Managing property rights of common-pool resources in the
fishing industry, to ensure economic growth and development of
the local communities through institutional models
Shamsiya Adams
Student number: 13417411
A research project submitted to the Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of
Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business
Administration.
10 November 2014
© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
I.
Abstract
The fishing industry provides direct and indirect livelihoods for over 140 000 people in South
Africa and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has identified 150 fishing
communities. Industrial boats employ some 200 people for every 1 000 tons of fish caught,
while small-scale fishing methods employ some 2 400 people for the same amount of fish.
There are various means of managing the fishing industry, which operates in a common-pool
resource. Small-scale fishers, however, live in poverty. The way in which the fishing industry
is currently being managed, through the individual transferable quota system, has led to
further problems for the small-scale fishers and the communities in which they live.
The aim of the study is provide a solution to the question of the best way to manage the
fishing industry, for the benefit of small-scale fishers, while also ensuring sustainability in the
fishing industry. The research will investigate three research questions, through literature
review and data gathered from interviews with small-scale fishers. The research questions
will investigate whether it is economically viable for small-scale fishers to continue to fish,
whether small-scale fishers want to have a self-management system and what would be the
best institutional model to manage the common-pool resource.
The research findings have found that there is not one best way to manage the commonpool resource. For communities to manage the common-pool resource themselves, it is
critically important that trust exists in the communities. The research has furthermore
confirmed recent literature that the individual transferable quota system can lead in many
instances to social problems in a community.
Key words: small-scale fishers; common-pool resource; individual transferable quota;
community; trust
i
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II.
Declaration
I declare that this research project is my own work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration at the Gordon
Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria. It has not been submitted before
for any degree or examination in any other University. I further declare that I have
obtained the necessary authorisation and consent to carry out this research.
……………………………………………
Shamsiya Adams
10 November 2014
ii
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III.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to my family, my staff
and friends who supported and encouraged me throughout this experience. The
journey has been remarkable and will remain an experience that I will cherish for years
to come. I would like to especially mention the following people:

My Staff, I thank you for your unwavering support. It is through your support and
standing in for me at work that my goals were attained and I was able to take
the necessary time off from work to do my research.

My supervisor, Mike Holland, who always had time for me. Thank you for
sharing your wealth knowledge with me. Your enthusiasm for my research gave
me the encouragement to complete my research.

To Nicolaas from Coastal links, without you I would not have been able to
complete my research. Thank you for taking the time to introduce me to the
fishers and the wealth of knowledge of the fishing industry that you shared with
me.

To all the fishers that I interviewed, I can’t thank you enough. You will always be
remembered by me.
iii
© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
Table of Contents
I.
Abstract ................................................................................................................... i
II.
Declaration ............................................................................................................. ii
III.
Acknowledgements............................................................................................ iii
List of Figures................................................................................................................ x
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ xi
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
1.1.
Research Title ................................................................................................ 1
1.2.
The Research Problem .................................................................................. 1
1.3.
Research Motivation ...................................................................................... 4
1.4.
Research Aims and the Objectives of the Study ............................................. 5
1.5.
The Scope of the Research ............................................................................ 6
1.6.
Key Concepts Defined.................................................................................... 6
1.7.
Outline of Research Report ............................................................................ 6
1.7.1.
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................ 6
1.7.2.
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................... 7
1.7.3.
Chapter 3: Research Question ................................................................ 7
1.7.4.
Chapter 4: Research Design ................................................................... 7
1.7.5.
Chapter 5: Results .................................................................................. 7
1.7.6.
Chapter 6: Discussion of Results ............................................................ 7
1.7.7.
Chapter 7: Summary and Recommendations .......................................... 7
1.8.
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 8
iv
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Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................ 9
2.1.
Managing the Fishing Industry ....................................................................... 9
2.2.
Common-Pool Resources .............................................................................10
2.3.
Common- Pool Resource Traps ....................................................................11
2.3.1.
Tragedy of the Commons .......................................................................11
2.3.2.
The Gilded Trap .....................................................................................12
2.4.
Small-Scale Fishers ......................................................................................12
2.5.
Co-Management of the Fishing Industry ........................................................13
2.6.
Community Management ..............................................................................14
2.7.
Engaging Communities .................................................................................15
2.8.
Trust..............................................................................................................16
2.9.
Types of Institutions ......................................................................................16
2.10.
Property Rights and Economic Growth ......................................................17
2.11.
Fishing Rights ............................................................................................19
2.12.
Stock Levels ..............................................................................................21
2.13.
Use of Incentives for Small-Scale Fishers..................................................22
2.14.
Support for Small-Scale Fishers ................................................................23
2.15.
Job Changes among Fishers .....................................................................23
2.16.
Summary ...................................................................................................24
Chapter 3: Research Question ....................................................................................25
3.1.
The Economic Viability of Fishing for the Small-Scale Fishers ......................25
3.1.1.
Research Question 1 .............................................................................25
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3.2.
Management of the Common-Pool Resource................................................26
3.2.1.
Research Question 2 .............................................................................26
3.2.2.
Research Question 3 .............................................................................26
3.3.
Summary.......................................................................................................27
Chapter 4: Research Methodology ..............................................................................28
4.1.
The Nature of the Study ................................................................................28
4.2.
Population of Relevance ...............................................................................28
4.3.
Sampling Method and Size ...........................................................................29
4.4.
Data Types....................................................................................................29
4.5.
Data Collection Process ................................................................................30
4.5.1.
Unstructured Interviews..........................................................................30
4.5.2.
Structured Interviews .............................................................................31
4.6.
Data Analysis Approach ................................................................................31
4.6.1.
Capturing the Data .................................................................................32
4.6.2.
Descriptive Statistic ................................................................................32
4.6.3.
Qualitative Analysis ................................................................................32
4.7.
Validity and Reliability ...................................................................................33
4.8.
Research Limitations .....................................................................................33
4.9.
Research Ethics ............................................................................................34
4.10.
Summary ...................................................................................................34
Chapter 5: Results.......................................................................................................35
5.1.
Descriptive Analysis ......................................................................................35
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5.2.
Participants Area of Residence .....................................................................35
5.3.
Gender ..........................................................................................................36
5.4.
Education Level amongst the Small-Scale Fishers ........................................37
5.5.
Tenure as a Fisher ........................................................................................38
5.6.
Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers...........................................................39
5.7.
Chance of Changing Jobs by the Fishers ......................................................40
5.8.
Quota Process ..............................................................................................42
5.9.
Quotas received ............................................................................................43
5.10.
Management of the Common-Pool Resource ............................................46
5.11.
Trust ..........................................................................................................48
5.12.
Fishing Operations of the Small-Scale Fishers ..........................................50
5.12.1.
Fishing Boats ......................................................................................50
5.12.2.
Fishing Gear .......................................................................................51
5.12.3.
Average Days Fishing Days................................................................52
5.13.
Summary ...................................................................................................53
Chapter 6: Discussion of Results.................................................................................54
6.1.
Findings - Is it economically viable for small-scale fishers to continue to fish?
54
6.1.1.
Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers (Question 8) ...............................54
6.1.2.
Changing jobs by the fishers (Question 33) ............................................55
6.1.3.
Quotas Received (Question 21 and 22) .................................................56
6.1.4.
Conditions for Economic Prosperity .......................................................57
vii
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6.2.
Findings - Would small-scale fishers be able to manage the common-pool
resource themselves, rather than the government managing it through the quota
system? ...................................................................................................................59
6.2.1.
Trust (Question 37) ................................................................................59
6.2.2.
Willingness by the Small-Scale Fishers to Manage the CPR (Question 34)
60
6.2.3.
Requirements for a successful and sustainable self-management system
60
6.3.
Findings - What institutional model will work best to manage the common-pool
resource for the benefit of small-scale fishers? ........................................................62
6.3.1.
Co-Management System versus a Community Management System ....62
6.3.2.
Relevance of the Individual Transferable Quota System ........................65
6.4.
Chapter Summary .........................................................................................66
Chapter 7: Conclusion .................................................................................................67
7.1.
Summary of Findings ....................................................................................67
7.1.1.
Chance of Obtaining a Quota .................................................................67
7.1.2.
Economic Conditions of the Small-Scale Fishers ...................................68
7.1.3.
Management of the Common-Pool Resource.........................................68
7.2.
Implications for Institutions ............................................................................69
7.3.
Suggestions for Further Research .................................................................70
7.4.
Concluding Note............................................................................................71
References ..................................................................................................................73
Appendices .................................................................................................................79
Appendix 1: Questionnaire.......................................................................................79
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Appendix 2: Fishing Gear ........................................................................................86
Appendix 3: Commercial Fishing Nets .....................................................................87
Appendix 4: Cold Storage Freezer Installed .............................................................88
ix
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Determinants of national competitive advantage....................................18
Figure 2: Participants Area of Residence ....................................................................36
Figure 3: Gender Distribution of Participants ...............................................................37
Figure 4: Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers ..........................................................40
Figure 5: Breakdown of Fishers who would Change Jobs ...........................................41
Figure 6: Fishers Age ..................................................................................................41
Figure 7: Feedback on Fairness of the Quota System .................................................42
Figure 8: Breakdown of Quotas Received ...................................................................44
Figure 9: Percentage Breakdown of Community Management of CPR........................46
Figure 10: Trust amongst Fishers ................................................................................49
Figure 11: Breakdown of Boat Owners ........................................................................50
Figure 12: Percentage of Fishers who own their own Fishing Gear .............................51
Figure 13: Number of Fishing Days .............................................................................52
Figure 14: Common-Pool Decision Model Tree ...........................................................70
x
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List of Tables
Table 1: Education Levels and Quota Status ...............................................................37
Table 2: Chance of Receiving a Quota Based on Education Level ..............................38
Table 3: Tenure in Fishing Industry versus Quota Status ............................................38
Table 4: Income Levels based on Quota Status ..........................................................40
Table 5: Breakdown per Area on Responses to Community Management of the CPR 47
xi
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter serves as an introduction to the research report. The intention of the research is
briefly explained, along with the motivation for the study. The aims and objectives of the
study are clarified, as well as the expected contributions to the current literature, as
emphasised by the significance of the study. Lastly, a brief summary of each chapter is
provided.
1.1. Research Title
Managing property rights of common-pool resources in the fishing industry, to ensure
economic growth and the development of local communities through institutional models.
1.2. The Research Problem
The aim of the study is provide a solution to the question of the best way to manage the
fishing industry, for the benefit of small-scale fishers while ensuring sustainability in the
fishing industry. The problem is that various models had been used in the past but they did
not lead to sustainability for the fishers. Furthermore, historically prior to 1994 only whiteowned companies received quotas allowing them to fish. A solution now needs to be found
by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries for the industry to be more
representative, which includes small-scale fishers of all races and females, while managing
a limited open access common-pool resource.
The fishing industry that is the subject of this research produces West Coast Rock Lobster,
Snoek, Harders and Hotnops fish. In 2011, it was estimated that South Africa had 16 256
tons of West Coast Rock Lobster available, the lowest since 1990 (Blaine, 2013). The catch
estimate was 2 991 tons in 2011 (Blaine, 2013). The fishing industry provide direct and
indirect livelihoods for over 140 000 people in South Africa (WWF, 2011). The Department of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries have identified 150 fishing communities in South Africa
1
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(South Africa. Info, 2013). Globally, 54.8 million people are engaged in capture fisheries and
aquaculture, and about three times as many are involved in upstream and downstream
activities (Bjorndal, Child, & Lem, 2014). Industrial boats employ some 200 people for every
1 000 tons of fish caught while small-scale fishing methods employ some 2 400 people for
the same amount of fish (Bjorndal et al., 2014).
The fishing industry in South Africa is regulated by the Marine Living Resource Act, which
came into being in 1998. This bill was introduced to control all aspects of the fishing industry
and ensure that all citizens benefit from it in a fair and equitable manner (Republic of South
Africa, 1998). The act was updated and the new bill, called the Marine Living Resource
Amendment Bill 2013, came into effect on 29 October 2013. Small-scale fishers were not
recognised in the Marine Living Resource Act and the purpose of the new bill is to provide a
legal framework for the implementation of the small-scale fisheries sector (The Department
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013). The new bill does not allow for real rights to be
issued. Rights granted to the fishers may not be sold, leased, donated or otherwise alienated
except with the written approval from the minister (The Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, 2013).
The fishing industry had been industrialised since the early 1900s (Isaacs, 2011). The
individual transferable quota system was first introduced in 1990, through the Sea Fishery
Act 12 of 1988 (Isaacs, 2011). Other models that have been used to manage the fishing
industry in South Africa include community quotas, allocating quotas to individuals where
individuals had to form small companies to apply for quotas and fishers applying as
individuals for medium term rights and interim rights (Isaacs, 2011).
Many small-scale fishers in South Africa are unhappy with the current quota system, as they
have been excluded from the allocation of quotas, while those who do not fish, or know how
to fish, have been given a quota. This has resulted in many fishers livelihood being taken
away from them. Furthermore, fishers are required to belong to a Co-operative and receive
collective rights rather than individual rights.
Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries’ minister, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, described as ―historic‖
a new amendment bill which will give small-scale fishers collective rights for the first time
(South Africa. Info, 2013). The bill requires fishers to set up legal entities. Some people,
however, questioned this, as it would mean more fishers sharing a dwindling stock of fish,
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leading to increased poverty and hardship. They also said that Co-operatives did not work in
the past, as they were not run by business-minded people (South Africa. Info, 2013).
The new South African bill would see more fishing rights being allocated to small-scale
fishers. However, the parliamentary research unit has said that the South African fishing
industry is not managed properly and warned against reducing commercial fishing
companies’ fishing rights, in order to increase the rights of SMME’s (Vecchiatto & Blaine,
2013). The research unit warned that this would reduce jobs and increase poverty
(Vecchiatto & Blaine, 2013).
The new fishing quotas were issued on 1 January 2014. Despite Minister Tina JoematPetersson welcoming the timely issuing of the new fishing quotas, they were set aside a few
months later, due to numerous appeals against the way in which they had been issued
(News 24, 2014).
In January 2014, fishers who were not granted line-fishing rights were granted interim relieve
in the form of exemptions, pending an appeal process with Department of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (Fin24, 2014). The Traditional Line Fish Association of South Africa
saw only 115 of its members successfully acquiring the new right to fish, under the new
allocation process, of the previous 303 members who were permit holders (Fin24, 2014).
This resulted in the fishers threatening civil disobedience as they claimed the process was
not fair and the majority of those allocated rights were new entrants (Fin24, 2014). One of
the requirements to have been granted a fishing right was that fishers had to have fished for
300 days off the Cape Peninsula, since 2007, and 120 days in other areas (Fin24, 2014)
On 15 May 2014 the Fisheries’ minister, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, announced that the 2013
fishing rights’ allocation process and its decisions and outcomes would be set aside (News
24, 2014) The reasons given for the process being set aside were that an independent audit
found that the process did not make sufficient use of legal advisors, which resulted in
potential weaknesses; some essential policy criteria had not been included in the
assessment processors and were inconsistently applied across all sectors.
A report by the WWF-SA has highlighted that, given the state of South Africa’s fisheries
resources, it is unlikely that job creation can take place in the short-term without progressive
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rebuilding strategies and that the immediate goal of the fisheries management should be on
job security (WWF, 2011).
1.3. Research Motivation
The research is necessary in order to find a solution as to how best to manage common-pool
resources in the fishing industry, for the benefit of small-scale fishers. Small – scale fishers
live in poverty and do not have the financial means and assets to compete with large
companies. The fishing quotas given are often not enough for small-scale fishers to make a
living from them.
In designing management plans and achieving long-term sustainability it is fundamental to
understand the fishers behaviour, in respect of how decisions are made, that are related to
what and how to fish and when and why to fish (Lopes & Begossi, 2011). The fish stocks are
currently under threat, with many fish listed as endangered. It is therefore important that the
models used to manage the small-scale fishing industry take into account conservation of
fish stock. It is also important to evaluate local decision-making, as this is likely to improve
understanding of conservation issues concerning the small-scale fishers (Lopes & Begossi,
2011).
Elinor Ostrom has suggested that common-pool resources can be best managed by
communities themselves. Research specifically on the small-scale fishing industry needs to
be extended, as can be seen in Canada and the Turtle Island of The Philippines, where
government interventions lead to tragedy (Ostrom, 2008). However, in New Zealand and
Iceland a successful quota system is being used to manage the fishing industry (Ostrom,
2008).
In South Africa, the new bill requires small-scale fishers to form legal entities. This has
however failed in the past, as it was not run by business minded-people (South Africa. Info,
2013). It also failed because the fishers were not the ones who benefitted from the proceeds.
They remained in poverty as a top-down approach was followed (Isaacs, 2011).
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The problem of marine fisheries has been pin-pointed by some as the failure of the fisheries’
management, which has led to the current crisis (Beddington, Agnew, & Clark, 2007). Smallscale fishers and local fishers end up being the losers, as they do not have the means to
compete with the big fishing companies, or the resources to move into other fields to earn an
income (Robinson, Albers, & Kirama, 2014).
Concerning issues of development, it is necessary for institutions to create public debate and
facilitate the collective decision-making process (Castellano & García-Quero, 2012). On the
relationship between institutions and development, there are disagreements about the
nature of institutions, institutional change and strategies of development (Castellano &
García-Quero, 2012).
1.4. Research Aims and the Objectives of the Study
The aim of the study is provide a solution as to the best way of managing the fishing
industry, for the benefit of the small-scale fishers while ensuring sustainability in the fishing
industry. In this report it is investigated whether the industry for small-scale fishers is best
managed by means of community management, co-management between small-scale
fishers and government institutions, or whether it is best that each fisher be given his own
quota and the industry be managed by the government institution.
The research will also look at whether it is economically viable for small-scale fishers to
continue to fish. The research would also look at what is most equitable for the small-scale
fishers. Can the small-scale fishers survive on the quotas given? The quotas given were
collective quotas, but would the collective catch be sufficient for each fisher to be able to
survive and make a livelihood from fishing?
Furthermore, the research will look at whether small-scale fishers would be able to manage
the common-pool resource themselves rather than be managed by the government. The
research will also look at the fishers’ willingness to manage the common-pool resource
themselves. The research will also take into account the social aspects that currently exist in
the community.
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1.5. The Scope of the Research
The research focuses on small-scale fishers who have received quotas and those who have
not been granted quotas, but have been fishing for a long time. The research also looks at
the income of the fishers and their fishing operations. Their views on how they believe the
industry should be managed will be investigated. The research will also gather the views of
large companies as to how they believe the industry should be managed. The research will
take into account information provided by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries as to how the quota system was supposed to work.
1.6. Key Concepts Defined

