From Real-Time Intercepts
to Stored Records:
Why Encryption Drives the Government
to Seek Access to the Cloud
Professor Peter Swire
The Privacy Project – Cloud Conference
April 4, 2012
The TPP Paper
• Rising adoption of encryption
• Declining effectiveness of traditional wiretaps
– Especially at local level
• Technological reason for shift in lawful access to the
cloud
• The “haves” & “have-nots”
Encryption Adoption (Finally?)
•
•
•
•
VPNs
Blackberry
Gmail now, other webmail soon
SSL pervasive (credit card numbers)
– Dropbox & many more
• Facebook enables HTTPS, may shift default
• Skype & other VoIP
• Result – interception order at ISP or local telco
often won’t work
Ways to Grab Communications
1. Break the encryption (if it’s weak)
2. Grab comms in the clear (CALEA)
3. Grab comms with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)
4. Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud
• My descriptive thesis: #4 is becoming FAR more
important, for global communications
• Also, temptation to do more #2 and #3
3
Phone
call
Alice
Local
switch
Telecom
Company
Local
switch
Phone
call
Bob
3
Phone
call
Alice
Local
switch
Telecom
Company
Local
switch
Phone
call
Bob
Hi Bob!
Alice
Alice ISP
Internet:
Many
Nodes
between
ISPs
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
%!#&*YJ#$
&#^@%
Bob ISP
Hi Bob!
Bob
Problems with Weak Encryption
• Nodes between A and B can see and copy whatever passes
through
• Many potential malicious nodes
• Strong encryption as feasible and correct answer
– US approved for global use in 1999
– India, China new restrictions on strong encryption
– “Encryption and Globalization” says those restrictions are
bad idea
Hi Bob!
Encrypt
Bob's public key
Alice
Encrypted message –
%!#&YJ@$
– Alice's local ISP
%!#&YJ@$
– Backbone provider
%!#&YJ@$
– Bob's local ISP
%!#&YJ@$
Decrypt
Hi Bob!
Bob's private key
Bob
Ways to Grab Communications
1. Break the encryption (if it’s weak)
2. Grab comms in the clear (CALEA)
3. Grab comms with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)
4. Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud
Limits of CALEA
• Applies to switched network & connect to that
• Bad cybersecurity to have unencrypted IP go through
Internet nodes
• How deep to regulate IP products & services
– WoW just a game?
– Will all Internet hardware & software be built
wiretap ready?
• That would be large new regulation of the
Internet
• Could mobilize SOPA/PIPA coalition
Ways to Grab Communications
1. Break the encryption (if it’s weak)
2. Grab comms in the clear (CALEA)
3. Grab comms with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)
4. Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud
Governments Install Software?
• Police install virus on
your computer
• This opens a back door,
so police gain access to
your computer
• Good idea for the police
to be hackers?
• Good for cybersecurity?
Ways to Grab Communications
1. Break the encryption (if it’s weak)
2. Grab comms in the clear (CALEA)
3. Grab comms with hardware or software before or
after encrypted (backdoors)
4. Grab stored communications, such as in the cloud
Stored Records: The Near Future
• Global requests for stored records
– Encrypted webmail, so local ISP less useful
– Local switched phone network less useful
• Push for “data retention”, so police can get the
records after the fact
• The “haves” and “have nots”
– Server in your jurisdiction
– Technically ahead of the curve
• MLATs and other upcoming legal battles
Conclusion
• Adoption of strongly encrypted communications now
going through a decisive shift
• Access by the cloud provider remains in many
scenarios
• This technological shift will put pressure to develop
legal mechanisms for global access to cloud providers