Running Head: TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
Trans-Symbolic Comprehension: A Higher Order of Thinking
Sandra M. Loughlin
Disciplined Reading and Learning Research Laboratory
University of Maryland, College Park
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Trans-Symbolic Comprehension: A Higher Order of Thinking
In the educational and psychological literature, the term comprehension has multiple
meanings and connotations. When considered in light of popular and influential taxonomies of
thinking (e.g., Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Bloom et al., 1956), comprehension is portrayed as
simplistic and certain. For instance, in Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I:
Cognitive Domain (Bloom et al., 1956), commonly referred to as Bloom's Taxonomy,
comprehension is categorized as a “lower-order” cognitive activity, second only to knowledge
acquisition, or “mere rote learning or verbalization” (Bloom, Hastings, & Madaus, 1971 p. 149).
This description connotes comprehension, or “understanding,” as minimally abstract, simple, and
easy. Moreover, it suggests that comprehension is separate from, but a necessary precursor to,
higher levels of cognitive activity represented in the taxonomy; namely application, analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation.
However, the reading and understanding literatures paints a different picture. To those
steeped in its examination, comprehension or understanding (most notably of text) is a far more
complex and multifaceted enterprise than suggested by Bloom and colleagues (Duke & Carlisle,
2011; Keene, 2008). Theories and models of reading imply that understanding text is neither
simple nor certain, requiring the orchestration of processes associated with higher orders of the
Bloom taxonomy, including evaluating the author’s point of view, inferring relations not
explicitly stated in the text, and elaborating (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). Likewise, decades of
research on teaching and learning for understanding have demonstrated the complexity of these
meaningful learning endeavors (Ritchhardt, Morrison, & Church, in press). In light of these
bodies of literature, some have even suggested that comprehension is often an instantiation of
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higher-order thinking, a position in direct contrast to the taxonomic perspective (Alexander et al.,
in press).
One of the paradoxes of Bloom’s conceptualization of comprehension is that, while it
positioned in a more simplistic way than has been established in over a century of reading theory
and research, it is nonetheless more expansive in its scope. Specifically, in Bloom’s taxonomy,
comprehension is not constrained to the understanding of information presented in linguistic
form (i.e., text or talk), as is typically the case within the educational literature. Rather, Bloom
and colleagues discuss in detail the role of comprehension in the gaining meaning from a variety
of non-linguistic compositions (e.g., mathematical statements, and paintings), an approach that is
reflected in both historical and contemporary views of understanding. However, this transsymbolic perspective of comprehension has not been mirrored in most of the contemporary
literature on reading. Instead, established models of comprehension are explicitly or tacitly
nested in the context of linguistic processing (e.g., Graesser, Mills, & Zwaan, 1997; Kintsch,
1998), generally excluding non-linguistic compositions or assuming that they are understood in
the same manner as text.
This treatise examines the conflicting views of comprehension represented in taxonomies
of thinking and the current literatures on the comprehension of text and understanding,
suggesting that while Bloom’s view of comprehension is overly simplistic on the one hand, his
trans-symbolic approach to its study is not. Rather, it is argued that the current literature on
comprehension would benefit from a similar, expanded view of “understanding” that addresses
meaning-making of both linguistic and non-linguistic compositions. Ultimately, the of TransSymbolic Comprehension framework (TSC; Loughlin & Alexander, in press) is forwarded as a
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reconceptualization of comprehension that addresses the limitations of Bloom’s taxonomic
approach while maintaining his trans-symbolic perspective.
A Taxonomic View of Thinking
While more than twenty different taxonomies of thinking are represented in educational
literature and practice (for a review, see de Kock, Sleegers, & Voeten, 2004), the first, and by far
the most influential, is that articulated by Bloom et al. (1956) in Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain. Commonly referred to as Bloom's Taxonomy, this
slim volume has had a lasting effect on many areas of education. Indeed, as described by
Anderson and Sosnaik (1994), the taxonomy is, “arguably, the most influential educational
monograph of the past half century (p. vii),” impacting not only educational assessment and
evaluation, but also, and possibly most notably, beliefs about thinking and learning. But why,
among the myriad publications on education, was Bloom’s taxonomy so powerful? One answer
lies in its historical context.
At the time of the taxonomy’s original publication in 1956, behaviorism was the
dominant paradigm in educational psychology (Alexander & Loughlin, in press; Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 2005), resulting in the view learning a behavioral response to stimuli. Because of
this emphasis on the stimulation of learning, not the process of learning itself, assessments and
objectives of learning were imprecise, vaguely worded goals, making reliable assessments
difficult and cumbersome (Snowman & Biehler, 2000). Moreover, the field of education was in
the midst of an instructional objectives movement spawned by industrial and military
psychology, wherein complex, whole tasks were broken down into specific, terminal behaviors
that were observable and measurable and often ordered in hierarchical frames (Saettler, 1990).
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In was in this context that Bloom’s taxonomy was presented. Originally designed to
“provide for classification of the goals of our educational system…to help all teachers,
administrators, professional specialists, and research workers who deal with curricular and
evaluation problems” (p. 1), the taxonomy was an attempt to break down the complexities of
learning into observable, doable pieces that could be easily identified, taught, and assessed. As
such, in its more general form, the taxonomy outlines six levels of cognitive processes associated
with learning:
1.0 Knowledge. Recognizing, remembering, or recalling previously learned information,
such as facts, terms, procedures, or principals; information retrieval.
2.0 Comprehension. Understanding the meaning of information presented in some form
of communication.
3.0 Application. Applying or demonstrating understood knowledge.
4.0 Analysis. Breaking down objects or ideas into simpler parts and seeing how parts
relate and are organized; identifying elements, relationships, and organizational principles.
5.0 Synthesis. Generating new knowledge structures by rearranging component ideas
into a new whole.
6.0 Evaluation. Making judgments about the value of knowledge based on internal
evidence or external criteria.
The ordering of these six cognitive processes was based on three key assumptions. First,
as described by Bloom et al. (1956), these six cognitive processes were ordered in terms of their
perceived complexity, moving from “lower” to “higher” orders of the taxonomy. Thus
knowledge was described as the least complex cognitive process and evaluation as the highest.
