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This book develops a unified utilitarian theory to cover all kinds of values. It
offers classification of good things in life according to the principle of
exchangeability and replaceability. It takes a decision-theoretic approach to the
study of actions in life. It argues that all the actions in a person's life are for
the pursuit of values, while all the values pursued are related to a life plan.
Thus, this utilitarian general theory of values leads to a philosophy of life.
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C. L. Sheng
The Value Inquiry Book Series (VIES)
is an international scholarly program that
publishes philosophical books in all areas
of value inquiry, including social and
political thought, ethics, applied
philosophy, feminism, personalism,
religious values, values in education,
medical and health values, values in
science and technology, humanistic
psychology, formal axiology, history of
philosophy, post-communist thought,
peace theory, law and society, and theory
of culture.
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61
A UTILITARIAN GENERAL
THEORY OF VALUE
C.L. Sheng
VIBS
Volume 61
Robert Ginsberg
Executive Editor
Associate Editors
G. John M. Abbarno
Mary-Rose Barra!
Virginia Black
H. G. Callaway
Rem B. Edwards
Rob Fisher
Dane R. Gordon
J. Everet Green
Heta ffiiyry
Matti Hayry
Richard T. Hull
Joseph C. Kunkel
Ruth M. Lucier
Alan Milchman
George David Miller
Michael H. Mitias
Samuel M. Natale
Peter A. Redpath
Alan Rosenberg
Arleen Salles
Alan Soble
Daniel Statman
~
Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1998
To my wife Josephine
Cover design by Chris Kok based on a photograph, ©1984 by Robert
Ginsberg, of statuary by Gustav Vigeland in the Frogner Park, Oslo, Norway.
@ The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "ISO
9706: 1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence".
ISBN: 90-420-0397-9
©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1998
Printed in The Netherlands
CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
One
Introduction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Two
ix
xi
A Utilitarian General Theory of Value
Value Versus Utility
The Three Conceptions of Utility
Norms of Values
The Scope of This Book
1
4
7
9
12
Definitions and Properties of Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
The Decision-Theoretic Approach
Some Basic Definitions
General Properties of Value and Utility
On Pleasure, Happiness, Desire-Satisfaction, etc.
15
18
24
29
Three Pseudo-Objectivity and Statistical Nature
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Four
33
34
35
37
41
43
Utility Theory
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Five
Objectivity and Pseudo-Objectivity
The Sources of Statistical Nature
Value Judgment
Extensions of the Notion of Value
Statistical Nature of Moral Value
Summary ofthe Statistical Nature of Value
Use Value or Utility of Goods
Utility of Money
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest
The Equivalence of Two Concepts of Utility
On Normalization and Terminal Utilities
Recent Developments in Utility Theory
45
48
50
58
63
65
68
Classifications of Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Various Classifications of Value
Intrinsic and Instrumental Values
Classification of Value from Moral Point of View
Clasification of Value According to Good Things
Further Discussion of Good Life
75
76
81
82
92
viii
Six
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Moral Value
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Moral Value Versus Other Values
Value of the Consequences of Moral Action
Moral Value of Feeling of Moral Satisfaction
Moral Value of Motive or Intention
Value ofa Moral Action
Value of Moral Principle, Virtue, or Moral Rule
The Relative Importance of Moral Value
95
98
101
105
108
III
113
Seven The Values of a Person
1. Various Values ofa Person
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The Moral Value of a Person
Special Features of Human Values
Replaceability of the Values ofa Person
My Utilitarian View of Personhood
The Contribution of a Person to Society
125
128
131
136
137
138
Eight Life Plan, Value Structure, and Teleology
1. Life Plan and Values
2.
3.
4.
5.
Nine
Final Value
Ultimate End of Life
Life Plan
Value Structure, Teleology, and Determinism
143
144
145
146
149
Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life
1. Views of Teleology
2. Life Plan Versus Teleology
3. Decision-Theoretic Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy
of Life
4. Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life
Notes
Bibliography
About the Author
Index
C. L. Sheng brings together here the key components of utilitarian value
theory in critical, careful, and well-reasoned ways. With his systematic
presentation, Sheng faces every pertinent issue and responds to the
contemporary literature, as he builds a convincing and unified case for a
utilitarian theory that we can live with. The concept of a life plan is a
crowning feature of his theorizing and of inestimable value for human
meaning.
This is a continuation and culmination of many years of Sheng's
publishing activity and international work. Crossing continents and oceans,
Sheng has been a model for the world in bridging the precise attitude of the
sciences and the palpable concerns of the heart. Humanist-scientist, Sheng
leads the way toward intelligibility and responsibility in the delicate matter of
human values. The present book is a rare and powerful combination of moral
sense and intellectual discipline.
153
158
161
164
169
179
185
187
Robert Ginsberg
Executive Editor
Value Inquiry Book Series
PREFACE
This book presents a general theory of value from my unified utilitarian point
of view. In a previous book entitled A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A
Unified Utilitarian Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice,
published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, I included a brief theory of
value as the starting point of my unified utilitarian theory, becasuse I defmed
utility in terms of preference. That value theory was pretty crude and sketchy.
Since a general theory of value is not restricted to moral value, but may be
extended or generalized to all kinds of value, I have since then cherished an
intention to develop a comprehensive utilitarian general theory of value. This
book serves this purpose and represents the result of my intensive study of
value theory from my unified utilitarian point of view during the past six
years. It deals essentially with the general properties of value common to all
kinds of value, not restricted to a specific kind of value, say, moral value or
aesthetic value.
This utilitarian general theory of value deals with several unique main
topics, which sharply distinguish it from almost all traditional theories of
value.
First, I hold that value is subjective in nature because value exists only in
the presence of and for a subject. This view is like the views of most
psychologists and decision scientists. Thus, I start from the defmition of
utility in terms of personal preference. I have a specific conception of
objectivity, based on which all values, except the exchange value of money,
are considered subjective. Those values that look objective are said to be
pseudo-objective.
Second, I introduce the concept of statistics into my theory of value and
claim that value is of statistical nature, because the subject may be a group of
people, all members of society, or even all human beings in the world, and
the value of any object for the members of any group of people varies from
member to member. The statistical nature of value can be derived not only from
the dimension of subject, but also from the dimensions of object and judge,
because the object, instead of a single particular one, may be the abstract
concept of a class of objects, and the judge, instead of a certain person, may be
any member of society. Thus, a value or value judgment may be of statistical
nature in one, two, or three dimensions, namely, the dimensions of object,
subject, and judge.
Third, I incorporate utility theory into my theory of value as an integral
part of it and make utility the starting point of my utilitarian general theory of
value. To refute the objections raised by the European school of utility theory to
the American school or von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, I modify or
reformulate the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory. I unify the three
conceptions of utility held by economists, decision scientists, and philosophers,
which are conventionally supposed to be different from one another.
PREFACE
Preface
Fourth, I do not use the traditional and conventional classification of
value into intrinsic and instrumental. The classification of the members of a
set into subsets is arbitrary, so that any classification is all right, as long as it
classifies the whole set into disjoint subsets and covers all members.
Although theoretically nothing is wrong with the classification of value into
intrinsic and instrumental, it is vague and fuzzy, and may lead to confusion,
misunderstanding, and circularity. Therefore, its use is not fully justified.
Instead, I use a classification based on my classification of good things in life
according to a law of replaceability.
Fifth, since utilitarianism is consequential and teleological, I take a
decision-theoretic approach to the study of actions in life. According to my
approach, nonmoral actions are guided by rationality and prudence, while
moral actions are guided by rationality, prudence, and morality as well. All
the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values
pursued are more or less related to the life plan. I present a dynamic
interpretation of the ultimate end of life, which is slightly different from the
conventional interpretation of fmal value. I emphasize the teleological nature
of life and maintain that the values pursued and obtained by a person are
essentially all interrelated and intertwined to form a value structure with the
life plan as the core. All values, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely,
aim at the ultimate end of life. By "essentially," I mean that these intertwined
values are not complete or that they do not necessarily include every value
obtained by a person, because many random factors in life are out of human
control or beyond even the anticipation of the person. Thus, this utilitarian
general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is
teleological, consequential, and utilitarian.
Although guite different from most traditional theories of value, I believe
that my theory of value is self-coherent and self-sufficient. It is not only
consistent with my unified utilitarian theory, but also serves as a basis for the
unified utilitarian theory as a moral and a social philosophy.
I would like to express my hearty thanks to Professor Robert Ginsberg,
Executive Editor of the Value Inquiry Book Series and a great friend of mine.
He has done a lot more things for this book than what an executive editor is
normally expected to do. After a careful reading of my manuscript, he has
made stylistic corrections on three versions of the manuscript and given
adequate and valuable suggestions for possible revisions, with a view to
improving the quality of the book as much as possible. Moreover, he kindly
wrote an editorial foreword for this book.
I am grateful to Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands, for its kind permission granted to me for taking materials freely
from my book, A New Approach to Utilitarianism. Some materials in some
sections of Chapter Two, Chapter Four, Chapter Six, and Chapter Seven are
derived from that book, with condensation, expansion, reorganization, or
rewriting, and mostly also with the addition of new materials. For direct
quotations and specific materials such as laws and theorems, I use endnotes
to refer to the original pages.
I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Harrison Fu-Hsiung Lee, General
Manager of Accounting and Administration Division, BASF Taiwan, Ltd.,
for a careful reading of the manuscript and the correction of typographical
errors. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. degree from the Graduate Institute of
Sunyatsenism of Chinese Culture University in 1994 under my supervision
and has a good background in the English language.
Finally, I thank Mr. Vincent Lin, a Ph.D. student at the Graduate Institute
of Management Sciences of Tarnkang University, working under my
supervision, for making a camera-ready copy of the manuscript according to
the standard format of the Value Inquiry Book Series. He is an expert in
information management and in the use of the latest computer software.
xii
xiii
One
INTRODUCTION
1. A Utilitarian General Theory of Value
The purpose of this book is to develop a general theory of value from a
utilitarian point of view. By a utilitarian point of view, I mean my unified
utilitarian point of view. By a general theory of value, I mean that it deals
with only those general properties of value common to all kinds of value, but
not restricted to a special kind of value. Apart from general theory, there are
also special theories of value. For instance, aesthetics deals with aesthetic
values. Economics deals with economic values. Moral philosophy deals with
moral values.
Among all kinds of value, moral value is the kind of value that is studied
more intensively and extensively by philosophers than any other kind. As will
be discussed in detail in Section I, Chapter Six, moral value is different from
other kinds of value, such as epistemic value, aesthetic value, and economic
value, in effects on others and society. Moral value also is special for the
study of technical details of value. Because of these two points of difference,
a general theory of value can hardly be isolated from ethical theories.
That is the case with this book. In the development of a general theory of
value, I quite frequently discuss moral values, use examples in moral
philosophy, and even rely on arguments and conclusions from ethical theories.
I reserve one chapter (Chapter Six) for the discussion of the properties of
various moral values, which, strictly speaking, are beyond the scope of a
general theory of value.
For the sake of convenience, I start my theory of value from my unified
utilitarian theory of moral philosophy, by discussing what is "good."! In my
theory, "good" is the adjective used to describe the property of an object
having a value. An object is said to be good if and only if it has a positive
value, and bad if and only if it has a negative value.
Ethics and axiology are closely related to each other and sometimes
overlap, particularly in utilitarianism. Since the principle of utility asserts that
the ultimate criterion for morality is maximal utility, the essence of
utilitarianism finally reduces to the maximization of aggregate or social
utility, which is a function of values. Therefore, value theory is not only
related to moral philosophy, but also becomes the basis of moral judgments.
A theory of value can be considered an integral part, or a foundation, of my
unified utilitarian theory, because, without a theory of value, this ethical
theory would not be comprehensive and self-sufficient.
Moral philosophy is concerned essentially with what is morally good or
INTRODUCTION
A Utilitarian General Theory of Value
bad. Studies in moral philosophy are more or less related to the clarification
of the meanings of those words such as "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong,"
"praiseworthy" or "blameworthy," and "noble" or "despicable," which are
used to judge a person, a trait of character, an action, a motive or intention,
etc. The meanings of these words are sometimes vague, uncertain, or
indefinite. Among these words, "good" is by far the most popularly used and
discussed word by moral philosophers, yet the notion of "good" has been
varied and controversial. Many theories exist as to what "good" is. Almost
every moral philosopher has her or his own defmition, interpretation, or
explanation.
One reason why so many defmitions and theories of "good" exist is that,
owing to its basic nature, philosophy itself is somewhat vague, uncertain, and
indefmite compared with science. It is difficult to give precise definitions to
philosophical terms. In the physical sciences, terms are usually well-defined
and the defmitions of most terms are completely clear without vagueness and
indefiniteness at all. If a term is defmed differently in two books, the
difference is merely in wording only, but the content of the two defmitions
are exactly the same. Thus, no difference ever exists in the definitions of
terms such as "mass," "power," "acceleration," or "electric current." In the
social sciences, terms are not so clearly and precisely defined as those in the
physical sciences. Terms such as "liberal," "conservative," "progress," or
"depression" are defmed by different authors in various books slightly
differently. The meanings may also differ slightly, but the same term, with
slightly different definitions used by the authors, still means essentially the
same thing. In philosophy, however, the same term, used by different
philosophers, may have quite different meanings.
Another reason for the large number of different defmitions and theories
of "good" or "value" is that the defmition of good is not only made to
explain its meaning, but is sometimes also used to justify a particular ethical
theory. In the physical sciences, terms are defmed to specify physical
characteristics or the conditions under which phenomena happen, so as to
make it possible to have a defmite scientific analysis. In philosophy, since
theories are sometimes subjective and involve the personal beliefs or even
feelings of philosophers, the definition of good or value is often used to
support a particular theory. For instance, G.E. Moore's concept of good-that
good is a simple property like the color yellow, so that it is indefinable in
terms of other properties and yet is intangible - is a theory in itself.2 The
defmition of good by naturalists like Ralph Barton Perry as a fact 3 is intended
to serve the purpose of inferring from description to prescription, or bridging
the gap between is and ought.
In addition to the different notions of good by various philosophers, some
obscurity occurs in the English usage of the word "good." This adds to the
diversity of definitions and theories of good.
First, the words "good" and "bad" have two main different uses: one in
the relative sense, and the other in the absolute sense. When used relatively, if
A is better than B, and B is better than C, then we consider B bad relative to
A, but we consider B good relative to C. For example, if B is a thief who just
steals, and C is a robber who robs with a gun threatening the life of the
robbed person, then we might say that B is much "better" than C. As another
example, a poor man may think the dinner at an ordinary cafeteria to be a
good meal, while a millionaire woman may consider the dirmer at a famous
restaurant a bad one. In the relative sense, no border line appears between
good and bad.
In most cases, however, good and bad are used in the absolute sense, and
people implicitly assume that an average in the class of things under
consideration is neither good nor bad. This average is taken as the standard
for comparison. If a member of the class is better than this average, then it is
said to be good. If a member of the class is worse than this average, then it is
said to be bad. So far as the moral value of human beings is concerned, an
average person can be said to be "neutral" and to have a zero value.
Therefore, the thief B in the above example, although "better" than the
robber C, is still considered bad in this absolute sense. In other words, a
border line or indeterminate area exists between good and bad, which is the
average or neutral.
To avoid confusion, we should abandon the relative sense and stick to the
absolute sense. While good is used in this absolute sense, it does not mean
that what is said to be good has an absolute objective value. It only means
that the judge herself or himself has an implicit idea of average, and, in
saying that something is good, slhe is comparing this specific thing with the
judge's own idea of average of the class of things.
Second, used even in this absolute sense, the meaning of good still varies
with the expectation. The same amount of goodness may be good when
applied to one person but may not be good when applied to another person.
For instance, if an average woman is only slightly good, that is, she does not
do bad things, but she is not enthusiastic in doing good things either, and only
occasionally takes small good actions, then we may consider her good. But if
a priest is like this average woman, then we may say that the priest is not
good enough or even that he is bad. Similar cases exist with the meanings of
such descriptive adjectives as "large" and "small." For instance, the large
size of an insect is certainly smaller if compared with a bird, and the large
size of a bird is certainly smaller if compared with a horse. This is because
the average can be that of a class of insects, a class of birds, a class of horses,
or a class of all animals.
Thus, the usage of "good" is quite complicated. For the moral goodness
2
3
INTRODUCTION
Value Versus Utility
of a person, various aspects or traits of character are available. For the same
aspect, different degrees of goodness may still occur. And for the same
degree of goodness, the value may still be different for different subjects or
purposes.
Since a general practice is to associate a value with what is good, the
situation will be made clearer if a defmite zero value is assigned to what is
neutral, while and good is expressed in terms of value. Thus, in my unified
utilitarian theory, first, "A is good" is considered synonymous to "A has a
positive value," or roughly "A has a value."4 Next, value is defined
ultimately in terms of personal preference, in a manner similar to the
definitions by psychologists and naturalists, although the further development
and emphasis of the unified utilitarian theory are quite different from
psychological and the naturalist theories.
In the following, I will advance the theory of value that I have developed.
It is a self-sufficient general theory of value formulated by using a scientific
approach as much as possible, such that the theory is amenable to
mathematical and quantitative analysis. Thus, value and some other terms
will be defined quantitatively and will be treated as parameters or variables.
"happiness," "desire-satisfaction," "well-being," "welfare," and "interest,"
have meanings quite close to, but not exactly the same as, those of value and
utility. I leave the discussion, clarification, and distinction of these terms to
Section 4 of Chapter Two.
The distinction between the meanings of value and utility hinges on two
basic notions emphasized in this book, namely, (1) the statistical nature of
pseudo-objective values, and (2) the distinction between use value and
exchange value. Pseudo-objective values will be discussed in detail in
Chapter Three, and use value and exchange value will be discussed in detail
in Chapters Four and Five. The distinction between value and utility will be
most readily seen in the light of these two notions. I will refer to these two
notions here briefly, insofar as the discussion of them is necessary for my
present explanation.
The relationship between value and utility will be considered separately
for the case of money and for the case of a commodity. The case of money is
simpler and will be considered first.
The value of a certain amount of money is understood to be the
exchange value or the purchasing power ofthe money. This value is objective
according to my definition of objectivity and is the only kind of objective
value in my theory. The utility of this amount of money for a person is its
subjective usefulness. The relationship between utility U and the value of
money V is expressed as the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U =
F(V) of the person.
This is an oversimplified description of the relationship between the
utility of money for a person and the value of money. Many sophisticated and
controversial points exist in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory,
which will be presented in Chapter Four.
Next, consider the case of utility of a commodity for a person. The
utility of the commodity is the usefulness of the commodity for the person.
This usefulness is also called the use value of the commodity for the person.
In this case, utility and value mean the same thing.
The relationship between the utility of a certain amount of commodity
for a person and the amount of the commodity is expressed by the law of
diminishing marginal utility in economics. The ordinate of a curve showing
the law of diminishing marginal utility of a commodity for a person
represents S, the satisfaction of the person, which is understood to be the
same as utility (see Fig. I below in Section 3). The abscissa of the curve
represents C, the amount of the commodity, which is not value. Since any
commodity has a unit price, which is fixed at a certain time and is supposed
to be a given quantity, the abscissa may be interpreted as the total price of the
commodity, while the ordinate may be interpreted as the money the person is
willing to pay for the commodity. If the dimensions of both the abscissa and
4
2. Value Versus Utility
Parallel to the term "value" is the term "utility." The meanings of these two
terms are quite close to each other. Value and utility each have several
different meanings. The meaning of value is, in some situations, similar to
that of utility, so that these two terms are sometimes used synonymously or
interchangeably. We must, in the beginning, clarify all these meanings, to
distinguish between value and utility, and to point out under what conditions
or in which sense value and utility may be said to be equivalent and may be
used synonymously.
The distinction between value and utility is a complicated and delicate
point. Sometimes the concepts of value and utility are mixed up. Many
philosophers still construe value and utility as not distinct. For instance,
David Gauthier writes, "Value, as understood here, is identical with utility."5
The mixing up of the concepts of value and utility sometimes entails the
opinion that utilitarianism is indifferent to the distribution of value, because,
if utility were identical with value, then, for a given amount of total value,
any distribution would result in the same aggregate utility.6 This further
entails the opinion that it is in general impossible to satisfy simultaneously
both the requirement of the maximization of individual utility and that of the
maximization of social welfare, as argued by Gauthier. 7
Apart from value and utility, some other terms often used and discussed
in moral philosophy, particularly utilitarianism, such as "pleasure,"
5
6
INTRODUCTION
the ordinate are interpreted as money, then the law of diminishing marginal
utility may be interpreted as that the person is willing to buy an amount of the
commodity such that the marginal utility of the commodity for the person
drops to just slightly higher than the unit price of the commodity. Obviously,
the ordinate utility (satisfaction) is subjective and the abscissa price (amount
of commodity) is objective.
We may conclude that, for money, utility is not equal to value, unless the
person has a linear utility curve so that U = F(V) = V. However, for a
particular commodity, the utility of the commodity for an individual person is
the same as the use value of the commodity for the person.
Now the value of an object, whether physical or mental, has an extended
meaning. As will be explained in detail in Chapter Three, the subject may be
the members of a group of people instead of a single person, and the object
may be the representative of a class of objects instead of a particular object.
In the case of value judgment, the judge is not necessarily the subject for
which the object has a value. Every member of society may be a judge, or all
the members of a group of people are judges. I will explain in Chapter Three
that the subject, S, the object, 0, and the judge, J, will then be of statistical
nature and that the notion of pseudo-objectivity arises. In that case, the value
or the value judgment of the object becomes the statistical average or norm of
a large number of values of one, two, or even three dimensions. This value or
value judgment is no longer the utility of a particular object for an individual
subject, but it becomes an abstract conception. This conception of value or
value judgment is by no means the same as utility.
Incidentally, in the case of the law of diminishing marginal utility, utility
is a function of the amount of commodity and, in turn, ofthe total price ofthe
commodity. In the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the
utility of money is also expressed as a function of the exchange value of
money. It looks as if utility were a concept derived from that of value.
However, logically, the concept of utility is prior to that of value, as will be
seen in Chapter Two, where the starting point of the general theory of value
is the definition of utility in terms of personal preference. That this is true can
further be seen from the extended meanings of value, which are all abstracted
from the original direct psychological response satisfaction, which
corresponds to the utility of an object for a subject.
Thus, we may say that value is a character assigned to an object such that
it retains the character of variation from person to person, but gets rid of the
character of marginal utility, namely, the variation with the total amount of
utility of the object for a person. In this way, value appears to be something
originating from the object and thereby seems objective and logically prior to
utility. However, value is a concept derived from utility and is conceptually
posterior to that of utility.
The Three Conceptions of Utility
7
3. The Three Conceptions of Utility
The conception of utility held by moral philosophers is quite vague. Nonutilitarians do not deal with utility so quantitatively as to consider utility
functions. Even utilitarians do not have a clear-cut conception of utility, and
the conception varies widely among utilitarians. Jeremy Bentham proposed a
hedonic calculus for the study of pleasure. Since pleasure involves
psychology, it is difficult practically to obtain quantitative results from a
hedonic calculus, and the application of it is rather restricted. Later the
concept of pleasure was extended and generalized. Some other terms, such as
"happiness," "interest," "well-being," and "welfare," have been used.
However, clear-cut concepts of these terms and sharp distinctions among
these terms still have not been developed.
In spite of the vagueness of conception, the application of utility is
general in that it can be applied to any person in any situation, because, in the
study of value by philosophers, the term "utility" is not limited to material
value, but covers all kinds of value. They study moral value in moral
philosophy, aesthetic value in aesthetics, epistemic value in theory of
knowledge and philosophy of science, etc.
The conception of utility held by economists is clearer than that held by
moral philosophers, as exhibited in the law of diminishing marginal utility.
For any person with respect to any commodity, a utility curve can be plotted
for utility against the amount of the commodity. This curve is a concave one
with a monotonically decreasing slope or first derivative. For a commodity
measured discretely by number, the marginal utility represents the additional
utility of a single incremental piece of the commodity for the person. For a
commodity measured continuously by weight, volume, etc., such as rice, beef,
and gasoline, the slope of the curve represents the utility of the commodity
per incremental unit of weight, volume, etc. for the person. A typical curve
showing the law of diminishing marginal utility for the continuous case is
given in Fig.l, where the axis C represents the quantity of commodity, and
the ordinate U represents the utility of the commodity.
The conception of utility held by economists is also vague in that the
nature of utility is not clearly expressed. Economists use "utile" as the unit of
utility. But what is a utile? In my opinion, the economists' utility is simply
money. A commodity has a price. When a person P buys a piece of a
commodity C, say a shirt at the price of $40, it means that the utility of the
shirt for P is at least $40. If P buys just one shirt, it means that the utility of a
second shirt for P would be less than $40. Normally, when P does not buy
anything, it means that the utilities of the commodities for P are all below
their prices. When P buys a commodity, either something that P has never
used before, or something to replace something consumed, the utility of the
INTRODUCTION
Norms of Values
commodity rises to above its price.The slope of the curve of the law of
diminishing marginal utility of a commodity for a person can be interpreted
as the utility per incremental unit of the commodity, which always decreases
as the amount of the commodity possessed by the person increases. Both the
dimension of commodity and the dimension of utility may be expressed in
terms of money. As long as the slope of the curve or the fIrst derivative of the
utility function is greater than one, the person will buy an additional amount
of the commodity; as soon as the slope of the curve or the fIrst derivative of
the function becomes smaller than one, the person will stop buying.
Although von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory is clearcut and welldefIned, something is still vague in it. What are the dimension and the unit of
this utility? Usually, utility is normalized such that it will range from 0 to 1.
As I have argued, this kind of normalization is unjustifIed and causes
difficulty in interpersonal comparisons ofutility.8 Since this utility is defIned
through lotteries with a probability distribution, whereas the economists'
utility in the law of diminishing marginal utility does not involve probability
at all, the general conviction of most von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
theorists is that these two conceptions of utility are entirely different. 9
However, I have shown that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is a
special case of the economists' utility, that is, it is the utility of money instead
of a commodity.l0 The utility of a commodity can be determined through a
comparison with money. Since it is impossible to conceive a comparison of
money with money itself, probability and lottery have been used as a means
to bring out the concept of utility. A detailed discussion of this point will be
presented in Chapter Four.
Since von Neumann-Morgenstern utility deals specifIcally with money,
it is also restricted to material values. Theoretically, it is applicable to all
persons, but practically, management and decision scientists usually work in
the capacity of analysts or consultants to the top-level management of
enterprises or government offIces to help solve decision problems.
The three conceptions of utility, namely, that of (1) moral philosophers,
especially utilitarians, (2) economists, and (3) management and decision
scientists, so far have developed more or less independently of one another.
Since I have shown the relationship between the economists' utility and the
management/decision scientists' utility (which will be discussed in further
detail in Chapter Four), I believe that these two different conceptions of utility
can and should be combined and unifIed into one conception. Philosophers
should adopt this same conception too, because philosophers have had only a
vague conception, not a clear-cut and really different conception. Various
utility theories should be put together to form a unifIed general theory, common
to philosophers, economists, and management/decision scientists. This is what I
intend to do in this book. Furthermore, the concept of utility of commodities
and money should be extended from material values to that of other values as
well because values of different natures can be and actually are compared
subjectively in decision-making.
8
u
f
~
C
Fig.l A Typical Curve Illustrating the Law
of Diminishing Marginal Utility.
The economists' utility is also applicable to all people, but the value or
the utility dealt with is restricted to material value, because all commodities
may be purchased by money. This is true because economics is a social
science specifIcally dealing with rational economic behaviors of human
beings.
The conception of utility by management and decision scientists, known
as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, is clear-cut. This utility, as a function
of value, is well-defmed. The utility function of a person in a situation can be
determined through tests of lottery choices. The details of von NeumannMorgenstern utility and utility functions will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Suffice it to say here that, through lotteries of this kind, a utility curve
representing the relationship between utility and value (that is, utility as a
function of value) can be plotted. Normally, all human beings are risk-averse
to some extent. If a person shows a risk-prone nature, then some special
cause(s) must exist for this phenomenon, which is considered abnormal. For
risk-averse people, the utility curve is concave. Utility is a monotonicallyincreasing function of value, but the slope of the curve or the fIrst derivative
of utility with respect to value is monotonically decreasing.
9
4. Norms of Values
The basis and starting point of my theory of value is that value or utility is
subjective in nature, because (1) the value of an object for a subject varies
from subject to subject, (2) the value of an object in a class of the objects
INTRODUCTION
Norms of Values
varies from object to object, and (3) the value judgment by a judge varies
from judge to judge. If the value or the value judgment varies widely so that
little is in common, then value can only be studied as an individual case, that
is, the value or utility of a particular object for a particular subject, or the
value judgment of a particular object or a particular action by a particular
judge, but no norm, criterion, or standard of value or value judgment can be
established. In that case, we will have no need for a theory of value at all. So
far as moral value is concerned, subjectivism holds that morality varies from
person to person, and relativism holds that morality varies from race to race,
from culture to culture, and from society to society. To the extreme,
subjectivism and relativism lead to skepticism, and skepticism leads to
nihilism.
Since my utilitarian theory of value basically regards value as subjective,
I naturally accept subjectivism. This acceptance is to a limited extent only.
Although some values and value judgments do vary widely from person to
person, most values and value judgments have a statistical distribution that is
fairly clustered so that a norm exists and may be taken as the typical or
representative value or value judgment. For instance, a cup is useful for
containing tea or coffee. Although the value of a particular cup for a
particular person varies depending on the size, shape, color, style, and quality
of the cup, and also on the taste, habit, preference, and financial condition of
the person, that the cup has a positive value or utility for the person is
unquestionable, unless the person already has so many cups that the marginal
utility of the cup is zero or negative.
Here I introduce the concept of norms into the study of my utilitarian
theory of value. If the distribution is fairly clustered, then a norm can be
established, which may be used as a standard or criterion. Statistics is
developed for the study of macroscopic phenomena, where it is impossible,
or impractical, or unjustifiable to study the microscopic phenomena of the
individual elements, but where it is useful and practical to study the
macroscopic phenomenon as a general proposition, relationship, or trend. I
call these norms of value or value judgment "pseudo-objective," in the sense
that although they are treated as if they were objective in nature, they are
actually derived through the methodology of statistics from ultimate
subjective values or value judgments. Pseudo-objectivity will be studied in
detail in Chapter Three.
A question arises in the use of norms. Are norms considered the criterion
or standard in value judgments? In sociology, psychology, and anthropology,
norms are studied as phenomena only. Since these disciplines are descriptive
in nature and are called positive sciences, they have no problem of value
judgment. On the other hand, in philosophy and education, value judgment is
involved. A moral norm, as is typical and representative, is usually also
considered right or good. It is not necessarily so. In old times, people were
superstitious. In some places, the practice of sacrificing a life for the
prevention or remedy of a natural calamity existed. For instance, according to
an old Chinese legend, in some place along the Yellow River the practice
existed of throwing a young lady into the river for the prevention or remedy
of flood, based on the belief that the God of the Yellow River needed a young
woman to be his wife. At present, we all know that this is simply a
superstition, and our value judgment is that all the people at that time and
place were wrong. But at that time and place, the belief that throwing a young
woman into the Yellow River was a right action was a norm. From this
example, we can readily see that the norm, or the average belief of most
people, is not necessarily right. To always take the norm as a criterion or
standard is conventionalism, which is not accepted by most philosophers.
If the norm is not necessarily right, then what should be the right belief or
value judgment? This is a question extremely difficult to answer and is also
the main difficulty in establishing an ethical theory or a theory of value. I have
presented five criteria for the establishment of virtues or moral principles. I I
These criteria are obviously also applicable to all kinds of value judgment.
They are listed below.
10
11
(1) Theoretical determination of utility
(2) Logical reasoning
(3) Screening by time
(4) Currency or popularity
(5) Insight of great thinkers, great philosophers, or sages
Criterion (1) is practically impossible. Criterion (2) is a necessary condition
for the establishment of a criterion, but is not sufficient. We need logical
reasoning in every inference from proposition to proposition, but we also need
some axioms, postulates, or ultimate propositions about value, which are
lacking. Criterion (3) is valid and has played an important role in the
development of ethical theories, as seen in the general change of some virtues
and moral principles. However, to have this kind of screening takes a long time.
Even in moral philosophy, where moral values have been intensively studied
more than any other kind of value, so many moral values which still exist are
controversial and have the possibility of being screened out in the future. For
instance, homosexuality and capital punishment are controversial issues the
opinions of which are so different that we really do not know which side is the
right one and what will be the general belief in the future. Therefore, criterion
(3), although having been useful, is not adequate to serve as a sole criterion.
Criterion (4) is the same as norm or convention, which has been shown to be
not necessarily right. Criterion (5) is valid when great thinkers, great
INTRODUCTION
The Scope of This Book
philosophers, or sages exist, as can be verified by those great historical figures
such as Confucius, Socrates, and Jesus Christ. However, not every era sees
such great thinkers, great philosophers, or sages. Even if at present such
persons exist, we do not know or are unable to judge who, among the numerous
persons, are the really great ones. Even great thinkers, great philosophers, or
sages in history are not necessarily completely and absolutely right, because at
present we still comment on and criticize some of their thoughts without
accepting any thought wholeheartedly, however great it may be.
This seems a problem that can never be completely solved. But we need
a general theory of value, and we have to develop some theories according to
one or more of these criteria. With this belief in mind, I endeavor to develop
my utilitarian general theory of value.
classifications depending upon the criterion of classification. Most of these
classifications are valid. I have reservations on the classification which
classifies value into intrinsic and instrumental, and I present arguments for
my reservations. I propose a classification according to good things in life.
In Chapter Six, I present my theory of moral value, which is a part of my
unified utilitarian theory as moral philosophy.12
In Chapter Seven, I elaborate my view of the values of or produced by a
person. In addition, I discuss the replaceability of the values of a person and
express my utilitarian view of personhood. I propose my criterion for the
determination of the contribution of a person.
In Chapter Eight, I clarify the values for or pursued and obtained by a
person, starting from good things in life. I clarify the concepts of fmal value
and the ultimate end of life. Then I argue that the values we pursue in life are
all directed toward a life plan and are all consistently related to one another,
thereby forming a value structure. I also point out that the ultimate mission of
life is the fulfillment of this life plan. If this life plan is optimally realized,
then we attain a state of complete satisfaction, which is called Heavenhumanity unification in some ethical theories.
In Chapter Nine, I tie in the conceptions of utility and subjectivity with
teleology and decision-theoretic approach. I hold that all sentient beings are
teleological, and human beings are teleological to the highest level- selfconscious, deliberate, and having a life plan. Humanity has rationality and
prudence as necessary conditions in decision-making for nonmoral actions,
and in addition has morality in ethical decision-making. Utilitarianism serves
as an appropriate ethical theory, and a utilitarian general theory of value
serves as a foundation for the philosophy of life.
12
5. The Scope of This Book
In this section, I describe briefly the contents of the following chapters,
bringing out the features of my theory of value, that is, my view of value and
utility, my approach to the study, my points of emphasis in the theory of
value, and the conclusions I obtain from my study.
In Chapter Two, I present my decision-theoretic approach to the study of
value theory and give some basic definitions. The first defmition is that of
utility in terms of personal preference. This defmition lays the foundation for
my strong advocacy that value and utility are subjective in nature. From the
basic defmitions I derive the general properties of value and utility. In moral
philosophy, obscurities and confusions exist among the meanings of pleasure,
happiness, well-being, interest, and utility. I clarify their meanings according
to the definitions and the general properties of value of my value theory.
In Chapter Three, I discuss the subjective nature of values in detail. I
explain my conceptions of objectivity and pseudo-objectivity. I also explain
the statistical nature of value in one or more of the three dimensions, namely,
in the dimension of object 0, in the dimension of subject S, and in the
dimension ofjudge J.
In Chapter Four, I describe briefly the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
and utility theory. This is the standard material of the American school. In
addition, I include my contributions to this theory, namely, the law of
diminishing incremental interest, the correspondence between the economists'
and the decision theorists' conceptions of utility, and the normalization of
utility functions. I give a brief description of recent developments in utility and
risk theory by scholars of the European school, which has reservations on the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory and endeavors to make breakthroughs
in several ways.
In Chapter Five, I discuss the classifications of value. Value has several
13
Two
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES
OF VALUE
1. The Decision-Theoretic Approach
In this chapter, I present the definitions of basic terms in my theory of value
and discuss some general properties of value. I start with the definition of
utility in terms of personal preference, because I adopt a decision-theoretic
approach. In decision theory, the decision-making for an action, or the choice
of an alternative among several alternatives is exclusively determined by the
comparison of utilities or expected utilities, when a risk or uncertainty occurs,
in the form of several state's of affairs with known probabilities. Then, for a
rational person, the choice is the alternative with the maximum expected
utility.
In some situations, the probabilities are not known. In that case, several
ordinal methods, such as the maximax and the maximin, are available for
decision-making. I have reservations concerning these ordinal methods and
advocate the adoption of subjective probabilities or even just a rough
estimation of them when objective probabilities are not available.
The choice of the alternative with the maximum expected utility is
an oversimplified description of the situation. The overall expected utility of
an alternative, which is the net benefit of the alternative computed from the
utilities of the advantages and the disutility of the disadvantages, is not easily
calculated. In many cases, the choice of an alternative is not an object that
can be obtained immediately after the decision has been made, but is a course
of action the consequences of which will not appear until a later time, which
may be days, months, or even years. Therefore, the calculation is based not
on an existing fact, but on predicted future facts, which may change from
time to time. In that case, the calculation is at best an accurate estimation. For
example, for large public projects with several feasible alternative ways of
implementation, feasibility studies are made to decide which alternative is the
optimum one, in the sense of minimum cost or maximum future benefits.
Such feasibility studies usually cost a lot of money and take several years to
complete.
In business administration and public projects, the feasibility study is
something made before the comparison and the decision-making. So the cost
of it does not affect the decision-making, because it is not attributed to any
particular alternative. Once a decision has been made, usually we are required
to take a course of action to carry out the chosen alternative. The cost of such
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
The Decision-Theoretic Approach
a course of action is not the same for the several alternatives. Therefore, it
should be regarded as the cost of the alternative. It is usually subtracted from
the gross profit or utility of the alternative so as to obtain the net profit or
utility of the alternative.
Here comes the crucial and most interesting point. Is the overall
consequence alone or the overall consequence plus the course of action
regarded as the alternative for comparison? As far as I can see, it is more
reasonable to regard the overall consequence plus the course of action as the
alternative or object of choice, because the course of action involves effort
and cost. If so, then another question arises: Will the course of action be
undertaken by the decision-maker herself or himself or be assigned to a
representative or a manager to undertake? For a personal action, say a moral
action, it will be taken by the agent herself or himself. For a business action,
sayan initial investment or an innovation project of an existing enterprise, (1)
it may be undertaken by the owner herself or himself, who is the chair of the
board or the president of the enterprise, or (2) it may be undertaken by a
president or a general manager, who is employed to take care of the whole
enterprise.
It is easier and simpler to study the second case, where the course of
action is assigned to the president or the general manager. So far as the owner
of the enterprise is concerned, once slbe has found a competent president or a
general manager and assigned the course of action to that person, what slbe
has to do is only to subtract the cost from the gross profit to obtain the net
profit. Then, for the owner, to compare two or more alternatives and to make
a decision as to which alternative to choose, the rational thing is to choose the
alternative having the maximum net utility. In this case, the alternative and
the object reduce to the same thing, because the course of action, considered
only insofar as it has a specific cost, is incorporated into the object. Therefore,
in this case, decision-making is relatively simple and straightforward.
The first case, where the course of action is undertaken by the owner of
the enterprise herself or himself, is much more complicated, because, apart
from the cost of the course of action, the degree of interest in the course of
action by the owner may vary widely and affect the final decision-making.
I use an example for illustration. Suppose that a man M has some money
for investment. The amount is sufficient to open a small convenience store or
a small restaurant. According to calculation of cost and profit, M finds that
the convenience store would be much more profitable than the restaurant.
However, M himself is a cook and is presently employed by a large restaurant
as a chef. He is very much interested in presenting his delicious dishes to
customers, but he is not as free to do so in a large restaurant owned by others
as in a small restaurant owned by himself. Now we have two alternatives to
compare. Alternative A is to open a convenience store. The overall utility
consists of the net profit of the store plus the salary M takes from the large
restaurant. Alternative B is to open a restaurant. The overall utility consists of
the net profit of the restaurant plus the salary M takes from his own restaurant,
which may be the same as what M takes from the large restaurant, or may be
less because the restaurant owned by himself is much smaller. Suppose that
the overall net utility of alternative A is much greater than that of alternative
B, but M still makes a decision to open a small restaurant. Why? Is his
decision an irrational one, or still to be considered a rational one?
My explanation is that M's decision to open a small restaurant is still
rational, because he has a strong interest in presenting his good dishes to
guests, and it is much more convenient for him to do so in his own small
restaurant than in the large restaurant owned by others. This kind of action
has a high utility for him. To cook delicious dishes is, in a sense, an artistic
creation. M finds a high aesthetic or artistic satisfaction in presenting his
delicious dishes to the guests. In the calculation of the overall utility of an
alternative, the spiritual value of aesthetic or artistic satisfaction should also
be taken into full account. With this utility properly counted, the overall
utility of alternative B becomes greater than that of alternative A.
This is my conception of the decision-theoretic approach. If every utility,
whether material or non-material, including those obtained in the course of
action, is taken into consideration, then, for a rational person, the right
alternative is always the one with the maximum utility.
In my unified utilitarian theory, I developed a decision-theoretic model
for moral actions, where I introduced the utility of the factor of feeling of
moral satisfaction to compensate for the seemingly lesser utility of the chosen
alternative compared to other alternatives, so that, subjectively, the chosen
alternative still has the maximum utility for the agent. 1
This feeling of satisfaction is not restricted to morality. It may be
extended to all kinds of activities. For artistic creation or appreciation, a
feeling of artistic or aesthetic satisfaction may arise. For scholastic work, a
feeling of epistemic satisfaction occurs. For professional, administrative, or
political activities, a feeling of professional, administrative, or political
satisfaction, respectively, can be enjoyed.
Federico Frischknacht and Pedro F. J. Pavesi divide decision-making into
three kinds, according to an ascending order of level: (1) the operative level,
(2) the management level, and (3) the policy or strategy level. They hold that
the application of decision theory at the operating level is clear-cut and
definite, while at the management level it is obscure and fuzzy, and at the
policy or strategic level it can at best be oraP That is to say, the application
of decision theory at high levels is quite difficult, if not impossible. I hold
that this difficulty is partly attributable to the non-material values gained in
the course of action, which so far have not been properly taken care of. If
16
17
18
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
these values are more intensively studied and included in the calculation of
overall utility for the decision-maker, then, although the problem of decisionmaking at high levels is still not expected to be solved completely or as
adequately as at lower levels, at least some improvement or breakthrough will
occur.
At any rate, the solution of the decision problem depends heavily upon a
subjective theory of value, and a decision-theoretic approach also seems a
necessary condition for the establishment of such a subjective general theory
of value.
To have this conceptual framework, it is not necessary to know every
detail about the nature of happiness. Douglas J. Den Uyl and Tibor R.
Machan examine "How happiness has been related to pleasure, to time, to joy,
to life, to morality, to virtue, etc.," and they conclude that "Contemporary
theories are struggling with much the same issues as their classical
counterparts.',3 A study of happiness in all these dimensions is quite different
from that of the general concept of happiness, just as a study of the details of
the several kinds of value is different from that of a general theory of value.
Incidentally, this exposition explains why in the unified utilitarian theory
I do not adopt the classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental. That
an object 0 has an "intrinsic" value implies that 0 is an end in itself. This
greatly disturbs the logical structure shown in Fig. 2 below. In the unified
utilitarian theory, every utility or value for an agent, whether material or
mon-material, moral or nonmoral, contributes to the happiness of the agent,
but the utilities or values themselves are not happiness because they are
considered from the viewpoint of the object.
Recently, D. W. Haslett proposed a compromise model of utility, as a
compromise between the traditional experience model and the more modem
preference model. 4 Since in the unified utilitarian theory utility is defined in
terms of preference, obviously the concept of utility is a kind of preference
model. However, since I consider happiness as a mental state, which results
from an actual incremental utility obtained by an agent (a subject) from an
object, these concepts of utility and happiness have already covered the
concept of "experience" and have also implied the cause-and-effect
relationship emphasized by the compromise model. Thus, the concepts of
utility and happiness in the unified utilitarian theory do not have the
weaknesses of either the experience model or the preference model, and in
effect unify these existing models with Haslett's compromise model.
2. Some Basic Definitions
Normally, value theories refer to general properties of all kinds of value,
while utility theories refer to a particular aspect, namely, von Neumann-
Some Basic Definitions
19
Morgenstern's utility in decision theory. Since I discuss values and utilities in
general, I call my theory a general theory of value. Since in my unified
utilitarian theory the starting point of the decision-theoretic approach to a
theory of value is a person's preference, which is obviously utility, I start my
theory of value from the definition of utility in terms of preference instead of
the definition of value. I regard value as a subsequent conception derived
from utility.
In this section, I will present the definitions of utility and value, and I
will explain several terms involved in the defmition. I defme utility first and
then derive the concept of value from that of utility, because I hold that the
concept of utility comes prior to that of value.
The defmition of utility in my theory is close to the defmition of value
presented by D.W. Prall, although the essence of my theory is quite different
from his. Prall writes:
Anything is properly said to have a value in case, and only in case, it is
the object of the affective motor response which we call being interested
in, positively or negatively, ... The being liked, or disliked, of the object
is its value. And since the being liked, or disliked, is being the subject of
a motor-affective attitude in a subject, some sort of a subject is always
requisite to there being value at all-not necessarily a judging subject,
but a subject capable of at least motor-affective response. 5
The defmition of utility in my unified utilitarian theory is formulated as
follows.
An object 0 is said to have a "utility U" for
has one or more special characters which
using, enjoying, or experiencing 0 to not
enjoying, or not experiencing 0. S is said to
only if 0 has a utility Ufor S. 6
a subject S if and only if 0
make S prefer possessing,
possessing, not using, not
take an interest in 0 if and
An object 01 is said to have a "greater utility for a subject S than another
object 02" if and only if, when S is to choose precisely one object out of 0]
and 02, S will choose 0]. Objects 01 and 02 are said to have equal utilities
for a subject S if and only if, when S is to choose precisely one object out of
0] and 02, S will have no particular preference. If S actually possesses, uses,
enjoys, or experiences 0, then the utility of 0 for S and the interest of SinO
are said to be "actual." Otherwise, they are said to be "hypothetical." If a
subject S has a hypothetical interest in an object 0, that does not necessarily
imply that S has a desire to obtain 0 by taking an action, because the
decision-making for an action depends upon other relevant factors as well.
