Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor

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Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor *
Sachiko Kitazume
Abstract
This paper attempts to illustrate cognitive models of humor and metaphor
based on the cognitively-based models of humor presented in Kitazume
(1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2006) . Although humor and metaphor are classified
into different categories, the cognitive models visualize that there is a strong
resemblance between the two linguistic forms in that both forms consist of
two contrasting domains in domains 1 and 2, connected by elements in domain 3. The similarity is seen also in that there are many implications involved. The analogies make it possible to create metaphorical humor, a
mixture of both humor and metaphor.
Keywords: humor; metaphor; cognitive models; domains; implications.
1. Introduction
A considerable number of studies have been made on humor and
metaphor since the time of Greek philosophers. Although these two linguistic forms have been studied respectively for over two millennia,
only a few attempts have been made at a comparative study. This paper
attempts to illustrate cognitive models of humor and metaphor in order
to compare the two models visually and to show the similarities and differences between them.
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Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
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In Kitazume (2006) 1, cognitively-based models of humor were presented based on the pragmatic models illustrated in Kitazume (1998,
1999a, 1999b) 2. This paper attempts to compare cognitive models of humor and metaphor by additionally illustrating cognitive models of metaphor.
Section 2 reviews the three groups of theories of laughter along
with the elements of humor proposed by various scholars. Section 3 explains the cognitive models of humor presented in Kitazume (2006).
Section 4 reviews contemporary theories of metaphor and section 5 attempts to illustrate cognitive models of metaphor. In section 6, metaphorical humor, which is characterized as a mixture of both humor and
metaphor is presented as an evidence of the similarities between the
two linguistic forms.
This paper argues that both humor and metaphor are creative linguistic forms consisting of two contrasting domains and the domain
which connects them. It will be also argued that understanding humor
and metaphor is an imaginative work which requires. both pragmatic
and cognitive efforts to interpret the contrasting meanings.
2. Theories of Humor
First of all, we have to inquire into humor. Since the time of Aristotle, humor research has witnessed numerous discussions about the
cause of laughter. A great number of philosophers, psychologists and
linguists have tried to explain what causes laughter and have expressed
a variety of views on the subject. These can be summarized into three
theories of humor: the incongruity theory, the superiority theory and
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the relief theory.
The incongruity theory claims that laughter comes from a sudden
surprise. It argues that humor is created out of a conflict between what
is expected and what actually emerges. This view, which was first
hinted at by Aristotle 3, was proposed in detail by Kane who claimed
that laughter arises from a sudden juxtaposition of incongruous situations. These theories are supported by many scholars such as Koestler
(1964) 5, Raskin (1985) 6 and Ziv (1984) 7 who presents an example of
incongruous humor, as seen in (1) :
(1) A young man looking for a wife went to a computerized marriage
agency. Filling out the form, he wrote, "I'd like someone who likes lots
of company, water sports, and formal dress, and is preferably rather
short." The agency sent him a penguin. 8
The hearer of the joke is led to form a certain expectation: the young
man is looking for a girl who possesses the qualifications. The interpretation is possible when the inference is made based on the stereotypical
scenarios of a marriage agency. This expectation is then turned upside
down by the punch line and an unimaginable scenario emerges. The incongruity arises from what is not explicitly mentioned in the form, yet
what the hearer takes for granted: she must be a human being.
The superiority theory presents humor as an expression of deformities and/or misfortunes. Plato explained the essence of laughter as an
attack on personal weakness, and indirectly, on the person. 9 Aristotle
presented a theory that laughter comes from the pleasure of humiliating and belittling someone else.lO Hobbes (1650) 11 characterized laugh-3-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
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ter as a "sudden glory" at a triumph of our own or at an indignity by
someone else. Canter and Zillman (1973)
12
conclude from the results of
an experiment that aggression aimed at those who possess authority is
more amusing than aggression aimed at someone of similar or lower
status.
The doctor is a familiar victim of this type:
(2) A doctor fills out a death certificate and signs his name under the
heading "Cause of death" .13
The doctor, who is expected to sign his name under the heading of
"Certifier's signature", mistakenly signs it under the heading "Cause of
death". This means that the doctor is, contrary to his intention, certifying that he was the cause of death. The joke, by making fun of the doctor for his stupidity, achieves superiority over someone who possesses
authority. The contrast between what is expected of a doctor and a foolish scenario also creates laughter.
The relief theory explains that laughter comes when people are liberated from social taboos, such as sex, death, religion and so on. Freud
(1905)
14
emphasizes that one of the important functions of humor is to
approach the subject of sex in a socially acceptable fashion. An example
of humor of this type is seen in (3) :
(3) "Is the doctor at home?" the patient asked in his bronchial whisper.
"No," the doctor's young and pretty wife whispered in reply. "Come
right in." 15
The short conversation between the patient and the doctor's wife, "Is
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the doctor at home?" "No," "Come right in," involves the mixture of two
utterances of contrary purposes: seeing a doctor by the former and seeing a lover by the latter. The script of seeing a doctor is interpreted
based on a prototypical scenario inferred from the words, "doctor", "patient" and "bronchial whisper". The script of "seeing a lover", on the
other hand, represents sexual delinquency, which is regarded as a taboo.
Having studied the three groups of theories of laughter, let us review the elements of humor argued by a number of scholars. Freud
(1905)
16
proposes not less than 20 different techniques of jokes, all of
which consist of two distinctive meanings. Koestler (1964)
17,
who
ar~
gues that the creative process is a process of bisociation, further contends that humor is based on "bisociation". Ziv (1984)
proposes a
18
technique of switching from one level to another. Raskin (1979,
1985) 19, in the explanation of his script-based semantic theory, describes joke (3) as involving an overlap of two scripts, DOCTOR and
LOVER. He claims that the two overlapping scripts are perceived as opposite in a certain sense, and it is this oppositeness which creates the
joke.
In addition to the oppositeness of two meanings, a number of scholars have presented "implication" as one of the peculiar characteristics
of humor. Freud (1905) emphasized
from Shakespeare's Hamlet:
"brevity of wit" citing a phrase
"Brevity is the body and the soul of wit"
and the account of Lipps (1989): "A joke says what it has to say, not always in few words, but in too few words - that is, in words that are insufficient by strict logic or by common modes of thought and speech. It
may even actually say what it has to say by not saying it".