Moreover, as articulated by Krathwohl, a coauthor of the Taxonomy (1956), the six processes
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were viewed as a “cumulative hierarchy,” in which the mastery of more a complex category
required prior mastery of all of the less complex categories below it (Anderson & Krathwohl,
2001). As such, comprehension relied upon prior mastery of knowledge or facts, application
depended upon comprehension of relevant ideas and their association facts, and so on through
the remaining levels. Finally, it was assumed that the six processes did not overlap (Furst,
1994); knowledge was discrete from comprehension, comprehension from application, and so
on.
For its time, Bloom’s taxonomy was innovative, suggesting that learning was not a
simple, unidimensional response to stimuli, but, rather, a more complex, multifaceted endeavor,
a message that resonated with educators and curriculum writers (Marzano & Kendall, 2006).
And, coming as it did during the instructional objectives movement, it gained immediate
popularity in the field of education, particularly in the area of evaluation. In fact, as described by
Marzano and Kendall (2006), within ten years, Bloom’s taxonomy was adopted as the primary
tool for evaluating heavily funded national educational reform efforts and, as a result, became
entrenched in curriculum and assessments documents across the county.
During the critical thinking movement of the 1980’s, exemplified and described by the
“Delphi Report” (Facione, 1990), Bloom’s taxonomy was repurposed as a means of describing
and classifying thinking. In particular, the taxonomy was widely used as a model for
distinguishing between low level or basic thinking and so-called higher orders of thinking
(Marzano & Kendall, 2006). Thus, although nowhere in the volume is the term “higher-order
thinking” to be found, conceptions of higher-order and lower-order thinking associated with the
taxonomy, as well as the distinction between them, have became codified in educational theory,
practice, and assessment (Alexander et al., in press). Moreover, beliefs about the relative
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complexity of the cognitive processes have spawned generations of educators and psychologists
who associate particular cognitive processes with either higher- or lower-order thinking and who,
endeavoring to promote student learning, eschew lower-order in favor of higher-order thinking
(Ritchhardt, Morrison, & Church, in press).
In the intervening half-century, a number of updates and revisions to Bloom’s taxonomy
have been forwarded (see de Kock, Sleegers, & Voeten, 2004), including a recent interpretation
undertaken by a group including Krathwohl, a coauthor of the original publication. This
revision, A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy
of Educational Objectives, forwarded by Anderson, Krathwohl, and colleagues, entails a number
of modifications to the original taxonomy, both minor (e.g., changing the term comprehension to
understanding) and significant (e.g., adding a second, knowledge-based dimension). However,
the Anderson et al. (2001) taxonomy, like most other efforts to revise Bloom’s original version,
retained the assumption that cognitive processes can and should be ordered by complexity;
describing some processes as less-complex, simpler, more concrete, or lower-order than others.
Comprehension, or as recoined by Anderson et al. (2001), understanding, is one of the
processes assumed to be lower order (Ritchhardt, Morrison, & Church, in press). It is to a closer
examination of this assumption that we now turn.
Perspectives on the Nature of Comprehension
As noted previously, conceptions of comprehension differ in the literature. In this
section, three perspectives on comprehension will be described and compared: comprehension as
a taxonomic category, comprehension as reading and understanding text, and comprehension as
understanding.
Comprehension as a Taxonomic Category
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For Bloom and colleagues, comprehension, although positioned at the lower level of the
taxonomy, represented the largest class of intellectual skills and abilities (Marzano & Kendall,
2006). As Bloom et al. argued,
…we are using the term “comprehension” to include those objectives, behaviors, or
responses with represent an understanding of the literal message contained in a
communication. In reaching such an understanding, the student may change the
communication in his mind or in his overt responses to some parallel form more
meaningful to him. There may also be responses which represent simple extensions
beyond what is given in the communication itself. (1956, p. 89)
As evidenced by this description, the authors made an effort to constrain comprehension to a
simplistic, “literal” understanding, emphasizing the limitations of this lower-level process.
However, this simplistic view of comprehension is immediately called into question upon
examination of three of its interrelated, but distinguishable subcategories: translation,
interpretation, and extrapolation.
Translation, the lowest order of comprehension, is evidenced when the known concept is
"put into different words or changed from one kind of symbology to another" (Bloom, Hastings,
& Madaus, 1971, p. 149). Examples of translation include putting into words visual elements
into words, such as graphic representations of trends in the cost of living or verbally analyzing a
work of art. The second level of comprehension, interpretation, occurs when a learner goes
beyond recognition of separate aspects of a communication to seeing interrelations among its
constituent parts. This is evidenced when the learner draws connections to prior knowledge and
separates important from unimportant aspects of the communication.
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The last subcategory of comprehension is extrapolation. "In this category, the receiver of
a communication is expected to go beyond the literal communication itself and make inferences
about consequences or perceptibly extend the time dimensions, the sample, or the topic" (Bloom,
et al., 1971, p. 149). Extrapolation is distinguishable from interpretation in its expansion beyond
the boundaries of the present communication. Whereas interpretation is focused on relating parts
of a communication in an effort to build a coherent mental representation, extrapolation reaches
beyond the literal limits of the communication.
Several aspects of this taxonomic view of comprehension are notable. First, as might be
expected from the previous discussion of the historical context, Bloom et al.’s (1956) conception
of comprehension was very behavioral, in that comprehension was described in terms that are
observable and measurable. Thus, while the authors articulated three subcategories of
comprehension, and provided a number of illustrative examples, they did not explain in depth the
processes inherent in translation, interpretation, or extrapolation, likely because these processes
represent unobservable, latent activities. Another interesting facet involves the contradiction in
the definition and operationalization of comprehension. The definition of comprehension
forwarded Bloom et al. (1956) and quoted previously, limits it to “understanding the literal
message contained in a communication.” However, the description of extrapolation in the
Bloom et al. (1971) publication states that “the receiver of a communication is expected to go
beyond the literal communication itself” (p. 149). Finally, it is notable that, because the purpose
of Bloom’s taxonomy was to identify non-overlapping categories of cognitive activity (Faust,
1994), comprehension was assumed to be distinct from the other processes in it.