Common-pool resource: A resource that is shared and is sufficiently large, so that it
is difficult to define recognised users and exclude other users.

Tragedy of the commons: This occurs where each person using a common
resource endlessly increases what he takes out; from a resource that has limits;
leading to the destruction of the common resource.

Small-Scale Fishers: They are fishers who fish near-shore and harvest a variety of
fish.

Individual transferable quota: It is a quota given to one person, which can be
transferred to another person for that person’s use.

Total allowable catch: Total amount of fish that is allowed to be harvested in any
one year.
1.7. Outline of Research Report
1.7.1. Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter outlines the aim of the research and the rationale of the research project. In
conjunction with this, the research objectives, motivations and the scope of the study are
emphasised. These aspects form the basis of the research study.
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1.7.2. Chapter 2: Literature Review
In Chapter 2, a detailed review of current literature is undertaken. The background to what a
common-pool resource is and common-pool resource traps are presented; followed by
institutional models to manage the resource in conjunction with literature on the alternative
method of managing the common-pool resource, which is community management. The
literature is further followed by current and past literature on the small-scale fishing industry.
1.7.3. Chapter 3: Research Question
The research questions are outlined in this chapter, relating to the objectives and aims
outlined in Chapter 1.
1.7.4. Chapter 4: Research Design
The research design of the study is described in this chapter. The nature and research
approach of the study is described, followed by the relevance of the population and sampling
method and size. The data collection process is then categorised, followed by a discussion
of the procedure that was followed, in order to analyse the data. Lastly, the validity and
reliability, the research limitations and ethics of the study are noted.
1.7.5. Chapter 5: Results
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the interviews that was conducted and described in
Chapter 4.
1.7.6. Chapter 6: Discussion of Results
In Chapter 6, the results explained in Chapter 5 are discussed. The results discussed take
into account the literature review in Chapter 2 and the aims of the research highlighted in
Chapter 1.
1.7.7. Chapter 7: Summary and Recommendations
Finally, in Chapter 7, a summary of the research findings are presented, in addition to some
suggestions for further research and the implications for practitioners.
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1.8. Conclusion
In this chapter the research problem was briefly described, clarified by the resulting
motivation of the study. The research aims and objectives were identified followed by the
scope and pertinent concepts that were also defined. Each chapter was then briefly
described to note the flow of the study. The next chapter provides the relevant literature
base, pertaining to the research problem.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The following chapter outlines the relevant literature regarding the research report. The
various management models used to manage the fishing industry are discussed, followed by
their importance to engaging communities. The report continues with a discussion around
the traps of common-pool resources. It discusses the need for alternate incomes and the
help that institutions are required to provide fishers with, in order for them to migrate to
alternative income sources, as well as incentives that need to be provided.
2.1. Managing the Fishing Industry
The fishing industry is a common-pool resource and many fish stocks have been depleted
due to overfishing (WWF, 2011). In 1982, the United Nations established exclusive
economic zones extending 200 nautical miles along the oceanic borders of coastal states
and these areas no longer form part of international waters (Ostrom, 2008). The exclusive
economic zones give powers to coastal states to manage resources within these areas to
ensure that they are not endangered by overexploitation (Ostrom, 2008). Fishing has the
problem of the tragedy of the commons.
The fishing industry is managed with the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), which is a limit set on
how much fish can be harvested in a year (Branch, 2009). The TAC is allocated to fishers
via fishing rights which are either community established or government controlled. A
problem with the TAC is that it may be exceeded under any management system if there is
not adequate enforcement (Branch, 2009).
In South Africa, fishers have to apply for quotas in order to harvest fish. Small-scale fishers
receive collective quotas so that they may harvest fish. Historically, on the West Coast of
South Africa, the fishing territories were managed in the interest of the community and not
the resource, as it was regarded as inexhaustible and thus relentlessly exploited to sustain
the immediate subsistence needs of the community and the profits of the patrons (Van
Sittert, 2003).
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In Canada, the Canadian government used a model of stock regeneration for Northern Cod
that scientists later determined was flawed and highly aggregated, with incomplete data
being used in deciding on quotas (Ostrom, 2008). The local fishers in Newfoundland feared
that a collapse was near, but the Canadian DFO assured everyone that Cod fishing was
recuperating from an earlier excessive harvest. In 1992, the Canadian DFO issued a guiding
memorandum to all those fishing for Northern Cod in Canadian waters (Ostrom, 2008). The
tragedy here is that local fishers, who had established local rules before the government’s
intervention and were the backbone of local economies, paid the cost of the collapse of the
fishing industry (Ostrom, 2008).
In the Turtle Island of The Philippines, the community had a very successful local system
which evolved over a decade and saw the percentage of eggs conserved steadily rise from
the mid -1980s to the 1990s, without major conflict between participants (Ostrom, 2008). The
tragedy here is that the national officials did not recognise local rules and passed the Wildlife
Resources Conservation and Protection Act of 2001, which prohibited hunting of threatened
wildlife and banned the collection of marine turtle eggs. This lead to the conservation of turtle
eggs ceasing and the depletion of turtle eggs proceeded at an alarming rate, with egg
conservation dropping from 80% to 40% in one year (Ostrom, 2008).
Due to the depletion of fishing stocks and lower harvesting each year, it is important for
governments to implement institutions to manage this common-pool resource, to reverse the
damage already done and prevent a complete tragedy. The question is, what type of
institution will work best and how will it benefit small-scale fishers who do not have the
means to compete with big fishing companies?
2.2. Common-Pool Resources
Common-pool resources are resources that are shared and that are sufficiently large, so that
it is difficult, but not impossible, to define recognised users and exclude other users (Ostrom,
2008). The use of common-pool resources by one person subtracts the benefits that others
might enjoy (Ostrom, 2008). As stated by Ostrom ―effective monitoring by officials and users
is an essential ingredient of sustainable common-pool resource institutions‖ (Ostrom, 2008,
p.17).
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When multiple appropriators are dependent on a given common-pool resource as a source
of economic activity, they are jointly affected by almost everything they do (Ostrom, 2011).
The basic problem of common-pool resource is organising its use and involves problems of
collective action to avoid free-riding (Dorj, 2013; Ostrom, 2011). A significant factor in the
resource use across communities is the in-and-out population migration of people (Dorj,
2013).
As the common-pool resource is an open access resource, restricting access to the resource
and ensuring sustainability is a major problem. The common-pool resources can be
managed by a range of institutional arrangements, which include governmental, private or
community ownership (Ostrom, 2008).
2.3. Common- Pool Resource Traps
There are two common-pool resource traps, namely the tragedy of the commons and the
gilded trap. Both of these see a decline in the stock levels in the common-pool resource,
which has social and economic effects on the communities that rely on them.
2.3.1. Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons is where each person using a common resource endlessly
increases what he takes out from a resource that has limits. In the example given by Hardin,
he demonstrated that where herdsmen add one cow after another to a common pasture
field, because the reward he receives is greater than the negative impact of adding more
cattle, the overgrazing is shared amongst all the herdsmen (Hardin, 1968).
The tragedy lies in the fact that each person pursues his own self- interest in the use of the
commons (Hardin, 1968). The individual benefits, while the society as a whole suffers
(Hardin, 1968). This eventually leads to the destruction of the commons. In the fishing
industry, overfishing has become a problem with numerous species on the endangered list
of fish. This is due to each fisher fishing to maximise his catch, without allowing for the stock
to recover. Some of the endangered species which can be found on the red list are East
Coast Rock Lobster, Natal Stumpnose, and West Coast Steenbras (Barendse, 2005). The
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red list is fish that are now illegal to buy or sell in South Africa due to sustainability pressures
(Barendse, 2005).
Examples of where the tragedy of the commons has occurred, due to mismanagement or
incorrect management rules being implemented, are to be found in Canada and the Turtle
Island of The Philippines (Ostrom, 2008). In some regions, like in Lake Tana, where there is
decline in fish stock, fishers have demonstrated that they want more sustainable harvest
than maximising their catch in the short term (Agimass & Mekonnen, 2011).
2.3.2. The Gilded Trap
The gilded trap is where social drivers increase the value of natural resources, as the
ecological state moves closer to the tipping point (Steneck, Hughes, Cinner, Adger, Arnold,
Boudreau, Brown, Folke, Gunderson, Olsson, Scheffer, Stephenson, Walker, Wilson &
Worms, 2011). The greatest concern when it comes to gilded traps is the precipitous decline,
without warning, of a species that is at the greatest risk (Steneck et al., 2011).
To prevent the gilded trap occurring, it requires recognition that increasing reliance on a few
high-value species increases the risks and consequences of precipitous declines in those
species (Steneck et al., 2011).
2.4. Small-Scale Fishers
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) has found that smallscale fishers are receiving the least economic benefits in terms of money for their products,
relative to other players in the value chain (Bjorndal et al., 2014). Small-scale fishers usually
fish inshore and make use of small boats, using hook and line and trap gear to fish (Wilson,
Kay, Colgate, Qi, & Lenihan, 2012).
One of the policy recommendations is that there should be increased governmental, NGO
and private-sector support, which is a prerequisite for the small-scale fisheries and
aquaculture sector to achieve more equitable distribution of benefits. The focus should be on
technical training, infrastructure needs, finance and research and development (Bjorndal et
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al., 2014). The FAO also found that there was a need for storage facilities in order to prevent
the small-scale fishers from selling their products in an unfavourable market, allowing them
to keep their products until conditions became more favourable (Bjorndal et al., 2014).
Research conducted by Leach found that entitlement failure frequently results less from
people’s lack of institutionally-grounded claims than their incapacity to make claims against
more powerful actors in the context of resource struggles (Leach, Mearns, & Scoones,
1999).
2.5. Co-Management of the Fishing Industry
The main purpose of co-management institutions was to protect the resources and pass
monitoring and surveillance responsibilities to the fishing communities (Isaacs, 2012). It is
also claimed that the approach of co-management delivers greater equity among users (Van
Sittert, 2003). Co-management involves a decentralised management system, where
responsibilities move from the national fisheries departments to newly formed local
institutions, which promote user rights (Isaacs, 2012). It describes power and responsibilitysharing agreements that are made between government and user groups (Schreiber, 2001).
A co-management system also calls for a system of interactive governance and cooperative
democracy, whether through direct participation or through representation at levels that
transcend local community boundaries (Van Sittert, 2003).
Historically, co-management existed under a weak pre-scientific state (Van Sittert, 2003).
South Africa is, however, the complete antithesis, with a dedicated marine bureaucracy,
research and enforcement capability backed-up by the police and the military (Van Sittert,
2003). Research in the social sciences has called into question the traditional role of
government as a manager, and brings to the forefront the role of local institutions in
protecting ecosystems and local access privileges (Schreiber, 2001).
Advocates for a co-management system give two reasons for the system: the crisis in the
fisheries and democracy. Van Sittert noted that neither is a reason for co-management in
South Africa, as the crisis is at least three decades old and has been effectively managed,
up to the present (Van Sittert, 2003). Schreiber however argues that the real crisis in
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fisheries management is not the over-exploitation of many species and areas, but the
desperation of fishing-dependent people and communities in the face of this lack of control
over their livelihood (Schreiber, 2001).
There is however two types of fish; those that migrate and those that stay stationary in an
area. Co-management systems may be able to work well for the fish that remain stationary
in certain areas but it has been criticised for its inability to monitor the stock levels of
migrating fish (Schreiber, 2001).
2.6. Community Management
A community management system is where the community manages the common-pool
resource without interference from government.
In the research done of the Lobster fishing industry in Maine, it can be seen that local
management and conservation can be effective at relative spatial scales (Steneck et al.,
2011). When there is no community management, social dilemmas occur. Social dilemmas
are group interactions in which an individual maximises his own payoff, when he does not
cooperate; but attaining the social optimum requires cooperation (Stoop, Noussair, & Van
Soest, 2012).
Community-based management goes further than consultation, in that it can ensure the
survival of small, rural fishing communities, the independent fishers, a fishing lifestyle, and
provide opportunities for meaningful stewardship of fish resources (Schreiber, 2001).
An approach to the problem of loss of fisheries-related benefits to coastal communities is the
establishment of community development quotas. Under this system, government
management agencies transfer quotas to community management boards, which consist of
representatives from geographically-defined communities (Schreiber, 2001).
Small-scale fishers and fishing communities around the world have expressed outrage at the
government-imposed fishing regulations, which they claim take away local access and place
it in the hands of large-scale, urban-based fishers (Schreiber, 2001).
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Successful self-governing common-pool resources have the following design principles:
(Ostrom, 2011)
1. Clearly defined boundaries – Individuals who have the right to withdraw resource units
for the common-pool resource must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the
common-pool resource.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions.
Appropriation rules restricting time, place technology, and quantity of the resource units
