommendation which remains to be implemented.
Laws governing media were amended in 2002, 2003, 2004253 and 2014, addressing a
number of OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations, albeit some only partially. This includes the
establishment of a permanent Republic Broadcast Agency (RBA) in 2002 which
OSCE/ODIHR welcomed but called for the autonomy and balance of appointments to the
RBA to be ensured.254 Furthermore, OSCE/ODIHR has recommended clarifying in the law,
which body, the RBA or the REC, should regulate campaign-related violations and
complaints.255 In 2014 and 2016 it called for clarification of competences in investigating and
sanctioning breaches of legislation and in 2016 observers drew attention to deficiencies in
implementation of the 2014 media legislation reform.256 OSCE/ODIHR repeatedly called for
changes to the election legislation to make it consistent with the broadcast law. As this
recommendation does not appear after the 2004 amendments, it may be assumed that it was
heeded in the amendment. OSCE/ODIHR also made more technical recommendations in
2007 and 2008 for a definition of promotion and sponsoring to be included in the law proper,
249
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December 2000. Final
Report." 11
250
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 13
251
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December 2000. Final
Report." 11
252
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections 16 March 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report."12/22
253
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report." 12
254
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Presidential Elections 29 September and 13 October
2002 and Repeat Presidential Election 8 December 2002. Final Report." 22
255
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 19
256
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 12
59
ensuring that rates for political advertising would not be higher than other adverts, as well as
guarantees for free airtime.257 The current law only addresses airtime in broad terms,
stipulating that the mass media “shall be obliged to ensure equal accessibility of information
about all submitters of the electoral lists, and about all candidates on those electoral lists.”258
From 2002 to 2012 OSCE/ODIHR noted balanced coverage in state media and, to a large
degree, in independent media as well. Beginning with the presidential election in 2008, they
observed that the incumbent president had an advantage.259 Since 2012 OSCE/ODIHR
interlocutors and the Anti-Corruption Council attributed the trend of tabloidization and
overall lack of critical analyses in the media to “widespread self-censorship resulting from
political influence through the allocation of advertising or tax relief, or initiating tax
inspections”.260 In 2016 OSCE/ODIHR observers stated that the ruling party dominated news
in public media and that in the absence of monitoring mechanism, bias, smear campaign and
infringement on media freedom were not addressed.261 OSCE/ODIHR’s recommended
regulation of media coverage of incumbents to avoid undue privilege still stands. It also added
a new recommendation that sufficient funding of public media should be guaranteed to reduce
its dependency on state budget.262 Furthermore, since 2008 OSCE/ODIHR has recommended
the adoption of a law on media concentration and transparency of ownership in media,
identifying this is an increasing problem, particularly following the privatization of over 30
local, public media in 2015.263
6.2.9 Vote
OSCE/ODIHR was critical of the voting in 1997, which, although efficient, was marred by
irregularities in the first election observed. This included absence of some members of the
polling boards, open or group voting (disregarding the secrecy of the vote), and missing
voting materials. In southern Serbia and Kosovo there were serious concerns over voter
registers, discrepancies in numbers of voters, polling stations which were not opened, and
257
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections 21 January 2007. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Report." 19
258
"Law on the Election of Members of the Parliament (2000, as Amended 2011)."
259
"Republic of Serbia: Presidential Election, 20 January and 3 February 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 1
260
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 12
261
Ibid. 2
262
Ibid. 13
263
Ibid. 13
60
cases of threats against observers. OSCE/ODIHR’s first recommendations were a regulation
of military/prison voting by mail and investigation into election fraud in Kosovo.264 They went
unheeded. Significant improvement of the whole procedure was evident in the December
2000 election, including introducing indelible ink to mark those who had voted, transparent
ballot boxes and a requirement that voters sign the register once they voted. A
recommendation on military voting was followed, allowing military personnel to vote in
regular polling stations.265 A recommendation to allow voting outside Serbia was followed in
2004, causing some further problems, such as lack of information of voting abroad and overly
generous rules for candidate observation abroad,266 which were later tightened. Since then,
long-standing and unaddressed issues relating to voting are recommendations to standardize
the quality of voting screens to ensure the secrecy of the vote and that polling stations are of
suitable size to avoid overcrowding and accessible for the disabled and elderly. 267 A
recommendation that people with disabilities can vote out of polling stations was
implemented in 2004.268
A recommendation on training for members of polling board staff to encourage individual
voting instead of group voting has been partly addressed by training of heads and deputy
heads as of 2012 but in 2012, 2014 and 2016 OSCE/ODIHR found the training insufficient. 269
Education for voters, called for since 2008, is not yet fulfilled although voting materials are
now printed in minority languages, following OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Generally, as
voting rules, procedures, knowledge and adherence to them improves, OSCE/ODIHR
recommendations become more detailed, including one in 2016 that all polling board
members wear badges.270
264
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 17
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December 2000. Final
Report." 5
266
"Republic of Serbia: Presidential Election, 20 January and 3 February 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 8
267
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 17
268
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election, 13 and 27 June 2004. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 6
269
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report." 21
270
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 17
265
61
6.2.10 Count
OSCE/ODIHR was highly critical of the counting in the two 1997 elections, due to
irregularities, contradictory laws and instructions on counting and the fact that it was not
possible to certify figures from individual polling stations.271 OSCE/ODIHR called for multiparty control of the counting to increase confidence, for improved transparency of counting
procedures and that figures should be put in both digits and words on receipt forms for the
counting protocols. In the first elections following Milosevic’s fall, OSCE/ODIHR noted
significant improvement in atmosphere and process. This continued with the only
observations being minor procedural failures, such as not counting unused ballots. 272 The only
recommendations specifically pertaining to the count were in 2016 to enhance the accuracy of
polling boards on counting and drafting protocols.273
6.2.11 Aggregation of results/Disputes
The aggregation process, when ballots and related materials are transferred from polling
stations, where they are counted, to intermediate election commissions for checking, was
criticized by OSCE/ODIHR in 1997 for lacking transparency as it was not possible to certify
numbers and the computer operator was able to correct input of numbers without it being
recorded in the database.274 OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations included safeguarding against
unauthorized operations and a public tender for services. As with other parts of the election
process, the procedures improved significantly in the last months of 2000. Multi-party
composition of election commissions provided transparency and the recommendation on
computer technology was followed.275 Since 2000 the recommendations have regarded an
overly strict time limit for complaints, not yet eased, and there is a standing recommendation
that appeals to the Supreme Court should be addressed in an open session with the right of the
complainant to present his/her case directly or through legal representation. 276
271
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 6
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Presidential Election 16 November 2003. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 13
273
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 20
274
"Republic of Serbia, Parliamentary Election September 21 1997 and Presidential Election September 21 and
October 5 1997." 13
275
"Republic of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Parliamentary Election 23 December 2000. Final
Report." 15
276
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 15
272
62
An OSCE/ODIHR recommendation for a review of the dispute resolution process to make
it efficient, transparent and inclusive has not resulted in a fully transparent process. Since
2012 OSCE/ODIHR has criticized the REC review process as it does not allow parties to
present their case and a deadline for redress has not been extended. In 2012 the REC
dismissed all complaints, weakening its integrity in the view of OSCE/ODIHR observers.
Furthermore, the administrative court and Broadcast Agency reviewed complaints behind
closed doors, prompting an OSCE/ODIHR call for transparent resolutions to all complaints. 277
This has not been fulfilled and in 2016 observers received reports of a perceived fear of
retribution for filing complaints as well as a general lack of trust in the effectiveness of the
judiciary and investigatory bodies.278 OSCE/ODIHR found REC decisions related to the 2016
elections inconsistent and stepped up recommendations, calling for effective legal redress for
irregularities, mechanism for inspection, securing voting materials and that the tabulation and
publication of disaggregated election results by polling station should be enshrined in the law,
not only rules, in order to increase transparency and confidence in the process.279
6.2.12 Publication of results
In 1997 OSCE/ODIHR recommended the immediate public posting of results and that
forms should include all parties’ results and turnout, as the REC had neglected to publish
preliminary results and turnout.280 After the 2000 federal elections, publication of results
became less disputed, with improved publication and preliminary results and turnout
announced several times during election night. A recommendation to publish results detailing
each polling station in a timely and public manner was repeated in observers’ reports until
2004.281 It then disappeared from the reporting until 2016, when a recommendation that timely
publication of disaggregated results is enshrined in the legislation to increase the confidence
in the election process, resurfaced. This recommendation referred to protests by opposition
277
"Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report." 17
278
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 2
279
Ibid. 19
280
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 6
281
"Republic of Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro: Parliamentary Election 28 December 2003. OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Report." 19
63
parties disputing the integrity of the process and accuracy of results, following an instance
where a contestant failed to reach the five per cent threshold by a single vote.282
6.2.13 Observers
A long-standing recommendation in line with OSCE commitments that access, rights and
obligations for international and domestic election observers is guaranteed in the law, remains
to be addressed. In two elections observers were partly or fully denied accreditation: in the
presidential election of 1997 (domestic observers)283 and federal elections in 2000, where
international observers were denied visas, and domestic non-partisan observers harassed.284
Since December 2000, observers have been allowed full access but their rights and
obligations are not yet enshrined in the law.