Upon careful examination of the Taxonomy (1956), this last assumption proves very
problematic. Despite being given its own, distinct category at the lower level of the taxonomy,
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as noted by Marzano and Kendall (2006) and others (e.g., Geersten, 2003), aspects of
comprehension are implicitly and explicitly found in the presumably higher-level categories. For
instance, aspects of comprehension are found in the Analysis category. In the taxonomy,
Analysis is described as identifying and classifying elements and the relation between elements.
However, identifying and relating elements has significant overlap with the interpretation
subcategory of comprehension, which requires the learner to identify interrelations between
aspects of a communication. This overlap was acknowledged by Bloom and colleagues who
stated in their description of analysis, “No entirely clear lines can be drawn between analysis and
comprehension at one end or between analysis and evaluation at the other” (p. 144). They go on:
“It is probably more defensible educationally to consider analysis as an aid to fuller
comprehension” (p. 144).
A similar conflation occurs in the discussion of the Synthesis category, which is
described as putting together elements and parts to form a meaningful pattern or structure. In the
same fashion, comprehension, understanding the message of a communication, necessarily
involves synthesis at multiple levels as evidenced again by the interpretation and extrapolation
subcategories of comprehension. First, a comprehender must put together pieces of the message
(e.g., words, visual elements) to form a coherent whole. Additionally, for even a surface
understanding of the communication, the message must be integrated with prior knowledge.
This process is even more critical if the comprehender is to extrapolate beyond the literal limits
of the communication to, for instance, extend the timeline or infer unstated relations. As with
analysis, this problem is noted by the authors of the Taxonomy. “Comprehension, application,
and analysis also involve the putting together of elements and the construction of meaning” (p.
162).
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Perhaps the clearest acknowledgment of the categorical conflation, however, can be
found in the description of evaluation, the highest level of the taxonomy.
Although evaluation is placed last in the cognitive domain because it is regarded as
requiring to some extent all other categories of behavior, it is not necessarily the last step
in thinking or problem solving. It is quite possible that the evaluation process will in
some cases be the prelude to acquisition of new knowledge, a new attempt at
comprehension or application, or a new analysis and synthesis. (p. 185)
As suggested by this statement, as well as the implicit and explicit complications before it, a
taxonomic view of comprehension is untenable. In fact, the entire complexity-based structure of
Bloom’s taxonomy is problematic; the conflation of categories in the taxonomy has been
documented statistically (e.g., Smith, 1970) and in practice (Fairbrother, 1975; Poole, 1972).
Thus, it is clear that, even when constrained to understanding the “literal message” of a
communication, assuming such a thing is possible, comprehension cannot be achieved without
processes at the “higher order” of the taxonomy. Thus, comprehension is not distinct from the
other categories, and the notion that it is a lower-order cognitive process is not supported, even
by the taxonomy itself.
Comprehension as Reading and Understanding Text
Difficulty experienced by Bloom and colleagues in neatly categorizing and delineating
comprehension from the other cognitive processes in the taxonomy would likely come as no
surprise to those who are steeped in the study of reading. The literature examining how
individuals understand textual information, termed reading or text comprehension, is vast and
reflects the belief that comprehension is a complex, multifaceted process.
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According to Duke and Carlisle (2011), comprehension refers to a listener’s or reader’s
understanding of a message expressed by a speaker or writer. They further describe
comprehension as an elaborate, constructive process, entailing an interaction between the text,
the reader, and the context. Some factors that influence this interactive comprehension process
include prior knowledge of the reader (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Romance & Vitale,
2001), beliefs about the topic of the text (Schraw, 2000), epistemic beliefs about the nature of
reading (Alexander et al., in press), comprehension goals (Geiger & Millis, 2004), topic interest
(Hidi, 2001), motivation for the task (Guthrie et al., 2004; Guthrie et al., 2007), and emotional
response to the text (Eva-Wood, 2004). Another critical aspect of text comprehension is the
enactment of comprehension skills and strategies.
According to Pressley and colleagues (Pressley, 2000; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995),
successful comprehension also requires a number of comprehension processes reflecting varying
degrees of complexity. For instance, successful comprehenders set goals and are aware of why
they are reading a text, gain an overview of the text before reading, identify and use text
structure to meaningfully navigate the text, make predictions about upcoming events in the text,
and read selectively based on their overview. Comprehension also requires readers to associate
ideas in text to what they already know, note whether their predictions and expectations about
text content are being met, and revise their prior knowledge when compelling new ideas
conflicting with prior knowledge are encountered. Comprehenders must also interpret the text,
evaluate its quality based on externally- and internally-derived criteria, review important points
at the conclusion of reading, and think about how ideas encountered in the text might be applied
or used in the future.
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A brief examination of this partial list of comprehension processes reveals examples at
each level of Bloom’s taxonomy. For instance, application in text comprehension is evidenced
when readers use text structures to meaningfully navigate a text or consider how the text might
be applied or used. Analysis is required for identifying the parts of a text (e.g., the characters
and setting) and synthesis is required to put these parts together with prior knowledge to create a
meaningful whole. Evaluation is also evidenced in this list of comprehension processes, in
selectively reading, identifying of important points in a text, and evaluating its quality. Thus, the
perspective of comprehension reflected in the literature on reading supports conclusion from the
previous section, namely that comprehension is not a discrete from other cognitive processes, nor
does it represent a lower level of cognitive complexity.
Comprehension as Understanding
To those who examine understanding, a term used synonymously with comprehension in
both the original (Bloom et al., 1956) and revised taxonomies (e.g., Anderson & Krathwohl,
2001), the taxonomic approach is fundamentally flawed; comprehension or understanding is not
a precursor to application, analysis, evaluation, or creation, but a result of it (Wiske, 1997). Like
Bloom and colleagues, those who study teaching and learning for understanding (e.g., Blythe et
al., 1998; Keene, 2008; Wiggins & McTighe, 1998) suggest that education is primarily designed
around the identification and retention of simplistic, memory-based activities (Saphier, HaleySpeca, & Gower, 2008). In reaction to this perceived educational orientation, they alternatively
articulate understanding as the primary goal of teaching, with thinking as its necessary precursor
(Ritchhardt, Morrison, & Church, in press).