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Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
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Raskin (1985) notes the importance of implication in humor by saying that "if implicature is construed as using a sentence not in its literal
meaning, many jokes can be explained in terms of implicature" .21 In example (3), we must interpret the implication of amorous design from
the punch line "Come right in", to understand and appreciate the
humor.
3. A cognitive model of humor
N ow we shall review the cognitive models of humor which are presented in Kitazume (2006)
22.
The revised models, which are cognitively-
based models, in the strict sense of the word, can clearly show the
main characteristics of humor argued in the previous sections.
In the following figures, we will use the term conceptual domain (abbreviated as domain) as a cover term for a world which represents structured background knowledge. Minsky (1975, 1980) 23 used the term
frame for a data structure used to represent stereotyped situations. Coul-
son (1997, 2001) 24 argued the importance of frame-based inference in
language interpretation using the notion of frame. The conceptual domain proposed in Kitazume (2006) represents not only stereotyped
situations, but also quixotic scenarios that can be interpreted by employing an imaginative ability like the local logic proposed by Ziv (1984) 25.
In jokes interpretation, the frame-based inference based on the data
structure of stereotyped situations is insufficient to interpret contrasting scenarios. The conceptual domain also includes a quixotic world that
is inconceivable, improbable, inexperienced and socially unacceptable
which cannot be interpreted in the frame of a stereotypical situation.
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The figure shows that humor consists of three conceptual domains:
the two contrasting meanings are characterized as a meaning in conceptual domain 1 (abbreviated as domain 1) , shown on the left, and that
of conceptual domain 2 (abbreviated as domain 2) on the right. Domain
1 represents a stereotypical script, while domain 2 depicts a quixotic
script. Domain 3 is a common domain that connects domains 1 and 2 in
that it has elements commonly found in the two domains. A phrase in
capital letters under a domain name indicates the title of each domain.
In order to illustrate another characteristic of humor, the technique of implication, an implication is shown in a dotted square, while
what is explicitly said (henceforth called "explication") is outlined by
a solid line. A straight line indicates that the two meanings outlined by
a square are connected.
Let us start with a case of humor whose effect can be best explained by the incongruity theory. A cognitive model of example (1)
is illustrated in Figure 1.
The context that "a young man is looking for a wife" leads us to assume that he expects "a girl with the required qualifications", as shown
in the second square from the bottom in domain 1. The assumption is
made based on our presupposition that he naturally wants a human being as a wife. The context "looking for" and "wife" (in the second
square from the top) gives us a picture that the man has an expectation
(in the top square), thus building a conceptual domain of EXPECTING
A WIFE.
What actually was sent is a pengum (in the second square from
the top in domain 2) that meets all the qualifications that the man required. The only difference is that the received item is "an animal with
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Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
Domain2
RECEIVING A PENGUIN
r----------------~
contrasting
: bewilderment :
Figure 1
Domain 1
EXPECfING A WIFE
----------------,
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: expectatIon
1-- - - - -
looking for
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I a wife
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Domain 3
COMMON ELEMENTS
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who likes lots of company,
water sports, and formal dress,
and preferably rather short
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,
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qualifications" (in the third square from the top). The incongruity occurs due to the presupposition that is left unsaid: she should be a human being. The empty slot in domain 3 leads to a big twist that leads to
the two contrasting scenarios. Here, pragmatic factors such as context
and presupposition work to interpret the hidden matter-of-course requirement that is ignored by the computerized marriage agency. The
offbeat scenario gives us the pleasure of imagining the bewilderment
(in the top square) of the man receiving a penguin, creating a conceptual domain of RECEIVING A PENGUIN.
The figure clarifies that understanding the humor reqmres both
pragmatic efforts to interpret the hidden meanings (shown in a dotted
square) and cognitive efforts to construct the structure that contains
two contrasting domains and the domain that connects them (domain
3). The figure also illustrates the psychological cause of laughter that
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arises in making fun of the man who was sent a penguin by implicitly
describing his bewilderment (in the top square). It should· be noted
that recognizing the incongruity between the young man's expectation
and his bewilderment creates and enhances the laughter.
The figure successfully shows the mechanism, elements and
causes of humor and that in understanding and appreciating this humor
we need cognitive, pragmatic and psychological points of view.
Next we will attempt to illustrate a cognitive model of example (2)
in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Domain 1
DOcrOR AS AN AUTHORITY
~----------------------~----1
: A doctor has an authonty. :
contrasting
1 ___________________________ •
..
[~i~~~~~~t~!~~~~!~~~~~l
..
A doctor signs his name under
the heading of i------.-------,
,"Certifier"
1
I
A doctor signs his name under the
heading of "cause 0 f death"
1
_ _ _ _ _ ... _ _ _ _ _ .... _ _ _ _ . I .
~----------~------~~
Domain 2
DocrOR AS A FOOL
Domain 3
s his name under the
"
A hearer of the joke expects a scenano
In
which a doctor signs his
name under the heading of "Certifier", as seen in the middle square in
domain 1, until the last phrase, "Cause of death". This interpretation is
based on the pre-existing knowledge about the job of a doctor and the
underlying perception of a doctor as an authority, as seen in the top
square in domain 1 under the title, "DOCTOR AS AN AUTHORITY".
The punch line, however, evokes an unimaginable scenario: the doctor
signs his name under the heading of "Cause of death", as seen in the
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middle square in domain 2. The hearer can figure out that the doctor,
who intended to sign his name under the heading of "Certifier", mistakenly certifies that he is the cause of death. The speaker, by expressing
the doctor's foolishness with implication, successfully achieves a inconceivable conceptual domain in which the doctor is described as a fool,
as shown in the top square in domain 2, under the title, "DOCTOR AS
A FOOL".
In order to understand the humor, the hearer has to make a pragmatic interpretation by making the inference that the doctor intends to
sign his name under the heading of "Certifier", as shown in a dotted
square. The hearer also needs to get· to the implicit message that the
doctor is a fool, as is illustrated in a dotted square. In addition to the
pragmatic perspectives, understanding humor requires cognitive perspectives. The hearer needs to recognize the contrast between the two
conceptual domains DOCTOR AS AN AUTHORITY and DOCTOR AS A
FOOL. The incongruity contributes to raise laughter as well as enhancing the laughter created by making fun of the doctor's foolishness.