6.2.14 Summary
This analysis demonstrates that from the end of 2000 until now, every election and
observation has shown some progress. The most significant changes for the better occur
following the fall of Milosevic, in late 2000 when Serbia speedily adopted changes to the
election laws, combined with the will and intention to conduct good elections, overcame
many of the hurdles which made the first two elections observed, in 1997, fall short of
international standards for democratic elections. Aware of the tendency of election observers
to endorse transitional elections,285 the changes undertaken in the course of three months, and
the will to change, nevertheless speak for itself. Another milestone was in 2004 when a
number of changes were made to the election legislation and a law on party financing was
adopted. Lastly in 2011/2012 when the unified voter register was taken into use and last
amendments to the election law were made. The pace, extent and nature of the changes made
to the election process change over time, with the most significant and extensive ones taking
place in the first years, as is to be expected when a fundamental overhaul of election
legislation is needed. However, some fundamental changes, which are more political in
nature, remain to be addressed, i.e. seats belonging to parties rather than individuals elected,
282
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 20
283
"Republic of Serbia: Rerun of the Presidential Election, December 7 and December 21, 1997." 7
284
"Elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 24 September 2000: Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions." 7
285
Kelley, "D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation." 771
64
sanctions against misuse of administrative resources and limits for campaign expenditure.
This overall change from the very extensive to more specific is also reflected in
OSCE/ODIHR’s recommendations, which may seem verging on the pedantic in areas where
the process and knowledge has improved to a point that recommended badge wearing has
replaced calls for investigations into fraud, as demonstrated in the chapter on voting. The
analysis also illustrates the evolution of the norms and standards that we hold for democracy
and human rights, with rights of mentally disabled only becoming a cause of concern in recent
years.
OSCE/ODIHR is not always consistent in its recommendations; an issue may disappear
from the list of recommendations for a while, only for it to resurface when problems arise.
Production of ballots, a highly contended issue in the Milosevic’s era, is improved and not
mentioned in the observations for over a decade but resurfaces in 2008 when doubts arise on
whether it fulfils the criteria of safeguarding secrecy of the vote. In the following report a
reference to the production is too general286 to draw a conclusion of whether action has been
taken to solve the problem or whether it is no longer considered an issue.
A negative trend stands out in two areas in particular: on the political campaign and in
media. After an eight-year period of improvement where the campaigns were described as
competitive and calm, death threats spoiled the 2008 parliamentary campaign, which was
characterized by bitter disagreements on relations to the EU, culminating with the signing of
the SAA during the election campaign.287 This was for many an echo of the fear and
intimidation described in the report of the federal elections in September 2000. The three
elections held since are all marred by credible and widespread reports of fraud, intimidation
and misuse of public funds. This goes almost hand in hand with worrying trends in media as
of 2012 of self-censorship and a lack of critical reporting. Also, advantage by the incumbent
and bias in state media, absent from monitoring reports since 2002, is again evident. This is in
line with a report of a government advisory body, the Anti-Corruption Council, which stated
in 2015 that, “the media in Serbia do not control the authorities and their results; on the
contrary, the media are in fact controlled by the government” and “independent media are
286
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary and Early Presidential Elections, 6 and 20 May 2012.
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report." 10
287
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 11
65
virtually non-existent.”288 The Council’s conclusion is echoed by international human rights
and media watchdogs.289
A recurring theme in the recommendations is a call for a review for the sake of
clarification and transparency, safeguarding the rights of citizens and spelling out the
responsibilities of the authorities. The repeated calls for a set of rules and instructions to be
included in the legislation proper may seem technical, particularly when no major problems
arise in their application, but their importance comes to light if doubts arise about the will or
capacity to follow them.290 Transparency is also key to improving confidence in the election
process, as can be seen in how the aggregation of results ceases to be an issue with multiparty composition of election commissions but remains an issue when addressing
complaints.291
Elections are a sensitive process, as they rest on trust in the integrity of those running it.
They rest not only on laws and regulations, but equally importantly, their interpretation. This
is evident during the 2016 where the REC, otherwise lauded for its professionalism, is
described as using its “wide and discretionary powers in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner”
addressing inaccuracies in result protocols, resulting in protests disputing the integrity. 292
Trust is a defining factor in elections, as it builds on the perceived will to implement the law
in good faith,293 to run things smoothly, solve problems and win the trust of the electorate. The
extraordinary changes that took place in the period of three months in the autumn of 2000 are
a clear illustration of what can be achieved when the will exists. Substantial changes for the
better in the last 16 years observed show what will and capacity can do, but the laxness in
following through with implementing some of the changes set out at the beginning of the
millennium does demonstrate a lack of the same. It is not uncommon; the examples of
recommendations not or only partially implemented abound in OSCE/ODIHR’s reports from
the participating states. In a 2016 report for Iceland, authorities “acknowledged that more
288
Government of the Republic of Serbia Anti-Corruption Council, ACA, "Report on the Possible Impact of
Public Sector Institutions on Media, through Financing of Advertising and Marketing Services," (Belgrade2015).
8
289
Human Rights Watch, "Western Balkans: Media Freedom under Threat," news release, 15 July, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/15/western-balkans-media-freedom-under-threat.
290
See chapter on election commissions
291
See chapter on aggregation of results/complaints
292
OSCE/ODIHR, "Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2016. OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Election Observation Mission Final Report." 20
293
"Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 May 2008. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report." 4
66
could be done to address prior OSCE/ODIHR recommendations”;294 see also Albania 2015295
and Bulgaria 2014296 for examples of OSCE/ODIHR repeating calls for previous
recommendations to be implemented. However, the number of standing recommendations,
combined with the worrying trends in media, political campaign and arbitrariness in
implementing the law and regulations, are of concern, particularly as these latter trends
resurface after a decade’s absence. No change for the better is seen in advance of the 2017
election, in a Needs Assessment Report for the 2 April presidential election which was issued
during the writing of this dissertation; interlocutors express worries of pressure on voters,
particularly civil servants, misuse of administrative resources and abuse of office.
OSCE/ODIHR also repeats that recommendations pertaining to the election administration,
campaign regulations and oversight, dispute resolution, and observers have not been
addressed.297
294
"Iceland Presidential Election 25 June 2016: OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 4-6 April
2016," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2016). 4
295
"Republic of Albania Local Elections 21 June 2015: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final
Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2015). 6
296
"Republic of Bulgaria Early Parliamentary Elections 5 October 2014: OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election
Observation Mission Final Report," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). 1
297
"Republic of Serbia, Presidential Election 2 April 2017. OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 910 February 2017," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2017). 1-2
67
7 Discussion
The question whether election observation has an effect is debated by scholars, who also
differ in their view as to whether the presence and recommendations of observers encourage
good electoral behaviour or whether observers have a negative effect on the holding of
elections. This chapter describes how election observation works vis-à-vis the authorities in
the countries observed, mainly from the point of view of constructivism and summarizes
differing views of scholars of the effects of observation.
7.1 Do election observations have an effect?
The holding of elections is arguably an extremely sensitive undertaking as it determines
who is in power. However, inviting observers to monitor elections, regardless of whether the
intention is to hold democratic elections, has become a part of the rules and practices that
define what proper, governmental election behaviour is.298 Krook and True take the gradual
acceptance of election monitoring as an example of how sovereignty-based objections give in
to the view that democracy and human rights are a basic entitlement.299 With election
observation, states have a tool, or what comes closest to a measurement, of the health of
democracy. OSCE/ODIHR’s decision alone to send observers for an election confirms that
the fundamental conditions for holding democratic elections are in place.300 Democracy and
democratic elections is a field that is complex to measure but systematic observation
establishes a system approach, which is turn gives a form of legitimacy to an elected
government, both internally and externally. Here it should be kept in mind that observers do
not attest the election as such or verify the results, their observation regards the process, not
the outcome. Their meticulous observation may nevertheless be an important factor in
legitimizing a government vis-à-vis its citizens, consolidating power and stability. Election
observation bestows legitimacy on the state in international cooperation, better enabling it to
protect and promote its interests. But a critical and credible observation can also tap into
domestic discontent, confirming suspicions of electoral maleficence, as was seen in the
298
Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring." 223
Krook. 111
300
Christian Strohal, "Testing OSCE Observations," Development and Cooperation 2008, no. 6 (2008). 232
299
68
revolutionary aftermath of the parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine’s
presidential elections in 2004.301
The dilemma here is whether one can put an institution into different conditions and expect
that it functions in the same way, with the same consequences?302 Will applying the same
methodology, relying on a similar or same group of people in a number of countries over a
long period, always render a comparable result? If our point of departure is that the
OSCE/ODIHR methodology is rigorously and continuously applied, then the answer must be
yes, the results are comparable and the difference lies solely within the countries themselves.
However, as scholars have pointed out, there is a tendency to show certain leniency to
practices in countries where a popular revolt, demanding democracy has taken place. 303 Also;
any methodology, however strict it may be, is applied by individuals and takes place in
unique conditions, i.e. they are never entirely the same as societies are unique and they
develop. A 2011 empirical study of six large OSCE/ODIHR short-term election
observations304 demonstrated that there is discernible, although very small difference in
individual assessments of observers, analysed by countries. Data which included over 3,000
short-term observers (1,568 teams of two) showed differences in observer assessments in 8
per cent of the cases on election day. There was a barely detectable difference by observer
origin, with Western observers marginally more negative in their assessments.305 From this
data it can concluded that a human and national factor in assessments of election observers
does clearly exist, as application of the methodology demands an assessment by individuals.
However, the data also strongly indicates that the overall consistency in which the
methodology is applied, including efforts to mix nationalities on teams, outweighs the human
factor, with well over 90 per cent consistency in assessments.