Unlike Bloom’s approach to learning, however, educators and researchers concerned with
the study of understanding eschew a simplistic, taxonomic approach to its examination. For
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instance, Ritchhart et al. (in press) argue that learning “doesn’t happen in a lockstep, sequential
manner, systematically progressing from one level to the next. It is much messier, complex,
dynamic, and interconnected than that” (p. 5). Some influences on meaningful learning (i.e.,
understanding) include the appropriate use of deep and surface learning processes (Alexander,
1997; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Marton & Saljo, 1976), transfer of learning from one context to
another (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Salomon & Perkins, 1989), and the development of
thoughtful habits of mind (Costa & Kallick, 2000; Tishman, 2000).
Drawing upon this understanding approach to learning, an alternate framework for
considering the relation between thinking and learning has been forwarded by Ritchhardt and
colleagues (e.g., Ritchhardt, Palmer, Church, & Tishman, 2006; Ritchhardt & Perkins, 2008;
Ritchhardt et al., in press; Tishman & Palmer, 2002). Specifically, this framework suggests that
there are particular kinds of thinking integral to understanding across all disciplines. These
“high-leverage thinking moves” include observing and describing, reasoning with evidence,
comparing and connecting, questioning and investigating, considering different viewpoints and
perspectives, uncovering complexity and going beyond the surface of things, and building
explanations and interpretations.
In contrast to the taxonomic approach adopted by Bloom and others, Ritchhardt and
colleagues view the relation between these cognitive activities as an unordered framework—no
type of thinking is more complex or important than another. In fact, Tishman and Palmer (2002)
suggest that, instead of being graphically represented in a taxonomic or hierarchical frame,
thinking might best be viewed as paints on an artist’s palette, with each type of thinking
representing a different color. This visual analog suggests that learning tasks necessitate
different thinking combinations and emphases. For instance, although all understanding requires
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observation to a certain degree, learning from a physics demonstration requires more observation
than does the comparison two characters in a novel. Likewise, reasoning is more essential to
solving a proof in geometry than it is to learning to create a representational drawing, although
reasoning is important in both contexts.
While Ritchhart and colleagues argue for the existence types of thinking central to every
understanding context, they take care to acknowledge that their list is not complete. “While
these eight [types of thinking] represent high-leverage moves, it is important to once again stress
that they are by no means exhaustive. We offer up this list as a useful starting place, and no
more” (Ritchhart et al., in press, p. 12).
Discussion
The foregoing discussion of perspectives on the nature of comprehension suggested by
the taxonomic, reading ,and understanding literatures demonstrates that, while it is position at the
lower levels of taxonomies (e.g., Bloom et al, 1956, 1971), comprehension is never the less a
complex and difficult processes requiring a number of processes and types of thinking. This
perspective, explicitly articulated by those in the fields of reading and understanding, is also
tacitly acknowledged in the conflation of Bloom’s taxonomic categories. Therefore, the view of
comprehension as lower-order, simplistic, or easy is not affirmed by the literature;
comprehension reflects a “higher order” of thinking, learning, and understanding.
Perspectives on the Scope of Comprehension
As in the foregoing discussion of the nature of comprehension, the literature reflects
differing perspectives on its scope; that is, in what contexts comprehension is instantiated. In
this section, three such perspectives are examined, reflecting taxonomic, reading, and “new”
literacies viewpoints. However, it is instructive to consider these viewpoints in light of their
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historical contexts. As such, this section has the following organizational scheme: Foundational
and Pre-Cognitivist Perspectives: James and Bloom; The Cognitivist Perspective:
Comprehension of Text; and Post-Cognitivist Perspectives: “New” Literacies.
Foundational and Pre-Cognitivist Perspectives: James and Bloom
Interest in meaning-making or comprehension processes lies at the foundation of
education and educational psychology, as evidenced in the writings of such foundational figures
as Bartlett (1932), Dewey (1910), James (1890/1950), and Mead (1912). For instance, William
James (1890/1950) in his seminal work, Foundations of Psychology, describes the mind as a
“stream of consciousness” that is constantly seeking to understanding the environment though
what he termed the “operations” or habits of the mind: attention, discrimination and comparison,
association, and conception.
Attention is the necessary first step in the understanding or comprehension process, in
which an individual focuses on a thought or percept, making it clearer and more vivid in the
figurative or literal eye. A second complementary process is perception, specifically the ability
to differentiation the whole from its constituent parts, or, what he later term, analysis. The third
critical psychological process outlined by James is association, which is inclusive of both
comparison and its the alter ego, discrimination. Association occurs when “objects at first
appearing as wholes are analyzed into parts, and objects appearing separately are brought
together and appear as new compound wholes to the mind” (p. 550).
The fourth mental process or habit of the mind is conception. For James, conception is a
broad term that seemingly encompasses memory, understanding, and learning, resulting in the
ability to “hold fast” to information “without confusion.” Moreover, conception seems to be the
end result of the previously articulated processes, namely attention, perception, and association.
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New conceptions come from new sensations, new movements, new emotions, new
associations, new acts of attention, and new comparisons of old conceptions... At the
outset we merely have the topic, then we operate upon it, and finally we have it again in a
richer and truer way. (p. 467)
Although nowhere in the 1,000 pages of Principles (1890/1950) does James provide a
clear and complete description of the interrelation of attention, perception, association, and
conception, let alone forward a conceptual model describing how they bear on the
comprehension of compositions, his writings inform its study. Specifically, James seems to
suggest that attention, perception, and association are necessary precursors to comprehension, in
that one must attend to and make sense of a composition before one can make meaning of it.
Additionally, it is clear that James, like other foundational writers (Bartlett, 1932; Dewey, 1910;
Mead, 1912), viewed the scope of comprehension broadly. In his description and discussion of
these “operations” of the mind, James included a variety of compositions, from musical scores to
scientific and mathematical theory, to paintings, text, and interpersonal exchanges, suggesting
that James perceived understanding and comprehension as necessary for all forms of
information.