The cognitive model shows that the meanings in the two domains
contrast with each other, although domain 3 involves elements commonly found in the two contrasting domains. A small difference in the
last phrase functions as a big twist that leads to the two distinguished
scenarios: the common scenario of a doctor in domain 1 and an unimaginable scenario in domain 2. The recognition of the incongruity between the two contrasting domains that bear common elements, gives
us a cognitive pleasure of solving a puzzle. The figure shows that a lot
of meanings are left unsaid, as are shown in dotted squares, and understanding humor requires pragmatic efforts to interpret implicated mean-10-
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mgs. The illustration successfully shows that interpreting humor
requires both pragmatic and cognitive efforts to interpret an implication
and construct a cognitive structure as shown in Figure 2.
The illustration can also describe the main cause of laughter that
arises from making fun of the doctor, as is expressed in "The doctor
is a fool", in the top square in domain 2. The psychological pleasure is
skillfully enhanced by the mechanism and elements of humor that can
be explained from cognitive and pragmatic points of view.
Next we will illustrate a cognitive model of (3), by which Raskin
(1985) proposes his script-based semantic theory in Figure 3.
Figure 3
Domain 2
Domain 1
SEEING A LOVER
SEEING A DOCTOR
contrasting
i--------------------i
: seeing a doctor
,r-'== ==
1,
,
r- -- - - -- - - ---- -- - - I
: seeing a lover
:
:
,-----~::::::::[::::::::~--------,,
====I===========~_,,
11,
I
_____________
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
,
1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
II
I
I,
lover'
,,
.....----------, :
I
I
L..-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- J
I
doctor's young pretty wife
,
,,
j--------------------not to be heard
:
I
I
::
,
,,,
I
,
,,
j--------------------: doctor's absence
,
--------------------_.
_______________________________ 2
~-------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ I
I
t
I
The patient's inquiry "Is the doctor at home?" (in domain 3) and "bronchial whisper" (in domain 3) lead us to expect that the patient is expecting the "doctor's presence" (in the middle square in domain 1). The
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words, "patient", "bronchial whisper" and "the doctor's presence" (in
the middle square), lead us to construct a common scenario of "seeing
a doctor", as shown in the top square in domain 1, SEEING A DOCTOR. The doctor's wife is regarded as a receptionist in this domain and
all of these lead to a perfect scenario of seeing a doctor until the last
comment of the doctor's wife.
The answering comment by the doctor's wife "No" (in domain 3)
indicates the doctor's absence (in the middle square in domain 2),
which will make the patient's visit useless. The wife's invitation "Come
right in" during the doctor's absence twists the common seeing-a-doctor scenario into a totally different scenario "seeing a lover", (in the
top square in domain 2), a socially unacceptable sexual relationship.
"The patient" (in the middle square in domain 1) is turned into "a
lover" (in the middle square in domain 2). In the same manner, "the
wife working as a receptionist" is now perceived as "a young pretty
woman", The patient's inquiry about "the doctor's presence" has a
new interpretation, a confirmation expecting "the doctor's absence"
and "bronchial whisper" is reinterpreted as "a whisper for secrecy,
not to be heard". Pragmatic inference coupled with cognitive perspectives can construct a structure consisting of two contrasting scenarios:
SEEING A DOCTOR and SEEING A LOVER from the conversation between the patient and the doctor's wife.
The cognitive models we have attempted to illustrate show that humor, regardless of the cause of laughter and its techniques, basically
consists of two contrasting scenarios in domains 1 and 2, connected by
common elements but twisted in domain 3. Understanding humor, therefore, requires cognitive efforts to construct a cognitive structure where
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there are two contrasting domains that have common elements.
The cognitive models also clarify that what is really meant is left unsaid, as are shown in dotted squares. Humor is a way to implicitly express what we really mean in a socially acceptable fashion. For
example, we can enjoy an extraordinary scenario which goes beyond
the boundary of logic, as the incongruity theory claims. Humor enables
us to express our superiority in a socially accepted way, as the superiority theory suggests. Humor also serves to liberate us from social taboos, for it allows us to express social taboos implicitly, as the relief
theory argues. The cognitively-based models can illustrate the main
cause of laughter by presenting an implicit message that is interpreted
from pragmatic and cognitive perspectives.
In summation, it has been shown that the cognitive models reviewed here can clearly show the mechanisms, elements and causes of
laughter which are essential in understanding humor.
4. Previous analyses of metaphors (Ortony (1979))
26
Having illustrated the cognitive models of humor, we may now go
on to consider metaphor. We will begin by reviewing traditional theories of metaphor.
Aristotle was interested in the relationship of metaphors to language and the role of metaphors in communication. He believed metaphors to be implicit comparisons, based on the principles of analogy. As
to their use, he believed that it was primarily ornamental. In modern
times, this view was translated into the comparison theory of metaphor.
The comparison view takes metaphor to be a statement of some similar-13-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
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ity or analogy and so takes every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic
simile.
Another traditional theory of metaphor is the substitution theory.
Searle (1969/1979)?:l says that if you hear somebody say, "Sally is a
block of ice", you are likely to assume that the speaker does not mean
what he says literally but that he is metaphorically saying that Sally is
unemotional. Searle calls what a speaker means by uttering words, sentences and expressions "speaker's utterance meaning" and what they
literally mean "literal sentence meaning". He argues that one arrives at
a metaphorical interpretation of a sentence by starting with the literal
meaning. When a literal interpretation is rejected, a metaphorical interpretation must be sought. Morgan (1979) 28 objects that such an account is too vague because it fails to distinguish between metaphors,
mistakes, irony and a host of other indirect speech acts.
Black (1979)
29
criticizes the comparison theory and the substitu-
tion theory by saying, "The reader will notice that both of these views
treat metaphor as unemphatic, in my terminology - in principle, expendable if one disregards the incidental pleasures of stating figuratively
what might just as well have been said literally."
A great influence on theoretical study of metaphor is that of Richards (1936) 30. He proposed a set of useful terms for talking about metaphor: "tenor", "vehicle" and "ground". "Tenor" indicates "what is really being said or thought of", while "vehicle" means "what it is compared to". The resemblance or analogy between the two ideas is called
"ground". Richards argues that vehicle and tenor working in co-operation give a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either. This view was further developed into the semantic interaction
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theory.