In the same vein we may ask: would authorities undertake all the same changes and
improvements had there not been any election observation? Judging from Hyde’s experiment
in Armenia, the answer is that it is unlikely. Her conclusion is that observer presence does
deter fraud, but can also push authorities into changing their methods to hide future
301
Dimitrij Rupel, "Address by H.E. Dimitrij Rupel, Ph.D., Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, at the Permanent
Council, 13 January 2005 " OSCE, http://www.osce.org/cio/39839. 4
302
Adam Przeworski, "Institutions Matter?," Government and Opposition 39 (2004).
303
Kelley, "D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation."
304
Armenia (2007 and 2008), Azerbaijan (2008), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2008), Serbia
(2007) and Tajikistan (2006).
305
Hans Schmeets and Caecilia Van Peski, "The ‘C-Factor’: Impact of the Nationality of Observers on
Observing Elections," in International election observation and assessment of elections, ed. Hans Schmeets
(Maastricht: Statistics Netherlands, 2011). 184
69
manipulation and therefore that reducing election fraud does not inevitably strengthen
democracy in the longer term.306 Hyde’s focus on voting and counting only tells part of the
story, as it ignores developments prior to the election itself, where oppression and bias may
have set such a distorted stage in advance of the election that no additional measures are
necessary to sway the vote. This underscores the importance of long-term observation, which
is aimed at detecting how the stage is set before the show is put on. Here analyses of the
media and political campaign are of importance, looking at the ability of all to stand and
receive equal coverage and treatment by officials and the law. Dutch election scholar van
Peski states that the impact of OSCE/ODIHR and EU election observation is substantial,
although hard to measure. Election observers not only detect and deter fraud by their
presence; if properly structured, observation can help hold together shaky electoral processes
in transitional countries. Furthermore, election observation has contributed substantially to the
dissemination and strengthening of basic standards of election administration.307 Here we see
not only the critical and correctional side of observation but also the endorsement when
progress is made and the capacity-building in the follow-up, which states are entitled to. This
is much in line with the diffusion mechanisms Börzel and Risse have identified for the EU’s
norm diffusion, using positive and negative incentives and socialization in interaction with
both members and accession countries.308
7.2 How does election observation work?
Liberal institutionalism, with its view that in cooperation, each party changes its
behaviour,309 does not suffice to explain the predominantly one-way push from the
organization, using the methodology as the standard to which the states have to comply.
Kelley argues that in Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of how norms evolve, the stage of norm
cascading sits well with the evolving of election observation, the tipping point of the electionmonitoring norms being in the years following the end of the Cold War, both in demand and
supply. With more and more states seeking legitimacy through election monitoring, even
cheating governments have seen the cost of not inviting as simply too high, leading to the
cascade of the norm.310 In the same vein, internalizing, which is the last stage of norm
306
Hyde, "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." 63
Caecilia Van Peski, "International Election Observation and Democratization," in International election
observation and assessment of elections, ed. Hans Schmeets (Maastricht: Statistics Netherlands, 2011). 130-135
308
Börzel and Risse. 6-7
309
Keohane. 380
310
Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring." 227
307
70
evolvement, is underway, as states adopt recommendations and the conduct of elections
generally improves. Worrying signs that governments are adapting to observation by
employing methods less measurable, including making use of their incumbency, media selfcensorship and lack of media scrutiny,311 are an indicator of new negative norms developing
from the prevailing ones.312 Simpser and Donno argue that is partly to blame on observers 
even high-quality election observers can unwittingly harm governance, as in order to conceal
their manipulation, authorities will move from more obvious forms of election fraud, such as
ballot-stuffing, to more damaging methods that hurt democratic institutions, governance and
fundamental freedoms, including media freedom.313
Hyde points out that democracy promoters put a pressure on states, rewarding and
punishing states depending on their commitment to democratize and maintain democratic
credentials. The link between democracy and international benefits is often made clear to
leaders before elections.314 By revealing and publicizing information, monitoring can create
pressure for enforcement and increase the credibility of international commitment.315 This
pressure increases as the state in question pursues membership in another economically and
politically prestigious institution, the EU, which uses a string of methods in its dealings with
accession states, including persuasion and providing negative and positive incentives.316
In the case of election observation this dissertation looks at states as social entities which
are being shaped in part by international social action. Policies of the state and its structures
undergo changes along with its understanding of the role as modern state.317 Observation by
experienced election experts and the related recommendations influence the work of the
country’s administration in the longer term, acting mainly as a teacher of norms 318 using
socialisation.319 They contribute to increased professionalism, to improved processes and
legislative framework and enhanced understanding of the electorate, including minority
groups, of their rights. They help media becoming more aware of their part in the election
311
See chapter on summary of the Serbia observation.
Finnemore and Sikkink. 895
313
Simpser and Donno. 501
314
Hyde, "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." 360
315
Daniela Donno, "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of
Democratic Norms," International Organization 64, no. 4 (2010). 622
316
Börzel and Risse. 6-7
317
Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy," International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993). 566
318
Ibid. 565
319
Börzel and Risse. 7
312
71
process, of their rights and obligations. By employing positive and negative incentives,320 they
put pressure on politicians to respect the democratic rules of the game and encourage them to
embrace norms of democracy and human rights, by publicly reminding them of their political
commitments and highlighting that respect for these same commitments are part of the
accession ticket to the EU. Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Draskovic, described in 2006 the
demands, his country was faced with, and arguably still is:
“Let me recall that Serbia wants to become a member of the European Union right now! But here, in
Brussels, we get the message: very well, but first you have to meet all the necessary requirements. So,
Serbia is not entitled to a European degree before it completes the full course of studies with honours,
that is, before it fulfils the required standards.”321
OSCE/ODIHR has promoted good electoral conduct, respect for civil liberties and
freedoms for over two decades in the liberal spirit that the firmer the norm becomes, the
likelier it is to be enshrined in the law.322 Reality may not be as straightforward. Norms do not
automatically change behaviour; the fact that authorities invite observers and still manipulate
or fail to ensure that the conditions for fully democratic elections are in place, indicates that
they are not entirely driven by norms of democratic elections.323 Hyde labels this as mimicry,
by those states or leaders who pretend that they want to adhere to norms, while not doing
that.324 Is this mimicry the observers’ fault as Simpser and Donno conclude? While election
observation is undoubtedly a factor in how governments adapt and change their methods, the
continuous negative reactions and countermeasures observers have provoked from several
governments325 are a strong indicator that their objective observation is still seen as a threat by
those who manipulate the pre-election environment.
7.3 The effect on Serbia’s elections
This analysis of Serbia’s elections since 1997 shows significant improvements in electoral
conduct and to confirm this, Serbia’s Foreign Minister stated in 2007 that almost 400 laws
had been passed by the National Assembly, “since the return of democracy to our country on
320
Ibid. 6
Vuk Draskovic, "Statement by H. E. Mr. Vuk Draskovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Serbia," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/mc/23010.
322
Axelrod. 1106
323
Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring." 224
324
Hyde, "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." 359
325
Fawn. 1138
321
72
October 5th, 2000”.326 The will to change is essential if there are to be changes for the better
in electoral conduct, but with it, the ability and knowledge has to be in place. The analysis of
how Serbian authorities have implemented OSCE/ODIHR recommendations shows beyond
any doubt that the insight and expertise of its election analysts, legal reviews, and the pressure
of their public statements has contributed considerably to the pace and extent of electoral
reforms. In a 2011 OSCE/ODIHR review of Serbia’s legislative process, legislative drafting
is said to be under-resourced and suffer from lack of training,327 which could explain some of
Serbia’s often incomplete implementation of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. The question
remains on how large a part of this progress, be it the 400 laws, or the willingness to improve,
OSCE/ODIHR observers can take credit for? As many scholars have pointed out, membership
of an international institution or organization is a powerful incentive to adhere to and adopt
norms, through a pull and push factor, where the organizations encourage and push for
improvement for the benefit of improved international status, membership or other
advantages. In 2016 the Dutch EU presidency’s comment on the Serbian elections lauds its
citizens’ “strong support for their country's strategic objective to join the EU”. 328 The hope of
becoming a member of the EU economic powerhouse is a strong modernizing factor for the
accession countries; a 2011 assessment of law drafting and legislative process in Serbia
criticises the pressure to adapt Serbia’s legislation to EU law by overusing urgent
procedure.329 Neighbouring Montenegro's foreign minister stated same year that it would have
taken his country ten years to reform as much as it has done in a year in the absence of the
pull of Brussels.330 The push and pull-factor of EU-accession for the Balkan-neighbours,
Serbia and Montenegro, also consolidates the impact of election observations, as in the
accession assessments, the EU refers to the need to implement OSCE/ODIHR
recommendations.331
However, the Serbian elections in the last few years also correspond with what
OSCE/ODIHR terms as challenges to the OSCE elections commitments: misuse of state
administrative resources by incumbents; pressure on the electorate to vote in a specific
Vuk Jeremic, "“Serbia and the Promise of Europe”: Address to the Permanent Council of the Organization for
Security and Co-Operation in Europe," OSCE http://www.osce.org/pc/26167. 3
327
St John Bates and Luzius Mader, "Law Drafting and Legislative Process in the Republic of Serbia. An
Assessment, December 2011," (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2011). 75
328
Dutch EU Presidency, "EU Statement on the Elections in Serbia," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/pc/238816.
329
Bates and Mader. 67
330
Tim Judah to Eastern Approaches, 24 January, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/10/serbias-troubles.