are related to local conditions and to the provision rules requiring labour, material, and
money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the operational rules can
participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. Monitoring. Monitors who actively audit the common-pool resource conditions and
appropriator behaviour are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be
assigned graduated sanctions by other appropriators.
6. Conflict resolution mechanism. Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to lowcost arenas, to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and
officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise. The rights of appropriators to devise their own
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
2.7. Engaging Communities
There is a growing awareness that local knowledge needs to be utilised to manage smallscale fisheries (Wilson et al., 2012). Communication plays a key role in community
engagement by building the social capital necessary to bring groups and individuals together
(Ostrom, 2011). An organisation seeking to establish a community engagement forum must
first consider how it can develop the social capital to underpin it, which will be dependent
upon the existence of shared norms, patterns of reciprocity and trust (Willis, 2012). The
preferences of society, especially those of the fishers also need to be taken into
consideration when implementing the fishery regulations and investments in sustainable
utilisation of resources (Agimass & Mekonnen, 2011).
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2.8. Trust
In order to construct the institutions required for the common-pool resource dilemmas, there
must be shared norms and patterns of reciprocity, which lead to the development of social
capital (Willis, 2012). Shared norms and patterns of reciprocity develop when individuals
have interacted through face-to-face communication over a substantial period of time (Willis,
2012). Research conducted by Elinor Ostrom also found that in successful long sustainable
self- management of the common-pool resource, extensive norms have evolved in all these
settings that narrowly define ―proper‖ behaviour (Ostrom, 2011). There also exists a
reputation for keeping promises, honest dealings, and reliability amongst the community
(Ostrom, 2011).
In an experimental research conducted with recreational fishers it was observed that social
dilemmas trigger negative cooperation (Stoop et al., 2012). The researchers found that while
cooperation can be found in naturally-occurring social dilemma situations, successful
cooperation does not spontaneously arise (Stoop et al., 2012).
The ITQs have had positive economic impacts but concerns have been raised about their
social impacts, especially in terms of fairness and equity, as the ITQs are usually
concentrated in the hands of a few people (Branch, 2009). This could have an impact on
trust in the community, as some fishers would not have received quotas and would therefore
question those who had.
2.9. Types of Institutions
Institutions are the man-made constraints that structure political, economic and social
interactions and provide the incentive structure for the economy (North, 1991). Institutions
enable ordered thought, expectations, and action, by imposing form and consistency on
human activities (Hodgson, 2006). Property rights are specified and enforced by political
institutions and a capital market entails security of property rights over time. It will simply not
evolve where political rulers can arbitrarily seize assets or radically alter their value (North,
1991).
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There are two institutionalist views on the problem of development, the one being the new
institutional economics (NIE) and the other being institutional political economy
(IPE)
(Castellano & García-Quero, 2012).
The new institutional economics (NIE) theory states that the basic functions of the state are
to assure property rights, enforce compliance with contracts, reduce transaction cost,
increase wealth, and encourage growth (Castellano & García-Quero, 2012).
The institutional political economy (IPE) is when central political control is weak and
democratic institutions are half-formed (Castellano & García-Quero, 2012). The IPE
professes that the behaviour and motivations of public figures are subject to modifications
(Castellano & García-Quero, 2012)
2.10. Property Rights and Economic Growth
Economic governance is important because markets and economic activity and transactions
cannot function well in its absence (Dixit, 2009). Economic governance is the structure and
functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic
transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts and taking collective action to
provide physical and organisational infrastructure (Dixit, 2009).
For economic growth to happen, property rights matter mainly in an institutional context,
wherein political power is divided among a number of political actors (Justesen & KurrildKlitgaard, 2013). This gives the ability of governments to change existing property rights at
some time in the future which makes even having strong property rights in isolation
insufficient to generate economic growth (Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013).
Porter stated ―A nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate
and upgrade‖ (Porter, 1990, p 73). Companies that are capable of consistent innovation,
pursue improvements, seek more sophisticated source of competitive advantage and
overcome substantial barriers to change and innovation, are so due to four broad attributes
that the nation possess, referred to as the diamond of national competitive advantage
(Porter, 1990). Figure 1 below is the diamond of national competitive advantage
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Figure 1: Determinants of national competitive advantage
Firm strategy,
structure and rivalry
Factor conditions
Demand conditions
Related and
supporting industries
North described property rights as ―the rights that an individual has to undertake actions with
regard to their own persons, including labour supply, and the disposition of the goods and
services of the process‖ (as cited in Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013). Economic
reasoning suggests that secure property rights are a necessary pre-condition for economic
growth to occur, as it encourages individuals to engage in productive behaviour rather than
destructive behaviour, exploitative and purely redistributive behaviour (Justesen & KurrildKlitgaard, 2013). Destructive behaviour occurs because individuals will fear that others will
deprive them of the fruits of their activities (Dixit, 2009).
The institutional evolution has seen not only the voluntary organisation that expanded trade
and made exchange more productive but also saw the state take over the protection and
enforcement of property rights (North, 1991). This is because effective property rights enable
economic actors to plan ahead and give them sufficient incentive to invest in capital and to
save (Dixit, 2009; Justesen & Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013).
Property rights in the fishing industry in many countries are in the form of quotas. A form of
quota is an individually transferable quota as used in New Zealand and Iceland (Ostrom,
2008). An individually transferable quota is when the right holder can use the quota himself,
or lease or sell it to someone else to use (Isaacs, 2011). Thus, having a fishing right allows
fishers to gain access to capital which could be used to buy fishing boats and equipment.
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A major cause of poor economic performance is due to the government’s failure to protect
property rights and violation, such as the expropriation of property without compensation
(Dixit, 2009). In the fishing industry, not having the right to fish, or preventing local fishers
from fishing, could lead to poaching; thus encouraging the tragedy of the commons.
In the fishing industry, a lack of any property right for many valuable commercial species in
the open ocean has led to massive overfishing (Ostrom, 2008). Most of the ocean fisheries
are open access and in 1982 the United Nations removed one third of the oceans from the
international realm, allowing coastal states to manage their own resources (Ostrom, 2008).
A well organised rights system alters the economic incentives of fishers, who no longer
compete for their catches, so that highly competitive fishing no longer takes place
(Beddington et al., 2007).
In the fishing industry, many management authorities have implemented a system of total
allowable catch (TAC) for the year and close the fishery when the year’s cumulative catch
has reached the TAC (Beddington et al., 2007). Another system that is in use is the
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) system. This system allows fishers to make rational
economic choices about where and when they catch fish, as well as allowing the industry to
settle on a fleet capacity that optimises individual economic yield to vessels or cooperatives
(Beddington et al., 2007).
2.11. Fishing Rights
Fishing rights is a form of property right whereby the holder of the right has a right to fish.
The oceans are an open accessed common-pool resource, as they cannot be fenced off and
do not belong to any specific person.
Fishing rights can take the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQ), non-transferable
quotas, community development quotas or collective rights. The ITQ system is a relatively
new concept in fishing management and is primarily a tool to solving the economic problems
of fisheries (Branch, 2009). The ITQs are essentially a private property right with the right to
harvest a given stock (McCormack, 2012).
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One of the first countries to introduce the ITQ system was Iceland (Schreiber, 2001). The
ITQ system has resolved the problem of fishing not happening all year round, due to the
fishers racing to fish the TAC as soon as possible; as fishers are now guaranteed an annual
quota (Branch, 2009).
The ITQ system has however some problems, in that it has resulted in more of the quotas
being accumulated by the largest companies and small-scale fishers who cannot afford to
purchase a quota of their own, must lease from quota-rich companies (Schreiber, 2001). The
ITQs can be sold or leased by the ITQ holders to other fishers thereby creating further
problems, whereby the fishers are not the ITQ owner and those with the ITQs do not fish
(Branch, 2009; McCormack, 2012). Economic theory predicts that the lease price should
approximate annual profits in excess of alternative opportunities, while the sale price is close
to the present value of all future profits obtained from fishing the quota (Branch, 2009).
The reality of the ITQ system is that it has had profound implications for the social and
economic life of fishing communities, in that it has cut small-scale fishers income by 40 50%, the income of those who cannot afford to buy an ITQ and have to lease it (Schreiber,
2001). They in turn cut the wages and shares of their crew, to make up for loss of income
(Schreiber, 2001).
In South Africa, fishers are considered commercial fishers and treated as commercial fishers
when they receive a quota; not a small-scale fisher even though their operations are still that
of a small-scale fisher. In Guaruja, the fishers moved from subsistence fishing to commercial
fishing due to economic pressure to change their lifestyle (Lopes & Begossi, 2011).
Initially the ITQs were based on past fishing history, which could result in fishers inflating
their catch in order to obtain an ITQ (Branch, 2009). It also opened the door for speculative
entry into the fisheries (Branch, 2009).
Many fishers over the past decades and all over the world have expressed their outrage at
government-imposed fishing regulations, which they claim take away local access and place
it into the hands of large-scale, urban-based fishers (Schreiber, 2001).
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Countries that have successfully implemented the ITQ system are New Zealand, Australia,
Iceland, Canada and Namibia. ITQ systems, however, come at a cost; as observers are
required, whom are paid for by the industry (Beddington et al., 2007). This has seen Norway
and New Zealand, who has one of the best run systems, have the highest cost per ship of all
fishing nations (Beddington et al., 2007).
2.12. Stock Levels
The majority of global fish stocks lack adequate catch, survey and other biological data to
calculate abundance and productivity, using conventional stock assessment methods. In
developing countries, it is estimated that the fish stocks that are assessed range between 5
and 20% (Carruthersa, Puntb, Waltersa, MacCallc, McAllistera, Dick & Coped, 2014)
Establishing data –limited methods is relevant to developing countries where there is often
less complete reporting of fishery data and even fewer resources allocated to analysing
(Carruthers et al., 2014).
In South Africa, a move towards co-management exists, to pass the surveillance and
management of the fishing stock to the fishers (Isaacs, 2012). A lack of fishing rights has
however prevented this from happening (Isaacs, 2012).
There are views that the biological methods developed by marine scientists are not the best
way to determine stock levels and protect the fish stock. Recognition of common-pool
resources at a local level is the best way of protecting fish stocks from the unpredictability of
stock assessment science and over-exploitation by large fishers (Schreiber, 2001). This is
due to the emergent properties of marine ecosystems that local fishers develop over the
years, which is overlooked by fisheries scientists (Schreiber, 2001).
Another method of managing fish stock levels is through marine protected areas (MPAs).
The 1992 Convention for Biological Diversity set a target for 10% of the global marine area
to be designated as MPAs by 2010 (McCay & Jones, 2011). Progress has been slow and
consequently the deadline has been extended to 2020 (McCay & Jones, 2011). Decisions
around MPAs are politically difficult, as proposals to redefine traditional fishing grounds as
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MPAs affect communities already limited in resource use, by regulatory control, competition
and decline in fish stocks (McCay & Jones, 2011).
In areas like Lake Tana, fishers want control during the spawning period in order to protect
the stock levels and have sustainability of the fish (Agimass & Mekonnen, 2011).
Experience has shown that local communities, by structuring the fisheries around social
concerns, are able to efficiently and successfully provide for the biological sustainability of
the resource (Schreiber, 2001).
2.13. Use of Incentives for Small-Scale Fishers
Small scale fishers in poor countries have few alternatives to fishing. If not fishing then what
would these small-scale fishers do to earn a livelihood? An option would be the use of
incentives to entice the small scale fishers into accepting the marine protected areas and to
fish in a sustainable way or not at all.
An incentive could have been used in the case of the Turtle Islands to have the fishers stop
harvesting the turtle eggs, instead of establishing an external but unenforceable rule. As
their livelihood was taken away, local rules that previously existed fell away too, and
poaching ensued (Ostrom, 2008).
Robinson, Albers and Kirama argued that marine protected areas in poor countries can only
contribute to sustainability if management induces changes in resource-dependent
households’ incentives to fish. Park managers in the Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine
Park (MBREMP), in Tanzania, are using a combination of strategies for a sustainable
harvesting regime and developing alternative or supplementary income, generating activities
for people who traditionally depend on the marine resources of the park (Robinson et al.,
2014). In MBREMP, the incentives offered with alternate income generating activities had
little success, as the alternate income was not sufficient to offset the loss of income from
fishing (Robinson et al., 2014).
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2.14. Support for Small-Scale Fishers
In South Africa, the fishing industry is managed by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries. Some of their responsibility is to conduct community outreach programmes
and events, undertake situational analysis for each respective area and establish community