The semantic interaction theory, which was first argued by Richards (1936), was discussed in detail by Black (1962/1979) 31. Black argues that something new is created when a metaphor is understood and
that metaphors afford different ways of viewing the world. The semantic
interaction view claims that a metaphorical statement has two distinct
subjects, to be identified as the "primary" subject and the "secondary"
one and metaphor involves a verbal opposition or interaction between
two semantic contents, that of the expression used metaphorically and
that of the surrounding literal context. Black explains his theory using
the following example:
(4) Marriage is a zero-sum game.
He argues that in (4) "marriage" is the primary subject and "a zerosum game" is the secondary subject. The presence of the primary subject "marriage" incites the hearer to select some of the properties of a
zero-sum game; such as "a contest", "between two opponents", "in
which one player can win only at the expense of the other". The primary subject then invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex
(a system of relationships) that can fit marriage; "A marriage is a sustained struggle", "between two contestants" ,"in which the rewards of
one contestant are gained only at the other's expense". The two subjects, in this way, interact and create a new meaning that gives different
ways of viewing marriage and a game. The idea that metaphors create
different ways of perceiving the world is argued by Schon (1979) and
Reddy (1979) 32.
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Reddy's great contribution to the study of metaphor is the presentation of the conduit metaphor. This metaphor is based on the idea that language is a carrier of ideas, thoughts, aspirations and so on, so that all
a hearer needs to do is to unpack the message and take out what was in
it. Reddy further argues that the locus of metaphor is thought, not lan-
guage and that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world. 33
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 34, developing Reddy's conduit metaphor,
present a detailed account of metaphor, saying that metaphor plays a
central role in the way in which we think and talk about the world.
Many of our most mundane concepts, such as those of time, states,
change, causation, and purpose, are represented metaphorically, that is,
in terms of other concepts. They present various metaphorical concepts
like TIME IS MONEY:
Lakoff (1979) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) explain a system of
conventional conceptual metaphors presenting examples (5) and (6)
35:
(5) Love is a journey.
(6) Our relationship has hit a dead-end street.
In (6), "love" is being conceptualized as "a journey", with the implication that the relationship is stalled, that the lovers cannot keep going
the way they've been going, that they must turn back, or abandon the
relationship altogether. Lakoff argues that the metaphor involves understanding one domain of experience, love, in terms of a very different domain of experience, a journey. More technically, the metaphor can be
understood as a mapping from a source domain (in this case,· a journey)
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to a target domain (in this case, love). He further says that there are ontological correspondences, according to which entities in the domain of
love (e.g., the lovers, their common goals, their difficulties, the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to entities in the domain of a
journey (the travelers, their common destinations, impediments to
travel, the vehicle, etc.).
Fauconnier
(1997)
36
and Turner (1994,
1996,
1998) and
Fauconnier
argue that analogical and metaphorical mappings playa key
role in the synchronic construction of meaning and its diachronic evolutions, citing the recent emergence of the notion "computer virus". It is
manifested linguistically in expressions like the following:
(7) Viruses are programs developed by renegade computer operators
who covertly implant them in other programs.
(8) Infections can spread from computer to computer as fast as the
Hong Kong flu.
(9) Files are contaminated by infectious bytes.
(10) Compuserve can never be completely immune to hidden killers.
(11) Data physicians develop vaccines, disinfectants, ...
(12) The only way users can be assured that their programs are healthy
is through safe interface.
We can all see that vocabulary from the domain of health, biology, and
medicine is being used to talk and reason about the domain of computers and programming. Biological viruses are mapped onto undesirable
and harmful computer programs that replicate themselves, erase files,
and so on. Vaccines in the domain of medicine are then projected onto
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Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
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the computer programs that counter these VIruses. Physicians are
mapped onto computer technicians, attempting to block the action of
the harmful programs.
5. A cognitive model of metaphor
So far we have seen the main theories of metaphor. What we find
common in all the theories above is that metaphor involves a verbal opposition or interaction between two semantic contents, that of the expression used metaphorically (in a source domain) and that of the
surrounding literal context (in a target domain) and that there are resemblances or analogies which relate the two.
Now, we will attempt to illustrate cognitive models of metaphor by
adapting the same rules that we used to illustrate cognitive models of
humor. The models consist of target domain, shown on the left, and
source domain, on the right. Domain 3 is a domain where analogies
that connect the two domains are presented. In order to illustrate another characteristic of metaphor, explication is outlined by a solid line,
implication by a dotted line. A straight line indicates that the two meanings outlined by a square are connected.
Let us start with the metaphor presented by the semantic interaction theory, as seen in Figure 4, that illustrates a cognitive model of (4).
The figure illustrates "marriage" in the target domain under the title
MARRIGE on the left and "a zero-sum game" in the source domain under the title ZERO-SUM GAME on the right. Black (1979) argues that
the presence of the primary subject "marriage" incites the hearer to select some of the properties of a zero-sum game; such as "a contest" ,
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Figure 4
Target domain
MARRIAGE
marriage
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Source domain
ZERO-SUM GAME
.
I a zero-sum game
contrasting
...
~--------------]-----------------~
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~----------------------------
: (a legal union)
,: with a sustained struggle
:
: : a contest
:
:
L___________________________ _
: (Both can gain or share
:
: rewards.) One contestant :
, can gain rewards at the
'
: _________
other's expense.
_________________ J:
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j---------------------------j
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,: woman
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1
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L ___________________________ _
l between a man and a
I
_____________ L___________________ _
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between two opponents
::
(Two people of the same: :
sex are possible.)
: :
r----------------------;----i
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: One contestant can Will at: :
:I the other's expense.
:I :I
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Domain 3
NALOGIC
LEMENT
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contest
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!..---------~
r---- -------------- -----,
: between two people
~------------------------~
:L_________________________
at the other's expense
:t
"between two opponents", "in which one player can win only at the expense of the other".
The New Oxford American Dictionary defines "marriage" as "the
formal union of a man and a woman, typically recognized by law, by
which they become husband and wife" and "zero-sum game" as "a
situation in which a gain by one individual or party must be matched by
a loss for another individual or party". Considering the contrasting definitions of a marriage and a zero-sum game, it does not seem natural
that the hearer jumps to the properties of a contrasting domain without
any intermediate process.