331
European Commission. 6
326
73
manner; media bias in favour of incumbents; complaints and appeals procedures that do not
always permit a timely and effective redress of complaints; failing to hold individuals
accountable for election-law violations; and lack of sufficient will to rectify identified
shortcomings.332 These trends, OSCE/ODIHR points out, can less and less be explained by
lack of experience or an inadequate legal and administrative framework, as the competence by
individual states to hold elections, improves.333 Looking at political developments in Serbia
and neighbouring countries at the time when regression in media freedoms and political
intimidation start to occur, this coincides with great disagreements on issues stemming from
Serbia’s national identity; the status of Kosovo and closer relationship with the EU.
Nationalism, a dominant factor in Serbia’s politics and aptly used by Milosevic to rally Serbs
behind him through wars and armed conflict, does not disappear with Milosevic’s demise.
His allies, some from nationalist parties, adapt to the changes in the political landscape, in
particular when acknowledging the undeniable economic benefit from EU membership. With
half-hearted efforts to improve relations with Kosovo and reinventing themselves as pro-EU
parties, personalities and bad habits from the Milosevic era resurface, after eight years
generally free of intimidation, media self-censorship, and advantage of the incumbent. This
also coincides with the economic turmoil of 2008, which brought Serbia’s old ally, Russia,
back with economic support and a reminder of that Serbia’s interests do not only lie to the
west. These developments also relate to Russia taking more space internationally, defying the
US, EU and their allies in eastern Europe, including in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine from
2014. Serbian authorities, having improved its election legislations and procedures, may also
have learned some of the lessons Hyde points out in her experiment: that observation can also
push authorities into changing their methods to hide future manipulation. They have realised
that although the improved electoral system and legislation allows for truly democratic
elections, covert pressure on those to influence opinions, e.g. media, and open pressure on
voters, combined with arbitrary and inconsistent application of rules and legislations by
election authorities, has the potential of greatly influencing voters, before election day.
Threats, pressure, censorship, bias and lack of transparency and will to rectify do not belong
in a description of a democratic election.
332
OSCE/ODIHR, "Challenges to OSCE Election Commitments," OSCE/ODIHR,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/43736.
333
Ibid.
74
7.4 Post-wall Europe
The pattern seen in this analysis coincides with a larger trend in Europe, which historian
Timothy Garton Ash has termed the “post-wall” period. In the first two decades following the
fall of the Berlin wall, the most poignant symbol of the end of the Cold War, great optimism
ruled that peace, democracy and prosperity would prevail in the best liberal spirit. This
optimism was particularly prominent before and after the wars, instability and economic
misery in the immediate years after the fall of the Wall. Many of the commitments for
democratic elections, but also for rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, were
introduced, adapted and strengthened in great liberal optimism that there was a unique
opportunity to make the world a better place. This included Serbia, which took on a number
of these commitments, in the period from 2000, changing not only the law, but also the
conduct of elections, a trend which was seen in other emerging democracies in Europe. This
post-wall period reached its height in 2005, claims Garton Ash, but saw its demise in 2009
following the economic crisis in 2008. At the time the crises of capitalism, democracy and the
project of European integration were also rearing their ugly heads. The “post-wall” era is now
effectively over with the rise of populism and Russian aggression, Garton Ash points out, in a
“spectacular shift from light to darkness”.334 More and more states seek to loosen the ties of
international treaties, conventions, commitments and laws,335 focusing increasingly on selfhelp as neo-realism defines it, although they still ally themselves with others when it suits
them, in the relentless aspiration to survive.336 They are in other words, no longer in transition,
but have reached a “final, and undemocratic form”.337
Are these trends a sign of a different kind of democracy? Can democracy be redefined and
renamed? The illiberal democracy Zakaria defined 20 years ago,338 has strengthened and
consolidated, as governments coming to power in free and fair elections chip away at the
foundations of a liberal democracy. Garton Ash, giving the example of nearby EU-member
Hungary,339 reminds us that although not an outright dictatorship, it exceeds populism or
“hybrid government”, it is illiberal democracy, a phenomenon is also known as “managed
334
Garton Ash.
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, Britain’s vote to leave the EU, Hungary’s, Poland’s constitutional
changes, infringing fundamental freedoms, to give but a few examples.
336
Waltz. See also chapter on realism-neo-realism.
337
Fawn. 1150
338
Zakaria.
339
Garton Ash.
335
75
democracy”.340 In the post–Cold War setting, some form of democratic legitimacy has become
essential to the survival of even authoritarian regimes. Elections would then be just
competitive enough to give the opposition some room to manoeuvre, while the regime intends
this to reinforce domestic support and its international standing.341 Here we are reminded of
how realism and neo-realism, harshly criticized for being unable to predict or explain the end
of the Cold War, may have the last word: in his defence of realist theory, at the height of
liberal optimism, Mearsheimer points out that a longer time than half a decade is needed to
determine “what kind of order or disorder will replace [the Cold War].”342 Geo-political
events in the last few years, ranging from armed conflict on European soil to the erosion of
liberal values in Europe, and changing power structures, seem to prove him right.
Is Serbia becoming an illiberal democracy like its neighbour, or is Serbia’s partial
regression mainly a part of the larger development in that direction? Although not a stranger
to foreign involvement, the two foreign elements in the 2016 elections have a worrisome
connotation, due to the changing and more confrontational political atmosphere in Europe.
Russia, in particular, has a strong bond with Serbia and has reinforced it in the last years with
economic, political and military incentives. Further to this, in October 2016 Montenegrin
authorities arrested a group for plotting a Kremlin-backed coup during elections in the
country. Shortly thereafter, the Serbian government confirmed the apprehension of another
group with the same plans for the neighbour state.343 This coincides with an increasing
Russian reaction to both Serbia and Montenegro moving closer to the EU in the last years,
with both countries having EU candidate status. Russia has stepped up its efforts to influence
the Serbian public, establishing news outlets in Serbian with anti-Western content344 and
reminding the authorities of their “close interest” in the upcoming elections in 2017.345
Does this make Serbia illiberal? It points towards a trend where Serbia is being influenced,
possibly manipulated, socialized and persuaded346 by the opposite forces to the EU valuebased bureaucracy, using some of the same methods as the EU. They remind Serbia where it
belongs in the regional, East-European and cultural orthodox context. Combined with credible
340
Nikolay Petrov, "The Essence of Putin's Managed Democracy," The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/10/18/essence-of-putin-s-managed-democracy-event-819.
341
Thompson. 160
342
Mearsheimer. 45
343
The Economist, "Russia Appears to Cause Trouble in the Balkans."
344
Salem, “Beware of the Russian Bear in the Balkans."
345
BETA, "Russia to Follow Serbian Elections "with Full Attention"," B-92,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=12&dd=27&nav_id=100084.
346
See definition of EU diffusion mechanisms by Börzel and Risse. 6
76
reports of silencing tactics and accusations of authoritarian tendencies,347 the analysis of the
election observation with media self-censorship and clear indications of tolerance of
threatening behaviour, paint a worrying picture. And there Serbia is not alone, the trend is
unmistakeable: In January 2017 Serbia was labelled a “flawed democracy” instead of a “full
democracy” in the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2016, for the first time
in the post-Milosevic period.348 Special reference is made to election irregularities in Serbia,
but also to the fact that this is part of a wider, alarming trend, with altogether 16 (!) of the
EU’s member states counting as flawed democracies.349 This development is also visible in
states’ stance on international cooperation as now some countries are less than enthusiastic 350
about the establishment of new organizations and even maintaining existing ones. We see this
in particular with the United States, which has for years resisted signing important
international conventions, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the
establishment of new bodies, such as the International Criminal Court,351 with more states
joining the US in their objections to it.
The Economist. "Serbia’s Prime Minister: The Changeling," The Economist, 17 September 2016.
Economist Intelligence Unit, "The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016: "Revenge of the
“Deplorables”," in Democracy Index (London: The Economist Group, 2017). 39
349
Ibid. 39
350
Abbott and Snidal. 5
351
Eric Engle, "The International Criminal Court, the United States, and the Domestic Armed Conflict in Syria,"
Journal of International and Comparative Law 14 (2013). 146-152
347
348
77
8 Conclusion
International election observation is a complex set of encouragement and deterrence for
states to adopt and adhere to the set of norms and values, while staying clear of the temptation
to manipulate the democratic outcome. The values to defend have become interwoven in the
Western liberal definition of democracy. By taking a closer look at the election observation in
this emerging European democracy over two decades, not only does a considerable
improvement to processes, legislative framework and the will to hold genuinely democratic
elections emerge, but also a recent trend towards authoritarianism that reflects a development
in a number of European democracies. These democracies belong to some or all institutions
which continue to put pressure on their members to improve their liberal democratic conduct
and respect for fundamental freedoms. Serbian authorities are torn between a firm will and
capacity to change and improve the election process, egged on by the powerful incentive of a
future EU membership, and the impulse to control this important legitimising process behind
a wall of sluggish follow-up and changes to sensitive areas, such as campaign and political
financing, party ownership of mandates and solidifying media regulation. In this, Serbia
seems to reflect trends in other OSCE states when it comes to challenges to the OSCE
elections commitments352 although this dissertation does not attempt to measure the
comparison to other states.
