Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 169–174
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Investigating Theory of Mind deficits in nonclinical psychopathy
and Machiavellianism
Farah Ali, Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic *
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 30 December 2009
Received in revised form 11 March 2010
Accepted 24 March 2010
Available online 14 April 2010
Keywords:
Primary psychopathy
Secondary psychopathy
Machiavellianism
Theory of Mind
Empathy
a b s t r a c t
This study investigated the relationships between psychopathy (primary and secondary), Machiavellianism, global empathy, and Theory of Mind (ToM) using three behavioural ToM tasks in order to test for
ToM deficits/differences in facial expressions, in the eye region, and in vocal affect. In addition, stimuli
were categorised in terms of emotional valence (positive, neutral, and negative). Primary psychopathy,
secondary psychopathy and Machiavellianism were positively associated with global empathy deficits
and ToM deficits in relation to overall scores on the ToM tasks as well as ToM deficits to specific categories of emotional valence.
! 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Successful social interaction is a vital component of the modern
world, with our relationships, and many other important life
outcomes, depending on it. Yet many of us are likely to encounter
individuals with ‘‘socially aversive personality traits” (Lee & Ashton,
2005, p. 1572). Nonclinical psychopathy and Machiavellianism
meet these criteria; they are similar (Fehr, Samsom, & Paulhus,
1992), yet ultimately distinguishable, ‘dark’ personality constructs
(e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Vernon, Villani, Vickers, & Harris,
2008), typified by shallow affect, cruelty, guiltlessness, manipulation, and superficial charm.
Research indicates that psychopathy consists of two subtypes,
namely, primary and secondary. Both types are characterised by
hostility, impulsivity and aggression, but secondary psychopathy
is also associated with social anxiety, introversion, moodiness
and low self-esteem (Blackburn & Fawcett, 1999). Primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy and Machiavellianism are highly
inter-correlated (e.g., Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009)
and like the psychopathy subtypes, Machiavellianism represents
a strategy of conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain and is associated with callousness and affective poverty
(McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998).
Considering the negative impact that individuals with psychopathic and Machiavellian traits can have on others (e.g., McHoskey
* Corresponding author. Address: Goldsmiths University of London, SE146NW,
UK. Tel.: +44 (0) 2079197885.
E-mail address: [email protected] (T. Chamorro-Premuzic).
0191-8869/$ - see front matter ! 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.03.027
et al., 1998), it is intuitive that both psychopathy and Machiavellianism would be associated with a deficiency in empathy, which
is essentially the capacity to understand and share another person’s mental experience. Generally, researchers agree that empathy has an affective and a cognitive component (Lawrence, Shaw,
Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). Affective/emotional empathy
can be defined as the capacity to experience the emotions of another, whereas cognitive empathy, often referred to as Theory of
Mind (ToM), is conceptualised as the ability to understand and infer
the emotions and emotional experiences of another (Jolliffe &
Farrington, 2004).
Unsurprisingly, research indicates that nonclinical psychopathy
and Machiavellianism are negatively associated with general
empathy (e.g., Andrew, Cooke, & Muncer, 2008; Mahmut, Homewood,
& Stevenson, 2008) and, in line with findings from clinical samples
(e.g., Blair, 2005), nonclinical research also suggests that psychopathy and Machiavellianism may be associated with inappropriate
empathic responding to affective stimuli, that is emotional or
affective empathy (Ali et al., 2009).
High psychopathy and Machiavellianism scorers are successful
at manipulation and deception (e.g., Austin, Farrelly, Black, &
Moore, 2007; Hare, 1999), which would indicate some ToM (cognitive empathy) proficiency. However, findings in relation to ToM
have been contradictory; some research indicates that individuals
with clinical psychopathy do not have a ToM deficit compared to
non-psychopathic controls (e.g., Richell et al., 2003), yet studies
have also found deficits in ToM in individuals with clinical psychopathy (e.g., Dolan & Fullam, 2004). Critically, all the ToM studies mentioned here measured psychopathy globally; they did not
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F. Ali, T. Chamorro-Premuzic / Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 169–174
distinguish between primary and secondary psychopathy, thereby
failing to identify whether differences exist in relation to ToM ability between the two subtypes.
