Analysis
June 1, 2015
Summary: A week before
Turkey’s parliamentary elections,
speculation regarding possible
outcomes occupies the minds
of political leaders and pundits
alike. The intricacy of the Turkish
electoral system, in particular
the 10 percent national electoral
threshold and the volatility
of voters’ preferences, make
accurate predictions difficult, but
this policy brief offers various
possible scenarios, including
different coalition government
configurations.
OFFICES
Washington, DC • Berlin • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara
Bucharest • Warsaw
Politics of Uncertainty: Possible Outcomes
of Turkey’s Forthcoming Elections
by İlter Turan and Ahmet K. Han
Introduction
A week before Turkey’s parliamentary elections, speculation regarding
possible outcomes occupies the minds
of political leaders and pundits alike.
The intricacy of the Turkish electoral
system, in particular the 10 percent
national electoral threshold and
the volatility of voters’ preferences,
make accurate predictions difficult.
Although the results of differently
timed polls are at variance with each
other, they agree that the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKParty)
will not achieve a sufficient majority to
change the Turkish constitution, either
directly by a two-thirds parliamentary
majority (367 votes) or by a three-fifths
majority (330 votes) on condition of
ratification by referendum. Excluding
the increasingly remote likelihood of
AKParty achieving a majority of more
than 330 deputies, what are the likely
outcomes?
Many observers feel that the AKParty
may still manage to achieve a parliamentary majority. Recent polls,
however, point to an erosion of
support for the party, creating the
possibility of a coalition government.
That both the president and the prime
minister have made references in
their recent speeches to the inherent
inefficiency, instability, therefore
the undesirability of coalitions may
indicate that they do not rule out the
possibility. If a coalition government
does become necessary, who forms it
with whom presents a challenge. The
campaign rhetoric of parties would
appear to rule out an AKParty–Republican People’s Party (CHP) or an
AKParty–Peoples’ Democratic Party
(HDP) coalition and bringing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and
HDP together. Yet caution is needed.
First, political parties maximize their
differences during the election, but
ultimately they want to enjoy the benefits of being in government. Second,
parties may reach accommodation
and support a minority government or
coalition. One needs only to recall that
after the elections of 1973, the CHP
and the religiously oriented National
Salvation Party (MSP), presumably
impossible partners, managed to form
a coalition that survived almost a year,
or that both Süleyman Demirel (19791980) of the Justice Party (AP) and
Bülent Ecevit (1999) of the Democratic
Left Party (DSP) headed minority
coalitions of reasonable duration
preceding elections.
Analysis
One Party Government
Before proceeding with a discussion of possible coalitions,
it may be useful to offer observations about a one-party
government. If the AKParty secures less than 330 but more
than 276 seats, enabling it to form a government by itself
but not change the constitution, the political landscape will
be redefined. Numerous polls have shown that majority of
AKParty supporters do not desire a presidential system, in
contrast with what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wants.
It is widely thought that a majority of the AKParty deputies
and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu himself share the
supporters’ sentiment, but they have felt obliged to yield to
the insistence of Erdoğan, whom they consider their “real”
leader and on whose charisma they rely on to win elections. The president has led his “former” party’s campaign,
departing from the letter and the spirit of the constitution,
which does not allow for such a partisan role. The AKParty’s
failure to achieve a “constitution-changing” majority may
therefore, instill in the AKParty desires for the parliamentary government to be restored and the president to return
to his constitutionally defined duties. The impossibility of
change that would ensconce Erdoğan as president in a presidential system and with diminished parliamentary majority
may actually present Davutoğlu with an opportunity to
establish himself as an autonomous center of power, freeing
him from appearing to be only a functionary implementing
the president’s policies. He would likely find support for this
within the parliamentary party and among party members.
It remains to be seen how Erdoğan, whose tolerance for
actions that do not fit into his preferences is known to be
low, would respond. Internecine conflicts may erupt.
Coalitions and Minority Government
Considering that an arithmetic necessitating a coalition is
possible, it may be prudent to look into the combinations
for achieving a parliamentary majority. The most frequently
proposed is an AKParty–MHP coalition. Despite the fact
that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli has publicly refuted this
possibility, he has not been as dismissive of it as he has been
of a CHP–MHP–HDP combination. Though sharing power
is a bitter pill to swallow, there are indications that AKParty
leadership is also sympathetic to an AKParty–MHP coalition, if that is the only option for staying in power. It is
difficult, however, to predict how such a coalition would
serve Erdoğan’s plans since the MHP leadership would
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The president has led his “former”
party’s campaign, departing from
the letter and the spirit of the
constitution.
not agree to a presidential system or a president who leads
the government and exceeds his constitutional powers.
Davutoğlu’s choice regarding his own political future, as
well as the prevailing sentiment in the AKParty, will be
critical in determining whether this option will become
a reality. Some observers say that if the HDP is left out of
the parliament and violent incidents attributed to Kurdish
separatists become commonplace, an AKParty-MHP coalition, aligned with the military whose sensitivity about the
territorial unity of the country is known, might result in an
even more authoritarian Turkey.
Similar considerations will have direct bearing on the prospect of an AKParty–CHP coalition. If Davutoğlu, inevitably a target of internal and external criticism for electoral
losses, chooses to lead the AKParty to a position that would
pitch him against Erdoğan’s aspirations, this partnership,
however unlikely it may seem today, might become a possibility. Some people even feel this would offer a remedy for
reconciling the present discords and political polarization of
Turkish society. This move might be backed, even encouraged, by a circle of disenfranchised AKParty doyens1 and
the former President Abdullah Gül who was deprived of a
chance to serve a second term. The scenario becomes more
plausible if Erdoğan insists on commanding the political
agenda.