20
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
Happiness is defined in my unified utilitarian theory as follows.
A subject S is said to have an "incremental piece of happiness" if and
only ifS takes a new actual interest in an object OJ
Ralph Barton Perry regards value as a relation between an object and an
interested subject. 8 In the unified utilitarian theory, utility as well as interest
are considered to be related to both an object 0 and a subject S, as a result of
the special character(s) of object O. While utility is from the point of view of
object 0, interest is from the point of view of subject S. Thus, utility and
interest can be considered cause and effect, or excitation and response. Their
relationship can be represented diagrammatically, as shown in Fig. 2 below.
Object
0
utility for_
---
--
Subject
S
mterest m
Cause or
excitation
Effect or
response
(l) Relationship between object and subject so
far as utility and interest are concerned.
o has a
utility
for S
"'--- .
;>
S has an
interest
inO
(2) Relationship between utility and interest.
Fig. 2 Diagrammatic Representation of the Relationships
among Object, Subject, Utility, and Interest.
The above defmition of utility needs some explanations. The four
quantities (object, subject, character, and interest), the two adjectives (actual
and hypothetical), and the term "happiness," will be explained in detail in
the following.
First, consider the term "object." Object is the thing that generates,
produces, or is the source of a utility or value. Object may be a concrete
Some Basic Definitions
21
physical object, like an automobile. For instance, after a person has obtained
an automobile, the automobile is used by the person when s/he drives,
possessed by the person all the time, and enjoyed by the person when s/he
thinks of or uses the automobile.
Object may also be abstract, such as fame or power. For instance, a
politician pursues power, and the power the politician has obtained is also
used, possessed, and enjoyed by her or him.
Object may also be a position, a situation, or a state of mind. For instance,
after a Ph.D. candidate has obtained a doctorate degree, s/he may find a
teaching position of assistant professor at a university. This assistant
professorship is not to be used or possessed like a concrete physical object,
but is to be experienced, not just occasionally, but constantly as long as s/he
remains an assistant professor. This position as assistant professor is also
enjoyed by the person.
For the sake of clarity, I use four verbs-"possess," "use," "enjoy," and
"experience"-instead of the single verb "obtain." So far as logical rigor of
the definition is concerned, the verb "obtain" is sufficient and may be used in
place of the four verbs, but the four verbs also explain why the object has a
utility for the subject.
We may say that anything that has a value or utility for a subject is an
object. Thus, an action that has a value for the recipient of the action is an
object. Strictly speaking, the value of an action lies in its consequences, or the
value of an action is the value of the consequences of the action. However, an
action has a value for the recipient of the action and also a value for the agent
who takes the action; these two values are often different. For moral actions, I
have distinguished between the value for the recipient (others or society),
called the value of the consequences ofthe action, and the value for the agent,
called the value of the action. 9
Next, consider subject. Subject is the recipient of the utility or value of
the object. By a subject is meant a person, a group of people, a society, all the
people of a nation, or all the human beings in the world. In the following, the
term "society" will be used to represent a group of people of any number, as
contrasted to an individual person, without considering whether society
represents a local community, a group of a special nature, or all the human
beings in the world. It is important to distinguish between an individual and a
society, but it is not essential to specify the nature or the exact size of the
society.
Since utility comes from an object, I speak of the utility of an object.
Since an agent is interested in, pursues, or takes an action to obtain the object
for herself or himself, I speak ofthe utility of the objectfor the subject.
Utility and interest are defmed in such a way that they are related to the
personal preference in decision-making. This implies that utilities have
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
Some Basic Definitions
magnitude and sign and are comparable subjectively. The degrees of interest
are like utilities in these ways. In the history of moral philosophy, the
defmition of "good" has been quite controversial, because it involves the
various senses of "good" in English usage. This further involves the
discussion of the meanings of similar words such as "desire," "desirable,"
"like," "right," "ought," "duty," and "obligatory."
The above defmition of utility circumvents the linguistic problem
completely, because to defme utility according to preference, which is
manifested as a result of comparison and decision-making, is defmite and
clear-cut, thereby introducing no obscurity of English usage.
As to the special character of an object, this refers to the specific use of
the object, together with the intrinsic properties of the material from which
the object is made, such as the weight and size of most things, the hardness
and high refraction angle of diamonds, the red color of rubies, the strong
tensile strength of nylon fibers, the elasticity of rubber, the good taste of fruit,
or the high insulating property of wool. Because of these properties, these
objects are utilized to make commodities which have material utilities. For
instance, rubber is used to make tires because of its elasticity. Diamonds are
precious because of their hardness and high refraction angle'. Wool is used to
make clothing because its high insulating property keeps the body warm. The
price, and hence also the utility, of many commodities are either directly
proportional to, or a function of, one or more of these properties, as well as
the available amount of these properties.
In addition to the elementary intrinsic characters of materials mentioned
above, many commodities have complex acquired characteristics. For
instance, a car is a means of transportation. Its essential characteristics are the
ability to be driven at several speeds, the capacity for seating a number of
people, and the quality in terms of dependability, endurance, appearance,
comfort, etc.
As to the word "interest," Perry writes, "It is this all-pervasive
characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state, act, attitude or disposition
of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name interest."10 No
matter how interest is defined by psychologists, the essential thing is that
interest is the response from a subject to the utility of an object for the subject.
Other terms may be used in place of interest. For instance, when a subject S
takes an interest in an object 0, we sometimes say, "S strives for 0," "S
longs for 0," "S wishes for 0," or "S desires 0." The word "desirable" is
often considered synonymous to "good." For the sake of simplicity and
clarity, "interest" will be used exclusively with the meaning explained above.
Interest is quite a suitable word. It can be used in connection with any
kind of utility. Suppose that a subject S takes an interest in O. If 0 has a
material value, then this means that 0 is useful to S in serving one or more
purposes. If 0 has an aesthetic value, then this means that S appreciates the
beautifulness of O. If 0 has an epistemic value, then this means that S
understands and enjoys the knowledge in O. If 0 has a moral value, then it
means that S approves, praises, or finds a moral satisfaction in O.
I will now explain the terms "actual interest," "actual utility."
"hypothetical interest," and "hypothetical utility." If an object 0 is actually
possessed, used, enjoyed, or experienced by a subject S, then S is said to take
an "actual interest" in 0, and 0 is said to have an actual utility for S. If 0 is
not actually possessed, used, enjoyed, or experienced by a subject S, then S is
said to take a "hypothetical interest" in 0, and 0 is said to have a
hypothetical utility for S.
For example, if a person A takes an interest in a new car B and actually
buys B at a proper price of, say $20,000, then B has an actual utility of
$20,000 for A. However, if for some reason A does not buy B in spite of A's
interest in B, then B is said to have only a hypothetical utility for A. This
distinction between actual utility and hypothetical utility is important in the
consideration of the total utility for a person. For instance, in the calculation
of the total material utility or wealth of a person, only the utilities of those
properties actually possessed by that person are taken into account.
Finally, I will discuss the term "happiness." Happiness is a controversial word and has many different interpretations like the word "good."
The study of the concept of happiness is still going on, as reported by
Douglas Den Uyl and Tibor R. Machan. 11 The most confusing point about
happiness is the one that Mill focuses on when he considers some things as
means toward an end as well as a part of the sole end of happiness. 12 In the
definition given above, happiness has a one-to-one correspondence to actual
interest, that is, happiness is deliberately defined to be exclusively the sole
end. The sequence of logical reasoning can be recapitulated as follows.
22
23
1. Object 0 has characters or characteristics, such that
2. Object 0 has a hypothetical utility for subject S, and S takes a
hypothetical interest in O.
3. If S actually possesses, uses, enjoys, or experiences 0, then 0 has an
actual utility for S, and S takes an actual interest in O.
4. S has an incremental piece of happiness, if and only if S takes an
actual interest in O.
These relationships can be represented diagrammatically, as shown in
Fig. 3.
General Properties of Value and Utility
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
24
o has a
Character
l
I
Such that,
S possesses,
uses,
experiences, or
---enjoys 0
. . .-
o has a
S has a
hypothetical
interest in 0
hypothetical
utility for S
o has an actual
utility for S
~
S has an actual
interest in 0
25
in Section 3 of Chapter One, and will be furthur discussed in Chapters Three
and Four. So far as the utility of a particular object for an individual person as
subject is concerned, utility is the same as value. So here I do not distinguish
between utility and value, and what I refer to as general properties of value
are also general properties of utility.
The general properties of value will be discussed in the following.
I-
receives an
incremental
~ piece of happiness
from 0
~
I. Value is subjective.
In the unified utilitarian theory, according to the definitions of utility and
value presented above, value is something that an object has for a subject S.
The defmition is stated in terms of utility and, in tum, of preference, which is
a purely personal choice or decision and, hence, is definitely subjective. Thus,
value is naturally asserted to be subjective.
This is also the view of most decision scientists, as exemplified by the
following statement by Peter C. Fishburn: "Every decision situation is unique.
Value or worth has meaning only in connection with a human agent with a
purpose, and is relative to this agent within the context of a decision
situation."]3 Here the term "relative" is referred to an agent in a decision
situation and, therefore, implies what I mean by "subjective."
J. B. Callicott has a clear view that value is subjective, and he strongly
supports the putative fact/value distinction. He writes:
Fig. 3 Diagrammatic Representation of the Sequence
of Logical Reasoning Leading to Happiness.
We can readily see that object 0 alone is a means and happiness is the
sole end. Since "happiness" is a noun, linguistically we can say that S has an
amount of happiness. In this way, happiness is treated as an object, which can
have a utility and in which an interest can be taken again. This is circularity!
This is why, in the unified utilitarian theory, I defme happiness in the
above manner. To avoid confusion, happiness, as a desirable final
psychological state, is considered the sole end but not a means. On the other
hand, knowledge, which has epistemic utility, and art, which has aesthetic
utility, are all objects and hence means. Even the feeling of moral satisfaction,
which has a moral utility for the agent, is a means, which contributes to the
sole end of happiness.
We see that happiness is almost synonymous to interest, except that
interest refers to a relation of a subject to an object, whereas happiness refers
to a general state of mind of the subject. However, interest can be used in a
general sense too, as in such terms like "degree of interest" and "equality of
interest." In that case, happiness and interest can be used interchangeably.
The objective physical world is sharply distinguished from subjective
consciousness in the metaphysical posture of modem science as
originally formulated by Descartes. Thought, feeling, sensation, and
value [my emphasis] have ever since been, from the point of view of
scientific naturalism, regarded as confmed to the subjective [my
emphasis] realm of consciousness. The objective, physical world is
therefore value-free from a scientific point ofview.l 4
Callicott's view is thorough and clear-cut, as seen from the following
excerpt:
3. General Properties of Value and Utility
Value is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the
subjective feelings of observers. If all consciousness were armihilated at a
stroke, there would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right
and wrong, only impassive phenomena would remain. IS
Once utility is formally defined, the next thing to do is to define or to explain
value in terms of utility and to distinguish between value and utility. Once the
concept of value is clarified, then some general properties of value can be
found. These general properties are essential to a comprehensive theory of
value. They may be inferred either directly from the definitions, or indirectly
from using common sense and logical reasoning consistent with the
defmitions.
The relation and the distinction between value and utility were discussed
That value is subjective solves a serious problem for utilitarianism. A
strong criticism of utilitarianism is that values are incommensurable because
values differ widely in nature. However, subjectively, we can still make a
i
L
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
General Properties of Value and Utility
choice between any two values, no matter how widely different in nature the
two values may be. For instance, we may choose love at the expense of
money, or we may sacrifice life for the noble cause of liberty. The natures of
the two alternatives are not comparable, but the subjective utilities or values
for the subject are comparable.
A unique exception is the exchange value of money, which means
purchasing power and is objectively determined by the market prices of the
commodities. These prices are in tum objectively determined by the amounts
of commodities supplied, the demand of the commodities by the people, and
the total amount of currency in circulation. Money also has a utility for every
person, which is expressed by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
of the person. Thus, so far as money is concerned, value is different from
utility.
Once the property of subjectiveness is established, other general proprties
of value can readily be established or inferred through simple logical
reasoning from the property subjectiveness.
That values of different kinds are commensurable was suggested by
Hastings Rashdall, as can be seen from this statement: "This position implies
that all goods or elements of the good are in some sense and, for some
purposes, commensurable." 16 His ideal utilitarianism is a combination of "the
utility principle that ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of
the ethical end." Thus, "Actions are right or wrong according as they tend to
produce for mankind an ideal end or good, which includes, but is not limited
to, pleasure."l7 Rashdall has generalized Bentham's notion of pleasure to
cover all kinds of values.
Jan Narveson, having made a detailed discussion of utility, concludes
that utilities are comparable and hence susceptible of quantitative analysis.
He writes, "As to the first point, it seems to me that we are sometimes clear
as to which of two alternatives produces more utility; and that we are clear
about this without having had to invoke precise metrics, precise
instruments."18 Even if value and utility are vague and hard to measure,
sometimes we have to compare and make a decision. Narveson considered
this situation a justification in favor of utilitarianism. He says, "Sometimes,
the method will be that of matching vagueness. If a case really is hard to
decide, and if we can show that what makes it hard to decide in that case is
that utility is involved, and that the utility in question is hard to measure, then
that is a point in favor of the utilitarian view."19
26
2. Values are comparable subjectively.
An objective thing or a property has magnitude, and the magnitudes of
two or more objective things or properties of the same kind can be
objectively compared. So the natural sequence of inference is from
magnitude to comparison, or the property of magnitude naturally precedes the
property of comparability. Values, however, are subjective in nature and,
hence, do not have objective magnitudes. The magnitude of a value does not
exist or appear in itself but is manifested or squeezed out only in subjective
comparison. Therefore, the natural order of inference is from comparability to
magnitude, that is, the property of subjective comparability precedes the
property of magnitude. So, along with the statement that value is subjective, I
claim that values are comparable subjectively.
Subjective comparability is valid for values of the same kind. We can
easily make a choice between two cars, between two diamond rings, between
two jobs, or between two friends. This comparability can be extended to two
values of different kinds. A person must often make a choice between
material value and non-material value. For instance, when you donate money
to a university, you actually trade off money for reputation and for a feeling
of moral satisfaction, or make a choice ofa moral value over a material value.
Quite often when a person makes a decision, several factors are in favor of
the final choice while several other factors are against it. Sometimes these
factors are mixed in nature, that is, their values belong to different classes. In
other words, values of different classes may be added together to form a total
value.
27
3. Value has magnitude and the mathematical sign of "positive" or
"negative."
Since values are comparable subjectively, after a subjective comparison
of two values, the value which the comparer prefers is said to be greater than
the other value.
That value has magnitude is often exhibited in daily oral statements. We
sometimes say, "A has a big value," "B is of little value," "A is better than
B," "C is the best of all," etc. The statement "A has a big value," or "B is of
little value," looks like an objective statement without subjective comparison.
In fact, A or B is understood to be compared with some average value or
norm of the same kind. A comparison is implied but not stated explicitly.
If something, A, is said to be bad, we mean that A's existence is worse
than A's non-existence, hence; A has a negative value. Prall already puts this
property in his definition of value: "...which we call being interested in,
positively or negatively, ... "20 If something is neither good nor bad, then it is
"neutral" and has a zero value.
Therefore, value may be associated with a sign and treated as an
algebraic quantity, that is, value may be a parameter, a constant, or a variable.
........
28
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
4. Value is measurable subjectively.
Since value has a magnitude and a sign and is comparable to other values,
value may be said to be measurable, at least theoretically, although
practically an instrument or a "valuemeter" to do the measurements does not
exist for all values. For instance, for the measurement of length, we have the
ruler or tape; for the measurement of weight, we have the spring or the
balance; and for the measurement of voltage, we have the voltmeter. These
instruments measure the respective quantities objectively, independently of
the subject or the observer. However, an objective valuemeter does not exist
to measure values, nor can we imagine or invent such a meter. Many
philosophers contend that values are incommensurable just because of this
reason.
This difficulty can be surmounted by the very notion that value is
subjective. Consider a case where an object, 0, has a value for a unique
subject, S, who is a single person. Then the measurement of the value of
object 0 is exactly done by the estimation, the judgment, and the decision of
subject S. In other words, subject S serves as a valuemeter.
For a non-material value, such as a moral value, the measurement is more
difficult. 21 When you want to make a decision involving moral factors, you
have to make measurements of the values of the moral factors as well as the
nonmoral factors before arriving at a decision, although the measurements
may be inaccurate and only in the form of rough estimates.
Since values are measurable, they should have the same unit, although so
far no standard unit has been adopted. However, for things having material
values, prices are expressed in terms of money, and the unit of money in the
United States is the dollar. Suppose prices properly represent values. Then
the unit of money, the dollar, may be borrowed to serve as a unit of material
value as well. Since values of different kinds are comparable, we may
reasonably adopt the dollar as the unit of all values.
5. Value is of statistical nature.
A commodity has an actual value only for the person or the family
possessing it, but it has a hypothetical value for all those persons who have
the potential for buying it. A piece of public property, such as a park or the
library, has an actual value for all the members of the local community. A
law or a national system of government has an actual value for all the people
of the country. Thus, an object usually has a value for a number of persons. In
that case, since value is subjective, it varies from person to person, just like
the marks of the students in a class or the salaries of the employees of a
company. When the number of persons is large enough, the values may be
On Pleasure, Happiness, Desire-Satisfaction, etc.
29
represented by a random variable with a probability distribution. For such
variables, statistical methods can be used to advantage.
R. G. Frey defmes preference-utilitarianism as classical utilitarianism
with an expanded value theory. He writes:
In recent years, however, numerous writers have moved away from a
mental-state view of utility and value, on the ground that it is too
confming to restrict utility to a concern with states of mind, to an
interest-satisfaction view, in which 'interest' is a generic term covering a
multiplicity of desires and preferences. Thus, construed as I have done
here, preference-utilitarianism is classical utilitarianism with an
expanded value theory.22
From the definition of value presented above, we can see that the unified
utilitarian theory is a preference-utilitarianism. An "expanded value theory"
means a value theory whic!). covers all kinds of values, including material and
non-material values. This is what I intend to emphasize. Frey also writes,
"The term 'utility', then, is a blanket term, to be filled in by whatever
standard of goodness is adopted."23
4. On Pleasure, Happiness, Desire-Satisfaction, etc.
This book deals specifically with value and utility. Because of the
complicated notions of these terms and the controversial views of them, what
I intend to do in this book is clarify these notions from my unified utilitarian
point of view, thus formulating my own utilitarian general theory of value. In
moral and social philosophy, especially utilitarianism, apart from value and
utility, other terms, such as "pleasure," "happiness," "desire-satisfaction,"
"well-being (welfare)," and "interest," have meanings close to value and
utility and are quite often used and discussed by moral and social
philosophers. However, these terms are not well-defined and their meanings
vary widely from person to person.
In this section, I discuss the following five terms briefly: (1) pleasure, (2)
happiness, (3) desire-satisfaction, (4) well-being or welfare, and (5) interest.
The term "welfare" has a meaning close to "well-being" and is sometimes
used synonymously with "well-being." So I put "well-being" and "welfare"
together as one term and do not discuss them separately.
"Pleasure" is the key word used by Bentham to express the ultimate end
of life. He even proposed a hedonic calculus to calculate the size of pleasure
in terms of seven properties. His calculus has never been popularly used,
perhaps because it is difficult to apply, or because pleasure is restricted in
meaning and cannot cover all aspects of the ultimate end of life. So
DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF VALUE
On Pleasure, Happiness, Desire-Satisfaction, etc.
"pleasure" was replaced by "happiness" in John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism.
"Pleasure" is basically a feeling, which is normally a direct and
immediate response without deliberation. So it covers only a small area of
human desire-satisfaction and is usually associated with low-level sensual
desires. For instance, Fred Feldman points out one main objection to classical
utilitarianiasm, namely, "the doctrine of swine," and says, "To suppose that
life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure - no better and nobler
object of desire and pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and grovelling,
as a doctrine worth only of swine."24 This charge causes Mill to employ the
distinction between quantity and quality.
As to the term "happiness," it is broader than "pleasure," and it also
expresses a psychological state of satisfaction, which is not necessarily an
immediate response, but may be considered the ultimate end oflife.
The term "pleasure" is not popularly used now, whereas the term
"happiness" is still widely used by philosophers, although it too is not welldefmed. Since I agree that pleasure is not an appropriate word to describe the
ultimate end of life as the essence of utilitarianism, I do not use it either. As
to the term "happiness," I not only use it but define it in Section 2 above in a
clear-cut way.
The term "desire-satisfaction" is not popularly used, but its notion is still
accepted by many philosophers. "Desire" is also basically a term related to
feeling. Some large utilities, which are usually obtained after a long course of
action, do not necessarily result in a kind of satisfaction in the sense of what
desire-satisfaction means. Thus, the scope covered by things having the effect
of desire-satisfaction is useful and has utility for a person, but not everything
that has utility for someone gives that person the so-called desire-satisfaction.
Therefore, "desire-satisfaction" does not seem an appropriate term, and I do
not use it much.
The terms "well-being" and "welfare" are quite popularly used and
discussed nowadays. For instance, James Griffin has written a whole
monograph to discuss the various aspects of well-being. 25 "Well-being" and
"welfare" are appropriate words, but are not well-defined. I use them from a
societal point of view. I use the word "welfare" specifically in the term
"social welfare function" to indicate aggregate or social utility, and I use the
word "well-being" only in a general and non-strict sense.
Finally, I come to the term "interest," which is quite popularly used. I
define the term "interest" concurrently in the definition of utility: A subject,
S, is said to take an interest, I, in an object, 0, if and only if object 0 has a
utility U for subject S. Thus, utility and interest have a one-to-one
correspondence, or roughly they amount to the same thing. The only
difference is that utility is from the point of view of the object, whereas
interest is from the point of view of the subject.
I believe we should define some crucial terms in a clear-cut way, in
order to have a definite and scientific study of them. Since in this book I am
developing a utilitarian general theory of value, which I intend to present
rigorously and scientifically, I define the frequently-used terms "utility,"
"value," "happiness," and "interest" rigorously. As to some other terms, such
as "pleasure," "desire-satisfaction," "well-being," and "welfare," they are
not rigorously defined, because they are not used in a specific way in my
theory. When I occasionally use them, they are meant according to the
general English usage.
Dan W. Brock lists four principal candidates for the different notions of
what has value or good consequences: (I) happiness; (2) the satisfaction of
desires or preference; (3) the promotion of interest or welfare; (4) a fmal
account which is difficult aptly to name but which is associated with what is
commonly called "ideal utilitarianism."26 Brock considers these different
notions or terms mainly from a linguistic point of view. Naturally, he comes
across difficulty in relating, differentiating, equalizing, or unifying their
meanings and the theories advocating these notions. On the other hand, I
discard the linguistic approach and start from a clear-cut defmition of utility
in terms of preference. In this way, the difficulty is avoided or circumvented.
By not using the terms "pleasure" and "desire-satisfaction," I find that the
four terms "utility," "interest," "happiness," and "well-being" are compatible
and can be used coherently.
30
31
Three
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND
STATISTICAL NATURE
1. Objectivity and Pseudo-Objectivity
In Chapter Two, I asserted that value is subjective and statistical in nature, but
without giving full justification for this assertion. In this chapter, I discuss in
detail the subjective and statistical nature of value. I claim that every value except
the exchange value of money is subjective. That this is true hinges on my special
definition of objectivity of value.
According to the generally-accepted notion of objectivity of value, a
value may be either subjective or objective; some values are subjective while
other values are objective. Or a value may be both subjective and objective; a
value may be partly subjective and partly objective.
Both the words "subjective" and "objective" have many meanings. A. W.
Sparkes explains the adjective "objective" from the point of view of
perceptual situation. l The situation has subjective factors: those contributed
to it by the person who perceives an object. The situation has objective
factors: those contributed to it by the object.
Archie 1. Bahm limits and specifies one set of particular meanings of
"subjective" and "objective" for his axiology, which seems representative and
accepted by most people. Bahm writes:
To be objective is to be an object of attention. Analyses of experience
normally distinguish a subject as that which attends and an object as that
which is attended to. In such an analysis, subject and object are
correlative. An object is always an object for a subject, and subject is
always aware of an object.2
According to this interpretation, all intrinsic values that are objects of
attention are inherently and automatically objective, and some instrumental
values are also objective. 3
I do not use the classification of values into intrinsic and instrumental,
nor do I adopt the notion of objectivity used by others. In order to study some
delicate characteristics of value more intensively from my unified utilitarian
point of view, I limit the use of the term "objective" as an adjective for the
description of a property or a characteristic of an object, which is a
characteristic of the object itself alone, independent of any subject. For
instance, the weight of a piece of stone, the length of a table, the area of a
L
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE
Value Judgment
room, the hardness of diamond, and the viscosity of petroleum, are objective.
Since value is the result of interaction between an object and a subject,
according to my conception of objectivity, value is naturally subjective and
cannot be objective. In other words, if the value of an object is objective, it
should exist even in the absence of any subject. Since the conception of value
is derived from utility, which I define in terms of personal preference, no
objective value (except the exchange value of money) exists at all.
However, sometimes the value of an object is for a group of people, and
the group may be all human beings. The value of the object may be felt and
perceived by all members of the group, with the magnitude of the value not
necessarily identical. In that case, the value of the object is usually conceived
and misunderstood as something not subjectively recognized by the subject,
but "objectively" existing and independent of the subject. The value of the
object is then called and generally accepted as an objective value. According
to my definition above, this value is still subjective, but sometimes I use the
term "pseudo-objective" to describe it. 4
Pseudo-objectivity is one of the sources ofthe statistical nature of values,
which I will discuss in the next section. Then, in Section 3, I discuss value
judgment specifically. In Section 4, I discuss the extension of the notions of
object, subject, and judge from a single object or person to a group using
various examples. In Section 5, I discuss the statistical nature of two most
important moral values: (I) the value of a moral action, and (2) the value of
an abstract moral concept, namely, a moral principle, virtue, or moral rule.
Finally, in Section 6, I list several kinds of values and their statistical nature
in a table form as a summary.
have a statistical nature in one, two, or three dimensions.
Consider the extension of object, subject, and judge from a single one to
a set or a group. Several notions of extension will be discussed in detail and
illustrated by examples in Section 3. Here I just point out their existence as a
fact.
So far as the object is concerned, since we often find desirable to know
the average value of a class of things, we naturally extend the notion of object
from a particular one to a class of objects. This kind of notion does occur. We
sometimes say how good, useful, or important something is. This something
usually refers to the class of this something, not a particular one of it. For
instance, when we say "Chocolate is good," we mean chocolate in general, or
the class of chocolate, not a particular piece of chocolate.
So far as the subject is concerned, we also naturally extend the notion of
subject from a single person to a group of people, or naturaly all human
beings. It is generally accepted that the conception of usefulness or goodness
is applicable to society. If something is good for society, then everybody
would have a chance to enjoy this goodness, and if something is bad for
society, then everybody would have a chance of being harmed by this
badness. So the extension of subj ect from a single person to a group of people
is quite natural, and it occurs.
So far as the judge is concerned, we may naturaly extend the notion of
judge from a single person to a group, because the judge who makes a value
judgment may be either the subject for whom the value exists or any other
member of society. The situation is further complicated because the value of
a value judgment may be either the same as or different from the value or
utility felt and perceived by the subject for whom the value exists.
34
35
2. The Sources of the Statistical Nature
3. Value JUdgment
The existence of value involves three necessary entities: (I) the object, 0, that has
a value, (2) the subject, S, for whom the value of the object exists, and (3) the
judge, J, who makes the value judgment of the object. The notions of object,
subject, and judge may each be extended from a single one to a set or a group.
The notion of object may be extended from a particular object to a class of the
objects. The notion of subject may be extended from a single person to a group of
people, to all members of society, or to all human beings. The notion of judge
may also be extended from a single person to all members of society. When at
least one of these three entities--object, subject, and judge-is a set or a group
instead of a single one, the value is not fixed but varies from one member of the
group to another, and may be regarded as a random variable having a probability
distribution. Sometimes the mean of the various values in a distribution is used to
represent the value, and that is called the "norm" of the value by social scientists.
This is what I mean by the statistical nature of values. Since three possible sets or
groups exist in which a value may vary from member to member, a value may
Becsuse of the importance of value judgment and of the complex feature that it
may be made either by the subject or by anybody else, I discuss it specifically in
this section. By value judgment, I mean the evaluation or the value estimate of an
object or a class of objects for an individual person, a group of people, or society
at large, by any member of society, who may be either the subject for whom a
value is or anybody else.
Normally the judge for the value judgment of a particular object for a
particular person is the subject herself or himself, because the subject feels or
perceives the utility of the object for that person and naturally has a value
judgment of the object no matter whether s/he deliberately makes the value
judgment. Other people do not know the exact magnitude of the utility of the
object for the subject and normally do not bother to make such a value
judgment. In that case, the value judgment of the object is usually the same as
L
36
Extensions of the Notion of Value
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE
37
that person's point of view. Suppose that Bert's drinking lemonade
would be good for him: he has a cold, his drinking lemonade would
alleviate it, and since the alleviation of his cold would on balance be in
his interest, his drinking lemonade would in balance be in his interest.
But he might not know that his drinking lemonade would alleviate his
cold, and therefore not value his drinking lemonade. If so, then while his
drinking lemonade would be good for him, it is not good from his point
of view.
the utility of the object for the subject. Since the notion of subject may be
extended from a single person to a group of people, the notion of judge may
be similarly extended. The statistical distribution of the value judgment is
also the same as the statistical distribution of the utilities for the subjects.
When we talk about value judgment, usually we do not say "utility
judgment," even though by the value of the value judgment we mean the
same thing as the value or utility felt and perceived by the subject.
Even for the value judgment of a particular object for an individual, a
value judgment may be made by a person other than the subject. As pointed
out above, when the subject makes a value judgment, it is usually the same as
the value or utility of the object for the subject. However, occasionally the
subject may be unaware of the exact nature of the object and feels or
perceives an apparent utility not compatible with the real value of the object.
For instance, a young person, A, may be unaware of the harm of a new drug
and tries it, enjoys it, and feels the utility of it. B, a friend of A, knowing the
harm of this drug, may make a value judgment of the drug and tell A about it.
In this example, the situation is complex. Since the new drug is harmful, it
has a negative value or disutility for the subject A who tries it. When A as a
judge makes a value judgment of the drug, the value is positive, because A
enjoys it and feels the utility of it in trying it. So A's value judgment of the
drug is obviously wrong. When B as a judge makes a value judgment of the
drug, the value is negative, because B knows the harm of the drug.
I regard this kind of ignorance as an exceptional case. Normally, I assume
that, as a rational person, an average or ordinary human being is able to judge
the value of an object in which s/he has an interest and a desire to obtain,
without the possibility of making a blunder as that made by A in the above
example. Some philosophers specify well-informed or well-considered
preference. For instance, John Harsanyi distinguishes between manifest
preference and true preference. s Because of the unboundedness of information
and consideration, the demarcation between well-informedness or wellconsideredness and not-well-informedness or not-well-consideredness is
extremely fuzzy. Therefore, I do not make such a distinction and do not
consider the exceptional cases.
Thus, value judgment is the evalution of the object according to the view
of the judge. Judith Jarvis Thomson calls this kind of value judgment
"goodness-from-a-point-of-view." She says, "What I mean by goodnessfrom-a-point-of-view is (roughly) prizing, or, as I will put it, valuing: a thing
is good from a person's point of view just in case the person values it."6
Thomson gives an example to distinguish between "good-for" and
"goodness-from-a-point-of-view," as quoted below:
It is also clear that a thing can be good from a person's point of view
without being good for that person. Bert might think that his drinking
furniture polish would alleviate his cold, and therefore value his drinking
furniture polish. That is compatible with its being the case that his
drinking furniture polish would not be good for him.?
In most cases, value judgment is made by a member of society who is not
the subject for whom the value exists. In that case, the value of the value
judgment may be either for the subject or for the society at large. Consider as
an example the value judgment of a moral action. Suppose that person PI
takes a moral action to help person P2, and person P3 says, "PI's action is a
good action." This statement is a value judgment of PI's action, and thus
may have two different interpretations. One interpretation is that this value
judgment refers to the value or utility of PI's action for P2. Since a morally
good action exemplifies some moral principle, virtue, or moral rule, the
action has a societal value. The value of the moral action for P2 is in tum also
for society. So another interpretation of the above statement is that the value
judgment refers to the value of PI 's action for society.
Since utility is subjective, and for P3 to know the exact utility of PI's
action for P2 is difficult, normally P3 would not bother to make a value
judgment of PI' s action in the sense of the first interpretation. So in general
we may take for granted that any value judgment like the above statement
should be understood in the sense of the second interpretation, except in
special situations.
In many cases, value judgments are of a class of objects or the abstract
concept of an object, while the subject is a group of people or the society at
large, but not a single person.
4. Extensions of the Notion of Value
In this section, I discuss in detail the extension of the notion of value from that of
a particular object (1) to the notion of value of a public facility, and (2) to the
It is clear that a thing can be good for a person without being good from
notion of value of a typical object, or the abstract concept of the object. A
L
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE
Extensions of the Notion of Value
particular object is usually possessed by an individual person, while a public
facility is usually used, but not possessed, by many people. So these two notions
should be distinguished. The notion of value of a particular object is also
naturally different from that of a typical object, or the abstract concept of the
object. In the following, for the sake of convenience, the explanation is mainly
made through the use of examples.
I fIrst consider the value (utility) of a particular object, say, a man's
jacket of size 40 regular, of a designated color, style, and quality. Two
situations occur. One situation is that this jacket has already been obtained by
a man, M. Here "obtained" means "possessed." Sometimes "obtained"
means "used, enjoyed, or experienced." In this case, the object, 0, is that
particular jacket, the subject, S, is that particular man, M, and the judge, J, is
also the same man, M, because M himself knows how good the jacket is and
how big its value is for him. This value is called an actual value, and the
interest of M in the jacket is called an actual interest, as defIned and
discussed in Chapter Two.
A second situation is that this jacket has not been obtained by M. In that
case, M has only a hypothetical interest in the jacket and the jacket has only a
hypothetical value (utility) for M. Here 0, S, and J are each not a particular
object or person but a member of a set. Since M has not purchased the jacket,
he could buy any other similar one from the same store or from another store.
A set of jackets exists of the same size, same color, same style, similar
quality, and similar price. M may buy anyone of this set. A member of this
set has a hypothetical value not only for this man, M, but also for any other
man of the same size, similar taste so far as style is concerned, and similar
fmancial condition. Therefore, the subject S is also not a single man, but a set
of men. As to the judge, J, it is also a set. If a jacket has a value, V, for a man,
M, then the value is for M, and M is also the judge of this value. Thus, the set
ofjudges is the same set of subjects with a one-to-one correspondence.
The actual situation is even more complicated. The jacket that a man
wants to buy is not unique. Suppose that a jacket of one style is M's fIrst
choice, and that another jacket of same size, color, and quality, but of a
slightly different style is M's second choice. Now if the second jacket is on
sale and can be bought at half price, M will likely buy the second jacket
instead of the fIrst one.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the jacket is unique, in the sense
that all the similar jackets in different stores are all of the same make and
priced the same. Among the set of men having a hypothetical interest in this
jacket, some will buy it, while some will still not buy it, because the
hypothetical value of the jacket for different men may be different. If the
price is below or equal to the hypothetical value for one man, then the man
will buy the jacket. If the price is above the value, then the man will not buy
the jacket.
In this oversimplifIed situation, object 0 is particular and unique,
whereas S and J are each a set and are of statistical nature. Since the set S and
the set J are the same and any person who is a subject is also the judge of the
value of the object, the statistics are of a single dimension.
I next consider the value of a public facility, such as a park. It is well
known that a public park has a value for the community. This value is not the
value ofthe whole park as an object for possession or for purchase, but is the
value for use or for enjoyment. A park is shared by all the people in the city,
especially those living close to it. An exceptionally beautiful park is a place
of interest of the city, and it is used and enjoyed not only by residents of the
city, but also by tourists from other places. The value of this park is different
for different people, depending on the frequency of visiting it by the person
and also on the degree of enjoyment of the person in visiting it. It has almost
no value at all to a person who never visits the park, except that the park may
contribute to the cleanness ofthe air of the city.
An existing public park is actually used and enjoyed by the people.
Therefore, the values of the park for the people and the interests of the people
in the park are all actual. Hypothetical values and interests exist only when a
park is under planning or construction.
For the case of a public park, the object is a particular park, which is
unique. The subject is a set of people who visit the park. The values of the
park are for these persons - a particular value for each person. The judges of
the value of the park are those members of society who have not necessarily
visited the park but have some knowledge of it.
The value judgment of such a park by a person is different from the value
of the park for that person. When people talk about the park, they may say,
"This park is beautiful," "This park is useful," or "This park has a high
value." Assume that the meanings of these three statements are equivalent, or
close to one another. They are different ways of expressing the opinion that
the park has a high value. Suppose that a person P I says, "This park has a
value." This statement represents the personal opinion about the park of PI,
where the value of the park is not meant the particular value of the park for
P I but the general value of the park for all the people of the town or society.
The particular value of the park for person PI and the general value of the
park for society are two different conceptions, as can be seen from the
following more complex statement by PI: "This park has a high value,
although I personally do not visit it often." In this example, PI is one of the
subjects for whom the park has a value. So to see a difference between the
value 'of the park for P I and its value for all the residents or society at large
may be confusing. Consider another example in which no value occurs for
the judge or the person who makes the statement. Suppose that a person A
38
--'--
39
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE
Statistical Nature of Moral Value
takes a charitable action for another person B, and a third person C says, "A
is a good person," or "A's action is virtuous." Here the goodness of A and
A's action is obviously not for C, but is only for B, and, in tum, for society at
large. This kind of statement, which is the opinion by an individual person
about the value of an object in general or for a group of people or for society
at large, is called value judgment.
Finally, I extend the conception of value to a typical object as the value
of an abstract concept of an object. By a typical object or an abstract concept
of an object, I mean the general concept of an object, without referring to any
particular object. For instance, you may say, "The piano is useful." This
"piano" is not a particular one because it is not specified at all, but it is a
typical piano or the abstract concept of a piano. In other words, it represents a
class of pianos of various kinds, styles, sizes, qualities, and prices, or it is the
norm of the class of pianos. Similarly, the subject, S, for whom a piano has a
value is not a particular person, but any person or any member of society, or a
typical person. Suppose that a bachelor, B, does not play piano, and his
bachelor's apartment has no room for a piano at all. Then any piano has no
value for B at all, except for an exchange value in resale. With the exchange
or resale value of piano not considered, no particular piano will have any
value for B. But B will still say that the piano is useful. Thus, the subject is
not B, because B personally does not need any piano. Moreover, the judge is
not limited to B. Any person, if s/he is asked to express a judgment of a piano,
will probably say, "The piano is useful." Therefore, the judge here is also any
member of society.
Value judgment may have a more sophisticated meaning, because the
object may be a class of objects, and the classes of different sizes exist.
Consider the famous Chinese classic, The Four Books. Not considering its
various editions, we all accept that it is a good book. This "book" refers to its
substance or contents rather than the physical object printed and bound in the
form of a book. Or, this book may be interpreted to refer to the class of all the
copies of The Four Books in the world. If a person, PI, has a copy of it, and if
PI shows that copy of The Four Books to a friend, P2, and says, "This book
has a high value for me," then P2 also refers to this particular copy of the
book, or to it as a representation of the book.
In pointing to her or his book and saying, "This book has a high value for
me," PI means specifically the value of the copy of the book for herself or
himself. But in saying, "The Four Books has a high value," PI means that
this book (by no means the particular copy of it) has a high value in general
or for all those people who read this book. So this statement is a value
judgment. In such a value judgment, since the value is for a group of people,
it is not necessarily the same for all the readers. Therefore, these values form
a statistical distribution. This value of the book, instead of the particular value
of the book for a particular person, may mean either the sum ofthe values for
all the readers, or the statistical mean of the values for all the readers.
The statement, "Books are valuable," which is equivalent to, "Books
each have a value," is a vague or fuzzy statement because most books are
valuable, but some books may exist which have no value at all or else have a
negative value. Logically, a negative value is also a value, and a zero value is
also a value. But in general, when we say something is valuable, we mean
that this something has a positive value. Let us interpret this statement as that
each book has a value in general. Even if every book has a positive value, all
books are not good to the same degree, for different books have different
values. So the value here either refers to the sum of the values of all books, or
to the statistical mean of the values of all books. Thus, the value of books is
of statistical nature in two dimensions: (I) the dimension of different readers,
the subject for whom the value is, and (2) the dimension of different books,
namely, the object which has the value.
A third dimension of statistics exists. The statement or the value
judgment made by a person, PI, is not necessarily accepted by other people,
because, when PI has a value judgment about an object, 0, and makes a
statement, another person, P2, may also have a value judgment of it and make
a statement, and any other person may have a value judgment and make a
statement. These value judgments made by PI, P2, etc. are not necessarily the
same. Even if they all agree that books are valuable, the magnitudes of the
values assigned to books can never be all exactly equal. Therefore, among the
judges or the persons who make value judgments, a statistical distribution
occurs too. A dimension exists of various judges, who are the people who
make, or who are in a position to make, value judgments.
Value judgment is a complicated phenomenon. Because of the three
dimensions of statistical distribution, it is a vague or fuzzy concept. In
particular, a person may make the statement that one object has a value for a
member of society. In general, a typical judge may make a statement that a
typical object has a value (for a typical member of society). Roughly, we may
say that the value judgment of a class of objects is the statistical mean or the
representative judgment by all members of society, of the statistical mean or
the representative value of the class of objects, for the statistical mean or the
representative subject. This complexity and the statistical nature of value
judgment may be reasons why so many philosophers and other people
maintain that value is objective.
40
41
5. Statistical Nature of Moral Value
Pseudo-objectivity and statistical nature are a general property of value and are
applicable to all kinds of value, including moral values. Moral values are of
L
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STATISTICAL NATURE
Summary afthe Statistical Nature of Value
special importance and will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. So the pseudoobjectivity and the statistical nature of moral values will be discussed in that
chapter too. Of all moral values, the value of a moral action for society and the
value of an abstract moral concept are of special significance because the subject
of these two kinds of value is society as a whole instead of a single person or a
group of people in the individualistic sense. In this section, I consider these two
kinds of moral value: (1) the moral value of a'moral action for society, and (2) the
moral value of a general moral concept or that of a moral principle, virtue, or
moral rule.
A moral action has a value for the recipient of the action, but the value
of the action for society is not necessarily the same as the value for the
recipient. For instance, to give some money to a beggar has a value for the
beggar, but not necessarily the same value for society. Suppose that a society
is affluent and provides unemployment allowance, so that nobody will really
starve. Also suppose that the people are in general generous, so that a beggar
can earn much more than the unemployment allowance. So, if nobody gives
money to beggars, there will be no beggars and nobody will starve. That
many people give money to beggars will encourage some people to prefer to
be beggars. Thus, the number of beggars tends to increase because of the
generosity of the people. Although the value of an action of giving money to
a beggar has a value for the beggar, this action has a negative value for
society because it increases the number of beggars.
To avoid this kind of complication, I consider the value of a moral action
for society only, without considering the value for the recipient. In this case,
the object, 0, is a particular moral action, which is unique. The subject, S, is
society as a whole, which is also unique. The judge, J, however, is any
member of society, because everybody is entitled to make a moral judgment
of a moral action. In this case, the statistical nature is limited to J alone, and it
is of a single dimension.
Next cosider the moral value of a general moral concept, by which I
mean a moral principle, virtue, or moral rule, such as the statement "you
ought to be honest," or the virtue "honesty." Such a principle, virtue, or rule
is an abstract concept derived from the whole class of moral actions
exemplifying the principle, "you ought to be honest," or the virtue "honesty."
It is extremely difficult, or even impossible, to determine the value of such an
abstract concept. The only way of determining the value of such an abstract
concept would be to take the mean or norm of the values of all members of
the class of moral actions exemplifying the principle or virtue. This kind of
averaging is plausible only as a theoretical framework, but is practically
impossible. For this reason, I strongly object to the arranging of moral
principles, virtues, or moral rules into a hierarchy or precedence order. 8
Therefore, the object, 0, of such a value is similar to the value of a typical
object discussed in Section 4. It is a set and is of a statistical nature.
As to the subject, S, it is similar to the subject of the moral value of a
moral action for society, that is, the society, as a whole, is unique.
As to the judge, J, it is also any member of society, because every
member of society is entitled to make a moral judegment of a moral principle
or virtue. Therefore, this situation is of the statistical nature of double
dimension.
42
43
6. Summary of the Statistical Nature of Value
For the sake of comparison and as a summary of this chapter, I list in a
table form (Table 1), the object, the subject, the judge, and the dimension of
statistical nature of six kinds of value: (1) value of a particular object - actual
and hypothetical, (2) value of a public facility, (3) value of a typical object or
an abstract concept of object, (4) value of a typical public facility or an
abstract concept of public facility, (5) value ofa moral action for society, and
(6) value ofa moral principle, virtue, or moral rule.
44
PSEUDO-OBJECTIVITY AND STA TISTICAL NATURE
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The three senses of utility are: (1) the economists' sense, as expressed in the
law of diminishing marginal utility, (2) the decision scientists' sense, as
expressed in utility theory, and (3) the philosophers' sense, as expressed in
utilitarian theories as a moral philosophy. These three senses are variations of
the same basic conception. In this section, I endeavor to derive the decision
scientists' sense from the economists' sense by starting from the law of
diminishing marginal utility.
The law of diminishing marginal utility expresses the relationship
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derives from it. The law may be stated as follows:
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1. Use Value or Utility of Goods
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Although not quantitatively stated, the law of diminishing marginal
utility implies that in any economic situation, the incremental effect of degree
of satisfaction, L, S, produced by a fixed incremental amount of commodity,
L, C, will monotonically decrease as the total amount of commodity C
increases.
C represents the "objective value" of the commodity, or the total price
you have to pay for the purchase of C. Its dimension is obviously money. I
hold that all values are subjective, but every commodity has an objective
price. Suppose that the price of the commodity is fixed at a time. Then you
have to pay according to the same unit price for the purchase of any
incremental unit ofthe commodity. Whence the "objective value."