While ToM has been investigated to a certain extent in clinical
psychopathy, to date, it has not been investigated in relation to adult
nonclinical psychopathy, nor have differences between primary and
secondary psychopathy been investigated in relation to ToM. This is
surprising, especially when considering that the heterogeneity of
psychopathy has been firmly established (Blackburn, 2009).
In relation to Machiavellianism, research demonstrates that it is
associated with the inability to understand emotions and general
emotional impoverishment (e.g., Wastell & Booth, 2003). Findings
in relation to Machiavellianism and ToM are also contradictory;
one study in an adult sample investigating Machiavellianism directly in relation to ToM (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007) did not find a significant relationship between Machiavellianism and ToM.
However, in a sample of primary school children ToM ability was
found to be negatively associated with Machiavellianism (Barlow,
Qualter, & Stylianou, 2010).
The current study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first
extensive study into ToM in the psychopathy subtypes and Machiavellianism in a nonclinical sample. There are surprisingly few
studies which specifically examine the relationship between psychopathy and empathy (Kirsch & Becker, 2007) and investigating
ToM in aversive traits is important because it is possible that individuals with psychopathic traits and Machiavellianism, rather than
being unwilling to empathise, may actually have difficulties with
ToM and therefore cannot sufficiently ‘‘put themselves into the
mind of others” (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb,
2001, p. 241).
The current study investigated both subtypes of psychopathy;
past research in ToM in clinical populations have not differentiated
between primary and secondary psychopathy and evaluating subtype similarities and differences in psychopathy may result in
greater research validity and reliability (Hicks, Markon, Patrick,
Krueger, & Newman, 2004). In addition, past research examining
ToM and clinical psychopathy has focused primarily on male samples, research using female samples is therefore important as there
is evidence for diverse expressions of psychopathic traits across the
population (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003).
Three different ToM tasks were employed in order to test for
ToM deficits/differences in full facial expressions, in the eye region
alone and in vocal affect. Researchers propose that laboratory tasks
that measure the affective, behavioural, and physiological correlates of psychopathy are required to gain greater insight into the
processes underlying psychopathy in nonclinical samples (e.g., Hall
& Benning, 2007). In addition, because research indicates different
empathic reactions to positive and neutral content in psychopathy
and Machiavellianism (Ali et al., 2009), this study as well as investigating global ToM scores, separates the emotional valence of the
stimuli into positive (e.g., ‘happy’), neutral (e.g., ‘thoughtful’) and
negative (e.g., ‘distress’) for each ToM task.
It was hypothesised that psychopathic and Machiavellian traits
would be positively associated with lower global empathy, lower
accuracy on the ToM tasks and be positively associated with specific difficulties in relation to certain emotional categories of stimuli. It was also hypothesised that global empathy would mediate
the relationships between the personality traits and the ToM tasks.
mal or corrected to normal vision and had no hearing
impediments.
2.2. Self-report measures
2.2.1. Empathy Quotient (EQ)
The self-report EQ scale (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004)
consists of 40 empathy questions and measures global empathy
in both healthy and clinical populations with empathic dysfunction. It has demonstrated good reliability and validity (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Cronbach’s a in the current
sample was .83.
2.2.2. Levenson Self-report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP)
The LSRP scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) is a 26item self-report measure designed to assess primary and secondary psychopathic attributes in nonclinical samples. The primary
psychopathy scale consists of 16 items and the secondary psychopathy scale consists of 10 items. Cronbach’s a in the current study
were .87 for the primary psychopathy scale and .77 for the secondary psychopathy scale (for details on the reliability and validity of
the LSRP see McHoskey et al., 1998).
2.2.3. Mach-IV
Machiavellianism was assessed with the Mach-IV (Christie &
Geis, 1970), which has 20 items assessing individual differences
in the tendency to use deceit in interpersonal relationships, have
a cynical attitude to human nature and lack concern for conventional morality. The Mach-IV is the most widely-used scale for
this construct and its reliability and the validity are well documented (e.g., Fehr et al., 1992). Cronbach’s a in the current study
was .75.