To many observers, an AKParty–HDP coalition looks
like an uneasy arrangement. The HDP’s declarations and
campaign rhetoric strongly defies Erdoğan’s presidential
ambitions. Furthermore, for the first time in its history, the
Kurdish political movement has adopted a political stance
that goes beyond their familiar blueprint of identity politics.
Claiming to pursue a comprehensive framework concen1 The statute of the AKParty does not allow members to run consecutively for a parliamentary seat more than three times.
Analysis
trating on corruption, rights and freedoms, and the inclusion of all excluded groups in Turkish politics, the HDP has
chosen to appeal to multiple constituencies. The extent that
the public is persuaded by this campaign will be the main
determinant of whether the HDP will pass the 10 percent
threshold. It is unlikely that it would be ready to gamble on
the credibility of its effort to become an all-Turkey party by
joining an AKParty coalition. Currently, the HDP’s primary
goal appears to be an expansion of individual liberties and
democratic space. This hardly corresponds to the law and
order preferences and authority proclivities recently characterizing AKParty policies.
There are also observers who insist that an AKParty-HDP
coalition should not be ruled out. They argue that the
apparent change in the HDP strategy has in fact been just
tactical, and in the end HDP will not hesitate to go into
a coalition with AKParty. Numbers permitting, it might
even affect consensus on a presidential system in return
for regional autonomy. They note that, beyond its core
constituency, the HDP campaign has targeted both liberal
Turks and more religious Kurds, an uneasy mix that has
made for difficulties in devising a coherent post-election
political stance. Whether the HDP might choose to ignore
the thrust it received from liberal circles and cooperate with
the AKParty in a coalition or even support an AKParty
minority government remains to be seen. Such a stance
might be so divisive as to produce a splinter party. Furthermore, any AKParty–HDP consensus for a constitutional
change in favor of a presidential system in return for
Kurdish autonomy is likely to be a hard sell in a referendum.
Finally, though the formation of a coalition between
CHP–MHP and the HDP is a logical possibility, the strong
ethnically based nationalism of the MHP and the positions
it has adopted toward the HDP have been so profound that
it is not currently within the realm of the possible. A similar
Currently, the HDP’s primary goal
appears to be an expansion of
individual liberties and democratic
space.
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observation holds for the HDP, which has perceived the
MHP as its antithesis.
Forming a majority coalition is wrought with difficulties
and is likely to take a long time, or prove impossible. In that
case, efforts might focus on a minority government and
possibly early elections. Previous experience with minority
governments was that they were established during the
third or fourth year of a legislative term and led the country
to elections, in one case a year early. Otherwise, the Turkish
parliament has demonstrated remarkable reluctance in
moving the elections forward. Part of this reluctance
derives from the rule that deputies are entitled to retirement
benefits only after two years of service, and it takes about
three years to recover resources expended in the previous
campaign and accumulate fresh resources to engage in a
new competition.
An Unconventional President
So far, we have assumed that the Turkish parliamentary
system will function like conventional parliamentary
systems, where parliamentary parties agree on a prime
minister whom the president or monarch asks to form the
government, and who then appoints a cabinet. Erdoğan,
however, arguing that he represents a majority of the electorate, has pursued an activist stance in violation of parliamentary traditions and, to many, the Turkish constitution.
It would be surprising if he does not continue this course of
action. If the AKParty is able to form a government by itself,
he may, for example, prefer to nominate a prime minister of
his choice rather than one nominated by the AKParty, who
is traditionally the party’s president. He may also reject the
appointment of ministers the prime minister recommends,
insisting on forming a government team that he personally prefers. If instead there is a coalition government, his
interventions may render the establishment of a government even more difficult. The most potent weapon available
to him in exercising political influence is a constitutional
provision that allows him to force the legislature into early
elections if a government with the confidence of the parliament is not established within 45 days; the prospects of a
coalition government with that confidence are slim.
Analysis
A Touch of Optimism
It is likely that Turkey will enter a period of uncertainty
as a result of the June 7 elections, no matter what the
outcome. The relations of any government with Erdoğan
at the helm cannot but be difficult as long as he assumes
that he can define an activist role for a president, irrespective of what the constitution says and whether a majority
to transform it into a presidential system exists. While such
uncertainty would likely create volatility in the short run,
it may also create an opening for reversing the recently
intensifying trend toward authoritarianism. During the
concluding legislative term, parties in parliament had
formed a committee to prepare a new, democratic constitution to replace the current illiberal document prepared
under instructions from the 1980 junta. Although significant progress had been achieved, the efforts came to a halt
when the AKParty insisted on introducing a presidential
system. If the AKParty reconciles itself that this is no longer
a possibility, and the elections show that all parties may one
day become the opposition, Turkey may get a democratic
constitution, an outcome that the citizens have long been
hoping for.
The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone.
About the Authors
İlter Turan is an emeritus professor of political science at Istanbul’s
Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001.
His previous employment included professorships at Koç University
(1993-1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also
served as the chair of the International Relations Department (19871993), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and
the Middle East (1985-1993).
Dr. Ahmet K. Han is an associate professor at Kadir Has University,
Istanbul. He is also an adjunct faculty member with Turkish Armed
Forces War College Institute of Strategic Studies, and serves as a
member of the board of EDAM, a leading Turkish think-tank.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
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About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and
intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish
observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
gmfus.org/turkey.
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