S represents the satisfaction of the person. It is a psychological term
from the point of view of the subject or person, and it corresponds to use
value or utility of the commodity for the person from the point of view of the
object or commodity. Then money may be used for the dimension of S too. In
that case, the law of diminishing marginal utility curve should be so drawn
46
UTILITY THEORY
Use Value or Utility of Goods
that whenever .6 S > .6 C, the person will continue to buy incremental
amounts of C, because the action of purchase of an incremental piece of
commodity .6 C may be interpreted as the choice between the utility of the
money for the purchase of .6 C, which is represented by .6 C, and the utility
of the commodity .6 C, which is represented by .6 S. In other words, the
person will stop buying at or near a point where the slope of the curve comes
down to unity.
The law of diminishing marginal utility may be illustrated by a simple
example. Suppose that person A needs a pair of shoes and pays $80 to buy a
pair. Normally s/he buys one pair at a time and would not buy a second pair
at the same price. However, if the price of the second pair drops to, say $40,
that is, if the shoes are so priced that you can buy two pairs at a reduced price
of $120, then maybe A will be willing to pay $120 to buy two pairs, by
praying $40 for the second pair. Although the second pair has a lower use
value for A, it is still greater than $40. The use value of a third pair for A may
be still lower.
When we plot the total utility of shoes against the number of shoes, we
obtain a stepped curve. If the price per unit of a commodity is smaller, and
the number of units of the commodity needed is larger, as in the case of socks,
or if the commodity is measured by weight or volume, and hence the quantity
purchased is continuous instead of discrete, as in the case of gasoline, then
the stepped curve will either approach or change into a continuous curve,
which is what we normally recognize as the utility curve of a commodity for
a person.
The utility curve of a commodity for a person is concave downward. It
has saturation because a person has satiety in any commodity. Assume that
someone who possesses a large number or quantity of a commodity is not
permitted to resell it. Then the utility curve has a maximum point, after which
the curve will go downwards, meaning that the marginal or incremental
utility will become negative.
The law of diminishing marginal utility also serves to show the
subjective nature of use value or utility. Consider the shoe example again.
Suppose that persons A and B have similar incomes and tastes and belong to
the same social class. They wear shoes of the same kind which cost about $80
per pair. If A needs a pair of shoes, he will pay $80 to buy a pair. If B does
not need a pair of shoes, she will not buy. But if a shoe sale occurs and the
price drops to $50 a pair, probably B will buy a pair for future use. The use
values of a pair of shoes for A and B are indicated by the prices A and Beach
are willing to pay, namely, $80 and $50. This shows that the use values of a
pair of shoes for A and B are subjective, depending on the needs of A and B.
You may argue that, no matter how subjective the use value of a pair of
shoes may be, the shoes have some objective characters or properties, which
are of use to A and cause A to buy them. Without these objective characters,
A would not buy them. Then why is the value of shoes considered completely
subjective? My answer is, what I mean by "subjective" is that whether or not
A is willing to pay a specific amount of money to buy the pair of shoes is
fmally decided by A's preference. The characteristics of the shoes are the
conditions. If the conditions of the shoes do not meet A's requirement
completely or almost completely, then probably A will not buy the shoes.
One condition is size. If size is not correct, then A will certainly not buy.
Another condition is color. Suppose that originally A wants to buy a pair of
black shoes instead of brown shoes. But if a pair of brown shoes of the same
quality and fashion is priced much lower, then maybe A will buy it. If the
price of an object is too high for A to buy, then A may lower the
requirements and buy a less expensive object of a lower quality. Many other
conditions originate from the objective characteristics of an object, but to buy
which object at what price is still decided subjectively by the person who
wants to buy the object. It is in this sense that I call value subjective. The use
value of a commodity such as a pair of shoes is relative to, or measured by,
the value of money, or money serves as a reference or criterion. The person
who wants to buy a pair of shoes subjectively measures the value of shoes in
terms of money and decides whether a specific pair of shoes under
consideration is worth buying.
Another point worth noting is the statistical nature of the subjective
values of a pair of shoes. Consider a pair of size 9D shoes of one style. Only
a subset of the people in the city take an interest in such a pair of shoes, and
they each are willing to pay a price up to, say $80 (the regular price of the
pair of shoes) to buy them. These different prices that they are willing to pay
are of statistical nature, form a probability distribution, and may be
represented by a random variable. This phenomenon I call the statistical
nature of subjective values.
We see that the use value of a commodity has two dimensions of
variation. One dimension is the amount of commodity. For one person, the
use value of a commodity varies with the amount of the commodity which
the person possesses, as is accounted for by the law of diminishing marginal
utility. Another dimension is the person among the group of persons as the
subject, because the use value of a commodity varies from person to person.
As another example, a ticket for a symphony concert may be worth $50 to
someone who is interested in classical music, buy it may be worth little or
nothing to someone interested only in modem music or to someone else who
has no musical taste at all.
Thus, so far as the use value of a commodity is concerned, it has the
same meaning as utility, and I do not need to distinguish it from utility.
47
48
Utility of Money
UTILITY THEORY
49
suddenly wins a lottery prize of one million dollars. Then probably he will
buy a tailor-made suit instead of a ready-made one. This means that, when M
is not rich, he would not pay $700 extra to buy the luxurious quality of a
tailored suit, but when he becomes rich, he is willing to do so. Since M
becomes rich suddenly, his tastes have not changed much, but his psychology
has changed. The utility of $700 for M after M has obtained one million
dollars is less than the utility of $700 for M before M has obtained the one
million dollars. This change is exactly the decrease of marginal utility of
money. The "utility of money" may be interpreted as a term created to denote
something expressing quantitatively the variation of the "usefulness" of
money with respect to the total amount of money a person possesses. For the
sake of clarity and convenience in mathematical treatment, the two
dimensions value and utility are treated separately. The interpersonal
dimension is taken care of by the term "value." Since exchange value does
not vary from person to person, we say that money has a fixed value. The
intrapersonal dimension is taken care of by the term "utility." Thus, money
may be used as a reference to measure the objective prices or pseudoobjective worth of goods or objects, with the term "value" used to describe
the pseudo-objective property of money and goods. On the other hand, utility
is used to express purely a person's subjective interest.
This value-utility relationship of money is exactly what decision
scientists call utility function. While the incremental utility of a commodity is
measured by money, the incremental utility of money cannot be measured by
money itself, nor can it be measured reversely by any commodity, because
the prices of commodities vary from place to place and no such a universally
applicable commodity exists to serve as a criterion. This is perhaps why in
the von Neumman-Mogenstem utility theory, utility is defined in terms of
probability. As far as I can see, probability is a means used for the description
and the determination of the utility of money, but it is not an inevitable
element inherent in the definition of the utility of money.
In the above example of suits, we assumed that M becomes rich
suddenly. Thus, the goods possessed by M have not changed and may be
assumed to remain fixed. If M needs a new suit before he wins the lottery
prize, he still needs a new suit after he wins the lottery prize. In other words,
the marginal utilities or the use values of commodities for M have not
changed. But the marginal utility of money for M has decreased, because of
his sudden winning of his lottery prize. This accounts for the distinction
between the exchange value of money, which is objective, and the utility of
money, which is subjective, and gives rise to the utility function and utility
theory.
Some marked differences occur between the utility curve of money and
that of a commodity. First, although the utility curve of money is also
2. Utility of Money
I tum to the value and utility of money or anything equivalent to money,
including those special commodities that can readily be sold and changed into
money, such as stocks, bonds, gold, and silver.
First, consider the value of money. The value of money is nothing but its
purchasing power and consequently is called exchange value. The purchasing
power of money varies slightly with time and place. For instance, the prices
of vegetables are slightly higher in winter than in summer because of scarcity.
This means that the purchasing power of money with respect to vegetables is
slightly lower in winter than in summer. Also, the prices of American
automobiles in Alaska are slightly higher than those in Detroit because of
transportation cost. Consequently, the purchasing power of money with
respect to automobiles is slightly lower in Alaska than in Detroit. But at one
time and in one place, the purchasing power of money does not vary from
person to person. The purchasing power of money may be assumed to be
uniform over all members of society.
Exchange value is regarded as objective. The exchange value of an
amount of money, like the price of a commodity, is independent of who
possesses the money.
The exchange value of money, although determined by market, is not an
inherent property of money, but is arbitrarily determined or assigned to it by
human beings. Banknotes are made of paper. A small piece of paper, no
matter how good or precious it may be, cannot possibly be worth a thousand
dollars, a hundred dollars, or even ten dollars. The law stipulates that a
hundred-dollar banknote should be worth a hundred dollars, and all people,
abiding by law, do take seriously that a hundred-dollar banknote is worth a
hundred dollars. Strictly speaking, the exchange value of money is not really
objective, but is pseudo-objective. Pseudo-objective values, apart from that
possessed by money, have several other forms, as discussed in Chapter Three.
Even a pseudo-objective value is not always fixed, but may change from
time to time. For instance, during a period of inflation, the exchange value of
money depreciates. If the depreciation rate is small, say less than 10 percent
per year, we usually regard it as normal. The exchange value of the money of
one country, say the U. S. dollar, with respect to the moneys of other
countries, also fluctuates from day to day.
Next, consider the utility of money. The question may be so formulated
as to ask whether the utility of money for a person varies with the total
amount of money (or wealth) the person possesses. It does so vary. Suppose
that a man, M, needs a new suit, and that he is willing to pay $300 to buy a
ready-made suit, but he does not consider the purchase of a tailor-made suit
for $1,000, even if he can afford to buy such a suit. Now suppose that M
L
UTILITY THEORY
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
concave downwards, no saturation of utility occurs and every incremental
utility is positive, so that the utility curve will always go upwards, no matter
how small the slope may be.
You may argue that as M suddenly becomes rich, his desires will grow,
he will have new desires, and he will not only buy more things but also things
of higher quality. This is what I want to emphasize. M's desires for luxurious
things and new desires are consistent with M's new evaluation of money in
terms of goods - the extra quality of a tailor-made suit is now worth $700 to
him. A diminishing incremental utility of money is a mathematical representation of one's psychology that the worth of money relative to
commodities decreases. You normally buy all the commodities you need but
will buy only some of the commodities you want yet do not need, as long as
you can afford to buy, until an equilibrium point is reached, where you stop.
As time goes on, you consume some of your goods and have new income, so
you go on buying things until a new equilibrium is reached. This is a
continuous process which lasts as long as your life lasts. When you suddenly
become rich, your equilibrium point moves far ahead, so that you will buy a
lot of new things, such as a new car, a new house, and new clothes, in
addition to those goods originally needed or wanted.
of diminishing marginal utility, and the other the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. The term used in the generally accepted utility theory is the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
Before I discuss in detail utility functions, I will briefly explain the
concepts of utility and utility functions through the following illustrative
example.
Suppose that a woman participates in gambling by betting on the result
of tossing a coin. Since the probability of either a head or a tail is 1/2, a fair
game has odds of 1 to 1. Suppose that the woman bets ten dollars. If she wins,
then she will gain ten dollars and will have a total amount of twenty dollars.
If she loses, then she will pay ten dollars and will have 0 dollars left.
Now if the amount of bet is one thousand dollars instead often dollars, a
person might not be interested in betting one thousand dollars for either two
thousand dollars or nothing. This means that to her, the subjective expected
utility of two thousand dollars with a probability of 1/2 and zero dollars with
a probability of 1/2 is less than one thousand dollars for sure. One thousand
dollars for sure is worth more to her than one thousand dollars in gambling.
Suppose that the amount she receives when she wins is fixed. Let the
probability of winning and losing be changed from 0.6 and 004, respectively,
by betting on something other than the toss of a coin, and suppose that under
this new condition she is willing to gamble. Now the expected value is
50
3. The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
The statistical decision theory is based on the assumption of rationality that
we always choose the greater value out of two values, when values are for
sure. When one or both values are expected, since at least one of the values is
of probabilistic nature, then the responses of different people may be different,
because human beings have subjective preferences regarding risk, depending
upon our personal interest and circumstances. We can be risk-averse,
indifferent to risk, or risk-prone. For two equal values, one being for sure and
the other being an expected value, a risk-averse person will prefer the one for
sure, a risk-prone person will prefer the expected value, and a person
indifferent to risk will have no preference between the two values.
To take this kind of preference of choice regarding expected values into
account, neither the expected reward criterion nor the expected loss criterion
of decision theory can be applied, and we must find a particular utility
function for the decision-maker. "Utility" is a general term used to represent
the interest of a person in anything, whether it is money, a good, a person, or
an abstract object such as a virtue, a practice, or a system, but utility theory
deals specifically with money. For one person, to a particular value
corresponds a utility. Thus, utility is a function of value, and when utility is
plotted against value the result is called a utility curve.
We have two distinct senses of utility: one used by economists in the law
v = 0.6
51
X 2,000 + 0.4 X 0 = 1,200.
This situation is equivalent to her considering her one thousand dollars for
sure worth twelve hundred dollars in gambling under this specified condition.
Suppose that the terminal values of $2,000 and 0 are fixed so that when
she wins she always receives a total amount of $2,000, and when she loses
she always receives a zero amount, no matter how much she puts up for
gambling. Also suppose that the probabilities of winning and losing may be
adjusted to suit her preference. If she puts up $500, she is willing to play
when the expected value is at least $650. If she puts up $1,500, she is willing
to play when the expected value is at least $1,700. If she puts up 0, it means
that she does not gamble, and the expected value is still O. If she puts up
$2,000, the expected value is also still $2,000, as this is the terminal value
and she has a probability of 1 to win.
Let us call these subjective expected values "utilities" and plot them
against the actual values, the amounts she puts up for gambling, as shown in
Fig. 4.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
UTILITY THEORY
52
53
U
6. V = V' - V be the incremental value, and
6. U = U' - U be the incremental utility.
2,000
1,700
Then we have
1,200
6. U = U' - U = fey') - fey) = f(V + 6. V)-f(V)
1·······_····_·······················_····_··_····. .
650
V'
j
o
500
~
i
j
1,000
1,500
V
2,000
Fig. 4. Utilities vs. Actual Values of an Example
Utilities expressed as a mathematical function of actual values, like what
the curve in Fig. 4 represents, are called "utility functions." Since a utility
function is used to calculate the expected values relative to one another, the
scale for utility does not have to be the same scale for the actual value.
Sometimes utilities are normalized so that the terminal utilities are always set
to be 0 and 1, no matter what the actual values may be.
Now I give a general mathematical expression of utility as a function of
value. Let
V be the total value for a certain person, and
U be the utility corresponding to V.
Then we have
U
=
f(V)
The concepts of incremental value and utility are useful when an action
causes a change in a value. If value is increased (decreased) from V to V',
then the corresponding utility will be increased (decreased) from U to U'. Let
A utility function is nothing but a quantitative representation of a
rational person's preferences, as was concluded by David Gauthier. He writes,
"A rational individual is one whose preferences can be measured by a utility
function, or, in other words, one whose preferences can be replaced
functionally by numerical utilities."z
The study of utility function is the core of decision and utility theory and
is interdisciplinary in nature, since it is related to several disciplines, such as
statistics, welfare economics, management science, and ethics. Serious
modem development of utility theory started with von Neumann and
Morgenstem,3 and A. Wald. 4 In the subrequent decades, intensive
mathematical studies in utility theory have been made by many scholars,
including Kenneth lArrow, R.O. Schlaifer, lW. Pratt, R.F. Meyer, P.C.
Fishburn, and Ralph L. Keeney.
The results of these studies are called the von Neumann-Morgenstern or
neo-Bernoullian formulation, which is quite clear-cut and defmite. However,
several European writers have had reservations regarding this utility theory of
the American School and have developed more complicated and sophisticated
utility theories. So some delicate mathematical points of utility theory are
quite controversial. So far as a utilitarian general theory of value is concerned,
the over-refmements of utility theory are of little consequence. In this book, I
will still follow essentially the American School or the neo-Bernoullian
formulation.
Since in the discussion of utility functions, r emphasize philosophical
justification rather than mathematical derivation or rigor, r will not go into
the mathematical details of utility functions. Ralph L. Keeney and Howard
Raiffa give an expository account of much of the standard literature of
single-attribute utility theory.s This is quite sufficient for the purpose of
reference in this book.
Before any further discussion of utility and utility functions, I will
introduce two conditions, called axioms, which all utilities and utility
functions have to satisfy. Let VI and Vz be any two expected values, and let
U I and Uz be their corresponding utilities. Then we have
1. rfVI > Vz, then UI > Uz.
54
UTILITY THEORY
It is implied that if VI < V2, then UI < U2, and if VI = Vz, then UI = Uz.
This characteristic of utility or utility functions is called monotonicity. It
means that utility increases monotonically with value. It is useful in that, in
some situations we do not have to specify whether value or utility is the
quantity to be considered, or even to distinguish between value and utility,
because value and utility change in the same direction. That is, a positive
incremental value always results in a positive incremental utility, while a
negative incremental value always results in a negative incremental utility.
2. If a person is indifferent between VI with probability I and (p Vz +
(1 - p) V3), where O~ p~ I, then UI = P U2 + (1 - p) U3.
This simply means that, in a fair game, if a person has no subjective
preference, then naturally V I = P V2 + (1 - p) V3, but if a person has
subjective preference, then slbe will be indifferent between (p V2 + (1 - p) V3)
and a value VI for sure which is not equal to (p V2 + (1 - p) V3), but is such
that UI = P U2 + (1 - p) U3. If the person is risk-averse, then VI < P V2 + (1
- p) V3. In other words, the fair game is now in terms of utilities instead of
actual values.
The utility function as a curve has various shapes, depending upon the
person and the problem. It may be concave (downwards), as shown in Fig. 4.
This is called a "risk-averse" utility function. It may be convex, called a
"risk-prone" utility function. It may be linear, in which the curve is a straight
line. The last case is simple, as it reduces to a decision-maker with no
preference. The risk-prone utility function is an unusual situation. Apart from
the normal fmancial reason, some other motives or reasons may exist, such as
inclination for gambling and wishful thinking. John C. Harsanyi distinguishes
"between a person's manifest preferences and his true preferences. His
manifest preferences are his actual preferences as manifested by the observed
behavior including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or
on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly
hinder rational choices."6 Obviously risk-prone utility functions are obtained
from what Harsanyi calls "manifest preferences." These utility functions are
considered irrational, and I will not discuss them. My interest is centered only
on the nature of risk-averse utility functions.
Normally, utility functions are obtained by curve-fitting and by means of
actual assessment of utilities assigned by the decision-maker for various
situations of lottery choice. Although practical, this method is not neat or
ideal, because the preference of a person can hardly be consistently and
accurately measured.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
55
A utility function is always monotonically increasing, and the utility
function of a risk-averse person, apart from being monotonically increasing,
has its first derivative monotonically decreasing. The utility curve of a riskaverse person is always concave. However, concavity is a necessary
condition for a curve to be eligible as a utility curve, but it is not a sufficient
condition. Among all the functions that can be plotted as concave curves,
only a subset is eligible as utility functions. The study of utility theory by the
American School has concentrated on the search for and the justification of
eligible and reasonable utility functions. Decision and utility theorists have
been intensively studying the essential properties of utility functions that
conform to the preferences of rational persons.
One important property that they have found is called risk premium,
which is the value corresponding to average utility minus the average value.
Consider again the example of betting one thousand dollars for either two
thousand dollars or zero with a probability of 1/2 for either winning or losing.
It is a fair game, because the average value of betting is also one thousand
dollars. Suppose that a person is not willing to bet unless the average value of
betting is 1,200 dollars. Here the risk premium is $1,200 - $1,000 = $200. It
means that the person considers the expected value of $1,200 in betting
equivalent to $1,000 for sure. Or, equivalently, if the person has $1,200, slbe
is indifferent to these two situations: (1) slbe bets $1,200 for an expected
value of$I,200, and (2) slbe pays $200 as risk-premium and does not bet, so
as to ensure the remaining $1,000.
Risk premium is a key property, but is not readily susceptible of
quantitative analysis. First, although we can easily find the risk premium
from a given utility function for a lottery, we cannot easily work in the
opposite direction to derive a utility function from a given risk premium.
Second, a risk premium can be found only at a fixed value, but it is difficult
to find the change of risk premium as value changes. Third, the risk premium
varies with the lottery, and is defined for a particular lottery, but is not a
general property for all lotteries.
Some conclusion about the risk premium can be reached, as Ralph L.
Keeney and Howard Raiffa point out: "It seems to be empirically true for
many people that as their assets increase, they are only willing to pay a
smaller risk premium for a given risk."? This conclusion is qualitative and
may serve as a guideline, but it is not very useful in deciding which concave
curves are eligible and reasonable as utility curves.
Another break-through in utility theory occurred when the nature of
utility functions was greatly clarified through the study of risk aversion, by J.
w. PrattS and Kenneth J. Arrow. 9
A risk-aversion function is defined as follows:
56
UTILITY THEORY
The von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
reV) = -U"(V)/U' (V),
When p = 1 / 2, V = C and no gain or loss occurs. Normally, p > 1 /2, so
that the expected value of investment is always greater than the capital,
because otherwise nobody would be interested in investment at all.
The expected utility, because of the concavity of the utility curve, varies
with m and is not always greater than the utility corresponding to C. When m
= 0, no investment occurs , and no gain or loss. As m increases, the gain
increases too until it comes to a maximum; then it decreases and eventually
becomes negative.
The theorem simply states that, if the optimal investment or maximum
gain occurs at a fIxed m irrespective of C, then the utility function has the
property that V reV) is a constant. A corollary of this theorem shows the
reverse: a function having the property that V reV) is a constant also has the
property that optimum investment occurs at a fIxed m. In other words, the
property of fixed m for optimal investment defInes a class of functions.
For instance, suppose that a person has a utility function within this class.
Assume m = 0.3. Then, when the person has a capital of $1 million, the
optimum investment occurs at $300,000, and when the person has a capital of
$3 million, the optimum investment occurs at $900,000.
The signifIcance of this theorem lies in that a fIxed m conforms to human
nature. The reasoning for this is the same as given for the law of diminishing
incremental interest to be presented in the next section, except that the
conditions are weaker for this theorem, so that the class of functions having
the property of a fIxed m covers more functions and includes the logarithmic
function as a member.
Keeney and Raiffa concluded that decrea£ing risk-aversion is an
important characteristic of rational utility functions, because the
characteristic of decreasing risk-aversion conforms to human nature and
is reasonable. They further said, "As we will soon see, many of the
'traditional' candidates for a utility function, such as the exponential and
quadratic utility functions, are not appropriate for a decreasing risk-averse
decision maker. Thus the characteristic of decreasing risk-aversion places
strong restrictions on the shape (i.e., function form) of one's utility
function." 11
The property that V reV) = - V U"(V)/U'(V) = a constant c is called
proportional risk-aversion, and the functions that have this property are called
constantly-proportional risk-averse functions.'2 Thus, proportional riskaversion is a further refInement of decreasing risk-aversion. Constantlyproportional risk-averse functions are a subset of the set of decreasing riskaverse functions. They are regarded as representing the class of reasonable or
rational utility functions. These functions are as follows.
where
U'(V) is the fIrst derivative ofU(V) with respect to V,
U"(V) is the second derivative ofU(V) with respect to V.
A utility function is said to be decreasingly risk-averse if the riskaversion function, r, decreases with increase of V, constantly risk- averse if r
is a constant, and increasingly risk-averse ifr increasses with increase ofV.
The importance of the study of risk-aversion function cannot be fully
appreciated until the establishment of the theorem of optimal investment,
which is given as follows.
Theorem of Optimal Investment
If in any class of investments the optimal investment does not depend on
the amounts to be invested and if a risk-averse utility function U is well
behaved (U'(V), U"(V) and lim [-VU'(V) / U"(V)] exist), then V
V reV) is constant. 10
v-a
The mathematical proof of this theorem is of little interest to
philosophers and is beyond the scope of this book: To describe it qualitatively,
the condition of this theorem is that, with an assumed form of lottery used to
represent an investment, the optimal investment will occur at a fIxed ratio of
the money gained or lost to the total capital.
The form of lottery used is as follows. Let
C be the capital possessed by a person,
I
be the amount of money invested,
m = I / C be the ratio of money invested to capital,
p be the probability of winning,
q = I - P be the probability of losing.
The lottery is that the person either wins I dollars with a probability of p
or loses I dollars with a probability of q = 1 - p.
The expected value of investment (including the capital C) is
V=C+pI-(l-p)l
= C + pmC - (l - p) mC
= [
I + (2p - I)m ] C
57
58
UTILITY THEORY
Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest
59
Y
for c = 0
Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest
yl-c
for c < 1, c*-O
In Y
for c = 1
Let Y be the total value, for a subject S, of all the properties possessed
by S, and I be the interest that S takes in Y. On the average, a
geometrical increase in Y will produce an arithmetical increase in 1.
_y-(c-l)
for c > 1
U(Y)~
4. Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest
As described in the previous section, in general a normal person is risk-averse
to an extent. A class of risk-averse utility functions, called constantlyproportional risk-averse functions, may be regarded as reasonable and
representative utility functions. As shown in the previous section, adequate
philosophical justification has been found for the assumption of general riskaversion. The property of risk-aversion is a crucial point in my utilitarian theory
of distributive justice and is an indispensable basis for the development of my
new socialism. To further justifY this property of risk-aversion, philosophically
I developed a law of diminishing incremental interest, which is summarized in
this section. 13 This law may be said to be a general utility function, because it
depicts the general relationship between the value of money and its utility for a
person. This law is derived not from the mathematics of utility functions, but,
instead, purely from philosophical justifications. It turns out to be one of the
constantly-proportional risk-averse functions - also representative because it
is in the middle position among three sub-classes of constantly-proportional
risk-averse functions.
To emphasize the point of view of the subject for whom money has
utility, this law is stated as a relationship between Y, the value of money, and
I, the interest that the subject takes in Y, instead of a relationship between Y
and U, the utility of the money for the subject. I use the term "interest" here
for two additional reasons.
First, "interest" or "degree of interest" is a term more popularly used
than the term "utility" by philosophers, especially nonutilitarians. Second,
although the term "utility" is more popularly used by economists, it may
seem restricted to the utility generated by material values, whereas the term
"interest" may be extended to the utility generated by non-material values as
well. Although I restrict my discussion to the utility generated by material
values, this law can be extended to the study of quality of human life, which
involves non-material values.
The logarithmic function is the unique single-argument mathematical
function that maps a geometrical change in its argument into an arithmetical
change. So this law is equivalent to saying that the utility function of the
value of money is a logarithmic function.
Such a law cannot be rigorously proved like a mathematical theorem,
nor can it be empirically verified, because it is correct only as an average or
on a statistical basis. However, I shall justifY this law using three different
arguments: (1) human sensitivity, (2) human expectation of change, and (3)
the unboundedness of personal welfare functions.
(1) I fIrst consider human sensitivity in response to differences in the
magnitudes of physical properties. Human estimation is rough measurement.
Human beings can estimate weight, length, volume, intensity of light, shades
of color, intensity of sound, sweetness, saltiness, degree of hardness, intensity
of smell, etc. Because of this ability of rough measurement, we have a
discriminating power to distinguish between two quantities of the same kind
but with different magnitudes. For instance, we can estimate the weights of
two objects and tell which one is heavier, provided that the two objects differ
in weight by a sufficient amount. This amount that can be discriminated by
human beings is usually not absolute but is a relative amount, roughly as a
percentage of the total amount. For instance, you can easily perceive that a
letter weighing thirty grams is heavier than a letter weighing twenty grams,
but you can hardly distinguish between a stone weighing one kilogram and
another one weighing 980 grams. Similarly, you can easily perceive the
difference between the screen of a twenty-six-inch television set and that of a
twenty-inch set, but you can hardly perceive the difference in the width
between an eighty-foot lot and a seventy-five-foot lot.
Since the interest a subject takes in an object is a human psychological
response, it is quite natural and reasonable to assume that this interest falls
into the same category as the other senses.
(2) Human expectation of change, either incremental or decremental,
is usually approximately exponential; we expect a change in the
incremental or decremental magnitude as a percentage of the total
magnitude. A general increase of salary, the rise of prices as an index of
inflation, the discount of commodities on sale, and the deductions of
prices of automobiles and houses as a result of bargaining are all more or
less on a percentage basis. The general increase of energy consumption
60
Law of Diminishing Incremental Interest
UTILITY THEORY
and the expansion of business, which indicate a kind of human interest,
also increase exponentially. Even the amount of a bet in gambling is
roughly dependent on the capital or cash on hand. If you have one
hundred dollars on hand, you may bet ten dollars each time, but if you
have one thousand dollars on hand, you may dare to bet one hundred
dollars each time. The total amount you are willing to put into gambling
also varies with your income or wealth, although many other factors exist
which make this amount a random variable with a high variance.
In some branches of science and engineering, decibel (db), as a
logarithmic function, is used to measure the intensity of sound or noise and
thereby converts a geometrical scale into an arithmetic scale. Similarly, in
music, one octave higher in pitch means doubling the pitch of the sound.
The argument of human expectation of change is close to the sensitivity
argument, except that the sensitivity refers to the difference of two quantities,
whereas the expectation of change refers to the change of a single quantity.
And sensitivity usually refers to a small difference, whereas the expectation
usually refers to a considerable amount of change.
(3) The boundedness of a utility curve at both lower and upper ends are
mathematically neat, but philosophically unjustified, especially when the
utility function is used for a personal welfare function, that is, when the value
is the total value for a person instead of the money specifically put into a
business. The usual concept of boundedness at the higher end is based on the
fact that normally the upper terminal value, V, is finite. Owing to the
insatiability of human beings, when V approaches infmity, U should
approach infinity too, although at a slower rate. Hence, without doubt the
utility curve with respect to money should be unbounded at the higher end.
The unboundedness of the utility curve at the lower end is a more
delicate thing. The utility curve with respect to a commodity is bounded
at the lower end because any commodity may be substituted by another
one and, hence, is never absolutely indispensable. The utility curve with
respect to money for the investment in a business can be bounded too,
because the money invested usually does not represent the total value for
the investor. The value stated in the law of diminishing incremental
interest is the total value for the investor, which should include that
person's total wealth and the equivalent wealth of her or his income.
Suppose that a person, A, has a yearly income of $40,000. Assume an
annual bank interest rate of 10 percent. Then A's income of $40,000 a
year is equivalent to a capital of $400,000. The case that V = 0 means that
A not only has no wealth, but also has no future income at all. This
situation is equivalent to A having borrowed $400,000 and having lost the
borrowed money so that A's future income has to pay an interest of
$40,000 per year forever. Then A will have absolutely nothing to live on,
61
and the situation is extremely disastrous. In terms of utility and utility
curves, two conditions have to be met: (I) Uo corresponding to Va should
be quite low, say approaching negative infinity, and (2) the marginal
utility at Va should be extremely high, say approaching positive infinity.
The personal welfare function curve with respect to money should be
unbounded at the lower end.
Mathematically, the logarithmic function is the simplest function that is
unbounded at both the lower and the upper ends. This fact, although not
sufficient to serve as a proof of the law of diminishing incremental interest,
does show the adequacy of the logarithmic function as a suitable function to
represent the human interest and the incremental interest in money.
Because of the statistical nature of the degree of human risk-aversion,
the variations of risk aversion among all members of society, the incremental
interest is not necessarily in exact proportion with the percentage of
incremental value. Different people may have different incremental interests
in the same incremental va.lue, even if they have the same amount of wealth.
A miserly person may have a much higher interest in a decremental value
than a generous person. This feature is manifested by the constant c of
constantly-proportional risk-averse functions of the von NeumannMorgenstern type. The personal welfare function of a particular person (the
utility function of a person with respect to total value of money) is not
necessarily a logarithmic function with c = 1, but may be the function U = VIc , where 0 < c < I, or the function U = _V-(e-I) , where c > 1. This is
inevitable because of the statistical nature of human risk aversion. The law of
diminishing incremental interest is claimed to hold only on the average, but is
not necessarily accurate for a particular case. This kind of inaccuracy is
normally permitted as long as it is not excessive, and is quite usual with many
laws in the social sciences.So this point does not create a serious problem.
Another interesting point is the illusion produced by a neglect of income
in the consideration of wealth. The incremental interest that a wealthier
person takes in a percentage of incremental value usually seems not as low as
the interest that a less wealthy person may take in the same percentage of
incremental value. For instance, suppose that person A has a wealth of a
million dollars, and that person B has a wealth of only fifty thousand dollars.
We can expect that normally A's interest in an incremental value of one
percent of her wealth, ten thousand dollars, is not as low as B's interest in an
incremental value of also one percent, that is, five hundred dollars. In general,
the total value for a person comes from two parts: (I) total saving as wealth,
and (2) income. The income of a person is, at least psychologically, equivalent to an amount of wealth. In the above example, suppose that A has a
total monthly income of fifteen thousand dollars, including both salary and
profit from investment, and that B has a total monthly income of three
~
62
UTILITY THEORY
thousand dollars. The ratio of monthly income of A to that of B is only five
times instead oftwenty times. Assuming an annual interest rate often percent,
after being converted into capital or equivalent wealth, the total value for A is
one and half million dollars, and the total value for B is three hundred
thousand dollars. The ratio of wealth between A and B is again only five to
one instead of twenty to one. Therefore, if A and B have the same degree of
risk aversion, A's incremental interest in ten thousand dollars will be the
same as B's incremental interest in two thousand dollars instead of five
hundred dollars. This is closer to reality.
The logarithmic curve is concave with a monotonically decreasing first
derivative, and thereby it is similar to the curve of the law of diminishing
marginal utility. Roughly speaking, the law of diminishing incremental
interest may be said to be a partic-ular case (applied to money) of the law of
diminishing marginal utility. But a marked distinction occurs between the
curves of these two laws.
The law of diminishing marginal utility refers to a single commodity and
is based on an assumption that the property of exchangeability does not exist.
The value concerned is use value. The incremental interest in an incremental
quantity of the commodity decreases faster than money, and then satiety
occurs. If the commodity is not permitted to be sold or exchanged for other
commodities, then the incremental utility can be zero, or even negative. The
curve may have a maximum point, after which the curve goes downwards.
For instance, for a bachelor, a second car has little utility, while a third car
may be a nuisance and a disutility, because the car needs a parking space and
care for maintenance. If you have eaten enough food at a dinner and you are
forced to eat more, this incremental part of the meal will probably cause
displeasure or harm to your body. This incremental food has a disutility.
The law of diminishing incremental interest refers to the total value of
money or a set of objects, which are assumed to be exchangeable. The value
concerned is exchange value. As long as the exchange value exists, no reason
exits why the incremental utility should be zero or negative. For money,
bonds, stocks, or those commodities, such as gold, silver, and jewellery,
which can be readily sold and converted into money, the value concerned is
essentially exchange value. If the discount, the commission, or the loss at
resale is ignored or properly taken into account, then the exchange values of
all the properties belonging to a person can be added together to form the
total value for that jerson. Therefore, incremental interest or utility should be
considered with respect to this total value in terms of money.
Because of exchangeability, the interest of human beings in total value or
wealth is never satiated. Hence, incremental interestcan never become zero or
negative, although it decreases as the total value increases.
The Equivalence of Two Concepts of Utility
63
5. The Equivalence of Two Concepts of Utility
We can see that the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and the
concept of utility in the law of diminishing marginal utility are basically the
same. I give some further argumentation here, because some writers believe
that they are different. Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa are of the opinion
that these two concepts are completely different. They write:
As we learn in e'{ery basic economic course, the economist's concept of
decreasing marginal utility implies that the utility function is concave
and conversely. Here, utility function is in italics because it is a
completely different construction from the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function that we are considering in this chapter. The distinction
seems important enough to deserve a brief digression. When the
economist says "his marginal utility for attribute x is decreasing," he
means that the difference in units of utility, called utiles - which are
never explicitly defined - because of an incremental change of x from x
to x+ I decreases as x increases. No probabilistic notions are introduced,
and any expected utility calculated from such a utility function has no
particular interpretation as it does in the case of von NeumannMorgenstern utility function. 14
My opinion is that the basic difference between the "utility function"
representing the diminishing marginal utility and the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function is not due to the fact that probabilistic notions
are introduced, but it arises because the economists' utility function is of a
particular commodity with use value only, whereas the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function is of wealth or money with exchange value. The
concept of utility in the diminishing marginal utility of a commodity is
different from the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, but I hold
that the concept of utility in the diminishing marginal utility of money is the
same as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, although probabilities are an
essential part of the definition of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. My main arguments are as follows. 15
First, probability is not the ultimate cause for the concavity of risk-averse
utility curves. In determining the marginal utility of a commodity, the utility
is measured by money as a standard or reference, but in determining the
marginal utility of money, the utility cannot be measured by money itself as
standard or reference. To determine a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
curve through lottery-type preference tests is an expedient to circumvent this
difficulty. Probability or lottery is a medium through which the marginal
UTILITY THEORY
On Normalization and Terminal Utilities
utility of money appears, and, it is also a means to determine the marginal
utility of money. The ultimate cause of diminishing marginal utility of money
is that money for any person is more important to that person when s/he has
less money than when s/he has more money. This is readily seen from the
example of a person before and after winning a big lottery prize, which I used
to illustrate the marginal utility of money, measured by a commodity as a
standard or reference. The utilities in that example are von NeumannMorgenstern utilities, but they are not in the probabilistic sense. We can
compare the incremental utilities of money for a person in two different
frnancial situations, say immediately before and after the person has won a
lottery prize. In that case, the utility function to be used, although not in the
probabilistic sense, is still the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
We can gamble using many units of a commodity as well. In that case,
the law of diminishing marginal utility can also be applied in a probabilistic
sense. This means that the concept of probability is not restricted to von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
You may argue that while the utility curve of a commodity is always
concave, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility curve can be linear or even
convex when a person is risk-prone. For linear utility curves, my explanation
is that, any utility curve, if we take only a small segment of the whole curve
or we take it from the part of the curve where V is quite large, always
approaches a straight line. For risk-prone utility functions, the convexity of
utility curves is mostly exhibited in gambling and buying lottery tickets. My
explanation of these kinds of utility curves is that other causes compensate or
more than compensate for the normal cause of diminishing marginal utility of
money, thus resulting in increasing marginal utility or convexity of utility
curve instead. These additional causes include superstition, wishful thinking,
ignorance of or miscalculation of objective probability, wrong estimation of
subjective probability, the extra spiritual value of excitement in gambling,
and cherishing a hope of winning a prize, no matter how slight it may be,
during the period of owning a lottery ticket before the prize is drawn.
Therefore, risk-proneness is exceptional rather than normal, and I exclude it
from consideration here.
Second, I will compare the curves of these two types of utility function.
The curve of the law of diminishing marginal utility varies with the
commodity and with the preference of the person. Hence, no typical curve.
But the curve of the law of diminishing incremental interest, which
represents a norm or a representative curve of the utility of money, is a
logarithmic function. As to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, I
have pointed out above that the most rational utility functions are constantly
proportional risk-averse functions, of which the logarithmic function is in the
middle (in the sense of degree of concavity or the value of c), and they may
be considered a representative or general utility function. This "general utility
function," which is in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense, turns out to be
the same as the utility function representing the law of diminishing marginal
utility of money.
Thus, we see that the two senses of utility and utility functionsmarginal utility and the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense -, are the same.
The ultimate cause for the marginal utility to decrease, no matter whether the
marginal utility is of a commodity or of money, is not risk, but the increasing
quantity of a commodity or money, because the need for the commodity or
money decreases as the quantity increases. The utility curve of money is less
concave than that of a commodity and does not come to saturation, nor does
the marginal utility become negative, because money has exchange value.
People are in general risk-averse because any amount of money
corresponding to the lower part of a person's utility curve is more important
or more urgently needed than the same amount of money corresponding to
the higher part of the person's utility curve.
64
65
6. On Normalization and Terminal Utilities
The study of interpersonal comparisons of utility entails a question: Is the
kind of normalization of utility functions generally assumed or adopted really
justifrable and desirable? This question is related to a concept called
strategical equivalence. Two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, U\
and U2, are said to be strategically equivalent if and only if the following
relation holds:
U2=aU\+b
where a > 0 and b is any constant.
This is a restricted linear transformation. A utility function seems to remain
the same (strategically equivalent) if it is vertically compressed or expanded
(but not inverted) or displaced upward or downward (but not horizontally).
Why is this kind of transformation justifrable? My answer is that normally a
utility function is to be obtained for the decision-maker (usually the owner of
an enterprise) for the comparison of utilities corresponding to various values,
merely for the decision-maker herself or himself, but no interpersonal
comparisons of utility are involved. When a utility curve is compressed,
expanded, or displaced vertically, although the marginal utility corresponding
to various values may change, the relative magnitudes of the weights of the
alternatives in a decision problem, which are each a linear combination of
utilities, remain unchanged. Thus, this restricted linear transformation does not
66
UTILITY THEORY
On Normalization and Terminal Utilities
affect the result of decision-making and, hence, is permissible.
Horizontal compression, expansion, and displacement are not permitted,
because the position of the utility curve is fixed between the lower terminal
value, Yo, and the upper terminal value, V 1 .
To have interpersonal comparisons between two utility functions, the
two utility curves must have fixed shapes and be fixed in proper locations.
We are not permitted to compress, expand, or displace these utility curves
vertically. Therefore, the original concepts of strategical equivalence and
restricted linear transformation are no longer applicable and have to be
discarded.
A problem related to this kind of normalization is the dimension of
utility. Because of the permissibility of restricted linear transfor-mation,
utility does not have a dimension. Usually, the terminal utilities are
normalized to 0 and 1, that is, Uo = 0 and UI = 1. Utility is nothing but a
subjective assessment of value with regard to total value. We should have a
normal or reference point. For instance, suppose that a business person, B,
wants to invest one million dollars in a small business. Then V = $1,000,000
is the normal or reference point. At this normal or reference point, B should
naturally regard one dollar as one dollar. Utility can have the same dimension
as value and, at the reference point, the marginal (incremental) utility is
simply unity. However, at a point below V on the utility curve, B should
psychologically regard one dollar as more than one dollar, and the marginal
utility should be greater than unity. At a point above V on the utility curve, B
should psychologically regard one dollar as less than one dollar, and the
marginal utility should be less than unity.
Thus, we see that the concept of dimensionless utility normalized to the
region between 0 and 1 is an artifice for the sake of convenience. It is
applicable to the case of a single utility function, but it would cause confusion
in the case of interpersonal comparisons of utility, with two or more utility
functions, and it had better be discarded. I propose that, for utility, the same
dimension and unit as those for value be used. I also propose the adoption of
a reference point for a utility curve, at which the slope or the marginal utility
should be unity.
Another problem related to the normalization and the dimension of
utility is the fixing of terminal values, Yo, and V I, and terminal utilities, Uo
and VI. If utility is no longer dimensionless and normalized between 0 and 1,
then what should be the terminal utilities, Uo and VI, corresponding to the
terminal values, Vo and VI? These are delicate points which I will explain
using an example.J 6
Suppose that a wealthy person, P, has a total wealth often million dollars
and she wants to invest one million dollars in a small business, say a
restaurant. A good chance is that s/he will gain $500,000 in a year's time, but
a small probability also exists that s/he will lose one million dollars. The total
value of the restaurant after one year will not be certain, but will be between
oand 1.5 million dollars. That V0 = 0 and VI = 1.5 seems natural.
Here arises a problem. Since P has, apart from the one million dollars
invested in the restaurant business, nine more million dollars left, P is not so
risk-averse as someone who has nothing left. Then should the nine million
dollars be added to the terminal values to make Vo = 9 and VI = 10.5? It all
depends! It depends upon P's attitude and whether the nine million dollars are
tied up in other businesses or are readily available and prepared for further
investment in the restaurant business. P may consider the one million dollars
the only money that is prepared for the restaurant business, or P may prepare
some extra money to put in this business in case of loss. This is why I
propose to consider the concept of capital, C. If nothing extra is prepared,
then the capital will simply be one million dollars. If two more million dollars
are prepared to put in the business in case of loss, then the capital will be
three million dollars.
The value used for a person's personal welfare function should always
be the value of the person's total wealth or property. In the study of
distributive justice, personal welfare functions, instead of utility functions
with respect to particular businesses, should be used.
Another delicate point occurs. As pointed out above, in determining the
total material value for a person, we should consider not only the person's
wealth, but also the hypothetical equivalent wealth or capital of her or his
income, by converting that income into an equivalent capital that would
produce the income as interest. You may argue that bank interest rate varies
from time to time and from place to place. That the capital equivalent to a
fixed income is not constant, but varies with time and place is a fact of life
that cannot be avoided. We have to put up with a rough estimation of the
equivalent capital. At any rate, the concept of a total wealth or capital
including the equivalent capital of income is much more reasonable than that
not including the equivalent capital.
Whether or not V includes the equivalent capital affects a person's
attitude at V = O. If V does not include the equivalent capital, then V = 0
means that the person has no wealth, but can still live on income, and the
situation is not very grave. If V includes the equivalent capital, then V = 0
means that s/he not only has no wealth, but also no future income at all, and
the situation becomes extremely serious. This is why V is set to be negative
infmity and U' to be positive infinity at V = 0 as two conditions that have to
be met.
Now I will have a look at the most rational utility functions: the classes
of constantly-proportional risk-averse functions. We see that the utility
function, U = In V for c = 1 and U = -V-(c-l) for c > 1, meets the first
67
UTILITY THEORY
Recent Developments in Utility Theory
condition, while U = VI-c for 0 < c < I, U = In V for c = I, and U = -V-(c-l) for
c > I, all meet the second condition. Thus, these three classes of non-trivial
constantly-proportional risk-averse functions are naturally compatible with
the situation that capital, C, includes the equivalent capital of income. If C
does not include the equivalent capital, then Uo = 0 should not correspond to
Yo, but should correspond to a value Vo+ > O. Before a constantlyproportional risk-averse function is used as a utility function for the decisionmaker of an enterprise, the terminal values and utilities should be properly
checked for reasonableness and physical significance, if any.
The function U = VI-c for 0 < c < I is bounded at the lower end but is not
bounded at the upper end, the function U = In V for c = I is not bounded at
both the lower and upper ends, and the function U =-V-(c-I) for c > I is not
bounded at the lower end but is bounded at the upper end. That the
boundedness of a utility function at both the lower and upper ends is
mathematically neat, but philosophically unjustifiable, is compatible with the
above analysis. So far as a personal welfare function is concerned, at the
lower end, Vo = 0 means no subsistence, and a bounded low utility Uo is not
suitable to represent the seriousness of this situation. Therefore, the function
U = VI-c for 0 < c < I as a personal welfare function is not reasonable at the
lower end. At the upper end, a bounded high utility is unsuitable to represent
the insatiety of human beings. Therefore, the function U = -VI-c for c > I, as
either a personal welfare function or a utility function, is also unreasonable at
the upper end. This is another reason why I propose the adoption of the
logarithmic function as a general utility function.
