Public Themes
Nº 812-
www.lyd.org- Email:[email protected]
23rd of March, 2007
ISSN 0717-1528
Chile Barrio:
It doesn’t justify its continuation
Finally an evaluation has been made
known of the impact that the program Chile
Barrio has had on its benefactors. This evaluation which has been headed up by the Head
Office for the Budget of the Ministry of Housing, was handed over to a panel of experts.
The evaluation of the program is categoric: not to be continued. Programs such as
Chile Solidarity, together with the increasing
values of housing subsidies which come into
effect this year, do not justify continuing with
this program. Add to this the deficient results
in regard to its capacity to help those people to
overcome their situation of poverty.
Chile Barrio was created in 1997 with the
purpose of “contributing to the overcoming of
poverty in homes and families of
scant resources, residents of
The program only took
lower income groups in the
country, through a substantial charge of a limited number of
squatter camps, not taking
improvement of the quality of
into account the dynamics
their habitation and their opporimplicit in the formation of
tunities of insertion socially and
squatter camps. In some
in the workplace”1. 972 squatter
cases
they have created new
camps were selected in which to
squatter
camps in the spaces
implement this program.
cleared out by dismantling
through Chile Barrio.
Initially, the target was
supposed to be reached in 2002,
but just recently in 2007 it is
hoped to have effectively covered the totality of
the camps targeted in this program.
In comparison to other programs of access to housing
for the poorer sectors of the
population, Chile Barrio was
put forth as a multi-sectoral
program, precisely with the
aim of not just delivering a
home but also providing the
conditions in families so that
they may overcome their condition of poverty.
Because of this the Ministry of Housing and Town
Planning, Public Works, Planning and National
Real State, Sub-secretariate of Regional Development, Solidarity Fund of social investment
and National Service for Training and Employment has become involved.
Besides these
different public divisions of the central government the regional and municipal government
entities have also become involved.
However, due to the fact that the camps
have continued- according to the Census of
2002 they were 713 lower income groups in
which close to 37.000 families resided- they
have put forth the need to continue with the
program Chile Barrio for the years 2007 to
2009.
7
Results of the
Program
Table 1
Expenditure Chile Barrio 1998-2005
(in millions of Chilean pesos 2007)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total
Componentes
Vivienda y Barrio
Hab. Social
15.807
1.090
28.883
3.330
26.302
3.849
33.372
2.723
54.466
327
32.590
928
80.881
1.223
75.671
1.747
347.973
15.218
Hab. Laboral
1.648
1.738
1.741
1.762
598
166
146
186
7.984
Total
18.545
33.951
31.892
37.856
55.392
33.684
82.250
77.605
371.174
Source: Private Evaluation, based on the information of the Evaluation of Impact Chile
Barrio and its respective Laws of Budgeting.
Translation of the Chart: Components; Housing and Neighbourhood; Social Habilitation;
Laboral Habilitation; Total.
The multi-sectoriality of Chile Barrio can
be resumed in three components: improvement of housing and neighbourhood, strengthening and improving the social insertion and
strengthening the labour and productive insertion. The average expenditure for the 93.560
families who benefited was almost $4.000.000,
some 217UF (see table 1). In addition to this
cost, the actual cost of the subsidy for housing
should be included, an amount, which depends
on the housing program as such which was
delivered: 280UF for social housing in urban
areas, in the range of 200UF for subsidies in
rural areas and 132UF for developmental
housing.
The evaluation of the impact of the program concludes that “there is no
evidence that Chile Barrio
allows homes that have
benefited to overcome
their situation of poverty
through income”. Give
that this was its main objective, it can be said that
Chile Barrio failed in the
fulfilment of purpose for
which it was created.
Only in the realm of improvement of housing
and neighbourhood have
positive results being obtained, while in the social
and laboral habilitation no
major advances have
been achieved.
It is interesting to analyze that while
those who made possible the social housing
component –primarily FOSIS through a program A Neighbourhood for my family- suggest
having covered about 80% of the families who
benefited from Chile Barrio, only between 8%
and 15% of the original beneficiaries of Chile
Barrio claim to have participated in the diverse
activities developed by this program2.
Keep in mind that the expenses of this
component of Chile Barrio was to the order of
$15.000 million, which in relation to the total
cost of the program appears as a minor
amount, implies an important expenditure for
social habilitation.
Of the 93.560 housing units which were
delivered between 1997 and 2005, 47% obtained a new house, 42% improved their preexisting house –primarily through the delivering
of sanitary installations- and the remaining
11% benefited through improvement in its surroundings.
In relation to the component of laboral
habilitation between 1998 and 2001, between
87% and 90% of the courses and the openings
for training through SENCE were filled. From
8
that time this plan of action of the program has
since lost impetus, which is reflected in the
strong reduction in resources assigned to this
component (see table 1). This shows that from
the beginning of the year 2001 the program
has almost totally eliminated one of its three
components.