Liberalism alone, with its trust in institutions where states interact responsibly instead of
based on their narrow self-interest, does not sufficiently explain the partially lacklustre
implementation of some recommendations in Serbia, although we are reminded of
Huntington’s prediction of a “third reverse wave.”353 Despite its declared will to “complete the
full course” of European studies,354 Serbia resists its completion in granting the voters full
freedom of making up their minds and giving them trust in the process. The changing social
construct of what constitutes good elections and the normative approach of constructivism
helps to describe and understand the complex relationship between an international
organization and one of its member states, which at the same time is its subject. It helps to
explain how Serbia adapts to the demands it faces domestically and internationally,
attempting to adjust to the normative environment to the extent possible, without
relinquishing power. Serbia’s leaders, having adopted most of the standards that should secure
352
OSCE/ODIHR, "Challenges to OSCE Election Commitments".
Huntington. 17
354
Draskovic.
353
78
Serbia’s interest in the long-term, resort to methods of not too distant past; manipulation and
misuse of power, at a time when difficult political issues arise which have the potential of
ending their term in office. By this they risk hollowing out the values and norms that are the
building blocks of truly democratic elections, building blocks which were conceived in a
liberal spirit. Here, realism may be more helpful in understanding how Serbia, in its
endeavour to keep both doors in its house open is taking part in redefining what democracy
stands for, and countering the declared goal at the outset of election observationto strive for
and strengthen liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights. While the framework for
democratic elections, and election observation, are still seen as useful tools to legitimize the
government, Serbia is increasingly engaged in an internal and external power struggle over
national identity, interests and alliances, either aligning or distancing itself to states and group
of states in an anarchic self-help system. In its quest to further its interests and secure its
survival, Serbia risks eroding the fundaments of truly democratic elections, which brought on
the benefits of such a system to begin with. Fareed Zakaria’s prediction in 1997, the same
year as OSCE/ODIHR’s first observation in Serbia was taking place, has an eerily foreboding:
Just as nations across the world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they
could well adopt and sustain varied forms of democracy. Western liberal democracy might prove to be
not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of many possible exits. 355
By summarizing OSCE/ODIHR’s observation and recommendations, with supporting
material from other international organizations and media, this dissertation answers the
research questions by demonstrating how the main election challenges facing Serbian
authorities to begin with were incomplete election legislation and lack of trust of the
electorate in the institutions governing elections. It documents how efforts to improve the law
and the process resulted in greater confidence but slackness in improving legislation and
implementations pertaining to sensitive areas such as financing of political parties and
campaign and media, combined with trends in media self-regulation and lack of criticism,
misuse of incumbency and pressure on certain groups, mirror a trend of electoral challenges
seen in other OSCE states. The process has, to some degree, been accelerated by the prospect
of EU membership.
This dissertation is limited by the information on implementation of recommendations,
available in observation reports and other somewhat sporadic documentation on the
355
Zakaria.
79
implementation. It is neither possible to claim the exact extent of implementations from the
material available, nor to assert which legislative change would not have taken place without
pressure from OSCE/ODIHR. However, the systematic approach by the observers, often
referring to implementation of previous recommendations, or lack thereof, throughout a
period of two decades, backed up by documentation from OSCE and others, draws a clear
picture of a variable will, and possibly capacity, to move legislation and the electoral
framework closer to standards for democratic elections.
In order to fully examine the will and capacity for improvement and change, as well as the
effect of the external pressure of election observations and possible EU membership, a
qualitative study of a particular part of the legislation, such as media or financing of political
activities could be undertaken; interviewing legislators, election officials, domestic and
international observers. Also of interest would be to further explore the OSCE wide trend of
election challenges, empirically, to the extent possible, and through comparative OSCE wide
study of election reports analysis.
80
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Annex I
89
Annex I
Overview of OSCE/ODIHR findings and recommendations 1997-2016
Abbreviations: EC= Election commission(s), MEC=Municipal Election commission, PB= Polling boards, REC= Republican Election Commission, VL= Voter lists
Election
Parliamentary
& Presidential
Sept/Oct 1997
Fundamentally flawed,
neither
transparent
nor uniformly
administered.
Procedures
mostly
adequate,
limited
attempt to
address
shortcomings.
Election law
ambiguous,
unclear EC
guidelines,
state TV
biased.
Presidential
Dec 1997
Fundamentally flawed
Limited
attempts to
improve
process
insufficient,
leaving
integrity of
the election
process
seriously
compromised.
Election
system
Process
neither
transparent nor
uniformly
administered.
Recommend:
Reassessm
ent of 29
district
system.
Need
transparent
process.
Election
commissions
REC failed to
issue clear
guidelines for
uniform and
transparent
process.
Appointment of
all EC subject to
bias towards
ruling party.
Recommend:
-Call for multiparty ECs
Election law
Voter registration
Law vague and
does not permit
uniform,
transparent
process. Problems
e.g. on composition
of commissions,
production of
ballots, military
&mail voting,
aggregation/public
ation of results.
Recommend:
-Need for rulings
for uniform
interpretation
Many complaints
on quality of the
VL, which is
prepared in each
municipality, of
very different
quality.
Recommend:
-Review of register
compilation
-Need for update
central register
Recommend:
-Need for
dialogue
between
all political
parties to
improve
election
process
and ensure
stable
environment.
-Need
guarantees
for multiparty
control of
election
process
Attempts to
improve limited,
no guarantees
multi-party
representation
on ECs
Recommend:
-Ensure multiparty
representation.
-Change twotiered EC,
decision making
more than
simple majority.
No change in
legislation from last
election.
Recommend:
-Repeat call for
guidelines and
rulings for common
interpretation of
law
Two parallel
registers, crosschecking not done
regularly. Many
cases of errors in
registry. Kosovo a
particular problem
due to
unwillingness of
citizens to cooperate.
Recommend:
-Ensure accuracy by
updating National
registry and basing
voter registry on it.
-Ensure public
access to registry.
Political
campaign
n/r
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
All security
aspects of
ballots
(printing,
paper,
distribution
ect) lacking.
Recommend:
Accountabil
ity of
production
of ballots.
-Law
amended
for
stamping.
-Public
tender for
ballot
paper/print
ing
Unclear
whether all
parties on lists
can take seats
on ECs.
President carrier
of list, which
may be
unconstitutional
Parties decide
order on lists
after election.
Recommend:
-Law
amendment for
finalizing lists
before
campaign.
State TV/radio
strongly biased in
favour of ruling
party. Difficulties
for private stations
to obtain
frequencies. Little
or no censorship of
print media
Recommend:
-De-politicization of
state media
-Lift obstacles for
independent
media.
-Address biased TV
news content
Voting efficient
but observers
reported on 30%
irregularities,
incl. not all
members of PBs
present, open
voting and
missing voting
materials. In
southern Serbia
(Kosovo) serious
concerns of
voter register,
discrepancies in
numbers of
voters, PSs not
opened and
threats against
observers.
Contradicting
law and
instructions on
counting, not
possible to
certify figures
from
individual PSs.
Recommend:
-Improve
transparency
of counting
procedures.
-Figures in
digits & words
on receipt
forms
n/r
Repeated
concerns
regarding
all aspects;
printing,
paper,
security,
distribution
Recommend:
-Set official
regulation
on prod. of
ballots
-Stamping
ballots.
-Improve
security of
storage
-Public
tender for
printing
Majority of
candidates
rejected,
registration &
signature checks
lack
transparency.
Recommend:
instruction for
checking validity
of supporting
signatures
State TV shows
clear bias in time
and tone towards
ruling party but
attempt at
providing all
candidates with
free airtime.
Independent
broadcasters
unable to register
for frequencies.
Recommend:
-State media to
become impartial,
addressing content
and order of news,
allowing for equal
access for
candidates.
-Call for equal
allocation of
frequencies.
Voting generally
adequately
administered but
pattern of
election fraud in
Kosovo, cases of
100% turnout
Voting by mail,
incl. military, a
serious issue, no
reliable inform.
on procedures
and rights of
conscripts.
Recommend:
-Regulate
military/prison
voting by mail to
address lack of
rules, uniformity.
–Investigate
election fraud in
Kosovo.
Repeated
concerns from
last election
Recommend:
-Multi-party
control of
process to
increase
confidence in
process. Receipt forms
amended to
include figures
and digits
90
Aggregation of
results
Aggregation
process lacks
transparency,
not possible to
certify numbers,
computer
operator can
correct input of
numbers w/out
recorded in
database.
Recommend:
-Safeguard
against
unauthorized
operations.
-Public tender
for services.
Publication of
results
Recommend:
Immediate
public posting
of result,
forms to
include all
parties results
and turnout.
Observers
Repeated
concerns reg.
software,
process not
always followed,
cases of
protocols sent to
party officials
ahead of
tabulation.
Recommend:
-Safeguard
against
unauthorized
operations.
-Public tender
for services.
REC neglects
to publish
preliminary
results & turnout.
Recommend:
-Public
posting of
preliminary &
final results.
-Need to
provide
timely, official
information
Domestic
observers
denied
accreditation.
Recommend:
-Ensure nonpartisan
observer
accreditation.
-Clear
guidelines for
access at all
levels
Recommend:
Guidelines for
rights &
obligations of
international
observers and
ensure nonpartisan
observer
accreditation.
Annex I
Election
Federal and
municipal Sept
2000
Election
system
n/r
Election
commissions
Opposition
members unable
to assert control
of process, Fed.
Ass & Fed
Election Comm.
in control of
appointments
Election law
Voter registration
No attempts to
address ODIHR
recommendations.
Last minute
legislation changes,
changing term of
office ect. Election
law lacks
safeguards to
prevent fraud, no
requirement to sign
voter list.
Failure to remedy
situation, denial of
inspection of
voters’ list
Changed to
a single
constituency from
29
previously.
-
Multi-party
election admin
transparent,
impartial.
Recommend:
-REC not to rule
of own decisions.