Practically, however, with the equivalent capital included in the total
value, the situation of V0 approaching zero never happens. A personal
welfare function curve need not start from a fixed Uo corresponding to Vo=O,
but may start from a Uo+ corresponding to a Vo+, where Vo+ > Vo = O. What
V0+ should be is beyond the scope of this book and will not be discussed here.
Suffice to say that a personal welfare function curve had better be drawn
around a reference point where the slope U' = I, the normal state where one
dollar is considered one dollar, extending to a suitable Vo+ to the left and a
suitable V I to the right.
Thus, from a utilitarian point of view, for the study of interpersonal
comparisons of utility and distributive justice, normalization, dimension, and
terminal utilities are crucial points that should not be neglected. To draw two
or more utility or personal welfare curves for interpersonal comparisons of
utility, another kind of normalization is required.
regarding decision theory are different between the "American school" and the
"European school," and opinions diverge within each school. The American
school tends to advocate using the traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility theory as a normative model for decision-making, whereas the
European school maintains, from an empirical point of view, that the traditional
utility theory is inadequate as an effective model of explanation and, hence,
questions the rationality of the theory. My position is mainly the same as the
von Neumann-Morgenstern theory but with new interpretations and
modifications. I identify the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility with
economists' utility of money, as presented in the previous sections. Ole Hagen
has surveyed some positions and views that are apparently logically possible.
As stated by Hagen, one such position is as follows.
68
7. Recent Developments in Utility Theory
Decision and utility theories are a controversial topic, because opinions
69
One could accept the existence both of a cardinal utility in the classical
sense (operating in riskless contexts) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index as describing actual behavior. This would imply either that
they were identical or that they were independent or that the effects
operating besides utility in the classical sense transformed this into a new
function having the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristics.J7
I have such a position. Out of the three implications, my position can be
considered to have either the first or the third, but defmitely not the second.
Related to the von Neumann-Morgenstern or neo-Bernoullian
formulation, as pointed out by Maurice Allais, is "an open question whether
rationality should be defmed on the basis of criteria relating only to random
choice, or following criteria which are independent of all consideration of
random choice."18 Hagen called the first defmition an ordinalist reaction to
neo-Bernoullian utility theory, which "was to give it an interpretation which
did not conflict with ordinalism in general. The von Neumann-Morgenstern
or neo-Bernoullian utility index served only to describe a person's
preferences under risk, and its different ratios had no significance in any
other contexts." 19
I think that either definition may be said to be correct, but neither one is a
complete interpretation, because utility of money cannot be defined in terms
of money itself, and thus was defined in terms of random choices. But I have
used the example of a person before and after winning a large lottery prize to
show that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility does not have to be in
probability terms.
The basic part of my theory, or the portion of decision and utility theories
that I believe and use, insofar as it affects moral philosophy and social choice,
is rigorous, self-consistent, and within the framework of the von NeumannMorgenstern formulation.
UTILITY THEORY
Recent Developments in Utility Theory
The main point of questioning of the traditional expected utility theory is
that some empirical results do not conform to one or more of the axioms of
the expected theory. The four main axioms are listed below.
measurement. This resolution is a small constant difference between any two
quantities very close to each other. This concept of resolution suggests a way
leading from the ordinal view to the cardinal view. For instance, if an ordinal
relation exists between A and B, say A > B, then we can find a quantity A'
such that A > A' > B and insert A' between A and B. We can fmd still other
quantities between A and A' and between A' and B. If we carmot find any
quantity between A' and B, or, if we fmd some quantity A" between A' and
B, but we can hardly distinguish either between A" and A", or between A"
and B, then this is the limit and the difference of magnitude between A' and
B is the resolution.
Value is subjective in nature. While no universal valuemeter exitsts,
values can be compared subjectively by the agent, or the agent serves as a
valuemeter. So values and utilities can have subjective resolutions too. This
resolution is no longer a constant difference, but, as I have argued in Section
4 of this chapter for the law of diminishing incremental interest, it is roughly
proportional to the value already possessed by the agent. In other words, the
ratio between the resolution of value that a person senses and the value
already possessed by that person is approximately constant. This implies that
the mapping of value into utility is a mapping from geometrical ratios into
arithmetical differences. Interestingly, the logarithmic function is exactly
such a function. This is why I present the law of diminishing incremental
interest and propose the adoption of the logarithmic function as a general
utility function. The concept of extremely small increment, or resolution,
extends naturally from ordinal comparison to cardinal measurement.
I admit that the determination of preferences is subject to errors. But
when we face several alternatives of a decision problem, we have to show a
preference, or we are forced to make a choice. So the error in expressing our
preference is a fact of life, which carmot be avoided, because preference is
the only way in which we are able to express the psychological values. I
therefore hold that it is necessary to have a cardinal view of utilities, no
matter how difficult and inaccurate the determination of utilities may be.
(2) Psychological Values. European scholars, as typically represented by
Maurice Allais, emphasize psychological values. 25 I agree that psychological
values are important and Allais's treatment is a refinement over the
traditional utility theory. However, I regard psychological values as already
covered in the concepts of preference, value, and utility, because preference
is a choice after the consideration, comparison and weighting of all factors,
including psychological ones. Since value is subjective, values even of
completely different natures can be compared and weighted subjectively. All
values, unless they have a nonlinear relationship between them, can be added
together to form a total value expressed in terms of a common dimension:
money. Psychological values thus have already been taken into account by
70
(1) Cancellations: If any state of the world yields the same outcome
regardless of the decision-maker's choice, then the entries in this state
may be canceled without affecting the choice. This axiom has been given
different names by authors, such as the substitution axiom of von
Neumann-Morgenstern,20 the sure-thing principle of Leonard J. Savage,2]
and the independence principle of R. Duncan Luce and David H.
Krantz. 22
(2) Transitivity: For any lotteries or prospects, L], L2, and LJ, if someone
prefers L] to L2 and prefers L2 to L3, then s/he must prefer L] to LJ. This
axiom is essential for the representation of preferences by an ordinal
utility scale.
(3) Dominance: If one option, 0], is better than another option, 02, in
one state and is at least as good as the other option, 02, in all other states,
then 0] is said to be dominant to 02 and should be the preferred option
between the two.
(4) Invariance: The different representations of the same choice problem
should yield the same preference. The axiom implies that the preference
between options should be independent of their description. A related
concept is consequentialism which has been discussed by Peter
Hammond. 23
Because of the occurrence of conflict, scholars have released some
conditions or axioms and formulate several other models which are able to
explain conflicting behaviors. For instance, based on his well-known Allais
paradox, Maurice Allais released the cancellations axiom. 24
My view is that when a theory is not adequate to explain some human
behavior, the theory is not necessarily wrong. The phenomenon of conflict
may be due to errors in experiment, such as sampling errors, or to semantic
ambiguity of the questions used in the experiments.
As far as I see, the controversies stem mainly from three crucial points:
(1) whether utility is ordinal or cardinal, (2) psychological values, and (3) the
relationship between utility and risk attitude. I now present my views
regarding these three points.
(1) Ordinalism versus Cardinalism. I hold that no unreconcilable conflict
occurs between the ordinal view and the cardinal view. So far as
measurement is concerned, almost all quantities are continuous, but in terms
of decimal numbers, the measured quantity has to be a discrete number the
precision of which is limited by what is called the "resolution" of the
71
UTILITY THEORY
Recent Developments in Utility Theory
preference and do not have to be treated separately.
From the point of view of "bounded rationality," as suggested by
Herbert A. Simon, a decision-maker, in facing a risky decision-making, may
have her or his value judgment affected by the overestimation or
underestimation of probability, thereby producing an effect of amplification
or diminution. 26 This effect on a decision-maker's psychological values is a
fact that appears in some empirical results. This effect is the conception of
"reweighting of probability" in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's
prospect theory.27 But this view of risk has a possibility of double counting of
weight because probability itself implies risk.
As to the ultimate nature or cause of these psychological values, I think
that is the problem of psychologists and sociologists, and it should not bother
philosophers and decision scientists.
(3) Risk Attitude. Risk attitude is one of the main controversial issues
between the European school and the American school. It initiated in
empirical evidence in tests of decision problems run by Maurice Allais,
henceforth known as the Allais paradox, which suggests inconsistencies in
the neo-Bernoullian formulation. 28 Since then Allais and others have
developed various theories intended to explain risk attitude and to modify or
replace the neo-Bernoullian formulation.
As described by Bertrand R. Munier, "Allais's results . . . were
conflicting with the independence axiom and also, more generally, with the
very concept ofNeo-Bernoullian utility index."29
Munier briefly describes Allais's position as follows:
different in total current wealth, normal operating point, and acceptable total
value. This is the main cause of the so-called Allais choice, which has little to
do with the question whether the traditional expected utility theory neglects
the risk attitude. To infer from the Allais paradox that the traditional utility
theory violates the cancellation axiom is unjustifiable.
Second, I think the concept of variance and higher moments lacks
physical significance and, hence, is not fully justified. Variance and higher
moments are used to express the effect of a deviation from the normal value
more than proportional to the deviation. The variance has a property of
symmetry on both sides of the normal value. It is applicable only when the
deviation is quite small relative to the normal value. But any rational utility
function, because of the concavity of the utility curve or the property of
diminishing marginal utility, is not symmetrical on the two sides of the
normal value. On the lower side, the effect of deviation is more than
proportional to the deviation, whereas on the upper side, the effect of
deviation is less than proportional to the deviation. The first moment is
directly proportional to the deviation, and the use of a risk-averse utility
function or concave utility curve is precisely to take the property of
diminishing marginal utility into account. Therefore, on the upper side, the
effect of variance and higher moments conflicts with the effect of the utility
function or curve, and, on the lower side, the effect of variance and higher
moments is a kind of double counting and is redundant.
Ole Hagen tried to explain the Allais paradox by his axiomatic model in
which an individual is not an expected utility maximizer. 32 In his model, the
utility of game is represented as the sum of expectation and a function
approximating the utility of risk: U = u + f(s,z) + £ , where U = utility ofthe game,
u = expectation of utility of gains, f = approximate expression for utility ofrisk, s
= standard deviation in terms of utility, Z = m3/s2 = ratio between third-order
moment and variance in terms of utility, and £ = error element. The preference of
a game is dependent not only on the expected utility but also on the dispersion of
the utilities of payoffs. The preferences under risk are in general not "linear in the
probability." Neglecting the error element, Hagen's treatment is to separate utility
into two independent factors. This method strikes me as a mathematical artifice
without much physical significance.
Mark J. Machina has developed a general preference model or "local
utility" theory.33 Based on a weaker assumption of smoothness of preference
over alternative probability distribution, Machina derived a general nonlinear reference function V(F(.)). According to Machina, an individual would
be an expected utility maximizer of the "local utility" function in the way
proposed by Machina. However, Allais concluded that "On the whole, the
Machina "local utility" theory is neither well-defmed nor testable."34 I hold
the same view as Allais regarding Machina's "local utility" theory.
72
He consistently argued that if defined only with respect to X, the NeoBernoullian index could not take into account the attitude towards risk and
the more or less risky character of a prospect. Hence, the dispersion of
utilities had to be taken into account in some way or another. Generally
speaking, besides the utility-evaluation of gains (which can be done
without any consideration of risk), the whole probability-distribution had to
be considered, and not only its first moment in utility terms.30
I do not agree with this view, because of the following arguments. First,
I have presented an explanation of the Allais paradox based on the neoBernoullian foumulation, using the concept of total current wealth VN and a
lowest acceptable total value V0+. 31 In the original Allais paradox the total
current wealth and the acceptable total value were not specified. This is an
obscure and fuzzy situation, which is misleading and may cause the testee to
implicitly make unrealistic assumptions. If total current wealth and
acceptable total value are reasonably assumed for the two problems a and b,
then the two decision situations a and b of the Allais paradox will turn out
73
74
UTILITY THEORY
Generally speaking, most special utility curves not of the normal
concave type are used to explain irrational behaviors. Some of these special
utility curves may be used to explain general decision behaviors, but then
these general behaviors are not inexplicable by the concave type utility
curves. For a general utility theory to cover every special or irrational
situation is unnecessary. For instance, the "reflection effect" of Kahneman
and Tversky's prospect theory,35 in order to express the greater disutility of a
loss than the utility of the same amount of gain, uses an amplified reflection
of the normal positive concave utility curve to obtain a negative convex
utility curve. The upper half of the utility curve is concave, while the lower
half of the utility curve is convex, with a "reference neutral point" separating
the two regions. Kahneman and Tversky conclude that human beings are riskprone for the region of loss, and they call the function thus obtained "value
function."
I believe that the additional property of convexity of the lower half of
the curve is unjustifiable, because, with the total wealth taken into account,
no real region of negative values exists, practically speaking. After any loss,
the total wealth is still positive. I have proposed the conception of a normal
operating point.3 6 In my opinion, in the use of traditional utility curves, for
the same decremental and incremental values, as long as the consideration of
gain and loss is centered around the normal operating point, the incremental
disutility (or decremental utility) will naturally be greater than the
incremental utility. Thus, the general human behavior can be effectively
explained, without resorting to "reflection effect" at all.
What the traditional expected utility theory is to explain is general
quantifiable behavior of choice. As special cases, some decision-makers may
be risk-prone and pursue high risk, because risk, as an exciting stimulus, may
bring them an additional satisfaction other than that brought by the normal
outcome. This satisfaction of risk as an exciting stimulus may be taken into
account by an additional factor and does not need to' be included in the
normal decision theory. Such special cases of risk-prone behavior are beyond
the general utility theory.
If the decision-maker has some non-monetary purposes, then that
person's behavior is also not what the traditional expected utility theory is to
explain. For instance, in the process of pursuing the accumulation of wealth,
a person may face different progressive objectives of several stages. To
overcome or break through such stages or bottlenecks the need may arise for
running higher risks than the person would normally run. Such a person may
have utility curves of different types, but these differenttypes are at different
stages and should not be regarded as different segments of the same curve.
This kind of special behavior does not need to be included in the general
utility theory.
Five
CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUE
1. Various Classifications of Value
Values have been classified in various ways. Values have properties or
characteristics according to which a classification may be made. The
classification of values is similar to the classification of concrete objects and
may be more readily explained in terms of a classification of, say, flowers.
Flowers may be classified according to the plant, such as tulips, roses, and
chrysanthemums. However, when you see many flowers of different colors,
you may intuitively classify them according to color, such as red flowers,
yellow flowers, white flowers, and purple flowers.
So the classification of values seems arbitrary and depends on the
purpose of classification. In my book on utilitarianism as a theory of moral
philosophy, I classify values first into moral and nonmoral, and then classify
moral value and nonmoral value into sub-c1asses. l This classification will be
reintroduced here in Section 3.
This kind of classification is not completely arbitrary. It must meet a
certain requirement. The classes must be disjoint and cover all the elements.
The classification should be complete and comprehensive, and no redundancy
should occur between classes. Consider the classification of flowers
according to color. This classification meets the above requirement, because
every flower has a unique color, or belongs to one and only one class.
According to this criterion, the classification of values into subjective and
objective is not valid because whether value is subjective or objective is a
controversial issue. Although some philosophers hold that some values are
subjective while other values are objective, other philosophers hold that
values are all subjective, yet other philosophers hold that values are all
objective, and still other philosophers hold that a value can be both subjective
and objective. As the subjectivity of value has been discussed in detail in
Section 4, Chapter Two, and Section 1, Chapter Three, I will not discuss it
here.
Another classification is to classify values into use value and exchange
value. This classification is helpful to my explanation of value and utility, and
my theory of value will be developed in the light of this classification. The
class of use value covers every value except the exchange value of money.
The classification seems not refined enough, because the purpose of classification is to identify the similar properties of members in the some class and
to distinguish the different properties of members in different classes.
Historically, some philosophers have made classifications of value. Plato
76
CLASSIFICA nONS OF VALUE
Intrinsic and Instrumental Values
distinguished between (1) instrumental, (2) intennediate, and (3) intrinsic
values. Regarding the fIrst as means values and the third as end values, Plato
held that intennediate values had both characteristics.2
John Dewey, with his concept of the means-end continuum, held all
values to be of the intennediate, extrinsic-intrinsic type. 3 Thus, Plato's
classifIcation seems not valid, at least not an ideal one.
In general, pleasure or happiness, the ultimate end of human life, is
considered to have an intrinsic value. However, John Stuart Mill says that in
the case of virtue, money, power, and fame, "the means have become a part
of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they
are means to."4 Thus, to identify and justify which instrumental values are
also intrinsic values and which instrumental values are not becomes
extremely diffIcult.
To avoid this kind of confusion, I do not use this classifIcation, which, as
will be discussed in detail in the next section, tends toward circularity.
R. B. Perry classified values into eight types, which he sometimes called
realms of value. They are: moral, aesthetic, scientific, religious, economic,
political, legal, and customary.5
Alejandro Korn distinguished nine types of value: economic, instinctive,
erotic, vital, social, religious, ethical, logical, and aesthetic. 6 Korn's
classifIcation is similar to Perry's. Assume that Korn's ethical value
corresponds to Perry's moral value, that Korn's logical value corresponds to
Perry's scientific value, and that Korn's social value covers Perry's political,
legal, and customary value. Then Korn had three more classes: instinctive,
erotic, and vital.
My classification in Sections 3 and 4 is quite similar to Perry's and
Korn's classifIcations. But my classifIcation in Section 4 is more systematic
and has more physical significance because it is according to life plan or the
good things in life and, thus, shows the teleological nature of utility and
utilitarianism.
as frequently discussed, argued, and attacked by so many philosophers.
Briefly speaking, the values of all ordinary objects are instrumental
values, and the value of only the ultimate end of life, happiness, is intrinsic
value. The original intention of this classifIcation may have been to
emphasize the ultimate end of life in comparison with all other things in life.
This emphasis is plausible. But according to my theory, the logical reasoning
has some inadequacy; hence, this classifIcation is not accepted.
According to my general theory of value presented in Chapter Two,
utility is defIned in terms of preference. It is something that an object has for
a subject. This object may be a physical object, such as an automobile, or a
non-material object, such as power, or an activity, such as sightseeing, or a
position, such as the presidency of a students' association. A physical object
may be purchased and possessed, like a suit, or it may be used without
possession, like a public park. A non-material object, like power, is not
purchased, but is pursued and, after obtained, can be used or enjoyed. An
activity like sightseeing is enjoyed. A position like the presidency is
experienced.
An object has instrumental value, use value, usefulness, or utility for a
subject before, during, and after a process of choosing it from among two or
more alternatives by the subject. The object of alternative Al is to be
weighted and compared by the subject with the objects of other alternatives
Az, A3, etc. After weighting and comparison, the subject will make a decision
to choose an alternative to obtain a particular object.
As to happiness as the ultimate end of life, in Chapter Two I defme it as a
state of mind after the subject has obtained a chosen object. After the subject
has decided to choose an alternative and has obtained the object of the chosen
alternative, the subject has an actual interest in the obtained object and then
gains an incremental piece of happiness.
Object is an external thing to be obtained by the subject, whereas
happiness is an internal thing, a state of mind, that the subject naturally
comes to after having chosen the alternative and obtained the object. So every
action involves an object and a piece of happiness in series. They are not two
different objects in parallel with each other, and they are not to be compared
for the values they have.
A time or sequential relationship exists between any instrumental value
and the intrinsic value of the ultimate end: any instrumental value will
eventually lead to an intrinsic value. No harm results from excluding the
ultimate en.d of human life from consideration in the classifIcation of values.
This will make the classifIcation simpler and clearer and will circumvent any
obscurity about means and end.
We may then ask the question: Can happiness itself be considered an
object having a value for the subject? If so, what is wrong with this value
2. Intrinsic and Instrumental Values
Previously I mentioned that I do not agree to the classifIcation of values into
intrinsic and instrumental, without giving detailed arguments for my
objection. In this section I present my arguments against this classifIcation.
Originally, Mill referred to only happiness, the ultimate end of life, as
having an intrinsic value, while all other objects, since they are useful as
instruments in attaining the ultimate end, have only instrumental values. Later
he added most spiritual values, such as virtue, fame, power, and beauty, to the
class of intrinsic values, thus converting some means into ends.? This is one
of the main sources of the obscurities ofthe "proof of the principle of utility,"
77
CLASSIFICAnONS OF VALUE
Intrinsic and Instrumental Values
being called intrinsic value? I agree that happiness itself may be considered
an object having a value, but that is in a different situation from the one in
which we consider the values of objects and make a classification of them. A
new incremental piece of happiness always has a cause, which is precisely
the obtaining of an obj ect. So the choice of an alternative and the obtaining of
an object are the cause, while the gaining of an incremental piece of
happiness is the effect. To compare the value of cause and effect and classify
them seems inappropriate. We may jump over the cause to the effect and
make a hypothetical comparison of different pieces of incremental happiness
caused by different objects. Then a piece of happiness should be compared
with another piece of happiness only, but it cannot be compared with another
object. If a piece of happiness is considered an object and compared with the
object causing this piece of happiness, then circularity arises, which can
cycle endlessly. Thus, I arrive at this conclusion. In normal decisionmaking we compare the utilities of objects, but do not compare them with
happiness, which is the effect of obtaining an object on the mind of the
subject. We may regard happiness as an object too, but in that case a
comparison is to be made only among different pieces of happiness, not
between a piece of happiness and another object that is not the resulting
happiness of an object.
Nothing is wrong in classifying values into intrinsic and instrumental
according to whether the value is that of happiness or that of any object other
than happiness. But I still do not adopt this kind of classification because of
the following reasons.
First, Mill's obscurity causes confusion. Virtue, fame, power, etc. are
ordinary objects which cause happiness, not happiness itself. They differ
from ordinary physical objects in that they have non-material values instead
of material values. But non-material values are not necessarily intrinsic
values. No logical inference leads to the equivalence of these two classes of
values. To avoid the confusion caused by this obscurity, the classification of
values into intrinsic and instrumental had better be discarded.
Second, the term "intrinsic value" in not well-defmed. John O'Neill says:
ethics the different senses of 'intrinsic value' are used interchangeably."9
Instrumental value and intrinsic value correspond to means and ends,
respectively. But Anthony Weston fmds that values exist between means and
ends. He follows John Dewey's lead and speaks of "immediate valuation, an
analogously direct kind of appreciation, though not restricted to
enjoyment."IO Then he says:
78
The term 'intrinsic value' is used is at least three different basic senses:
(1) Intrinsic valuel Intrinsic value is used as a synonym for
noninstrumental value.... (2) Intrinsic value2 Intrinsic value is used to
refer to the value an object has solely in virtue of its 'intrinsic
properties' .... (3) Intrinsic value3 Intrinsic value is used as a synonym
for 'objective value' i.e., value that an object possesses independently of
the valuations ofvaluers. 8
Yet, as noted by O'Neill, "In much of the literature on environmental
79
Here there is indeed immediate valuation, intense appreciation in the moment,
but that valuation is not separate from - indeed, quite the contrary, it
presupposes - a larger context, a longer pattern of development, a past and a
future.... To bring the larger, underlying pattern into attention, let us speak
in addition of values-as-parts-of-patterns. 11
Weston argues that the existence of immediate values and values-asparts-of-patterns opens up the possibility of a space between ends and means.
He writes:
Immediate values and values-as-parts-of-patterns are indeed valuable
"not just as means" to something else, and thus in at least a loose way
they are valuable "for their own sakes." But we must be cautious in
calling them "ends," let alone "intrinsic values," even though we readily
agree that they are "not just means." Of course, we could merely define
"end" as "Not Gust) a means," so that "ends" and "means" really do
exhaust the possibilities. Ordinarily, though, the notion of "ends" carries
some other baggage, making the ascription of "end"-status to what are
"not just means" necessarily non-automatic.J2
We cannot avoid obscurity and confusion if the term "intrinsic value"
and the classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental are used.
Third, from the objectivistic point of view, intrinsic values exist
objectively, independent of the existence of human beings as valuers. Then
intrinsic value theories are inevitably involved with environmental ethics. As
pointed out by Tom Regan, "A common conception of environmental ethics
involves appeals to nature's intrinsic values. Without such appeals, it is
believed, we will be unable to illuminate, account for or ground either respect
for or duties to natural entities."13 But Regan regards this view as a mistake.
He classifies theories of intrinsic value into several categories: (1) mentalstate theories, (2) state-of-affairs theories, (3) end-in-itself theories, and (4)
hierarchical ends-in-themselves theories. Regan has argued that all these
theories fail to meet the requirements imposed by environmental ethics. He
writes:
80
CLASSIFICA nONS OF VALUE
Finally, while there may be other accounts of intrinsic value in addition
to those I have considered, none can possibly assist in illuminating,
accounting for or grounding respect for or duties to nature; for intrinsic
value must be interpreted either in an egalitarian or in a nonegalitarian
fashion, and the consequences in either case are inimical to the
development of an environmental ethical theory.
If I am right there is no theory of intrinsic value that, in a parsimonious
fashion, can possibly meet the demands this conception of an
environmental ethic imposes on it. 14
Thus, intrinsic value theories come across difficulties ansmg from
environmental ethics. If we do not classify values into intrinsic and
instrummental and do not use the term "intrinsic value," then these
difficulties will be circumvented. Ifwe take a subjectivistic view of values, as
I do in this utilitarian theory of value, then the problem of environmental
ethics will reduce to that of moral community. In that case, I agree with Peter
Singer that a practical solution is to consider graded interests of human
beings, animals, other sentient beings, and the inorganic environmental nature,
in a descending order of interest. IS We cannot possibly include animals and
plants into our moral community, for otherwise all human beings would
starve to death.
Fourth, when we classify values into intrinsic and instrumental, we
usually imply that intrinsic values are superior to or higher than instrumental
values. According to the defmitions of my general theory of value, utility has
only one dimension of comparison, namely, magnitude, which depends
completely upon the subjective "usefulness" of the object for the subject.
Superiority or highness is already covered by the magnitude of "usefulness,"
utility, or value. I agree that, for a good life plan, we should pursue nonmaterial values, such as virtue, fame, and power, more than material values.
But this is a normative prescription that has nothing to do with the
classification of values, which is positive and descriptive.
Fifth, even if we admit that the value of happiness is different from the
value of of all other objects, to classify values into intrinsic and instrumental
is still unjustifiable when intrinsic value belongs to only a single item of
"object." You may argue that different kinds of happiness exist, just as
different kinds of objects, and, therefore, happiness is not a single item. In
that case, no way exists to distinguish between the different kinds of
happiness by analysis, test, or experiment unless we go back to the cause of
happiness, the objects which were obtained by the subject and caused the
subject to gain the piece of incremental happiness. The classification of
Classification of Value from Moral Point of View
81
happiness cannot be made except as a mirror image of the classification of
objects which cause happiness. To then deal with this mirror image is
redundant and trivial.
These are the reasons why I do not use the classification of values into
intrinsic and instrumental, even though theoretically nothing may be wrong
with it.
3. Classification of Value from Moral Point of View
I proposed a classification of value from a moral point of view. 16 A
classification of value is made essentially for the sake of convenience, and
what the categories are does not matter much. Normally, moral value is a
kind of non-material value, because the object that has a moral value, such as
a moral action, a moral principle, and a feeling of moral satisfaction, is an
abstract object instead of a physical object. So moral value may be regarded
as a subclass of the class of non-material value. From a moral point of view,
values may be first classified into moral value and nonmoral value, and then
moral values and nonmoral values each may be classified into subclasses. My
classification of value from a moral point of view is presented below.
(I) Moral values
A. Moral value of a person
Examples: Jesus Christ, Confucius, Socrates.
B. Moral value of a virtue
Examples: Cardinal virtues, righteousness, love.
C. Moral value of an action
Examples: Donating, saving the life of a drowning person,
sacrificing your life for your country.
D. Value ofa motive or an intention
E. Value of the consequences (which may have a moral value, a
nonmoral value, or both) of an action
F. Moral value ofthe feeling of moral satisfaction
Examples: When you donate money, you feel satisfied. The loss
of money due to donation is compensated by the moral value of
the feeling of moral satisfaction.
(2) Nonmoral values
A. Material value
Examples: Car, house, watch, money, food, clothing.
B. Sentimental value
Examples: Love, sex, friendship, souvenir, photograph.
C. Epistemic value
82
CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUE
Examples: Knowledge, invention, discovery, a new theorem.
D. Aesthetic value
Examples: Poem, oil painting, composition of music, ballet
performance.
E. Professional value
Examples: Power, fame, achievement.
F. Social value
Examples: Constitution, police force, social security system,
good custom or convention.
G. Historical value
Examples: Ruins, palaces, monuments, historical documents, a
great person in history.
H. Religious value
Examples: Churches, temples, religious ceremonies.
The classes of value in the above classification are similar to my other
classification according to good things in life to be presented in the next
section, except that here health value is missing. The similarity between my
two classifications shows the arbitrariness of classification.
4. Classification of Value According to Good Things
In this section I propose a classification of value according to good things in
life. Previously, based on the set of good things in life, I established a
mathematical model for the quantitative measurement of the quality of human
life, similar in structure to the model for the calculation of reliability of a
system consisting of several components. l ? In that paper I classified the
values of the good things in life into nine categories: (l) physical health, (2)
mental health, (3) social order, (4) peace, (5) justice, (6) material, (7) activity,
(8) interpersonal relationship, and (9) morality. That classification is pretty
crude. The classification proposed here is a refmement and modification of
the previous one, with added explanations and justifications.
Bofore the presentation of the classification and the explanation of
various values, I first discuss some properties of the values so far as the
relationships among them are concerned.
A value, VI, for a person, P, is said to be replaceable by another value,
V2, if and only ifP feels indifferent to whether P obtains either VI or V2. For
instance, when you go to a restaurant for dinner, and if you like steak and
chicken similarly, then you will have the same degree of satisfaction if you
order and eat either steak or chicken. The value of a steak dinner for you is
equal to, and is replaceable by, that of a chicken dinner.
The economic values of most objects that can be purchased by money are
Classification of Value According to Good Things
83
regarded as replaceable. Strictly speaking, they are still not replaceable.
Consider, for instance, the value of food. When you are hungrey, you need
food, and food carmot be replaced by clothing or a car, no matter how
beautiful the clothes may look or how luxurious the car may be. However,
since almost every commodity or service can be purchased by money, the
value of a commodity or service may be expressed in terms of money. This
is equivaleut to that the property of replaceability holds for the values of all
commmodities and services.
Values having the property of replaceability may be added together to
obtain the total value. For instance, if an object, 01, has a value, VI, and
another object, 02, has a value, V2, then their total value, VI, is equal to
VI+V2. The two values, VI and V2, are said to have an additive relationship
between them. The relationships among the weights of the factors of an
alternative in decision-making are usually additive relationships. Previously,
I presented a law of exchangeability and substitutability in studying the
quality of human life.J8 I now rename it a law ofreplaceability and quote it
below.
Law of Replaceability
Values having the property of replaceability have additive relationships
among them in being combined together.
This law implies that any single value among a group of values having
additive relationship is not indispensable. You may replace, exchange, or
trade off an amount of value for the same amount of some other value,
without affecting the total satisfaction produced by the group of values.
However, not every value is replaceable. For instance, the health value
of a person is essential or indispensable. If a person is in very bad health,
s/he will be unable to enjoy whatever other values that may exist for P, and
no matter how wealthy P may be, s/he will not be able to buy back her or
his health by spending money. To the extreme, the worst health condition
means death. If P dies, all the values for P will vanish. Suppose that P has
two values: health value, Vh, and economic value, V e .
When Vh
approaches zero, the total value VI will approach zero too. Thus, the
additive relationship carmot represent the ralationship between Vh and V e .
It seems that a multiplicative relationship, that is, VI = Vh X V e , better
represents the relationship between Vh and V e , because when Vh = 0, VI =
OXVe = 0 too.
The relationshop between Vb and V e may be more complex than a
simple multiplicative relationship. However, it is extremely difficult to
determine the exact relationship between two values such as Vb and V e , and
CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUE
Classification of Value According to Good Things
I cannot but presume that the multiplicative relationship is a fairly
reasonable approximation.
A difficulty exists with the multiplicative relationship. For an additive
relationship, the dimension or unit of the total value is the same as the
dimension or unit of each component value. But for a multiplicative
relationship, say between two values, the dimension or unit of the product
would be the square of the dimension or uriit of each component value. And
for the product of n values having multiplicative relationships among them,
the dimension or unit of the total value would be the nth power of the
dimension or unit of each component value. This seems very unreasonable.
Besides, the nth power of the dimension or unit of value has no physical
significance at all.
To circumvent this difficulty, I propose to use normalized or per unit
values. By a normalized or per unit value I mean the value divided by the
standard or normal value. It is a ratio of two values and, hence, is
dimensionless. For instance, consider the physical health value. Since we
usually regard a person without any illness and in top health condition as
normal, we may use the health value corresponding to this condition as the
normal value, and divide every health value by this normal value. Thus,
when a person is in pefect health condition, the normalized or per unit health
value is 1. We may use a fraction of I, say 0.9, to represent a slightly bad
health, and 0.1 to represent the health of a cancer patient at the last stage.
The concept of normalized or per unit value entails the concept of what I
call passive value. For instance, health is something we require in order to be
able to live a normal life. When you are healthy, you do not think of the
pleasure or happiness of being healthy. On the other hand, when you are ill,
you sharply perceive the pain or unhappiness of being ill. Therefore, it may
be said that health is not a positive value, but is a necessary condition for a
person to live and to pursue other values for her or his life plan. In other
words, health has a normal state, which is the best, ideal, or perfect condition
and also is the limit. We do not expect or pursue anything beyond this limit.
Thus, the normalized or per unit representation of best health by 1 as a
multiplicative factor to other values seems appropriate. When the health
value is 1, you can enjoy the other values to the full. When you are ill and
the health value reduces to 0.8, the other values you enjoy will be discounted
by 20 percent.
Contrary to passive values, some other values that we pursue are limitless.
I call them active values. For instance, consider the epistemic value of
knowledge and the aesthetiv value of art. Knowledge is limitless in quantity
and quality (I mean depth or profundity). So is artistic creation too. A sincere
and serious scientist or artist usually devotes her or his whole life to scientific
study or artistic creation without saturation or satiety.
Some values, however, are both passive and action. For instance, food is
a basic requirement for maintainging existence or a simple life, but delicious
flavors are also smoething that we pursue and enjoy.
So whether a value is active or passive is regarded simply as a property,
not as a criterion for classification.
We may say that the ultimate end of life is to pursue some active values
as a life plan. To live and to fulfill the life plan we need some other passive
values, which we enjoy as well. The sources of these active and passive
values are called the good things in life. So my classification of vlaue is
based on these good things in life and the life plan. I consider the
relationships among the values and distinguish between the passive values
and the active values. In the following, I list the various classes and
subclasses of values first and then give an explanation of their natures.
84
85
Classification of Value According to Good Things in Life
(1) Health Value
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A. Physical health
B. Mental health
Economic Value] (material value)
Sentimental Value]
Environmental value
Social Value
A. Security value
B. Political Value( value of political system)
C. Legal value (value oflegal system)
D. Economic value2 (value of econmic system)
E. Other social values (values of social systems or institutions such
as coustom, religion, convention, and etiquette)
Moral Value]
Religious value]
Career value
A. Epistemic Value (value of epistemic satisfaction)
B. Aesthetic Value (value of aesthetic or artistic satisfacion)
C. Professional Value (value of professional satisfaction)
D. Economic value3 (values of economic satisfaction as a career)
E. Sentimental value2 (value of sentimental satisfacion as a career)
F. Moral value2 (value of moral satisfaction as a career)
G. Religious value2 (value of religious satisfaction as a career)
Now I will give a brief discussion ofthe categories of values in the above
classification and explain why values are so classified.
CLASSIFICA nONS OF VALUE
Classification of Value According to Good Things
(1) Health Value.
Health is obviously a primary necessary condition for a human being to
live. Its value is indispensable and cannot be replaced or exchanged by any
other value. Both physical health and mental health are essential, so that,
strictly speaking, physical health value and mental health value should be
regarded as having a multiplicative relationship between themselves and also
between them and all other values. Obviously, health value is a passive value.
(2) Economic Value.
I further classify economic value into economic value], econmic value2
and economic value3. They are not grouped together, but belong to different
calsses. By economic value] I mean material value, or the value of all the
things needed and wanted in life, which can be purchased by money.
These things include food, clothing, residence, transportation, and recreation.
The values of most things in this category do not have the property of
replaceability. However, as explained before, since everything having an
economic value] can be purchased by money, I regard every economic value]
as replaceable by another econmic value!. However, the class of economic
value] is not replaceable by any non-economic value. Therefore, econmic
value! as a whole should be regarded as non-replaceable arid, hence, it has a
multiplicative relationship with other values.
Economic value is both passive and active. As mentioned above, food is
a basic need as well as a luxurious enjoyment. Business persons and
entrepreneurs earn money not only for living, but also as a career. This is why,
in the list of values, apart from (2) economic value], I list (8) D, economic
value3 as a career. The subclass (5) D, economic value2 is still different. It
represents the value of the economic system for a member of society.
(3) Sentimental Value.
By sentimental value I mean the value of personal feelings and
interpersonal natural feelings toward and from family members, relatives,
friends, etc., including love, sex, and friendship, which cannot be replaced or
exchanged by any other kind of value. Since everybody has feelings, this
category is essential to a normal life. You may argue that some people exist,
such as Buddhist monks, who have little emotional life. I would reply that
they are exceptional. Even Buddhist monks have a general benevolence or
love for all creatures or lives.
Sentimental value is also both passive and active. It is passive in the
sense that, for most people, a life with love, sex, and frienship is normal, and
a life without love, sex, and friendship is regarded as incomplete and
unsatisfactory. It is active in the sense that, in certain exceptional situations,
sentimental value may be the ultimate end of life or the core of a life plan.
For instance, in Romeo and Juliet, love is the ultimate end of life for both
Romeo and Juliet. In some Chinese novels and even in Chinese history, a
hero may have planned and worked for the whole life to revenge on a lifelong
enemy who had killed the hero's parents.
This is why in the list of values, apart form (3) Sentimental value! I list
(8) E, sentimental value2 as a career.
(4) Environmental value
By environmental value I mean the value of the physical environmental
nature in which a person lives. It consists of (A) a satisfactory environmental
and ecological lovel and (B) the availability of various goods. The physical
environment is certainly essential to living, because a place too cold, like the
antartic regions, or a place too hot and dry, like a desert, may be
uninhabitable.
Thus, environmental value is certainly passive. But it is also active
because a beautiful scenery may be a place of interest and is for the
enjoyment of tourists. This luxurious part of environmental value can be and
usually is purchased by money. This value, like the luxurious part of
economic value, is pursued by many people as material enjoyment, and may
be regarded as covered by economic value3.
(5) Social value
By social value I mean all those values produced or supplied by society
or social systems. I divide them further into five categories: (A) security
value, (B) political value or value of political system, (C) legal value or value
of legal system, (D) economic value2 or value of economic system, and (E)
value of other social systems or institutions, such as custom, convention,
religion, and etiquette.
Security value is the value of the police system, which is for the
maintenance of social order, and also the value of the national defense system,
which is for the protection ofthe nation and the maintenance of peace.
The other systems include the government, legislation, public facillities,
educational, cultural, and religious institutes, mass media, medical facilities,
banks and financial organizations, and informational institutes, which all
affect the life of every person living in the society.
Note that each social value is essentially passive in that, if a system,
institution, or practice is good, then we will feel natural but will not perceive
the value constantly and clearly, whereas if a system, institution, or practice
is bad, then we will feel not only uncomfortable and unsatisfied, but will
perceive the disvalue constantly.
(6) Moral value
Moral Value is of a special nature. It is essentially for and required by
others and society from the agent rather than by the agent who pursues value.
Society requires a minimum level of morality. Whether to go beyond this is
up to the individual. Therefore, this minimm requirement of morality is the
indispensable moral value that a member of society ought to pursue for
86
87
CLASSIFICAnONS OF VALUE
Classification of Value According to Good Things
society. So moral value is essentially passive.
Corresponding to the morality of the agent in general, the agent has a sense
of morality, and corresponding to a particular moral action taken by the agent,
slbe has a feeling of moral satisfaction. The value of the sense of morality and
that of the feeling of moral satisfacion have moral values for the agent.
For an ordinary or average person, morality is only a part of life, not the
main career. Some people, such as preachers and moralists, however, regard
morality as the ultimate end of life and deliberately take moral actions as a
career. In that case moral value is also active. This is why in the list of
values, apart from (6) moral value\, I list (8) F, moral value2 as a career.
(7) Religious value
Religious value has a very special nature. When a person believes in a
religion, s/he has a religious feeling and belief. In this way, religious value
is related to sentimental value. Religion has organization and institution, and
has a kind of social value. Religion promotes morality. Thus, religious value
is obviouly also related to moral value. Religion has theory and practice.
Theologists make theoretical studies of religion. Preachers, ministers,
Catholic fathers and nuns, and Buddhist monks do practical work for religion
as a profession. So religious value is related to career value too.
However, although most people believe in a religion, atheists and
agnostics do exist. So religious value is not a value that everybody needs for
living. It is also not required by others or society from every person, perhaps
with the exception of Islemic countries. That is to say, religious value is not
an essential value for a person to pursue. I propose that it be included as a
part in sentimental value, social value, and moral value, and also listed as (8)
G, religious value2 as a career.
(8) Career Value.
By career value I mean those values that you pursue and obtain as a
result of your career according to your life plan. Although each career value
is not non-replaceable, career value as a whole is non-replaceable. Once a
career is selected, the career value is indispensable because, from a utilitarian
point of view, human life is teleological and career value is no doubt what is
pursued as the ultimate end of human life. Roughly, I classifY it into four
main categories: (A) Epistemic value of knowledge. A scientist or a professor
doing research work is a typical example of a person pursuing epistemic
value. (B) Aesthetic value of art. A musician, an oil painter, or a poet is a
typical example of a person pursuing aesthetic value. (C) Professional value
of professional activities. It covers all vocational, professional, technological,
engineering, administrative, and political activities. Workers, technicians,
engineers, civil servants, lawyers, accountants, physicians, dentists, football
players, executives, business persons, entrepreneurs, and politicians can all be
considered to pursue professional values. (D) Economic value3 of businesses
and enterprises. Business persons and entrepreneurs particularly pursue extra
ecomomic value, which is not the passive economic value\ required for a
basic living, but is for luxurious enjoyment and as a career. Many other
people are also interested in obtaining extra economic value in addition to
their regular income, as can be seen from the large number of people who are
engaged in lotteries, gambling, and stock investment or speculation.
Beside these four main classes, I add (8) E, sentimental value2 as a career,
(8) F, moral value2 as a career, and (8) G, religious value2 as a carer.
All the career values are active, not passive, in that there is no limit or
satiety in the pursuit of them. Most people each pursue a single career value,
and some people may pursue two or more career values, but nobody can and
does pursue all these career values. Although career value is the most
important active value that a person pursues as her or his life plan, no
particular career value is required to pursue by everybody. It is up to the
prson to choose one or, in special situations, two or more career values.
The relationships among the values for a person are analogous to those
among the elements of a system in reliability study. Suppose that a system,
S, consists of two components, C\ and C2. If either C\ or C2 is indispensable,
that is, when either C\ or C2 fails, S fails too, then S may be represented by
an electric circuit with C\ and C2 connected in series, meaning that when
either Cl or C2 is open, the circuit is open. This is shown in Fig. 5(1).
88
~
C1
H
C2
89
t--o
(I) Series Circuit
(2) Parallel Circuit
Fig. 5 Electric Circuit Analog of System Reliability
If either Cl or C2 alone is not indispensable, but C\ and C2 together are
indispensable, that is , when either C\ fails or C2 fails but not both, S does not
fail, but when both Cl and C2 fail, S fails too, then S may be represented by
an electric circuit with Cl and C2 connected in parallel, meaning that when
_ _ _I
CLASSIFICATIONS OF VALUE
Classification of Value According to Good Things
either C) or C2 is open, but not both, the circuit is still closed, but when both
C) and C2 are open, the circuit is open. This is shown in Fig. 5(2).
Now the values for a person may also be represented by an electric
circuit similar to a system in reliability study. Replaceable values are
connected in parallel, and non-replaceable values are connected in series. All
the values in the above list are diagrammatically represented in Fig. 6.
moral value). Only class (8) career value is regarded as active value, which a
person positively pursues as a life plan. So values of classes (1) through (6)
are like constraining or discounting factors to modify the career value.
The total value for a person may be expressed as the product of the
various classes of values, as follows.
90
(1) Health value
0--
A. PhYSiCal} In
B. Mental
senes
(3) Sentimental value)
H
(2) Economic valuel}
(including religious
value!)
(5) Social value
(4) Environmental
f---
0.-
value
A. Security value
B. Poltical value
>C. Legal value
D. Economic value2
(value of economic system)
E. Other social values
f--
All in
senes
(8) Career value
A. Epistemic value
(6) Moral value
~ (including religious value!)
B. Aesthetic value
C. Professional value
D. Economic value3
E. Moral value2 as a career
F. Sentimental value2 as a career
G. Religious value2 as a career
Allin
parallel
f----o
Fig. 6 Diagrammatical Representation of the Values of the
Good Things in Life for a Person.
In the diagrammatic representation of the values of the good things in life
in Fig. 6, all the classes of values are in series. Classes (1) through (6) are all
regarded as passive values. Class (7) religious value) is not represented by an
element, but is included in (1) sentimental value!, (5) social value, and (6)
91
Total value - health value X economic value! X sentimental value!
X environmental value X social value X moral value!
X career value
where normalized or per unit values should be used for the fIrst six classes of
value.
However, in considering each class of value alone, it is not necessary to
use normalized or per unit values. For instance, economics and decision
theory deal with economic value, which is expressed in terms of money, As
discussed in chapter 4, I object to the conventional normalization of utility
and deliberately adopt the dimension and unit of value as the dimension and
unit of utility.
Some people do not have a clear-cut career or life plan. Then each of
class (1) through (6) may also serve as an active value, which is more or less
regarded as, or is equivalent to, career. For instance, old people usually
particularly care to take mild physical exercises everyday to maintain or
improve health and, hence, health value seems to be the ultimate end of life.
Chinese people emphasize the happiness of having fIlial piety from many
children and grand children at the old age. This kind of sentimental value,
although not exactly sentimental value2 as a carer, is much more than a
passive value. In recent years, many people in Taiwan and Hong Kong
immigrated to North America, Australia, and New Zealand. For the young
people, this kind of immigration may be said to be for a better opportunity of
career, but for the retired people, the immigration is essentially for better
environmental and social values. These values also look like active rather
than passive.
There is no clear-cut demarcation between passive value and active value.
