The Role of International Policy
in Mitigating Global Shipping
Emissions
James J. Corbett
James J. Winebrake
Professor
Professor
University of Delaware Rochester Institue of Technology
Transportation has been called one of the four cornerstones of globalization,
along with communication, international standardization, and trade liberalization.1
International markets for goods only exist because transportation allows trading to occur
efficiently, and international maritime shipping has been an important engine of international trade growth. Responding to strong market signals and adopting technological
innovations, the maritime industry transformed its technologies, national registries, and
labor resources over the past decades to serve the demands of globalization.
Shipping and other international transport providers also identify themselves as a
cross-sectoral link in a global supply network that must adapt to emerging constraints
related to energy supply, the environment, and economics. International policy developments are directly addressing the movement of goods by ships for both environmental
and security concerns.
We focus on the environmental dimensions that have engaged international
shipping in the socio-political dialogue. This article discusses the role of international
policy in mitigating global shipping emissions to reduce climate impacts and protect
the environment. We outline three policy paradigms informing international and
domestic negotiations determining greenhouse-gas mitigation targets: a) the invisible
hand of the market; b) the guiding hand of performance-focused policies; and c) the
firm hand of regulatory requirements and restrictions. A policy implementation framework is presented to achieve environmental goals across all commercial freight modes
including international shipping. Global economics and multinational policy contexts
engaging international shipping in new climate and environmental protection strategies
James J. Corbett is a professor in the College of Earth Ocean and Environment and in the College of
Engineering at the University of Delaware. James J. Winebrake is a professor and chair of STS/Public
Policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology. They are leading collaborators in a multi-university Sustainable Intermodal Freight Transportation Research program.
Copyright © 2010 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
Spring/Summer 2010 • volume xvi, issue ii
James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
may benefit from matching strengths of these policy paradigms with technological and
operational opportunities for integrated action.
International Shipping and Intermodal Connectivity
The logistics of moving international cargo are like a relay race where different modes
of transport represent different runners. Like coaches choosing which runners will
carry the baton during each leg of the race, logistics managers choose which modes
will move products from origin to destination. Each freight mode (road, rail, water,
or air) carries the cargo for part of the distance; for most international trade, no single
mode can successfully deliver door-to-door—or more accurately, from factory to retailer. With respect to maritime shipping, international movement of goods relies on
a global freight transportation system that includes trans-oceanic, coastal, and inland
waterway routes. In fact, sea-based transport accounts for approximately 90 percent of
global freight transportation (measured in ton-miles).2
Maritime shipping is one part of a larger multimodal goods transport network
where transportation managers select modes based on logistics goals and route constraints. In the recent global economy, competing mode-choice factors include time,
cost, and reliability of delivery. Low-cost modes may be less preferred than faster modes
if the cargo is very time sensitive; however, slower modes often carry much more cargo
and, with proper planning, these lower-cost modes can reliably deliver larger quantities
to meet timely inventory needs even for containerized or courier (less than a truckload) cargoes. In addition, these low-cost modes may have energy and environmental
advantages that can be exploited or disadvantages that must be addressed in ways
discussed below.
International Shipping in an Environmental Context
Global warming is a leading international concern, and anthropogenic greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2) are directly linked to climate change.
These GHGs create radiative forcing, which alters the energy balance of the earth and
leads to a variety of climatic problems.3 Radiative forcing from GHGs can be distributed uniformly across the globe (e.g., CO2) or with significant regional variability (e.g.,
aerosols interacting with clouds).
