Social Protection and the Poor in Bangladesh Qaiser Khan, Kalanidhi Subbarao, Josh Al-Zayed and Shaikh S. Ahmed, World Bank Presented at Conference on What Works for the Poorest: Knowledge, Policies and Practices Dec 3-5, 2006, BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh Social Protection Goes Beyond Poverty alleviation Social Protection includes poverty alleviation and safety net programs but it goes beyond to address risks and vulnerabilities Social protection is increasingly important for countries like Bangladesh which are transiting from a rural economy where traditional safety nets work well to an industrial economy where new safety net tools are needed Risk, poverty and vulnerability Risk: – uncertain event that may damage people’s wellbeing Poverty: – not having enough now of something valuable Vulnerability: – probability now of not having enough of something valuable in the future Why do we care about vulnerability? 1. Poverty vulnerability in theory nor in practice China Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia India Indonesia Pakistan Russia South Africa Vietnam Zimbabwe 1985-1990 1987-1988 1994-1997 1976/76-83/84 1997-98 1986-1991 1992-1993 1993-1998 1992/93-97/98 1992/93-1995/96 Percentage of Households who are: Always Sometimes Never poor poor poor 6.2 47.8 46.0 25.0 22.0 53.0 24.8 30.1 45.1 21.9 65.9 12.4 8.6 19.8 71.6 3.0 55.3 41.7 12.6 30.2 57.2 22.7 31.5 45.8 28.7 32.1 39.2 10.6 59.6 29.8 Chronic poor could be seen as the very vulnerable, temporary poor as the vulnerable, and the non-poor as non-vulnerable to poverty but vulnerable to income fluctuations nonetheless. Social risk management matrix Arrangements and strategies Risk reduction Risk mitigation -portfolio Informal Market-based Public *migration to less drought *food market prone areas integration *disaster prevention infrastructure *drought resistant *micro-finance varieties; multiple activities *research and extension regarding drought resistant varieties *mandating insurance, including old age pensions payments -insurance *marriage/family *rainfall and commodity price based insurance Risk coping *sale of assets *consumption credits *sending children to work *public works Type of Shocks – useful classifications Examples of risky events by categories, classified by their degree of correlation Idiosyncratic events Regional covariant events Rainfall Landslides Volcanic eruptions Natural Risks Health Risks Life-cycle Risks Social Risks Illness Injury / Accident Disability Birth / Maternity Family break-up Old-age Death Crime Domestic violence Economic Risks Business Failure Political Risks Environmental Risks Nation-wide and international covariant events Earthquakes Floods Droughts Strong Winds Epidemic Famines Terrorism Gangs Unemployment Harvest failure Resettlement Ethnic discrimination Gender discrimination Religious discrimination Riots Pollution Deforestation Civil strife War Social upheaval Output collapse Balance of payments shocks Financial crisis Currency crisis Technology- or trade-induced terms of trade shocks Political default on social programs Coup d’état Need for Social Protection Some recent poverty thinking: Income distribution matters for growth…. Distribution of assets matters more. Growth helps the poor, but level of investment is most important implication?: transfers, but not at cost of investment. Transfers themselves as an investment, in human capital – e.g. nutrition, education Three Constraints to Safety Nets in Very-Low-Income Countries The Information Constraint The Administrative Constraint The Fiscal Constraint What is Possible? (I) The Information Constraint Information - not known, expensive (e.g. pensions elsewhere) Proxy indicators e.g. demographic, dwelling Link to another program (e.g. PWP, nutrition) 3 Ways around the Information constraint: Self-targeting Community targeting Universal programs Self-targeting Two examples – Public workfare programs with a wage rate slightly below the market wage – enables participants to selfselect themselves into the program Food subsidies – if restricted to types of food consumed only by the poor, self-targeting is possible What is Possible? (II) Community Targeting Communities, or representatives identify beneficiaries (subject to criteria), deliver benefits Information may be better, lower cost Risks: favoritism, difficulties of inclusion/exclusion; divisive. Administrative support. Remarkably little experience Rajasthan, Malawi, Uzbekistan Generally limited (e.g. Armenia) , jury still out. What is Possible? (III) The Administrative Constraint Weak capacity, labor-intensive, supervisory staff Policy implications? – Choose simple program designs – Simple, repetitive steps, sustain over a long period – Choose a few simple, nationwide programs – Explore possibility of using existing administrative systems. What is Possible? (IV) The Fiscal Constraint - Typically VLIC total public expenditure spending $50-75 p.c. p.a. - Illustratively: $20 per annum ($1.67/month) to 40% below poverty line = 21% of public spending; not affordable. - No way of defining ‘right’ mix, but some programs can reach the poorest groups if carefully designed Program Choices Cash Transfers - Selected, Universal (e.g. pensions, unemployment) Public Works: self-targeting, create assets, counter-cyclical but Expensive ($2/$1 transferred); critical get wage rate right; create ‘good’ assets; costs can be reduced if quality assets created Food Programs - Free Dist’n, Foodfor-Work, Food Stamps, School Feeding. Food Subsidies/Free food/Conditional transfers Agricultural Inputs - Subsidies, Free Packs Nutrition