It depends, to some extent, on the normal value we set. If we set the normal
value low, then the perfect condition or limit will be higher than the normal
value, and may be regarded as active. Consider health value again. Even if
health has a limit, we really do not know where the limit is. Suppose that the
average life span of human geings is seventy years. A healthy woman in the
sixties naturally hopes and expects to live up to eighty, ninety, or even a
hundred years old. That she pays particular attention to nutrition, physical
exercises, sleep, and recreation and regards health value as active as if it were
her career seems quite natural and reasonable.
CLASSIFICAnONS OF VALUE
92
Further Discussion of Good Life
5. Further Discussion of Good Life
As pointed out by Lawrence C. Becker, "It is useful to divide conceptions of
the good life into pluralist and unitary ones."19 As a pluralist, Becker assumes
that "Attempts to construct an account of the fmal good are either vacuous or
unsound." He further writes:
Then consider the range of things that might plausibly be regarded as (a)
distinct goods, not reducible to others on the list, (b) intrinsic, necessary,
or widely instrumental goods, and (c) defmite, at least in part, of a good
life. We may call goods falling into this range "criterial" ones with
respect to a good life. Here is a reasonably full list ofthem.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
The material conditions necessary for sustaining life
consciousness.
The quality ofconsciousness.
Understanding.
Self-command.
The harmonization ofreason, desire, and will.
The exemplification ofgoodness-of-a-kind.
Meaningful opportunity.
Meaningful activity.
Meaningful necessity.
Self-love.
Benevolence.
Mutual love.
Sexuality.
Achievement.
Rectitude.
Integrity.
A life as an aesthetic object. 20
and
This list corresponds closely to my classification of value according to
good things in life, except for difference in terminology and in grouping. For
instance, Becker's material conditions correspond to my economic value, and
his mutual love and sexuality correspond to my sentimental value. It is difficult
to identify the one-to-one correspondence, because a value in my list may cover
a part of several items each in his list and vice versa. But to make this kind of
identification is not crucial. Suffice to say that his list is claimed to be a
reasonably full list, and that I also claim my list covers all the good things in
life.
93
What is important is the accounts of the good life. Becker catalogues "the
most influential accounts of the good life under these headings: congruence,
inner unity, human excellence, personal excellence or achievement, personal
well-being or fulfillment, right conduct, autonomous activity, vocation,
aesthetic value, and rationality."2l
The crucial point is that whether all of these accounts, or some of them, or at
least one of them, can serve as a unitary account. After a detailed discussion of
these accounts, Becker concluded, "Taken together, these accounts constitute an
argument for pluralism, and that is a result I am happy to let stand."22
Becker is right in a sense, but many points of fuzziness occur in his
discussion and statements. Instead of arguing against Becker, I would rather
explain my view of a good life from the point of view of life plan.
First, I do not accept the term "the good life," because life plan varies
from person to person and a good life of a person is that life fulfilled
according to the life plan of that person. For the same person, the life plan is
not rigidly fixed, but may 'ihange as time goes on. Even if a person sticks to a
life plan for the whole of that person's life, s/he may come across frustrations
in the lifetime, and after a frustration the person may have to modify her or
his life plan slightly.
Second, because of free will, autonomy, and an individual person's being
an end in itself, the values pursued by a person are mainly for the person
herself or himself, and are for society or others only as a by-product. Whether
the life of a person is good should be measured by how much the life plan is
realized, not by an external, absolute, or objective criterion. Most of the
accounts in Becker's list are objective criteria, and no wonder none ofthem is
adequate.
Third, since everybody has a life plan, a good life does not mean the
good life of a great person, a sage, or a moral ideal. It should be a good life of,
or considered a good life by, an ordinary or average person. Most of the
accounts on Becker's list are a measure to test whether a characteristic is
ideal or perfect. They are not suitable accounts.
Fourth, if a single account serves as a unitary account, then every good
life should satisfy this account. A look at the accounts in Becker's list shows
that every account measures a special characteristic or feature of a life, which
a good life does not have to satisfy. I classify values according to good things
in life in such a way that the values that are not exchangeable and replaceable
are required, and the values that are exchangeable or replaceable are not
required. The required values, such as moral values, serve not as a criterion to
measure the degree of goodness of the life, but more as a constraint, in that as
long as a minimum requirement is met, the life is considered satisfactory in
this respect, and the goodness of the life is to be measured by other things.
On the other hand, a career value, namely, epistemic value, aesthetic value,
94
CLASSIFICAnONS OF VALUE
or professional value, which is replaceable, is the main value that a person
pursues in her or his life plan. The goodness of a life is measured fIrst by the
adequacy of the life plan and second by how successfully the person pursues
the values of her or his life plan. Since different people have different life
plans with different kinds of career value, no single career can serve as a
unitary account for a good life.
Therefore, no particular value can serve as a unitary account of a good
life. The general conception of life plan, or more specifIcally, how you set up
a life plan and how you fulfIll it, is the unitary account of a good life.
Six
MORAL VALUE
1. Moral Value Versus Other Values
In this chapter, I discuss different kinds of moral value, which is any value
that is related to morality in some way. Moral value, like epistemic value and
aesthetic value, is deah with by a special value theory, in this case, ethics or
moral philosophy. Strictly speaking, a detailed discussion of moral value is
not supposed to be included in a book on general theory of value.
Moral value differs from epistemic value, aesthetic value, and economic
value, not in its nature, but in its effect on others and society, and in its
technical details. I discuss these two points seriatim.
First, consider the effect of value on others and society. On the face of it,
moral value is similar to two other crucial intellectual values: the epistemic
value of knowledge, and the aesthetic value of art. I give a brief comparison
of epistemic value, aesthetic value, and moral value so far as their effects on
others or society are concerned.
For the epistemic value of knowledge, truth is objective and impersonal.
If something is proved to be true, then you have to believe it, no matter
whether you like it or not, because human beings are rational and can reason.
For the aesthetic value of art, the situation is quite different. If something,
say a classical oil painting, is known to be of a high aesthetic value, one
person may like it and appreciate its value, but another person, who is a
modernist or is not artistic at all, may not like it and not appreciate its value.
To appreciate art, you must have an artistic taste. Similarly, you may have no
musical talent at all and be unable to appreciate the performance of a
Beethoven symphony played by a famous orchestra. Even if you have the
talent for one kind of art, you may still not like it. For you not to like a kind
of art or not to appreciate a piece of art is considered fully justifIed. You are
completely free to have your own taste for art, with respect to kind and
degree.
In the case of morality, theoretically the situation is almost the same as
the case of art. You may have no propensity for morality, you may have no
"taste" for morality, or you may even be not interested in morality. Yet the
case of morality differs from the case of art. A non-artistic person is not
harmful to society, and, therefore, society does not care whether you are
artistic. But in the case of morality, an immoral person or an immoral action
may be harmful to society and, therefore, other people and society do care
whether you are moral, and they will exert social pressure, in the form of
approval or disapproval, on members of society so far as moral issues are
MORAL VALUE
Moral Value Versus Other Values
concerned. Hence the power of societal praise or blame.
Second, consider the technical details involved in the study of a specific
kind of value. Some value, such as the aesthetic value of art, involves much
technical detail. For instance, for a philosopher to judge the value of an oil
painting would be difficult unless s/he is a painter, to judge the value of a
symphony unless s/he is a musician, or to judge the value of a poem unless
s/he is a poet. Artists and literary writers are in a better position to understand
aesthetics or to judge the aesthetic values of arts. As to the epistemic value of
knowledge, epistemology is certainly a branch of philosophy. However, the
phenomenon of cognition is also studied by such scientists as psychologists,
linguists, and computer scientists, so that the study of the cognitive
phenomenon is now called cognitive science. Yet literary and general writers
also write on the value of truth. Similarly, economists are in a better position
than philosophers to study and write on economic value. Therefore,
philosophers rarely go to the technical details of such specific values as
epistemic value, aesthetic value, and economic value.
Moral value, however, is general and popular in that any person may
come across a moral value so that everybody should have some moral belief
or an attitude toward morality and should be moral to some extent or able to
meet the minimum moral requirement implicitly set in society. Yet morality
is not a profession or a discipline, and nobody except philosophers studies
morality and moral value. Specific ethics, such as business ethics, medical
ethics, engineering ethics, and military ethics, do exist, but these· ethics are
each an applied ethics, which means ethics applied to a specific profession,
and each has to be based on and deducible from general ethics or moral
philosophy, which is a branch of philosophy.
Therefore, moral value is a proper field of philosophical study. It is
related to everybody because anybody may come across a moral issue, has to
make an ethical decision, and has to take a moral action. Moral value also has
"technical" details in meta-ethics and normative ethics, which are specifically
studied by philosophers, not by ordinary people or people in other professions.
From the above discussion of the two points of difference of moral value
from other values, a detailed discussion of moral value is justified in a book
on general theory of vlaue. So I reserve the whole of this chapter for this
purpose.
In the following five sections, I discuss the values of several moral
entities.! Before that I will point out and examine these moral entities of
which we are interested in knowing the value or in making a moral judgment.
Let us consider a moral action taken by a person. Quite a few things are
related to this action. First, this action exemplifies one or more moral
principles or virtues and adds an incremental value to the system, the
institution, or the practice of society of which the moral principle or virtue is
a part. I call this value societal value.
Second, this action has consequences to a person or several persons or an
organization, and, in tum, to society at large. For instance, if you donate some
money to a foundation, then the consequence of donating is an increase of
material value for the foundation.
Third, the moral action has a motive or an intention behind it. One person
may take a moral action sincerely, but another person may take a moral
action with a side purpose in mind, say, for reputation, or as a means to an
end.
Fourth, the action itself has a value for society and for the agent herself
or himself. The value of the action for society seems inseparable from the
virtue the action exemplifies and the consequences the action produces. The
value of the moral action for the agent is the justification for her or him to
take the action. This value has a moral factor, which is sometimes decisive in
the weighting for the decision-making in favor of the action. When you take a
moral action, you find some satisfaction in it, or you have an interest in
taking the action. This implies a value for the agent, whichs I call the value of
the feeling of moral satisfaction. This value is normally not considered an
object of moral judgment, but is a unique feature of my unified utilitarian
theory, and it makes this theory different from all other existing forms of
utilitarianism. 2
Finally, since a moral action is taken by a person, the person is
susceptible of a moral judgment too. Usually society is interested in judging
what kind of person you are when you take a big moral action.
A person has a moral value, but I leave the discussion of it to the next
chapter, because a person has so many other kinds of value that I will allocate
a whole chapter to deal with the values of a person. Since moral principle,
virtue, or moral rule is an abstract concept which is more complex because of
its statistical nature of more than one dimension, the discussion of the value
of a moral principle, virtue, or moral rule is more appropriate and desirable
after the discussion of the values of other moral entities. These several moral
values will be discussed in detail and quantitatively, when appropriate, in
Sections 2 through 6 of this chapter, in the following order.
96
97
(1) Value of the consequences produced by a moral action.
(2) Value of a moral factor in weighting, namely, the factor of the
feeling of moral satisfaction, for the person who takes a moral action.
(3) Value of the motive or the intention of the person who takes a moral
action.
(4) Value ofa moral action.
(5) Value of a moral principle, a virtue, a moral rule, or any abstract
concept a moral action exemplifies.
98
MORAL VALUE
2. Value of the Consequences of Moral Action
Any moral action produces consequences, and a consequence has a value.
Therefore, any moral action results in some values. The person, the group of
persons, or the organization acted upon by the agent is the object or recipient
of the action. For instance, if you donate some money to a foundation, then
the value is for the foundation and, in tum, for society at large. If you help a
friend, a neighbor, or a relative, then the value is for the friend, the neighbor,
or the relative. Every value is, in turn, for society, because society is the
aggregate of all its members.
The moral value of the consequences of a moral action is for three
different subjects. One subject is the recipient of the action. In the case of
fmancial help to a friend, the recipient is the friend, and in the case of
donation to a foundation the recipient is the foundation. A second subject is
society. Since the recipient is a member or a part of society, the utility for the
recipient is in turn a value for society. The societal value is also for society.
Society is a subject as well as an object. As a subject, society receives the
value of the consequences of a moral action. As an object, society has a value
for its members. In the study of the value of the conseqences of a moral
action for society, society plays the role of a subject. A third subject is the
agent herself or himself. The values of the consequences of a moral action for
the recipient, for society, and for the agent are all different, as will explained
below.
I denote the value of the consequences of a moral action for the recipient
of the action by Vo. It may be a nonmoral value or a moral value. For
instance, in the case of donating to a university, the consequence is that the
university gains money, which has a material value. Thus, the value of this
consequence is nonmoral. As an example of a consequence having a moral
value, consider the case that a person A wants to do something which is
really good but is against the convention. Perhaps A does not have enough
moral courage to do it. B, as a friend of A, encourages A to do it, or gives A
moral support. If A takes the advice of B and does it, then the consequence of
B's moral support is that A has increased her or his feeling of moral
satisfaction. Or the moral value for A in her or his weighting for the decisionmaking increases. In addition, A's action is a moral one and has a moral
value for society. Without B's moral support, A might have not taken the
action. Therefore, the moral value of A's action is also an indirect
consequence of B's action of moral support. Thus, the consequences of B's
action have some moral values.
The value of the consequences of a moral action for society is not the
same value as for the recipient, but is more than that value. Since society is
the aggregate of all its members, any value for the recipient of a moral action
Value of the Consequences of Moral Action
99
is, in turn, also for society. Besides, a morally good action exemplifies, and a
morally bad action violates, a virtue, a moral principle, or a moral rule. The
exemplification is a positive value for society, while the violation is a
negative value. I call it a societal value and denote it by Vs. Societal value is
an incremental value added to or subtracted from the value of a system, an
institution, or a practice of society, of which the virtue, the moral principle, or
the moral rule is a part. This societal value produced by a moral action is for
society as a subject, and then, in turn, society becomes an object having this
value for the members of it.
The value of the consequences of a moral action for the agent herself or
himself is again different from either the value for the recipient or the value
for society. In the case of donation, when the recipient gains a value Vo , the
agent loses this value Vo • What the agent gains is a value of the feeling of
moral satisfaction Vm, which is a function of Vo and Vs. This total value of
the consequences of a moral action for the agent herself or himself is from the
decision-theoretic point of value. Since it involves the value of the feeling of
moral satisfaction and sometimes even the value of motive or intention, I
leave the discussion of this value to a later section on the value of a moral
action.
What I have discussed are the values of the direct consequences of a
moral action. In addition, numerous indirect consequences may exist. The
consequences of a big moral action of a great person are usually far-reaching.
Who is able to determine the value of the consequences of the crucifixion of
Jesus Christ all over the world during the past twenty centuries? Because of
this complication and difficulty, the value of the far-reaching consequences
of a moral action cannot be taken into account.
Sometimes decision is made under conditions of uncertainty; the states of
affairs are probabilistic in nature. In that case, according to my unified
utilitarian theory, the value of the expected consequences, rather than the
value of the actual consequences, are taken into account.3 This concept of
expected consequences is reasonable and should be used to take care of
accidental consequences, because under conditions of uncertainty we have no
way to know, at the time of decision-making, the exact values of the future
consequences of the alternative actions, except as expected values in the
probabilistic sense. As a result of the complication due to numerous
far-reaching consequences, the total value of the consequences of a moral
action is never exactly equal to the moral value of the moral action calculated
before or when the action is taken. Even under normal conditions, although a
cause-and-effect relationship exists between an intended action and the
consequences of the action, many environmental and random factors also
exist, which also have effects, in various degrees, on the consequences. The
correlation between an intended action and its consequences is by no means a
MORAL VALUE
100
perfect coupling. A good action with good motives occasionally has bad
consequences, while a bad action with bad motives occasionally has good
consequences, although this kind of situation is exceptional. The concept of
expected consequences can be traced back to Brand Blanshard. "An act is
right if it tends to produce not less than the greatest good attainable."4 "Tends
to produce" implies that the greatest good is "intended" or "expected."
Let us consider examples of accidental consequences. Suppose that the
carelessness of a person, A, causes a fIre in an apartment building, and the
consequences are so serious that, in addition to damage to properties, some
people are burnt to death. A is bad and is responsible for the fIre. But to what
extent? Should A requite the lives of those who died due to the fIre? How?
Suppose that the cause of an airplane crash is found to be a mechanical
failure, which could have been prevented if maintenance and repair work had
been done better. Should the mechanics who did the maintenance and repair
job be responsible to the extent of paying all the losses and requiting the lives
of the dead?
The above two examples are accidents, which have the characteristics of
unpredictability and small probability of occurrence. Normally, the person
who causes an accident is held responsible to a degree but not completely.
The losses are usually taken care of or requited by insurance. This is the
reason to have insurance systems.
These examples show situations where the value of an action should not
be determined completely based on actual consequences, and where motives
have to be taken into account and probability and statistics come into play.
This is why in the unifIed utilitarian theory expected values are used instead
of actual values.
The total value of the consequences of a moral action, including all the
far-reaching consequences, may be of interest to act-utilitarians, but it is not
the chief concern in the unifIed utilitarian theory, because the determination
of such a value is of theoretical interest only. For insignifIcant moral actions,
this kind of determination is unnecessary, while for big and signifIcant moral
actions, such as the crucifIxion of Jesus Christ, at best only a crude estimation of the value can be made.
However, the direct consequences ofa moral action to the recipient of the
action and the indirect consequences to the relevant system, institution, or
practice of society, not including the remote consequences, are used in the
unifIed utilitarian theory as the basis for the calculation of value. To express
the value ofthe consequences of an action quantitatively, let
Vo
Vs
be the value of the direct consequences for the object or recipient
of an action and, in turn, for society,
be the societal value ofthe consequences for society, and,
Moral Value of Feeling of Moral Satisfaction
101
Vc be the total value of the consequences for society.
Vo is quite obvious. For example, if an action is the donating of a sum of
money to a foundation, then the recipient or object is the foundation, and Vo
is the amount of money donated. V s represents the incremental societal value
produced by the action in exemplifying or violating a virtue, a moral
principle, or a moral rule. V s represents supporting or damaging a good
system, institution, or practice of society. It may be positive or negative,
depending on whether the action is morally good or bad.
The total value of the consequences of an action may be expresser~
mathematically as the sum of V 0 and V s:
1. Vc=Vo+V s
The prescription for a moral action by act-utilitarianism is normally
based on the values of the consequences of the possible alternatives of the
action. Traditionally, the value of the consequences of an action is interpreted
simply as V 0, without including the component V s. In that case, the value of a
right action could be less than that of a wrong action, and the prescription by
act-utilitarianism could be different from the prescription by common-sense
judgment based on the sense of justice. This is probably why some nonutilitarians allege that act-utilitarianism is incompatible with the principle of
justice or that an irresolvable conflict exists between the principle of utility
and the principle of justice. This is also a main cause of the development of
rule-utilitarianism in the middle of this century.
If the value of the consequences of an action is interpreted as in Equation
I above, and if Vs is assigned a suffIciently large value, then, in those cases
where the prescription by act-utilitarianism is originally different from the
prescription based on the conception ofjustice, the prescription by the unifIed
utilitarian theory will be the reverse ofthe prescription by act-utilitarianism.
3. Moral Value of Feeling of Moral Satisfaction
The value of the feeling of moral satisfaction is for the person who takes a
moral action and, therefore, is not an object of normal moral judgment. Since
this value is an important factor in the weighting processs of decision-making
for a moral action and is related to my way of determining the value of a
moral action, it will be discussed and analyzed quantitatively, before the
discussion of the value of a moral action itself.
According to my explanation, the value of the feeling of moral
satisfaction, V m, is a function of Vc or (V 0 + V s). Mathematically we have
MORAL VALUE
102
2. Vm=f(Vc)=f(Vo+V s)
Quite naturally when the contribution is small, the feeling of moral
satisfaction is also small, and when the contribution is large, the feeling of
moral satisfaction is also large. We may reasonably assume that Vm is
directly proportional to Vc. Then we have
3. Vm= k Vc = k (V 0 + V s)
where k is a coefficient depending on the morality of the agent. k can serve as
a general index for the morality of the agent. For normal people, we can
reasonably set the range ofk from 0 to 1:
4. 0
~
k
~
Moral Value of Feeling of Moral Satisfaction
103
In addition to the value of the gain or the loss, Vg, the agent also receives
a value of societal praise or blame, Yr. When a virtuous action is taken,
unless it is kept secret, usually a societal praise or a societal approval of the
action arises. This brings a good reputation and a reward to the agent and
thereby has a positive value for the agent. When an immoral action is taken,
usually a societal blame or societal disapproval of the action arises. This
brings a bad name to the agent and, hence, has a negative value for the agent.
Let this value of societal praise or societal blame be denoted by Yr. In the
case of virtuous action, V r is positive, and in the case of immoral action, V r is
negative. Thus, in two alternatives, a and b, the components are Vr (a) and
VrCb), respectively.
With all component values considered, the decision model for a moral
action will be established as follows. Let
1
The lower bound that k = 0 means that the agent is extremely callous and
does not feel at all whether the agent has done a good or a bad thing to other
people or society. It represents the lower limit of morality.
The upper bound that k = 1 means that the agent is quite sensitive to what
the agent has done to others and feels as if the good or the bad thing were
done to herself or himself. It represents the upper limit of morality.
k can be negative. In that case the agent enjoys when s/he is doing or has
done a bad thing and suffers when s/he is doing or has done a good thing.
This is extremely abnormal and exceptional. So the cases of negative k will
not be considered.
R.M. Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking,
called the intuitive thinking and the critical thinking. This is a dichotomy in
terms of the extremes of moral thinking. People range from the top to the
bottom, as Hare writes, "Although the archangel and the prole are
exaggerated versions of the top and bottom classes in Plato's Republic, it is
far from my intention to divide up the human race into archangels and proles;
we all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at
different times."5
My concepts of the range of feeling of moral satisfaction and the
statistical nature of value, moral judgment, and morality are close to Hare's
concept of two levels of moral thinking, except that I intend to study the
problem using mathematical and quantitative approaches. Hare's moral
thinking covers both moral belief and conduct, or both moral theory and
practice. I hold that a high correlation exists between moral belief and
conduct, but the coupling is by no means perfect. My emphasis is placed on
conduct, because the feeling of moral satisfaction is manifested only in moral
actions and is otherwise immeasurable.
Yea) be the total value of alternative a for the agent,
V(b) be the total value of alternative b for the agent,
Vg(a) and Vg(b) be the values of gain or loss of alternatives a and b,
respectively,
VrCa) and VrCb) be the values of societal praise or societal blame of
alternatives a and b, respectively,
Vm(a) and Vm(b) be the values of the feeling of moral satisfaction or
moral dissatisfaction of alternatives a and b, respectively.
Then the expressions for V (a) and V (b) are as follows.
5. V (a)
6.
7.
8. V (b)
9.
10.
=Vg(a)+Vr(a)+Vm(a)
= Vg (a) + Vr (a) + kVc (a)
= Vg (a) + Vr (a) + k (V o (a) + V s (a))
=Vg(b)+Vr(b)+Vm(b)
= Vg (b) + Vr (b) + kVcCb)
= Vg(b) + Vr (b) + k (V o (b) + Vs (b))
The choice will be action a ifV(a) > V(b); the choice will be action b ifV(a)
< V(b); a tie will occur ifV(a) = V(b).
To illustrate the quantitative analysis of the value of feeling of moral
satisfaction, let us reconsider the example of donation. Suppose that a
wealthy businesswoman, P, donates a million dollars to a university for the
construction of a building, say, a library. Materially, P loses one million
dollars. This loss in material value is compensated for by the value of the
feeling of moral satisfaction that she has done something good for the
university and in tum for the society in which she lives. In weighting the
values, she fmds that the moral value she gains from donating is higher than,
Moral Value of Motive or Intention
MORAL VALUE
104
or at least equal to, the material value she loses. Hence the action of donating.
In the case of donation, the societal praise is often in the form of public
recognition. Perhaps the fact of donation will be announced, and the donor
will be awarded a certificate of recognition at a ceremony. Her picture may
be exhibited somewhere in the university. Or, if the amount of donation is
large, the building constructed by using the donated money will be named
after her. All these bring a good reputation or a mental reward to the donor,
which has a positive value.
Now I will apply Equations 5 through 10 to the above case of donation.
When the donor donates an amount of money to an organization, the donor
herself loses this same amount. If action a represents the action of donating,
and action b represents the action of not donating, then we have
105
If Vr(a) is taken into consideration, then we have
15. Yea) = Vm(a)+Vr(a)+Vg(a) = Vm(a)+Vr(a)-Vo(a)
Then the choice is action a, if
16. V m(a) + V r (a) - Vo (a) >
°
or Vm (a) > Vo (a) - Vr (a)
In the above example of donation, if the value of societal praise for the
donor is worth two hundred thousand dollars, then we have
Vm(a) > V o (a) - V r (a) = $1,000,000 - $200,000 = $800,000
11. Vg(a) = - Vo(a)
Ignoring V r (a) for the moment, we have
12. Yea) = YmCa) + Vg(a) = YmCa) - Vo(a)
Assume that for no donation all the values are zero. Then
13. V(b) =
°
Although it is not exactly known whether the feeling of moral
satisfaction of the agent in the case with Vr is really less strong than in the
case without V r, the lower bound of its value is counted less.
If a person is paid for or otherwise compensated for doing something
good for society, then the good action of the person should not be, and
usually is not, counted or credited for. In that case, the feeling of moral
satisfaction of the agent will be less than that when the agent is not paid for or
otherwise compensated for the good action, but then s/he will have a sense of
duty to do the good thing instead.
Therefore the choice is action a, or the decision is for donation, if
V m (a) - V 0 (a) >
Or
°
V m (a) > V o (a)
In the above example of donating,
V m (a) > V o (a)
=
$1,000,000
This means that the value of the feeling of moral satisfaction is counted
at least $1,000,000 if the donor is willing to donate this amount of money.
If a person is genuinely interested in donating but not in any kind of
public recognition so that s/he donates money anonymously or secretly
without being publicized, then the donor will deserve full credit for this
action of donating, or the value of her or his moral satisfaction will be
counted at least equal to the value of what the person donates.
4. Moral Value of Motive or Intention
In this section, I turn to the value of the motive or the intention which a
person has in taking a moral action. A motive or an intention is considered to
have a moral value, because first, the motive or the intention is directly
related to the action, to the virtue, and to the trait of character of the person
who takes the action, and second, the feeling of moral satisfaction is
generally considered exclusively derived from the person's consciousness of
her or his doing a morally good thing. The moral value of a motive or an
intention is considered to be for the recipient of the action and, in turn, for
society.
That the moral value of a motive is different from the moral value of an
action is obvious. We often hear such a remark: "Although this action itself is
good, the motive behind it is quite questionable." That the value of a motive
or an intention is different from the value of the consequences is still more
obvious. We sometimes say, "Unfortunately such a good motive and such a
good action should cause such a bad result." The study of the value of motive
or intention of a moral action is important for its own sake. Such study is also
J
MORAL VALUE
Moral Value of Motive or Intention
important because it is related to the value of a moral action and because the
motive or the intention indicates a disposition or a trait of character of the
person who takes the action. Therefore, the value of motive or intention is
also related to the moral judgment of a person. Without other sources of
information about a person, a moral judgment of the person is still possible
because judgment can be based on the accumulated information on traits of
character through the assessments of moral values of the motives or the
intentions of many small moral actions.
The determination of the moral value of a motive or intention is not an
easy thing, because a bad motive or intention is usually hidden, and
sometimes we have no way to disclose ·it. If a person takes an action with a
bad motive or a bad intention, since intellectually human beings are rational,
that person will be unwilling to admit or recognize this fact, at least
consciously. You need a big moral courage to accept or recognize your moral
badness. Usually, you find a justification to deceive yourself as well as others.
Sometimes it is necessary to go deeply into the subconsciousness to find out
the real bad motive or bad intention for an action.
In the case of a morally good action, the value of a motive or an intention
is not considered important, not because of the difficulty of determination,
but because it is a practice in a modem society not to go behind an apparently
morally good action to investigate the motive or the intention, since this
raises the problem of privacy. The general public is not so much interested in
the motive or the intention as in the consequences of the action. The situation
in moral matters is slightly different from that in legal matters. In the law,
especially in a criminal case, the motive or the intention is a key factor and
has to be investigated carefully and thoroughly. For similar actions, different
motives may lead to completely different verdicts and sentences.
Normally, moral judgments of the moral principle or the virtue
exemplified by an action, of the consequences of an action, and of the motive
or the intention of an action, are regarded as three criteria to be used for the
moral judgment of an action. In the unified utilitarian theory, the effects of
motive or intention on the moral practice of society are incorporated into the
expression for the value of moral action.
Although a motive or an intention is considered to have a moral value in
itself, we can say, from a different point of view, that a good motive or a
good intention is naturally related to a good action. A good action without a
good motive or a good intention is not a really good action, or at least not as
good as a similar one with a good motive. In this sense, the value of a motive
or an intention can be incorporated into the value of an action. If a moral
action has a good motive, the action deserves its full value. If a moral action
does not have a good motive, then the value of the action should be
discounted. Or, to obtain the net value of an action, a value representing the
negative effect of the bad motive should be subtracted from the original value
of the action. This is what I intend to do, as this way of quantitative
calculation clarifies the concepts of the various relevant values and presents a
better picture of the whole situation.
Suppose that theoretically the information about the factors in the weighting
process of decision-making for an action taken by a person is available. Normally,
we assume that a good action has a corresponding good motive or intention. The
effect of a bad or not-so-good motive or intention is taken as a negative value. A
bad motive or a motive that serves a side or secondary purpose has a secondary
value for the person, which is to be deducted from the value of moral satisfaction.
Let this secondary value be denotedby Vse.
Then, from Equation 15, we have
106
107
17. Yea) = Vm (a) + Vr (a) + V se (a) + Vg (a)
For the case of donation, from Equation 11 we have
18. Vm(a)+Vr(a)+Vse(a)-Vo(a»0
Or 19. Vm (a) > V o (a) - Vr (a) - Vse (a)
Eqation 19 sets a lower bound to Vm (a) in terms of three values related
to a moral action: the value of the consequences for the recipient of action,
the value of societal praise or societal approval for the agent, and the value of
the secondary motive for the agent. This expression presents a clear and
simple overall picture of the relationship among those values relevant to
moral judgment.
For the sake of simplicity, Vse(a) may be incorporated into Vg(a), because
Vse (a) represents a kind of gain for the agent like Vg(a). Then Equation 17
reduces to Equation 15, where Vg(a) is the value of all the gains or losses for
the agent, including the benefit obtained from any secondary motive, except
for the value of societal approval or societal disapproval.
In the above example of donation, if, in addition to a pure interest of
donation, donor P has another motive or intention that the public recognition
of this donation and the enhancement ofP's reputation would help P to win a
seat in the city council in the forthcoming election of city councilors and
alderpersons, then the credit for her or his moral satisfaction will be further
reduced. Suppose that the expected value of this probable consequence is
worth one hundred thousand dollars. This value is the secondary value
discussed above and given in Equation 17.
Then the net value of A's feeling of moral satisfaction in donating will be
as follows.
108
Value of a Moral Action
MORAL VALUE
Vm (a) > Vo (a) - Vr (a) - Vse (a)
=
$1,000,000 - 200,000 - $100,000
=
$700,000
5. Value of a Moral Action
After the discussion of the values of consequences of a moral action, of the
feeling of moral satisfaction of the agent, and of the motive or intention of the
agent, the value of a moral action itself will be discussed. Before the
discussion of the value of a moral action, two things need to be clarified,
which may be expressed by two questions. First, what is the distinction
between a moral action and a nonmoral action? Second, is the value of a
moral action the same as the value of the consequences of the moral action?
My answer to the first question is that a moral action must involve at
least one moral value, that is, the value ofthe moral action for the agent has a
moral component or factor.
From the decision-theoretic point of view, the moral value of a moral
action is for the agent herself or himself, and it is exactly the value of the
feeling of moral satisfaction or moral dissatisfaction. When you take a
nonmoral action in daily life, you do not have a feeling of moral satisfaction
or moral dissatisfaction. You have a feeling of moral satisfaction only when
you take a virtuous action, and you have a feeling of moral dissatisfaction
only when you take an immoral action. Therefore, we may say that an ethical
decision-making is to make a choice among several alternatives at least one
of which has a moral factor (a feeling of moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction)
and a moral action is an action which involves a value of feeling of moral
satisfaction or dissatisfaction for the agent.
As to the second question, my answer is "Yes" and "No." As discussed
in Section 2, the consequences of a moral action have three different values
for the three subjects, namely, the recipient, society, and the agent. The value
of the moral action also belongs to this set. When we talk about the value of a
moral action or the value of the consequences of the moral action, we usually
have a particular implication and mean a particular value among the three
values. The recipient of a moral action is the person who is directly and
immediately affected by the action. So in practice, when we talk about the
value of the consequences of the action, we usually refer to the value of the
consequences for the recipient. The moral judgment of a moral action is
usually meant the evaluation of the action by a member of society as a judge
109
and, hence, is meant the value of the moral action for society. This is also
what we normally mean by the value of a moral action. The agent, as a
decision-maker for her or his action, also senses and calculates the values or
utilities of the several altematives and chooses the alternative with the
greatest value or utility. This value or utility isfor the agent.
A moral action has three different values: (1) a value for the recipient, (2)
a value for society, and (3) a value for the agent. In practice, we call (1) the
value of the consequences of the moral action, (2) the value of the moral
action, and (3) the value of the moral action for the agent, which is used by
the agent for decision-making, but is not important to others and society.
Act-utilitarians use the value of the consequences of an action as the
criterion for the moral judgment of an action. The total value of all the actual
consequences of an action is regarded as the quantity to be maximized. Ruleutilitarians use the value of the general consequences of the moral rule
conformed to by an action as the criterion. Deontologists use the a priori and
absolute concept of the moral principle, the virtue, or the moral duty exemplified by an action as the criterion. The unified utilitarian theory is like actuilitarianism, at least so far as the moral judgment of actions is concerned.
However, owing to the difficulty or the impracticability of determining the
value of all remote and far-reaching consequences, in the unified utilitarian
theory not the total value but only the value of the direct or immediate
consequences is taken into consideration for the moral judgment of actions.
In the case of uncertainty, the expected value or utility is used. In addition to
the value of immediate consequences, several other values have been
introduced to take into account all other related factors.
For quantitative analysis, let us recapitulate the notation and the
defmitions of the various values involved in a moral action, as follows.
V0
Vs
Vc
Vm
Vr
Vg
V
denotes the value of the direct consequences for the recipient of an
action, which is, in tum, for society
denotes the societal value of the action for society, that is, the
incremental value added to a system, an institution, or a practice of
society
= V 0 + V s denotes the total value ofthe consequences for society
= f( Vc ) = k V c = k (V o +V s ), 0 ;:;:; k ;:;:; I, denotes the value of
the factor of feeling of moral satisfaction for the agent
denotes the value of any reward to the agent for the agent
denotes the apparent value of an action for the agent
denotes the total value of an action for the agent.
The three values of a moral action, or of the consequences of a moral
action, for the three subjects may be expressed, respectively, as follows:
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MORAL VALUE
(1) The value of the consequences of a moral action for the recipient is
Yo.
(2) The value of a moral action for society, as is usually evaluated by
moral judgment, or the value of the consequences of a moral action
for society, is
Vc=Vo+V s
(3) The value of a moral action for the agent, or the value of the
consequences of a moral action for the agent, is
V= Vg+Vr+V m
=Vg+Vr+kV c
= Vg + Vr+k (V 0 + V s)
The question arises of how to make a value judgment of a moral action.
The unified utilitarian theory provides two approaches. One approach is to
consider and compare the values of the consequences of all the alternatives of
the action for society: Vc = V 0 + Vs. Another approach is to consider the
credit of the agent, through a check of the factor of feeling of moral
satisfaction. Since k = I means the extreme of high morality, while k = 0
means the extreme of low morality, the judge may substitute 1 or 0 for k into
the values of the several alternatives of the moral action and see what would
be the decisions made. The decision made through the substitution of k = 1
means a decision out of high morality, while the decision made through the
substitution of k = 0 means a decision out of low morality. Thus, the process
of weighting and decision-making can also serve as a check or an aid for the
moral judgment of an action.
R. Eugene Bales stresses "the importance of maintaining a sharp
distinction between (a) decision-making procedure, and (b) accounts of what
makes right acts right."? Thus, the quantitative analysis of moral action
presented above clarifies and provides an explanation of the distinction
pointed out by Bales.
A moral action is often made at the sacrifice of some moral or nonmoral
values for the agent. The magnitude of this sacrifice can be roughly taken as a
crude criterion for the moral judgment of an action. It turns out that in many
cases the magnitude of sacrifice is represented by the feeling of moral
satisfaction. A general opinion is that morality must recognize various
Value of Moral Principle, Virtue, or Moral Rule
111
excuses and extenuating circumstances. Cases exist in which a person does
not take the right action because otherwise s/he would have suffered an
intolerable sacrifice. S/he may even have been incapable of doing it rightly.
To allow sacrifice and extenuating circumstances to be reasonable excuses
for not taking the right action is tantamount to assuming that the feeling of
moral satisfaction corresponding to a large sacrifice has an extraordinarily
large weight beyond an ordinary person.
This interpretation of moral judgment takes into account factors which
are normally considered related to the value of a moral action but which are
taken into consideration only vaguely. In addition to consequences, motive,
and the feeling of moral satisfaction, this interpretation and the method of
calculation automatically take into consideration the generally-accepted
opinion that a necessary condition for the proper evaluation of a moral action
is that the agent is aware of the significance of the action and that the action
is not out of control. This present weighting method implies that the agent is
the decision-maker of the action, or s/he is autonomous and has the freedom
to make the decision and to take the action within the framework of the
generally-accepted concept of human freedom.
6. Value of Moral Principle, Virtue, or Moral Rule
In this section I discuss the value of a moral principle, a virtue, or a moral
rule. Sometimes "principle" or "virtue" will be used as a generic term to
denote a moral principle, a virtue, or a moral rule.
The value of a virtue is no doubt a moral one. Owing to the statistical
nature of the value of a virtue, the exact interpretation of a virtue may vary
slightly from person to person, and the weight of a virtue in the decisionmaking for an action may vary from case to case depending on circumstances.
However, the general concept of a virtue is essentially the same in a society.
The value of a virtue is represented by its average value, and is similar to the
price of an essential commodity, such as bread, which is steady and wellrecognized within a society.
The value of a virtue lies in its contribution to the whole of society in
general. Consider the virtue honesty. From the utilitarian generalization point
of view, these two situations may be compared: one is that every member of
society is honest, and the other is that every member of society is not honest.
A society where everyone is honest is obviously much better than a society
where everyone is not honest, and you will normally prefer to live in a
society where people are all honest rather than in a society where people are
not honest.
But to measure or to find out how much the former is better than the
latter may be impossible. Therefore, I do not endeavor to measure or to [md
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MORAL VALUE
out the values of moral principles, virtues, or moral rules at all.
Then the question arises whether virtues can be arranged in an order of
precedence according to their values, that is, whether an ordinal relationship
can be established among virtues. My answer is still negative. In addition to
the abstract nature of virtue, and the difficulty of measurement, the problem
of coverage of a virtue arises. Virtues may be combined into only two basic
ones, or they may be split into hundreds of small ones. When the number of
virtues is small, virtues are general in nature and tend to become a state of
mind or a general attitude. When the number of virtues is large, virtues are
more particular in nature and tend to become practical rules of conduct. If ten
small virtues are grouped together to form a large virtue, are we justified to
say that the value of this large virtue is ten times as large as the value of each
small virtue? To compare the values of virtues with different coverage or
different size may be impossible. Even if the value of a virtue is known, to
use it in the weighting for any individual situation is still impossible, because
in individual situations virtues are realized by good actions or violated by bad
actions in various ways or to various degrees. Quite possibly in a situation a
small virtue is realized to a large degree such that its value is greater than that
of a large virtue which is realized to a much smaller degree.
Some philosophers have tried to arrange the cardinal virtues in an order
of precedence according to their values. A set of only four virtues has 24
permutations, and a set of eight virtues has 40,320 permutations. Even if the
set of cardinal virtues is unique and universally accepted, how can we hope
that a particular permutation out of such a large number of choices will be
accepted? So it is impracticable, futile, and unjustified to propose a
precedence order even for only a small number of virtues.
While positive values are assigned to virtues, vices should be assigned
negative values. But most virtues have an opposite side, for not behaving in
conformity with a virtue is regarded as a vice. For instance, dishonesty is the
opposite of honesty. Thus, it is redundant to study the negative values of
vices.
According to my unified utilitarian theory, exceptional cases are
permitted, and in a situation a conflict may exist between basic principles,
between moral principles, between virtues, between moral rules, or between
two different actions in accordance with the same virtue or the same moral
rule. Numerous such examples exist in daily life and in history. A crucial
question is: Without a precedence order, how can a judgment be made in the
case of an exception or a conflict? The answer from the unified utilitarian
point of view is to go back to the comparison and the weighting on the basis
of value of the actions rather than on the basis of value of virtues, principles,
or rules. A crucial difference exists between the unified utilitarian theory and
act-utilitarianism. According to the unified utilitarian theory, for the moral
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
113
judgment of an action, a component of value is assigned to the action for its
incremental contribution to the system, the institution, or the practice, of
which the virtue, the principle, or the rule is a part, not as a value of the virtue,
the principle, or the rule itself as a whole, but as a consequence of the moral
action. (An immoral action has a negative contribution or decremental value.)
This value was called a societal value and denoted by V s. V s is the connecting
link between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism, or the concrete
element that unifies the two different views. V s is not necessarily proportional
to the value of the related principle, virtue, or rule, because a principle, virtue,
or rule can be realized or violated in various ways or to various degrees. Thus,
even if we generally accept that in principle virtue A is much more important
than virtue B, in a situation with a conflict between A and B, it is still
reasonable and permissible to have the weight assigned to B greater than that
assigned to A because B is realized to a much greater degree than A.
7. The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
In both moral and social philosophy an unanswered question regarding moral
value is whether a moral value is always more important than a nonmoral
value. This question is not clearly formulated because it may mean (1) that
whether every moral value is more important than any other nonmoral value
irrespective of the magnitudes of the values considered, or (2) that whether
every moral value always is dominant or naturally has, or is assigned, a value
greater than that of every related nonmoral value in the particular situation in
comparison with the moral value.
The literature abounds in discussions of this topic, but I need not refer to
the literature at all, because my reasoning and argumentation in this utilitarian
general theory of value are basically different from the traditional and
existing theories of value.
My answer to the first sub-question, from my utilitarian point of view, is
clear-cut: "A moral value is not always more important than any other
nonmoral value irrespective ofthe magnitude of the values considered." This
is because the dimension for the comparison of values is magnitude, and the
dimension of importance is also magnitude. By "The value of A is more
important than that of B," so far as value is concerned, is meant "The value
of A has a greater magnitude (or weight) than that of B." The importance ofa
value is simply exhibited by the magnitude assigned to it.
You may argue that a value may have several dimensions. For instance,
according to Jeremy Bentham's hedonic calculus, pleasures have seven
respects or dimensions for comparison. 8 Suppose that a woman, W, is to
choose a pleasure from two pleasures, PI and P2. Neglecting the remaining
five respects, consider the two respects duration and intensity only. Suppose
MORAL VALUE
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
that the duration of PI is longer than that of P2, but the intensity of PI is
smaller than that of P2. Then PI and P2 may be regarded as two vectors.
Normally, two vectors, A, and B, in the same space cannot be ordered unless
every component of A is greater (or smaller) than every corresponding
component of B, or ratios of tradeoff occur between every pair of dimensions.
Vectors like A and B are said to have a partial ordering between them. So
pleasures PI and P2 have only a partial ordering between them, and they
cannot be objectively compared, unless a ratio of tradeoff between duration
and intensity is given. This ratio of tradeoff is normally given or set implicitly
by the agent or decision-maker. If W chooses PI instead of P2, it means that
W prefers PI to P2 and, therefore, that the value VI of PI for W is greater than
the value V2 of P2 for W. This is the reason why I emphasize that value is
subjective in nature and I define utility and value in terms of preference.
The value of an object, 0, for a subject, S, may be due to several
characteristics which have different dimensions. But when we come to the
overall magnitude of the value, all the dimensions have already been
combined together and reduced to the single dimension of magnitude,
through the application of the ratios of tradeoff among the various
dimensions. What I mean by magnitude, importance, and weight all refer to
the same final single dimension.
Let VI be a moral value and V2 be a nonmoral value. If it is known or
given that the magnitude of VI is smaller than that of V2, then it is logically
impossible or contradictory to say that V I is more important than V2, because
that V I is more important than V2 means that the magnitude of VI is greater
than that of V2, which contradicts the known or given condition that the
magnitude of VI is smaller than that ofV2.
The second question is not so readily answerable, because the
comparison of moral value with other values in situations of moral actions
varies with the kind of action. However, my answer is also, "A moral entity
does not always naturally have, or is not always assigned, a value greater than
that of every nonmoral value in comparison with the moral value in the
particular situation." This statement cannot be proved theoretically, because it
is a statement of fact. We cannot compare a moral value and a nonmoral
value in general and abstract terms, because values are subjective and are
incomparable and incommensurable objectively. They are compared only
subjectively in particular situations for the taking of an action for a
designated objective. The situation of comparison varies with the kind of
action. So, to show the facts of the situations of comparison, I have to classifY
actions into several categories and investigate the problem of relative
importance between moral value and nonmoral value in various kinds of
actions separately, using examples for illustration.
Since my argumentation is to show that a moral value is not always
dominant or more important than any related nonmoral value in the particular
situation, but not to show that a moral value is always nondominant or less
important, a single counterexample is sufficient to show the correctness of
my argument. Therefore, my discussion in terms of examples is valid and
serves well the purpose of this section.
Moral actions are first classified into personal actions and public actions.
Psersonal moral actions are further classified into (I) charitable actions, (2)
moral actions as positive duties, and (3) moral actions as negative duties.
Public actions may be similarly classified, but we will find later that no
public charitable actions exist, so that all public actions are duties.
The moral value to be compared with a nonmoral value is of two
different kinds. One kind is the positive moral value of a charitable action or
an action as positive duty. Not taking such an action means the nonproduction of a positive utility for the recipient. Another kind is the negative
moral value of an action violating a negative duty. Taking such an action
means the production of a disutility for the recipient of the action. The
nonmoral value to be compared with the moral value is also of two different
kinds. One kind is for others, and another kind is for the agent herself or
himself. Normally, we refer the nonmoral value to its second kind, but
occasionally we may refer to its first kind. Generally, we cannot say which
kind of moral value and which kind of nonmoral value are compared in
various actions, but when a particular action is examined the comparison will
be self-evident. So I do not further classifY actions according to the kind of
moral and nonmoral value. The three classes of personal moral actions are
explained below.