Several peer-reviewed scientific papers and a recent study by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) have evaluated GHGs and other emissions from shipping.4 The results demonstrate that, in both past and future, international shipping
has been an important contributor to climate change.5 In 2007, international shipping
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The Role of International Policy in Mitigating Global Shipping Emissions
emitted about 1,050 million metric tons of CO2, which accounted for approximately
3 percent of the global CO2 inventory.6 If the global shipping industry were a country,
it would be the sixth largest GHG emitter, exceeding Germany’s emissions, according
to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Indicators.7 In addition to
CO2, ships produce emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC), methane (CH4),
black carbon (BC), organic carbon particles (OC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), nitrous
oxide (N2O), sulfur oxides (SOx) and carbon monoxide (CO). These pollutants from
shipping lead to detrimental regional impacts on air quality, coastal environments, and
human health, and contribute to important climate-scale effects primarily associated
with aerosol emissions (“cooling effects”) and black carbon (“short-lived climate forcers”), which will be discussed in greater detail below.8
CO2 emissions from ships are expected to rise considerably over the next few
decades (Figure 1.a), given growth expectations in international trade. Trends and
forecasts suggest shipping growth is tightly coupled with economic activity and may
increase faster than non-transport sectors of similar size. Importantly, health and environmental benefits of cleaner air and cost-effective measures such as fuel switching and
engine emissions controls motivated the IMO to require reductions in pollutants over
the next decade, such as NOx, SOx, and particulate matter (PM).9 Figure 1.b depicts
emissions from shipping for NOx and SOx based on expected impacts of IMO policies
regulating sulfur content in marine fuels and combustion control requirements. Because
sulfur emissions act as global cooling agents and because ships emit large quantities of
sulfur in sensitive ocean regions, regulations aimed at reducing sulfur in fuel will actually make maritime activity the only transportation mode estimated to switch from net
cooling to net warming over the coming decades.10 In other words, reducing harmful
air pollutants from shipping unmasks the underlying warming effects of long-lived
greenhouse gases, and may result in observed increases of climate change effects—both
regionally and on a global average. However, relying upon high-sulfur aerosols from
ships to stave off GHG warming (one form of so-called geoengineering) may also be
unwise, as it may also be as unwise as it may be infeasible given priorities to mitigate
today’s PM health impacts. Shipping aerosol emissions affect more than cloud reflectivity and lifetime; aerosols emitted over ocean regions also change the location of cloud
formation and modify the patterns of eventual precipitation.11 When cast simplistically
as direct tradeoffs, these create a conundrum for regulators working to address both
human health impacts and climate change impacts simultaneously.
In addition, other types of emissions from ships contribute to regional impacts
that affect sensitive ecosystems and may lead to increased climate change. For example,
shipping emissions of small BC particles may accelerate ice melt in important regions,
notably the Arctic.12 As climate change melts Arctic sea ice more rapidly, access to polar
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James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
resources will increase the demand for maritime transport. Increased shipping in and
near the sensitive Arctic may accelerate unwanted regional climate impacts from BC
emissions in close proximity to ice and snow. Most dramatically, new navigable routes
among major trading nations may emerge as ice recedes at least during summer and
fall, for example the so-called Northeast Passage along the coasts of Russia and Scandinavia. Action to reduce short-lived forcing emissions, such as BC, may offer methods
to slow global warming, especially from ships operating within sensitive regions like
the Arctic.
Figure 1.a: Trends in Emissions from Ships for expected CO2 emissions given trends in demand, technology, and operations.
Figure 1.b: Trends in Emissions from Ships for projected changes in NOx and SOx pollution from controls
mandated by recent IMO action.
Note: forecast trends conform to scenarios in the Second IMO GHG Study 2009.
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The Role of International Policy in Mitigating Global Shipping Emissions
Policy Paradigms Applied to International Shipping
Multimodal transportation logistics serving global trade are not easily captured in
traditional environmental regulations, which tend to be sector-specific and not international. International shipping has been required to meet national security policies
and international trade and maritime law, but mainly through a complicated maze of
flag state and port state control, exempt from most domestic regulation even though
ships operate mostly at the edges of national domains with more than 70 percent of
activity within the exclusive economic zones of nations). Because ships are economically
linked to the shippers, other forms of transportation, and the receivers of the cargo,
ship activity is becoming more visible through supply chain transparency and green
marketing. In environmental contexts, the IMO is the premier international regulatory forum for international shipping, addressing environmental issues important to
avoiding catastrophic damage (e.g., oil spill, invasive species) and to preserving special
ecosystems (e.g., marine mammal protection).
Given the global interest in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping,
as well as the complex regulatory structures in which such mitigation policies would
reside, a descriptive framework may help understand debate about the application
of various policy alternatives. Through the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), nations have agreed to work with the IMO to lead
climate change mitigation efforts for shipping. Like other international policy bodies, the IMO follows a consensus-action decision-making process with a tradition of
technology-focused solutions that
Like other international policy bodies,
may take years to negotiate and
additional years to enter into force. the IMO follows a consensus-action
Compared to other international
decision-making process with a tradition
policy bodies, the strong influence
of industry on the IMO process of technology-focused solutions that
tends to reinforce the status quo. In may take years to negotiate and
the climate debate, the UNFCCC
additional years to enter into force.
is engaging the IMO to develop
non-incremental policies to meet new targets matching those under discussion in the
international climate policy dialogue. One can frame the diversity of dialogue with
respect to three paradigms that address international environmental problems (see
Figure 2).