In many ways, Bloom et al.’s (1956), description of comprehension and its subprocesses
(i.e., translation, interpretation, extrapolation) resonates with the work of James (1890/1950),
particularly when taking into account the previously argued conflation of comprehension with
other categories of Bloom’s taxonomy. For instance, Bloom’s comprehension subprocess,
translation, is closely tied to James’s attention and perception; in order to translate a
communication from one form to another, one must first attend to and perceive it. Likewise,
Bloom’s interpretation subprocess is akin to James’s association, in that understanding a
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message necessitates both analysis and synthesis. Similarly, Bloom’s extrapolation subprocess is
like James’s conception, as both rely on meaningful understanding that allows for its use in
expanded or new contexts.
Also, like James, Bloom and colleagues, suggested that comprehension is instantiated in
a variety of contexts. To demonstrate the viability of their taxonomy for education, Bloom et al.
(1956; 1971) set out to show its broad applicability, drawing on content experts in a variety of
disciplines, (e.g., art, mathematics, social studies, language arts, and science) to provide
examples of tasks and behaviors that operationalized each aspect of the taxonomy. Thus, Bloom
and colleagues demonstrated how comprehension, and its three subprocesses was instantiated
across symbol-systems, in linguistic (e.g., language arts or literature) and non-linguistic (e.g.,
mathematics or art) compositions.
The works of James (1890/1950) and Bloom (1956; 1971) suggest that they perceived the
scope of comprehension broadly, including both tacit and explicit references to its instantiation
in a variety of symbol-systems. However, this trans-symbolic view of comprehension predated
the cognitivst revolution and the concomitant rise of the cognitivist paradigm that greatly
impacted beliefs about the nature and scope of comprehension.
The Cognitivist Perspective: Comprehension of Text
The cognitivist revolution began, by many accounts, in 1957, just one year after Bloom’s
original publication of the Taxonomy (Gardner, 1985; Miller 2003). This revolution of ideas was
a reaction against the behaviorist paradigm, which, as noted previously, viewed learning as a
response to environmental stimuli (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 2005). In contrast, those espousing
the cognitivst paradigm viewed learning in relation to the burgeoning research on artificial
intelligence and computer science, emphasizing the inner mental activities and processes that
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guide learning, such as thinking, memory, knowing, and problem solving (Gardner, 1985). Thus,
changes in behavior were viewed principally as an indication of associated internal mechanisms
of thought and processes of knowing (Loughin & Alexander, in press). In investigating and
articulating the computer-like mechanisms of meaning-making, theorists, particularly those
espousing an Information Processing approach, relied primarily upon language-based inputs,
specifically text (Reynolds & Sinatra, 2005).
The cognitivist emphasis on language resulted in the nesting of comprehension within
text. For instance, while the literature on comprehension includes many theories and models (for
an overview see Tracey & Morrow, 2006), and myriad comprehension processes have been
identified (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1992), these comprehension models and processes emphasize
comprehension of language, particularly classroom talk and written. Moreover, unlike the view
of comprehension espoused by Bloom et al. (1956, 1971), most of these examinations do not
consider text as one of many opportunities for comprehension.
Rather, for the most part, theories and models of comprehension either exclude nonlinguistic compositions (e.g., Graesser, 2007) or assume that they are understood in the same
manner as text (e.g., Kintsch, 1998). This has resulted in the frequent conflation of
comprehension with reading comprehension. Indeed, a cursory search for the term
comprehension in the Index of prominent texts educational psychology handbooks and textbooks
yields the following directive: “see Reading Comprehension” (e.g., Alexander & Winne, 2006).
Post-Cognitivist Perspectives: “New” Literacies
The past decade or so has seen a rise in reactions against the mind-as-computer and
information-processing perspectives of cognitivism (Wallace et al., 2007). These so-called
“post-cognitivist” perspectives include situated cognition (Greeno, 1998), ecological psychology
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(Bronfenbrenner, 1979), evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2004), and socioculturalism (Wertsch,
1991). These paradigmatic orientations represent wide-ranging emphases and lines of inquiry
(for an overview see L’Abate, in press), but are united their increased consideration of the role of
environment, broadly construed, on the investigation of the mind and behavior.
The rise of post-positivist perspectives has coincided with a reexamination of the scope
of comprehension, both outside and within the field of reading. For instance, the New London
Group (1996), a group of educators, psychologists, and semioticians, published an influential
statement on the importance of expanding the definition of literacy (i.e., the ability to read and
write) beyond text to incorporate human communication in a wide variety of contexts.
Within the field of reading, there is a similar movement to broaden the definition and
conception of text, and thus comprehension, to incorporate other forms of communication (Flood
& Lapp, 1995). For instance, comprehension has been associated with creative compositions
like television and film (Kendeou, et al., 2009; Watts, 2007), pictures (Paris & Paris, 2003),
paintings (Clyde, 2003; Williams, 2007), and dance (Au & Raphael, 2000). Likewise, many
examinations have been undertaken in an effort to describe comprehension of mathematics
(Fletcher, Lucas, & Barron, 1999), and technology-based (e.g., Coiro & Dobler, 2007, Salmerón,
Kintsch, & Cañas, 2006), and multi-symbolic compositions (e.g., Butcher, 2006, Mayer, 2001,
2003).
Many of these inquires have been grouped together under the umbrella term new
literacies (Leu et al. 2009). However, as noted by Leu et al. (2009), this descriptor is nonspecific and means different things to different people, with little consensus on, or unification
within, the field. For instance, while some researchers ground their work in sociocultural frame
(e.g., Gee, 2007; Street, 1995, 2003), other reflect a cognitivist view (e.g., Alexander & Jetton,
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
20
2003; Mayer, 2001, 2003). Moreover, there is disagreement on the even the descriptor for these
lines of inquiry. For instance, Alexander et al. (in press) argue that there is nothing “new” about
comprehension processes, regardless of their perceptual or symbolic compositions; only that the
surface features have changed. They therefore argue against the validity of the new literacies
descriptor. Despite these differences in theoretical grounding and terminology, according to
Coiro et al. (2008), what is common to these disparate lines of inquiry is the shared belief that
meaning-making is required for much more than traditional text or language, and that the field
must work to identify the skills, strategies, and dispositions associated with comprehending a
variety of compositions.