A charitable action is a morally good action and it has a moral value
because it produces a positive value or utility (whether moral or nonmoral)
for the recipient of the action. 9 The class of charitable action includes
supererogatory actions, because so far as the comparison of moral value with
nonmoral value is concerned, we need not distinguish between an ordinary
charitable action and a supererogatory action. A supererogatory action may
be regarded as a special kind of charitable action, because the only difference
between a supererogatory action and an ordinary charitable action is that the
first produces a large utility for the recipient and at the same time produces a
large disutility for the agent, whereas in the second, no matter how large the
utility produced by it for the recipient may be, the disutility produced by it for
the agent is never regarded as very large.
An action as a positive duty is a morally good action. If it is taken, then it
will produce a positive value or utility (whether moral or nonmoral) for the
recipient of the action, and if it is not taken, then a disutility will occur for the
recipient(s). So taking such an action has a positive moral value, while not
taking such an action has a negative moral value. The difference between an
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MORAL VALUE
action as a positive duty and a charitable action is that the dutiful action
involves a correlative right on the part of the recipient so that, if the action is
not taken, then the correlative right of the recipient will be violated. Not
taking an action as a positive duty will be regarded as immoral, whereas not
taking a charitable action is not regarded as immoral.
The class of action as positiive duties includes those actions which we
ought to take but which are not our duty to "take. 10 The substantive difference
between these two kinds of action is that an action as positive duty involves
larger utilities or disutilities, whereas an action which we ought to take but
which is not our duty to take involves smaller utilities or disutilities.
Therefore, as far as the comparison of moral value with nonmroal value is
concerned, we need not distinguish between these two kinds of action.
An action as a negative duty is not an action taken, but is the refraining
from taking an action harming a recipient(s) and violating a correlative right
of the recipient. We have a duty of not taking such a harmful action. If such
an action is not taken, then nothing will happen. If such an action is taken,
then it will produce a negative value or disutility for the recipient. So not
taking such an action has zero moral value, while taking such an action has a
negative moral value.
The class of actions as negative duties includes those actions which we
ought not to take but which are not our duty not to take. The substantive
difference between these two kinds of action is also that an action as negative
duty involves larger utilities or disutilities, whereas an action which we ought
not to take but which is not our duty not to take involves smaller utilities or
disutilities. Therefore, as far as the comparison of moral value with nonmoral
value is concerned, we need not distinguish between these two kinds of
action.
After the classification of actions, I discuss in detail various personal
actions and, by using examples, check to see if the moral value involved is
regarded as more important than the nonmoral value.
First, consider charitable actions. As I have discussed and argued, we are
not required to take charitable actions. II Whether to take a charitable action is
up to the agent to decide, and if an agent does not take a certain charitable
action, the agent is not blamed as immoral. Therefore, in the case of
charitable actions, we need not consider the comparison of moral value and
any other nonmoral value from the societal point of view. We just consider
the comparison from the personal point of view of the agent. According to
my unified utilitarian theory, an agent taking a morally good action has a
feeling of moral satisfaction, and an agent taking a morally bad action has a
feeling of moral dissatisfaction.J2 The decision of the agent depends on the
comparison of the value of moral satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with other
values.
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
117
Let us use an exanlple for illustration. Suppose that a person, P,
originally intends to donate some money, say ten thousand dollars, to a
foundation, but later P feels that he does not want to lose this ten thousand
dollars and changes his mind, so that P eventually does not donate. P's not
donating amounts to an action not producing a moral value of more than ten
thousand dollars but saving a nonmoral value of ten thousand dollars.
Normally, morality permits this because charitable actions are not required.
From the societal point of view, if P donates, P's action will have a moral
value of more than ten thousand dollars, because the foundation will receive
ten thousand dollars and his donation has an extra societal value for society in
that it exemplifies the good practice of donation or the virtue of generosity.
If P donates, then societal praise or public recognition may result, which
has a mental value for P. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the money is
donated anonymously, so that no societal praise or public recognition occurs.
Then, from the personal point of view, P's comparison is between the value
of the feeling of moral satisfaction and the value of material loss. IfP donates,
it means that the magnitude of the value of the feeling of moral satisfaction is
greater than the value of ten thousand dollars. If P does not donate, it means
that the magnitude of the value of the feeling of moral satisfaction is smaller
than the value of ten thousand dollars. Obviously, the moral value of the
feeling of moral satisfaction is not always greater than any related nonmoral
value in the situation under comparison.
Another possible result of P's change of mind is that, instead of not
donating, P uses this money, or a different amount of money, to do another
charitable action, say to pay the medical bill for a poor friend. The value of
this second charitable action is also a moral value, not a nonmoral value. So
the comparison is not between a moral value and a nonmoral value. No
distribution problem occurs in charitable actions, and P is free to take either
charitable action or to take no charitable action at all.I 3
Thus, in the case of charitable actions, from the societal point of view, no
problem arises of comparison of moral value with nonmoral value. From the
personal point of view, moral value is by no means always dominant. It may
be either greater than or smaller than a related nonmaral value in the situation.
Next, consider the comparison of moral value with nonmoral value in
actions as positive duties. It is generally accepted that, since a positive duty is
required, the moral value of taking an action performing a positive duty must
be greater or more important than any other nonmoral value that any other
action the agent takes to replace the original moral action may produce.
However, I believe that this is not necessarily so. I have a subtle reason for
my belief, which I will explain using examples.
Suppose that a person, PI, is the only person seeing another drowning
person, P2, and that PI is a good swimmer and is able to save P2 without
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MORAL VALUE
danger. Then PI has a duty to save pz, even if PI has other urgent business to
do, the delay of which by the action of saving will cause PI some material
loss. Normally, we all agree that the moral value of saving the life of Pz is
much greater than the material value that PI would obtain from the other
business. Almost every ethical theory will prescribe that PI ought to save PI
instead of doing the other business.
Consider a slightly different situation. Suppose that the moral action to
be taken is not the saving of the life of another person, but voting in a
political election. We all agree that PI ought to vote or that PI'S duty is to
vote. But if the delay of the other urgent business would cost PI several
thousand dollars and if Pi actually does not vote and goes to the other
business, do we blame PI as immoral for not voting? I believe most people
will not blame PI. In most elections, a case of a hundred percent of people
voting does not occur. Seventy percent is considered a high percentage, and
we never blame the thirty percent of people as immoral for not voting. We
do not even question why they do not vote.
Consider the case of a strike as another example. Suppose that PI is a
worker of a large manufacturing company, and the workers' association has
decided to take a strike on a designated day during the bargaining for an
increase of wages. PI is advised by the workers' association to participate in
the strike. The advice of the workers' association is not mandatory, but the
usual understandiing is that the worker should listen to the advice of the
workers' association. However, PI is poor and does not want to sacrifice one
day's wage. And PI sees that the percentage of participation in the strike will
be so low that the probability of success of the strike is also low. So PI
decides not to participate in the strike. In this case, people will not blame PI
for not participating.
Thus, the moral value of not voting or not participating in a strike is not
necessarily dominant. According to my unified utilitarian theory, the agent
may make a decision through a comparison between the moral value and the
nonmoral value, but with the understanding that the agent should be
responsible for the consequences of not taking the action as a positive duty.
In actions as positive duties, the moral value is not regarded as infmitely large,
and it may be compared with a nonmoral value.
Finally, consider the comparison of moral value with nonmoral value in
actions as negative duties. The general belief is that we ought not to take an
action to violate a negative duty for any personal benefit, because violating a
negative duty means causing some harm or disutility to the recipient, thus
violating a correlative right of the recipient. For instance, everybody has a
right to her or his property, and the duty of everybody else is not to steal
money from anybody else. In general, to take money or other property from
any person by such immoral or illegal methods as stealing, robbing or
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
119
cheating, or to harm others physically or mentally, for the benefit of the agent
is not permissible.
Now a question arises: "Does the immoral value of violating a negative
duty always override the nonmoral value of the benefit to the agent?"
According to practice, the answer is "Yes." Then what is the justification of
this answer? Rights-theorists would say that the right of the recipient is
inviolable. Its value is infinitely large in magnitude and, hence, greater than
any other value. But this kind of reasoning is unconvincing. A dilemma arises
when two principles, two virtue!!, two rules, or two rights conflict with each
other.
My unified utilitarian theory gives a better explanation of the dominance
of moral value.J 4 Let us consider the nonmoral value for the agent and the
immoral value for the recipient and society in the action of stealing, say ten
thousand dollars. The nonmoral value for the agent is ten thousand dollars.
The loss to the recipient is also ten thousand dollars. But the immoral value
of the action of stealing is not restricted just to this ten thousand dollars. I
assign a negative incremental (decrement) value to the violation of a good
system, institution or practice of society by the immoral action, called
societal value. So the total negative immoral value of the action of stealing is
negative ten thousand dollars plus this negative societal value. Usually, this
societal value is assigned as large, so that the immoral value of the action is
always greater than the value of the benefit to the agent.
This societal value also accounts for why we are not permitted to do a
charitable action at the sacrifice of others. Suppose that PI is a rich person so
that the marginal utility of money for him is little, and that Pz is a poor person
and urgently needs money because of unemployment and high medical
expenses for his sick wife. Suppose that the agent P3 steals fifty thousand
dollars from PI and gives them to Pz to pay his medical bill. Is it permissible
for P3 to do so? I still say "No" in spite of the fact that the disutility of the
loss of fifty thousand dollars for PI is far smaller than the utility of the gain of
fifty thousand dollars for Pz. This is also explained through the assignment of
a societal value. Many nonutilitarians misinterpret utilitarianism and assert
that utilitarianism is a theory of replacement, utilitarian sacrifice, and
tradeoffs, because they do not have the conception of this societal value and
they think that utilitarianism would prescribe simply based on the comparison
of the magnitudes of the disutility for PI and the utility for Pz.
Among all personal actions, only in actions as negative duties is the
moral value dominant or overriding the nonmoral value. In charitable actions,
no such dominance exists because charitable actions are not required and no
comparison can be made. In actions as positive duties, in some situations the
moral value is dominant, while in other situations it is not dominant. Only in
actions as negative duties is the moral value generally regarded as dominant.
MORAL VALUE
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
Next I discuss public actions and check to see the relative importance of
moral value in comparison with nonmoral value. A public action is an action
taken by an official or staff member of a government office or an
organization, whether public or private, such as an enterprise, a foundation,
or an association, on behalf of the office or organization.
Since a government office or an organization always has a program and a
budget for the program, everything done is included in the program and
according to the budget. Although the functions of some public actions
related to welfare systems are similar to those of personal charitable actions,
according to my interpretation these public actions are taken to be actions as
positive duties. Everything that a government office or organization does is
considered an action as positive duty, because it is a part of the program. The
public actions that are similar to charitable actions are those social actions of
fringe benefit for the personal benefits of staff members, such as Christmas
parties, birthday parties, and excursion tours, where, like in charitable
personal actions, no action is required and no moral value is dominant.
In actions as positive or negative duties, if a staff member takes an action
to obtain some personal benefit with the violation, neglect, or non-performing
of a positive or negative duty, then, from the societal point of view, this
action will be regarded as not only immoral, but also illegal. To take such an
action is always impermissible. Or, equivalently, the immoral value of
violating a positive or negative duty is always regarded as dominant over or
greater than whatever the involved personal nonmoral value may be.
From a personal point of view, such an immoral value is not always
dominant but varies, depending on the situation and morality of the person.
Let me illustrate this by using an example of bribery. Suppose that a civil
servant, A, takes a public action to improperly benefit a businessman, B, by
one million dollars. As a bribe, B gives A two hundred thousand dollars.
Since the public action taken by A is complex, the inappropriateness of the
action is subtly covered, and A will not be punished by law. We consider this
matter simply as a moral one that does not touch on legal matters.
From the societal or governmental point of view, the negative value or
disutility of this immoral action is far more than one million dollars, because,
apart from the material loss to society or government of one million dollars,
the immoral action violates a good practice of incorruption and has a large
negative societal value. From the point of view of the civil servant A, the
comparison is between the material value of two hundred thousand dollars
and the value of a feeling of moral dissatisfaction, which, according to my
unified utilitarian theory, has a magnitude of less than two hundred thousand
dollars in that case, for otherwise he would not take the immoral action and
the bribe.
Suppose that the civil servant would not take a bribe of only ten thousand
dollars, or even one hundred dollars, yet does take a bribe of two hundred
thousand dollars. Thus, for him the value of the feeling of moral
dissatisfaction is by no means infinite. It is finite, and, for the abovementioned case, it is somewhere between one hundred thousand dollars and
two hundred thousand dollars. A moral value is not always greater than any
other related nonmoral value in the situation, but depends on the agent and
the situation.
In other special cases of a public action as a negative duty, a comparison
of an immoral value with a nonmoral value may be made. Usually, the
comparison is not between an immoral value of violating a negative duty and
a nonmoral value of personal benefit. Instead, the comparison is between an
immoral value of violating a negative duty and another value, whether moral
or nonmoral, of performing a separate positive duty, which causes the
violation of a negative duty as a side effect. For instance, consider the
situation of constructing a new airport in the suburb of a city, which will
cause a lot of noise to the people living near the airport. The construction of
the airport is an action as positive duty, which produces utility for all the
people who use the airport. But the noise of airplanes in taking off and
landing produces disutility for the group of people living near the airport. The
solution to this kind of problem is usually not the canceling of the
construction project because of the dominance of the disutility but the
payment of compensation to the people living near the airport, because of the
harm of the noise and the devaluation of the houses and apartments near the
airport. With proper compensation, people living near the airport will have
the freedom to choose to still live there or to move out, without material loss.
The harm to the people living near the new construction project may be
so serious that they have to move to another area. Sometimes the construction
of a nuclear power plant may cause radioactive damage to health serious
enough to justify moving, and the construction of a large dam to form a water
reservoir certainly will make the area submerged in the reservoir
uninhabitable. For instance, the construction of the Yang Tze River Dam in
China will form the largest human-made reservoir in the world, and over a
million people in the area have to be evacuated and moved to other places.
A difficult situation of comparison between a moral value and a
nonmoral value lies in the economic development of a developing country.
Economic growth may cause a worse distribution of income and wealth. Then
arises the question, "Is the economic growth justifiable?" Suppose that one
country, in a year during its economic development, attains a ten-percent
economic growth with a considerable worsening of distribution of income
and wealth. Or, the country may attain a lower percentage, say six percent, of
economic growth, with a less serious worsening of distribution of income and
wealth. Now the question is: "Is a ten-percent economic growth with a worse
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MORAL VALUE
distribution considered better or worse than a six-percent economic growth
with a better distribution?" This is a serious and realistic problem of
comparison or trade-off between a moral value of distribution of income and
wealth and a nonmoral value of economic growth.
I have studied intensively the problem of distribution of income and have
developed a utilitarian theory of distributive justice. Where, for the situation
of a given constant value, that is, given gross national product, I have
developed a specific social welfare function and have incorporated the
optimization problem of distribution into the maximization problem of social
utility so that the social welfare function will be a maximum when the
distribution is ideal or optimum. 15 But my model and method give no exact
solution when the total value is not a constant, when economic growth occurs.
This is an extremely difficult problem for which a quantitative solution may
be impossible to find. One difficulty lies in the rate of trade-off between the
moral value of quality of distribution and the nonmoral values of economic
growth. A more serious difficulty is that while the percentage of economic
growth may be roughly estimated, the worsening of distribution during the
coming year due to economic growth is not readily measurable, let alone to
be controlled to a desirable degree. The government of a developing country
can only try to limit the percentage of economic growth to a moderate rate,
say at most ten percent, and at the same time try to check inflation and
worsening of distribution by using various measures.
The comparison of moral value with nonmoral value may be seen more
clearly from a personal point of view and then from a societal point of view.
From a personal point of view, everybody has a life plan and pursues
values related to and for that life plan as a core. These values are mostly
nonmoral values. There are no professionals of morality. Even moralists and
preachers, although emphasizing morality, do not take morality as a career or
regard it as the main purpose of life. Ordinary people come across problems
of morality only occasionally, and only when they come across a moral
problem will they face moral values, need to compare moral value with
nonmoral value, and show their morality. People have degrees of morality
according to their sense of morality and feeling of moral satisfaction. Most
people maintain a level or degree of morality of their own, and the degree of
morality of all the people form a statistical distribution.
While morality does not serve as a main career for people to pursue, it
serves as a side guideline or as a constraint. As long as everybody does not
violate her or his negative duties, all members of society will feel secure and
peaceful. Actions as positive duties and charitable actions are extra benefits
existing in a better or ideal society. The comparison of a moral value with a
nonmoral value is more significant in actions as negative duties than in
actions as positive duties.
The Relative Importance of a Moral Value
123
From a societal point of view, no charitable actions occur, and all public
actions are actions as positive duties. How well the government takes actions
as positive duties is certainly a measure of the quality of the government, but
the violation of negative duties harms people directly and obviously. We
should more urgently prevent or redress violation of negatve dutes than
violation of posiitive duties.
Since justice is the basis of social philosophy as well as moral philosophy,
politicians, govemment officials, and civil servants should emphasize
morality in public actions, even more than in personal actions. Or morality
should be taken as a stronger constraint in public actions than in personal
actions, and the violation of negative duties should be punished more
severely than in personal actions.
So far as the government is concerned, laws should strictly conform to
morality and be carefully enacted. Bad laws create difficult problems and
make people at a loss as to what to do. In the case of large construction
projects, care must be taken to reduce the damage to the people or the
violation of negative rights of the people to a practical minimum. If damage
or violation still exists, then appropriate compensation should be made for the
loss or damage to the people.
Hence, emphasis on moral value varies in various actions, and is stronger
in situations of actions of negative duties than in actions as positive duties.
One thing for sure is that moral value is not always overriding or more
important than any other nonmoral value. If a moral value is greater than a
nonmoral value, this is not because the value is a moral value, but because the
moral value has, or is assigned, such a value that this is greater than the other
nonmoral value. Once values are quantified, they are compared for
importance or priority according to the magnitudes only.
I
Seven
THE VALUES OF A PERSON
1. Various Values of a Person
A person, in the eyes of others, is an object. An object, according to my
unified utilitarian theory,l must be useful in some sense for some subject for the person herself or himself, for some other persons, or for society. The
values of a person are a topic of the philosophy of life, which is studied,
discussed, or written about not only by professional philosophers, but also by
many nonprofessional philosophers, such as literary writers, social scientists,
educators, historians, politicians, and preachers, as expressed in numerous
fictions, poems, books, and popular essays. Too much literature abounds on
the values of a person to be adequately referred to. For the sake of
convenience, I will present only my ideas, opinions, and conclusions, without
referring to the literature at all.
Then, what kinds of value does a person have? As far as I see, a person
has several nonmoral values and a moral value. The concept of nonmoral
values of a person is pretty clear, whereas the concept of the moral value of a
person is obscure and views of it may be controversial.
First, a person has a blood relationship with and love for her or his
family members, and, to a lesser degree, the person has affection for relatives
and friends. You have a sentimental value for your family members,
particularly your spouse, parents, children, brothers and sisters, and, to a
lesser degree, for your other relatives and friends.
Second, if you earn money for the living of yourself and family
members, then you have an economic value for yourself and your family
members.
Third, you contribute to society through your work, in the form of
production or service. This contribution has a value. This value of
contribution is for the people or the organization for which you work, and the
work is usually paid for. For instance, if you work for a private company,
then the value of the contribution is for the company, and you are paid a wage
by the company. If you are a civil servant, then the value of the contribution
is for the government or society, and you are paid a salary by the government.
If you are a self-employed professional, say, a lawyer, then the value of the
contribution is for the clients, and you are paid fees for the services by the
clients.
According to the principle of reciprocity and the theory of distributive
justice that I have proposed,2 the value of contribution of a person, in an ideal
situation, is fully paid for materially, so that others and society do not owe the
THE VALUES OF A PERSON
Various Values of a Person
person anything. Some contribution, in addition to the value that is paid for
materially, has extra spiritual value for society. For instance, an artistic
creation, say, an oil painting, a piece of music, or a poem has an aesthetic
value. A new discovery in physics or biology has an epistemic value. A new
law or institution has a societal value. These intellectual values have a farreaching consequence which cannot be properly compensated for. They are
considered extra contributions to society.
When an ordinary person has passed away, s/he will soon be forgotten
by most people except for family members and close friends. If s/he is a great
person, such as a person of state, a military leader, a sage, or a famous artist,
scientist, scholar, or literary writer, then slhe will be remembered by more
people and her or his name will last. In that case, s/he will have a historical or
a cultural value for society or for the state.
Fourth, every person has a life and a life plan. Life certainly has a value
for the person herself or himself, for others, or for society. In the broader
sense, the value of a life includes every value a human life has and is the
same as the values of a person. In the narrower sense, the value of life of a
person means the value of the life for the person herself or himself, excluding
the value of the life for others and for society.
As I discussed above in Chapter Six, when you engage in a morally good
or bad action, you will have a feeling of moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction,
which has a positive or a negative value for you.3 This value is roughly
proportional to the value of the consequences of the action for others or
society. Or, mathematically,
good or bad done to others or society as if it were done to herself or himself.
This shows the upper limit of morality. k = 0 means that the agent is
completely callous and s/he feels nothing about anything good or bad done to
others or society. This shows the lower limit of morality.
Strictly speaking, the contribution of the agent to others or society also
has a value for the agent. Whether the value of a life should be in the broader
or the narrower sense depends on the purpose of study.
The value of life for yourself means everything, because without life you
cannot have any other interest whatsoever. As an exception, you may commit
suicide. Suppose that an action of suicide is deliberate but not impulsive. One
situation is that a person can no longer stand the physical or the mental pains
or tolerate the troubles and difficulties of life. If you continue to live, you will
fmd too much negative value in your life to be tolerable. You would rather
choose to die, which means the reduction of every value to nothingness. As
another exceptional case, a martyr for religion or for revolution may sacrifice
life for a noble cause. In that case, s/he may think that her or his death would
make a big contribution to the society, to the nation, or to the world, such that
the value of moral satisfaction of this action would be greater than the sum of
all the other values in life for that person. In spite of the fact that this person's
life still has a positive value for herself or himself, the martyr would choose
death which has a higher value for her or him.
I now introduce the term "the value of a life plan," to emphasize the
teleological nature of human life. "Life" means what life presently is, but
"life plan" means the future life, the life you intend and plan to lead in the
future. For instance, to injure a person or to steal money from a person is to
harm the present life (this kind of harm will also indirectly affect the future
life of the person), but to force a person to do something or to prevent a
person from doing something is to harm the future life of the person, to harm
that person's life plan. Since the present time is only an instant or point in the
"line oftime," whereas the future is a period composed of an infinite number
of points, and since every present instant soon disappears, becomes a part of
the past, and is immediately followed by a future instant as its successor, the
future is really inseparable from the present. So also is the life plan
inseparable from the present life. Therefore, I defme the value of a life plan to
include the value of the present life. By introducing the term "the value of a
life plan," I will no longer consider "the value of a life" separately. This
concept of life plan is in conformity with the teleological view of
utilitarianism.
I have discussed the life plan of a person in detail and concluded that all
values in life for a person form a value structure for a life plan and that every
seemingly random action in life is well fitted into this structure through one
or more stages or levels of decision-making. 4 The value structure will be
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V rn
=
k Vc
where
Vrn is the value of the feeling of moral satisfaction/dissatisfaction for the
agent,
Vc is the value ofthe consequences of the action for others or society,
k is a constant of proportionality.
The value of k varies between 0 and I, depending upon the morality of the
agent:
O~k~I
k
=
I means that the agent is perfectly sympathetic and s/he feels anything
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127
THE VALUES OF A PERSON
The Moral Value of a Person
discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, a person has a moral value. Whether the moral value of a person
is really "moral" is a controversial topic, which will be discussed in the next
section.
consist of two things: (1) the contributions of the person, and (2) the person
herself or himself. The first is normally in the form of teachings and writings,
and the consequences of moral actions. The second is the moral quality of the
person, which sets up a personality as a moral ideal. These criteria will now
be discussed in detail.
Teachings and writings are easily accessible and therefore provide a
good source of information for the assessment of a person. Many important
persons do not leave behind teachings and writings, and people of high
morality are no exceptions. Yet teachings and writings on morality may be
only of theoretical nature. Nowadays moral philosophers are not necessarily
also moralists, as was the case in old times. Thus, teachings and writings are
just knowledge and have nonmoral values rather than moral values. In the
determination of moral value of a person, only those teachings and writings
that are a close representation of the person's personality or a true record of
her or his behavior or experience suggest a real moral value. Teachings and
writings of this nature were abundant in olden times but are scarce nowadays.
The moral actions of a person serve two purposes in the moral judgment
of a person. First, the consequences of moral actions show the contributions
of the person. Second, moral actions manifest the traits of character of the
person and help establish the personality as a moral ideal. Sometimes a single
big action is sufficient to serve both of these purposes. In the case of no such
big action, we have to resort to many small moral actions. Usually, the
accumulation of numerous small moral actions will provide information for
an estimation of the consequences or the overall personality as a moral ideal.
The direct or the immediate consequences of a moral action are not
difficult to determine, whereas the far-reaching indirect consequences of a
big moral action are difficult even to estimate roughly. Such consequences
are usually a natural effect of a great personality and are rarely deliberately
sought for the moral judgment of the person.
Because of the shortage of big actions as well as teachings and writings,
and the difficulty in the estimation of value through numerous small actions,
emphasis is sometimes laid on the determination of the value of personality
as a moral ideal. However, a personality is usually built up from traits of
character, which are in turn manifested in actions. Although morality is
essentially something internal, it is by no means innate. Traits of character are
acquired through learning and self-realization; they have to be cultivated.
Thus, morality can in no way be completely isolated from actions.
Although the moral value of a person is to an extent manifested in
actions, the moral value of an action does not necessarily represent the moral
value ofthe person accurately. First, an action may be small and insignificant,
so that it cannot show a high moral value, even if the agent does have a high
morality. Second, a person may show different moral values in different
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2. The Moral Value of a Person
I now discuss the moral value of a person. A person who has good traits of
character or has taken morally good actions is usually said to have high
morality or a high moral value. Whether the value of a person owing to high
morality should be regarded as a moral value or a nonmoral value is
controversial. We have reason to regard it as a nonmoral value. An artist
produces works of art. We say that a work of art, such as a painting, a
sculpture, a poem, or a symphony, is beautiful, but we do not say that a
painter, a sculptor, a poet, or a composer is beautiful. A work of art has an
aesthetic value, while the artist or the creator of the work of art does not have
an aesthetic value, but a value of different nature. Only in performing arts do
we sometimes say that the performer is beautiful. For instance, for a beautiful
ballet, we may say that the ballerinas are beautiful. Even for a piano concert,
where the pianist plays in front of the audience, we usually say that the
playing, instead of the player, is beautiful. Similarly, a scientist writes books
and papers which represent knowledge and have epistemic values, but we do
not regard a scientist as a person to have an epistemic value, although s/he
has a lot of knowledge in her or his brain. On the same reasoning, we may
say that although a moral action of a person has a moral value, the person
who acts has a value of a different nature.
We also have reason to regard the value ofa person of high morality as a
moral value. A moral action is different from an artistic action (producing a
work of art) or a scholarly action (producing a book or a paper) in that a
moral action is more closely related to the person than any other action,
because a moral action has a motive or intention and reflects a trait of
character of the person who acts. Since a moral action has a moral value, a
person may also be said to have a moral value so far as moral judgment is
concerned. A sage or a person with a very high morality exemplifies virtues
and serves as a moral ideal. Such a person is normally considered to have a
moral value, in addition to that person's historical or cultural value.
I accept this reasoning and consider a person to have a moral value so far
as moral judgment is concerned.
After these concepts relevant to the moral judgment of a person have
been clarified, I will show what the criteria for the moral judgment are. It is
commonly accepted that the morality of a person does not lie in moral
principles. The criteria for the moral judgment of a person may be said to
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Special Features of Human Values
THE VALUES OF A PERSON
131
person, with some explanations, as follows.
(1) Through the judgments of many small actions. For an average
person, only her or his offsprings, relatives, friends, neighbors, and
colleagues who know the person well are in a position to make judgments on
the person, although such a judgment may sometimes be biased. For a famous
person or a person of great achievement, sometimes a diary, biographies,
autobiographies, or memoirs will supply materials for moral judgments.
These materials are subject to biases too.
(2) Through the judgment of one special major action. If a special action
shows a high moral value, we can infer without much error that the moral
value of the person who takes this action is also high. When the whole story
of this action and all the major factors involved in the decision-making for
this action are known, the process of weighting and decision-making can be
followed to determine the moral value of this action, which is assumed to
represent the moral value of the person.
For instance, the decision of Socrates of not escaping from the prison
when he was able to do so, shows that he has a high moral value. Also, the
decision of Wen Tien Hsiang, a captured high official of the Sung Dynasty in
Chinese history, of not surrendering to the Yuan Dynasty, at the sacrifice of
his life after having been imprisoned for three years, shows his extremely
high moral value.
(3) Through teachings and writings of the person. Sometimes a person
does not leave behind for judgment a special major action or many small
actions, but leaves behind writings which deal with morality or moral
philosophy. In that case, if the writings are not of purely theoretical nature
but involve preachings with utilitarian purposes, then they suggest a high
moral value of the person.
One final point is that while anyone or more of the criteria are used for
the moral judgment of a person, that does not mean that each criterion alone
has only one-third of the total weight. If only one criterion is available, it still
has the full weight. The evaluation is like the marking of a student. If s/he
takes three courses, the evaluation is the average of the marks of the three
courses. If slhe takes just one course, then the evaluation is just the mark of
that course. That the mark of one course may be not representative is
something that cannot be helped. The moral judgment is based on all the
information available. If the judgment is not accurate because of incomplete
information, this inaccuracy is not the fault of the evaluation method, and
little can be done to help it.
actions, just as a student may have different examination marks in different
subjects. As an action is related to one or some but not all virtues, the moral
value of an action manifests the morality of the person only so far as this trait
of character is concerned. The judgment of a person in general is the moral
assessment of the person as a whole, or the determination of the overall
average moral value of the person, like the average mark of a student. Thus,
the more information we have, the more accurate our judgment will likely be.
The determination of moral value of a person is similar to the
determination of the level of achievement of a boxer, a chess player, a scholar,
or an artist. But moral judgment is much more difficult, because of the unique
situation of morality. The level of achievement of a boxer or a chess player
can be easily tested through a contest. Which of the two opponents has a
higher level of achievement can be immediately found out and recognized. A
scholar usually writes a number of papers and books. The level of her or his
scholastic achievement can also be determined from an assessment of her or
his writings by experts in the same field. For an artist, sayan oil painter, her
or his artistic achievement is exhibited in the artist's paintings and will
usually be recognized by society. A long time may be needed for the artistic
value of the paintings to be fully recognized, as seen from those cases in the
history of art where the value of paintings was not recognized during the
lifetime of the artist, but was eventually recognized after her or his death.
Anyway, the assessment ofa person is no real problem, except for the case of
moral judgment.
In the determination of moral value of a person, a person may have
cultivated a lot of traits of character to a high level, but in that person's
lifetime s/he has never come across any major moral issues through which
her or his high moral value can be shown. The person cannot deliberately
create a big action to show her or his morality, as an oil painter produces a
painting to show her or his talent, or as a scholar writes a book to show her or
his knowledge or original ideas. In that case, how can the public know that
s/he has a high moral value? This is why the moral values of some famous
people in history remain controversial even after several hundred years.
Another difference between a person with high morality and a person
with a high level of achievement in any other field is that in other fields the
level of achievement is raised through learning and practice, whereas in
morality the only practice possible is through small actions in daily life. A
person cannot possibly create a big action for showing that person's moral
value or as a practice. This is also the difficulty in the cultivation of traits of
character and in that of selfconfidence. Cases existed in history where a
person supposed to have high morality eventually collapsed when a test of
big action came after a peaceful life with no big actions.
I will still present three criteria or measures of the moral judgment of a
3. Special Features of Human Values
In this section I point out and discuss the complex nature and special features
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Special Features of Human Values
THE VALUES OF A PERSON
of human values. By human values I do not mean the values for a specific
human being, but only those values of or produced by a specific human being.
Consider all the human values related to a person, P. The values may be
classified into four kinds. One kind is those values produced by P through
manual or mental labor, in the form of production or service, solely for others
or for society, as a means to the end of earning a living, through the
reciprocal payment of a compensation equivalent in value to the production
or the service. Since this kind of value is a means to an end, and since P is
paid a compensation, the value of which is counted separately, the value
produced by P is not for P herself or himself.
A second kind of value is those values produced by P for herself or
himself. In other words, the producer and the recipient or the subject of the
value is the same person.
A third kind of value is those values produced by P, for others, for
society, or for P herself or himself, which have extra contribution to society
and, hence, is also for P because of the feeling of satisfaction.
A fourth kind of value is those values which are not produced by P but
are obtained by P (for possession, use, appreciation, or experiencing), through
purchase, as gifts, grants, or inheritance.
Thus, the values of kinds one, two, and three are values produced by P,
or of P, while the values of kinds two, three, and four are values for P. In this
chapter, I discuss the values ofa person, and call them human values.
I [md that human values have the following two special features. (1) The
human values produced by a human being are different from the value of a
physical object in the formation and deterioration of the value. (2) Some
values produced by a person for others or for society (a subset of the human
values of the third kind) are also for the person herself or himself because of
the feeling of satisfaction. These values are important because they are farreaching and lasting and constitute the main contribution of human beings to
society. These two points will be discussed in detail in the following.
(1) Difference between a Human Value and the Value of a Physical
Object. Any physical object is either produced directly from raw materials or
produced from the composition of parts which are in turn produced from raw
materials or again from the composition of subparts. For example, consider
an automobile. It is composed of a large number of parts. Consider a small
and simple part of the automobile, say, the handle of a door. It is made of
metal, say, iron.
The iron used for casting the handle, as the raw material of thc:; handle,
has a value. The value of the handle is greater than the value of the iron,
because the handle has the additional cost of labor and overhead. Suppose
that an automobile is composed of a thousand parts. Then, the value of it is
greater than the sum of the values of the one thousand parts, because the
133
automobile has the additional cost of labor and overhead for the assemblage
and the test of the automobile. Once the automobile is assembled and tested,
and ready for sale, it will have a value for the customer who buys it.
After the automobile is purchased by a customer, it will be used by her
or him, and its value will begin to deteriorate through the consumption of the
customer. After having been used for several years, the value of the
automobile will reduce to zero and the automobile will be discarded.
The value of a physical object like an automobile is clear-cut and can be
separated from the values of other objects. This value of the object begins to
decrease when it is possessed and used by the owner through consumption.
The rate of consumption varies widely, depending on the nature ofthe object.
For instance, a meal will be consumed in about one hour's time, and the food
purchased and stored in a refrigerator will be consumed in about one week's
time. A pair of shoes will probably be consumed in one year's time, an
automobile in ten years' time, and a house in a hundred years' time.
Some objects are preserved for appreciation, not for use. Then they are
not consumed at all, and, unless the material deteriorates, they and their
values will last. The oil paintings in a gallery or a museum will last hundreds
or thousands of years, although the paint may change color a little, crack or
even drop off gradually. Jewellery made of gold, platinum, or precious stones
may last forever because of no chemical reaction with air and moisture. They
may suffer only mechanical damage due to external contingent causes. These
objects are exceptional rather than normal. Most objects are produced for
consumption. Every object has a life span of production and consumption or
deterioration..
Human values are different from the values of physical objects in that
they do not appear as separate objects but are values added to the values of
raw materials, appearing as manual or mental labor, to form the completed
objects. For instance, the value of an automobile may be decomposed into the
values of the raw materials, the values of mental labor of research,
development, and design, the values of manual labor of manufacturing, the
values of mental labor of management, etc. Occasionally, an object is made
completely by a single person. For instance, consider a philosopher who
writes a philosophical book, with no co-author, so that the philosopher is the
unique author of the book such as this one. This uniqueness refers to the
content of the book. For a book to be in a proper form so that it may be read
by readers, it has to be printed by a publisher. Even if you make a handicraft,
say a ceramic vase, the value of the vase, in addition to the labor of the maker,
consists of the raw materials. Strictly speaking, human values, which are
generated either in production or in service, never appear as separate
individual objects. This is why we usually refer to human values as values of
action, because anything that has a human value in it was completed through
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THE VALUES OF A PERSON
Special Features of Human Values
some human action.
Human actions are of many kinds. Some human actions are simple and
short in duration, taken continually for a short period without interruption. To
light up a cigarette is such an action. The smoking of a cigarette, which may
last five or ten minutes, is different from the lighting up of the cigarette
because smoking is not continual but intermittent. During these ten minutes
the smoker may drink coffee, talk with other people, think about something,
or write lines of a manuscript. Consider a much longer action, say, the writing
of a book. Suppose the writing takes three years; apart from other routine
actions, the writer may write another book or several papers. If the writer is a
professor, s/he does teaching and reading as well during the three years of
writing the book. Thus, in most cases, the processes of action-taking of many
actions are not arranged one after another so that each action can be sharply
separated from other actions, but they are taken intermittently and are
intermingled with parts of other actions, just like the time-sharing of many
long programs processed by a computer.
Sometimes we do call such actions objects. But these objects are abstract
objects, not concrete physical objects. In the most general sense, love,
relationship, reputation, name, power, title, experience, and situation may
each be regarded as an object. I do not deny human actions as objects. I only
point out that human values are essentially generated by human actions, and
human values are different from the values of ordinary concrete physical
objects in some respects.
(2) Far-Reaching and Lasting Human Values. Another key feature of
human values is that, in addition to the value for the subject who obtains the
object having human value, a human value may have value for society and for
the person who produces this human value. According to my utilitarian general
theory of value, any value is subjective and is for a specific subject. This
subject may be a single person, a group of people, society at large, or even all
human beings. The value of an automobile is for the person who possesses and
uses the automobile. The value of a public park is for those people who live
close to the park or frequently visit the park. No matter whether the value is for
a single person or for a group of people, normally the value will be consumed.
Some intellectual values, such as the aesthetic values of artistic products, the
epistemic value of new discoveries and inventions, the moral values of great
moral actions, and the values of political, economic, or military achievements
of great leaders, leave extra values behind apart from the values for the
immediate recipients of the achievements. These values will be lasting.
Beethoven's symphonies and Shakespeare's plays have lasting aesthetic values.
Newton's laws of physics and Einstein's relativity theory have lasting
epistemic values. Confucius' teachings and Socrates' action of not escaping
from prison have lasting moral values. The revolution led by Sun Vat-Sen in
135
China and George Washington's fight for the independence of the United
States have lasting values of political achievements.
As will be discussed in Section 6, these extra values are considered the
criterion for the measurement of the contribution of a person. 5 Normally, the
labor of a person, either manual or mental, is fully compensated for by the
payment according to the principle of reciprocity, so that all other people do
not owe the person anything. In that case, I count the net contribution of the
person as zero. But the extra lasting values of arts, truth or knowledge,
morality, and achievements are not fully compensated for. So a person who
produces such a value has made a net contribution to society. For instance,
one of the best oil paintings of Van Gogh has a price over ten million
American dollars, but the total material reward to Van Gogh made in his
whole life, or the total material value he consumed in his lifetime, is far less
than a million dollars. So, Van Gogh was underpaid. Van Gogh a net great
contribution to the society of human beings in his time and for many
generations after him.
Everybody has a life plan, and all the values you produce, pursue, or
obtain form a value structure for the life plan. For some people, the sense of
life plan may be not strong or clear-cut. But for other people, the sense of life
plan may be strong. They work not only for earning a living, but also for
fulfilling their life plans. With a life plan fulfilled, you have a feeling of
satisfaction which has a positive value or utility for yourself. The life plan is
not fulfilled in one day; it is gradually fulfilled during your whole life
through the taking of a sequence of actions. The success of each action is
accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, and the magnitude of such a feeling,
and, hence, its value or utility for the agent is proportional to the magnitude
of the success.
Like the feeling of moral satisfaction of a person who takes a virtuous
action, when you achieve something in artistic creation, you have a feeling of
aesthetic satisfaction. When you achieve an original discovery or invention in
knowledge, you have a feeling of epistemic satisfaction. When you achieve
something in political, economic, military, administrative, or other
professional affairs, you have a feeling of professional satisfaction.
We can readily see that this feeling of satisfaction is proportional to the
magnitude of achievement, which is measured by the extra, far-reaching,
indirect contribution of it to society. Those people who have high intelligence,
learning, ability, creative power, enthusiasm, and morality are likely to make
large contributions to society and also to enjoy a high feeling of satisfaction.
This explains why most of the successful artists, scientists, professors, and
preachers work hard even though their incomes are low compared with
pOliticians, entrepreneurs, movie stars, singers, and football-players.
We may conclude that, if you produce a human value, which, in addition
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THE VALUES OF A PERSON
My Utilitarian View of Personhood
to serving the immediate purpose for the recipient of the value, is an extra
contribution and value for society, then the agent enjoys a value of feeling of
satisfaction. This is equivalent to saying that this human value, albeit
essentially for the recipient, is also for the agent, although the value for the
agent is not necessarily as large as that for the recipient, because the agent's
value depends on the magnitude of the feeling of satisfaction which varies
from person to person.
forgotten, because a father's or mother's love cannot be replaced by other
kinds of love. In general, the fIrst value discussed above, the sentimental
values for family members, etc., are not readily replaceable, but they are still
not regarded as absolutely non-replaceable.
Finally, I tum to the fourth nonmoral value discussed above, the value of
your life plan. This value is uniquely for yourself, and no part of it may be
replaced by the life plan of any other person. Although different causes for
the formation of the life plan may exist, once a life plan is formed, because of
free will and autonomy, it is considered completely your own. We may say
that this value of your life plan is absolutely nonreplaceable. You may
sacrifIce a part or the whole of your life plan for a new noble cause. This
cause has to be a new one, for otherwise the life plan would not have
appeared in the original form. In that case, the life plan has undergone a
drastic internal change, and the "sacrifIce" becomes a part of this new life
plan. By replacement I mean that a value is replaced by some other value
external to the original value. So the life plan is still not replaced by anything
external.
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4. Replaceability of the Values of a Person
I now discuss replaceability as a crucial characteristic of value. I had
proposed a law of exchangeability and substitutability,6 and in Chapter Five I
reproduced it and changed its name into law of replaceability. A value is
replaceable if, when it is lost and then replaced by another value of the same
magnitude, no overall change of effect on the recipientofthe value will occur.
Thus, the second nonmoral value discussed above, the value of a person
in earning money, no matter how large it may be, is replaceable. In fact,
every material value is replaceable.
Any value for society is also replaceable, even if it' is an intellectual
value, such as an aesthetic value, epistemic value, societal value, or moral
value, because the loss of an intellectual value contributed to society by a
member may be replaced by a similar value contributed by another member.
For instance, if Isaac Newton had not existed or had died early in his
childhood, then Newton's laws in physics would not have been discovered by
him. But sooner or later they would have been discovered by another top
physicist and would have been named after that person instead of Newton. As
far as society is concerned, nobody is really indispensable. When a president
of the United States died or was assassinated, the designated successor took
over the office right away. The office of president continued although the
person serving changed.
The third nonmoral value, the value of contribution, and the moral value
of a person for society are also replaceable.
Let us now have a look at the fIrst nonmoral value discussed above: the
sentimental value of a person for her or his family members, relatives,
acquaintances, colleagues, followers, etc. Is this kind of value replaceable?
No, but it is substitutable to an extent. We may say that such a value is
partially replaceable, and the replaceability varies approximately inversely as
the proximity of relationship between the recipient of the value and the
person under consideration. For instance, normally you have many friends,
and the loss of a particular friend and the accompanying friendship will soon
be replaced by the friendship with other friends. However, you have only one
father and one mother, so that the loss of father or mother is not readily
137
5. My Utilitarian View of Personhood
I will relate this non-replaceability of the value of life plan to personhood,
and I will clarify a misunderstanding of utilitarianism that it is a theory of
utilitarian sacrifIce, replacement, and tradeoffs. Deontologists, libertarians,
and rights-theorists, following the Kantian view that a human being is an end
in itself, not a means to an end, almost all emphasize personhood. As a
utilitarian, I emphasize personhood too. As I construe it, the emphasis on
personhood stems from the non-replaceability of the value of a life and of a
life plan. The non-replaceability of a life is obvious, and my emphasis is on
the life plan. I also believe that non-replaceability is related to the concept of
equality. Because of non-replaceability, every life plan is indispensable and
no justification exists to compare them objectively. Equality is the only
generally-accepted criterion for the comparison of fulfIllment of life plans
and also the unique necessary conditions for the fulfillment of life plans,
namely, basic human rights and personal respect.
Since I said above that the values for society are replaceable, and since
the ultimate criterion for utilitarianism is the maximization of social or
aggregate utility, you may question why utilitarianism is not a theory of
utilitarian sacrifIce, replacement, and tradeoffs. This is a crucial question and,
as a utilitarian, I have the responsibility to answer it. I have presented a paper
in defense of utilitarianism against charges raised by rights-theorists,7 a paper
asserting that utilitarianism is not indifferent to distribution,8 and a
monograph on utilitarianism and its application to distributive justice. 9
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THE VALVES OF A PERSON
The Contribution of a Person to Society
Briefly, I may say here that (1) social or aggregate utility is expressed by a
social welfare function, which is in general a function of personal welfare
functions of all members of society. Therefore, utility is not identical to value.
(2) Because of the risk-averse characteristic of human nature and, hence, the
concavity of all rational utility curves, in the social welfare function the loss
of a value to a person usually weighs much more heavily than the gain of the
same amount of value to another person. Finally, (3) while I say that values
for society are replaceable, this is in a macroscopic sense, and this view does
not refute but complements the microscopic or personal point of view that
some personal values, such as the value of a life plan, are non-replaceable.
All members of society grow in age, and every day new babies are born
and some people pass away. Consider a small country with a population of
five million. Suppose that on one day a great artist dies. This death is a great
loss to the country. But on this day all the other artists grow a little closer to
the status of a great artist. Statistically, these small increases in greatness
aggregate to a gain to the country, which roughly, and on the average,
compensate for the loss of the departed great artist. The social welfare
function or the social or aggregate utility, is snow composed of only
4,999,999 personal welfare functions instead of five million. This aggregate
utility remains a criterion of utilitarianism as well as of distributive justice.
So the great loss of the departed artist does not appear in the new social
welfare function. But when the great artist is still alive, a harm to the
personhood of that person, or even to any other person, would mean a large
disutility for the artist and, in turn, for society at large. Therefore, the
utilitarian view and the ultimate criterion of maximal utility does not at all
invalidate the concept of emphasis on personhood.
unreasonable, because so far as manual power is concerned, a horse's
contribution would be about eight times that of a person, and a cow's
contribution in plowing rice field would be more than ten times that of a
person, so that the contribution of an animal to society would be considered
greater than that of a person.