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James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
Policy
Paradigms for
International
Shipping
Invisible Hand:
x Price Signals
x Profitmaximizing
Innovation
x Consumer
Preferences
Guiding Hand:
x Market-based
Policies
x Taxes, Fees,
Levies
x Direct Subsidies
Firm Hand:
x Regulatory
Requirements
x Reporting and
Enforcement
x Regulatory
Prohibitions
Figure 2. Alternative paradigms informing the dialogue on environmental policy as applied to international shipping.
Invisible hand of the market: Invoking Adam Smith, this represents an unfettered market in which industry is responsive only to market forces.14 The premise is that
self-interested behavior of individuals (or corporations), along with the self-regulating
nature of free markets, ultimately maximizes social welfare. Under the invisible hand
of the market, price signals and consumer preferences dictate industry response. Profit
maximization allows those companies that are most responsive to customer requirements to stay in business. If market conditions (e.g., customer demands and preferences) expect environmental performance in shipping, then the industry will provide
environmental improvements. Industry prefers an unfettered market, but this could
lead to an outcome shown Figure 1a and reported in the Second IMO GHG Study: an
increase in CO2 emissions in the shipping sector.15 Because the costs of climate change
are external to the market prices for shipping goods, a need exists to look beyond the
invisible hand if society wishes to control GHG emissions from ships.
Firm hand of regulation: In some contexts, the invisible hand cannot identify a
market-value or price of socially important behaviors. Firms will have little reason to
pursue such actions if they increase cost to an industry. Where such action increases
cost to an industry, firms will have little reason to pursue these. This is a tpe of market
failure to which policy action may require industry to provide socially important actions
or products. Maritime security zones and navigation restrictions for marine mammal
protection are typical of firm-hand policies for shipping. The future scenarios for NOx
and SOx, shown in Figure 1.b, illustrate the firm hand results of more than a decade
of negotiations to adopt and revise the International Convention for the Prevention
of Air Pollution from Ships, known as MARPOL Annex VI.
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The Role of International Policy in Mitigating Global Shipping Emissions
Guiding hand of performance-based instruments: Where market levers are
understood, apparently missing economic signals for social preferences can be communicated through policy incentives and disincentives. Fees, levies, rebates, and subsidies are
economic mechanisms set by policymakers that increase the costs of undesired actions
and/or reward desired actions. Emissions trading systems act to provide these incentives, by identifying market-optimized actions that achieve environmental targets. Fees
or subsidies offer the advantage of highly certain costs per unit of action, for example,
fuel levies for international marine fuels or cargo fees per unit shipped; trading systems
allow for market volatility in price, but can provide greater confidence in performance
if so designed (e.g., cap-and-trade markets for CO2 in Europe or SOx in the U.S.).
Each of these paradigms is present in the international policy dialogue concerning
shipping and environment. The question the international shipping sector faces is which
approaches (invisible, firm, or guiding) are best suited for achieving GHG reduction
targets. The invisible hand is not beyond influence to meet GHG emissions objectives.
For example, CO2 reductions may occur if increasing fuel prices inspire fuel saving
technologies or operational changes, such as speed-reduction.16 Additionally, voluntary
eco-labeling, industry environmental management systems, and environmental awards
programs may add market value to green behavior and could be pursued by industry
without regulatory intervention.17 The IMO and the UNFCCC are discussing both
firm-hand and guiding hand policies for climate change mitigation, ranging from new
design and operation metrics to carbon levies and emissions trading markets. Unilateral
action is also proposed (and may in part motivate stronger international agreements).