The figure illustrates that the analogies m domain 3 connect both
elements in the two contrasting domains. For instance, "contest" in do-19-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~tJR
mam 3 connects the contrasting elements: "a legal union with a sustained struggle" in domain 1 and "a contest" in domain 2. The
analogical element "between two people" connects the distinguished
elements "between a man and a woman" in domain 1 and "between
two opponents" in domain 2. The analogy "at the other's expense" in
domain 3 connects descriptions on rewards in the two contrasting domains. It should be noted, however, that only partial meanings of both
domains are focused, while there are many hidden elements that are
not commonly found in the two domains.
It should be also noted that in contrast to the models of humor
shown above, in figures 1, 2 and 3, the cognitive model of metaphor in
figure 4 has no twist in domain 3. What are found in domain 3 are
analogical elements, which lead to connect the two contrasting domains. The analogical elements construct the metaphor consisting of
the target domain and the source domain both of which represent a
world that can be interpreted based on the data structure of stereotyped
situations.
Having illustrated the cognitive model of (4), it is important to
point out that all the properties, which Black calls "implication-complex", are left unsaid, as shown in dotted squares. Understanding the
metaphor requires an imaginative effort on the side of a hearer to get to
implied
elements which are
prerequisite in understanding the
metaphor.
Next, we will attempt to represent a cognitive model of the conceptual metaphor of Reddy's (1979) conduit metaphor, Lakoff (1979),
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and Lakoff and Turner (1989). A cognitive
model of (5) is illustrated in Figure 5.
-20-
x~
Figure 5
. ~{ij\j • xft
18~
1~
Source domain
Target domain
JOURNEY
contrasting
LOVE
~
'III
-----~----~---T
r ---.- ---_.,
I
~
I
: lovers
:
I
,
:
: f-l~-;; ~~i;ti~~;hi-p --1
I
I
I
:
:
i
,,
~ __________________ _
~
________________ _
:
,
I
I
r - -- - - - -- -- -- -- -
I
_____________ ~
,
r-------------~
!
______________ ••
1
II
r----------------------~
I
: vehicle'
: common destination
Domain 3
ANALOGICAL
I
t
t
!
J'
I
I
r-----------------,
: common goal
I
,~ 'r-------------~
traveI e r s :
!:
•
,
,•
I
ajourney
____________
J_______________ _
I
I
I
2006. 7
--I
___ ~~f:_~NT$_____ .
: Difficulties in:
L_~_t>:. !~~~t~?~_s!t!~__:
---------~------~
:L ________________
companies
:
I
,----------------------
1
_ ______________________ ~
i
t
,
.------------------------1 !
:, ________________________
impediments to travel J::
I
•
--------------------------,
~
-----------------,
: ________________
relationship
J:
~
: :L________________
goal
J
I
J
I
- - - -- -- --- -- --- --,
: : difficulties
!
! ~----------- ______
I
~----------------------~
In understanding the conceptual metaphor "LOVE IS A JOURNEY", a
hearer has to find implied analogy between the two conceptual domains, the domains of LOVE and JOURNEY, on the basis of the structured background knowledge. One of the basic elements in the domain
of LOVE is "lovers", which is transferred to "travelers" in the domain
of JOURNEY through an analogical element, "companies" in domain 3.
While "lovers" and "travelers" have analogical properties in that
they both involve "companies", that is, "persons who are going the
same way", the two words represent distinguished properties of their
own in that "lovers" are "two persons in love", while "travelers" are
"persons who are traveling together" and the number of persons involved is not limited to two. It is important to point out that the hearer
does not jump from the element in the LOVE domain to the element in
-21-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~tJ1\
the contrasting domain JOURNEY, but the analogical elements in domain 3 work as an intermediate cognitive process. 37
In the same way, "love relationship" corresponds to "vehicle" by
going through the intermediate process of "relationship" in domain 3.
Lovers' "common goal" is transferred to their "common destination"
on the journey through the analogical element "goal". "Difficulties in
the relationship" is projected to "impediments to travel" through "difficulties" as an intermediate process.
The important point to be noted here is that although the metaphor
has the two contrasting domains, LOVE and JOURNEY, the meaning in
both domains can be interpreted based on the stereotypical data of each
domain. The presence of a twist in humor leads to two contrasting domains, one domain which are based on the stereotypical knowledge and
another domain representing a world that cannot be interpreted based
on the data structure of stereotyped situations.
It is important to bear in mind that the properties of both "love"
and "journey" in domains 1 and 2 as well as the analogies shown in Figure 5 are implicit and a hearer has to find the implication-complex and
the analogy in understanding the metaphor.
There is one further example that is related to the conceptual metaphor (5), LOVE IS A JOURNEY shown above. A cognitive model of (6),
a metaphorical description based on the conceptual metaphor (5) is illustrated in Figure 6.
Although the domain names "LOVE" and "JOURNEY" are the
same in both Figures 5 and 6, entities in both domains are different between (5) and (6). Another point to be noted is that while the domain
names LOVE and JOURNEY are explicit in Figure 5, they are only im-22-
x?!f: . ~1iI\r . xiI: 18:§ 1 ~ 2006.7
Figure 6
.
Target domain
contrasting
r-LQY.E-.,
: love
r - -- -- ----,
:
_'~ ~ ~~ ~C~~~~ ---,
~
our relationship
I
:
I
I
: i--------------------j:
:I : dead-end condition :
1 ____________________
I~
_______________________
I
r-~~-~~~~t~~~~~~~~-------I
:
: :_:..e_~~c~~____ l
:
I
I
I
I
J
I
I
:
Source domain
JOURNEY
~---~----------I
a Journey
,
Domain3
ANALOGICAL
ELEMENTS
,
JI
r- 1-----------------------·-·--- ,
I
:
,
I
relationship :
1 ________________,
I
:
:
I
I
I
dead-end street
,
________________________:
-:
:
.
1--------------
: : dead-end
:
: ,-----------i
f
I
J
:
::
1______ - - - - - - - - - - ,
:
I ___________________ ..I
1-
plicitly expressed in Figure 6. It comes from this result that understanding metaphors like (6) requires more effort than understanding
metaphors like (5) in that a hearer has to go through the process of interpreting the conventional metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY before finding out the corresponding entities.
Lastly, let us illustrate a cognitive model of "computer viruses"
from (7) to (12), which are exemplified in Fauconnier and Turner
(1994, 1996, 1998) and Fauconnier (1997).