The transfer or the exchange of values between persons in society,
whether the values be material or non-material, moral or nonmoral, are
mostly on a reciprocity basis, as stated in the principle of reciprocity:
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139
Man is not to take a value from, or to cause a negative value to, others,
no matter whether the value is material or non-material, moral or
nonmoral, except as a gift, grant, inheritance, etc., or in the form of a
mutually-agreed-upon exchange on a reciprocity basis.10
Most of the values a person gives to others or society are properly
rewarded or compensated for. Therefore, a person's contribution to society
should not be measured by the gross sum of all the values given to others or
society by the person. A more appropriate measure or criterion should be the
net value, the gross sum of all the values the person gives to others or society
minus the values s/he takes from others or society. If net value is the criterion
for measuring a person's contribution, then "goodness" is a better word than
greatness to praise a person.
Let this net value be called net contribution. If you give a greater total
value than you take, then your net contribution is positive. If you give a
smaller total value than you take, then your net contribution is negative. If
you give a total value equal to what you take, then your net contribution is
zero.
Based on net contribution as a criterion for judging persons, we may
classify persons into three categories: (1) persons having zero net
contributions, (2) persons having positive net contributions, and (3) persons
having negative net contributions. I will use examples to illustrate these three
classes of persons.
(1) Persons having zero net contributions. An ordinary or an average
person belongs to this class, because her or his work for production or for
service is normally rewarded or compensated for by salary, fee, or profit.
That person's work has a contribution to her or his employer or customer, but
has no other far-reaching consequences as extra contribution. This kind of
person is normal. Individual persons get together to form a society for mutual
benefits by exchange of products and services. Microscopically, each person
has zero net contribution to others or society, but macroscopically the average
utility for a person living as a member of society is much greater than that for
the person living completely by herself or himself as a hermit.
6. The Contribution of a Person to Society
We can readily see that the values a person pursues or produces can be
regarded as all motivated toward her or his life plan and, naturally, these
values are essentially for that person. During a person's life-time s/he takes a
series of actions, and some of these actions have values for others or society.
The questions naturally arise: "How shall we measure the contribution of a
person to society?", "Shall we determine a person's contribution to society
according to the gross sum of all the values given to others or society by the
person?", "What should be the proper criterion for measuring a person's
contribution to society?"
We usually call a person who makes an extraordinary contribution to
society a great person. This "great" is obscure and misleading. Does it mean
that the gross contribution is large in magnitude? If so, then the magnitude of
gross contribution is a criterion for the measure of contribution. This seems
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THE VALUES OF A PERSON
The Contribution of a Person to Society
(2) Persons having positive net contributions. Although most contributions,
in the fonn of product or service, are rewarded or compensated for by money,
position, name, or power, some great contributions have far-reaching influences
beyond compensation. These contributions are the major part of the positive net
contributions, and persons who produce such positive net contributions are
what we call great or good persons. For instance, a great composer, say
Beethoven, produced many great symphonies, which are still played by famous
orchestras at present and, hence, are still contributing to the aesthetic values for
many music lovers. Some of Van Gogh's oil paintings are now worth more
than ten million dollars a piece, which is far more than the total material value
Van Gogh received during his whole life. Shakespeare's plays are still enjoyed
by many English-speaking people. Newton's basic laws in physics and
Einstein's theory of relativity had tremendous influence on the subsequent
developments in science and technology and have affected the life-style of all
human beings. Abraham Lincoln, as a great statesman, in addition to
eliminating the slave system in the United States, has had far-reaching effects
on the concept of equality of all human beings and on the rebuttal of racial
discrimination. Socrates' thoughts have affected the development of the whole
European civilization. Confucius' teachings have ever since been the core of
Chinese culture and life-style. Thus, great artists, writers, scientists, scholars,
persons .of state, and thinkers, all have extra far-reaching contributions beyond
what have been rewarded or compensated for to them, either materially as
money or spiritually as position, name, or power. They all belong to this class
of persons having positive net contributions.
I further distinguish between two kinds of persons: (A) those who
produce a positive net contribution to society as a by-product, and (B) those
who deliberately produce a positive net contribution as the main purpose of
moral actions.
Such persons as artists, scholars, and persons of state, apart from
working for material values to support living, have a deep interest in creation,
search for knowledge, or political as well as administrative achievement,
respectively. Some top persons have far-reaching influences and produce
extra values or positive net contributions to society. So their positive net
contribution to society is a by-product of.their work in fulfilling their life
plans.
Moralists are slightly different from artists, scholars, and persons of state.
Although a morally good action may be considered a part of your life or a
part of your work in fulfilling your life plan, it is not your normal work in the
sense of profession, because everybody has to have a profession to earn a
living and nobody can exclusively take morally good actions. So a morally
good action is deliberatety taken, not a by-product. If I am to rank between a
naturally-produced positive net contribution as a by-product and a
deliberately-produced positive net contribution as a consequence of a morally
good action, I will rank the second higher.
(3) Persons having negative net contributions. Persons who do harms to
others or society make negative net contributions, because, if without
counting these harms they are persons having zero contributions, then the
harms have negative values and are obviously negative net contributions.
Those persons who commit sins or crimes cause harms to others or society
and belong to this class.
In addition to these morally or legally bad persons, I regard those persons
who are overpaid for their work as having a negative net contribution,
because they take more than they give. According to Robert Nozick's
entitlement theory of distributive justice, any transfer of holding, if it is
procedurally just, is just. But according to my utilitarian theory of distributive
justice that uses contribution as a pattern for distribution, even a procedurally
just exchange or transfer of values may be morally unjustifiable and, hence,
unjust. For instance, in the United States, a top civil servant, say a cabinet
member, has an annual salary around a hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
The President of the United States has an annual salary of two hundred
thousand dollars. Yet, a famous doctor or lawyer can easily make a yearly
income of over half a million dollars. The president of a large private
enterprise has an annual salary of over one million dollars. A top boxer, a
football player, a singer, or a movie star has an annual income of several
million dollars. An entrepreneur or the owner of a large private company may
have an annual unearned income of hundreds of millions. I would like then to
ask this question: Are the contributions of these persons really that large, as
to deserve these high incomes, which are ten, a hundred, or even more than a
thousand times that of a cabinet officer or even the President of the United
States? I do not believe so. I maintain that these persons are overpaid or
receive excessive profits in their business. The worth of their work is far less
than what they take as reward or compensation. Therefore, their net
contributions are also negative, or these people belong to the class of persons
having negative net contributions.
For a person to pursue material values for a better life is quite natural,
and that some persons are overpaid is due to a bad social system rather than
the fault of those who are overpaid. Many rich people make extra
contributions to society as an after-thought or after they have become quite
wealthy, in the form of charity, grants, donations, establishing a foundation,
etc. Yet even after this kind of extra contribution, they still have an enormous
amount of wealth and should be considered overpaid and, hence, belonging to
the class of persor,s having negative net contributions.
Conventionally, we judge the worth, value, or importance of a person by
that person's gross contribution. After the above analysis, we can see that the
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THE VALUES OF A PERSON
Eight
criterion of gross contribution is really unfair and inadequate. This criterion
has a side effect of making people compare and compete for magnitude of
gross contributions. This leads to heroism, contests, and Olympic games. This
may be said to be an incentive to make people work hard, but this causes all
kinds of conflicts among people and is harmful to the ideal of a harmonious
society. Since only one "fIrst" exists, and most people are not "fIrst," then
they become unsatisfIed. If the criterion of gross contribution is replaced by
net contribution, then all these disadvantages will be eliminated.
Traditionally, the Chinese people are classifIed into four classes: (1)
intellectuals, (2) farmers, (3) workers, and (4) merchants. Whether this
classifIcation implies ranking I am not sure, but it has been criticized by
liberals and radicals as implying class distinction and discrimination,
particularly because workers are ranked third among four classes.
However, I fmd that this classification is compatible with my
classifIcation according to net contribution. Traditionally, most Chinese
painters are intellectuals, because a crucial factor of good Chinese painting is
the control ofthe brush, which is common to painting and calligraphy. Many
Chinese intellectuals who are good calligraphers are also good painters.
Similarly, the most popular Chinese sculpture is the carving of seals and
stamps, which is also done by intellectuals who master calligraphy. Therefore,
traditional Chinese intellectuals include government officials, scholars,
writers, poets, calligraphers, painters, sculptors, and moralists, and roughly
represent or cover the class of persons having positive net contributions.
Farmers and workers represent the ordinary people who roughly correspond
to the class of persons having zero net contributions. As to the ranking of
farmers above workers, this is perhaps due to the fact that, in a rural society,
the majority, or above 80 to 95 percent of the population, are farmers. Out of
the four essential needs in life - food, clothing, shelter, and transportationfood is regarded as of paramount importance. Merchants, especially wealthy
ones, usually make large amounts of money through excessive profit.
Therefore, they are regarcjed.as taking more than they give and are persons
having negative net contributions. Thus, if the old Chinese classifIcation is
also a ranking, it ranks from positive net contribution to zero net contribution
and to negative net contribution, or in an descending order of net
contributions.
LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE,
AND TELEOLOGY
1. Life Plan and Values
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In this chapter, I present my view regarding the relationships among the
values of objects, which are for or pursued and obtained by a person. On the
surface, most values are unrelated to one another. A designated value seems
relevant to a particular action or a moral judgment because values are
weighted, aggregated, and compared only when they are involved in their
particular actions or judgments, but are in general unrelated to one another
when they are involved in separated actions or judgments. I will show that the
values encountered, considered, and treated by a person are all oriented
toward the ultimate end oflife, or for a life plan, and arranged and organized
in a complex interrelated structure which I call value structure.
I have developed a new form of utilitarianism, called unified utilitarian
theory, in which I use a decision-theoretic approach. I I hold that, if an agent
suffers a loss in taking a morally good action, then s/he will naturally have a
feeling of moral satisfaction, which has a moral value for the agent so that it
will more than compensate for the loss.
Once the feeling of moral satisfaction is taken into proper account, the
unifIed utilitarian theory reduces to ethical egoism. The benefits of actions
are not necessarily immediate and apparent. Some do not appear immediately
but may appear in the long run. This is why in ethical egoism prudence and
considered preference are advocated. To explain this kind of ethical egoism
with the value of the feeling of moral satisfaction properly taken care of
according to the unifIed utilitarian theory, I interpret the ultimate end of life
as life plan. The ultimate end of life is not interpreted as the fmal state when a
person dies, but as the whole process of life with the fInal state included, or
as the aggregate of all courses of actions in life.
Many philosophers hold that a final value in life exists. The concept of
final value is not clear-cut, nor is it unique, because various philosophers
have different views of it. Final value is close to the ultimate end of life and
life plan, but is vaguer and fuzzier.
In the following, I try to clarifY the concepts of fInal value, ultimate end
of life, and life plan, which though similar are in an order of ascending clarity.
I discuss final value first in Section 2, then the ultimate end of life in Section
3, and fmally the life plan in Section 4.
Once the concept of life plan is clarifIed, I then show in Section 5 that all
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LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY
Ultimate End of Life
the values a person pursues or takes actions to obtain are intertwined into a
composite well-organized structure oriented, directly or indirectly, toward the
ultimate end of life plan. The concept of life plan and a well-organized value
structure are the very basis of the teleological view of utilitarianism. Finally, I
explain how this view naturally leads to a soft determinism.
not representative of the painter's contribution, nor would s/he admit that the
fmal value s/he pursued is restricted to the 1,000th oil painting.
If the final value refers to the value of the accumulated happiness
received as a result of the completion of all 1,000 oil paintings, this
accumulated happiness carmot be determined and is not felt by the painter,
because after s/he has received every incremental piece of happiness, this
happiness gradually dissipates as time goes on, until only a residual amount is
left. Happiness is perceived piecewise, but you do not know and carmot tell
how much total happiness you finally have. So the interpretation of "final" as
the end of a person's life is not valid.
Next suppose that "final" refers to the ultimate end of a person's life plan
in the person's mind. Then this ultimate end, as a general objective, does not
have a definite or fixed value like an ordinary object. The utilities or values
of the alternative choices of an action are measured, weighted, and compared
subjectively only when the agent is to make a decision for taking a specific
action. As I will discuss in Section 4, life plan is a general objective, not a
specific action to take. A person's life is made up of a series of numerous
actions. No person is able to assign a specific final value to that person's life
plan. When you are still alive, or when you have not come to the end of life,
your life plan has not yet been completed, and you are not in a position to
quantify this value.
I do not object to the use ofthe term "final value" by other philosophers,
but this "value" is not in the same quantitative sense as I use throughout this
book. I would rather call final value the ultimate end of life. The term
"ultimate end of life" needs to be better defined. When I use it, I mean the
general objective of life, not a specific quantity of value. To avoid confusion,
I like best to use the term "life plan," because it is a purely descriptive term
without any implication of quantity.
After this discussion, and going back to the diverse views of final value,
we can see that they are elements or factors that contribute to a life plan, as
differently emphasized by different philosophers.
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2. Final Value
Most philosophers believe that a value or set of values exist, at which all
human beings do or should aim. 2 This is called the final value, or in
teleological theories, the ultimate end of life. Even in utilitarianism, different
philosophers specify different things as the final value.
The value most popularly accepted by utilitarians as the fmal value is
"happiness." John Stuart Mill advocates happiness as the ultimate end of life.
In my unified utilitarian theory I also adopt the concept of happiness.
Happiness is what Aristotle first proposed and called eudaemonia. Aristotle's
eudaemonistic view contained a large amount of self-realization (or selffulfillment), which is regarded as life's final value by other philosophers.
Other things are also regarded by philosophers as the chief value of life,
such as the pleasure of Jeremy Bentham, Jen (humanity or benevolence) of
Confucianism, agape (or selfless love) of Christianity, wisdom of Spinoza,
renunciation of Schopenhauer. 3
Final value is not well-defmed, because many philosophers have
different notions of it, and because it cannot possibly be defmed. To explain
this point, I borrow the utilitarians' concept of "happiness" as the ultimate
end or the final value of life. First, consider the word "fmal." Does it refer to
the end of a person's life? Or does it refer to the ultimate end of a person's
life plan in her or his mind?
As I defined above, a person receives an incremental piece of happiness
after s/he has obtained an object (as a physical object, an abstract object, an
action, a situation, or an experience) through the taking of an action. If
"final" refers to the end of a person's life, the final value must be the value of
the last incremental piece of happiness as a result of the person's final action,
or else the accumulated value of all the happiness the person has received
after s/he has taken the final action. The view of the value of the last
incremental piece of happiness is in conformity with the conventional view
that happiness has an intrinsic value. According to my unified utilitarian
theory, the object or the action has an incremental value for the agent.
Consider an oil painter as an example. Suppose that in the painter's
lifetime s/he completes 1,000 paintings. If the final value refers to the value
of the incremental piece of happiness received through the completion of the
1,000th oil painting, then I think that the final piece of oil painting alone is
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3. Ultimate End of Life
In this section, I discuss the ultimate end of life, which has a meaning quite close
to what is called by some philosophers the final value, but not exactly the same,
as I explained in the previous section. The term "ultimate end of life" is used
often in teleological theories, but it is also not well-defined.
As I see, the fuzziness mainly hinges on the distinctions between the
value of an ordinary object and the value of a person, and I start my
discussion of the ultimate end ofJife from these distinctions.
One distinction lies in the objective and the time of fulfillment of the
LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY
Life Plan
objective. A product, a service, or a construction work is to be used or
enjoyed by people after its completion. For instance, an automobile is to be
purchased and used by a customer after its having been completely
manufactured. A market research report makes recommendations to the client
after the research has been done. An office building is to be purchased or
rented by customers for use as offices after the completion of the construction
work. A person, however, is an end in itself. A person's life is completed
only when the person's life comes to an end, but s/he is not to be used or
enjoyed by others after s/he has died. Instead, the fulfillment of a life plan is
essentially for the person (although, in most cases it also benefits the society
of which that person is a member), and it is enjoyed and experienced by that
person, during lifetime, not after slbe has died.
A second distinction lies in the nature of the value and the subject the
value is for. A product, a service, or a construction work has a value, which is
usually priced in terms of money. Every piece of material, time, or effort
spent on the product, the service, or the construction work contributed to it.
But to determine the valuse of a person is probably impossible. The
contribution of a person to society can at best be roughly estimated. A
person's value for herself or himself, is still more difficult to determine or
measure. A person consumes goods during life. A good meal taken by a
person has a utility for the person, but this good meal is eventually consumed
by the person. We do not conceive that this meal becomes a part of the
person's fmal worth or value. Therefore, the ultimate end of a person as a
whole is not a well-defmed or clearly-described concept like that of a product,
a service, or a construction work. What can be clearly stated is only a life
plan.
To study the philosophy of life, rather than identify what the fmal value
or the ultimate end of life is, I would start from life plan. A life plan will
dictate the big decisions in life, and these will dictate smaller or low-level
decisions for all kinds of actions in life.
suggest, are a well-formed self-concept, a life plan that is appropriate to one's
humanity and individuality, and an understanding of the context of one's
existence in a way that is commensurate with one's powers and constructive
in one's life."; Although not a defmition, Adams's statements delineate a
clear picture of a life plan.
Every person has a life plan of her or his own, no matter whether that
person is conscious of it. The original cause of formation of a life plan may
be different. Some life plans originate from conscious deliberation, while
some life plans are forced to form by external factors. For instance, a mother
may persuade or urge a daughter to follow a profession or trade, say, to take
over the mother's business upon the mother's retirement.
Although everybody has a life plan, the strength of sense of life plan
varies widely from person to person. Some people may have a strong sense of
life plan, while for some other people, the sense of life plan may not be
strong or clear-cut.
For instance, the son of a farmer may be so familiar with the work and
life of a farmer that, even without a clear life plan of being a farmer, he may
naturally and automatically follow the footsteps of his father and become a
farmer in the future. The father's life as a farmer naturally becomes a pattern
of life for the son. If the son is not ambitious, or has no stimulus or incentive
for pursuing another kind of life, the most probable choice of life plan will be
that of a farmer. In that case, work is to eam a living or as a means for the
end of life. The work of a farmer is a part of the life of the farmer, but the
farmer may have no strong interest in his work. Or, we may say that the
actions of the farmer, apart from the purpose of exchange for money to eam a
living, have not much other use for the farmer himself.
In the extreme case, the work of a worker of a mass production
manufacturing company, say, an automobile factory, because of the mass
production and the high degree of division of labor, could be extremely
simple and monotonous. Then the actions of the worker are exclusively for
the purpose of earning money for living, and they have no other value for the
worker at all. This entails what Marx called the "alienation" problem: the
worker is alienated from her or his work spiritually.
No matter what the original cause of formation oflife plan may be, or no
matter how weak the sense of life plan may be, little controversy arises that
most people accept a life plan, and, because of the general recognition of
autonomy and free will, the acceptance of a life plan is ascribed to a person's
own final decision irrespective of the cause of formation.
Life plan is a whole project or the whole process of a life, not a static
point in life or the state of life at a time. It involves a person's ultimate end,
what kind of life the person wants to lead, and what kinds of things the
person wants to do. Life plan consists of many aspects. The values pursued
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4. Life Plan
Having discussed the final value and the ultimate end of life as two fuzzy
concepts, I come to the discussion of life plan, which will give us a clear-cut
view of the relationships among all the values pursued and obtained in a
person's life.
In a previous paper I have discussed life plan and value structure. 4 The
materials in and the following section are partly new and are partly taken
from that paper.
What is a life plan? Recently, E. M. Adams discussed the self-concept
and life plan of human beings. He says, "The basics for success in life, I
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LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY
and obtained by a person form a value structure. The making of efforts for the
life plan is called self-realization or self-fulfillment. The [mal effect on the
state of mind after an incremental piece of value has been obtained is called
an incremental piece of happiness.
Life plan is subjective. This statement has two senses. First, from the
point of view of decision, everyone's life plan is finally decided by herself or
himself. Second, the life plan is essentialiy for the person. A life plan has
some effect on the society in which the person lives. According to morality, a
life plan has to meet requirements or be constrained to lie within limits. A
person's life has an amount of worth for society, because the person
contributes to society. Since the person is an end in itself, the generallyaccepted concept of personhood dictates that a life plan is essentially for the
person, although in the fulfillment of the life plan the person also contributes
to society. Because of this, the worth of a life plan should not be judged by its
objective contribution to society, but it should be judged by the subjective
feeling, perception, and satisfaction of fulfillment.
Since all the activities of a person are to fulfill that person's life plan,
directly or indirectly, slhe naturally follows an optimum path and proceeds in
an optimum direction, by discarding all other possible paths and directions in
the mean time. You have to make choices in taking actions and to take only
those actions that best satisfy your life plan, while discarding those actions
that are irrelevant to or conflict with your life plan. Utility then appears when
you make a choice, in weighting and in decision-making.
When you compare several alternative objects, situations, or actions, the
first step is to find out their common characteristics. The second step is to
mark or grade the magnitudes or "weights" of these characteristics of the
various objects, situations, or actions, and to [md their differences. Weighting
and decision-making start from comparison. Comparison can be made only
on common characteristics. For instance, to compare a piece of wood with a
piece of stone, one characteristic that may be compared is the weight, because
weight is a characteristic common to the wood and the stone. We carmot
possibly compare the color of wood with the shape of stone. We may
interpret weighting and decision-making as comparing the common
characteristics of several things and finding their differences.
The crucial point lies in what the common characteristic is. The physical
properties of the objects, situations, or actions, such as length, volume,
weight, time, hardness, brightness, and velocity, are not what we call
common characteristics here. The use of one or more of these physical
properties as a criterion is restricted to the comparison of similar objects, but
they do not have a direct bearing on the fulfillment of your life plan. The
common characteristic is a special thing. When you choose and obtain an
object, a situation, or an action out of several alternatives, the overall reason
Value Structure, Teleology, and Determinism
149
is that the chosen alternative is the most useful. This "usefulness" may be for
an immediate purpose, for a remote purpose, or for no purpose at all, but for
the life plan as a whole. Thus, every value a person pursues or takes an action
to obtain is related to or motivated by that person's life plan. All these values
form a value structure with life plan as the core.
This "usefulness for a life plan" is exactly the characteristic common to
all the objects and can serve as a unique criterion for comparison and choice.
What you compare for your life plan is the magnitude of this "usefulness for
your life plan" of the various objects under consideration. This "usefulness
for a life plan" is what is commonly called utility. In this sense, the principle
of utility appears as a tautology.
Although the whole structure of values for a life plan is complicated, it is
not necessary, or practical, to show this structure as clearly as a plan.
Practically, values are weighted and compared only in decision-making. In
the decision-making for a particular action, only those values relevant to this
particular action are considered.
5. Value Structure, Teleology, and Determinism
In the previous section, I discussed the life plan and showed that all the values
pursued and obtained by a person are more or less related to the life plan. In this
section, I go further in this direction and show that these values are organically
interrelated and form a fairly tight structure called value structure of the life plan
of the agent.
When I say that values are interrelated and form a value structure of the
life plan of the agent, I mean that the values are related to one another
through the relationship among the actions. As I discussed above, the actions
you take are all directed toward the ultimate end of your life or your life plan,
closely or remotely, directly or indirectly.
The values for or pursued and obtained by a person are of three different
kinds. A first kind of value is those values produced by the person for the
person. The producer and the recipient or the subject of the value is the same
person, the agent. A second kind is those values produced by the person,
either for others or society or for the person, which have extra contributions
to society and, hence, is also for the agent because of the feeling of
satisfaction. A third kind is those values which are not produced by the
person but are obtained by the person through purchase, as gifts, grants, or
inheritance. These three kinds of value are all for the agent, no matter
whether they are also for others or society.6
Oh the face of it, the values of two separate objects, 01 and 02, in the
broad sense of including situations and actions, are related to each other only
insofar as both values appear as values or component values of alternative
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LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY
Value Structure, Teleology, and Determinism
choices in the decision-making for the same action. Otherwise, they are
unrelated. Two different actions are considered as two separate things, and
the values of objects in action AI are considered unrelated to the values of
objects of action Az.
In fact, any value for a person is related to that person's life plan, not
necessarily directly, but in general indirectly, through several stages or levels
of decision-making. The decision-making to take an action may appear either
related or unrelated to the life plan. If related, it does not need further
reasoning. If unrelated, the decision-making is usually a lower-level one
which is subsequent to a previously-made higher-level decision-making,
which is directly related to the life plan, or subsequent to a still higher-level
decision-making, etc. The objective of this highest-level decision-making is
always clearly set so that it is directly related to the life plan. Once a higherlevel decision has been made, it gives constraints on lower-level decisions,
and these constraints make the lower-level decision problems clear-cut. In
this way, the value in the lower-level decision problems are said to be related,
indirectly and remotely, to the life plan.
I will give a personal experience as an example to illustrate this kind of
indirect relationship between a value in life and the overalll'ife plan.
I went to the World Conference of Philosophy held in Nairobi, Kenya,
2 I -25 July 1991. I arrived there on 19 July and left Nairobi on 26 July.
On 23 July, I took a one-day tour to Lake Nakuru. What I want to
illustrate is how this tour is related to my life plan.
On the face of it, this tour has no relationship to my life plan at all. I
regard my decision to participate in the conference as a higher-level decisionmaking that would cause lower-level decision-makings, because if I had not
gone to the conference, it would not have been possible for me to have a tour
of Lake Nakuru.
This participation, however, is related to my life plan as a philosopher. I
was invited to present a paper at the conference. So if I participated, I would
present a paper, which would add some value to my career as a philosopher.
At the conference I would meet philosophers from all over the world. This
would have value for me as well. Therefore, I preferred participating to not
participating. However, without receiving a travel grant, I could not
personally afford the traveling expenses, nor would I prefer participating at
my own expenses to not participating. Since I received a travel grant, I
decided to participate.
This is the higher-level decision. Once I decided to participate, I began to
consider the question of taking a tour in Kenya to see some of its celebrated
wild animals. I had this intention vaguely before I went to Nairobi, and
because of some business in Europe, I had decided to leave Nairobi on 26
July, immediately after the conference. This can be said to be a strong
constraint on the possible dates of a tour.
After arriving at Nairobi, I learned more information about tours: halfday tours, one-day tours, and more-than-one-day tours. Because of the tight
schedule of the conference, I could take at most one day off for a tour. I
learned from traveling agents that a one-day tour to Lake Nakuru was a good
one. The program of the conference on 23 July was of little interest to me.
Therefore, on 22 July I made the decision to take a one-day tour to Lake
Nakuru on 23 July.
You may argue that a lot of random things occur in your life. And since
you have free will and autonomous, you are free to do anything, so that, in
your lifetime, among all the actions, some actions that are not directed toward
the life plan must exist. Then how can my theory take account of these two
points?
This objection is rooted in a view against hard determinism. My
teleological view does not imply hard determinism. First, so far as the
physical environmental nature is concerned, the statistical decision theory
takes the probabilistic nature of the states of the world into consideration. In
my unified utilitarian theory, the utility to be maximized is not actual utility,
but is expected utility.? When the states of the world have a probability
distribution, you can still be teleological and make decisions for your life
plan. The probabilistic or random situation of the physical environmental
nature is not genuinely random. Microscopically this nature is still
deterministic. These microscopic affairs are too numerous, too complex, or
too difficult for men and women to study individually, so that we fmd
preferable, and sometimes inevitable, to study them macroscopically from a
probabilistic point of view, using statistics. Therefore, the randomness of the
physical environmental nature is not a valid argument against the teleological
vIew.
As to the free will and the autonomy of human beings, although the exact
and detailed defmitions of them vary widely, nobody will admit that those
terms mean unconstrained and absolutely wild freedom of choice, because
human behavior is constrained by rationality, prudence, and morality.
Economics is the study of rational human economic behavior, decision
science deliberately takes prudence into account, and moral philosophy
further takes morality into account. The defmitions of rationality, prudence,
and morality vary widely in detail. But basically, by rationality, I mean
logical coherence and mathematical consistency, where the logic and
mathematics involved are those within the common sense of an ordinary
person, not those understood by logicians or mathematicians. 8 By prudence, I
mean comprehensive and long-range rationality. As far as the teleological
nature of life is concerned, it is not necessary to consider morality.
Rationality and prudence alone are sufficient to constrain the free decisions
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LIFE PLAN, VALUE STRUCTURE, AND TELEOLOGY
and actions of a normal person to a small range.
By this small range I do not mean hard determinism. As far as a human
being's mind is concerned, how much of determinism may be admitted is still
controversial or even unknown. For the purpose of studying the teleological
nature of human values, we need not have a clear-cut view of determinism,
because even if the hard determinism would be true, from the point of view
of a human being, s/he still could not predict the future and would feel that
s/he is free and autonomous. Because of rationality, prudence, and morality,
the randomness in decision and in action of a normal person is rather
restricted. That this is so can be seen from some ordinary phenomena. For
example, suppose a professor, P, teaches at a university. Beside teaching, P is
engaged in the writing of a book and several essays. During the office time,
P gives lectures or stays at her or his office. During the evenings, s/he
does some reading, or occasionally, goes out with her or his spouse for
shopping or dining. Now, P's lectures are fixed in time and are regular
without much randomness, unless P is sick or has some emergency such that
s/he has to ask for a leave. For the remaining time during the day and the time
in the evenings, P is free to do what s/he chooses to do, but P's choices are
restricted by her or his profession and interest, so that P either reads, or writes,
or goes out with her or his spouse. No matter what actions P may take during
the evenings, they all fit well into P's life plan of scholastic career as a
professor.
In conclusion, although the randomness in life, whether it is in the
environmental nature or in a person's own mind, affects the consequences of
the person's life plan, it does not affect the fact that the person has a
teleological view of life and life plan. That everybody more or less has a life
plan is empirically true, although life plans differ widely in clarity and
defmiteness. Some of them are clear-cut or defmite, while some others are
obscure or indefmite. No matter how obscure or indefinite a life plan may be,
the concepts of life plan and value structure remain valid.
Nine
THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY,
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
1. Views of Teleology
In the previous chapter, I discussed fmal value, ultimate end of life, life plan,
and value structure. The main thesis was that all the values for or pursued by
a person are not only goal-directed, but also organically intertwined into a
value structure for the life plan of the person. My view of life plan is close to,
though not exactly the same as, the view of teleology taken by most
philosophers.
As pointed out by David L. Norton, "To outward appearances,
teleological description and explanation of human conduct have lately been
regenerating themselves, phoenix-life, from the ashes to which they were
reduced by positivism and behaviorism. . . . But current usage of the term
'teleological' is often so loose as to court conceptual confusion."l
So teleology is something closely related and valuable to my theory of
value. In order to present a comprehensive and complete utilitanian general
theory of value, to clarify delicate points, and to distinguish my view of life
plan from several views ofteleology, I devote this concluding chapter to the
discussion of teleology in relation to my theory of value.
In this section, I collect some recent views of teleology which I consider
most important and representative.
In Section 2, I discuss afresh my view of life plan as a teleological view
of human life. I emphasize the main differences between my view and the
views taken by recent writers. I explain how my theory of value deals with
some sophisticated and controversial issues arising in the recent study of
teleology.
In Section 3, I give my interpretation of a passage in the Confucian
Analects,2 which, as I understand it, is Confucius' philosophy of life from a
decision-theoretic point of view, conforming to my decision-theoretic
approach to the study of utilitaranism.
In Section 4, I tie up the conceptions of moral philosophy, decision
theory, teleology, life plan, and the philosophy of life, distinguish between
moral philosophy and the philosophy of life, and conclude that a general
theory of value is the basis of the philosophy of life.
I come to the discussion of several views of teleology taken by recent
writers. These views are essentially the same, though they differ slightly in
details and emphasis. To precisely identify these views and distinguish
154 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
between them is difficult, let alone to comment on them. Instead of
commenting thoroughly on each view, I will only comment on each view
casually when presenting it, but I will give my overall and comprehensive
view of teleology afterwards.
Douglas B. Rasmussen contends that "Self-directedness or autonomy ...
is the central nesessary feature of human flourishing.... It is not external to
the essence of human flourishing, but is the very form, the only form, in
which a life in accordance with virtue (human flourishing) can be lived."3
David L. Norton accepts Rasmussen's view but thinks that it still leaves
two gaps to be closed. Norton holds that "full-bodied teleology fills the first
gap in Rasmussen's endorsement of autonomy by flourishing an objective
inner criterion of individual choice."4 To fill the second gap, Norton further
writes:
"Autonomy" is by definition the direction of the self by the self. In the
case of apparent autonomy, the self that does the directing is entirely a
social product. Given the sociological truth that all selves begin (in
childhood) as social products, true autonomy will be possible only if an
independent source of self-identification exists, and such a source must
be innate. s
So far, Norton's view of autonomy and teleology is close to my view of
life plan.
In pointing out the failures of communitarians, traditionalists, and
feminists, who criticize "individualism" as destructive of good social
relations, to recognize distinctions among kinds of individualism, Norton
says
Eudaemonia is the distinctive kind of happiness that attends self-fulfilling
living. By what has just been said, it is precluded to persons who do not
intend that their lives shall be of worth to others. And a life that is
without worth to other worthy lives, in spite of its intent to be so, is
lacking an essential dimension of self-fulfillment. 6
I do not agree with this statement. I will discuss this point in detail in
Section 2.
Douglas J. Den Uyl is another writer who advocates teleology through a
strong form of agent-centeredness. His arguments are mainly against Samuel
Scheffler's "agent-centered restrictions." Den Uyl defends what Scheffler
calls "agent-centered prerogative" and the "hybrid" theory, which "is a
predominantly consequentialist doctrine that allows for it to be sometimes
permissible to act without consideration of the best overall outcome. It is
Views of Teleology
155
designed to incorporate the intuitive plausibility ofthe ACP."7
Den Uyl concludes that "teleology can provide the rationale Scheffler
claims is missing from a strong form of agent-centeredness."8
I agree with Den Uyl's view of agent-centeredness. However, my
arguments are based on my unified utilitarian theory, not on ACP and the
hybrid theory. With my unified utilitarian theory, I proposed a solution to the
Trolley Problem. 9 Similar problems and paradoxes can readily be solved.
Den Uyl's provis0s that "it cannot do so without some controversial and
metaphysical commitments," and that "it also cannot do so within the
ordinary and established paradigms of much modem ethics" are no longer
required. 10
I will discuss my view of agent-centeredness in Section 2 in detail.
J. B. Callicott has a clear view that value is subjective and also strongly
supports the putative facUvalue distinction. I I I quoted his crucial statements
in Section 3 of Chapter Two and I will not repeat them here.
Callicott's facUvalue distinction and projectivist accounts of value might
be thought to undermine any value-centered theory of teleology, but Mark
Bedau has given three reasons to argue that this is not SO.12 Bedau also has
given three reasons to show that the worry that a value-centered account of
teleology is viciously circular need not prove serious. 13
In this respect I agree with Bedau completely. Rather than quote his
reasons, I quote his conclusions in advocationg a value-centered theory of
teleology, as follows:
Value and teleology would be part of a unified theoretical system of
concepts, as a theory forming a package to be taken together or not at all.
Being theoretically unified is not a flaw; many groups of concepts form
similar theoretical systems. Each theory could still be informative. We
can grasp teleological notions such as goal and purpose without
recongnizing that they involve value, as we can grasp the idea of value
without seeing it as involving natural functions. A value-centered theory
of teleology and a function-centered theory of value might both be true
but not be trivially analytic, so sensible and intelligent people could
disagree about them. So, even if teleology and value are part of an
interdefined family of concepts, a value-centered theory of teleology can
be a significant and informative theoretical advance. 14
Harry Bingswanger has discussed in detail life-based teleology as the
foundation of ethics and has presented a clear picture of life-based teleology.
Since I agree with him completely regarding life-based teleology, I will quote
quite a few passages from his paper instead of rewording them. He writes:
156 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
My thesis is that all living action, whether conscious or vegetative, is
goal-directed, and that no inanimate objects can have or pursue goals. I
will argue that teleology is biologically based: life is the phenomenon
that gives rise to the existence of goal-directed action. Purposes, in this
view, are a special subcategory ofthe wider class, "goals"; purposes are
consciously held goals.!5
Bingswanger supports the need for the broadening of "some teleological
concepts, such as 'goal', to cover the end states of vegetative action" ... "by
identifying three fundamental causal features that unite vegetative and
purposeful action and differentiate both from inanimate processes. I refer to
these three features as: self-generation, value significance [my emphasis] and
goal-causation." 16
Here Bingswanger associates goal-directed action with value. He says,
For a given effect to be part of one's purpose, producing that effect must
make a difference to the agent: he must desire it, want it to occur, value
[my emphasis] it in some sense....
Views of Teleology
157
type of end state possessing survival value.
A "purposeful goal-directed action" may be difined as: a self-generated
action that has been consciously selected [my emphasis] from its
projected future efficacy in attaining a consciously valued end state.
"Goal-directed action," simpliciter, may be defmed as follows: A "goaldirected action" is a self-generated action that has been selected for its
efficacy in attaining a value.!8
Bingswanger's view conforms to my theory of value and my decisiontheoretic approach because a purposeful goal-directed action is consciously
selected.
The association of value with decision-makeng goes back further to Ayn
Rand, as can be seen from the following excerpts:
... "Need," in this context, denotes a necessary condition of an entity's
very existence. It is "existence-needs" that provide the basis of valuesignificance....
Where there are no alternatives, no values are possible. There is only one
fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence-and
it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence
of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it
depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes
its forms, but it carmot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that
faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of
self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that
action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of
existence. It is only the concept of "Life" that makes the concept of
"Value" possible. 19
When a purposeful action succeeds, the agent satisfies a desire; when a
vegetative action succeeds, the organism satisfies a need. In the case of
purposeful action, then, the goal has a conscious value-significance for
the agent, in vegetative action the goal has a biological value-significance
for the agent.!?
"Value" is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept "value"
is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to
whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve
a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals
and no values are possible. 2o
Although I am not a biologist, I agree with Bingswanger completely as
far as his interpretation of goal-directed action in terms of value-significance
is concerned.
Bingswanger further defmes goal-directed actions in terms of value as
follows:
Rand's basic idea of ethics, as pointed out by Bingswanger, is that ethics
is teleological, not deontological, and that survival needs are the necessary
bases of teleology (of the concept of "value").
As far as the teleological nature and decision-theoretic approach of my
theory of value are concerned, I agree with Rand and Bingswanger. But as far
as the details of my ethical theory, namely, my unified utilitarian theory is
concerned, I deviate from them.
Even though vegetative actions lack emotion and conscious valuing,
there is something that plays a similar role: needs. Although the end
states of vegetative actions are not desired by the organism, they are
needed....
A "vegetative good-directed action" may be difmed as: a self-generated
action that has been naturally selected for its past efficacy in attaining a
158 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
2. Life Plan Versus Teleology
In this section, I present my view of teleology, or more precisely, the minor
differences between my view of life plan and the current views of teleology
taken by other writers. I have four main points: (1) life plan as not restricted
to morality, (2) agent-centeredness, (3) life plan as something that everybody
has, and (4) the interpretation of the principle of utility. These points will be
discussed seriatim.
(1) Life plan is not restricted to morality. Many philosophers regard
teleology as the foundation of moral philosophy, or they study teleology from
the point of view of moral philosophy. But as I see life plan, it is the plan of
how to live a life, which covers other things beside morality as an essential
element. As I discussed in Section 4 of Chapter Five, the values a person
pursues in her or his lifetime are of various kinds. Some values, such as
health value, are necessary for existence or survival. Other values, such as
material value, are also necessary to obtain physical pleasure. A special kind
of value, career value, is for the fulfillment of life. I list three kinds of career
value, as epistemic value, aesthetic value, and professional value, the last
category covering all professions in human society. I do not include morality
as a career because professional moralists do not really exist. Even sages,
religious leaders, priests, and Buddhist monks are not purely professional
moralists, because sages in history dealt with not only moral philosophy, but
also political philosophy, philosophy of education, and philosophy of life. As
to religious leaders, priests, and Buddhist monks their careers are more on the
religious side than on the moral side.
I list moral value as an essential, non-exchangeable, and non-replaceable
value, which serves more as a constraint than as a career. Since immoral
actions are harmful to others and society, others and society care very much if
a member of society is immoral to an intolerable degree. Therefore in any
society, in addition to criminal laws, we always fmd moral principles and
rules, whether explicitly written or not. Any member of society is expected or
required to meet some basic or minimum moral requirements. If you do not
meet these requirements, you are to be blamed by others and society.
This is related to the distinction between moral philosophy and the
philosophy of life. Moral philosophy tells what is morally good, how you
should be morally good, whereas the philosophy of life tells what is a good
life, what a life plan is, why everyone should have a life plan, how you
should establish a life plan, and how you should behave to fulfill the life plan.
(2) Agent-centeredness. Even if the life plan of a person is not morality,
the primary purpose of the life plan can still look like serving others or
society. For instance, a politician may claim that her or his political ideal is to
make everybody live decently, freely, comfortably, and happily. Thus, the
Life Plan Versus Teleology
159
life plan of this politician seems to be primarily for others or society instead
of for herself or himself. In this respect, I agree with the view of most writers
of teleology, and especially Harry Bingswanger's life-based teleology, that a
human life is an end in itself, and the primary objective of a life plan is selffulfillment and self-satisfaction. That a good life plan usually also has a value
for others or society is a natural by-product.
You may argue that, because of the division of labor, most people work
for others or society. The worker of a private enterprise works for the
enterprise. A civil servant works for the govermnent and, in turn, for society.
Even a self-employed -person, such as a lawyer, or the owner and manager of
a small motel, renders service to the public and thereby works for others.
However, as I explained in Chapter Seven, a person's contribution should be
measured by that person's net contribution, not gross contribution, that is, the
gross contribution the person gives to others or society minus the
compensation slbe takes from others or society. Since the sale of products
and services are in general based on the principle of reciprocity, what you
take as compensation is supposed to be equivalent in value to what you give
as productivity or service, and the net contribution of an average person is
counted as zero. That you work for others or society for compensation of
money as salary, wage, or fee is not to be taken as an argument for the
assertion that the primary purpose of a life plan is a benefit for others or
society.
This view also resolves the ever-existing conflict between egoism and
altruism. According to agent-centeredness, human beings are inherently
egoistic, but morality as a constraint tells people how to fmd a compromise
between egoism and altruism. Every ethical theory endeavors to resolve this
conflict and claims to give the best and the most convincing explanation and
justification.
(3) Life plan is everybody's business. Another tendency in the views of
teleology taken by recent writers is that the fmal value or the ultimate end of
life must be something great. In the narrow interpretation of teleology as
morality, the ultimate end of life is the moral ideal or sage. And in the general
or broader interpretation of teleology, the ultimate end of life is personal
excellence or achievement. But life plan is something that everybody has as
the core of values pursued or as the master plan according to which all kinds
of objectives and sub-objectives are generated and actions are taken to attain
these objectives. How can an ordinary or average person expect to become a
moral ideal, a great person of state, a top-level scientist, a world-famous artist,
or a millionaire-entrepreneur? An ideal life plan is like a tailored suit. It is
tailored to the intelligence, knowledge, ability, aptitude, interest, and
propensity of a person, so that the person who is devoted to such a life plan
may be able to attain the highest self-fulfillment and the greatest satisfaction.
160 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
To teach or to encourage a child to become a great person is a gross mistake,
because only a few out of millions of people are great persons, and the result
of such a teaching is that more than ninety-nine percent of people will be
frustrated, disappointed, unsatisfied, and unsuccessful. This kind of view is
over-individualistic heroism, to which I strongly object.
(4) The interpretation of the principle of utility. As was discussed in the
previous sections, Douglas J. Den Uyl criticized Samuel Scheffler's "agentcentered restrictions" (ACR) and advocates "agent-centered prerogative
(ACP) together with a hybrid theory. Briefly, ACRs have the effect of
denying that there is any non-agent-relative principle or ranking overall states
of affairs such that it is always permissible to produce the best available state
of affairs so construed." "The hybrid theory is a predominantly consequentialist doctrine that allows for it to be sometimes permissible to act
without consideration of the best overall outcome."21
This kind of controversy originates from the obscurity of the principle of
utility in either classical utilitarianism or the existing act- or ruleutilitarianism . The unified utilitarian theory that I have developed is able to
resolve all kinds of conflicts and thereby defend utilitarianism.22 Instead of
commenting on Scheffler and Den Uyl, I now describe some features of my
theory insofar as they are related to agent-centeredness and the controversy
about the principle of utility.
Three crucial features of my unified utilitarian theory are related to the
controversies about agent-centeredness, as will be discussed briefly in the
following.
(A) Flexible nature of morality. I presented my view of the flexible
nature of morality, based on my classification of the situations of moral
actions into (1) continuous-continuous, (2) continuous-discrete, (3) discretecontinuous, and (4) discrete-discrete. 23 For the first two types of situation,
which correspond roughly to what are commonly called positive duties, I
point out that the moral requirement is not strict or else is arbitrarily set. I
also argue that, for charitable and supererogatory actions, no moral
requirement exists at alJ.24 Therefore, for such actions, the criterion of
maximum utility does not have to be strictly conformed to. This is what I call
the flexible nature of morality. This crucial feature is able to resolve some
supposed conflicts in utilitarianism and to meet some objections to
utilitarianism.
(B) Recognition or assignment of societal value. In the value judgment
of moral actions, the values of the factors of all alternatives normally
considered are only the apparent ones, with an important but hidden one not
taken into account. This value is the incremental value produced by the action
owing to its exemplification (in the case of morally good action) or violation
(in the case of morally bad action) of an institution, a system, or a practice of
Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy of Life
161
society. This value I call societal value. 25 With societal value taken into
proper account, the prescription made will sometimes be reversed, so that it
will become the same as what other ethical theories or common sense will
prescribe. Thus, the strong objection to utilitarianism that the principle of
utility and the principle ofjustice are incompatible will no longer exist.
(C) Trouble due to bad law, bad higher-level decision, unclear
specification of the role of the agent. Sometimes a difficulty or dilemma of
decision-making and moral judgment arises because of bad law, bad higherlevel decision, or unclear specification of the role of the agent. I have
discussed the situations of group actions with bad higher-level decision. 26 I
have also discussed the problem of decision-making and moral judgment in
the face of bad law.27 Recently, I proposed a solution to the Trolley Problem,
emphasizing the state of affairs and the role of the agent.2 8 These situations
appear as targets of attack on utilitarianism by non-utilitarians and also points
of controversy among recent writers on teleology and agent-centeredness. But
I have solved all these problems by using my unified utilitarianism. These are
problems or controversies in moral philosophy and should have little to do
with the agent-centeredness in teleology.