Chile Barrio was not a program which
was socially focussed. The program was oriented towards a determined number of squatter camps in which approximately 76% of the
families qualified as poor before the arrival of
Chile Barrio. That is to say, 24% of those who
benefited from the program did not correspond
to families in conditions of poverty and 16%
had already benefited from other housing programs before.
In short, despite having been designed
as a multi-sectorial program, in practice it was
just another program of access to housing for
sectors of low income groups. Even though
Chile Barrio, did not embrace the sugthe total cost for a housing unit delivered in the
gestion made to them by the Head Office of the
end can not be directly compared to the cost of
Budget for housing in the year 2002 after a the
other housing programs, it can be estimated
first evaluation of their work, in which they
that above the cost of traditional subsidies of
generated indicators which allowed them to
housing programs, on average, an additional
evaluate the impact of the program in its di217UF was spent on units handverse actions. 4 years after
ed over by Chile Barrio, which on
having completed the eval24% of those who bene- uation of the impact, they
average allowed better housing
fited from the program did
units to those delivered through
concluded once again that
not
correspond to families in the program did not generate
the traditional programs of housconditions of poverty and
ing completed in the same period
indicators which allowed an
16%
had already benefited
of time.
evaluation of its impact. This
from other housing programs lack of information also
before.
Regarding the cost of adtranslates to a minor control
ministration of the program, the
over the expenses and use
impact study concludes that it is
of its resources3.
three times higher than other
housing program in comparison.
For the years 2002-2005, the Solidarity Fund
It did not do away
for Housing presented an administrative exwith squatter camps
pense which did not surpass 1%, while for
The program only took charge of a limChile Barrio it was 3%.
ited number of squatter camps, not taking into
account the dynamics implicit in the formation
In resumé, Chile Barrio did not achieve
of squatter camps. In some cases they have
the purpose for which it was created – to overcreated new squatter camps in the spaces
come poverty. It was just one more program of
cleared out by dismantling through Chile Barhousing and infrastructure which counted with
rio.
better resources than traditional housing programs, and which had high administrative
costs.
Add to this that you cannot discard that
certain sectors of the population have been
Other aspects
induced to live in squatter camps in order to
obtain social benefits. The number of families
who finally benefited was 8% more than those
9
initially catalogued, caused by new families arFinal Comments
riving at squatter camps that were going to be
catalogued and to new camps –it is estimated
Chile Barrio, without a
some 23- which were created in
doubt has improved the living
the surrounding land of the existconditions of an important
ing and previously catalogued
That they prolong Chile
number of people in the councamps and to those to whom
Barrio beyond this present year,
try. This has been achieved
finally the benefits of Chile Barrio
would be a mistake in the conat a high cost for the governwere also extended.
text of the high value of housing
ment financial coffers, diminsubsidies and the existence of
This apparent incentive other multi-sectorial programs ishing as such resources to
other social programs.
to live in squatter camps gains
such as Chile Solidarity. By
more strength, if one considers continuing they will be duplicatThat they prolong Chile
that on average the units deliv- ing administration costs and the
Barrio beyond this present
ered by Chile Barrio were better coordination which this implies.
year, would be a mistake in
than the other housing programs
the context of the high value
for a similar group of the populaof housing subsidies and the
tion. To this must be added the
existence of other multiexpectations that could have
sectorial programs such as
been generated at the beginning of the existChile Solidarity. By continuing they will be duence of this program, that the same could be
plicating administration costs and the coordinaextended and covered in the future to other
tion which this implies.
camps.
From a point of view of the efficiency of
the program relating to the overcoming of povLessons for
erty, neither is it recommendable to continue
public politics
seeing as the results in this aspect have been
well deficient.
From a point of view of the design of public politics arises the need that at the moment
1 Source: Supreme Ruling Nº2 of 1998 , Ministry
of its design there should be included the genof Housing and Urbanism which creates the program
Chile Barrio.
erating of statistics and information that permits
2 The activities developed by the program “A
the evaluation of its efficiency and know its toneighbourhood
for my family” were, for example, courses
tal cost. Public politics should necessarily deand guidance in maintenance and care of the house, revelop knowing the result and the effects that
quirements for the formation and consolidation of organizations relating to housing and use of share space, applithey will generate to be able to be capable of
cation and formulation of projects of community improveintroducing modifications for greater efficiency,
ment and social co-habitation.
3 Other suggestions put forward after the evaluaa fact which makes it impossible if it is carried
tion
of
the
year 2002 were also considered.
out without knowing its real impact, and as a
result it is practically operating “in the dark”.
As a matter of fact, the territorial focus of
housing programs ends up being incompatible
with the focus on families in conditions of poverty, a fact which finally leads to the loss of focus of the social programs in relation to the
condition of poverty of its beneficiaries.
10