-Reinstate
intermediate
level of election
admin;
-Ensure political
pluralism,
gender and
national
minorities in ECs.
-Improve
procedures to
avoid delay in
opening PSs.
-Training for PBs
Hastily changed law
addresses
numerous concerns
but needs further
improvement.
Allows for
Supervisory Board
Recommend:
-National minorities
represented in
parliament
-Voters to know
rules on seat
allocation
-Campaign
expenditure
clarified, set
penalties.
-Minor breaches
not to result in
repeat voting.
Decision on
national registry to
be computerized.
Recommend:
-Legislation on
compilation,
maintenance and
public display.
Access denied,
report based
on “reliable
sources” and
public
information
“Significant
deterioration”
Parliamentary
Dec 2000
Considerable
progress,
many flaws
addressed but
a number
remain. Multiparty
administration
transparent,
impartial.
Respect for
fundamental
freedoms,
absence of
intimidation.
Improved
media
environment.
Political
campaign
Pre-election
environment
characterized
by severe
restrictions,
intimidation
and fear.
Ballots
General
absence of
intimidation,
parties able to
register
candidates and
campaign fairly
and equally.
Improved
law on
printing
ballots,
parties
witness
printing.
Candidate Lists
Absence of
control of
printing
and
distribution
of ballots
REC registered
candidate lists
impartially.
Allows parties
to decide final
order on lists
after the
election.
Difficult for
regional parties
to overcome 5%
threshold.
Individuals not
able to stand.
Recommend:
-Allow individual
candidates
- Order of
candidates set
before election
91
Media
Voting
Count
Deteriorating
situation of media
w/1998 law on
public information,
incl. strict
regulation
“publicizing the
truth”: Harassment
of journalists, bias
of state media.
Process in
Kosovo &
Montenegro ad
hoc, w/out
support of
authorities.
Allegations of
widespread
fraud. Violence
in polling
stations.
n/r
Significant
improvement, state
media not overtly
biased, but still
unbalanced in
favour of DOS.
Supervisory Board
set up with unclear
mandate.
Recommend:
-Setting penalties
for breaking silence
period.
-Develop state TV
from state to public
broadcaster.
-Provisions for
equal coverage,
access.
-Abolish supervisory board, set up
permanent
regulatory body
Significant
improvement,
introducing
indelible ink,
voters sign
register &
transparent
ballot boxes.
Military to vote
in regular PSs.
IDPs disenfranchised as
voting only to be
in Serbia.
Recommend:
-Improve access
for disabled.
-Allow voting
outside Serbia
-Improve PSs and
voting screens
Proper and
free of
intimidation
and tension.
Most results
displayed
publicly.
Aggregation of
results
Denial of access
for opposition
representatives
to observe data
processing.
Publication of
results
n/r
Observers
Procedures
generally
adhered to,
multi-party
composition
provided
transparency.
Improved
computer
technology.
Parties witness
tabulation.
Recommend:
-Parties given
sufficient time to
notify REC on
complaints
-Citizens to be
able to appeal
directly to court.
Final results
delayed due
to repeat
voting
Recommend:
Call for results
detailing each
polling station
published
timely and
publicly.
REC displayed
open attitude,
non-partisan
observers
allowed.
Recommend:
Legal right for
non-partisan
groups to
observe
Denial of visas
for
international
observers,
harassment of
domestic nonpartisan
observers.
Annex I
Election
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication of
results
Observers
Municipal
(limited) July
2002
Introduction of
proportional
and direct
election for
mayors
enjoys
wide
support.
Recommend:
-REC to have a
formal role
-Establish
alternative
appellate
structure, higher
than municipal
court
-Ensure political
plurality and
national
minorities on
MECs and PBs
Recommend:
-Mandate belong to
independent
councillors, not
parties
-Realistic
timeframes and
deadline in election
law.
Accuracy,
transparency of VL
remains
contentious.
Recommend:
-Improving
transparency,
quality and
accuracy of VL.
-Further dialogue
with Kosovo on VL
Generally quiet
atmosphere,
honouring
code of
conduct.
Provision
for election
materials in
Serbian and
Albanian.
Lists, citizen’s
groups
registered.
Increased
participation of
women due to
required 1/3
minimum on
lists. Individual
candidates
allowed.
Recommend:
- Parties set
order of
candidates on
list prior to
election
Media compliance
of agreed
guidelines
Minor
irregularities
group voting,
overcrowding.
Recommend:
-Allowing voting
outside PSs
-Standardize
polling booths,
-Training for PBs
and voter
education.
-Ensure voters
sign when
receiving ballot
- Guidelines for
closing
Mostly good,
in cases of
irregularities
referred to
MEC.
Tabulation
orderly except
for one MEC
Publication
within time
limits but took
time.
Broad access
for nonpartisan
observers but
law still does
not ensure
this.
Recommend:
Law on rights
and responsebilities of
observers.
Admin
generally
efficient
but
difficulties
implement.
conflicting
provisions.
Three
failed
attempts
to elect a
president.
Lower
public
confidence
in reforms.
Practical
difficulties
solved by ad hoc
decisions but
w/out legal basis
Recommend:
-Clarify rights of
election admin
bodies, in case of
repeat elections.
-PBs only
resolved by REC
and after formal
complaint
-Greater political
pluralism on
commissions.
Recommend
-Comprehensive
review of election
law, removing
inconsistencies
btw. Presidential &
parliamentary
elections
-Ensuring adequate
representation of
minorities, independent candidates
-Remove provisions
for min. turnout.
-Longer period btw
calling and holding
elections
Recommend:
-Long-term effort
to improve
registers.
-Consider single,
civil database,
responsibility of
one body.
-Uniform software
for municipalities to
verify errors.
-VL publicly
accessible in PSs
before elections
-Access to pol.
parties only with
privacy safeguards.
Generally
calm,
significant
improvement
from before
2000. Use of
campaign fund
for contestants
insufficiently
controlled.
Recommend:
-Greater
accountability
on use of
public funds
for campaign
expenditure
n/r
Recommend
-Revision of
process for
nomination,
candidate
registration, so
it is practical,
enforceable and
allows for
signature
verification.
State TV provided
free airtime to all
candidates &
unbiased coverage,
private media
favouring particular
candidates.
Recommend:
-Law ensuring equal
access to media,
incl. payments for
ads.
-Clarify role of
Media Supervisory
Board for
monitoring,
enforcing penalties.
Voting calm, in
accordance with
law. Low
turnout.
Recommend:
-Allowing out-ofpolling station
vote.
-PSs to be of
suitable size and
accessible for
disabled.
-Standardize
quality of voting
screens.
Count quick
and efficient.
Results
published within
deadline. A few
significant
complaints.
Recommend:
-Review of
resolution
process to be
transparent,
efficient,
inclusive.
-Appeals to
Supreme Court
in open sessions,
right to present
case directly or
legal repr.
Most
protocols
published
publicly.
Recommend:
-Rights of
international
and domestic
observers
guaranteed by
law.
Admin
generally
efficient
and transp.
Less
controversy with
admin.
Calls for
boycott
and nonparticipation.
narrowed
choices.
Recommend:
-Clarification of
rights of
extended
members of
commissions
PBs only
resolved by REC
and after formal
complaint
Recommend:
-Comprehensive
review of law
removing
inconsistencies
btw. Presidential &
parliamentary
-Remove provisions
for min. turnout.
-Out-of-polling
stations for
disabled and others
-Longer period btw
calling & holding
elections
Despite review of
VL, accuracy still
questioned.
Recommend:
-Consider single,
civil database under
a single state body.
-Uniform software
for municipal
records.
-VL to be public
ahead of elections.
-Access to pol.
parties only with
privacy safeguards.
Campaign low
key, rhetoric
relatively
constructive
n/r
Process smooth,
unlike past
presidential
elections.
State TV gave free
airtime to all
candidates &
unbiased coverage.
Recommend:
-Ensure autonomy
& balance on
Council of
Republican Agency
for Broadcasting
Media
-Change election
law for consistency
w/ broadcast law.
Recommend:
-PSs to be of
suitable size and
accessible for
disabled.
-Standardize
quality of voting
screens.
-Training of PB
staff on conduct,
to prevent group
voting
Positive
assessment of
voting, but
some minor
procedural
failures, such
as not
counting
unused ballots
Efficient and
transparent
tabulation
Recommend:
-Review of
disputes
resolution
process
-Appeals to
Supreme Court
in open sessions
and right to
present case
directly.
Preliminary
results
announced
several times
during
election night
and turnout
figures.
Broad access
for nonpartisan
observers
contributed to
high level of
transparency.
Recommend:
law on rights
and
responsibilitie
s of observers.
Generally in
accordance w/
international
standards.
New election
law made
progress but
shortcomings
remain.
Participation
of all
ethnicities.
Presidential
Sept, Oct, Dec
2002
Conduct in
line with
international
commitments
but did not
meet criteria
for domestic
law due to
political
impasse and
defective
legislation.
Failed to elect
a president
Presidential
Nov 2003
In line with
international
commitments,
but failed to
elect
president due
to political
impasse,
defective
legislation &
demand for
over 50%
92
Annex I
turnout
Election
Parliamentary
Dec 2003
Generally in
line with OSCE
commitments
but challenges
in relation to
legislation
unchanged
since October
2000.
Presidential
June 2004
Essentially in
line with OSCE
/ CoE
standards for
democratic
elections.
Welcome
changes to
election law,
although
some hurdles
remain.