3. Decision-Theoretic Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy of Life
In a passage in Confucian Analects, Confucius tells his disciples his mental
developments at several ages, from fifteen through seventy. This passage is :
The Master said, "At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning.
At thirty, I stood firm.
At forty, I had no doubts.
At fifty, I knew the decree of Heaven.
At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth.
At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing
what was right."29
On the face of it, this passage is just a description of Confucius' progress
in learning, which is only related to his theory of education, but not relevant
to his teachings in moral philosophy or political philosophy.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, we see that this passage is more than a
description of Confucius' own experience; it is the essence of his philosophy
of life. From this point of view, I find that the passage may be interpreted in
terms of decision theory and moral philosophy.
Consider the last part first. "At seventy, I could follow what my heart
desired, without transgressing what was right." "Without transgressing what
was right" means being morally right. Also involved is the desire from the
162 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
heart. Nonnally, what you desire may be beyond what morality permits. In
that case, your sense of morality serves as a check, constraint, or control,
which forces you to give up such a desire. This kind of control by the moral
sense or whatever your source of controlling power may be, is a soft selfcontrol, as contrasted to the brute-force self-control of stoicism. However, to
naturally follow what your heart desires without transgressing what was right
shows the highest achievement of morality, which cannot be attained readily
by an ordinary person, but can only be attained by sages or moral ideals like
Confucius. Even for Confucius, this high morality was not attained until the
age of seventy after a long period of self-cultivation.
Along this line of reasoning and interpretation, I go backwards to the
early ages of Confucius and present my decision-theoretic interpretation as
follows.
(l) At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. This is the age at which
you begin to get seriously interested in learning. Fifteen corresponds to the
age of a grade nine or ten for secondary-school students nowadays. It may be
a little early for an average person, but it seems normal for Confucius as an
exceptionally intelligent child.
(2) At thirty, I stood firm. Obviously, "I stood firm" does not mean
standing firm physically. It means standing firm mentally. But what does "to
stand firm mentally" mean? My interpretation is that at thirty Confucius had
free will and autonomy so that he was able to make decisions. He became no
longer dependent upon others for the decision-making about his actions.
(3) At forty, I had no doubts. At thirty Confucius was able to make
decisions, but the decisions made may be not ideal ones, and they may even
have been bad ones. To make a decision you need information and
knowledge, which include not only general information and knowledge for
decision-making, but also special information and knowledge for the
particular action to be taken. Having fairly sufficient information and
knowledge, Confucius was not only able to make decisions for actions, but
also believed that the decisions he made were right, or were the optimum
decisions within his means and reach.
(4) At fifty, I knew the decree of Heaven. Since at forty he already had
no doubts, that means that before fifty Confucius already had enough
information and knowledge for making decisions. This decree of Heaven
learned at the age of fifty must be something newly added to his previously
learned knowledge. What is it? According to my interpretation, this
something is morality. What he was able to make before fifty were decisions
for nonmoral actions, and at fifty he began to learn how to make decisions for
moral actions, because the decree of Heaven tells the way of morality.
That this is so may be seen from the beginning of The Doctrine of the
Mean:
Interpretation of Confucian Philosophy ofLife
163
What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with
this nature is called THE PATH of duty; the regulation of this path is
called INSTRUCTION.3o
In Confucianism, moral philosophy, political philosophy, and the
philosophy of education are inseparable, and the basis of the whole
philosophy lies in self-cultivation as morality. The interpretation of the path
of duty may be seen in another excerpt from The Doctrine ofthe Mean:
Therefore the administration ofgovemment lies in getting proper men.
Such men are to be got by means of the ruler's own character. That
character is to be cultivated by his treading in the ways of duty. And the
treading those ways of duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of
benevolence.
Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great
exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of
actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the
worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the
steps in the honor due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of
propriety.31
The basis of the path of duty is nothing but morality.
(5) At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth.
The decree of Heaven tells truth. At fifty Confucius knew the truth about
morality, but not necessarily believed it. I interpret the reception of truth at
sixty as genuinely believing in this truth. This is another step forward from
just knowing the truth.
(6) At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without
transgressing what was right. Belief is one thing; behavior is another thing.
They are correlated, but the coefficient of correlation is not necessarily one.
The behavior of a person is not necessarily up to the level of belief, and in
most cases behavior lags behind belief or cannot cope with belief. To make
your behavior not transgress what is right, you need to make the effort for
self-control. Usually, a conflict exists between what you desire and what is
permitted by morality, and you need to resolve such conflicts. This is what a
person of good character and high morality does.
As to Confucius, at seventy his behavior did not transgress what was
right naturally, without needing to make the effort for self-control, because
his heart did not desire anything which would transgress what was right. At
seventy, Confucius was able to make right ethical decisions spontaneously
164 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
and naturally. No conflict existed for Confucius at all. This is the highest
state of morality, or what is called supreme good.
Human life is a series of actions. Two kinds of actions are: nonmoral and
moral. To be able to make decisions for nonmoral actions, apart from
information and knowledge, you need rationality and prudence. To be able to
make decisions for moral actions, you need morality in addition. This is the
most difficult part of life. Even for a sage like Confucius, it was not until the
age of seventy that he came to the top level of morality.
4. Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life
In this last section, I tie up my conceptions of theory of value, decisiontheoretic approach, utilitarianism, moral philosophy, teleology, and the
philosophy of life. Since I hold that value is subjective, values cannot be
compared objectively, but they may be compared and weighted subjectively,
and the magnitude of value manifests only in the decision-making for the
choice of an alternative of action. This is why I take a decision-theoretic
approach in my unified utilitarian theory.
Human life consists of two parts: externally it exhibits itself as a series
of actions to pursue the values or utilities of some objects, while internally it
exhibits itself as a series of mental states. The actions and the mental states
are so correlated that when a person has taken an action to obtain an object
which has a value or utility for the person, s/he is satisfied in the pursuit of
values and has an incremental piece of happiness as a state of mind. When
s/he has failed to obtain an object, s/he is frustrated or dissatisfied and has a
decremental piece of happiness or an incremental piece of unhappiness as a
state of mind.
An action related to morality is called a moral action. To tell whether a
moral action is right or wrong, or to prescribe which alternative to take when
you have two or more alternatives from which to choose is what moral
philosophy or ethical theories deal with. An action not related to morality is
called a nonmoral action. To tell or prescribe which alternative to take for a
nonmoral action when you have two or more alternatives from which to
choose is what decision theory deals with. Normally, decision theory is
unrelated to morality, and its basis is human rationality and prudence.
Decision theory can be applied to moral actions as well, and this is the
decision-theoretic approach I used in my unified utilitarian theory. Both
moral philosophy and decision theory are covered by the philosophy of life.
That a person takes an action to obtain an object is for the pursuit of the
value or utility of the object for the person. Here arises teleology. I have
discussed the views of teleology taken by some contemporary writers in
Section 1, and I completely agree with Harry Bingswanger's life-based
Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life
165
teleology. Bingswanger distinguishes the vegetative goal-directed actions of
plants as naturally selected from the purposeful goal-directed actions of
animals as consciously selected. 32
Since purposeful goal-directed actions are taken not only by human
beings, but also by other animals, the question arises: "Is there a difference
between the purposeful goal-directed actions taken by animals and those
taken by human beings?" My answer to this question is "Yes," because
human beings each have a life plan, whereas animals do not. Animals are also
conscious of the problem of life and death, and know how to make a selection
for survival, but only vaguely and for particular actions. They do not have
much rationality and prudence; hence, they do not have an overall life plan.
Life plan manifests teleology at the highest level.
Recently, E. M. Adams discussed self-concept and life plan in detail.
Adams distinguishes between human beings and other animals by
emphasizing rational knowledge, critical judgment, and moral constitution.
He says:
While many animals share some of our psychological powers, we are the
only beings on this planet who live by rational knowledge and critical
judgment under a self-concept and worldview. Furthermore, only human
beings live in a society organized by, and governed under, a moral
constitution. In other words, among the beings we know, only human
beings are persons and only persons are knowledge-based in their
identity, form knowledge-based and morally regulated societies, and
have religious anxieties and attitudes toward themselves as beings in the
world. 33
Although Adams's statements and description of life plan are quite
different from mine, the essence of his view of life plan is quite close to my
teleological view that uses the decision-theoretic approach with rationality,
prudence, and morality as the basic features of human beings, which
distinguish human beings from other animals.
With a life plan, the values pursued by a person in her or his lifetime are
intertwined and organized to some extent according to the objectives and subobjectives of the numerous actions taken in the whole life. This is what I call
the value structure of a life plan, as was discussed in Chapter Eight.
The life plan of a person dictates the career of the person, or the career
values pursued by the person in the whole life. The process of continuous
pursuit of values for the person is manifested as a series of actions, each one
being either moral or nonmoral.
Before the taking of an action, the agent has to make a decision,
choosing one alternative out of several feasible choices. The criterion for the
166 THEORY OF VALUE, TELEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
choice or decision-making is utility.
For nonmoral actions, the decision-making is completely dictated by
rationality and prudence. For a rational and prudent person, the choice ought
to and naturally will be the alternative which, in long terms, has the greatest
expected utility for the agent. Statistical decision theory and utility theory are
the science and philosophy that justify the rational and prudent choice and
that tell how to make such a decision.
.
For moral actions, morality comes into play. To make a decision for
taking a moral action, the agent has to be guided by morality as well, in
addition to rationality and prudence. Roughly speaking, morality plays the
role of constraint, in that the agent still makes a decision according to
rationality and prudence, but only insofar as the action will not do harm to
others or society. Morality restricts the latitude of the agent or the scope of
feasible alternatives of the action.
Beside external behavior manifested as actions, we have the internal
mental state. Happiness is the final state of mind after a person has obtained
an object pursued. Apart from this fmal state, a person has other aspects of
mental state. As far as an action is concerned, the agent has motive and
intention. Feelings and emotions exist as well as traits of character.
Traditional Western moral philosophy deals essentially with external
behavior or human conduct, but ancient Chinese and Greek moral philosophy
deal with virtues as a result of self-cultivation of traits of character. In recent
years, virtue ethics has received increasing attention, interest, and study. To
defme virtue ethics exactly is difficult, because opinions vary widely. But no
doubt moral philosophy should now cover both external behavior and internal
state of mind.
Then how about the philosophy of life? The philosophy of life is also
difficult to defme, because, in the broad sense, philosophy of life is that part
of philosophy related to human life. Every branch of philosophy is related to
life to some extent; thus, philosophy oflife covers all sub-areas of philosophy.
In the narrow sense, philosophy of life may be defmed as that part of
philosophy which is necessary for a person to know in order to live a life with
a life plan. In that case, the philosophy of life should cover self-cultivation
for the traits of character as well.
Virtue ethics, or moral philosophy in a broad sense, already covers the
cultivation of traits of character. Then, as far as internal state of mind is
concerned, is the philosophy of life the same as moral philosophy? I propose
a distinction between them. Just as the study of actions not related to the
utility for others is regarded as not covered by moral philosophy but covered
by the philosophy of life, so the study of "virtues" or the traits of character
that are not related to others may be regarded as not covered by moral
philosophy but covered by the philosophy of life. For instance, the virtues of
Theory of Value, Teleology, and Philosophy of Life
167
filial piety, love, and benevolence are related to others, while the virtues of
frugality, humility, and contentment are not directly related to others.
Traditionally, the latter virtues are also covered in the study of moral
philosophy, but I see no reason why the internal states of mind should not be
classified similar to the classification of external behavior or actions.
According to this classification or definition, moral philosophy is a part
of the philosophy of life, which covers not only external behavior and
internal state of mind related to morality, but also those actions and traits not
related to morality.
All that I have discussed in this section - actions, moral philosophy,
decision theory, teleology, and virtues-are in the realm of the philosophy of
life, and they are interrelated and centered around the values pursued by
human beings as the core. Therefore, I conclude that a general theory of value
is the basis of the philosophy of life.
NOTES
Chapter One
1. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 100-102.
2. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University Press,
1966), pp. 6-17.
3. R. B. Perry, A General Theory of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1967), pp. 115-145
4. Sheng, A New Approach.
5. David Gauthier, "On the Refutation of Utilitarianism," in The Limits of
Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Minneapolis,
Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 144-163.
6. C. L. Sheng, "Utilitarianism Is Not Indifferent to Distribution,"
presented at the Fourth International Conference on Social Philosophy, Oxford,
England, 16-19 August 1988; also published in Rights, Justice, and Community,
ed. Creighton Peden and John Roth (Lewiston, N. Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press,
1991). pp. 363-377.
7. Gauthier, "On the Refutation ofUtilitarianism."
8. C. L. Sheng, "A Note on Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,"
Theory and Decision, 22: 1 (January 1987), pp.1-12.
9. Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple
Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1976), p. 150.
10. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 363-366.
II. Ibid., pp. 54-60.
12. Ibid., pp. 185-212.
Chapter Two
I. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 153-162,194-199.
2. Federico Frischknacht and Pedro F. J. Pavesi, "Managemnet Decision
Systems," presented at the Fifth International Conference on the Foundations
and Applications of Utility, Risk, and Decision Theory, Durham, N. C., USA,
June 1990.
3. Douglas J. Den Uyl and Tibor R. Machan, "Recent Work on the
Concept of Happiness," American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (April 1983), pp.
15-134.
4. D. W. Haslett, "What Is Utility?", Economics and Philosophy, 6:1
170
NOTES
(April 1990), pp. 65-94.
5. D. W. Prall, "A Study in the Theory of Value," University of
California Publications in Philosophy, 3:2 (1921), pp. 215-227.
6. Sheng, A NewApproach,pp. 113-119.
7. Ibid.
8. R. B. Perry, A General Theory of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1967), pp. 115-145.
9. Sheng, A NewApproach,pp. 188-194,201-206.
10. Perry, A General Theory of Value.
II. Den Uyl and Machan, ''Recent Work."
12. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, with Critical Essays, ed. Samuel
Gorovitz (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), pp. 13-57.
13. Peter C. Fishburn, Decision and Value Theory (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 39-40.
14. J. Baird Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in
J. Baird callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental
Philosophy (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 132.
15. Ibid, p. 147.
16. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971).
17. Ibid.
18. Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1967), p. 43.
19. Ibid.
20. Prall, "A Study in the Theory of Value."
21. Here by "spiritual" I do not mean "religious," but mean "nonmaterial." According to my classification of value, economic value (or material
value) is one class, and the other values are classified into many classes. When
1 refer to any value that is not material value, or that is not directly measured by
money, I occasionally use the term "spiritual value." This term has the same
meaning throughout the whole book.
22. R. G. Frey, "Introduction: Utilitarianism and Persons," in Utility and
Rights, ed. R.G. Frey (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), pp. 3-19.
23. Ibid.
24. Fred Feldman, Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: PrenticeHall, 1978), pp. 30-36
25. James Griffm, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral
Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
26. Dan W. Brock, "Utilitarianism," in And Justice for All: New
Introductory Essays in Ethics and Public Policy, ed. Tom Regan and Donald
Van De Veer (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), p. 222.
Notes
171
Chapter Three
I. A. W. Sparkes, Talking Philosophy: A Wordbook (London: Routledge,
1991), pp. 212-213.
2. Archie 1. Bahm, Axiology: The Science of Values (Amsterdam and
Atlanda: Rodopi, Value Inquiry Book Series, 1993), p. 62.
3. Ibid.
4. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), p. 112.
5. John C. Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,"
Social Research, 44:4 (Winter 1977).
6. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "On Some Ways in Which a Thing Can Be
Good," Social Philosophy and Policy, 9:2 (Summer 1992), pp. 96-117.
7. Ibid.
8. Sheng, A New Approach, p. 187.
Chapter Four
I. J. L. Hanson, A Dictionary of Economics and Commerce (London:
MacDonald and Evens, 1969), p. 127.
2. David Gauthier, "Reason and Maximization," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 4:3 (March 1995), pp. 411-433.
3. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenst~m, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953).
4. A. Wald, Statistical Decision Functions (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1950).
5. See, for instance, Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with
Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1976), pp. 219-253.
6. John C. Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,"
Social Research, 44:4 (Winter 1977).
7. Keeney and Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, p. 166.
8. 1. W. Pratt, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large," Economics,
32 (1971), pp. 90-120.
9. Kenneth J. Arrow, "Theory of Risk Aversion," in Essays in the Theory
ofRisk-Bearing (Chicago: Marham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 90-120.
10. Keeney and Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, pp. 175-178.
II. Ibid., p. 167.
12. Ibid., pp. 175-178.
13. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
NOTES
Notes
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 358-363.
14. Keeney and Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, p. 150.
15. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism.
16. C. L. Sheng, "Some Quantitative Concepts of Value and Utility from a
Utilitarian Point of View," Theory and Decision, 26:2 (March 1989), pp. 175195.
17. Ole Hagen, "Introductory Survey," in Expected Utility Hypotheses and
the Allais Paradox, ed. Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 13-24.
18. Maurice Allais, "Foreword," in Expected Utility Hypotheses and the
Allais Paradox, pp. 3-11.
19. Ole Hagen, "Introductory Survey."
20. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior, 2nd d. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953).
21. Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1954).
22. R. Duncan Luce and David H. Krantz, "Conditional Expected Utility,"
Econometrica, 39 (1971), pp. 253-271
23. Peter Hammond, "Consequential Behavior in Decision Trees and
Expected Utility," Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences,
Working Paper No. 112 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University, 1985).
24. Maurice Allais, "Le comportement de I'homme rational devant Ie
risque: Critique des postuiats et axiomes de l'ecole Americaine," Econometrica,
21 (1953), pp. 503-546.
25. Maurice Allais, "The Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice
Involving Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American
School," in Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 27-145.
26. Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,"
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 69 (1955), pp. 99-118.
27. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, 47 (March 1979), pp. 263-291.
28. Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice."
29. Bertrand R. Munier, "A Guide to Decision-Making under Uncertainty,"
in Risk, Decision, and Rationality, ed. B. R. Munier (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 1-34.
30. Ibid.
31. C. L. Sheng, "An Explanation of the Allais Paradox," presented at the
Sixth International Conference on Foundations and Applications of Utility,
Risk, and Decision Theory, Paris, France, 15-18 June 1992; also published in C.
L. Sheng, Philosophical Papers (Taipei: Tarnkang University Press, 1993), pp.
231-254.
32. Ole Hagen, "Towards a Positive Theory of Preferences under Risk," in
Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox, pp. 271-302.
33. Mark J. Machina, "Expected Utility Analysis without the
Independence Axiom," Econometrica, 50:2 (March 1982), pp. 277-323.
34. Maurice Allais, "A New Neo-Bernoullian Theory: The Machina
Theory. A Critical Analysis," in Risk, Decision, and Rationality, pp. 345-403.
35. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk."
36. C. L. Sheng, "Some Quantitative Concepts of Value and Utility from a
Utilitarian Point of View," Theory and Decision, 26:2 (March 1989), pp. 17595.
172
173
Chapter Five
1. C.L.Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 105-108.
2. See, for instance, W.L. Reese, Dictionary ofPhilosophy and Religion:
Eastern and Western Thought (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press,
1980), pp. 443, 604.
3. Ibid., pp. 128,604.
4. John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism,'' in Mill: Utilitarianism, with Critical
Essays, ed. Samuel Gorovitz (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1971), pp. 13-57.
5. Reese, Dictionary, pp. 424, 604.
6. Ibid., pp. 258, 604.
7. Mill, ''Utilitarianism.''
8. John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," The Monist, 75:2
(April 1992), pp. 119-137.
9. Ibid.
10. Anthony Weston, "Between Means and Ends, " The Monist, 75:2
(April 1992), pp. 236-249.
II. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Tom Regan, "Does Environmental Ethics Rest on a Mistake?", The
Monist, 75:2 (April 1992), pp. 161-182.
14. Ibid.
15. Peter Singer, "Not for Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in
Environmental Issues, " in Ethics and Problems of the 21 th, Century, ed. K. E.
Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1979), pp. 191-206.
_ _ _ _ _J
174
Notes
NOTES
16. Sheng, A New Appproach.
17. C. L. Sheng, "A Measure of the Quality of Human Life," presented at
the Third International Conference of the Society for Systems, Informatics, and
Cybernetics, Baden-Baden, West Germany, 19-24 August 1986, also published
in Advances in Education and Human Development, ed. Tetsunori Koizumi and
George E. Lasker (The International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems
Research and Cybernetics, 1990), pp. 115-123.
18. Ibid.
19. Lawrence C. Becker, "Good Lives: Prolegomena," Social Philosophy
and Policy, 9:2 (Summer 1992), pp. 15-37.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
Chapter Six
1. Sections 2 through 6 ofthis chapter are summarized from C. L. Sheng,
A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian Theory and Its
Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlends: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1991).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 190.
4. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (New York: Macmillan,
1961), p. 321.
5. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981),
p.45.
6. C. L. Sheng, "On the Flexible Nature of Morality," Philosophy
Research Archives, 12 (1986-1987), pp. 125-142.
7. R. Eugene Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making
Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?", American Philosophical
Quarterly, 8:3 (July 1971), pp. 257-265.
8. Jeremy Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation," in Ethical Theories: A Book of Readings, ed. A. 1. Melden
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 359-361.
9. C. L. Sheng, "On Charitable Actions," in C. L. Sheng, Philosophical
Papers (Taipei: Tarnkang University Press, 1993), pp. 131-153.
10. Joseph Raz, "Right-Based Moralities," in Utility and Rights, ed. R.G.
Frey (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp.
42-62.
I I. Sheng, "On Charitable Actions."
12. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 194-198.
13. Sheng, "On Charitable Actions."
175
14. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 201-206.
15. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 393-397, 542-559.
Chapter Seven
1. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
2. Ibid., p. 91, and Part 2: A Utilitarian Theory of Distributive Justice.
3. Ibid., pp. 194-195.
4. C. L. Sheng, "The Value Structure for a Life Plan," presented at the
World Congress of Philosophy, Nairobi, Kenya, 21-25 July 1991; also
published in C. L. Sheng, Philosophical Papers (Taipei: Tarnkang University
Press, 1993), pp. 443-452.
5. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 206-212.
6. Ibid., p. 149.
7. C. L. Sheng, "A Defense of Utilitarianism Against Rights-Theory,"
presented at the Third International Conference on Social Philosophy, Charlotte,
N. C., USA, 4-6 June 1987; also published in The American Constitutional
Experiment: Problems in Social Philosophy, ed. David M. Speak and Creighton
Peden (Lewiston, N. Y: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), pp. 269-299.
8. C. L. Sheng, "Utilitarianism Is Not Indifferent to Distribution,"
presented at the Fourth International Conference on Social Philosophy, Oxford,
16-19 August 1988; also published in Rights, Justice, and Community, ed.
Creighton Peden and John Roth (Lewiston, N. Y: The Edwin Mellen Press,
1992), pp. 363-377.
9. Sheng, A New Approach.
10. Ibid., p. 91.
Chapter Eight
1. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
2. W. L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and
Western Thought (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 605.
3. Ibid.
4. C. L. Sheng, "The Value Structure for a Life Plan," presented at the
World Congress of Philosophy, Nairobi, Kenya, 21-25 July 1991; also
published in C. L. Sheng, Philosophical Papers (Taipei: Tamk:ang University
Press, 1993), pp. 443-452.
5. E. M. Adams, "Character: The Framework for a Successful Life," The
~~~~~
J
NOTES
Notes
Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 33: 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-17.
6. C. L. Sheng, "The Values of a Person," in C. L. Sheng, Philosophical
Papers (Taipei: Tamkang University Press, 1993), pp. 394-406.
7. Sheng, A New Approach, p. 190.
8. C. L. Sheng, "Rationality, Prudence, and Morality," presented at the
International Symposium on the Vienna Circle: In Memory of Tscha Hung,
Beijing, China, 21-24 October 1994; also to be published in a volume of
selected papers from the Symposium.
21. Den Uyl, "Teleology and Agent-Centeredness."
22. C. L. Sheng, A New Approach to Utilitarianism: A Unified Utilitarian
Theory and Its Application to Distributive Justice (Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
23. C. L. Sheng, "On the Flexible Nature of Morality," Philosophy
Research Archives, 12 (1986-1987), pp. 125-142.
24. C. L. Sheng, "On Charitable Actions," in C. L. Sheng, Philosophical
Papers (Taipei: Tamkang University Press, 1993), pp. 156-173.
25. Sheng, A New Approach, pp. 193,285.
26. C. L. Sheng, "Marginal Consequences and Utilitarianism," Philosophy
Research Archives, 14 (1988-1989), 143-163. C. L. Sheng, "Constraints on
Utilitarian Prescriptions for Group Actions," Theory and Decision, 23:3
(November 1987), pp. 301-316.
27. C. L. Sheng, "Injustice in Law Caused by Conflict Between Equality
and Equity," in Law, Justice, and the State, ed. Alexander Pecznik and Mikael
M. Karlsson (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), pp. 25-32.
28. Sheng, "A Suggested Solution to the Trolley Problem."
29. The Four Books, I. Confucian Analects, translated into English by
James Legge (Taipei: King Chwan Publishers, 1975), pp. 146-147.
30. The Four Books, III. The Doctrine ofthe Mean, translated into English
by James Legge (Taipei: King Chwan Publishers, 1975), P. 383.
31. Ibid., pp. 405-406.
32. Bingswanger, ''Life-Based Teleology."
33. E.M. Adams, "Character: The Framework for a Successful Life," The
Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, 33:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-17.
176
Chapter Nine
1. David L. Norton, "On Recovering the Telos in Teleology, or 'Where's
the Beef?"', The Monist, 75:1 (January 1992), pp. 3-13.
2. The Four Books, I. Corifucian Analects, translated into English by
James Legge (Taipei: King-Chwan Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 137-345.
3. Douglas B. Rasmussen, "The Right to Project Pursuit and the Human
Telos," Reason Papers, No. 14 (Spring 1989), p. 104.
4. Norton, "On Recovering the Telos."
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Douglas J. Den Uyl, "Teleology and Agent-Centeredness," The
Monist, 75:1 (January 1992), pp. 14-33.
8. Ibid.
9. C. L. Sheng, "A Suggested Solution to the Trolley Problem," Journal
ofSocial Philosophy, 25:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 195-209.
10. Den Uyl, "Teleology and Agent-Centeredness."
11. 1. B. Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in his
In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 132, 147.
12. Mark Bedau, "Goal-Directed Systems and the Good," The Monist,
75:1 (January 1992), pp. 34-51.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Harry Bingswanger, "Life-Based Teleology and the Foundations of
Ethics," The Monist, 75: 1 (January 1992), pp. 84-103.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (New American Library, 1961),
p. 121.
20. Ayn Rand, "the Objectivist Ethics," in The Virtue ofSelfishness (New
York: New American Library, 1964), p. 15.
177
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
C(hing) L(ai) Sheng is presently professor emeritus of management sciences
at Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. He received his
B.Sc. from the National Chiao Tung University in Shanghai, China, in 1941
and his Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1948. Since
1949 he has taught at various universities, including the National Taiwan
University in Taiwan and the University of Ottawa and The University of
Windsor in Canada. From 1972 through 1978 he served as the president of
the National Chiao Tung University in Hsinchu, Taiwan, R.O.C.
In 1979, Sheng changed his fields of interest and research work to utility
theory, moral philosophy, and social philosophy. His publications include
over a hundred papers and eight books. Recently, A Nr::w Approach to
Utilitarianism appeared in 1991 (Kluwer Academic Publishers) and On The
Regulation of Capital appeared in 1995 (Taipei: National Institute of
Compilation and Translation).
At present he is engaged in several projects of writing papers and books,
both in Chinese and in English. As a measure for implementing his new
socialism, he has already completed the first draft of a book-length
manuscript entitled On Publicly-Owned Enterprises. As a purely theoretical
study, he is considering the expansion and elaboration of a paper entitled "On
Equal Degree of Fulfillment of Life Plan" into a monograph entitled Good
Things in Life, Good Society, and Equality.
INDEX
absolute sense, 3
action, 98, 108, 156- I 57
charitable -, I 15
goal-directed -, 156
moral -, 98, 108
purposeful goal-directed -, 157
personal -, II 5
public -, 115
supererogatory -, 115
vegetative goal-directed -, 156
actual interest, 19, 23
actual utility, 19,23
Adams, E. M., 146-147, 165
additive relationship, 83
aesthetics, 1, 7
agent-centeredness, 154, 158
alienation, 147
Allais, Maurice, 69, 70, 72, 73
Allais paradox, 70, 72
American school (of utility theory),
53,69,72
Aristotle, 144
Arrow, K. J., 53, 55
axiology, 1
Bahm, Archie J., 33
Bales, R. Eugene, 110
Becker, Lawrance C., 92, 93
Bedau, Mark, 155
Bentham, Jeremy, 7, 29, 113, 144
Bingswanger, Harry, 155-157,
164-165
Blanshard, Brand, 100
bounded rationality, 72
Brock, Dan W., 31
Callicott, J. 8.,25, 155
cancellation axiom, 70
cardin"aIism,70
charitable action, 115
comparability, 26-27
subjective -, 26-27
compromise model of utility, 18
Confucius, 140, 161
Confucianism, 144, 163
Confucian Analects (The Analects),
153,161
Confucian philosophy of life,
161-164
contribution, 138
gross -, 141
negative net -, 139
net -, 139
positive net -, 139
- - of a person to society, 13 8-142
critical thinking, 102
decision-theoretic approach, 12, 13,
15-18
decision-theoretic model for moral
actions, 17
defmition of utility, 19
desire-satisfaction, 5, 30
Den Uyl, Douglas J. 18,23, 154,
155, 160
Dewey, John, 76, 79
determinism, 149-152
soft -, 144
hard -, 151
Doctrine ofthe Mean, The, 162
dominance, 70
economics, 1
environmental ethics, 79
equivalence of two concepts of
utility, 63-65
equivalent capital of income, 68
ethical egoism, 143
ethics, 1
environmental -, 79
eudaemonia, 144
European school (of utility theory),
12,69,72
exchange value, 48
188
exchangeability, 83
expanded value theory, 29
expected loss criterion, 50
expected reward criterion, 50
experience model of utility, 18
feeling of administrative
satisfaction, 17
feeling of artistic or aesthetic
satisfaction, 17, 135
feeling of epistemic satisfaction, 17,
135
feeling of moral satisfaction, 17,
135
feeling of political satisfaction, 17
feeling of professional satisfaction,
17, 135
Feldman, Fred, 30
Fishburn, Peter C., 25, 53
flexible nature of morality, 160
Four Books, The, 40
Frey, R. G., 29
Frischknacht, Federico, 17
function-centered theory of value,
155
Gauthier, David, 4, 53
general theory of value, 1
goal-directed action, 156, 157
purposeful - - -, 157
vegetative - - -, 156
good, 1
good things in life, 13, 76, 82
goodness-from-a-point-of-view,36
Griffin, James, 30
Hagen, Ole, 69, 73
Hammond, Peter, 70
happiness, 5, 7,20,23,29,30, 77,
144
defmition of - , 20
Hare, R. M., 102
Index
INDEX
Harsanyi, John, 36, 54
Haslett, D. W., 18
heaven-humanity unification, 13
hedonic calculus, 7, 113
human expectation of change,
59-60
human sensitivity, 59
hypothetical interest, 19, 23
hypothetical utility, 19,23
immediate valuation, 79
independence principle, 70
indifferent to risk, 50
instrumental value, 13,33
interest, 5, 7, 19,22,30
actual -, 19,23
hypothetical -, 19,23
interpersonal dirr,lension, 49
intrapersonal dimension, 49
intrinsic property (character,
characteristic), 22
intrinsic value, 13,33
intuitive thinking, 102
invariance, 70
jen, 14
judge, 34
Kahneman, Daniel, 72, 74
Keeney, Ralph L., 53, 55, 57, 63
Kom, Alejandro, 76
Krantz, David H., 70
law of diminishing incremental
interest, 12,59
law of diminishing marginal utility,
5,45
law of replaceability, 83, 136
level of decision(-making), 127, 161
level (or degree) of morality, 122
life plan, 13,76, 135, 143, 146-149,
158
fulfillment of - -, 13, 137
usefulness for a - -, 149
value structure for the - -, 135
"local utility" theory, 73
Luce, Duncan, 70
Machan, Tibor R., 18, 23
Machina, Mark J., 73
magnitude of value, 27
Marx, Karl, 147
maximax method, 15
maximin method, 15
measurability, 28
subjective -,28
method, 15
maximax -, 15
maximin -, 15
ordinal -, 15
Meyer, R. F., 53
Mill, John Stuart, 23, 30, 76, 78,
144,
monotonically-decreasing, 8
monotonically-increasing, 8
monotonicity,54
Moore, G. E., 2
morality, 13, 122, 152, 160
flexible nature of -, 160
level of -, 122
Morgenstern, 8, 12, 53, 70
multiplicative relationship, 83
Munier, Bertrand R., 72
Narveson, Jan, 27
negative duty, 115
neo-Bernoullian formulation, 53, 69
nihilism, 10
non-replaceability, 137
norm, 10
normalization of utility functions,
12,65-68
Norton, David L., 153, 154
object, 20, 34
objective probability, 15
objectivity, 12, 33-34
pseudo -, 6, 12,33-34
O'Neill, John, 78
order of precedence, 112
ordinal method, 15
ordinalism,70
Pavesi, Pedro FJ., 17
Perry, Ralph Barton, 2, 20, 22, 76
personal action, 115
personal welfare function, 67
personhood, 13, 137, 148
utilitarian view of -, 13, 137
philosophy
moral -, 1,7
- oflife, 164-167
- of science, 7
Plato, 75-76
pleasure, 4, 7, 29-30, 144
positive duty, 115
positive science, 10
Prall, D. W., 19
Pratt, J. W., 53, 55
preference, 12, 18
manifest -, 36, 54
personal -, 12
true -,36,54
well-considered -, 36
well-informed -, 36
- model of utility, 18
preference model of utility, 18
principle
independence -, 70
sure-thing -, 70
- of utility, 1
probability, 15
objective -, 15
subjective -, 15
189
190
proportional risk aversion, 57
prospect theory, 72, 74
prudence, 13, 152
pseudo-objective, 5, 10,33-34,48
pseudo-objectivity, 6, 12,33-34
psychological value, 70, 71-72
public action, 115
purchasing power, 5
quality of human life, 82
Raiffa, Howard, 53, 55, 57, 63
Rand, Ayn, 157
Rashdall, Hastings, 27
Rasmussen, Douglas B., 154
rationality, 13, 152
reference point, 66
reflection effect, 74
Regan, Tom, 79-80
relationship between object and
subject, 20
relationship between utility and
interest, 23
relative sense, 3
relativism, 10
replaceability, 13, 82, 83
risk attitude, 70, 72-73
risk-averse, 8, 50
constantly - -, 56
constantly-proportional - - , 57
decreasingly - -, 56
increasingly - -, 56
risk aversion, 55
proportional - -, 57
- - function, 55-56
risk premium, 55
risk-prone, 8, 50
Savage, Leonard J., 70
Scheffler, Samuel, 154, 160
Schlaifer, R. 0., 53
Schopenhauer, 144
Index
INDEX
self-fulfillment, 148
self-realization, 148
Simon, Herbert A., 72
Singer, Peter, 80
skepticism, 10
societal blame, 96
societal praise, 96
Socrates, 140
soft determinism, 144
Sparkes, A. W., 33
Spinoza, 144
statistical nature, 5, 6, 12, 28, 34-35,
41-44,47
- - of moral value, 41-43
statistics, 12
strategical equivalence, 65
subject, 21, 34
subjective comparability, 26
subjecitve measurability, 28
subjective nature, 12,25
subjective probability, 15
subjectivism, 10
substitutability, 83
substitution axiom, 70
supererogatory action, 115
sure-thing principle, 70
system reliability, 82, 89
teleological nature (of human life),
127,151
teleological nature (of utility and
utilitarianism), 76
teleology, 13, 149-152, 158, 164-167
biologically-based -, 156
life-based -, 155, 164-165
value-centered theory of -, 155
terminal utilities, 65-68
theorem of optimal investment, 56
theory
expanded value -, 29
unified utilitarian -, 1, 4
utility -, 12
- of knowledge, 7
- of value, 1, 164-167
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 36
trait of character, 129
transitivity, 70
trolley problem, 155, 161
Tversky, Amos, 72, 74
two levels of moral thinking, 102
ultimate end of life, 13,77,143,
144,145-146
unboundedness (of personal welfare
function curves), 59-62
unified utilitarian point of view, 1
unified utilitarian theory, 1,4
use value, 45
utilitarian general theory of value, 1
utilitarian generalization, III
utilitarian sacrifice, 119
utility, 4
actual -, 19,23
aggregate -, 1, 4
compromise model of -, 18
concave - curve, 8
defmition of -, 19
dimension of -, 66
dimensionless -, 66
diminishing incremental -, 50
diminishing marginal -, 5
experience model of -, 18
hypothetical -, 19,23
incremental -, 50
interpersonal comparisons of -, 9
linear - function, 54
marginal -, 5
preference model of -, 18
principle of -, 1
risk-averse - function, 54
risk-prone - function, 54
single-attribute - theory, 53
191
social -, 1
von Neumann-Morgenstern -, 8,
9,12,51
von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, 9, 12, 50-58, 69
- curve, 8, 50
- function, 8,49,52
- of money, 48-50
- theory, 12
value, 1,4
active-,84
aesthetic -, 1,7,76,82,85,95
career -, 85, 88-89
classification of -, 12, 75-94
consumption of -, 133
cultural -, 126
customary -, 76
deterioration of -,132,133
diagrammatical representation of
-,90
economic -, 1,76,85,86,125
environmental -, 85, 87
epistemic -, 1,7,81,85,95
erotic -,76
ethical -, 76
exchange -,5,48, 75
expanded - theory, 29
far-reaching and lasting human - ,
134-136
fmal -, 13, 143, 144-145
formation of -, 132
general theory of -, 1
health -, 85, 86
historical -, 82, 126
human -, 131-136
instinctive -, 76
intermediate -, 76
intrinsic -, 13,33, 76-81
192
instrumental -, 13,33,76-81
legal -, 76, 85
logical -, 76
magnitude of -, 27
material -, 81
moral -, 1,7,76,81,85,87-88,95
moral - ofaperson, 81,128-131
moral - of motive or intention,
81,105-108
nonmoral-,81
normalized or per unit -, 84, 91
objective -, 5, 75
passive -, 84
political -, 76, 85
professional -, 82, 85
pseudo-objective -, 5, 10,48
psychological -,70,71-72
religious -, 76, 82, 85, 88
scientific -, 76
security -, 85
sentimental -,81,85,86-87,125
social -, 76, 82, 85, 87
societal -,97,99,109,161
special features of human -,
131-136
subjective -,75
subjective nature of -, 12,25-26
theory of -, 1
use -,5,45-47,75
utilitarian general theory of -, I
vital -,76
- for society, 109
- for the agent, 109
- for the recipient, 108
- function, 74
- judgment, 35-37
- of a life plan, 127
- of a moral action, 81, 108-111
- ofaperson, 125-142
INDEX
- of money, 48
- of moral principle, virtue, or
moral rule, 81, 111- I 13
- structure, 13, 127, 135,143,
144,149-152
- of the consequences of a moral
action, 98-10 1
- of the feeling of moral
satisfaction, 81, 101-105
value-centered theory of teleology,
155
value-significance, 156
biological - -, 156
conscious - -, 156
values-as-parts-of-patterns, 79
von Neumann, 8, 12, 53, 70
Wald, A., 53
welfare, 5, 7, 30
well-being, 5, 7, 30
Weston, Anthony, 79
VIBS
The Value Inquiry Book Series is co-sponsored by:
American Maritain Association
American Society for Value Inquiry
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Center for East European Dialogue and Development, Rochester Institute of
Technology
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College of Education and Allied Professions, Bowling Green State University
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
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R.S. Hartman Institute for Fonnal and Applied Axiology
Society for Iberian and Latin-American Thought
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Yves R. Simon Institute.
Titles Published
1.
Noel Balzer, The Human Being as a Logical Thinker.
2.
Archie J. Bahm, Axiology: The Science of Values.
3.
H. P. P. (Hennie) LOtter,lusticefor an Unjust Society.
4. H. G. Callaway, Context for Meaning and Analysis: A Critical Study in
the Philosophy of Language.
5.
Benjamin S. Llamzon,A Humane Case for Moral Intuition.
6. James R. Watson, Between Auschwitz and Tradition: Postmodern
Reflections on the Task of Thinking. A volume in Holocaust and
Genocide Studies.
15. Sidney Axinn, The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant's View of
Religion.
16. Messay Kebede, Meaning and Development.
17. Amihud Gilead, The Platonic Odyssey: A Philosophical-Literary Inquiry
into the Phaedo.
18. Necip Fikri Alican, Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart
Mill's Notorious Proof. A volume in Universal Justice.
19. Michael H. Mitias, Editor, Philosophy and Architecture.
20. Roger T. Simonds, Rational Individualism: The Perennial Philosophy of
Legal Interpretation. A volume in Natural Law Studies.
7. Robert S. Hartman, Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story, edited
by Arthur R. Ellis. A volume in Hartman Institute Axiology
Studies.
21. William Pencak, The Conflict ofLaw and Justice in the Icelandic Sagas.
8.
22. Samuel M. Natale and Brian M. Rothschild, Editors, Values. Work,
Education: The Meanings of Work.
Archie J. Bahm, Ethics: The Science of Oughtness.
9. George David Miller, An Idiosyncratic Ethics; Or, the Lauramachean
Ethics.
23. N. Georgopoulos and Michael Heim, Editors, Being Human in the
Ultimate: Studies in the Thought of John M. Anderson.
10. Joseph P. DeMarco, A Coherence Theory in Ethics.
24. Robert Wesson and Patricia A. Williams, Editors, Evolution and Human
Values.
II. Frank G. Forrest, Valuemetrics: The Science of Personal and
Professional Ethics. A volume in Hartman Institute Axiology
Studies.
12. William Gerber, The Meaning of Life: Insights of the World's Great
Thinkers.
13. Richard T. Hull, Editor, A Quarter Century ofValue Inquiry: Presidential
Addresses of the American Society for Value Inquiry. A volume in
Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies.
14. William Gerber, Nuggets of Wisdom from Great Jewish Thinkers: From
Biblical Times to the Present.
25. Wim J. van der Steen, Facts, Values. and Methodology: A New
Approach to Ethics.
26. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, Religion and Morality.
27. Albert William Levi, The High Road of Humanity: The Seven Ethical
Ages of Western Man, edited by Donald Phillip Verene and Molly Black
Verene.
28. Samuel M. Natale and Brian M. Rothschild, Editors, Work Values:
Education, Organization, and Religious Concerns.
29. Laurence F. Bove and Laura Duhan Kaplan, Editors, From the Eye of the
Storm: Regional Conflicts and the Philosophy of Peace. A volume in
Philosophy of Peace.
30. Robin Attfield, Value, Obligation, and Meta-Ethics.
31. William Gerber, The Deepest Questions You Can Ask About God: As
Answered by the World's Great Thinkers.
32. Daniel Statman, Moral Dilemmas.
33. Rem B. Edwards, Editor, Formal Axiology and Its Critics. A volume in
Hartman Institute Axiology Studies.
34. George David Miller and Conrad P. Pritscher, On Education and Values:
In Praise of Pariahs and Nomads. A vOlume in Philosophy of
Education.
45. Alan Soble, Editor, Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for
the Philosophy of Sex and Love, 1977-1992. A volume in Histories and
Addresses of Philosophical Societies.
46. Peter A. Redpath, Wisdom's Odyssey: From Philosophy to
Transcendental Sophistry. A volume in Studies in the History of
Western Philosophy.
47. Albert A. Anderson, Universal Justice: A Dialectical Approach. A
volume in Universal Justice.
48. Pio Colonnello, The Philosophy of Jose Gaos. Translated from Italian
by Peter Cocozzella. Edited by Myra Moss. Introduction by Giovanni
Gullace. A volume in Values in Italian Philosophy.
35. Paul S. Penner, Altruistic Behavior: An Inquiry into Motivation.
36. Corbin Fowler, Morality for Moderns.
37. Giambattista Vico, The Art of Rhetoric (Institutiones Oratoriae, 17111741), from the definitive Latin text and notes, Italian commentary and
introduction by Giuliano Crifb, translated and edited by Giorgio A. Pinton and
Arthur W. Shippee. A volume in Values in Italian Philosophy.
38. W. H. Werkmeister, Martin Heidegger on the Way, edited by Richard T.
Hull. A volume in Werkmeister Studies.
39. Phillip Stambovsky, Myth and the Limits of Reason.
40. Samantha Brennan, Tracy Isaacs, and Michael Milde, Editors, A Question
of Values: New Canadian Perspectives in Ethics and Political Philosophy.
41. Peter A. Redpath, Cartesian Nightmare: An Introduction to
Transcendental Sophistry. A volume in Studies in the History of
Western Philosophy.
42. Clark Butler, History as the Story of Freedom: Philosophy in
Intercultural Context, with Responses by sixteen scholars.
49. Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove, Editors, Philosophical
Perspectives on Power and Domination: Theories and Practices. A volume in
Philosophy of Peace.
50. Gregory F. Mellema, Collective Responsibility.
51. Josef Seifert, What Is Life? The Originality, Irreducibility, and Value of
Life. A volume in Central-European Value Studies.
52. William Gerber, Anatomy of What We Value Most.
53. Armando Molina, Our Ways: Values and Character, edited by Rem B.
Edwards. A volume in Hartman Institute Axiology Studies.
54. Kathleen J. Wininger, Nietzsche's Reclamation of Philosophy.
volume in Central-European Value Studies.
A
55. Thomas Magnell, Editor, Explorations of Value.
56. HPP (Hennie) Lotter, Injustice, Violence, and Peace: The Case of South
Africa. A volume in Philosophy of Peace.
43. Dennis Rohatyn, Philosophy History Sophistry.
57. Lennart Nordenfelt, Talking About Health: A Philosophical Dialogue. A
volume in Nordic Value Studies.
44. Leon Shaskolsky Sheleff, Social Cohesion and Legal Coercion: A
Critique of Weber, Durkheim, and Marx. Afterword by Virginia Black.
58. Jon Mills and Janusz A. Polanowski, The Ontology of Prejudice. A
volume i" Philosophy aud Psycholugy.
j
59. Lecna Vilkka, The Intrinsic Value ofNature.
60. Palmer Talbutt, Jr., Rough Dialectics: Sorokin's Philosophy of Value,
with Contributions by Lawrence T. Nichols and Pitirim A. Sorokin.
61. C. L. Sheng, A Utilitarian General Theory of Value.
I
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