Figure 7 shows that "viruses", a vocabulary from the domain of BIOLOGY, is used to talk about "undesirable, harmful programs" in the
domain of COMPUTER. The features of computer viruses of "replicating themselves" and "erasing files" are talked about in terms of vocabulary from the domain of BIOLOGY, such as "infection can spread"
and "contaminate", by inducing generic features: "a new token appears
that has the same undesirable properties as the original" and "disrupt
the function" in domain 3. A biological word "vaccines" is used to refer to "computer programs that blocks the action of the harmful pro-23-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
Figure 7
~tJR
Source domain
Target domain
contrasting
COMPUTER
BIOLOGY
i-----------~------l
: computer viruses :
r---------~====::=[=====:=::::~------r--------------------------------
I
I
I
I
: :
~
________________________________
undesirable, harmful programs J
(biological) viruses
:
,----------------------.
: replicate themselves
infection can spread
::
I
I
-----------------------
f
r-----------------I :
contaminate
: ________________
erase files
L
J: :
I----------------------------~----
t
: programs (that blocks the actIOn: :
:
: of the harmful program)
I
vaccines (immune
to hidden killers)
I
I
I
----------------------------
r--------------------
: computer technician
-----, I
I
1____________________
---I
__
J:
:
I
:
I
I
I
I
~
____________________
I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I1
.--
----- --- --I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
,
I
I
I
,
I
~--
-- ----------------------- -- ----I
: te nicians who adiust the system
:
_____________________________________ 1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I4 _________________________________ -_____________ I1
gram" by inducing an analogy "programs that counteract the effect of
harmful properties". "Physicians", a vocabulary of BIOLOGY indicates
"computer technicians" attempting to block the action of harmful programs due to the analogy "technicians who adjust the system".
It should be noted that the vocabularies from the domain of biology
are being used to refer to the entities in the computer domain instead
-24-
)C~ • ~1iIiJ
• )Cit 18§ 1 ~ 2006.7
of inventing new words for the new entities. The figure clearly shows
that the analogical elements, though they are implicit, play an important
role in naming and description.
The cognitive models we have attempted to illustrate show that
metaphor consists of two contrasting domains (target domain and
source domain) and the analogical elements in domain 3. The absence
of a twist in Domain 3 lead to construct the two domains representing
the stereotypical situations.
They also clarify that what is really meant is left unsaid, as are
shown in dotted squares. In understanding metaphor, a hearer starts
with target domain recalling entities which are in many examples left
unsaid, and searches for corresponding entities, which are in many
cases implicitly expressed, in source domain, by inducing implicitly expressed generic features from both domains. Metaphor skillfully conveys what it has to say by not saying it explicitly.
To sum up, understanding metaphor is an imaginative work that requires cognitive efforts to conceive contrasting domains and pragmatic
efforts to get to implications.
6.
cognitive model of metaphorical humor
Having illustrated the cognitive models of humor and metaphor, we
will compare characteristics of humor and metaphor that are made explicit in the cognitive models.
The cognitive models we have attempted to illustrate show that
there is a strong resemblance between humor and metaphor, in that
both humor and metaphor consist of two contrasting domains (do-25-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~tJ1\
mains 1 and 2) and the domain (domain 3) that connects the two domains. The difference lies in domain 3. In humor it involves a twist that
leads to two distinguished scenarios: a common, stereotypical scenario
in domain 1 and a quixotic or socially unacceptable script in domain 2.
In metaphor the domain 3 has analogy that is commonly found in the
two contrasting domains. It can be safely said that understanding humor and metaphor requires cognitive efforts to conceive the three
domains.
Another characteristic common to humor and metaphor is that
there are many implications involved. A hearer has to interpret implied
meanings to understand and appreciate them. Understanding the two
linguistic forms is an imaginative work that requires pragmatic efforts
by a hearer to get to implications. It seems reasonable to suppose that
both linguistic forms are skillful methods by which a speaker says what
he/she has to say by not saying it explicitly.
In short, both humor and metaphor are creative linguistic forms
consisting of three domains and the clever use of implications. The
analogies between the two forms make it possible to create metaphorical humor, a mixture of humor and metaphor, with characteristics of
both forms.
Example (13) is a case of metaphorical humor whose laughter can
be explained by the superiority theory:
(13) ISDN Mouth "You'll have to excuse our field technician, he has
an ISDN mouth, but his brain only runs at 28.8."
A cognitive model of (13) is shown in Figure 8.
-26-
38
;t~
.
~f,liJ
18~
. ;tit
Figure 8 Target domain (Domain 1)
SLOW-WITTED TECHNICIAN
r-----------------------------·
: a slow-thinking technician :
'- -::::::::::1:::::::::::::~---·
,,
r----------------~
I
facile tongue
.
2006. 7
Source domain (Domain 2)
SLOW COMPUTER
----------------------------i
contrasting : a slow-running computer
...
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
mouth
L
I ________________
1 -f}
'-------------l--------------
:
I
ISDN
/
~
I
I
I
,,
,~------------------I
fast interface
I, __________________ .1
I
I
I
his brain
I
I
I
: functions slowly :
.. --- -- -- -- ---- -- ----,
-------------
,r-----------------,
I
r-------------------
I ·
I
I
,
I
I
I
___________ J
Domain 3
NALOGICA
ELEMENT
I
I
mouth
ISDN
----------------1 r-------------,,
: fast-running : interface
,---------------- !..-------------~
I
I
I
his brain
~!1Jy_~! ~~.~.
,------------.., ,!~_~~
I
.
I
a controller :1 _______________
s ow-runmng 2
!...-------------~
I
I
I
I
I
I
a modem
runs onfy at-28~8.-I
/
/
I
The figure shows that the metaphorical humor is made of three domains: two contrasting domains of SLOW-WIITED TECHINICIAN and
SLOW COMPUTER and the domain that connects the two contrasting
domains (domain 3). "ISDN mouth" in domain 3 is a metaphorical
phrase made by the blending of two words, "ISDN" in the COMPUTER domain and "mouth" in the TECHINICIAN domain.
His
"mouth" corresponds to "ISDN" through the analogous elements of
"fast-running" and "interface" in domain 3. The description "his brain
only runs at 28.8" is produced by blending two expressions, "his brain"
in the TECHINICIAN domain and "only runs at 28.8" in the COMPUTER domain. "His brain" in domain 1 corresponds to "a modem"
in domain 2 because of the analogy of "a controller". The expression
-27-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~tJl\
"runs only at 28.8" in domain 2 is transferred to "functions slowly"
III
domain 1 through the analogy of "slow-running" in domain 3.