2.3. ToM stimuli
2.3.1. Faces test
The Faces test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997)
tests the recognition of mental states from facial expressions. Participant are presented with 20 images with a target word and one
foil word and are required to choose the word that best describes
what the target (an actress) is thinking or feeling. The task is
self-paced, although participants are asked to respond on the answer sheet as quickly as possible (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). The
test is scored by totalling the number of mental states correctly
identified by participants.
Separate positive, neutral and negative valence scores were also
computed. Using a similar methodology employed by Harkness,
Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, and Chen (2005), five independent
raters (all graduate students) rated the 20 images from the Faces
test with the correct answer (with no foil word) below each face
picture. The raters scored the stimuli for emotional valence on a
7-point scale with 1 = very negative, 4 = neutral, and 7 = very positive. Those stimuli that had mean ratings significantly below neutral (one-sample t = 2.78, df = 4, l = 4, p < .05, uncorrected) were
classified as negative, those stimuli with mean ratings significantly
above neutral were classified as positive and those stimuli that did
not differ significantly from neutral were classified as neutral.
Cronbach’s a’s were .67 for positive faces, .69 for neutral faces
and .88 for negative faces.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
In all, 112 undergraduates (92 female, 20 male) participated in
the study in exchange for course credits. Their ages ranged from
18 to 44 years (M = 20.74, SD = 5.85) and all participants had nor-
2.3.2. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) revised
The revised RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is an advanced
ToM test which measures the ability to decipher a mental state
from 36 images of the eye region alone. Participants are required
to select which of four complex mental state descriptors (one
target word and three foil words) best describes the thoughts or
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F. Ali, T. Chamorro-Premuzic / Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 169–174
feelings expressed by different individuals. The task is self-paced
and a glossary of the mental state words is provided for participants to consult at any point if required. The test provides a global
score of the number of correctly identified mental states. Separate
positive, neutral and negative valence scores were also computed
(one-sample t = 2.78, df = 4, l = 4, p < .05, uncorrected) using the
same method described above. Five independent raters (the same
individuals as above) rated the 36 images from the RMET with
the correct answer (with no foil words) below each eye picture.
Cronbach’s a’s were .69 for positive faces, .96 for neutral faces
and .94 for negative faces.
three ToM tasks (the Faces test, the revised RMET, and the revised
RMVT, split into positive, neutral and negative emotional categories) are shown in Table 1.
3.2. Multiple regressions
A series of standard regressions were performed next (see
Table 2). Primary psychopathy, Machiavellianism and global empathy significantly predicted the variability in ToM to total faces.
Machiavellianism and global empathy significantly predicted the
variability in ToM to positive Faces. Primary psychopathy, Machiavellianism and global empathy significantly predicted the variability in ToM to neutral Faces.
Primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, and global
empathy significantly predicted the variability in ToM to total eyes.
Secondary psychopathy and global empathy significantly predicted
the variability in ToM to positive eyes. Primary psychopathy and
global empathy significantly predicted variability in ToM to neutral
eyes.
Primary psychopathy and global empathy significantly predicted the variability in ToM to total voices and primary psychopathy. Machiavellianism and global empathy significantly predicted
the variability in ToM to neutral voices.
2.3.3. Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (RMVT) revised
The RMVT revised (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford,
2006) requires participants to listen to 25 short verbalisations
and decide from four words which one best describes how the
speaker is feeling. A glossary is available for participants. Each verbalisation is only played once and after the participant chooses a
word, the next verbalisation is played. The task is scored by totalling the number of correct answers and separate positive, neutral,
and negative valence scores were also computed (one-sample
t = 2.78, df = 4, l = 4, p < .05, uncorrected) using the same method
described above. Five independent raters (the same individuals
as above) rated the 25 verbalisations from the RMVT along with
a list of the correct answers (no foil terms). Cronbach’s a’s were
.89 for positive voices, .68 for neutral voices, and .92 for negative
voices.
3.3. Mediations
Sobel’s tests of mediation (Sobel, 1982) were then performed in
sixteen cases where mediation conditions were met (Baron & Kenny,
1986), with six models proving to be significant (see Table 3).