At present, however, there is no consensus on an appropriate framework for this
examination. In his discussion of future directions for new literacies research, Unsworth (2008)
articulated the need or a "trans-disciplinary" framework to provide unified resource for research
on comprehension of "meaning-making" systems, such as language, visual display, sound, and
movement. He urged literacy educators, linguists, information and media researchers, and
psychologists to find common, compatible or complementary theoretical frameworks that,
together, inform the ways in which individuals process and understand information.
Additionally, he argued that this framework should allow researchers to pursue a focused study
within a single meaning-making system, while building bridges between symbol systems.
Discussion
As evidenced by this discussion, the scope of comprehension has been differentially
perceived in the 120 odd years since the publication of James’s Principles (1890/1950), and
heavily influenced by the historical backdrop of educational theory. An expansive view of
comprehension is grounded in both foundational writings (e.g., James, 1890/1950), taxonomic
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
21
perspectives (e.g., Bloom et al., 1956, 1971) and some of the current literature on reading (e.g.,
Leu et al., 2006). In fact, in light of this discussion, it is arguable that the emphasis on the
comprehension of text has been predicated on the popularity of the cognitivist paradigm in
educational theory and research, and is thus, in the scheme of educational history, an anamoly.
Rather, historical speaking, it has been more common to view comprehension as understanding
endeavors in the many symbolic and compositional forms through which human communicate,
as did Bloom and colleagues. Thus, examinations of comprehension should consider both the
understanding of linguistic and non-linguistic compositions.
As also evidenced by this discussion, however, while decades of research has illuminated
the processes inherent in gaining meaning from text, the understanding of how individuals
comprehend other, non-linguistic compositions remains rudimentary. For instance, what
comprehension processes are commonly used for understanding non-verbal compositions, such
as visual displays, both realistic and abstract, or mathematics? Moreover, what is the relation
between these processes and what research has shown to be important in text comprehension?
These open questions suggest that there is a need for a theoretical reconceptualization of
comprehension that, like the work of Bloom and colleagues (1956,1971) addresses the processes
inherent in understanding information within and across symbol systems. Trans-Symbolic
Comprehension (TSC; Loughlin & Alexander, in press) is forwarded as such a framework.
Trans-Symbolic Comprehension
Drawing on the preceding perspectives of the nature and scope of comprehension, TransSymbolic Comprehension (TSC: Loughlin & Alexander, in press) is offered as a framework for
investigating meaning-making processes across and within symbol systems. Specifically, the
TSC suggests that both trans-symbolic and symbol-specific processes are present in any act of
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
22
comprehension. When reading a text, for instance, it is argued that individuals comprehend the
message through trans-symbolic processes that are essential to understanding any form of
communication, as well as use processes that are particular to understanding text. Likewise,
comprehending a painting entails both painting-specific and general, trans-symbolic, processing.
The TSC framework is germane the discussions of Bloom’s taxonomy, thinking, and
comprehension that have been the focus of this treatise for two reasons. First, as has been argued
previously, while not on the higher end of Bloom’s or other popular taxonomies, comprehension
is never the less “higher order” in the sense that it is abstract, complex, difficult to achieve, and a
significant facet of meaningful learning. Moreover, comprehension results from a number of
processes and types of thinking. The TSC reflects this view of comprehension.
The second, and possibly more significant, rationale for the inclusion of the TSC here
relates to the scope of comprehension. As discussed, one of the paradoxes of Bloom’s
conceptualization of comprehension is that, while it over-simplified comprehension, it was
nonetheless more expansive in its scope, discussing in detail the role of comprehension in the
gaining meaning from a variety of non-linguistic compositions (e.g., mathematical statements,
and paintings). This valuable, trans-symbolic approach is not mirrored in much of the
contemporary literature on comprehension. Thus, the TSC is forwarded here in an effort to
address the limitations of Bloom’s taxonomic approach to comprehension while maintaining his
trans-symbolic perspective of it.
At the outset, however, it is necessary to emphasize that, although the TSC is forwarded
as an alternative framework of comprehension, it does not seek to undermine or negate the
decades of research on text comprehension processes. Rather, this work intends to expand the
frame of comprehension to reflect other forms of human communication. In fact, it is fully
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
23
expected that many of the processes currently associated with text comprehension will be
evidenced in meaning-making endeavors in non-linguistic compositions, for reasons that will be
addressed.
In this section, the TSC framework is described, and its component processes—transsymbolic and symbol-specific processes—are briefly framed in the extant literature. In
particular, the TSC is considered in light of those perspectives heretofore discussed (i.e., the
writings of Bloom and James and the literatures on understanding, text comprehension, and
“new” literacies), with special emphasis is given to the work of Bloom. First, however, it is
necessary to raise key definitions.
Definition of Terms
Composition. For our purposes, compositions are intentional, meaningful, human
communications that have been encoded symbolically and reified. Intentional communication is
thus distinguished from unintentional communication by the deliberative intent of the
communicator. For instance, the definition of composition is inclusive of a pen and ink drawing
of a dog, but exclusive of an accidental scribble that also resembles a dog. Moreover,
compositions are necessarily communicative. That is, they intend to covey some idea, belief, or
emotion. Further, this meaningful communication must be encoded in a symbol system (i.e.,
linguistics, mathematics). Finally, a composition is reified, in that the deliberate, meaningful,
encoded communication has been given concrete or material form (e.g., poem, mathematical
argument, sculpture). Thus, this definition of composition is exclusive of communications that
have not, is some from, been recorded.
Symbol system. At this juncture, it is important to address the choice to focus on symbol
systems as the descriptor of compositions. Symbol systems are structures that gives meaning to
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
24
perceptual patterns (e.g., cat, +, or ♪ are understood in the structures of language, mathematics,
and music, respectively). In literature that distinguishes between text and other forms of
communication, many descriptors are used, including signs or codes (Halliday & Hansan, 1985;
Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996), modes (Unsworth, 2008), channels (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001),
media (Mayer, 2001), representations (Ainsworth, 2008), literacies (Leu et al. 2009), languages
(Goodman, 1976), and structures (Gernsbacher, 1990).