forums (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014).
Some local communities, like the Gulf of Maine and Monhengan Island, provide affordable
housing for fishers and maintain coastal fishing communities (Steneck et al., 2011).
2.15. Job Changes among Fishers
Fish stocks throughout the world are becoming depleted. In order to ensure that fishers are
able to continue to make a living and not fall further into poverty, fishers must be able to
move into other jobs (Isaacs, 2012; Pita, Dickey, Pierce, Mente, & Theodossiou, 2010).
Livelihood is key in fishery dependent communities to cope with poverty and vulnerability
(Isaacs, 2012).
In Europe, fishers have incentives to move to other jobs, in order to protect the marine areas
and allow fish stocks to recover (Pita et al., 2010). The incentives take the form of
compensation to fishers for the lack of full time employment and subsidies for labour
diversification (Pita et al., 2010). The compensation is for fishers with at least five years’
fishing experience (Pita et al., 2010).
On Monhegan Island, fishers diversify their livelihood by having a Winter-only fishing season
and in Summer augment their income by exploiting the Summer tourist trade. This allows the
community to better exploit local and international markets. The community can afford to do
this, as they have exclusive fishing rights (Steneck et al., 2011).
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2.16. Summary
The ocean is an open access common-pool resource and while progress has been made
over the years to protect the species and protect the fishing communities along the sea, a lot
still needs to be done. The UN has declared 200 nautical miles around the coastal areas as
protected areas.
Different fishing management models have been used over the years to manage the industry
but there is still no one model that is commonly suited to management of the industry for the
small-scale fishers. Some of the models used are individually transferable quotas, nontransferable quotas, co-management system and community management system.
The individually transferable quota system, used in many parts of the world, disadvantages
many small-scale fishers as the amount of fishers allowed to harvest fish reduces. This
negatively impacts on the social aspects of the fishing communities and leads to mistrust in
the communities.
The literature has revealed that government has to engage communities when they are
setting policies, as the communities understand the environment in which the harvest for
fish.
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Chapter 3: Research Question
The literature discussed in Chapter 2 relates to the impact of the management of the
common-pool resources and how this management can lead to the tragedy of the commons,
whereby the commons become extinct or unusable (Hardin, 1968).
Because of the limited resources in the form of the fish stock and the ocean being a
common-pool resource, the impact of the management of the fishing industry on the lives of
the small-scale fishers is looked at, as well as which institutional model will be best suited to
manage the common-pool resource.
3.1. The Economic Viability of Fishing for the Small-Scale Fishers
The economic viability of fishing for the small-scale fishers is confirmed through the research
question which follows.
3.1.1. Research Question 1
Is it economically viable for small-scale fishers to continue to fish?
This research question answers the question as to whether small-scale fishers can make a
living from their fishing activities. It also answers the question of whether the small-scale
fishers would seek alternative work opportunities if it became available.
Currently the small-scale fishers live in poverty and remaining in the fishing industry may not
be the answer for the fishers to move out of poverty. The common-pool resource may not be
large enough to allow everyone to fish and earn a living from it.
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3.2. Management of the Common-Pool Resource
Previous research has looked at how the fishing industry is managed in various parts of the
world. Research done by Ostrom looked at the management of common-pool resource
management by communities themselves. The following research questions look at how
best to manage the common-pool resource for the benefit of small-scale fishers.
3.2.1. Research Question 2
Would small-scale fishers be able to manage the common-pool resource themselves,
rather than the government managing it through the quota system?
Research question 2 answers the question as to whether the small-scale fishers should or
should not manage the common-pool resource themselves and why. It also answers the
question as to whether the small-scale fishers want to manage the common-pool resource
themselves.
Small-scale fisher may want to manage the common-pool themselves but may not know
how. This would make it difficult for them to manage the common-pool resource better than
the government. There may also be social fundamentals that do not exist in the community
which may prevent them from managing the common-pool resource.
3.2.2. Research Question 3
What institutional model will work best to manage the common-pool resource for the
benefit of small-scale fishers?
Research question 3 answers the question as to what model should be implemented to
manage the fishing industry, which is based in a common-pool resource for the benefit of
small-scale fishers, given the fact that there are small-scale fishers who would like to
continue to fish.
There are various institutional models that can be used to manage a common-pool resource
and it is important to understand which model will work in which situation.
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3.3. Summary
The research questions outlined in this chapter focus on the management of the commonpool resource and what the best way is to manage it, for the benefit of the small-scale
fishers. Furthermore, as a response to existing literature, research question 2 focuses on
whether small-scale fishers would be able to manage the common-pool resource
themselves, as a community.
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.1. The Nature of the Study
The research followed an inductive approach, as qualitative type data was collected
(Saunders, 2012). The nature of the study followed the essence of exploratory research as
the research sought to find new insights into a management model that will best benefit
small-scale fishers, while ensuring sustainability of the fish stock (Saunders, 2012). The
identification of literature on institutional models used in various parts of the world, as well as
literature on the self-management of common-pool resources, formed the basis of the
exploratory research, through which interviews with experts, as well as with the small-scale
fishers, were conducted.
4.2. Population of Relevance
For the purpose of this research project, the population was identified as small-scale fishers
in the Western Cape, who are considered a small-scale fisher. These fishers need not have
applied for a quota. The sample included those who applied for a quota to fish and who
either received a quota, or whose application for a quota was declined, as well as those who
did not apply for a quota but are fishing anyway
The identification of these fishers would lead to a greater understanding as to how the smallscale fishing industry operates and the effect of having a quota has on their livelihood.
Furthermore, the identification of small-scale fishers, whose application for a quota was
declined, would lead to a greater understanding on the impact of not being able fish, on the
livelihood of the fishers, as well as the community in which the fishers lives.
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© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
4.3. Sampling Method and Size
While a complete list of fishers was available, in respect of those who were successful in
their application for quotas and those who were unsuccessful, contact details were however
not available. The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries do not supply contact
details of fishers. Probability sampling was therefore not possible. Non-probability sampling
was therefore used to make a logical generalisation of the population (Saunders, 2012).
Non-probability sampling can be conducted using a variety of sampling techniques, including
quota, purposive, snowball, self-selection and convenience sampling (Saunders, 2012).
Snowball sampling was identified as the most suitable method for the report. This was due to
the researcher requiring to be put into contact with fishers who would be interested in
participating in the research.
The sample size was 29 small-scale fishers. The 29 fishers were made up of five who
received a quota, 20 who received interim relief and four who had not received any quota or
interim relief. Interviews with experts at the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries were also conducted. These interviews were conducted in order to gain an
understanding of how the quota process is supposed to work and how the fishing industry is
managed. Interviews with the management of large companies were not held as planned, as
the researcher was unable to conduct interviews, due to time constraints
4.4. Data Types
For the purpose of this research, qualitative data was identified, as structured interviews
were used to collect the data. Structured interviews allowed for pre-determined questions to
be asked from the interviewees in the same manner. Data collected by conducting structured
interviews is perceived to be associated with a high level of validity, due to the fact that each
member of the sample group is asked the same questions, and therefore, there are fewer
chances for the interviewee to be biased.
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Furthermore, unstructured interviews with experts were conducted in order to obtain an indepth understanding of the fishing industry. Unstructured interviews are more informal and
are used to explore a general topic in which the researcher is interested in more depth
(Saunders & Lewis, 2012).
4.5. Data Collection Process
The data collection was facilitated through structured interviews and unstructured interviews.
Unstructured interviews were conducted with experts from the Department of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, to obtain an in-depth understanding of the fishing industry and their
views on the small-scale fishing industry and how the quota system operates. Structured
interviews were conducted with the small-scale fisher, in order to recommend a
management model which could be used for the management of the small-scale fishing
industry.
All the interviews were recorded as well as questionnaires completed. The researcher had to
complete the questionnaire self as this made it easier for the interviewee to respond to
questions and provide information to the researcher. The recordings were done in order to
allow the researcher to refer back to it, if there were incomplete information on the
completed questionnaires.
4.5.1. Unstructured Interviews
Unstructured interviews were held with experts from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, in order to gain an in-depth understanding of how the fishing industry
operates and how the quota system works.
The information gathered was used to support the conclusions on which a management
model, if any, should be used, to manage the small-scale fishing industry.
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4.5.2. Structured Interviews
The second method used was a structured interview based on recent literature and
information obtained from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The
researcher also looked at other questionnaires previously done by researchers, in order to
obtain guidelines on how the questions should be asked and what questions to ask. A
questionnaire that was looked at to help the researcher set up this research questionnaire
came from the document ―Determination of Fishery and Socioeconomic Effects of SIMCA
and Local Fishing Communities and Evaluation of the Effects of Reserve Protection on Reef
Fish Size and Abundance‖ (Chen, Teh, Kuek, Hoon, & Sikim, 2012). Another questionnaire
was from the document ―Lake Huron Fish Community Questionnaire‖ (Hunt, Saunders, &
Browne, 2009).
The questions were structured and aimed at understanding the fishers’ views as to how they
feel the common-pool resource in the fishing industry should be managed. It also looked at
the economic circumstances of the fishers. The questionnaire made use of both Likert-scale
questions and open-ended questions.
The Likert-type scale was utilised in the questionnaire gathering data from the fishers in
order to obtain demographic information from them, as well as to quantify their fishing
activities and income from fishing activities.
Open-ended questions were utilised in order to prompt further information from the
interviewee in order to gather in-depth information on how they feel the small-scale fisheries
should be managed as well as the level of trust in the community. Open-ended questions
were also utilised to gather in-depth views from the fishers about the way the quotas were
granted and the process managed.
4.6. Data Analysis Approach
Four unstructured interviews were requested from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, of which two were conducted. The two interviews that were not conducted
were due to the unavailability of the experts at the department.
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60 structured interviews were requested from small-scale fishers, of which 29 were
conducted; due to time constraints. The request was made via the representative of the nongovernmental organisation Coastal Links, in the various areas. The interviews conducted
included those who had received quotas and those who had not received quotas.
4.6.1. Capturing the Data
The data was captured in Excel and also analysed using this programme. Tables were set
up using the pivot function in Excel, where sets of data are compared to each other, e.g. the
level of education versus the fisher’s chance of obtaining a quota.
Data presented in a graph format was first put into a table format, from the data captured,
using the countif function in Excel, to count the number of responses per item and to present
them graphically. Pie charts were then used to represent the gender spread, breakdown of
the number of fishers who change jobs, fairness of the quota system response, community
management of the common-pool resource, breakdown of trust, breakdown of the
percentage of boat owners and the percentage of fishers who own their fishing gear. Bar
graphs were used to graphically represent the income levels and number of days that fishers
fish.
4.6.2. Descriptive Statistic
Descriptive statistics were used to provide a general commentary regarding the outcomes of
the questionnaires. These representations were concerned with explaining and summarising
the data obtained. Emphasis was placed on these descriptive statistic due to sample being
small.
4.6.3. Qualitative Analysis
Grounded analysis was used to analyse the open-ended questions, as it provides a more
open approach (Eaterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002). Common themes were identified
and used to analyse the data. Important comments made by the small-scale fishers were
highlighted to support the results of the data.
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4.7. Validity and Reliability
Validity is a question of how far one can be sure that a test or instrument measures the
attribute that it is supposes to measure (Eaterby-Smith et al., 2002). Reliability is primary a
matter of stability and whether the same outcome would be achieved if an instrument is
administered to the same individual on different occasions (Eaterby-Smith et al., 2002),
The data collected were mostly done in groups of two or more. The data were also collected
in different areas in order to obtain the views from fishers in different settings and comparing
the results of data collected. The interviews conducted with the Saldahna Bay fishers were
conducted as one large group. The interviews being done in groups could have created
groupthink, which might have affected the outcome of the data collected. Groupthink
describes a situation in which group pressures for conformity deter the group from critically
appraising unusual, minority or unpopular views (Robbins & Judge, 2013).
4.8. Research Limitations
The research conducted in this project had the following limitations:

The research was only conducted in the Western Cape and therefore a bias could
have resulted, based on the answers given by the fishers in the Western Cape
possibly not representing the views of all fishers.

Insufficient response by the sample might have weakened the possible conclusion.
Only 29 interviews were conducted with small-scale fishers.

The fishers were Afrikaans-speaking while the interviewer was English-speaking. In
some instances an interpreter had to translate and explain what was being asked.

Some interviews were conducted in pairs or groups, as the fishers were not
comfortable being interviewed on their own. This could have weakened the results,
as the fishers might have been agreeing with each other, rather than be giving their
own views.

The fishers do not keep records of their catch and therefore the researcher could not
confirm whether their income given matches what they are harvesting.
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4.9. Research Ethics
The research report adhered to the ethical requirements for sound research as the below are
applicable:

The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Gordon Institute of
Business Science.

Full anonymity and confidentiality to all participants was guaranteed.

No Participants were named in the research project.

All information was provided voluntarily.

Participation was completely voluntary and no incentives were provided to
participants.
4.10. Summary
This chapter outlined the features of the research design applied in this report. It also
explained the logic behind the selection of specific scientific tool and techniques, as well as
the limitations such a design presented. The results of the research are noted in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Results
The previous chapter outlined the manner in which the researcher aimed to analyse and
explain the relationship between the various variables through specific measuring
instruments and methods. Chapter 5 presents the results and the findings of the research
conducted in the previous chapter.
5.1. Descriptive Analysis
The interviewed was conducted with 29 small-scale fishers and three staff members of
Coastal Links, which represents the fishers, as well as two staff members from the
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The interviews with the large commercial
fishing companies did not occur, due to the researcher having time constraints. The smallscale fishers came from Lambert’s Bay, Langebaan and Saldhana Bay; all of which are
areas on the West Coast in the Western Cape Province, in South Africa.
Some participants did not answer all questions and questions not answered were excluded
from the data analysis. The questions not answered involved two participants who did not
provide their education level, three participants who did not provide their income level. One
participant did not provide information on how they wished to manage the common-pool
resource or the level of trust in the community.
5.2. Participants Area of Residence
Figure 2 represents the number of residents of each area that participated in the research.
The majority of fishers were from Lamberts Bay, as this is an area considered a purely
fishing town. There is no other production or industrial activity in Lamberts Bay. Langebaan
and Saldahna Bay have other industries which residents can engage in to earn an income.
15 participants were from Lamberts Bay and seven each from Langebaan and Saldahna
Bay.
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© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
Figure 2: Participants Area of Residence
Area of Residence
16
14
12
10
8
Quantity
6
4
2
0
Lamberts Bay
Langebaan
Saldhanha Bay
5.3. Gender
Figure 3 illustrates that 86% of the respondents where male and 14% were female. Fishing
has been traditionally a male industry with the females remaining home to tend to the
children and home. Those females who did fish became fishers as teenagers, when the
family’s economic conditions required them to go to sea with their fathers to help harvest for
fish.
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© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
Figure 3: Gender Distribution of Participants
5.4. Education Level amongst the Small-Scale Fishers
Two fishers who received interim relief did not indicate their education level and were
excluded from Table 1 below. The results are therefore those of the 27 participants that were
interviewed. Table 1 indicates the education level of the fishers and the quota status.
Table 1: Education Levels and Quota Status
Education Level
Quota
Matric
Some High School
Some Primary School
Total
Quota Status
Interim Relieve None
2
3
2
11
1
4
5
18
Total
1
3
4
6
16
5
27
The majority of the fishers from the research conducted had not completed high school, with
16 fishers having some higher education and five fishers only having some primary
education. No fishers had completed education higher than Matric.
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Table 2: Chance of Receiving a Quota Based on Education Level
Education Level
Quota
Matric
Some High School
Some Primary School
Quota Status
Interim Relieve None
33%
50%
13%
69%
20%
80%
Total
17%
19%
0%
100%
100%
100%
The result from those interviewed showed that having completed high school had no impact
on the chances of the fishers obtaining a quota. Three out of the five fishers (60%) had not
completed Matric. Table 2 indicates that 17% of fishers with Matric had not received any
quota or interim relief, while 19% of those with some high school education did not receive
any quota or interim relief.
5.5. Tenure as a Fisher
Table 3 indicates how long fishers have been fishers. The majority of fishers interviewed had
been fishing for more than 30 years. Only one fisher was relatively new to the industry and
had been in the fishing industry for between 6-10 years.
Table 3: Tenure in Fishing Industry versus Quota Status
Quota Status
Length in Fishing
Industry
>30
26-30
21-25
16-20
11-15
6-10
Total
Quota
% Quota
Interim
21,43%
0,00%
0,00%
2
33,33%
0,00%
0,00%
5
17,24%
3
9
1
4
3
2
1
20
% Interim
None
64,29%
100,00%
100,00%
50,00%
66,67%
100,00%
68,97%
% None
Total
14,29%
0,00%
0,00%
1
16,67%
1
33,33%
0,00%
4
13,79%
2
14
1
4
6
3
1
29
% Total
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
100,00%
The data indicates that the longer a fisher is in the industry, the greater the chance that they
would obtain some form of quota, whether an actual quota or interim relief. Amongst the
fishers who were in the industry for more than 30 years, there were two fishers who did not
receive a quota. They not having received a quota had to do with the way the government
implements its policies and how it identifies who a fisher is.
38
© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
In Lamberts Bay, the government asked the community to identify who the fishers were. The
one fisher, who had been in the industry for more than 30 years that had not received a
quota, believes it was because his wife owned a shop and the community therefore turning
against him as he has an alternate source of income. The second person who did not
receive a quota is a female and she had not received a quota as her husband received a
quota. The government does not allow two related people in the same house to both have a
quota.
Fishers who did not received a quota gave the following reasons for not receiving a quota
―People who do not fish and don't go out to sea received quotas”
"Too much people who do not know how to fish got a quota”.
“Some people with quota are not using it. Government should look into those that are not
using their quota and reallocate it to those without a quota”.
The fishers who had been in the industry between 16-20 years, and received a quota, owned
more than one boat. Only three fishers interviewed owned more than one boat. The third
fisher who owned more than one boat has been in the industry more than 30 years. The
results from the interviews indicate that while tenure matters, fishers also need to possess
the determination to succeed. The two fishers who owned two or more boats and have been
in the industry for only 16-20 years have been able to rise above many fishers who had been
in the industry for longer. Education was not a factor, as the one fisher had completed
Matric, while the other fisher had not done so.
5.6. Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers
Figure 4 represents the income of the fishers. The majority of fishers earn on average R2
001 - R4 000 per month followed by R0 – R2 000. The fishers who earn higher than R4 000
are those who received a quota as shown in table 4.
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Figure 4: Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers
Breakdown of Income
14
12
10
8
Quantity
6
4
2
0
0-2000
2001-4000 4001-6000 6001-8000
>8000
Fishers who have a quota have the potential to double their income. The fishers who are
earning an income but do not hold a quota or have interim relief are fishing illegally to earn
an income. Table 4 says that there are four fishers who are fishing illegally and earning an
income.
Table 4: Income Levels based on Quota Status
5.7. Chance of Changing Jobs by the Fishers
Question 33 in the interview questionnaire attached in Appendix 1 asked fishers if they
would take on a full-time job with a company. Figure 5 indicates that 55% of fishers would
leave fishing and take on a full-time job if they were offered alternative work. The main
reason given by the fishers for wanting to change jobs is that the size of the quota is too
40
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small to live from. Most of the fishers who would not change jobs said this was due to age.
Some fishers had already reached retirement age. Figure 6 indicates that there are 11
fishers who are older than 50 years of age.
Figure 5: Breakdown of Fishers who would Change Jobs
Figure 6: Fishers Age
Fishers Age
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
21-30
31-40
41-50
+50
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5.8. Quota Process
Figure 7 indicates the split of fishers who thought the quota system was fair that those that
did not. 85% of fishers felt that the quota system was not fair. Surprisingly enough, this
feedback also came from the fishers who received quotas from the Lamberts Bay area.
Figure 7: Feedback on Fairness of the Quota System
Some of the feedback given by the fishers follows:
―Presentations were done in English”
“Government did not do what they said they will do.‖
The fishers on the West Coast of South Africa are Afrikaans-speaking. All except one of the
fishers speak Afrikaans as a first language. The one fisher who does not speak Afrikaans as
a first language speaks Xhosa. The fishers also indicated that their English is not very good
and the language used on the quota application was not easy to understand, as the level of
the language used was beyond their understanding.
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Other comments made by the fishers regarding the quota system:
“People had to get applications off the internet but they do not have computers.”
“Too much people who do not know how to fish got a quota.”
The fishers that found the quota system fair were from Langebaan and they either received a
quota or they received interim relief and felt that having receiving at least something was
better than nothing.
Most of the fishers who had not received a quota said they were not told why they were
unsuccessful while others were simply told that they were new entrants.
The government considered all the small-scale fishers as new entrants if they did not have a
quota before even if they had been fishing all their lives. Fishers had to show proof that they
were valid fishers. Obtaining proof was not easy, as fishers did not keep any official records
of their fishing activities.
One of the fishers stated, with respect to obtaining proof that he is a fisher:
―I had to obtain signatures from all previous employees. Never got it as the travel cost was
high and it was too much effort‖.
5.9. Quotas received
The small-scale fishers who received a quota initially received a quota size to harvest 750kg
of West Coast Rock Lobster. This has since been reduced to 606kg. The reduction is due to
scientists from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries determining that the
stock levels of the West Coast Rock Lobster is being depleted. They therefore reduced the
quota size for the sustainability of the species. Some of the fishers had indicated that the
scientist only came once to the area to record the level of the catch and on the results of one
day only they made the decision to reduce the quota size.
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Due to many of the small-scale fishers being unhappy about not receiving quotas, the
government granted interim relief to some small-scale fishers so that they could still fish and
earn a living. The interim relief came about due to court actions undertaken by the fishers
themselves.
Figure 8: Breakdown of Quotas Received
Breakdown of Quotas Received
25
20
15
10
5
0
Quota
Interim
None
Figure 8 shows that 20 out of the 29 small-scale fishers interviewed received interim relief.
Only five fishers interviewed had received a quota when they applied for it. Four small-scale
fishers had not received any quota or interim relief, even though they have been fishers for
many years
The researcher found that in terms of the interim relief, the government handled each area
differently. In Lamberts Bay, small-scale fishers had to form small co-operatives in order to
obtain a quota. Each person in the co-operative received a quota. In Langebaan and
Saldahna Bay the community received a quota. The size and restrictions placed on the
community quotas differed between Langebaan and Saldahna Bay.
In Lamberts Bay, each fisher in the co-operative interim quota consisted of a basket of fish
that they could harvest. The basket is made up of 138kg of West Coast Rock Lobster per
season, 420 Snoek per week, 210 Hotnots per week and 420 Mussels per week.
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A fisher indicated that they prefer to work as a co-operative rather than as an individual as
then they had support. The comment made follows:
“According to the application for Line-fish, the latest application is that we as small-scale
fishers don’t want to apply for that. Because if you are successful for Line-fish you are not
allowed catch anything else. While in the policy we are talking about a basket of rights. You
can to catch what-ever you can get in your waters. But on that, if you apply for crayfish you
can only catch crayfish. Like in the case of the guys with the 606 kg’s. You are not allowed to
go for Line-fish. If the Crayfish is good in our area it took them only 5 days, 6 days to catch
their quota and then they are sitting for the rest the year doing nothing. And that is the
reason we do not want to go onto that sector. We prefer to be part of the small-scale policy.”
Another comment made about being in a co-operative:
“If you operate alone, individual, it is easy for the sharks to target you. That is why we prefer
to work communal. Then we are more protected but your rights as an individual are
protected in that communal right.”
In Saldanha Bay the community received 4.3 tons of West Coast Rock Lobster. This they
split equally amongst the fishers that are entitled to fish. Those who were entitled to fish and
share the quota were decided by government. There are currently 37 small-scale fishers
who were given the right to fish in Saldanha Bay. Pensioners were not given a right to fish by
the government, even if they had fished their whole lives, as the government viewed the
government pension that they received as an income.
The government has however placed restrictions on the fishing activity of the fishers from
Saldanha Bay. The fishers are only allowed to fish for West Coast Lobster from Sunrise until
15:00. This Rock Lobster is however a fish that is better caught at night. By the fishers being
made to fish during daylight for West Coast Rock Lobster it makes harvesting for the species
hard on the fishers. In their quota they further received Snoek, Yellow Tail, White Stumps
and Tuna, with no restrictions to the amount that they can harvest. The Tuna is however a
fish that they cannot harvest, as their boats are too small to reach the Tuna.
45
© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
In Langebaan the community received a quota of 3 726kg of West Coast Rock Lobster for
the season. Other fish included in the quota are 420 Snoek per week per person and 240
Hotnots fish. There are 27 small-scale fishers included in the community quota. The
community is only allowed to have three boats at a time on the Lagoon to fish. They
therefore have not split the actual quota but split the proceeds of the catch amongst the
fishers as fish harvested per day can vary. The community also encourages the best fishers
to go out to sea to fish. This means that fishers can earn an income without going out to sea
to harvest fish but live off the activities of others.
5.10. Management of the Common-Pool Resource
Participants that were interviewed were asked if they believed that the community should
manage the common-pool resource themselves, rather than through a formal quota system.
75% of participants indicated that they would like to manage the common-pool resource
themselves, as is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Percentage Breakdown of Community Management of CPR
Fishers indicated that they would like to be given the opportunity to manage the commonpool resource themselves. They also believed that they would be able to do a better job than
46
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the government as they understood the area. The fishers are also aware of sustainability
and would implement a rotation programme so as to protect the species.
The responses between areas had however varied as per Table 5 below. One participant in
the interviews did not give his view as to how he would like the common-pool resource to be
managed and was excluded from the results below.
Table 5: Breakdown per Area on Responses to Community Management of the CPR
Location
No
Lamberts Bay
Langebaan
Saldhanha Bay
Total
Responses
Yes
Total
6
9
1
5
7
7
21
15
6
7
28
The results from Table 5 shows that the majority of fishers from Langebaan would like to
manage the common-pool resource themselves. In Lamberts Bay there was about a 50%
split between those who agreed to the community managing the common-pool resource
themselves and those who disagreed. Everyone in Saldanha Bay responded ―Yes‖ to the
community managing the common-pool resource themselves.
The reasons given by the fishers in Langebaan for managing the CPR themselves are the
following:

The community managed the CPR, the Lagoon, themselves, before.

They had a system in place, referring to where they would fish and who was allowed
to fish.

They used to take the sustainability of the resource into account by rotating where
they fished as well as only fishing from Sunday evening to Thursday evening, thus
giving the resource a break on Fridays and Saturdays.

The fishers used to monitor each other’s fishing behaviour and initiate punishment for
those who did not follow the rules.

Punishment involved not being allowed to fish for a few days.
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Reasons given by the fishers from Lamberts Bay for wanting to manage the CPR is that they
believe that they can do it and would like to be given the opportunity to manage the CPR
themselves. One of the fishers stated “I feel that the fishers can manage the CPR better than
the government, once they sort out their domestic issues”.
The reason given by the fishers of Lamberts Bay not wanting a community management
system was:

They would like a co-management system.

There is lack of trust amongst the fishers in the community.

Some fishers have ―one-track minds‖ and will not be able to manage the CPR.

The loan sharks have an effect on the way the community is behaving
5.11. Trust
Figure 10 indicates that 57% of fishers said that there is no trust or a low level of trust in the
community. 35% of fishers said that the level of trust amongst the fishers is good. The
majority of fishers who said that the trust is good in the community are from Saldahna Bay.
The results could have been affected by the fact that the interview in Saldahna Bay was a
group interview.
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Figure 10: Trust amongst Fishers
The fishers had indicated that trust existed before but the introduction of the quota system
split the group. This was because some received quotas whilst others did not, even though
they all fished for many years and were all except one born and raised in the area that they
fished.
Some of the quotes made by the fishers regarding trust in the community are:
“Quota system split community.”
“People who know nothing about fishing like doctors, lawyers and teachers got quotas”
“Fishers are already split between the commercial and interim fishers. Commercial don’t
trust interim. Government caused problem”
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5.12. Fishing Operations of the Small-Scale Fishers
5.12.1.
Fishing Boats
Only 52% of small-scale fishers who was interviewed have their own boat, as shown in
Figure 11. These boats had an average size of 4.1 metres. Twelve co-operatives in the
Lamberts Bay area received fishing boats from the Department of Trade and Industry, in
order to help the fishers out economically. Among the fishers who own their own boats, three
owned more than one fishing boat. One co-operative was given two boats by the
Department of Trade and Industry.
Figure 11: Breakdown of Boat Owners
The fishers usually go out to sea in pairs. Going as a pair helps with their safety as they can
help each other if something tragic or unforeseen should happen, while they are out at sea.
This is also a reason why all the fishers do not own their own boat.
The boats that the fishers use have motors, which help them get to the fishing grounds more
quickly. However, the motors use 25 litres of petrol per fishing trip. This cost of the fuel is the
largest expense of the fisher, due to the high petrol price.
50
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All the fishers, except one co-operative in the Lamberts Bay area, do not own their own
transport. The fishers therefore incur further cost by having to pay a person with a vehicle to
transport their boats to the harbour.
A remark made by one of the fishers as to why they do not all have their own boats:
“Unfortunately, each fisher cannot have their own boat. Imagine if each person had their own
boat, who would be doing the fishing? It cannot happen that each person can have a boat
and will never happen.‖
5.12.2.
Fishing Gear
Figure 12 shows the breakdown of the fishers who own their own fishing gear. 86% of the
fishers own their own fishing gear. The 14% who do not own their fishing gear borrow from
friends when they go out to fish.
Figure 12: Percentage of Fishers who own their own Fishing Gear
The fishers use traditional fishing methods to catch the stock. However, each area makes
use of different fishing gear, due to the type of stock that is harvested. In the Lamberts Bay
the fishers use line and hook to harvest line fish and ring nets to catch West Coast Rock
Lobster. Appendix 2 shows a picture of the traditional ring-nets that the fishers use to
harvest for Rock Lobster. Appendix 3 shows a picture of the nets that the large commercial
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fishers use to harvest for Rock Lobster. In Langebaan the fishers use nets to fish in
Langebaan Lagoon and in Saldahna Bay the fishers make use of line and hooks.
5.12.3.
Average Days Fishing Days
Weather conditions play a role in whether the small-scale fishers go out to sea to fish or not.
The fishers do not go out to sea in bad weather and rough seas. The majority of fishers go
out to sea to fish, as per Figure 13, on average between 147 and 219 days a year. The next
group averages between 220 and 292 fishing days.
Figure 13: Number of Fishing Days
The fishers who go out more than 292 days are fishers that attempt to fish every day, even
when the weather is not very favourable to fish. Those fishers are often the only ones fishing
on the sea, risking their lives in order to earn an income.
One of the fishers who only fish between 0 and 73 days is a female fisher from Lamberts
Bay, who only fishes during Lobster season. The other fishers who only fish between 0 to 73
days are pensioners who seldom go out to fish. They fish as they require extra income to
sustain themselves. All the fishers working only 0 to 73 days hold an interim relief quota.
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5.13. Summary
In this chapter the results were presented and discussed. A significant result of the findings
was that the government implementation of the quota system led to mistrust in the
community. The results also indicate that tenure matters more than education. The results
also highlighted the level of the fishers dissatisfaction with the way the quota process were
managed
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Chapter 6: Discussion of Results
This chapter discuss the results analysed in Chapter 5 in terms of the research questions
and in terms of the literature review.
6.1. Findings - Is it economically viable for small-scale fishers to
continue to fish?
In discussing the findings of Research Question One, regarding whether it is economically
viable for small-scale fishers to continue to fish, the following will be looked at: income levels
of small-scale fishers, the fishers changing jobs. the quotas received and the conditions for
economic prosperity
6.1.1. Income Levels of Small-Scale Fishers (Question 8)

What is your monthly gross income?
R0 – R2000
R2001 – R4000
R4001 – R6000
R6001 – R8000
R8000>
Figure 4 in Chapter 5 says that the maximum amount that any fishers earned was between
R4001 and R6 000. The majority of fishers earn between R2 001 and R4 000. The medium
salary of South African employees in 2010 was R2 800 per month (Statistics South Africa,
2010). The small-scale fishers in 2014 have a medium salary of between R2001 –R4000. As
income ranges was used, the exact medium of the income of the small-scale fishers could
not be determined, but only the range. The minimum living wage in South Africa is R5 000
(Chirwa, 2014). The small-scale fishers therefore earn below the minimum living wage.
The fishers had indicated that the income that they earn is not a liveable income. Based on
the living wage in South Africa, this confirms the small-scale fishers’s views that the income
they earn from their fishing activities is not a living wage. The small-scale fishers therefore
live in poverty, resulting in them not being able to afford the necessary equipment to improve
their fishing activities, like owning their own boats. As can be seen in Figure 11 in Chapter 5,
only 52% of fishers own their own boat. This then impacts further on their fishing activities,
together with the size of the quota received.
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The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) has found that smallscale fishers, relative to other players in the value chain, are receiving the least economic
benefits in terms of money for their products (Bjorndal et al., 2014). Research conducted has
also found that small-scale fishers are not able to compete with more powerful, actors in the
context of the resource struggles (Leach et al., 1999). This research highlights the struggles
of the small-scale fishers as can be seen from their income. The small-scale fishers with the
quotas, as part of the conditions of their quota, have to sell their Lobster to the large
commercial companies yet they remain in poverty.
6.1.2. Changing jobs by the fishers (Question 33)

If you were offered a full time job from a large company would you accept the
job offer rather than fish yourself and why?
This question was asked to gauge the likelihood of fishers accepting alternate forms of work
and the reasons for this. Figure 5 in Chapter 5 says that 55% of fishers would leave fishing
and take on other work, if the opportunity was there. This is due to the fishers earning below
the minimum wage. Recent research has been done on the need for fishers to move into
other jobs and not fall further into poverty. In coastal Brazilian villages, they face similar
economic pressure to change their lifestyle and either adapt their livelihoods to other
sources of income or suffer increased poverty (Isaacs, 2011). The small-scale fishers in
South Africa therefore understand the need to find alternate forms of income but finding
alternate forms of income is a challenge, due to the high unemployment rate in South Africa.
In Europe, fishers are incentivised to move into other jobs, in order to protect the marine
areas and allow fish stocks to recover (Pita et al., 2010). The incentives take the form of
compensation to fishers for the lack of full time employment and subsidies for diversification
(Pita et al., 2010). In South Africa, there are no incentives provided for fishers to move to
other jobs. The government has instead implemented a quota system, to provide a legal
means for small-scale fishers to earn an income on the sea, but this has negatively affected
the social norms of the community. The quota received is not sufficiently large in order for
the small-scale fishers to earn a liveable income and therefore they continue to live in
poverty.
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In an area like Lamberts Bay there exists no industry. The only resource available to the
fishers to earn an income is from the sea and selling the fish, without any further processing
happening. The only fish processing plant that was in the area and that was owned by
Oceana has been converted to produce potato French fries, as part of Oceana’s social
responsibility programme (Oceana Group, 2012). This was to help offset the loss of jobs
when the fish processing plant closed.
The fishers have indicated that they would like to be given training on how to run a business,
as they would like to own their own fish processing plant; whereby the fish can be further
processed and value added to it before being sold. This will allow them to earn a higher
income.
Langebaan is becoming a huge tourist attraction area as well as an ideal retirement area for
retirees. The West Coast National Park also borders Langebaan, which attracts both local
and foreign visitors to the area during the flower season. These developments are providing
alternate sources of income for the fishers of the area, but the jobs are limited.
It is also important that the incentives given to small-scale fishers be sufficient to offset the
loss of income from not fishing. In MBREMP the incentive offered for alternate income
generating activities had little success, as the alternate income was not sufficient to offset
the loss of income from fishing (Robinson et al., 2014). This lead to the fishers continuing to
fish to earn an income.
Along the West Coast there have been no incentives or alternative jobs provided to the
fishers; leaving many fishers to either become poachers or to take the government to court,
in order to receive a quota.
6.1.3. Quotas Received (Question 21 and 22)

Did you receive a quota?