2.4. Procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room in the
University. Participants completed all of the ToM tasks (the Faces
test, RMET, and RMVT) in randomised order. After completing
the tasks participants completed the questionnaire battery (the
EQ, LSRP, and Mach-IV) and were then fully debriefed.
4. Discussion
The present study examined whether primary and secondary
psychopathy and Machiavellianism were positively associated
with ToM difficulties using three tasks that required an ability to
infer mental states in terms of facial expression, eye region and vocal affect. Females were significantly positively correlated with
global empathy; this is consistent with research which demonstrates that females demonstrate global empathy superiority
(e.g., Lawrence et al., 2004). The psychopathy subtypes and Machiavellianism were positively associated with deficiencies in global
empathy. Past research indicates that in nonclinical samples
3. Results
3.1. Correlations
Intercorrelations among primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, Machiavellianism, global empathy (the EQ) and the
Table 1
Intercorrelations: bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Gender
Primary psychopathy
Secondary psychopathy
Machiavellianism
Global empathy
6.
7.
8.
9.
Faces
Faces
Faces
Faces
test
test
test
test
total
positive
neutral
negative
10 Eyes test total
11. Eyes test positive
12. Eyes test neutral
13. Eyes test negative
14.
15.
16.
17.
Voices
Voices
Voices
Voices
test
test
test
test
total
positive
neutral
negative
F = 1, M = 0.
*
p < .05 level (2-tailed).
**
p < .01 level (2-tailed).
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
!.19*
.25**
.40**
!.14
.68**
.46**
.23*
!.47**
!.40**
!.46**
.14
!.26**
!.13
!.21*
.32**
.27**
!.18
!.04
!.24**
.19*
.02
!.24*
!.14
!.20*
.24**
.12
!.11
!.06
!.01
.21*
.04
!.24*
!.21*
!.10
.44**
!.05
!.11
!.30**
!.05
.34**
.13
!.29**
!.08
!.14
.27**
.01
!.08
!.06
!.01
.32**
.00
!.24*
!.12
!.18
.29**
.01
!.07
!.09
!.10
.14
.00
!.30**
!.14
!.19*
.26**
.01
!.07
!.02
!.06
.17
.52**
.83**
.28**
.23*
.08
.18
.19
.21*
.04
.19
.15
.18
.04
.13
.17
.22*
!.10
.26**
.14
.13
!.01
.20*
.01
.12
!.18
.15
.14
.69**
.73**
.22*
.68**
.20*
.29**
.63**
.15
.17
.29**
.07
.24*
.24*
.35**
.06
.36**
.33**
.24*
.01
.22*
.19*
.07
.00
.09
.05
.34**
.09
.30**
.32**
.25**
.01
.28**
.25**
.51**
.76**
.12
.74**
.23*
.25**
172
F. Ali, T. Chamorro-Premuzic / Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 169–174
Table 2
Summary of regression analyses.
Criterion
Predictors
B
SE B
b
t
p
Faces test total
R2 = .12 and DR2 = .09 (p < .01)
Constant
Machiavellianism
Primary psychopathy
Global empathy
17.64
.00
!.03
.04
1.47
.01
.03
.02
.01
!.15
.25
12.02
.10
!1.17
2.38
.00
.92
.24
.02
Faces test positive
R2 = .07 and DR2 = .05 (p < .05)
Constant
Machiavellianism
Global empathy
4.18
!.01
.00
.39
.00
.00
!.20
.09
10.78
!1.92
.90
.00
.06
.37
Faces test neutral
R2 = .08 and DR2 = .05 (p < .05)
Constant
Machiavellianism
Global empathy
Primary psychopathy
1.02
.01
.01
.02
Constant
Global empathy
Primary psychopathy
Secondary psychopathy
!.02
.17
!.14
8.97
!.19
1.55
!1.09
.00
.85
.12
.28
Eyes test total
R2 = .20 and DR2 = .17 (p < .01)
9.15
!.00
.02
!.02
Eyes test positive
R2 = .14 and DR2 = .13 (p < .01)
Constant
Global empathy
Secondary psychopathy
Eyes test neutral
R2 = .10 and DR2 = .09 (p < .01)
Constant
Global empathy
Primary psychopathy
Voices test total
R2 = .10 and DR2 = .08 (p < .01)
Constant
Global empathy
Primary psychopathy
13.63
.08
!.06
2.58
.04
.05
Voices test neutral
R2 = .11 and DR2 = .09 (p < .01)
Constant
Global empathy
Primary psychopathy
Machiavellianism
5.95
.03
!.07
.01
2.01
.02
.03
.02
Table 3
Sobel’s tests of mediation.