Although these terms reflect slightly different discriminatory emphases, these descriptors
either highlight the perceptual system though which a communication occurs (e.g., the visual
channel) or the totality of the whole communicative system (e.g., mode of dress). However, to
emphasize the belief that compositions are encoded in a symbolic system and, therefore, must be
decoded and comprehended, the TSC describes compositions in terms of their symbol systems.
Comprehension. Comprehension is defined here as an interactive process through
which an individual comes to understand a composition. Comprehension is thus distinguishable
from perception. Whereas, perception is related to making sense of perceptual information, such
as sounds or images (Gibson, 1994), comprehension is related to meaning making, or
understanding the message. Missing from this definition of comprehension is a statement
regarding the nature of the type of information to be comprehended. This omission is deliberate,
and intended to be broadly applicable. In fact, comprehension might be better defined as an
interactive process in which an individual come to understand or make meaning from
information, regardless of the symbol system in which it is communicated. Thus, comprehension
is applicable to both linguistic and non-linguistic compositions.
Component Processes
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
25
As mentioned previously, the TSC reconceptualizes the nature of comprehension, more
particularly the processes that give rise to the understanding of symbolic representations, as
relation between two component processes: trans-symbolic and symbol-specific.
Trans-symbolic comprehension processes. Trans-symbolic processes are processes that
are instantiated in comprehension of any composition. The existence of trans-symbolic
comprehension processes is predicated on two key assumptions; a) that unearthing the meaning
of both linguistic and non-linguistic compositions requires understanding or comprehension
processes, and b) that, at some level, these processes are the same or similar across symbol
systems. Evidence to support both of these assumptions and, therefore the existence of transsymbolic comprehension processes, can be found in many of the literatures described in the
preceding discussions of the nature and scope of comprehension.
Linguistic and non-linguistic compositions require comprehension. There is ample
support in the literature for the assertion that comprehension is required for both text (i.e.,
lingusitc) and other, non-text compositions. The comprehension of text has been wellestablished by research and theory in the field of reading; indeed, as noted, the terms
comprehension and reading comprehension are often used synonymously (Alexander & Winne,
2006).
What is less-established is the necessity of comprehension in other contexts. However,
the literature reviewed herein provides a number of substantiations for this claim. For instance,
writings of James (1890/1950) and Bloom and colleagues (1956, 1971) offer a number of
examples of comprehension across disciplines and symbol-systems, the understanding literature
(e.g., Keene, 2008; Ritchhardt et al., in press) suggest that understanding is critical to learning
across all disciplines, and the “new” literacies movement is hinged on the goal of expanding
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
26
notions of text and comprehension to include a wide variety of compositional forms. From these
sources and others (Elgin, 1993; Goodman, 1976; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), it seems clear
that this first assumption underpinning the existence of trans-symbolic processes has been met.
Comprehension processes are the same or similar across symbol systems. This second
assumption, while not so explicitly addressed, can be inferred from these same bodies of
literature and some likely trans-symbolic processes can be discerned. For instance, James
(1890/1950) suggests that all understanding requires attention, perception, discrimination,
association, and conception; attention and perception as necessary precursors to comprehension
and discrimination and conception as actively involved in it. The work of Bloom and colleagues
(1956; 1971) is also instructive, suggesting that trans-symbolic comprehension might entail
interpretation and extrapolation (translation, as will be discussed, is more likely a symbolspecific process). In order to interrelate separate parts of a communication for example, a key
feature of interpretation, comprehenders must connect the parts and message of the composition
to relevant prior knowledge.
Likewise, the literature on understanding, particularly the work of Ritchhart and
colleagues (e.g., Ritchhardt et al., in press), provide examples of processes or types of thinking
that might undergird comprehension of all compositions: observing and describing, reasoning
with evidence, comparing and connecting, questioning and investigating, considering different
viewpoints and perspectives, uncovering complexity and going beyond the surface of things, and
building explanations and interpretations.
Beyond these broad descriptors, however, the particulars of trans-symbolic processes are
not suggested. For instance, what is involved in discriminating (James, 1890/1950),
extrapolating (Bloom et al. 1971), or questioning and investigating (Ritchhardt et al., in press)?
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
27
The answers might be found in an examination of the rich corpus of literature on text
comprehension. Because, the TSC assumes that every act of comprehension includes both transsymbolic and symbol-specific processes, the myriad associated processes associated with text
comprehension can likely be organized into trans-symbolic and text-specific processes. Thus,
the lengthy list of text comprehension processes presented earlier (e.g., setting goals, using text
structure, making predictions, associating new information with prior knowledge, and
evaluating; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995) may reveal specific trans-symbolic processes.
However, in order to discern those, it is first necessary to discriminate them from symbolspecific processes.
Symbol-specific comprehension processes. While the evidence to this point has
suggested the existence of trans-symbol comprehension processes that are instantiated when an
individual attempts to understand a composition, regardless of the symbology in which it is
encoded, another body of literature suggests otherwise. Specifically, some work in human
intelligence and cognitive psychology view meaning-making processes as necessarily nested,
and thus differentially enacted, within symbol systems. In other words, there is support for the
existence of symbol-specific processes. Moreover, there is some suggestion as to the nature of
these processes.
Support in the literature. A full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
treatise, however several examples are instructive. For instance, Sadoski and Paivio (1991)
argue, based on Dual Coding theory, that at some level, words and pictures evoke different
conceptual processes involving separate cognitive mechanisms. Likewise, Barsalou et al. (1999)
argue for what they term perceptual symbol systems. According to this view, small fragments of
perceptual features are retained in the information coding process, such that an individual's
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
28
conception of a chair is inclusive, to an extent, of its color, shape, and texture. Accordingly,
higher cognitive functions such as knowledge, memory, language, and thought, are sensitive to
modality.