If no, did you receive interim relief?
Yes
Yes
No
No
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A breakdown of those who received quotas can be found in Figure 8 in Chapter 5. Five
small-scale fishers received a quota, 20 received interim relief and four received no quota or
interim relief. On deciding on the quota size the government set a total allowable catch limit.
In terms of the quotas received, it is clear that the Government is not following their own
policies and that there is lots of perceived unfairness in the system. Due to the small-scale
fishers not receiving quotas, court action was taken against the Department of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries. The result of the court action is that the government had to draw up
a small-scale policy. Due to the considerable time that it is taking the government to draw up
the small-scale fishing policy, the fishers were given interim relief in order to continue to fish
and earn an income. There were still many fishers left out and who did not receive an
interim relief. The latest Marine Living Resource Bill was amended to include the small-scale
fishers (The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013).
6.1.4. Conditions for Economic Prosperity
In order for there to be economic prosperity, government must have policy stability. In the
literature on Competitive Advantage of Nations it was stated that there are four broad
attributes that a nation has to have, in order to be successful. They are factor conditions,
demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry
(Porter, 1990).
In assessing the results in terms of the diamond of national competitiveness the following
was found:

Factor conditions: the small-scale fishers are skilled in fishing but do not possess
other skills that would allow them to move into other industries. Infrastructure is poor.
The government tried to help the small-scale fishers out by installing large cold
storage freezers at the harbours in order for the fishers to store their catch and sell it
when the market conditions are favourable. But after two years the containers are still
not working, as no electricity has been connected to the freezers in order for them to
work. Picture in Appendix 4. The reasons for no electricity being installed to date are
due to government departments not working together and their lack of alignment.
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Also significant is the number of government departments in South Africa. To put
things into perspective, the harbours are managed by the Department of Public
Works, the freezers were installed by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries as part of the social upliftment programmes, the Department of Trade and
Industry is also responsible for proving assistance to small businesses in need of
financial assistance. The problem now is who is going pay for the electricity for the
freezers? After two years this has not yet been resolved.

Demand Conditions: fish and fish products in South Africa are not in huge demand,
as they are becoming more expensive and scarce. The world average consumption
of fish is 16kg per person annually. while in South Africa it is only 1.6kg (Ferreira,
2013). In order for there to be competitiveness, there has to be a local demand for a
company’s products.

Related and Supporting Industries: assessing the small-scale fishing industry, it
appears they do not have the facilities to process the fish products further and
provide products for the international market. They therefore cannot compete with the
large companies. Related and supporting industries are thus poor in South Africa.
Small-scale fishers do not have access to marketing channels in order to themselves
sell the products on a large scale.

Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry: there are currently inconsistencies in how
the government implements its policies. The research findings also highlighted that
the government is not following the policies and procedures that it had laid out. For
example, they said that the applications for quotas must be available in the language
that the people speak. However, in some areas the applications were only available
in English even though the fishers are Afrikaans-speaking, thereby making it difficult
for the fishers to complete the applications. The government is also treating every
area differently when it comes to the small-scale fishing industry. This makes it
difficult for the fishers to know what the right policy is. It also makes it difficult for all
fishing communities to form one group when they have grievances that they would
like to address with the government, as each area is being treated differently. The
researcher found that in Lamberts Bay the fishers had to form co-operatives to
receive an interim relief quota, while in Saldahna Bay and Langebaan the community
received a quota. The government did not know who the small-scale fishers were
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when they handed out the quotas, so a lot of ―fishers‖, who are in fact not fishers,
received quotas.
6.2. Findings - Would small-scale fishers be able to manage the
common-pool resource themselves, rather than the government
managing it through the quota system?
In answering the research question on whether small-scale fishers would be able to manage
the common-pool resource themselves the researcher would discuss the following based on
the findings in Chapter 5 – trust, willingness by the community to manage the CPR
themselves and requirements for a successful and sustainable self-management system.
6.2.1. Trust (Question 37)

What is the level of trust amongst fishers?
As per Figure 10, the majority of fishers feel that trust amongst the fishers is low or does not
exist. Literature by Dixit on the issue of property rights states that destructive behaviour
occurs because individuals will fear that others will deprive them of the fruits of their labours
(Dixit, 2009). The researcher found that the trust that once existed amongst the small-scale
fishers no longer exists.
The reason given by the fishers is that the quota system implemented by the government
split the community, as some fishers received the quota and others did not. Those who
received the quota feel that they are more entitled to fish than those who have not received a
quota. Those who did not receive the quota are suspicious of those who did receive it and
wonder why they received the quota. Comments made by some of the fishers are:
“Quota system split community”.
“People who know nothing about fishing, like doctors, lawyers and teachers, got quotas”
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Elinor Ostrom has found in her research that for successful sustainable self-management of
the common-pool resource, extensive norms have evolved that define proper behaviour. A
reputation for keeping promises, honest dealings and reliability is a valuable asset (Ostrom,
2011).
6.2.2. Willingness by the Small-Scale Fishers to Manage the CPR (Question 34)

Should local small-scale fishers manage the harvest areas themselves rather than be
managed by government through the quota system?
Figure 9 says that 75% of the fishers would like to manage the common-pool resource
themselves and do not want the government to manage it. The fishers who do not want to
manage the common-pool resource self would like a co-management system between the
government and the community.
Research done on community management of the common-pool resource has found that
communities can manage the common-pool resource themselves, in some cases better than
the government can. In Maine it can be seen that the local management and conservation of
the Lobster fishing industry can be effective on a relative spatial scale (Steneck et al., 2011).
Before implementing a co-management system or community management system,
institutions first need to understand the type of fish that is being harvested in an area, as
migrating fish are not easy for communities to monitor.
6.2.3. Requirements for a successful and sustainable self-management
system
Research conducted by Ostrom found that successful and sustainable self-management
systems of the common-pool resource have seven design principles, namely clearly defined
boundaries, congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions,
collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution
mechanism and minimal recognition of rights to organise (Ostrom, 2011).
In many parts of the world, small-scale fishers have proven that they are able to manage the
stock levels successfully and in many instances better than government institutions. In Lake
Tana fishers want control during the spawning period, in order to protect the stock levels and
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the sustainability of the fish (Agimass & Mekonnen, 2011). Other areas that have a
successful community management system are the Turtle Island of The Philippines,
Newfoundland and Maine in Canada (Ostrom, 2008).
Small-scale fishers were asked how they would manage the common-pool resource
themselves (Question 36) to determine if they would be able to do this and if they know what
would be involved in the management.
In evaluating whether the communities along the West Coast possess those principles,
information provided by the small-scale fishers in Langebaan would suggest that they did
possess these principles necessary for a successful and sustainable self-management
system, before the current quota system. In answering Question 36 of the questionnaire in
Appendix 1, the fishers provided the information below, on how they would manage the
common-pool resource. They also indicated that this is how they managed the common-pool
before the quota system was introduced.

They had a system in place as to where they would fish and who was allowed to fish.

They used to take sustainability of the resource into account by rotating where they
fish as well as only fishing from Sunday evening to Thursday evening, giving the
resource a break on Fridays and Saturdays.

The fishers use to monitor each other’s fishing behaviour and punish those who do
not follow the rules.

Punishment involved not allowing those fishers to fish for a few days
Small-scale fishers therefore do possess the necessary knowledge and the communities do
have the attributes of the design principles, for a successful community management system
to be implemented.
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6.3. Findings - What institutional model will work best to manage
the common-pool resource for the benefit of small-scale fishers?
The preference of society, especially the small-scale fishers, needs to be taken into
consideration when implementing the fishery regulations and investment on a sustainable
utilisation of resources (Agimass & Mekonnen, 2011). In answering Question 3 the following
would be looked at – co-management system versus a community management system and
the relevance of the individual transferable quota system.
6.3.1. Co-Management System versus a Community Management System
Figure 9 says that 75% of the community would like to manage the common-pool resource
themselves. The 25% who said ―No‖ to a community management system would like a comanagement system. Research in the social sciences has called into question the traditional
role of the government as a manager, and brings to the forefront the role of local institutions
in protecting ecosystems and local access privileges (Schreiber, 2001).
A co-management system involves a decentralised system where the responsibilities move
from national government departments to newly formed local institutions that use rights, as
well as passing the monitoring and surveillance responsibilities to the fishing communities
(Isaacs, 2012).
A community management system involves the community managing the common-pool
resource without the interference of government institutions.
Before an institution decides on whether to have a co-management system or a community
based system it is important to understand the following:

The type of fish that the community harvest.

The existence of norms that define ―proper‖ behaviour.
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6.3.1.1. Type of Fish the Community Harvest
There are two types of the fish, those that migrate and those that stay stationary in an area.
Co-management systems may be able to work well for the fish that remain stationary in
certain areas but the system has been criticised for its inability to monitor the stock levels of
migrating fish stock (Schreiber, 2001). The main fish harvested by the fishing communities
that participated in this research was West Coast Rock Lobster. This is a high value fish
stock. West Coast Rock Lobster is a fish that remains in a specific area. All the areas also
harvest fish that is specific to that area and remain stationary, like Hotnot in Lamberts Bay
and Saldahna Bay and Harders in Langebaan.
For a few weeks in a year, the small-scale fishers supplement their income with Snoek,
which is a migrating fish. Their main income is however from non-migrating fish. A comanagement system would therefore work in these fishing communities as well as a
community management system based on the fish they harvest.
6.3.1.2. The Existence of Norms that Define Proper Behaviour
In areas where there has been successful community management of the common-pool
resources, there is the existence of extensive norms that have evolved over time and which
define ―proper‖ behaviour (Ostrom, 2011). In these areas, it is also important for individuals
to maintain their reputations as reliable members of the community (Ostrom, 2011). In the
Turtle Island of The Philippines they had a very successful local system which evolved over
decades and saw the percentage of eggs conserved steadily rise from the mid-1980s to the
1990s, without major conflict between participants (Ostrom, 2008).
The community in all areas still use traditional methods of harvesting fish. Appendix 2 shows
the traditional ring-nets that are that are used by the small-scale fishers to harvest Lobster.
Appendix 3 shows the cages that are used by the large commercial fishers to harvest
Lobster. The traditional ring-nets are more sustainable, as only Lobster can be trapped in
them. The large cages used by the commercial fishing companies trap other species of fish
as well. The small–scale fishers continuing to use the traditional methods of fish indicates
that they take sustainability of the fish stock into account and can be relied upon to protect
the stock.
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In Langebaan it has always been a norm of the community to only fish from Sunday
evenings to Thursday evenings. The fishers had always adhered to this. The reason given
for the fishers not fishing every day is to allow the stock to recover, allow them a break and
use the time that they are not fishing to fix their nets.
6.3.1.3. Participants Area of Residence and Area where they Fish (Question 15 and
16)