Independent
variable
Mediation by global
empathy
Outcome
variable
Model
Primary
psychopathy
Machiavellianism
Full
Faces test
total
Faces test
total
Eyes test
total
Eyes test
total
Eyes test
positive
Voices test
total
(Z = !2.21,
p < .05)
(Z = !2.44,
p < .05)
(Z = !3.44,
p < .05)
(Z = !3.26,
p < .05)
(Z = !2.35,
p < .05)
(Z = !2.07,
p < .05)
Primary
psychopathy
Secondary
psychopathy
Secondary
psychopathy
Primary
psychopathy
Full
Full
Full
Partial
Full
psychopathy and Machiavellianism are positively associated with
general deficiencies in empathising ability (Andrew et al., 2008;
Mahmut et al., 2008). This global empathy deficit is likely to be
the cause of, or at least contribute to, the aversive characteristics
associated with these traits such as callousness and affective
poverty.
As predicted, primary psychopathy was significantly negatively
correlated with overall accuracy on the Faces test. In our sample
individuals with primary psychopathic traits experienced difficulties in interpreting mental states when presented with full facial
expressions.
Primary psychopathy, as expected, was significantly negatively
correlated with overall accuracy on the Eyes test. At odds with the
current findings, Richell et al. (2003) did not find significant differences in ToM ability between clinically psychopathic individuals
and non-psychopathic individuals on the Eyes test, concluding that
psychopathic individuals do not show any generalised impairment
20.55
.16
!.01
!.02
3.19
.04
.05
.08
7.47
.05
!.07
1.34
.02
.04
8.38
.03
!.05
1.40
.02
.03
.42
!.03
!.03
6.45
4.12
!.27
!.30
.00
.00
.79
.76
.26
!.19
5.58
2.70
!1.95
.00
.01
.05
.17
!.21
5.98
1.68
!2.04
.00
.10
.04
.23
!.13
5.29
2.24
!1.24
.00
.03
.22
.17
!.26
.06
2.96
1.60
!2.07
.50
.00
.11
.04
.62
in ToM. However, the sample size in this study was small (n = 19
for psychopathic participants).
Primary psychopathy was also significantly negatively correlated with overall accuracy on the Voices test. Our voices convey
a substantial amount of emotion about our emotional state (Knoll,
Uther, & Costall, 2009) therefore the inability to ‘read’ someone’s
voice would be detrimental to an individual’s interpersonal
relationships.
Interestingly, when the stimuli were categorised in terms of
emotional valence, primary psychopathy was significantly negatively correlated with accuracy in identifying the mental states of
neutral faces, neutral eyes and neutral voices. Individuals with primary psychopathic traits may be more attuned to extreme feelings,
such as happiness and distress because understanding these particular mental states could be especially valuable in manipulating
others. The ability to read extreme emotions in others may enhance manipulation and exploitation by indicating when a tactical
change is needed (e.g., Hare, 1999). Neutral mental states could
therefore pose a particular problem for individuals with primary
psychopathic traits as they are difficult to interpret and thus
manipulate.
Secondary psychopathy, like primary psychopathy, was significantly negatively correlated with overall accuracy on the Eyes test.
However, unlike primary psychopathy, it was significantly negatively correlated with ToM accuracy on positive eyes. Secondary
psychopathy is associated with negative affectivity (e.g., Del Gaizo
& Falkenbach, 2008) and individuals with secondary psychopathic
traits are more withdrawn and anxious than individuals with primary psychopathic traits (Blackburn, 1993). It is possible that these
individuals experienced difficulties in inferring mental states from
the positive stimuli because they are less likely to actually experience positive emotions so are less likely to empathise with these
emotions in other people.