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication of
results
Observers
Efficient
admin
despite
legal deficiencies
and lack of
intermediate
level of
admin
Recommend:
-Provide a role
for Municipal EC
to reduce
logistical
problems and
provide multiparty
representation
-Ensure PBs only
dissolved by REC,
following formal
complaint.
Recommend:
-Comprehensive
review of
legislation:
-End parties power
to strip elected
members of
mandate.
-5% threshold
based on ballot
cast, not VL
signatures.
-Consider
facilitating national
minorities in
parliament.
Recommend:
-Single VL overseen
by one State body.
-Continue to
improve accuracy
-Uniform software
for civil records.
-VL public prior to
elections.
-Minimum resident
requirement for
right to vote.
-Access to pol.
parties only with
privacy safeguards
-Dialogue with UN
Kosovo on registers
No serious
incidents,
campaign
lively.
Seen as first
election where
voting for
preferred
option rather
than the party
least disliked
n/r
Broad range of
choices,
including
persons indicted
for war crimes
(not illegal)
Recommend:
-Parties decide
order on lists
before election
Extensive and
largely balanced
coverage, state
media complied
w/law.
Recommend
-Changes to
election law to
ensure consistency
with broadcast law.
Rates for political
advertising not
higher than other
ads.
Still cases of
overcrowding,
group voting.
Recommend:
-Allow disabled,
imprisoned,
abroad to vote.
-PSs to be of
suitable size and
accessible for
disabled.
-Standardize
quality of voting
screens.
-Training of PB
staff to prevent
group voting
Quick and
efficient.
Continued
cases of PBs
not counting
unused ballots
Several times
during
election night.
No challenge
to the
accuracy of
result.
Recommend:
Results to be
put on public
display
outside PSs
after vote
count.
Recommen
d:
Rights of
observers
guaranteed
in the law.
Significant
amendments to
election
law Feb
2004,
ensuring
election of
President.
REC efficient in
tackling
numerous
changes due to
new law
Women well
represented in
election admin.
Recommend:
-PBs to enforce
all aspects of
voting
procedures.
-Offer PBs
training.
Difficulties in
interpreting and
implementing new
law on financing of
pol. parties.
Recommend:
-Winning candidate
based on majority
of valid votes cast
-Review rights of
candidates to
follow out-ofcountry vote due to
costs.
-Ministry of Finance
to interpret law on
pol. party financing.
-Different finance
regulation for
presidential vs.
parliamentary.
-List of private
donations included
in form on finances.
-One body
responsible for
implementing law
on finances.
-Training provided
on law on finances.
Need for
centralized VL
persists.
Recommend:
Single VL and law
on maintenance of
VL.
Continue to
improve accuracy.
Uniform software
for municipal civil
records.
Facilitate voter
registration
amongst Roma and
IDPs.
Campaigning in
calm
atmosphere,
language
heating up in
second round.
n/r
Broad range of
candidates, only
two women out
of 15, no
national
minority.
Broad and generally
balanced coverage.
Rep. Broadcasting
Agency issued
binding instructions
but did not monitor
media.
Recommend:
-Status of Council
of Republican
Agency for
Broadcasting Media
clarified.
-Remove provisions
in election law
contradicting
broadcast law.
-Complete
transformation of
RTS to public
service
Peaceful, minor
irregularities.
Disenfranchisem
ent of Roma
voters. Signs of
laxness returning
to procedures.
Recommend
-Facilitation of
absentee voting
in Montenegro.
-Lower threshold
for PSs abroad.
-Information
campaign to
raise awareness
of newly allowed
out-of-polling
station voting.
-New, standard
voter screens to
ensure secrecy
-Offer PBs
training.
n/r
Efficient and
transparent
Recommend:
-Review of
dispute
resolution
process to make
it efficient,
transparent,
inclusive
-Appeals to
Supreme Court
to be in open
sessions
-Right to present
case directly or
legal
representation.
Complaints on
first round and
against Ministry
of Finance on
mishandling new
law on financing.
Ruled on by REC
and Supreme
court.
n/r
Despite
changes to
election
law, no
changes in
status of
observers.
Recommen
d:
Rights of
observers
guaranteed
in the law
93
Annex I
Election
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication of
results
Parliamentary
Jan 2007.
n/r
REC work open,
transparent,
inclusive,
confidence by
parties in
process.
Recommend
-Intermediary
municipal EC to
avoid
inconsistency
-Formal
guidelines for EC
appointments.
- Review of rules
calling for repeat
voting, focus
rather on
recount or audit
of protocols.
Law provides
safeguards &
enables minority
participation. Still
some concerns
Recommend:
-Gender quota
apply to mandate
distribution
- 10.000 signature
minimum revised
for minority groups
- Define national
minority party
- Guidelines for
challenges to law.
-5% threshold
based on votes
cast, not VL
Recommend:
-Single VL and law
on maintenance of
VL.
-Continue to
improve accuracy.
-New law on voter
registration,
marking
responsibility for
maintenance.
-Facilitating voter
registration
amongst Roma,
IDPs.
Vigorous and
unrestricted
n/r
Twenty lists,
inclusive
process of
registration.
Albanian party
participated first
time
Recommend:
-Parties decide
order on lists
before election
Diverse media
offering extensive
info, balanced
coverage of public
broadcaster.
Recommend:
-Guarantees for
reasonable portion
of free airtime on
now public RTS.
- Definition of
promotion and
sponsoring.
-Media Supervisory
Board to be
activated for
resolving campaign
and media
complaints, within
set deadlines.
Peaceful and
orderly, high
level of
confidence in
process among
voters, officials
well organized,
professional.
Recommend:
-PSs of suitable
size, accessible
for disabled.
-Standardize
quality of voting
screens.
-Train PB staff on
conduct, incl. to
discourage group
voting
Smooth and
efficient,
although
procedure not
consistently
followed.
Recommend:
-Role of Office of
Statistics in
tabulation of
results to be
defined by law,
to achieve
greater
transparency.
-Appeals to
Supreme Court
to be in open
sessions and
right to present
case directly or
legal
representative.
n/r
Recommend:
Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law
First
presidential
election
following
constitutio
nal changes
in 2006.
REC professional,
transparent but
appeared at
times influenced
by politics,
ignoring ruling of
Supreme Court
Recommend:
-Ensure PBs only
dissolved by REC
when violation
impacts integrity
of election.
- Review REC
decision-making
process.
- Decisions of
REC public on
website
-Reduce number
of PB members
-Intermediary
municipal EC to
avoid
inconsistencies.
Law generally
provides sound
basis for
democratic
elections, but is
under-regulated.
Recommend:
-Different
framework for
campaign financing
for presidential
elections vs.
parliamentary.
-Audit capacity for
body receiving
financial campaign
reports
-Open hearings at
Supreme Court
- REC guidelines for
challenges to law.
- Extend deadlines
for complaints &
appeals.
Recommend:
-State-wide, single
VL as required by
law.
-Encourage work on
reforming voter
register.
Pluralistic,
competitive
and calm, civil
and political
rights
respected.
Recommend:
-Clarification of
provisions for
pre-election
silence.
Ballot
paper too
thin to
protect
secrecy of
vote.
Recommend:
-Printing
ballots on a
betterquality
paper to
enhance
secrecy.
Inclusive
process.
Rejections by
REC confirmed
by Supreme
Court.
Variety of media
gave candidates
opportunity to
convey messages,
but incumbent
president had an
advantage.
Recommend:
-Media Supervisory
Board to be
activated in
accordance with
law for campaign
and media
complaints.
-Consider adopting
draft law on media
concentration and
transparency of
ownership.
Recommend:
Reconsider party
observation of
vote abroad, as it
is paid by public
funds.
-Standardize PS
layout and voter
screens
-Voter education
campaign on
individual voting.
-Training of PB
staff on voter
identification,
secrecy of vote,
inking and use of
lamp
n/r
Recommend:
-Role of Office of
Statistics in
tabulation of
results to be
defined by law,
to achieve
greater
transparency
n/r
Recommend:
-Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law
Conducted in
line with
OSCE and
other
standards for
democratic
elections.
Offered
genuine
opportunity
to freely
choose from a
range of
platforms.
Presidential
Jan/Feb 2008
Mostly in line
with OSCE
commitments
for
democratic
elections.
Transparent
process,
genuine
choice for
voters but
incumbent
president
enjoyed an
advantage
and law could
be improved.
94
Observers
Annex I
Election
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication
of results
Observers
Early
parliamentary
May 2008
n/r
Recommend:
-Intermediary
municipal EC to
institute a chain
of command and
reduce logistical
burdens.
-Define how
parties
appoint/change
members on
REC.
-Making work
and decisions of
REC public on its
website
Review of REC
decision-making
process to
harmonize it.
Law sound basis
but shortcomings,
recommendations
to be addressed.
Recommend:
- Apply gender
quota to
distribution of
mandates
- Consolidate entire
election legislation
in Electoral Code.
-Criteria for
provision allowing
minority mandates
when receiving less
than 5%
-Different
framework for
campaign financing
for presidential
elections vs.
parliamentary
Recommend:
-State-wide, single
VL as required by
law.
- Facilitating voter
registration
amongst Roma,
IDPs.
Vigorous and
open but went
too far when
death threats
were directed
against
officials.
Recommend:
-Supervisory
Board to
monitor the
conduct of the
media, political
parties,
candidates and
other
participants in
the electoral
process needs
to be
established.
Recommend:
-Printing
ballots on a
betterquality
paper to
prevent
breaches to
secrecy.
-Foresee
possibility
of issuing
new ballots
to voters
who have
damaged
theirs.