From the phrase "ISDN mouth", a hearer will get to the implication
"a facile tongue", while from the clause "his brain runs only at 28.8",
the hearer will understand the implicit meaning that the technician's
brain functions slowly. A hearer will get to the implication that while
the technician has a facile tongue, he is slow in thinking. Although it is
socially unacceptable to ridicule the technician as a slow-witted person
with a facile tongue, as seen in SLOW-WIlTED TECHNICAIAN domain, the unexpected analogy expressed in the metaphorical expressions make it socially acceptable. The example creates humor because
the speaker can ridicule the technician with the metaphorical expressions. The laughter also is created and enhanced by the incongruity of
the contrasting images between a slow-witted technician and a slow
computer.
Next we will examine an example of metaphorical humor which
can be most appropriately' explained by the relief theory. (14)
IS
an ex-
ample of a computer joke which implicitly expresses sex.
(14) WARNING!!!
III There is a new virus: Viagra ! It turns your 3.5" floppy into a hard
drive !l!
39
Although sex is not directly mentioned, example (14), with a word "Viagra", prepares a reader for a sexual joke and the expectation helps to
find a sexual meaning in the phrase "turns your 3.5" floppy into a hard
drive". Figure 9 shows a cognitive model of (14).
-28-
)(~
Figure 9
• ;':1iJlf . )(11::
18~
Domain 1 (Target domain)
COMPUTER VIRUS
contrasting
a virus
I
~--------------_J_-------------l
:
a virus
4111
..
:
Viagra
I
I
I
I
I
I
f-
turns your 3.5" floppy
into a hard drive
I
I
I
-------------~
-
I
~----------------- -------------~
I
~----------------
-
;;~~;d -~~~;;~Utti~~ ~f-t~;~i-~g-l
: a soft thing into a hard one
l
I
I
I
Domain 2 (Source domain)
VIAGRA
I
I
I
2006. 7
I
I
I
I
1~
---------------------------------------------
--I
:i _______________________________________________
very small organism which causes some effe t _:
I
I
It turns your 3.5" floppy into a hard drive!!!
r-~~~-;~it-thi~gi~t~-~h~d ~~~ --1
,_________________________________ J
______________________________________________________ -
______ 4
Figure 9 illustrates that the joke consists of two contrasting domains,
the domains of COMPUTER VIRUS and VIAGRA. The expression
"There is a new virus" in domain 3 is inherited from the COMPUTER
VIRUS domain, while "Viagra!" in domain 3 is transferred from the VIAGRA domain. The induced meaning "a very small organism which
causes some effect". functions as an intermediate process to connect
the two contrasting domains. The description "It turns your 3.5" floppy
into a hard drive!!!" contains two contrasting interpretations: a literal interpretation in the COMPUTER VIRUS domain and a sexual implication
in the VIAGRA domain. In the metaphorical humor above, the analogies
open the way for a sexual domain that is unacceptable in a normal conversation.
It is important to point out that there are many implications in the
model and the joke requires an effort to find out the implied sexual
-29-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~tJl\
meamngs. As Ziv (1984) explained, indirect sexual humor, the kind
that only hints at sex, contributes to fantasy much more effectively than
direct stimuli, at least for some people. 40
Lastly we will study an example of metaphorical humor whose
laughter can be explained by mixture of the three theories, the incongruity theory, the superiority theory and the relief theory. Examples
(15) and (16) are cases of metaphorical humor written in Haiku form,
a short Japanese poem in 17 syllables:
(15) What if errors were written in the form of haikur 1
First snow, then silence.
This thousand dollar screen dies
so beautifully.
(16) Windows NT crashed.
I am the Blue Screen of Death.
No one hears your screams.
The laughter arises from the incongruity between the topic and the artistic style of haiku in which it is presented. (15) metaphorically expresses a crash in a computer as "snow", "silence" and "death" and in
(16) a computer crash is described as "the Blue Screen of Death". The
incongruity between a computer crash and what it is compared to
causes the laughter. The laughter is enhanced by other causes. The superiority theory dictates that we feel superior to a superb machine by
pointing out its weakness. It is also important to remember that talking
about death releases the tension we find in our life, as the relief theory
explains.
-30-
X$ . ;:;:Wi . x1t
18~
1 i}
2006.7
A cognitive model of (15) is illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10 Domain 1 (Tariet domain)
Domain 2 (Source domain)
_CQMPJlTER CMS}.I
: computer crash
contrasting
:
~..
,r---------~:::::::::J::::::::::~---,,
..
-------------
I
:
: flicker
:
t
~
____________
This thousand dollar screen
r-------------------------~
:L ______________
stops working. __________ :
~
,..Q.EATH __
,,death:'
!.. _________ 1
::
This thousand dollar screen
dies so beautifully.
::
•
,
~ __ '_ _-___-___-___-___-___-_....l.o_,..-__-_-_ _-_ -_--'
_ ___:
,j - ,,
------------ ---
-----
--- ---------------
,
'
,'
··,
·,
,
1
,,
,
I
,
I
:I
,,,
-----,
,
This thousand dollar screen dies so beautifully.
:
t
r-------------'f
I
1
:
:!.. _____________
motionless !:
:
·
I
I
I
,
,
~--------------------------------------------- ______ I
As is shown in Figure 10, "snow" and "silence" in domain 2 are
mapped to
"flicker" and "freeze" because of the analogies such as
"while line" and "no sound", as are illustrated in domain 3. The description "This thousand dollar screen dies so beautifully," is projected
to the description "This thousand dollar screen stops working" because of the analogous feature "motionless" in domain 3. The analogies open the way to DEATH domain, which are regarded to be a taboo
subject.
Next we will illustrate a cognitive model of (16) in Figure II.
The metaphorical phrase "The Blue Screen of Death" in domain 3 connects "blue screen" in the domain of COMPUTER CRASH and "Death"
in the domain of DEATH. The description "No one hears your screams"
-31-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
Figure 11 Domain 1 (Target domain)
COMPUTER CRASH
:
:
i
f
,
Domain 2 (Source domain)
DEATH
contrasting
~
r--------- --------j
,
.