If the effect of IMO’s multilateral initiative is unsatisfactory, the European Commission is considering a guiding hand approach that may add the shipping industry to the
European Union emission trading system or include ships in emission-related harbor
dues and binding CO2 index limits.18 In addition, possible firm-hand actions are now
proposed that are taking aim at ship emissions; for instance, California enacted the
Global Warming Act of 2006, requiring reduction of GHG emissions from all sectors
including ships while in port.19
Searching for Policies That Fit
Government authorities have iteratively applied regulation to prevent the worst behavior
while supporting voluntary measures such as industry best-practice standards across
all sectors. Historically, international policy for global shipping has oscillated between
relying on the invisible hand of unregulated markets and the firm hand of regulatory
prescription. The choice is largely related to the perception of environmental risk and
the ability of stakeholders to achieve consensus about this risk. Where consensus on the
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James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
urgency of action has been achieved, international negotiations have reached firm-hand
agreements. For example, international agreement on prevention of tanker oil spills
was protracted until the perceived risk evident in the Exxon Valdez and Erika disasters
justified the cost of recapitalizing the tanker fleet with double-hull tanker designs. Other
examples in shipping include IMO conventions and annexes prohibiting dumping and
safety-of-life-at-sea (SOLAS) requirements. On the contrary, in cases where perceived
environmental risks are low or when significant stakeholder disagreement exists about
these risks, an invisible hand has been allowed to operate. Under these cases, industry
may still respond with environmentally responsible behavior, as long as such behavior
increases profits through cost reductions or by meeting consumer preferences.
When perceived risks are uncertain or stakeholder agreement is less than unanimous, market-based policy instruments through a guiding hand could be pursued.
Market-based incentives such as port fees and rebates for vessels that meet emissions
standards are useful in encouraging environmentally responsible industry behavior.20
Other examples in shipping include IMO air pollution regulations, ballast water treatment requirements, and special area designations for protecting marine mammals or
ecosystems. The advantage of the guiding hand is that it maintains direct proximity
to effective invisible-hand levers and enables firm-hand controls to be applied when
necessary. Market based instruments offer an effective way to reduce conflict among
stakeholders from politically and ideologically different points of view that must agree
on environmental policy.21
Implementation Framework for Environmental Performance
A suite of potential actions can be taken by the shipping industry to improve performance and achieve regional and global targets for energy use, climate change and environmental protection. Categorically, these range from new vessel designs, innovation and
diffusion of better technologies, and operational changes, which were all summarized in
some detail in the recent IMO study.22 In addition, industry, advocacy, and regulatory
stakeholders are debating and ranking the merits and costs of these approaches.
Improving environmental performance of movement of goods involves reconfiguring freight mode technologies, operations, and infrastructures across six dimensions (Table 1).23 These include: a) Intermodal infrastructure; b) Fuel alternatives; c)
Technological alternatives; d) Operational practices; e) Logistical realignment; and f )
Demand changes for goods and packaging. This is termed the IF-TOLD framework
for improving economic, energy, and environmental performance of movement of
goods. Recently increasing fuel prices and requirements to reduce emissions of both
traditional and GHG emissions correlates with observed responses by industry and
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The Role of International Policy in Mitigating Global Shipping Emissions
•
•
•
•
•
•
Demand
T
•
•
•
•
Logistics
Technology
F
•
•
•
Operations
•
•
•
I
Fuel
Example Policy Instruments
Performance standards
Taxes
Subsidies
T h l
Technology
d t
mandates
Infrastructure Investment
R&D investment
Alt
Alternative/low-carbon
ti /l
b fuels
f l
Size/weight restrictions
Operator training/education
D
Demand
d managementt
a
Infrastructur
e
government to modify these IF-TOLD elements for greener freight systems. Some
industry responses are consistent with either invisible hand pricing or firm hand
regulation. In the maritime sector, this includes new investments in vessels and port
terminals, fuel-switching, advanced retrofits for energy efficiency and emission control,
slow-speed operations, new logistics routing plans, and improved matching of containerpayloads and warehouse-inventory needs in the supply chain. However, some responses
are unintended, such as industry practices to hold onto second hand vessels past their
design life to avoid the added cost of greener designs. An implementation framework
like IF-TOLD can be matched with policy instruments that enable a three-handed
synergy in international regulation.
•
•
•
O
L
D
•
•
•
•
•
•
Table 1. Example matrix of policy instruments for implementing aspects of the IF-TOLD strategy framework.
Some disagreement exists among stakeholders regarding the costs and benefits of
the impacts of GHG emissions and their control. We think that the guiding hand will
be the regulatory approach that comes to the fore for international shipping regulations.
Table 1 presents an application of different guiding-hand mechanisms across the range
of IF-TOLD options. Taxes and subsidies are clearly a guiding hand approach that
crosses all IF-TOLD areas. Investment in research and development and infrastructure
is potentially important and viable. Finally, performance standards that normally would
be considered a firm-hand approach can be combined with credit-trading as a way to
price externalities instead of banning them. For example, a performance standard for
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James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
CO2 emissions that allows for the buying, selling, and banking of emissions reduction
credits can be used to achieve the goals of CO2 reduction, but using a market-based
approach. In this way, a number of approaches can be influenced by guiding-hand
approaches to achieve goals more quickly than firm-hand approaches and with greater
certainty than invisible-hand approaches.