Programs - Child nutrition, micro-nutrient supplementation Problems with Food distribution programs Seasonal Price/Supply Smoothing Potentially attractive in VLICs. Options: NFR, buy surplus, release stocks; controlled food grain price Risks: captured by non-poor (urban consumers, middle-men for re-sale) Gov’t cannot afford to intervene on sufficient scale (high cost, ultimately ineffective) discourages dev’t of private markets Prefer: Arms length interventions, make use of trade option as did Bangladesh; buy-sell at commercial prices, influence aggregate supply, check if market failure exists Conditional food/cash transfers Where possible, useful to link free transfers (either food or cash) to behavioral change from recipients: for example, transfers could be conditional upon children in the family attending the school, or getting vaccinated etc. Known as “conditional cash transfers”, highly successful in Bangladesh, Mexico, Nicaragua, Turkey and now being implemented in several countries Effectiveness of Safety Net Programs in Bangladesh Targeting Effectiveness Measured as Ratio of Recipients to group size by Income Group (2005-06) Lowest 10% Lowest Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top Quintile Total VGD 1.61 1.59 1.46 0.96 0.73 0.27 100 Test Relief 1.80 1.89 1.10 0.91 0.74 0.36 100 VGF 1.80 1.89 1.10 0.91 0.74 0.36 100 Other Targeted 1.96 1.81 1.24 1.04 0.66 0.26 100 Total Targeted 1.79 1.73 1.29 0.98 0.72 0.29 100 Selection Criteria viewed by Recipients in Bangladesh 2005-06 Reason of inclusion in targeted programs in percent 2005-06 Poor/ Landless Divorced/ Widows Disabled/ Other Others Total Non-Targeted 50.4 12.7 15.7 21.2 100.0 Targeted 82.3 6.3 2.8 8.6 100.0 Total 70.2 8.7 7.7 13.4 100.0 Recipient’s Perceptions of Bangladesh Programs 2005-2006 Participants Perception about assistance from targeted programs in percent Lowest 10 % Lowest Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top Quintile Total Very Helpful 60.5 56.1 56.7 59.2 63.6 50.4 57.6 Moderately Helpful 33.8 37.3 34.1 30.9 26.5 31.5 33.3 Slightly Helpful 5.8 6.6 8.3 9.1 8.9 18.1 8.5 Not Helpful 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.5 Estimates of Leakage from the VGD, VGF and FFE Program 2000 HIESbased survey estimates (metric tons) 95% Confidence Interval for estimate VGD 99,978 VGF FFE 70,760 49,951 Program Offtake for FY 19992000 (metric tons) Survey estimate as % of total program allocation (confidence intervals) [72,894, 127,061] 216,675 [34%–59%] [44,251, 97,267] 149,138 [30%–65%] [27,192, 72,710] 285,973 [10%–25%] Comparative Losses from Different Programs Leakage VGD PESP RMP A. Losses due to delivery of amount less than stipulated and other unauthorized expenses (per taka) 0.17 0.23 0.02 B(i)…at least one targeting criteria 0.00 0.11 0.00 B(ii)…at least three targeting criteria 0.61 0.98 0.00 …A+B(i) 0.17 0.34 0.02 …A+B(ii) 0.78 1.22 0.02 B. Losses due to beneficiaries not meeting… Total Losses…. What the data shows Bangladesh targeting criteria is good at targeting the poorest Bangladesh programs are perceived by the beneficiaries as helpful specially the poorest Relatively high leakage from food based programs and despite popular assumptions they are not better targeted What the data does not show Programs are very rural focused but the country is getting rapidly urbanized with increasing proportion of the poor living in urban areas Programs have significant administrative leakages Too many programs run by too many Government departments and thus a large administrative overhead which can be reduced and used to provide benefits Too many layers of decision making in selection of beneficiaries Old Age Income support in Bangladesh- a rapid evolution Allowance Per Beneficiary (Tk.) 250 200 150 100 50 0 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2004- 2005- 200698 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Number of Beneficiary 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2004- 2005- 200698 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Grameen Bank’s Pension Saving Scheme Growing rapidly Way to the future Rationalize programs by using the one player that gets involved in all programs i.e. union parishads. Expand the better safety net programs such as old age pensions, Public works and widow/ disability payments using UPs to select beneficiaries and distribute benefits Build on Bangladesh’s massive micro-finance network to provide social protection for those just above the poorest – e.g. Grameen Bank already provides pensions and insurance (life and health to over 6.5 million members. Illustration of new urban poverty and vulnerability challenge Bangladesh 2005 - Percent enrolled by quintile and region 90.0 85.0 80.0 75.0 70.0 rural 65.0 urban metropolitan 60.0 55.0 50.0 45.0 40.0 Low est 40% Middle 20% Highest 40% rural 57.1 67.0 77.4 urban 60.6 71.9 85.5 metropolitan 42.9 57.8 80.5 Addressing the Urban Poverty Challenge In an ironic reversal of history, enrollment rates in metro areas for the poorest quintiles are worse than rural areas – this represents both past successes in rural areas and new challenges in urban areas. New approaches to urban safety nets and safety ladders are needed Move to ex-ante risk management from ex-poste risk coping Bangladesh current programs are characterized by ex-poste risk coping programs with the possible exception of Grameen’s pension scheme New programs need to address ex-ante risk management. They could include expanded pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, catastrophic risk insurance i.e. floods.
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