Inclusive
process, 22 lists,
thereof 10 of
national
minorities
Recommend:
-Reassess
demand for
10.000
signatures for
lists, particularly
for minorities.
-Parties decide
order on lists
before election
Diverse range of
media, coverage
predominantly
neutral. Official
information widely
available in
minority languages.
Recommend:
- Supervisory Board
to be activated in
accordance with
law for campaign
and media
complaints.
-Clarify provisions
on pre-election
silence.
-Consider adopting
draft law on media
concentration and
transparency of
ownership.
Recommend:
-Improve
selection of PS
locations to
better
accommodate.
-Standardize
layout and voter
screens
-Training of PB
staff and
handbooks or
checklists to
assist their work
n/r
Recommend:
-Role of Office of
Statistics in
tabulation of
results to be
defined by law
-Appeals to
Supreme Court
to be in open
sessions and
right to present
case directly or
legal
representative.
-Establish
deadlines for
resolving
complaints
-REC to develop
procedure for
dealing with
complaints.
n/r
Recommend:
-Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law and
criteria for
accreditation
defined.
Election
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication
of results
Observers
Parliamentary
and early
presidential
May 2012
n/r
ECs performed
duties efficiently
& within
deadlines.
Recommend:
-Intermediary
municipal EC to
institute chain of
command and
reduce logistical
burdens.
-Build capacity
and institutional
memory at ECs
-Reduce
members of PBs
-Publicize work
of REC
Recent
amendments to law
based on ODIHR
recommendations.
Anti-corruption
agency ACA
established.
Recommend:
Law to be
reconciled,
reviewed, possibly
in a single electoral
code.
-Strengthen finance
regulation
-Clarify loans, nonmonetary
contributions,
lower limits
-Shorten deadlines
for financial reports
ensure publication
A unified voter
register used for
the first time.
Recommend:
Enhancing
efficiency,
delineate duties
and responsibilities
Focus on socioeconomic
issues.
Allegations of
fraud raised
concern. 1/3 of
candidates are
women.
Recommend:
-Investigate
allegations of
vote-buying,
intimidation,
misuse of
public funds.
n/r
Recommend:
Reassess
demand for
10.000
signatures for
lists, particularly
for minorities
Wide range of
information but
lack of critical
coverage; tendency
towards selfcensorship due to
pressure and
financial situation.
Recommend:
-Laws on
transparency of
media ownership,
preventing media
monopolies,
neutral financial
state assistance to
media.
-Broadcast Agency
to provide more
information to
public.
Orderly but
procedural
problems
Recommend
-Voter
education, incl.
in minority
languages.
-Reduce size of
PSs to avoid
overcrowding.
-Layout can
accommodate
voters and PBs
and be
accessible to
disabled.
-Quality of voting
screens to be
improved.
Transparent,
orderly.
Improved in
the latter
round, with
less crowding
and staff
following
procedures to
a greater
degree.
REC reviewed
complaints in
open session but
without parties
presenting their
case. Dismissed
all complaints,
weakening its
integrity. Admin
Court, Broadcast
Agency reviewed
behind closed
doors.
Recommend:
-Resolution of all
election dispute
transparent.
-Deadlines for
complaints
extended.
Supervisory
Board set up.
n/r
Recommend:
-Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law and
criteria for
accreditation
defined.
Overall
conducted in
line with
OSCE
commitments
but partly
overshadowe
d by negative
campaign,
with death
threats to
officials.
Long-standing
OSCE
recommendat
ions still not
addressed.
Election
offered voters
large degree
of choice and
was
characterized
by respect for
fundamental
rights but
media
scrutiny
lacking,
allegations of
fraud marred
the process
which needs
enhancing.
95
Annex I
Election
Election
system
Election
commissions
Election law
Voter registration
Political
campaign
Ballots
Candidate Lists
Media
Voting
Count
Aggregation of
results/Disputes
Publication
of results
Observers
Early
Parliamentary
Marc 2014
Recommend:
Law revised
to equip
institutions
w
competenci
es to
enforce &
control
-Legal
consequenc
es clearly
defined.
Recommend:
Increase
transparency by
publishing
agenda for REC
sessions in
advance.
-Additional
safeguards for
pol.
representation
on PBs
Law sound basis for
dem. elections but
recommendations
unaddressed;
candid. registration,
election admin,
complaints &
appeal, observers.
Recommend
-REC provisions
included in law
-Set limits to
campaign
expenditure.
-Ministry of Finance
to publicize info on
campaign funding.
-Procedures for
safeguarding
sensitive materials.
Considerable
efforts to improve
VL but still needs
improving, incl.
names of nat.
minorities
Recommend:
-Strive to improve
VL further, incl. in
minority languages.
-Make parts of VL
open to public
scrutiny
-Improve info on PB
location.
Some incidents
of violence &
credible
reports of
intimidation of
voters, incl.
official
employees.
ACA proactive
but need to set
limits to
expenditure.
Increase in
minorities
being elected
despite some
boycott
Women 1/3 on
lists but not
visible in
campaign.
n/r
Inclusive but
laborious
process.
Recommend:
-Allow individual
candidates.
-Allow signing
support for
more than 1 list
-Finish list
registration
before
campaign.
-Implement
gender quota
-Reconsider
demand for
10.000
signatures for
minorities.
Extensive coverage
but lack of critical,
analytical reporting
on campaign.
Influence by pol.
parties jeopardizes
independence of
media.
Recommend:
Broadcast Agency
to pro-actively
investigate
breaches of law.
-Publicize minutes
of meetings.
Orderly, good
knowledge of
procedures
Professional,
transparent
Too short
deadline for
complaints, no
public hearings.
Supervisory
board still not
established.
Recommend:
-Review
deadlines for
resolutions &
complaints.
-Enable
complainants to
attend sessions.
-REC inform on
right to seek
legal redress.
Publication
within
deadline.
Recommend:
-Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law and
criteria for
accreditation
defined.
n/r
REC met
deadlines,
adopted detailed
instructions for
PBs. Concerns
raised on
processing of
results and postelection
complaints.
REC authority to
annul voting
limited.
Recommend:
-Clarify REC
competency in
investigating and
sanctioning
breaches of law.
-Give REC
authority to
rectify PB
decisions.
-Standardized
training for PBs.
Law provides sound
basis but issues still
regulated by REC
instructions. Many
unaddressed
ODIHR, CoE
recommendations.
Insufficient
measures against
misuse of admin
resources,
inadequate finance
regulation, absence
of sanctions on
some violations.
Recommend:
-Comprehensive
review of law,
closing loopholes,
unclear provisions
-Regulate
campaign, incl
abuse of admin
resources.
-Limit campaign
expenditure and set
sanctions.
VL updated, but not
displayed for public
scrutiny.
Recommend:
-Display VL for
public scrutiny
-Allow mentally
incompetent
persons on VL.
Ruling party
took undue
advantage of
incumbency,
blurring
distinction btw
state & party,
pressuring
voter, incl.
public sector.
Irregularities
unaddressed.
Recommend:
-Implement
recommendati
ons for
transparency
of campaign
finances:
-expenditure
ceiling,
-requirement
for interim
financial
reports, timely
publishing.
-Law to
prescribe
sanctions.
n/r
Rules unclear.
some lists abuse
privileges for
minority
registration.
Deadline for
registration too
close to
elections.
Recommend
-Clarify rules for
transparency.
-Allow individual
candidates.
-Allow signing
support on
more than 1 list.
-Provisions for
candidate
withdrawals.
-Expand
registration
deadline
- Prevent abuse
of provisions for
minorities.
Equal airtime on
public media but
ruling party
dominated news.
Lack of analytical,
critical reporting,
widespread selfcensorship.
In absence of
monitoring
mechanism, bias,
smear campaign &
infringement on
media freedom not
addressed.
Recommend:
-Provide sufficient
funding of public
media, reduce
dependency on
state budget.
-Regulate media
coverage of
incumbents to
avoid undue
privilege.
Generally
efficient and
according to law.
Voting screens
and layout of PSs
still problematic.
Recommend
-REC to develop
voter info &
education
-Improve layout
and screens to
ensure secrecy
of vote
-All PB members
to wear badges.
A number of
PB members
unfamiliar
with counting
procedures.
Recommend:
-Enhance
accuracy of PB
on counting
and drafting
protocols.
Many
complaints but
deadline too
short for
redress.
Perceived fear of
retribution for
filing complaints,
lack of trust in
effectiveness.
Law not
prescribing
transparent
tabulation, REC
decisions
inconsistent.
Recommend:
-Set effective
legal redress for
irregularities
-Extend deadline
of dispute
resolution.
-Mechanism for
inspect, secure
voting materials
-Law prescribing
tabulation.
Recommend:
-Enshrine
timely
publication
of
disaggregat
ed results
to increase
confidence
in process.
Recommend:
-Rights of
observers
guaranteed in
the law and
criteria for
accreditation
defined.
Gave voters
genuine
choice,
respect for
fundamental
rights but
credible
reports of
intimidation.
Legal
framework
sound basis,
admin.
efficient.
Media lack
analysis,
scrutiny.
Early
Parliamentary
April 2016
Efficiently run
elections but
handling of
complaints
raise concern.
Fundamental
freedoms
respected but
biased media
coverage and
unlevelled
playing field;
advantage of
incumbent
and blurred
distinction
between
state and
party activity.
96
Recommend:
-REC to develop
voter info &
education
-Improve info on
PB location.
-Improve layout
and access to
PBs, better
screens.