Are you originally from this area?
Which fishing areas do you fish in?
All fishers interviewed live and fish in the area where they were born and raised,except for
one participant that was born in an area nearby to where he currently lives. Small-scale
fishers therefore tend to remain in the area where they were born, building relationships with
the community and sharing in similar norms.
To increase their income, some fishers move outside their immediate area of fishing. The
fishers in Langebaan move their fishing activities to St Helena Bay, when Snoek fish arrives
in the area. St Helena Bay is 45 kilometres away from Langebaan and fishers do not move
beyond this.
The fishers in Lamberts Bay stay within the fishing areas from Elands Bay to Doring Bay, an
82 kilometre distance, with Lamberts Bay being in the middle of the two areas.
The main reason why the small-scale fishers do not move beyond this area is the cost
involved in travelling. The small-scale fishers’s boats are also small and can travel only
limited distances. The small-scale fishers have also built relationships in the area that they
fish and understand what the norms of the area are. Each area uses a different method of
fishing and fishers therefore already have an established method of fishing.
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6.3.2. Relevance of the Individual Transferable Quota System
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing currently uses an individual transferable
quota system. Before the ITQs are granted, the government first have to decide on the total
allowable catch.
The relevance of the ITQ system and the impact it has had on the
community has to be looked at, as research has found that the ITQs have negative social
impacts on the community (Schreiber, 2001).
6.3.1.4. Total Allowable Catch
The results found that over time the total allowable catch (TAC) for Lobster has been
declining.
When
the
TAC
reduces,
the
quotas
that
the
fishers
hold
are
adjusted to fit in with the TAC. West Coast Rock Lobster is a valuable resource and the main
income for the fishers who hold quotas. The fishers were initially granted 750kg of West
Coast Rock Lobster. This has been reduced to 606kg for the past season. Literature by
Steneck has indicated that when there is a reliance on a few high valuable resources, this
increases the risk of a gilded trap occurring (Steneck et al., 2011). It is therefore important
for the institutions to monitor the stock level of species and adjust the TAC accordingly.
6.3.1.5. The Individual Transferable Quota System
Figure 8 says that only five small-scale fishers received a quota out of the 29 interviewed.
This is only 17%of small-scale fishers receiving an initial quota and means to legally earn an
income.
As previously indicated, the quota system has split the community and caused members of
the community in many areas not to trust one other. Previous research has found that the
ITQ system has had positive economic impacts, but concerns have been raised about their
social impact, especially in terms of fairness and equity, as the ITQ is usually concentrated
in the hands of a few people (Branch, 2009). In South Africa the ITQ system did increase the
wealth of the fishers for those who have a quota as per figure 4 in Chapter 5 but has had the
negative impact noted in previous research.
Research has also found that where small-scale fishers cannot afford to buy an ITQ and
have to lease it, their income has been cut by 40 -50%. This has had profound implications
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for the social and economic life of the fishing communities (Schreiber, 2001). In South Africa
the latest application fees for a quota was R500 per application. The small-scale fishers also
had to obtain a medical certificate in order to confirm that they are in good health. Some
fishers could not afford these fees and did not apply, leaving them with no income.
While there are many negatives with regard to the ITQ system, there is a place for it. The
ITQ system has also been implemented successfully in many countries. Countries where the
ITQ has been successfully implemented are New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, Canada and
Namibia (Beddington et al., 2007). The ITQ system allows for fishing to happen all year
round, as there is not a race by fishers to harvest the TAC as soon as possible (Branch,
2009).
In South Africa, the TAC in respect of the West Coast Lobster is small and in times when
there is a good season, the Lobster can be caught within a few days. This leaves the smallscale fishers with nothing to do for the remainder of the season.
It is therefore important that while the ITQ system allows for fishing to occur all year round, it
should be sufficiently large for this to occur.
6.4. Chapter Summary
In this chapter the results illustrated in Chapter 5 were discussed comprehensively, in line
with the research questions outlined in Chapter 3. A summary of the results, implications for
institutions and recommendations for future research are presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings presented in Chapter 5 and discussed in
Chapter 6. The implications of these findings for government institutions and small-scale
fishers are postulated, while suggestions for future research are also offered. Finally a
concluding note is presented by the researcher.
7.1. Summary of Findings
A significant finding was that with the government’s good intentions of correcting the past
equalities by allocating quotas, they caused a split in the community. As a result of the split
in the community, trust no longer exists in most fishing communities as fishers have become
suspicious of each other. Fishers with a quota now have an entitlement attitude, which they
did not have in the past. Due to the lack of trust, while the community would like to manage
the common-pool resource themselves, this would not be possible. Trust is an important
component in the self-management of common-pool resources by communities.
Education had no significant influence on whether a fisher received a quota or not, but
tenure plays a role in whether they receive a quota. The researcher found that while tenure
played a role in a fisher receiving a quota, the fisher can succeed and investing in fishing
equipment like fishing boats can help him overcome tenure and allow the fisher to obtain a
quota.
7.1.1. Chance of Obtaining a Quota
While analysing the chance of a small-scale fisher receiving a quota, the level of education
of the fisher played no significant role in obtaining a quota. Initially, the ITQs were based on
past fishing history (Branch, 2009). Tenure therefore plays a role in the fisher obtaining a
quota. All except one fisher was born in the area where they now reside and fish and
therefore place of residence and birth place has no influence on whether a fisher receives a
quota or not.
67
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The new institutional economics (NIE) theory states that the basic functions of the state are
to assure property rights, enforce compliance with contracts, reduce transaction cost,
increase wealth, and encourage growth (Castellano & García-Quero, 2012). Based on the
finding it appears that the South Africa Government is following the institutional political
economy which professes that the behaviour and motivation of public figures are subject to
modification (Castellano & García-Quero, 2012).
7.1.2. Economic Conditions of the Small-Scale Fishers
The income that the small-scale fishers earn is below the minimum living wage. Small-scale
fishers therefore live in poverty. In order for small-scale fishers to improve their living
conditions, they need to be able to move to other industries (Isaacs, 2012; Pita et al., 2010).
Currently, many small-scale fishers cannot afford to purchase their boats or to purchase
vehicles for transporting the boats to the sea. It is therefore important for government to
provide assistance to the small-scale fishers. Government also has to provide incentives to
small-scale fishers to move into other industries. This will help the small scale-fisher move
out of poverty while improving sustainability of the fish stock.
7.1.3. Management of the Common-Pool Resource
In implementing management models for common-pool resources it is important that the
institution implementing the management model understand the area, the people, the current
operations and the social fabric of the area. Due to a lack of knowledge on the operations of
the community by the government, the ITQ system was implemented in South Africa. The
ITQ system has resulted in a split in the fishing communities that once stood together. Trust
that once existed no longer exists.
A co-management system will work best in situations where the lack of trust amongst fishers
and the lack of knowledge by the government institutions on how the fishing industry needs
to operate are factors. An ITQ system will also not work where the government is unable to
determine who the real small-scale fishers are. Where the government cannot determine
who the real small-scale fishers are, a situation will occur as in the current situation, where
people who are now fishers but have never been involved in fishing have been given a quota
68
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at the expense of the true small-scale fisher. This has left many small-scale fishers without a
means to legally earn an income, resulting in many fishers becoming poachers to survive.
7.2. Implications for Institutions
When deciding which model to use to manage the common-pool resource, government
institutions can use the model in Figure 14 to help them decide which model would be best
suited for an area. Each common-pool area should be treated differently and independently
of the next area, as each area will have different characteristics that define it.
Trust is a key factor in the management of common-pool resources and understanding the
trust that exists in a community should be the starting point in the decision on which model
should be used.
69
© 2014 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria.
Figure 14: Common-Pool Decision Model Tree
Common-Pool Decision Model Tree
Can the government identify
the fishers?
Is there trust in the community?
No
Co -magement system must be
implemented
No
Yes
Yes
ITQ system should be
implemented
Yes
Does the community have a
system in place to manage the
CPR?
No
Can the government identify
the fishers?
No
Co -magement system must be
implemented
Yes
Is the community practising
sustainability?
No
Co -magement system must be
implemented
Yes
Community self- management
system should be
implemented.
The type of fish that exist in an area should also be taken into account. Literature by
Schreiber has highlighted that it is not easy for communities to monitor fish that migrate and
therefore a co-management system will not work well. A community management will
therefore also not work well, as the communities will not have the means to monitor the
stock levels of migrating fish.
7.3. Suggestions for Further Research
The results of this research unveiled opportunities for further important research to occur.
Firstly the sample should be expanded to include more fishers from each area. The sample
should also be expanded to include more fishing areas. Due to the constraint of the sample
size, the results of the views of the fishers could be altered if more fishers were included in
the sample size.
70
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The research should also be done over a longer period of time. This will allow the researcher
to observe the fishing behaviour of the fishers more closely. It will also allow the researcher
to survey the quantity of fish caught by the fishers self, as they do not keep accurate records
of their catch.
A further very interesting piece of research would be for a researcher to specifically conduct
research on disruptions that the new government rules or regulations have on wellfunctioning communities. The research conducted by the researcher of this report found that
even when government’s intentions were good but they lacked understanding on how the
community operates can cause disruptions. A change implemented by government to the
way a community operates could lead to disruption and mistrust amongst the community
rather than move the community forward.
The fishers interviewed were all hardworking fishers who go out to sea to fish. There are
however fishers, as stated by the small-scale fishers interviewed, that do not go out to fish.
Some of the fishers who do not go to fish received boats from the government, which are
now not being used. Research should be conducted on what drives small-scale fishers to go
out to sea to fish, even in inclement weather, and what makes fishers not want fish when
conditions are good.
Research should also be conducted on the impact that large commercial fishing companies
have on the small-scale fishing industry. Institutions have to balance the industry between
providing for the small-scale fishers and not running the risk of job losses in the commercial
fishing sector.
7.4. Concluding Note
Following the research work conducted by Elinor Ostrom on managing the commons, it is
important that further research be conducted. The ITQ system is the most popular
management system being used to manage the fishing industry but the effect it has on
communities is not well understood.
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The research conducted found where a community self-management is functioning well, the
introduction of quotas by the governments had a significant impact on the community. The
community became split and trust that once existed no longer exists.
It therefore important that institutions before implementing changes to the operations in the
fishing industry that they first engage with the community that will be affected and obtain an
understanding of how the community operates. This will help them in making the right
decision on which operating model will work best.
72
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Questionnaire
Opening:
My name is Shamsiya Adams and I am a student at the Gordon Institute of Business
Science. I am currently doing my research for my thesis in partial fulfilment for the
completion of my Master of Business Administration.
I would like to ask you some questions around the management of the quota system and
quota allocation given to small-scale fishers and the management of the fishing industry as
well as some general demographic questions.
I would like to use the information to find the best way of managing the fishing industry for
the benefit of small-scale fishers.
The interview should take approximately one hour. Are you available to respond to some
questions?
Research Question:
The aim of the research is to establish the following?
1. To establish the best model to manage the fishing industry in terms of small-scale
fishers.
2. To establish whether small-scale fishers would want to have a community
management approach of managing harvesting areas for themselves
3. To determine whether it is economical viable for small-scale fishers to fish for
themselves or whether it is more viable for fishers to work for large companies.
A. General demographic questions
1. What language do you speak?
English
Afrikaans
Xhosa
Zulu
Other
If other: What language do you speak: ____________________________________
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2. Are you
Male
Female
3. What racial group do you belong to?
White
Black
Coloured
Indian
Other
If other: What race are you: _____________________________________________
4. In which age bracket to you fall?
Younger than
21 – 30 years
21 years
31 – 40 years
41 -50 years
Older than 50
years
5. What is your highest educational level?
Post
Matric Matric
Some High School Some Primary No
Qualification
School
6. Do you financially support anyone?
Yes
Schooling
No
7. If yes to question 6, how many people do you financially support?
1-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
9>
8. What is your monthly gross income?
R0 – R2000
R2001 – R4000
R4001 – R6000
R6001 – R8000
R8000>
B. Questions around fishing activities.
The following questions are related to your fishing activities. The aim of these questions
is to obtain a better understanding around your fishing activities and your income from
fishing activities. This will help my research in determining whether the current quota
system is economically viable for small-scale fishers.
9. Do you own your own boat and fishing gear?
Yes
No
10. What gear do you use to fish? ___________________________________________
11. How large is your boat in metres? ________________________________________
12. Do you owe any money to any person or financial institution on your fishing gear or
boat?
Yes
No
13. If yes to question 12, how much do you owe?
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0 - 50 000
50 001 –
100 001 –
150 001 –
100 000
150 000
200 000
> 200 001
14. Whom do you owe the money to? ________________________________________
Bank
Other Financial Government
Institutions
Agency
Friends/
Other
eg Relatives
small business
cooperation
15. Are you originally from this area? _________________________________________
16. Which fishing areas do you fish in?
___________________________________________________________________
17. How long have you been fishing?
<1 year
1–5
years
6 – 10
years
11 – 15
years
16 - 20
years
21 – 25
years
26 – 30
years
> 30
years
18. How many days in the year do you fish?
0 -73 days
74 – 146 days
147– 219 days
220– 292 days
293– 365 days
19. Which fish do you harvest, and state quantities in the table below?
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Catch Size per month per fish stock
Fish Stock
Tick
which
% harvest
stock you of total
Jan
harvest
catch
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Hake
Line Fish
Mussel
Squid
Tuna PoleLine
White
Mussel
Other
Total
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20. How many fishers do you have on the boat? __________________________
C. Questions around the recent quota system.
The following questions are to establish your views on the quota system and
as well as whether you have received a quota or not.
21. Did you receive a quota?
Yes
No
22. If no, did you receive interim relieve?
Yes
No
Yes
No
23. Do you think that the quota system is fair?
24. Please elaborate on your answer in question 23.
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
25. Was the process explained properly to you and were you given sufficient time to
complete the necessary documents?
Yes
No
Please elaborate further on how you found the quota system application
process.
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
If you answered yes to question 21, please answer questions 26 and 27
before proceeding to question 31.
26. What is your size of your quota?
_______________________________________
27. Are you better off with the new quota or were you better off before? Please
elaborate.
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
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If you answered no to question 21, please answer 28, 29 and 30 before
proceeding to question 31
28. What was the reason given for not receiving a quota?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
29. Did you have a quota before?
Yes
No
30. What are you going to do to earn an income since you have not received a
quota?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
31. Is there any further information that you can provide regarding the quota
system?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
32. Does the government provide any incentives/ assistance to help small scale
fishers?
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
33. If you were offered a full time job from a large company would you accept the
job offer rather than fish yourself and why?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
D. Questions around alternative methods to manage the fishing industry.
Another way to manage the fishing industry is through communities
managing the harvest area themselves.
84
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34. Should local small-scale fishers manage the harvest areas themselves rather
than be managed by government through the quota system?
Yes
No
If you answered yes to question 34, please answer questions 35 -37
35. Why do you feel that small-scale fishers should manage the harvest area
themselves?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
36. How would you go about managing it?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
37. What is the level of trust amongst fishers?
_______________________________________________________________
38. If answered no to question 34, why not?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Closing
I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is there anything else that may be of
value to my research that you can think of?
I should have all the information that I need. Would it be possible to have a follow-up
interview if I have any more questions?
Thank you
85
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Appendix 2: Fishing Gear
The picture below is the traditional ring-nets used by the small-scale fishers to harvest
Lobster.
86
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Appendix 3: Commercial Fishing Nets
The picture is the Lobster cages used by the commercial fishing companies.
87
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Appendix 4: Cold Storage Freezer Installed
The picture below is of the Cold Storage Freezer installed at Lamberts Bay harbour.
88
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