Conclusion
10
Given its visibility as a sector without nationally divided statistics of energy, emissions,
or economics, shipping is unique in the climate change and energy efficiency debates
of policymakers. Moreover, shipping contributes to global environmental impacts and
offers solutions to environmental problems comparable to major nations—but without
sovereign authority to negotiate its own role for action. The environmental stakes are
high and complex: shipping is the only transport mode where the climate impact will
change sign (from cooling to warming) in the next several decades. Equally, the opportunity is substantial: improved performance by shipping, a key link in the supply
chain, can be as transformative as when the shift to containerized ships enabled timely
global logistics.
From these observations of the dialogue around global shipping and environmental
policy, and within the three-hand paradigms motivating policy selection, we suggest
that several patterns may emerge. First, industry will still argue for the invisible hand
of markets without regulation, advocating international (and preferably uniform) standards through the IMO. Second, government bodies will continue to pursue the firm
hand of regulation, sometimes unilaterally in situations without much probability of
multilateral consensus. For problems that are more important and critical, a firm hand
will be needed, and may be chosen where consensus agrees urgent action is needed or
complex barriers to market integration exist. Third, these approaches may be necessary
but insufficient for the global shipping sector, which means a guiding hand approach
will develop market based environmental regulatory regimes with mandatory reporting
that will effectively address many environmental problems in shipping.
International maritime transportation has played a crucial role in the globalization of economies, technologies, and cultures. Without policy action, the invisible
hand of energy prices and trade could change shipping over the next few decades in
ways that are comparable to the transition from sail to steam to motor throughout the
past century. With policy action, positive transformations for the environment will
be more likely. Increasingly, international organizations and national stakeholders are
evaluating how best to use the guiding hand of market-based measures in shipping—in
negotiated treaties and/or exercising jurisdictional authority. The result could be a new
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The Role of International Policy in Mitigating Global Shipping Emissions
century of innovation for the movement of goods, in which shipping may again play
W
a linchpin role. A
Notes
1. Shashi Kumar and Jan Hoffmann, “Chapter 3 Globalization: the Maritime Nexus,” Handbook of
Maritime Economics and Business, ed. Costas Grammenos (London: Lloyds List Press, 2002): 62.
2. Ø. Buhaug, J.J. Corbett, Ø. Endresen, V. Eyring, J. Faber, S. Hanayama, D.S. Lee, H. Lindstad,
A. Mjelde, C. Pålsson, W. Wanquing, J.J. Winebrake, K. Yoshida, “Second IMO Greenhouse Gas
Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization (London: March 2009).
3. S. Ribeiro and S. Kobayashi; Lead Authors: M. Beuthe, J. Gasca, D. Greene, D.S. Lee, Y. Muromachi, P.J. Newton, S. Plotkin, D. Sperling, R. Wit, and P.J. Zhou; Contributing Authors: H. Hata,
R. Sims, K.O. Skjolsvik, “Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III: Chapter 5, Transportation
and its infrastructure,” in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: 2007).
4. See Kumar 62; J. Fuglestvedt, T. Berntsen, G. Myhre, K. Rypdal, R.B. Skeie, “Climate forcing
from the transport sectors,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no 2 (2008): 454-458;
R.B. Skeie, J. Fuglestvedt, T. Berntsen, M.T. Lund, G. Myhre, K. Rypdal, “Global temperature change
from the transport sectors: Historical development and future scenarios,” Atmospheric Environment 43
no. 39 (2009): 6260-6270; K. Capaldo, J.J. Corbett, P. Kasibhatla, P. Fischbeck, S. Pandis, “Effects of
Ship Emissions on Sulphur Cycling and Radiative Climate Forcing Over the Ocean,” Nature no. 400
(1999): 743-746; J. Fuglestvedt, T. Berntsen, V. Eyring, I.S.A. Isaksen, D.S. Lee, R. Sausen,”Shipping
Emissions: From Cooling to Warming of Climate and Reducing Impacts on Health,” Environmental
Science & Technology 43 no. 24 (2009): 9057-9062.
5. Ø. Buhaug, et al.,“Second IMO Greenhouse Gas Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization (London: March 2009).