Schnotz (2005), another cognitive psychologist, distinguishes between depictions and
descriptions. Descriptions consist of symbols, defined as signs that have no similarity to their
referent. Text and mathematical expressions are common kinds of descriptions. For instance, the
word "ant" has no similarity to a real ant and the symbol 2 has no relation to two single units of
an actual something. Descriptive representations are more powerful than depictions in expressing
some forms of abstract knowledge. Schnotz (2005) notes that the sentence, "The Marsh Harrier
feeds on mammals or reptiles," is easy constructed; however communicating this same
information through depictive representations requires a series of pictures.
Depictions, on the other hand, consist of icons, which share a structural commonality
with their referent. Pictures, paintings, and drawings are depictive representations, as are maps
and bar graphs. Descriptive representations are more informationally complete and are thus
more useful for communicating a large amount of concrete information efficiently. For instance,
in the Marsh Harrier example, a picture of the bird stalking a mouse on the edge of a marsh
communicates several things: the Marsh Harrier preys on mice, the size of the bird relative to the
mouse and their orientation in space, the marsh environment common to the bird, and so on.
Depictions illustrate the saying, "A picture is worth a thousand words" and are more useful than
descriptive representations for drawing inferences (Butcher, 2006; Kosslyn, 1994).
The nature of symbol-specific processes. Unlike the previous examination of transsymbolic processes, it is challenging to discern from the literature particular symbol-specific
processes. Aside from the contention that depictive representations likely elicit more inferences
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
29
than descriptions (Butcher, 2006; Kosslyn, 1994; Schnotz, 2005), the work in cognitive
psychology cited here is silent on the subject. However, the work of Bloom and colleagues
(1956, 1971) may again prove valuable, providing a useful starting place for exploring symbolspecific processes.
The first of Bloom’s comprehension subprocesses, translation, "put into different words
or [change] from one kind of symbology to another" (Bloom, Hastings, & Madaus, 1971, p.
149), seems necessarily tied to symbology. Translation from one symbology to another is related
to perception, as a learner is unable to translate from the base symbology without first perceiving
and, if necessary, decoding it. For instance, the parts of a painting cannot be put into words
before the viewer sees those parts. Likewise, a reader cannot translate the words on the page into
spoken language without first seeing and decoding the symbols and spaces before him.
Therefore, because it is first nested in one mode, be it verbal or non-verbal in nature, the
processes inherent in translation may be more specific to each mode.
Interpretation, the second subcategory of comprehension, may include symbol-specific
processes, in addition to those trans-symbolic processes already identified. As described by the
authors, a key feature of interpretation is discerning which parts of the communication are
important for understanding the message, and which parts are not needed. The knowledge
relevant for making this distinction might be symbol-specific. When tasked with interpreting a
newspaper article, for example, a skilled reader knows that a news article is structured with the
most relevant information appearing in the first several sentences followed by increasingly less
important information. In contrast, the most important aspects of a painting are typically
positioned in the center of the canvas, with supporting visual material at the edges (Kress & van
Leeuwen, 1996). Without knowledge of organizational structures particular to the symbol-
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
30
system, and likely within differing compositional types within it, distinguishing important from
unimportant information would be very challenging.
Research on the TSC Framework
As noted by Loughlin and Alexander (in press), the TSC is a newly articulated
framework and, as such, is an ongoing project. As is appropriate when forwarded new
framework, the authors are interrogating its robustness by iteratively exploring and modeling
particular relations arising from it. Currently, the TSC is being used to as a guiding framework
supporting an examination of the relation between comprehension of text and paintings using
think-aloud protocols. While pilot studies have been completed, the full inquiry is currently in
the data analytic phase. Preliminary findings have, however, provided three key indicators
supporting the TSC:
1. Understanding paintings, non-linguistic compositions, illicit comprehension processes;
2. Painting comprehension elicits some of the same processes as text comprehension (i.e.,
trans-symbolic processes); and
3. Painting comprehension elicits some process that are not found in text comprehension
(i.e., symbol-specific processes).
Assuming these preliminary findings are borne out in the full inquiry, additional research will be
needed to address the relation between the comprehension processes of other symbol-system, in
an effort to further articulate the robustness and scope TSC.
Conclusion
In the educational and psychological literature, comprehension has been differentially
perceived, in relation to both its nature and scope. When considered from the perspective of
taxonomies of thinking (e.g., Bloom et al., 1956, 1971), comprehension is positioned in the
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
31
lower-orders and portrayed as simplistic, easy, and certain. However, in light of the literatures
on reading and understanding (e.g., Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; Ritchhardt et al., in press), and
as tacitly acknowledged in Bloom’s taxonomy itself, comprehension is complex, multifaceted,
and challenging, requiring a number of comprehension processes and types of thinking. Thus,
while it is not high on Bloom’s taxonomic structure, it is nonetheless a “higher order” cognitive
activity.
While the flaws in Bloom’s taxonomic perspective of comprehension have been
portrayed here, his broad, trans-symbolic view of comprehension has likewise been praised. For
decades, the literature on comprehension has been nested in the comprehension of linguistic
compositions, particularly talk and text, resulting in the conflation of comprehension with
comprehension of text (Alexander & Winne, 2006). However, recent movements from outside
and within the field of reading have sought to expand this frame to, once again, reflect Bloom’s
trans-symbolic view of comprehension (e.g., Leu et al., 2009; New London Group, 1996).
The Trans-Symbolic Comprehension (TSC; Loughlin & Alexander, in press) seeks to
reconceptualize the nature of comprehension, more particularly the processes that give rise to the
understanding of symbolic representations, serving as a possible framework for research
reflecting an expanded view of comprehension, on that is not nested in the comprehension of
linguistic compositions. The TSC reflects Bloom and colleagues (1956, 1971) complex relation
to comprehension, addressing the limitations of their taxonomic approach to its examination by
repositing comprehension as “higher order” and emphasizing the complexity of thinking required
for it, while maintaining their trans-symbolic perspective of its scope. Thus, the Tran-Symbolic
Comprehension framework is articulated as a higher order of thinking.
TRANS-SYMBOLIC COMPREHENSION
32
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