F. Ali, T. Chamorro-Premuzic / Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 169–174
It should be noted however, that when considering all the tasks,
primary psychopathy was associated with more deficiencies in
ToM than secondary psychopathy. As individuals with secondary
psychopathic traits experience more emotion in general than primary psychopathy individuals and tend to be emotionally unstable
(e.g., Blackburn, 1993) they may actually be better at empathising
and recognising mental states than individuals who score highly
on primary psychopathic traits.
In the current sample, neither psychopathy subtype was significantly associated with ToM inaccuracy in the negatively rated
stimuli for any of the tasks. Previous research in nonclinical samples (e.g., Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008) has not demonstrated a
deficiency in recognising negative emotions in high psychopathy
scorers. It is possible that individuals with psychopathic traits in
nonclinical samples are not deficient in the ability to infer negative
thoughts and feelings. However, research into ToM and nonclinical
psychopathy is needed for further clarification.
Machiavellianism, like primary psychopathy, was significantly
negatively associated with overall ToM accuracy on the Faces test
as well as to neutral faces. Unlike primary psychopathy however,
Machiavellianism was also significantly negatively associated with
ToM accuracy to positive faces. Machiavellianism, like secondary
psychopathy, is positively associated with the experience of negative affect such as anxiety and neuroticism (McHoskey et al., 1998),
which may cause difficulty in inferring positive mental states.
Machiavellianism, like primary psychopathy, was negatively
associated with ToM accuracy to neutral voices. Machiavellian
individuals may also be more attuned to extreme thoughts and
feelings, which enhance their manipulative strategies and therefore like high primary psychopathy scorers, they experienced difficulties with the facial and vocal neutral stimuli. Surprisingly, while
both psychopathy subtypes were significantly negatively associated with lower accuracy on the Eyes test, Machiavellianism was
not. This task requires a high degree of sensitivity to subtle eye
expressions and it is possible that individuals who score highly
on Machiavellianism are simply better at this task than their psychopathy counterparts. Perhaps by forcing Machiavellian individuals to focus on the eye region alone their ability to infer a mental
state is enhanced. Replication of this finding and further research,
particularly with larger samples, is needed.
The regressions demonstrate that of all the ToM tasks, accuracy
on the total score of the Eyes test was the most strongly predicted
and that global empathy was a significant predictor of accuracy on
the ToM tasks across the board. The mediations indicate that global
empathy accounted for the effects of personality on many of the
ToM tasks; lower global empathy appears to have a detrimental effect on ToM.
A limitation to the current study was the use of a small, majority
female, undergraduate sample, which may make generalisability to
other nonclinical groups difficult. Nevertheless, undergraduate
samples have the advantage of being relatively free of severe Axis
I disorders which could distort the reporting of enduring personality traits and personality disorder features (Lilienfeld & Penna,
2001). An important aspect of the current study was that behavioural tasks were used as dependent variables alongside self-report
measures; overreliance on self-report inventories as dependent
variables may result in inflated correlations because of criterion
contamination and method covariance (Hall & Benning, 2007).
This study is, to date, the first to investigate both psychopathy
subtypes in relation to ToM in a nonclinical sample and the first
to distinguish between the emotional valence of the ToM stimuli
in relation to psychopathy and Machiavellianism. Our results indicate that it would be worth replicating this study in a larger sample
and the current study lends support to research which advocates
investigating psychopathy heterogeneously (e.g., Blackburn,
2009). The authors strongly recommend future research to take
173
into account the emotional valence of the stimuli, especially in
relation to neutral emotional valence, as this appears to be a point
of differentiation between the psychopathy subtypes and Machiavellianism (see also Ali et al., 2009). As Kirsch and Becker (2007)
point out, the majority of literature mainly relies on self-report
measures of global empathy deficits ‘‘making it impossible to
determine if the lack of empathy in psychopathy is due to impairments in cognitive empathy, affective empathy, or both” (p. 916).
Ali et al. (2009) identified affective empathy deficits in nonclinical
psychopathy and Machiavellianism; the current study also implicates cognitive empathy deficits in these traits.
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