~tJT\
..
death
f
Blue screen
I
I
:
Domain 3
r-ir~~~-;---: {
ANALOGICAL
~ Death
~----------,! ~....--,,
-=E~L~E~ME~NT~~S____
/-:K/ r - - - - - - - - ,
No one hears
f-N~-;~~~d-i~-j~
The B~l!~~~~~~I!~J~eath
your screams.
heard.
:'
:!.. _____________
motionless ~:
I''-_ _ _ _ _ _- - J
/
I
i," __
i
V
I
t
I
I
-':::::::::::::::~-: I\'r-----'-----ry
No one h~~~'y"~~!_~!~s.
: no sound :
, ___________ ... _1
in domain 2 is an expression connected to "no sound is heard" in domain 1 through the analogy of "no sound" in domain 3. Although a
computer crash and death have quite different images, there are analogies such as "motionless" and "no sound".
The figures above show that in the examples of metaphorical humor, the analogy is implied and it requires an effort on the part of a
hearer to figure out the implicit meanings to understand the metaphorical humor.
We have illustrated examples of metaphorical humor covering typical examples of the three theories of humor and the mixture of the
three theories. We have shown that the similarities between humor and
metaphor have contributed to the creation of a large number of instances of metaphorical humor.
-32-
X$ . ;;1iI\j .
xit
18~
1 % 2006. 7
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to illustrate cognitive models of humor
and metaphor on the basis of the pragmatic models presented in Kitazume (1998, 1999a, 1999b) and the cognitive models illustrated in Kitazume (2006). We have illustrated that the cognitively-based models
presented here can clearly show the main characteristics of humor and
metaphor which require both cognitive and pragmatic efforts to understand.
First we have studied humor, reviewing the three groups of theories of humor as well as various types of techniques and the mechanism
of humor. In an attempt to visualize the mechanism and elements that
are commonly found in the theories above, we have illustrated cognitive
models of humor.
Next, we have inquired into metaphor by introducing contemporary
theories of metaphor, as well as traditional theories. We have illustrated
cognitive models of metaphor to visually demonstrate the mechanisms
and elements of metaphor.
The cognitive models show that there is a strong resemblance between humor and metaphor, in that both humor and metaphor consist
of two contrasting domains (domains 1 and 2) and the domain that connects the two (domain 3). The difference lies in domain 3. In humor,
a stereotypical script in domain 1 is connected but twisted in domain 3,
leading to a quixotic or socially unaccepted script in domain 2. In metaphor, domain 3 involves analogies that open the way to two apparently
distinguished domains.
-33-
Cognitive Models of Humor and Metaphor
~t.JJ\
Another characteristic common to humor and metaphor is that
there are many implications involved both in humor and metaphor, as
are illustrated in dotted squares and understanding them requires pragmatic efforts to interpret implied meanings.
To sum up, it has been argued that although humor and metaphor
are classified into different categories, both humor and metaphor are
creative linguistic forms consisting of two contrasting domains and the
clever use of implications. Understanding humor and metaphor, therefore, is an imaginative work that requires cognitive approaches to build
up three domains as well as pragmatic efforts to interpret implied meanmgs.
Notes
*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
This is a revised version of a paper I presented at the 7th International Pragmatics Conference of the International Pragmatics Association on July 13, 2000. I am
grateful to Deirdre Wilson for her valuable comments and Salvatore Attardo for
his kind comment and encouragement. lowe greatly to Michiko Takeuchi and Tomoko Matsui for their friendly advice and helpful comments. I am also indebted
to Robert Kowalczyk and Miyagi Sadamitsu for their valuable comments and suggestions. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Michael T. Wescoat for his
valuable comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I want to thank the participants of
the conference for their comments. The author's e-mail address is <[email protected] >.
See Kitazume (2006) pp.125-50 which illustrates cognitive models of humor.
The cognitively-based models have been developed based on the basic models presented in Kitazume (1999, 1999a, 1999b) in which various jokes including a large
number of Tyson jokes are analyzed according to causes of laughter.
See Aristotle, Rhetoric III, 11 for details.
See Kant, Kritik of judgement, trans. 1. H. Bernard (London:Macmillan, 1892),
p.223 for details.
See Koestler (1964) pp.1-3.
See Raskin (1985) pp.99-127.
See Ziv (1984) pp.70-80.
-34-
)c~ .
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
;;:1iIIf . )cft
18~
1 {j-
2006.7
See Ziv (1984) p.88.
See Plato, Philebus, 48-50 and Republic, V, 452.
See Aristotle, Poetics 5 and Rhetoric, II, 12 for details.
See Thomas Hobbes (1650), Human nature, English works, ed. W. Molesworth
(London: Bohn, 1840), voL 4, ch.9.
See Canter and Zillman (1973) pp. 321-9 for details.
See Ziv (1984) p.1l.
See Freud (1905), lokes and their relation to the unconscious for details.
See Raskin (1985) p.100.
See Freud (1905) pp.16-89.
See Koestler (1964) pp.32-8.
See Ziv (1984) pp.91-2.
See Raskin (1979), Raskin (1985) pp.99-127 and Linguistic theories of humor by
Attardo, pp.195-229.
See Freud (1905) p.13.
See Raskin (1979) p.327.
See Kitazume (2006) pp.134-158.
See Minsky (1980) AI Memo No. 603
See Coulson (1997) pp.31-81 and Coulson (2001) pp.33-70.
See Ziv (1984) p.76 and p.90.
See Ortony (1979) pp.1-37 for details.
See Searle (1979) pp. 83-9 for details.
See Morgan (1979) pp.124-34 for details.
See Black (1979) p.27 for details.
See Richards (1936) pp. 95-6 for details.
See Black (1979) pp.27-30 for details.
See Schon (1979) pp.137-63 and Reddy (1979) pp.164-201 for details.
See Reddy (1979) pp.166-71 for details and Ortony (1979) pp.5-7 for the summary.
34
35
36
37
See Lakoff and Johnson (1980) pp.7-9 for details.
See Lakoff (1979) pp.206-8 and Lakoff and Turner (1989) for details.
See Fauconnier (1997) pp.18-25.
See Fauconnier (1997) p.19. Fauconnier explains this process as "schema induction".
38 and 39 They are quoted from New York Com Search, http://www.jokes.com//.
40 See Ziv (1984) p.22 for details.
41 This is quoted from New York Com Search, http://www.jokes.com//.
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