6. Ibid.
7. Millennium Development Goals Indicators, “Millennium Development Goals Report 2009,”
United Nations (2009), http://mdgs.un.org.
8. A. Lauer, V. Eyring, J.J. Corbett, C. Wang, J.J. Winebrake, “An assessment of near future policy
instruments for international shipping: Impact on atmospheric aerosol burdens and the Earth’s radiation budget,” Environmental Science and Technology (2009).
9. J.J. Winebrake, J.J. Corbett, E.H. Green, A. Lauer, V. Eyring, “Mitigating the Health Impacts of
Pollution from Oceangoing Shipping: An Assessment of Low-Sulfur Fuel Mandates,” Environmental
Science & Technology 43 no. 13 (2009): 4776-4782; J.J. Corbett, J.J. Winebrake, E.H.Green, P. Kasibhatla, V. Eyring, A. Lauer, “Mortality from Ship Emissions: A Global Assessment,” Environmental
Science & Technology 41 no. 24 (2007): 8512–8518.
10. Jan Fuglestvedt, “Shipping Emissions: From Cooling to Warming of Climate and Reducing
Impacts on Health,” Environmental Science & Technology 43 no. 24 (2009): 9057-9062.
11. A. Jones, J. Haywood, and O. Boucher, “Climate impacts of geoengineering marine stratocumulus clouds” Journal of Geophysical Research. 114 (2009).
12. L. Brigham, R. McCalla, E. Cunningham, W. Barr, D. Vanderzaag, V. Santos-Pedro, R. MacDonald, S. Harder, B. Ellis, J. Snyder, H. Huntington, H. Skjoldal, M. Gold, M. Williams, T. Wojhan,
J. Falkingham, “Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,” Arctic Council (Tromsa: 2009):
194.
13. Ø. Buhaug, J.J. Corbett, Ø. Endresen, V. Eyring, J. Faber, S. Hanayama, D.S. Lee, H. Lindstad,
A. Mjelde, C. Pålsson, W. Wanquing, J.J. Winebrake, K. Yoshida, “Second IMO Greenhouse Gas
Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization (London: March 2009).
14. Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. London: W. Strahan
and T. Cadell, 1776.
15. Ø. Buhaug, et al.,“Second IMO Greenhouse Gas Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization (London: March 2009).
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James J. Corbett and James J. Winebrake
12
16. International Maritime Organization; Energy Information Administration; Department of Energy
Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_
d.htm (accessed November 2009).
17. Aditya Mattoo and Harsha Singh, “Eco-Labeling—Policy Considerations,” Kyklos 47 no. 1
(1994): 53-65; S.K. Swallow, R.A. Sedjo, “Eco-labeling consequences in general equilibrium: A
graphical assessment,” Land Economics 76 no. 1 (2000): 28-36; Roger Sedjo and Stephen Swallow,
“Voluntary eco-labeling and the price premium,” Land Economics 78 no. 2 (2002): 272-284; Alain
Nadai, “The Impact of Industrial Strategy and Expert Information on Eco-Labels,” Improving Regulation: Cases in Environment, Health, and Safety, (Washington, D.C. 2001).
18. European Union, Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament. Directive 2009/29/EC of the
European Parliament of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend
the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community (2009).
19. State of California, AB32: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. In Board, ed.
A.R. (Sacramento: 2006).
20. P. Kågesonand, “Economic instruments for reducing emissions from sea transport,” Swedish
NGO Secretariat on Acid Rain, The European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E) and
the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), (Göteborg and Brussels: 1999); B. Volk, G.A. Hader, M.
Zachcial, “Incentive-based Instruments for Environmentally Acceptable Sea Transportation,” Institute
of Shipping Economics and Logistics (Bremen: 2000); Environmental Protection Agency, “The United
States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment” (January 2001).
21. J.J. Winebrake, A. Farrell, M. Bernstein, “The Clean Air Act’s sulfur dioxide emissions market:
Estimating the costs of regulatory and legislative intervention,” Resource And Energy Economics 17
no. 3 (1995): 239-260.
22. Ø. Buhaug, et al.,“Second IMO Greenhouse Gas Study 2009,” International Maritime Organization (London: March 2009).
23. J.J. Winebrake, J.J. Corbett, “Improving the Energy Efficiency and Environmental Performance
of Movement of goods;” ed. James Cannon (Sacramento: UC Davis, 2010).
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